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THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN VICIEN^T INCIDENTS


by

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THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN VIOLENT INCIDENTS

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1. LETTER TO PROFESSOR SCANLON FROM P. ENGSTAD

2. STATE-OF-THE-ART REVIEW

While current control programmes do take the role of the media into account, this seems to be a largely untapped area for further research and study, ie. the possible role of the mass media in prevention and control programmes. (Szabo, Denis, Crelinsten, Ronald D., Laberge-Altmejd, Danielle, Hostage Taking: Problems of Prevention and Control, Montreal: International Centre for Comparative Criminology, 1976, pp. 280-81).

In the opening phase...the terrorists make a lot of noise. They want the whole world to know. They are in a state of ego inflation... at the same time, he is anxious, paranoid and uncertain. This is all very dangerous.

They want publicity. I say give them publicity here to avoid casualties. (Psyching Out Terrorists", 1977, p.17)

...relegating terrorist deeds to relative mass media silence, at least in democratic nations, can be a most effective preventive measure. (Alexander, 1977, p. 57)

The first quotation is from Dirk Mulder, a Dutch psychiatrist, who was involved as an adviser and negotiator in major terrorist incidents in the Netherlands. The second is from Yonah Alexander, who has produced the most scholarly writings on terrorism and the media.

The quotes illustrate the dilemma that permeates the literature on terrorism and the media. There is a conflict between the perception that the media are useful, even essential, and the view that they are the tool of the terrorists and a hindrance to the authorities.

There is no question the media play a significant role in terrorism. Even before incidents occur they are used to publicize threats, counter-actions and results. (Symposium on Cases Involving Hostages, 1975, p.52; Alexander and Levine, 1977, p.241). The Federal Aviation Administration in Washington, for example, publicized conditions for hijackers in Cuba in an attempt to dissuade those who saw the island as some sort of paradisaal haven.

Once an incident begins, some authorities argue that giving terrorists the publicity they demand will stabilize an otherwise tense situation. (Alexander, 1978, p. 48)

...where publicity is his primary goal such direct communication with the media may prove helpful to law enforcement. (Civiletti, 1979, p.22)

Good publicity may be a stabilizing factor since, while it doesn't cost anything or commit

the authorities to anything, it gives the offender a measure of satisfaction and panders to his desire for recognition. (Harland, 1977, p.6)

Some authorities even go so far as to suggest that the authorities should bring up the idea of a contact between the perpetrators and the media. (Goldaber, 1974, p.12)

Thus we find the Washington, D.C., police in the Hanafi incident allowing press calls to the hostage takers to continue. The police reasoned that this allowed the hostage takers to ventilate their grievances. It is argued that a hostage taker who is talking is not doing anything to his hostages.

Others strongly disagree with this viewpoint. They say publicity builds terrorists beyond their real strength (Bradshaw, 1978, p.39), sometimes turning the terrorists into heroes rather than criminals. (Friedlander, 1976, p.241; The New Yorker, 1977, p.61).

An episode that typifies the media's role in this development occurred in 1970-71. Headlines and photographs, which appeared throughout the world, created the impression that Leila Khaled was glamorous and adventuresome. In sober reality, this gun-toting Arab moll had attempted to hijack an Israeli airliner. She was responsible not only for a criminal act that had endangered many lives, but also for the failure of her mission -- her companion had been killed and she, herself, had been captured. (Parry, 1976, p. 520)

They say the publicity encourages others to commit similar acts, sometimes even imitating the methodology. (Shales and Ringle, 1977, p. B4; Hubbard, 1971, p. 216; Wilkinson, 1978, p.3; Miron and Goldstein, 1978, p. 86); Kobetz, 1975, p.34)

It's not entirely coincidental that when we report a hijacking another one occurs. (Quoted in Swietnicki, 1973, p.28)

The authorities say published accounts of how the authorities handle such incidents are used by new terrorists to plan counter tactics ("Psyching Out Terrorists", 1977, p.16; Northorp, 1978, p. 5), even used by different terrorist groups to communicate to each other. (Alexander, 1977, p.57)

Terrorists watch themselves on television.
They read stories about themselves in newspapers.
They hear commentators analyze their effects on
the authorities and their chances of getting
away with their exploits. (Schreiber, 1978, p.113)

There is evidence that skyjackers and terrorists are becoming aware of the tactics that are used by the authorities. On one occasion, a terrorist group and an individual both avoided direct communication with the authorities. This reduced the ability of the authorities to put on pressure.

In fact, Mulder has been criticized by other psychiatrists for revealing the tactics he used during negotiations with terrorists. ("Psyching Out Terrorists", 1977, p.15). Dutch press reports show that South Moluccan terrorists had studied newspaper accounts of such psychological tactics, before taking nearly 170 hostages in a train and school in the Netherlands.

A number of those who have examined the relation between terrorism and publicity argue that without publicity terrorism would be far less potent a weapon. (Friedlander, 1976, p.241; Hassel, 1975, p.56; Quoted in Alexander, 1979, p.15). Others say publicity does not spawn terrorism. (Johnpoll, 1977, p.165; Quoted in "TV Newsmen Split on Air Time for Terrorists", 1977, p.20).

One of the phenomena of hostage situations is that there is a build up of identity between the hostage takers and the hostages. They begin to see the authorities as their common enemy, who will not allow the incident to end. This phenomenon is known as the Stockholm Syndrome. It is now widely understood and it is clear that some hostage takers encourage it to build support among their captives, others discourage it so they will not have difficulty executing hostages. ("Angry Freed Hostages surprise the psychiatrists", 1977, p.21; Strentz, undated, p.13).

The Stockholm Syndrome, incidentally, presents an enormous problem for the authorities when hostages are released. If the hostages are given immediate access to the media, they are likely to be extremely critical of the authorities and very sympathetic to their hostage takers. One group of airline staff, for example, attempted to raise money to support the political goals of their hostage takers. This sympathy fades over time and the immediate sentiments may well be embarrassing to the same persons some time after the incident (though this has not been widely examined).

The view of whether publicity is desirable is complicated by the nature of specific incidents. In a kidnapping, where money is demanded, the police usually ask for and get a news blackout. The perpetrators threaten to kill their victim if there is publicity. Some incidents never get to the ears of the police, let alone the media. (Harland, 1977, p.6; Parry, 1977, p.114). Yet when the kidnapers make political demands, such as was the case with the Front de la Libération du Québec, the authorities may ask the press to cooperate and publish their goals. The contrast was noted by Sir Robert Mark, then Commissioner of Scotland Yard. (Mark, 1976, p.17).

It seems, therefore, that if publicity suits the terrorists and the authorities are prepared to go along with it, the media are asked to cooperate. If the perpetrators don't want publicity and the authorities don't think it would be helpful, then the media are asked not to provide coverage. The authorities assist the terrorists to manipulate the media. (Arlen, 1977, p.12; Cooper, 1976, p.277; Rabe, 1977, p.4).

In West Germany in early 1975...the state's television network "was hijacked, in effect to serve the kidnapers' master plan...one TV editor: "For seventy-two hours, we just lost control of the medium. We shifted shows to meet their timetable. Our cameras had to be in position ...It was the gangsters who wrote the script and programmed the mass media." (Parry, 1976, pp. 520-21).

Neither the students of media nor the media personnel doubt that terrorists commit their acts to get publicity and that they have mastered the art of manipulating the media. (Hickey, 1977, p. 114; Alexander, 1977, p.241; Documentation of Schleyer case, 1977, p.9; Crelinsten, 1976, p.131; Bell, 1978, p.110).

These terrorist acts are media events... The media should consider the extent to which they want to cooperate with terror. (Quoted in Winfrey, 1977).

The latest outrage in the news here demonstrated that terrorists have figured out how to use the newspapers, radio and television for their own purposes and that we still haven't puzzled out how to handle them. (Quoted in Winfrey, 1977).

Some authorities disagree that terrorists succeed in getting the media to publicize their goals and causes. They argue that the media in a way actually manipulate the terrorist by covering only the act and not the aim. (Kelly and Mitchell, 1979, p.34).

While the dilemma of the media and official relationships to the media has been well-documented in relation to terrorism, it exists as well in other, non-terrorist incidents. Here, however, it is less well-documented and there is an absence of relevant information.

It is clear, however, that journalists have been involved in hostage and similar incidents especially in Canada, sometimes as intermediaries (Parry, 1977, p.114); Denton, 1974, p.13), sometimes to gather intelligence. The distinction between reporter and participant sometimes becomes blurred. (Shales and Ringle, 1977, p. B1; Denton, 1974, p.15).

At Dorchester, the hostage taker asked that he be given access to a television reporter... The prison staff...did invite a radio reporter to talk to the hostage taker. On arrival, however, the reporter discovered he was not just a reporter, he was also a negotiator. He was forced to decide whether his news reports should be altered or conditioned by his dual status. (Scanlon, Unpublished, p.5).

When violent people are playing to the camera there's no question that the medium itself can become a kind of hostage, and the reporter has to dodge and struggle to keep from being captured and used. (Quoted in Gladis, 1979, p.6).

Police forces across the country have continued to call upon reporters when they see their involvement as appropriate. The problem with this is that the authorities consider the usefulness of the media as related to their efforts to solve the immediate problem. They will, for example, ask for publicity even though publicity might increase the chances of future incidents. They will ask for a blackout to save particular hostages even though the portrayal of the terrorists or hostage takers as cold, calculating killers might eliminate the kind of images that build.

Although police forces sometimes do ask reporters to get involved, they are generally prepared to use their own trained negotiators as the contact between hostage takers and the authorities. Since there are more and more negotiators being trained all the time this is becoming easier and easier.

The media have been asked to provide credibility to official promises (Needham, 1977, p.12). Agreements have been tape recorded and broadcast over radio stations or, in one case, read over television. On occasion police have given reporters' press cards to hostage takers to assure them the press is present and is monitoring police activities. The media have been there when incidents have ended, because the perpetrators have asked that some outsider be present to guarantee they won't be harmed. Sometimes that person present is a police officer who disguises himself as a cameraman or photographer.

At times this presence has had dramatic and unexpected consequences. In one incident in the United States, the perpetrator, instead of surrendering as he was expected to do, kept his gun at the head of his hostage and delivered a lengthy and vitriolic diatribe -- all of which was seen on live television.

The 'cocksuckers' had undermined his attempts to package a land deal. The 'motherfuckers' held a shotgun in his ear for years. "I'm a god-damned national hero," he proclaimed.

It was one of the most incredible spectacles ever played out on live television. At any moment it seemed H's the hostage's head could be splattered. (Trounstine, 1977, p.14).

Not all such coverage is, of course, voluntary. As mentioned earlier, the media -- even such papers as the New York Times -- have published material when they felt it would aid the authorities. (Parry, 1975, p.520).

There is some suggestion, incidentally, that the extensive coverage diminishes as the number of incidents rises. The media begin to see a certain sameness, a diminishing of the drama. (Kobetz, 1975, p.34). But there is concern lest the terrorists devise new and more dramatic tactics to capture the media attention again. (Kupperman, 1977, p.18; Kelly and Mitchell, 1979, p.22).

The media have also been asked to and have cooperated in various kinds of news blackouts and delays of publication. (Harland, 1977, p.7; Elliott, 1978, p.43; Scanlon, 1978, p.1; Clutterbuck, 1977, p.106). Sometimes these blackouts have extended for some considerable time.

There is evidence, however, that media blackouts do not stop the spread of information. (Linstead, 1971, p.9; Scanlon, Taylor, 1975, p.10). The media have, on occasion, censored their own news, without police request or guidance. (Scanlon, 1978, Canadian seminar paper, p.8).

While the authorities welcome such assistance they cite instances where the media have interfered with official operations and endangered a situation. (Fenyvesi, 1977, p.18; Civiletti, 1979, p.22; Rabe, 1977, p.2; Needham, 1977, p.28; Clutterbuck, 1978, p.123). The media have called hostage takers, sometimes delaying the start of negotiations (Scanlon, 1978, p.7), sometimes even giving away police tactics.

In another recent incident in Quebec, at a provincial hall in St. Jerome, the principal interviewer for a national daily evening radio program -- a popular program with a large national audience -- was able to contact a hostage taker with seven hostages by telephone and the conversation went something like this: "Hello, there, how are you getting on. You know the police are going to try to wait you out. What are you planning to do? (Bourne, 1979, p.13).

There are two ultimate horror stories in the field of media interference with the scene of an incident. One involves a radio reporter who phoned a hostage taker and inquired why he was asking for so little ransom. The other involves a television station which gave live coverage of a shoot-out situation involving the police and two armed men. Two policemen had already been shot. The live coverage was monitored by the culprits who had with them a TV set, and they used the TV reports to counter police action. (Scanlon, June, 1978, p.2).

Sometimes the media calls have come in just as the incident was about to end, breaking up an understanding between the perpetrator and the authorities. (Alexander, 1979, p.84; Gladis, 1979, p.1).

For example, the hostages at the Bankers Trust on Sixth Avenue in Greenwich Village... were about to be released when someone from the media called in. The perpetrator said to the hostages, 'You guys can go out. I want to talk to this guy from the press.' The hostages were afraid they'd be shot on the way out so they all stayed. He talked on the phone to this guy for three hours and broke the thought pattern. (Friedman, 1977, p.19).

In another incident, a radio caller put a hostage taker in touch with a relative who promptly encouraged the hostage taker to carry on, with sentiments such as, "Sock it to them. You're really showing them. Keep it up."

Sometimes there have been near misses (Documentation of the Schleyer case, 1977, p.153), and in at least one case media reports have been blamed for the death of a hostage. (Alexander, 1978, p.48). Some authorities say that police are trained to negotiate, and reporters risk lives if they attempt to do so. (Rabe, 1978, p.25). At least one person, however, argues that police are more

likely to incite violence than a reporter seen as mediator.

His tape demonstrated it was his [the reporter's] conversation with the holdup man that had a calming effect; whereas the police sergeant created a tense situation when he told the man to surrender. (Walker, 1977, p.12).

The media have been accused of over-reporting some incidents, thus blowing them out of proportion. (Schreiber, 1978, p.35; Miron and Goldstein, 1978, p.86).

There are days...We've overplayed Patty. I think the Sacramento angle of the Patty story was overplayed [attempting to link her to a bank robbery and slaying in Carmichael, Calif.]...that really wan't where the story was. We had to send someone up there for sompetitive reasons. (Olderman, 1975, p.17).

Often hand in hand with over-reporting is the risk of intruding on the perpetrator's right to a fair trial. (Olderman, 1975, p. 18) This is the only legal aspect of reporting terrorist incidents which is mentioned in the literature, and such references are rare. Rabe says the media should limit their coverage of terrorist events to protect this right to a fair trial.

Such factors as adverse pre-trial publicity and contamination of a crime scene by live coverage on the part of the press can become grounds for a mistrial or even the case being dismissed. (Rabe, 1977, p. 15)

Media response to these criticisms is that failure to cover such incidents would raise questions about media credibility: what else is the media not reporting? It would also leave the authorities not watched.

If we cover up this story, the public has every right to believe we will cover up other stories, and then the whole belief, the reliance on the press has gone. (Schultz, p. 1)

If the media doesn't play an adversary role, the police might take justice further than they should. When we're covering a hostage story,

police violence is not our first concern at the height of it but it is one of the other elements. When the police say, 'We don't want you guys around', my first thought is, 'What are you going to be doing in there?' (Quoted in "TV Newsmen Split on Air Time for Terrorists", 1977, p. 20)

Media and police need not be antagonistic, however; sometimes they can cooperate to end a hostage taking situation.

Such was the case in Cleveland...Moore [the hostage taker]..would only discuss his situation with a local black television reporter. Under the guidance of the police, the reporter talked Moore out of the situation, and no one, including the hostage taker, was injured. (Gladis, 1979, p.6).

Media reports may also reduce the spread of rumours, and warn people that something is happening in a particular area. (Rabe, 1978, p.21).

The media play another role too. Their radio newscasts and their telecasts are often seen by hostage takers and hostages alike. There is ample evidence that hostage takers listen to and watch the media. In fact they often ask for a radio or access to a radio or TV as one of their early demands. (Scanlon, 1976, p.4). Police presence as shown over television was reassuring to hostages in one incident. Radio broadcasts were listened to carefully in another.

Just as negotiator tactics affect the emotional state of the hostage taker, so too do media reports. On one occasion, television broadcasts affected the emotional state of the hostage taker and the hostages, sometimes upsetting them.

While the effects of broadcasts on the hostages have been little studied, it has been suggested that these may be extensive. (Scanlon, 1978, p.9; Shales and Ringle, 1977, p.B6; Quoted in Alexander, 1979, p.97). In the Entebbe incident, hostages crowded in front of the cameras; once they were seen on TV, no one could deny their existence.

Negotiators sometimes try to distract the hostage taker's attention during a media broadcast.

Police forces have also tried to cut off the access of hostage takers to the media by cutting electric power. (Gladis, 1979, p.7). Often this has been unsuccessful since the power is also needed for other purposes. For example, lighting is essential for the marksmen who are usually part of the official response unit.

Given all this, it might be expected that the literature on the role of the media would be extensive and related. This is not the case.

The literature on terrorism and hostage incidents and the literature dealing with mass media are generally separate. There is little evidence that researchers have linked the two.

In addition, large areas of research have been left uncovered. Although reporters have often been involved as intermediaries, there is no extensive literature describing this role. (Scanlon, 1977, p. 15). Data banks on skyjackers and hostage takers cover the media only in passing. Interrogations by various police agencies focus on evidence rather than on effects; it is rare for information to be gathered about such things as media effects.

Even detailed case studies of famous hostage incidents such as the Williamsburg siege (Cawley, 1974) ignore the role of the media.

In view of this it is not surprising perhaps that most of the existing guidelines are vague, motherhood type of documents (Salant, 1977, p. 21) and that in many cases there are no guidelines at all. The Royal Commission's report does suggest how the media can improve their coverage of collective violence, without interfering with law enforcement efforts or inciting further violence. (Jackson, 1976, p.171). These guidelines, however, are directed to the coverage of riots, demonstrations, racial conflicts, and other such incidents, rather than to terrorist acts.

CFTO-TV in Toronto is one of the few stations with published guidelines.

...CFTO News will not contact hostage takers by telephone and will endeavour not to provide a platform for terrorists. Personnel will not volunteer to act as intermediaries or as hostages and if they are in some way drawn into an event, they will cease reporting functions and follow police instructions. ("Newsmen want pictures on cards", 1978, p.7).

The one policy that is suggested is that when the authorities want cooperation they take the media into their confidence. It is a technique recommended by Sir Robert Mark and one that has been successful in Canada. (Scanlon, 1978, p.).

In the sort of case I am discussing the only really effective way to achieve temporary avoidance or disclosure or secrecy without risking very harmful consequences is by appealing to the press for it -- this involves frank explanation of the reasons for the request, and the aiming of the decision by those responsible for the press themselves -- rather than by those seeking it. (Mark, 1976, p.18).

3. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

N.B. We were not able to locate complete references for each listed article or book. Missing information is noted with a dash (----).

Alexander, Yonah, "Communications Aspects of International Terrorism", International Problems, Vol. 16, Spring 1977, pp. 55-60.

Alexander divides this article in two parts. The first deals with the mass media and terrorism. The second deals with the interconnections of various terrorist groups. With regard to the media, his main point is that terrorists regard extensive coverage of their actions as major rewards. He cites, as an example, the Patricia Hearst-SLA episode during which the Symbionese Liberation Army terrorists demanded the media carry their messages in full.

Alexander adds that another major consequence of extensive media coverage of terrorism is the exportation of terrorist techniques which trigger terrorist acts by other individuals and groups. He cites, as an example, the concern, voiced by people such as U.S. Vice President Rockefeller in 1975, that extensive publicity afforded two assassination attempts on President Ford by the media would lead to more attempts.

Alexander says two problems must be considered in this media-terrorism connection. They are the use of the media as tools by publicity-hungry terrorists and, secondly, the vital importance of a free press. He says that "notwithstanding the sensitivity of the second problem", some form of censorship has been suggested as a preventative measure against terrorism.

In the second part of the article, entitled "Transnational Terrorist Collaboration", Alexander stated that "modern technology" has intensified the interconnection of various terrorist groups across national boundaries. As an example, the author cites a March 1973 incident where Black September terrorists, holding hostages, demanded the release of members of the terrorist group, the Baader-Meinhoff Gang being held in West Germany by the authorities. Although he does not state it explicitly, Alexander implies this "modern technology" is that of the mass media, which sends stories of terrorist activity and goals all over the world and, accordingly, to other terrorists.

Alexander, Yonah, "Terrorism and the Media in the Middle East", in Alexander, Yonah and Finger, Seymour Maxwell, editors, Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York, The John Hay Press, 1977, pp. 166-199.

Alexander starts his article with general discussion of media and terrorism, his major point being that terrorists use the media to gain publicity. In the Middle East, the Arab nations have used their media to display support for Palestinian terrorism. As a result, Alexander says, international recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization has increased, especially in the United Nations. Alexander deals here with the general impact of the media on the Middle East conflict -- not their effect on specific terrorist incidents.

Alexander, Yonah, ed., Terrorism: An International Journal, New York, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., Vol. 2, Nos. 1 & 2, 1979.

Alexander reports the proceedings of a conference on police and press problems during terrorist events. The speakers were news directors, FBI personnel, police, professors, and other authorities in the field. They discussed police-media conflict and cooperation, with references to terrorist incidents.

The authors say that police and media will continue to resist making specific rules concerning how a terrorist incident should be covered. They conclude that police should be made aware of the negative consequences of not telling the press as much as possible; for example, reporters who are left in the dark may dig out information which causes an incident to worsen. The media, too, should be warned of the harmful consequences of improper reporting.

Guidelines for coverage of terrorism by some newspapers and news agencies are listed at the back of the book.

Alexander, Yonah, "Terrorism, the Media and the Police ", Police Studies, June 1978, pp. 45-52.

In an excellent overview, Alexander argues that, to terrorists, extensive media coverage is a reward which publicizes, advances and legitimizes their cause while striking fear in the hearts of potential victims.

The article -- stating that research in the area is limited -- proposes various considerations for research in the hope that police and media can better manage terrorist activities.

Terrorism is violence for effect and is directed, not only at its instant victims, but also at a wider audience. Terrorism is theatre and terrorists make a concerted effort to manipulate the media.

The media are based on competition and profit so it is inevitable that they become an integral part of any terrorist act, for terrorism sells. By providing extensive coverage, the media give the impression that they sympathize with the terrorist cause and create a climate congenial to further violence. The media hinder law enforcement agencies. Occasionally, the media have been helpful to the authorities in managing incidents without abandoning their responsibilities to the public's right to know.

Alexander also concludes that the media should objectively, accurately and credibly report about terrorist acts lest the public panic and lose trust in both the press and government. Any attempts to impose media blackouts are likely to force terrorists to escalate the levels of violence in order to attract more attention.

The media should help criminal justice processes in dealing with terrorism and, conversely, the justice officials should turn to the media for professional assistance in handling incidents. Media and police must work together to form policies on this matter.

Alexander, Yonah, and Levine, Herbert M., "Prepare for the Next Entebbe", Chitty's Law Journal, Vol. 25 No. 7, 1977, pp. 240-242.

The authors say that the dilemma of terrorism is that although most governments and people recognize the dangers of terrorism, they are unwilling or unable to take the steps necessary to control it. New technology, they say, creates new dangers; more weapons are available for causing destruction. Furthermore, economic development has been inhibited since industries can develop only in an environment of peace. In concluding, the authors affirm that we can continue to expect more terrorist acts.

Alpern, David, with Carter, Betsy and Schwartz, Tony, "How They Covered Sam", Newsweek, - - - - -

The "Son of Sam" saga brought out the best and worst in New York journalism. The arrest of David Berkowitz dominated the evening newscast of all three networks. One criticism of the coverage was that the widely published speculation that Son of Sam might strike on the anniversary of his first attack, sparked an attack only two days later. However, many psychiatrists doubt Berkowitz was affected by the media; they say he would have committed the crimes in any case. Some reporters were defensive about criticism of the reporting. One said that it was impossible to report the murder of kids in a restrained manner.

Another criticism raised was that when Berkowitz was put on the cover of Newsweek it implied respectability and recognition. Newsweek replied that the story was worth a cover page because it was a national story of compelling interest. The press has a right to satisfy the public's interest in any crime, an interest that includes what happened, what that means to the people involved, and what the police are doing about it.

Arlen, Michael J., "Reflections on Terrorism and the Media", More, June 1977, pp. 12-14.

Arlen argues in a philosophical vein that media coverage of terrorism is not a new phenomenon, but is the result of a desire to satisfy people's "psychic habit of violence" and has been with us for centuries. He cites, as an example, the torture of Damians in front of massive crowds in Paris after he failed in an attempt to assassinate Louis XV in 1757.

The star syndrome has taken over modern society, with entertainment that society's prime objective. Arlen extends this general point to the media. To quote, "For television news editors and executives have pushed the news so far in the direction of entertainment and performance that they now find that they have surrendered a large measure of their authority to their performers -- even terrorists." Trapped by their entertainment orientation, the media have forced themselves to cover terrorist activities, regardless of the consequences. (Arlen does not list or detail consequences.)

The media cover the terrorist activities of rebels to satisfy their audience. But the media fail to cover "those acts of rage and brutality by those who wish to stay in power." The brutality of the Shah's regime, for example, was seldom covered before it toppled. Arlen maintains the public "alternates between fascination with these terrorist dramas and moralistic criticism of those who put them on the screen."

Bell, J. Bowyer, A Time of Terror, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1978, pp. 111-117.

Bell says that not only do terrorists commit their criminal acts to obtain publicity, but they have learned from the experience how to get the most coverage for the most time. Bell blames the media for becoming part of the incident rather than just reporting it. The Western media will never ignore a terrorist event because it has always stressed sensationalism and novelty and terrorism offers "news" that is specifically designed for the media's needs.

Ben-Porat, Yeshayahu, Haber, Eitan, and Schiff, Zeev (translated by Louis Williams), Entebbe Rescue, New York: Delacorte Press, 1977.

The book describes the hijacking of an Air France airplane and the Israeli raid on Entebbe to free the Jewish passengers who had been kept hostage. Though utmost secrecy was maintained, the CIA got some inkling of what was happening --, "IT'S DIFFICULT TO ASSUME THAT ISRAEL WILL OPERATE IN UGANDA" (p. 372) and a military correspondent received a partial tip from a government spokesperson: "It's worthwhile to stay awake tonight." (p. 322). News of the raid was broken by a French news agency in Kampala while the planes involved were still on radio silence en route home. (p. 329, 330). Later some details of the pre-raid intelligence-gathering were revealed by an article in the German magazine, Der Spiegel. (p.255).

Although news of the raid was not given to the news media, some information was: there is a special editors' committee in Israel at which editors are kept informed of secret defence matters. (p.176). The book says television affected the behavior of the hostages - "once you are seen on a TV screen no one can deny your existence." (p.120) - and the relatives of the hostages who shoved their way past a fence, encouraged by "foreign" newsmen. (pp. 193-194).

Beveridge, George, "Critics and Crises in Crisis Coverage ", The Washington Star, March 18, 1977,

Beveridge raises some questions about the broadcast media's coverage of the Hanafi Muslim hostage incident in Washington D.C. He states that coverage was perhaps too extended -- most shots during the 39 hour siege were those of TV cameras focused on inactive buildings. Beveridge questions the practise of often transmitting police moves to the terrorists via media coverage. Beveridge also touches upon the potential damage inherent in having the media, both local and international, call in and risk enraging the hostage taker while interviewing him.

Generally, Beveridge says, the coverage was responsible but he adds: "For all the superb things -- and all the good fortune -- that did emerge from those 39 hours, there is ample occasion for thanks. In the full flush of all the post-crisis back-patting, though, the slips and the flops are much the more important to remember for the future."

Black, Gregory K., Police-Media Interaction: A Major Impact on a Hostage Situation, unpublished honours research project, School of Journalism, Carleton University, Ottawa, May 1979.

Black's project provides a good overview of the literature concerning police-media relations in hostage incidents, and the role of the media in such incidents. It includes a detailed case study of media-police relations at Oak Lake, Manitoba in 1978, and an overview of literature on police-media relations in general. It concludes with suggestions for guidelines to be applied in practical situations.

The Oak Lake incident is one of the few where the role of the media is clearly documented and Black contends it illustrates five main factors. First, the media, aided by experience, equipment and specialized talents, will search and continue to search for more information in such incidents.

Second, the story the media report will be shaped by their individual demands, such as deadlines. Third, if the media do not get information from the police they will get it from other sources, be they formal systems or informal, conversational chains. Fourth, the media accept that they serve the public and will co-operate with the police under some circumstances. Fifth, media reports become part of a bigger communication network that is national, perhaps international.

The 71-page report is quite detailed and provides both an original case study and literature reviews. Black urges police and media to realize their impact on a hostage situation, and work together to develop guidelines for their relations in hostage situations.

Bosarge, Betty B., Developing Guidelines for Police-Media Relations in Hostage-Taking Incidents, unpublished paper for The International Association of Chiefs of Police meeting, May 1975.

This paper was written to help police develop police-media relations in a hostage-taking incident. It provides questions police agencies should ask themselves as they develop guidelines -- but not answers or even suggestions.

It covers in its first part six areas of importance: safety of media representatives, type of information to be released, procedure for the release of information, media access, facilities for media representatives, and special considerations (such as the use of helicopters by reporters, photographers and cameramen).

The second part of the paper provides questions to guide police in their post-incident evaluation of police-media relations.

Bourne, Robert, Terrorism Management in a Federal State, working paper No. 2, Arnprior Conference on Disaster Research, Emergency Planning Canada, January 1979, Federal Study Center, Arnprior, Ontario, pp. 1-16.

Before 1970 most government contingency planning was directed towards nuclear war. After the Laporte/Cross affair and a large oil spill on the Atlantic coast in the early 70s, it was decided to improve the government's capability to respond to a variety of crisis situations. The "lead Minister" concept was introduced -- in an emergency the responsibility for coordinating government response is automatically assumed by a particular cabinet minister, depending on what the emergency is. In a terrorist incident within Canada, the Solicitor General is the lead minister.

The general policy framework for the Government of Canada is one of refusal to yield to the demands of the hostage-takers, but allowing minor concessions in the immediate place and time of the incident.

The release of information to the media is the responsibility of the lead department, though the field commander must be the deciding authority on what should be released. This is one of the most difficult of crisis management responsibilities, as the media tend to behave irresponsibly. There are a number of examples. In 1978 a man took 11 hostages in a bank in Toronto and demanded to fly to Uganda. A radio reporter was able to get through to the hostage-taker, and interviewed him on the national radio network.

In another recent incident in a jail in St. Jerome, Quebec, an interviewer contacted seven hostage-takers by telephone and asked them what they were planning to do in light of the fact that the police were going to try and wait them out.

In Manitoba, a hostage-taker was surrounded in a doctor's house in a small town. A national television network decided to circumvent the road-blocks by flying over the house in a helicopter. A hostage, after being released, reported that the hostage-taker went berserk when he heard the helicopter, suspecting it to be a police attack.

Bradshaw, Jon, "The Dream of Terror", Esquire, July 18, 1978, pp. 24-50.

Terrorism in Germany is being fed by the refusal of society to treat terrorists as common criminals. The government has introduced special anti-terrorist laws, the press covers terrorism far out of proportion to its actual effect, terrorists become romanticised, and the romance breeds more terrorism.

Bremen, Phil, "Television's Dilemma: Stay on the Air -- or Bail Out?"
The Quill, March 1977.

Anthony Kiritsis held Richard Hall hostage in an apartment for 62 hours. When Kiritsis emerged, he had a gun to Hall's head and went to an impromptu press room where he began a 26-minute harangue of which only 32 seconds did not contain an obscenity.


Of the three stations covering the incident, two, CBS affiliated WISH-TV and NBC outlet WRTV covered it in its entirety. ABC affiliate WTHR cut off shortly after it began. They felt that not to do so would invite others to control the news in the same way. The two stations which continued to carry the harangue justified it by pointing to its value as a news story. The public's general response, as demonstrated by letters to the stations, was that the incident should have been cut off.

Burman, Tony, "Some Would Call It Adultery ", Content, March 1978, Vol. 29, pp. 14-15.

Burman criticizes a document outlining operating guidelines agreed upon by the Canadian Association of Broadcasters and the Association of Chiefs of Police of Canada. He suggests they restrict press independence. The guidelines concern police-media relations in general, not terrorism and hostage-takings in particular. Burman is particularly concerned with clause five of the document which states, "The police must have the right to make the decision on the release of news for publication." The CAB is a body of owners of private radio and television stations, and Burman feels working journalists should be allowed a say in the development of the guidelines under which they must work.

California State University, Department of Journalism, "Police Chiefs Blame TV for Acts of Terrorism!" Editor & Publisher, August 27, 1977, p. 12.

This article looks at some of the reactions of police chiefs in U.S. cities to coverage of terrorism by television reporters. Most of them believed that live television coverage of terrorism encouraged it, according to a nationwide survey. About half of those interviewed thought live television coverage of terrorist acts was a great threat to hostage safety. Furthermore, journalists should only communicate with terrorists with official consent.



"CBS News' Ground Rules for Terrorist Coverage Backed by Peers, Law Enforcers", Broadcasting, November 7, 1977.

A survey conducted by the California State University, at Northridge, of television news directors and police chiefs in 30 U.S. cities attempted to document their response to CBS News' guidelines for terrorist coverage. Most surveyed agreed demands of hostage takers should be paraphrased; coverage should not be live "except in the most compelling circumstances"; that news media should insure use of phone lines won't restrict the authorities; that news personnel attempt to get guidance from experts; that local authorities should be given the names of all media personnel involved; that the media personnel should follow all police instructions but notify their superiors if they feel the news is being suppressed; and finally, that coverage should be of balanced length so as to not unduly drown out other important news.

Civiletti, Benjamin R., "Terrorism: The Government's Response Policy", FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, January 1979, pp. 19-22.

Civiletti outlines the U.S. government's guidelines for responding to terrorism. He says the government recognizes the news value of crisis situations and has no right to limit or prohibit coverage of such an event. The government may, however, ask the media to cooperate in minimizing risks to the lives of those involved.

The best way for the government to do this, he says, is to assign a public information officer. Furthermore, the media should develop guidelines for reporting terrorist incidents.

Civiletti says media coverage of such events can sometimes cause problems and increase the risk to life. For example, reporters trying to talk to the hostage-taker may interfere with negotiations, or cause the hostage-taker to act contrary to the negotiators' efforts. The author recognizes that such publicity can be helpful if that is the goal of the hostage-taker.

Clutterbuck, Richard, Guerillas and Terrorists, London, Great Britain: Faber and Faber, 1977.

Chapter nine deals specifically with what price a community should be prepared to pay in terms of sacrificing civil liberties in order to defeat terrorism. This, Clutterbuck writes, depends on the climate of public opinion which stems largely from media coverage.

The media provide terrorists with publicity and information. On the other hand the media, conscious of circulation and public opinion, tend to be hostile to terrorists since most members of the public are hostile to terrorists.

Clutterbuck makes no statements on the specific effects media have on situations, stating only that if media betray or hamper the police the public will not lightly forgive them. Therefore, he adds, police and government should treat media as powerful allies.

Clutterbuck, Richard, Kidnap and Ransom: The Response, London: Faber and Faber, 1978.

Clutterbuck provides a detailed study of kidnapping. He outlines its practise and the response to it in various parts of the world, and documents this with a number of international case studies. The work contains a number of media references.

Clutterbuck states that in political kidnappings publicity is often the main aim, as in the case of the Schleyer kidnapping. The media will only pass up sensational news, like kidnappings, if they know their rivals will also forgo it. Clutterbuck says this blanket news blackout approach has worked on occasion, as in the case of the kidnapping of a Cypriot girl in London in 1975. Police, says Clutterbuck, must have a shrewd knowledge of the media and be willing to reward journalists when they are cooperative. In most cases, kidnappers should be provided with a transistor radio so they can hear the news. While this has backfired on occasion, it more often has a soothing effect, especially if the kidnappers have a political motive. Hostages should not be made available to the media immediately upon their release, as they will be bombarded by reporters' queries when they are least emotionally prepared to deal with them.

Clutterbuck provides case studies from various countries.

In Great Britain in 1969, a senior newspaperman's wife was kidnapped and held in a glare of publicity. Telephone lines were blocked, and detectives and relatives were harassed by journalists. A 1975 kidnapping also documented by Clutterbuck serves as an instance where journalists were briefed in a kidnapping and did not leak the story until the incident ended. In other British incidents, papers and broadcasters edited stories so as to not hinder police efforts.

In the Netherlands, in an incident involving the kidnapping of school children by South Moluccan terrorists in 1977, reporters hampered police efforts.

In France, the kidnapping of Baron Empain in January 1978 led to a virtual news blackout after the initial reports of the kidnapping.

In West Germany, a lawyer spoke on French television and a playwright wrote in Le Monde in support of the Baader-Meinhoff Gang.

Clutterbuck, Richard, Living with Terrorism, London: Faber and Faber, 1975.

Clutterbuck describes the characteristics and motives of terrorists. He says terrorism is an international problem, and people should be aware of how to protect themselves from it. He discusses precautions to take against kidnapping attempts, for example, and how to detect bombs.

He says a pattern of political kidnapping has developed in such countries as Guatemala, Brazil, Canada, Turkey, and the United States.

Since violence makes news, terrorists stage events to attract the attention of the media, thus getting free publicity and transmitting their ideas and goals to a vast audience.

Clutterbuck, Richard. "The Police and Urban Terrorism", The Police Journal, vol. XLVIII No. 3, pp. 204- 214.

Terrorists seek political or financial dividends in the form of publicity or ransom. He discusses whether terrorism is increasing or whether this is just an image created by the press. Terrorists are increasingly aware of the value of taking hostages in acquiring demands and thus political violence has increased on the whole.

Clutterbuck traces aims and philosophies of terrorist groups such as the I.R.A., Argentinian terrorists, Maoists, Trotskyists and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. He discusses their political motives and tactics and whether they work on the inside or get help on the international scene. The P.L.O. he argues, has agencies throughout Europe, Asia, and the Middle-East.

The I.R.A. says Clutterbuck, use "counter-media" devices (pamphlets, radio, etc..) to attack biased reports and to spread propoganda. Other groups are seeking publicity and he argues that young reporters would be lured by the excitement rather than trying to get behind the scenes.

Clutterbuck believes terrorisms will increase, due to public vulnerability and better travel and communication resources (see p. 212). It is up to goverments and official agencies to use the media as effectively as the terrorists do. Clutterbuck promotes on-the-scene interviews of officials and police (in front of cameras and for radio). Openess is a good policy, he says.

Codd, Michael J., Tactical Manual For Hostage Situations, New York: City of New York Police Department.

The New York City hostage plan is divided into three stages: the confrontation and containment stage; the mobile stage if the hostage taker is to move; and the relocation stage, basically stage one at a new location. Dominating all these stages is the theme of ensuring the safe release of the hostage.

A feature of this plan, which is a break from the traditional method of dealing with hostage-takers, is buying time through negotiations. Buying time is important because the more time the hostage taker spends with the hostages the less likely he is to kill or injure them. Also, the time gives the police an opportunity to prepare for different eventualities and allows the hostage-taker to make a mistake.

Members of the negotiating team should be of mature appearance and should portray themselves as subject to a higher authority. This permits the negotiator to buy time by constantly going back to the authority, and to maintain a rapport with the hostage-taker by being able to say it was not he, the negotiator, who refused the hostage taker's demand, but the higher authority.

Almost all demands are negotiable but two: supplying weapons, and giving or exchanging additional hostages.

A hostage-taker will usually fit into one of the following categories: the professional criminal who has his escape blocked during the commission of a crime, the psychotic, and the terrorist.

The professional criminal is easiest to deal with. He is considered rational, and usually refrains from unnecessary killing. The psychotic tends to be irrational, but time works on him because he is emotionally tense and will eventually wear him down. The terrorist is the greatest problem because he is seeking social justice. As time passes, however, his resolve to die for the cause may deteriorate.

In all hostage situations there will be a field commander who will establish the policy for dealing with the situation. One of his responsibilities will be to establish a press information center. A member of the Office of the Deputy Commissioner Public Information will be assigned as liaison officer with the press.

Cooper, H.A., "Terrorism and the Media", Chitty's Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 7, 1976, pp. 226-233.

Cooper says a terrorist's prime, perhaps only, objective is gaining publicity for his cause. As he puts it, "The terrorist is an urgent suitor: if he cannot get what he seeks by seductive means he will not hesitate to attempt rape. The real problem seems to be an uncertainty on the part of the media whether to play coy handmaiden or harlot."

As an example, Cooper says the kidnapping of West Berlin mayoral candidate Peter Lorenz by the Baader-Meinhof gang in March 1975 serves as an example of manipulation of the media by terrorists. They dictated that television carry some of their activities live. Adds Cooper, "This, of course is a classic case of media rape. But one cannot help but feel from the sentiments expressed that the media enjoyed it just the same."

Journalists have even accompanied terrorists on their tasks, as was the case when a reporter and photographer from Der Spiegel actually went along with the Baader-Meinhof gang in an attack and sacking of a house in Hamburg.

Terrorism, according to Cooper, has become a form of mass entertainment and therefore the media virtually always affords it great attention. "To speak of an act of terrorism that failed, somehow, to command the attention of the media is to give utterance to a thought as incongruous as that of giving a war to which nobody came."

Some countries, such as Argentina, have imposed partial or total news blackouts in such situations. But Cooper points out that suppression of the news, and its implication for the image of a government imposing censorship and control on civil liberties, is also a victory of sorts for the terrorist.

Cooper maintains the media must realize the vital and dangerous role it plays in terrorism and strive to police itself in the public interest. Cooper concludes, "If the media can truly see itself as a part of the problem it is well on the way to becoming an important part of the solution."

Cooper, H.H. Anthony, "The Terrorist and the Victim", Victimology: An International Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 1976, pp. 229-239.

Cooper describes the different types of terrorism, their methods of operation, and their victims. He says that because there is more terrorism, more people become victims, and may be exposed to the Stockholm Syndrome. He says terrorism, like any form of criminality, in some ways involves politics, and the terrorist is anti-social. Cooper says terrorists commit their acts to hold their victims up as a horrid example to the 'watchers in the wings', implying that less publicity may solve the problem.

Crelinsten, Ronald D., and Laberge-Altmejd, Danielle, (editors), Impact of Terrorism and Skyjacking on the Operations of the Criminal Justice System, International Centre for Comparative Criminology, Montreal, 1976.

The criminal justice system must deal with terrorism in the same way it deals with other crime. This includes sentencing principles, and conditions of incarceration.

In preventing terrorism, thought must be given to the consequences of preventive measures in terms of their effect on society as a whole. The main preventive measures to date have been target-hardening (cf. skyjacking), the creation of special police units, intelligence gathering, and the involvement of the military.

The mass media creates special problems in exacerbating and prolonging the atmosphere of terror created by the terrorist act. The media is also, however, one of the best means to combat terrorism in that it can inform and shape public opinion in how to deal with terrorism.

Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation Public Relations Aspects, United States, - - - - - pp. 1-2.

This document stresses the need for the guarding of law enforcement strategy and tactics from disclosure by the press. It says the media should concentrate instead on publicizing the personalities of the individuals who perform the crimes as well as what action the courts take against them. It condemns publicizing threats and hoaxes in relation to hijackings. It says that ill-informed personnel have given too much information to the press regarding the tactics used by police in hijackings. The document also frowns on the media's description of some hostage takers as heroes. All such media restrictions, it argues, are for the safety of the public.

Czerniejewski, Halina J., "Guidelines for the Coverage of Terrorism ", The Quill, August 1977, pp. 21-23.

Czerniejewski makes the point that the media, in the act of covering an event such as terrorism, changes the character of that event. She goes on to outline discussions on the role of the media in hostage takings and different guidelines for reporting which have resulted. These include those resulting from a working session on civil disorders at the University of Southern California in 1966, UPI's guidelines, CBS's guidelines, NBC's guidelines and those of the Louisville Courier-Journal and Times.

To summarize through a quote: "The recurring theme in journalists' responses to such challenges in recent decades - in covering 'crisis' stories - has been one of returning to basics. Basics such as accuracy, fairness, thoroughness, responsibility. That's essentially the theme of the latest guideline proposals on hostage taking."

Dawe, D., "Police Problems of the Future", in Terror; Future Trends in Hostage Taking and Violence, Ottawa, presented to Canadian Police College Executive Development course, April 21, 1978, pp. 1-19.

Dawe expresses concern that the world of terrorism is fast expanding on both the international and local scenes. He comments on what he sees as the inadequacy of the definition given terrorism, emphasizing the differences between that and hijacking and kidnapping.

Dawe is primarily concerned with prison hostage-takings which, he says, are not that different from other terrorist activities. However he says that the risk is greater, due to the large concentration of people with a criminal record.

Dawe says that he thinks one of the reasons terrorists take hostages is to gain publicity. He also says that the police are developing profiles based on the physical appearance and records of past hostage takers, in order to determine who would be likely suspects.

Dawe says that there is a need for international agreement on the handling of hostage takers. He says that in Italy, for example, the Italian government public safety unit has issued a pamphlet on kidnapping for extortion purposes with a separate section on precautions (so common an occurrence is kidnapping in Italy).

Dawe says that experts confirm what Richard W. Kobetz has claimed, that hostage takings are more numerous due to the "contagion factor" in which the media puts ideas in the minds of future hostage takers through their publication of hostage incidents.

Dawe says that Canada, like Europe and the United States, is experiencing hostage-taking incidents involving "psychos" who seize captives in order to gain recognition. He argues that Canada is not prepared to deal with the ever-increasing number of such incidents.

"D.C. Chief Proposes Limits on Coverage of Hostage Scenes" Law Enforcement News, December 20, 1977, p. 3, 4, 16.

This short article outlines and discusses a series of restrictive guidelines on media coverage of hostage incidents proposed by police chief Maurice J. Cullinane of the District of Columbia. To quote, "In general, the proposals would limit the movement of media personnel during hostage or barricaded gunmen situations. They call for restricting the use of live minicams to 'distant shots of the scene,' banning telephone calls to people holding hostages, and establishing a special 'broadcast area' where police officials could provide the press with 'off the record comments.'" The guidelines would also bar live broadcasts that reveal the position of policemen stationed around the scene. If reporters receive a call from a hostage-taker, according to the proposal, "They will immediately notify the police department for guidance as to how the call should be handled."

One television news director in the area comments that the proposal restricts freedom of the press as granted by the U.S. First Amendment. A local newspaper editor echoes those sentiments. The article says the Washington Post, has adopted internal guidelines that strive to not endanger lives by frequently withholding information like police plans and the names of hostages. Like the Post, several news organizations have adopted internal guidelines, including United Press International (UPI), the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), the Field newspapers in Chicago and the Louisville (Kentucky) Courier-Journal. They generally stress avoiding direct involvement, or providing an "excessive platform" for the demands of hostage-takers and terrorists.

Denton, Tommy, "Fair to be Middlin' ? The Newsmen as Negotiator", The Quill, September 1974, pp. 13-17.

Denton questions the role of the media in hostage-takings. In light of the media's role in the Washington and Huntsville sieges, he quotes newsmen and police officers who present various opinions on just how involved in a hostage taking a reporter should become. It is pointed out that more prison takeovers will occur because inmates have learned how to manipulate the press. The media, according to a Washington Post writer, have been exploited by inmates, authorities -- everyone.

Department of External Affairs, Tips on Terrorism: Security Suggestions for Canadian-Business People Living or Working Abroad. 1979.

The terrorist threat is as great or greater than ever. Business people are a tempting target, but the risk can be reduced by invoking security measures at home, at the office and en route. The most important rule is not to get into a day-to-day routine. The rule can be expressed as "Same time and Same Place = Tempting Target." Business people can assess their susceptibility to terrorist attack by determining; if the local authorities are not competent to prevent such attacks, if terrorists exist in the area, and if an attack would receive wide media coverage. A yes answer to one or more indicates a need to improve security.

Documentation on the Events and Decisions Connected with the Kidnapping of Hanns Martin Schleyer and the Hijacking of the Lufthansa Jet, "Landshut". Press and Information Office of the (W. German) Federal Government, November 2, 1977.

On September 5, 1977, four persons were killed in Cologne, W. Germany, during the kidnapping of Hanns Martin Schleyer. The federal government asked the W. German media to restrict their reporting, as the efforts to save Schleyer's life would be endangered by too much publicity. With few exceptions, the media recognized the necessity of limited reporting. After the kidnapping the federal government said it would publish a detailed account of the incident. This document is the result. It includes an account of the government's endeavors to free the hostages of the jet "Landshut", which was skyjacked during the Schleyer incident. The document does not evaluate, it simply records the facts of the incident.

Elliot, John D., "Contemporary Terrorism and the Police Response", The Police Chief, February 1978, pp. 40-43.

Elliot says contemporary terrorism has many weaknesses. The myth that it is invincible must be destroyed by organizing specific responses to combat those characteristics of terrorism that are predictable. For instance, it is known that terrorists commit such illegal acts as skyjacking, hostage taking and bombings for political purposes. Elliot notes the success that West Germany has had in coping with the terrorist threat. Society, he says, must be educated by the media to understand that terrorists are criminals; this will lessen the terrorists' success in winning converts.

Add to documentation (from previous page)

A German commando unit attacked the plane killing three terrorists and rescuing the hostages. Five hours before the attack news of the presence of the unit in the area moved on AFP, French news agency, and was broadcast in France and the United Kingdom. Later, Israeli television reported the possibility that a plane which had landed in the area without lights was a commando unit. Apparently none of these broadcasts came to the attention of the hijackers.

Emery, Mike, "Remark: SLA Not the Only Con Artist", The Quill, May 1974, p.5.

Emery says that the news media was manipulated by the Symbionese Liberation Army in the Patty Hearst case, but that this wasn't new. The media in general (not just the news media) have been manipulated by big companies and others presenting one-sided views to influence their audience.

Fédération Professionnelle des Journalistes du Québec, "Yes, Virginia, There is a Dossier Z ", Content, May 1971, pp. 5-11, (translated).

Compiled by the Fédération Professionnelle des Journalistes du Québec. Dossier Z is a summary account of police and political interference in journalists' work as it occurred during October 1970's kidnapping crisis of Pierre Laporte.

As the Fédération notes, the cases cited are meant to be illustrations of a general situation. It outlines a number of cases of unmotivated arrests of journalists, direct interference, searches of reporters and press photographers, policemen disguised as journalists in press conferences, journalists molested and professional equipment damaged, journalists' appearances in court and, finally, censorship in the communications media during the October Crisis. For example, "Colette Duhaime of the Journal de Montréal, was arrested in the newsroom of her paper and was incarcerated for several days, then released without being charged."

Fenyvesi, Charles, "Looking Into the Muzzle of Terrorists ",
Quill, August 1977, pp. 16-18.

Fenyvesi was one of the hostages held captive in Washington D.C. in March 1977. In addition, he is a journalist, editor of the National Jewish Monthly. He recounts his feelings, as an ex-hostage and journalist, on the role of the press in terrorism and also writes of more harsh criticism of the media on the part of his fellow hostages.

He cites, while saying that most media acted quite responsibly, three cases where media endangered the hostages. One local TV reporter filmed a basket being lifted by rope to the fifth floor of the occupied building where people were hiding from the hostage takers and the gunmen were informed of the scoop - but did not take the people hostage. Another reporter asked Khaalis (the hostage taker) if he had set a deadline - a question that could have endangered negotiations. Another newsman interviewing Khaalis on the phone suggested that the police were trying to "trick him" while appearing to negotiate in good faith. Khaalis was enraged and stepped up his talk of murdering the hostages.

Fenyvesi says he is against government regulation of the press, but he does possess strong feelings that the press should regulate itself.

He says newsmen should receive special training on how to cope with terrorist crises; members of the electronic media should be conscious of the dangers of live coverage and should edit terrorists' comments (this would allow them to vent their frustrations while ensuring some control by the media).

Editors in each metropolitan area should establish a committee of editors who could agree on declaring and enforcing what might be called a news media emergency which would mean a suspension of some of the "the story first" rules of the profession, and place not endangering lives as a first priority. He says terrorist incidents should invoke the same self-regulation as kidnappings and wars have on the media.

Freiman, Lawrence, Don't Fall off the Rocking Horse: An Autobiography, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978.

This is the story of Freiman, owner of a major family department store (since sold to the Hudson's Bay Company).

Among the adventures he describes is that of being told that the police had uncovered a plot to kidnap his son. While the Ottawa and provincial police arranged for the boy's security, Freiman called his friends in the press, asking them not to cover the story. A week later, the Toronto Telegram broke the story, and the Ottawa press followed suit. After much publicity, the Freimans took a holiday in Europe, returning to hear that the matter had been resolved and the boy was safe.

Friedlander, Robert A., "Terrorism and Political Violence: Do the Ends Justify the Means?", Chitty's Law Journal, Vol. 24 No. 7, 1976, pp. 240-245.

Friedlander debates, in moral and legal terms, whether the goals of political violence and terrorism justify the taking of innocent lives through terrorist crimes. He concludes that they do not. The author mentions the media only briefly, referring to how they aid the terrorists' cause by providing him or her with publicity. To quote, "Deprived of media attention and without publicity, terrorism becomes a weapon of the weak." Finally, Friedlander traces the historical and legal background of international terrorism.

Friedman, Robert, "Crisis Cop Raps Media", More, June 1977, pp. 18-21.

An interview with Lieutenant Frank Bolz, head of the New York City Police Department's hostage negotiating squad, is reproduced verbatim. The topic is the media's role in covering hostage incidents.

Bolz asks the press to regulate themselves and follow the instructions of the police in such incidents.

He cites examples where media interference has damaged negotiations between the police and the perpetrator. The media interfere by describing on air, or in the press, police strategy or procedures.

To quote Bolz: " In New Rochelle (where Fred Cowan killed five people on February 14), one of the news radio stations up there was saying, 'The police are crawling across the rooftops with shotguns. They have rifles. The sun is beating down into their eyes.' Now if the perpetrator had been listening to that radio station, he would have had a blow-by-blow description of what the police manoeuvres were. Or the media, because of what Bolz describes as their eagerness to get a "scoop", will phone and interview a hostage taker. This disrupts negotiations. Says Bolz: "For example, the hostages at Bankers Trust on Sixth Avenue in Greenwich Village (October 6, 1975) were about to be released when someone from the media called in. The perpetrator said to the hostages, 'You guys can go out, I want to talk to this guy from the press.' The hostages were afraid they'd be shot on their way out, so they all stayed. He talked on the phone to the guy for three hours and broke the thought pattern. This is one of the problems the media must realize. They don't know what pattern the police have established with the perpetrator, what path we're trying to bring him down. Just calling in gives a thought interruption, and thought interruption is sometimes just enough to sway him away from the way we want him to go."

Bolz says he asks the press to take what information the police give them until the incident is over.

Fromkin, David, "The Strategy of Terrorism!" in Foreign Affairs,
-----, pp. 683-698.

Fromkin discusses the strategy of terrorism from a historical perspective, dating from the reign of terror (1793-1794). He says the success of terrorist activities depends on how people react to it; if they react the way terrorists want them to, then the terrorists have succeeded.

Gallup Poll, "Public Divided Over Media Coverage of Terrorists", Opinion, 1977, pp. 70-71.

A Gallup poll taken in 1977 revealed that the majority of American respondents felt that media coverage of terrorist activities encourages others to commit this act. 67% of the 1,550 people interviewed said that news media coverage encourages terrorism while 27% said it doesn't. 47% of those (majority male) said that terrorism is overemphasized by the media, while 50% insisted that such reporting is necessary to keep the public informed. There was a much greater percentage of whites (50%) than blacks (24%) who feel that terrorism is overemphasized by the media, the poll indicates. Among those who were convinced that detailed media coverage of terrorist events promotes terrorist activity, as many as one-third feel that this coverage is necessary to keep people informed.

"The Getty Affair" (a report from the Italian police), International Criminal Police Review, Vol. 30, No. 289 (July, 1975), pp. 166-171.

In July, 1973, seven Italian criminals kidnapped Paul Getty and held him for nearly six months. During that time they negotiated the ransom with a family lawyer. The kidnapers and the Getty family used the media to relay messages back and forth. Getty's mother appeared on television to plead for her son's life. After threatening to cut off Getty's ear, should 200,000 lire not be paid, the Roman newspaper "Messaggero" received a human ear and a lock of hair. Another newspaper received information of Getty's physical state.

Italian police captured six of seven suspects in December after the ransom had been paid and Getty released.

Gladis, Stephen D., U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, "The Hostage/Terrorist Situation and the Media", unpublished paper, 1979.

Gladis is a special agent for the public affairs office of the FBI. This short paper is a good overview of the problems surrounding hostage/terrorism situations and the media. These include the belief that media encourage terrorism by lending it publicity; examples of direct interference by media in negotiations (in Cleveland, Ohio a hostage taker was about to surrender but suddenly changed his mind when he saw the positioning of police snipers via live television); and discussions of press freedom versus police responsibility.

Gladis deals briefly with the guidelines advocated by CBS, NBC and UPI and discusses the value of such guidelines. He discusses the help media sometimes afford the authorities (journalist as negotiator), the interference of self-appointed media negotiators (like the reporter who asked a Washington D.C. hostage taker if he could really trust the police, or had he set a deadline); and the need for trust and cooperation between the media and police. Gladis says each department should have a public information officer to deal with the media, and this officer should play a special role in hostage/terrorist situations by briefing the media and supplying them with proper facilities. Gladis states "the problems can be worked out with mutual effort on the part of both law enforcement and media."

Goldaber, Dr. Irving, Checklist for Negotiations in Hostage Situations, unpublished paper for The International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1974, pp. 1-134.

An instructional article outlining for police negotiators the basic steps in the procedure. There are only a few references to the media. Goldaber writes in his outline of organization of a hostage negotiating team; "If the officer in charge of the negotiations team is of sufficient rank, then he will direct and coordinate the containment, negotiations, crowd-control, community-relations and media-relations activities."

Goldaber discourages the use of people outside the police force as negotiators. It is presumed this includes media personnel. But he writes: "Agree, if the perpetrator insists upon it and it will bring him to yield the hostage and surrender, to arrange a meeting with the mass media personnel." He adds, "Introduce to the perpetrator the idea of the meeting with the media, if he does not come to it himself."

Griswald, Denny (ed.), "Media Handling of a Major Disaster Which Made International News ", PR News, New York; -----
pp. 1-2.

This is a report of how the San Diego Police Department and the San Diego County Sheriff's Department handled media relations during the 1978 air disaster in which 144 people died.

They argue that in the case of a crisis situation, having a "non-police public relations professional" to give reports to the media and prevent interference in the police work and safety operation, proved invaluable.

A "press information centre" was set up and the PR man kept the press posted on all events, gave them a tour of the disaster site, and relieved the earlier friction that had developed between the tense police corp and the newsmen. In the end, in a "memorial edition" put out by the San Diego Union, there was no press criticism of the police in their handling of the disaster and the press.

"Guidelines Issued by the UPI National Advisory Board", United Press International, New York,-----"

The guidelines are short and very general. They consist of seven points: each station should have established procedures for terrorist coverage; each story should be judged individually as to its newsworthiness; coverage should be carried "with an awareness of the potential danger to life and person"; demands should be reported but not given an excessive platform; reporters should avoid involvement as negotiators or hostages; when no deadline has been mentioned, no one should ask the hostage about one; and, to quote, "Above all, the rules of common sense should apply."

Haggart, Ron and Golden, Aubrey E. Rumours of War, Toronto: New Press, 1971.

Haggart and Golden outline the events of the FLQ kidnappings as they affected civil liberties. The authors argue that the Liberal government in 1970 suppressed the news and circumvented freedom of the press by invoking the War Measures Act. Reporters were arrested and not charged; stories were withheld or not allowed to be broadcast. The most startling thing about the episode, say Haggart and Golden, was the widespread support given the government's measure in English Canada.

Hamblin, Robert L., et al "The Airplane Hijackings," in The Perfecting of Basic Social Inventions,
1974, pp. 122-126.

Hamblin graphs data on the number of hijacking attempts and successes for U.S. airplanes between 1968 and 1972. He discovers three synchronous cycles he says show that, while each airline hijacking may be considered a "unique" modification of the first hijacking in Peru in 1930, the number of counter-innovations to prevent hijackings by the authorities "effectively make the hijacking of airlines more and more difficult."

Hamblin also says that ransoming became a factor in hijacking in 1970 but continued on such a small scale that it further confirmed psychiatric assumptions that hijackers were not motivated by money. Hamblin says that early hijackings were carefully detailed by the media. In 1974, however, he says that the news media in the U.S. "voluntarily attempted a partial news blackout on details of attempted and successful hijackings" (p. 125). Hamblin then predicts that such blackouts should stop the flow of what does and does not work in hijacking attempts and will inhibit innovative attempts by hijackers.

He says that what makes air pirates psychotic is their great "desire for national publicity." By not publicizing hijackers' names, says Hamblin, one decreases the level of motivation.

Harland, Peter, "Terror and the Press: Politics and Greed; When Lives are at Stake Where is the Difference?", IPI Report, November 1977, pp. 5-7.

Harland criticizes the distinction between "commercial" and "political" terrorism made by Sir Robert Mark, then Commissioner of London's Metropolitan Police, and Dr. Dick Mulder, the Dutch expert.

The problems of terrorism, he says, are indivisible; characteristics of terrorist activities cannot be separated into two such categories since the activities may have elements of both types of terrorism. Harland says good publicity can give the offender the recognition he wants, especially when the reason for the terrorist act is political. However, too much publicity can be harmful; for example, in the McKay case, telephone lines were jammed and the kidnappers became scared.

Harland notes that the FBI believe that less publicity will help to ensure the chances of getting the kidnapped victim back. Kidnappers may fear publicity because it alerts the police to their plans.

Harland compared the coverage of terrorist activities in different countries, noting that media contact with kidnappers is particularly strong in the United States, while in Europe there is "more self-restraint". He outlines the guidelines used by the United Press International in covering terrorism. He says that news blackouts, usually at the request of the police or the family of the victim, are common in Italy where there is a feeling that press revelations about family wealth have often led to demands being stepped up.

Hassel, Conrad V., "The Hostage Situation: Exploring the Motivation and the Cause ", The Police Chief, September 1975, pp. 55-58.

Hassel suggests that hostage-takers may be dealt with by police on the basis of the hostage takers' apparent motivation. He says that hostage-takers, acting under rational political motives, such as the Marxist ethic, often seek publicity from the mass media.

He says politically motivated terrorists have three choices when their demands are not met: murder-suicide, the lessening of demands, and surrender. They are more likely to choose martyrdom following the murder of hostages, according to Hassel, if their acts will "be broadcast around the world to inspire others." "If, however, the media will not cooperate with the terrorist, and the terrorist will only be known as a deranged criminal and his act one of wanton cruelty rather than revolutionary heroism, he may well modify his demands and surrender." (p. 56)

Law enforcement must depend upon voluntary restraint exercised by the press. Other motivations discussed by Hassel, in which the role of the media is relatively unimportant, include: the motivation of escape, motivation of freedom from, or better, conditions in prison, and the fulfillment of the mentally-deranged and the sociopath.

Hickey, Neil, "Gaining the Media's Attention", in William P. Lineberry, editor, The Struggle Against Terrorism, New York: H.W. Wilson, 1977.

Neil Hickey of TV Guide discusses, mostly through a review of the literature, the role of the media -- particularly television -- in publicizing terrorist acts.

He asserts that while international terrorism is not new, it has escalated in the past decade as political groups seek to propagandize their goals. To quote: "Groups like the Tupamaros (Uruguay), the Baader-Meinhof gang (West Germany), the Quebec Liberation Front, the IRA, the United Red Army (Japan), the Eritrean Liberation Front (Ethiopia), separatist units of Basques, Bretons and Corsicans, as well as the many pro-Palestinian activists (and many others) have all absorbed an important lesson of the terrorist and his audience -- television will provide coverage, if the crime is sufficiently outrageous and dramatic."

He recounts examples of media use by terrorists, such as the use of the German TV network in February, 1975. And he quotes various experts' debates on whether media controls are possible or useful. He singles out the Palestine Liberation Organization as one group that gained legitimacy through media-publicized international terrorism.

Finally, Hickey outlines rough guidelines proposed by some experts. These include the downplaying, or omission, of names of terrorist groups, and emphasizing the inhuman abuse of human lives.

"Hijackers/Hostage Situations" in Hijacking of Aircraft, -----

In giving advice on how to handle hijacking incidents this document outlines the hijackers methods of operation based on many different incidents perpetrated by different groups. They include the terrorists' seizing of hostages, their use of false identification to get through customs, their previous training and preparation as to the weapons they should use, and their contact with the media during the time of the incident.

The document says that techniques of hijackers have improved over time due to the information published in the media concerning mistakes made by other hijackers. During the incident, the report states that hijackers carry radios and listen to local channel coverage of the event.

The report argues that the best way to counter-attack a hijacking incident is to have a plan previously prepared. Experts on terrorism may be called in, up-to-date maps of the area should be provided and the aircraft containing the captors and captives should be "isolated from the press and the public." The command structure must be clearly defined and a senior official should assume control of the entire operation. A control post is recommended that should also be isolated from press and public. Communication links would then have to be set up between the control room, the plane, and the Air Traffic Control Tower so that no other plane would be put in jeopardy.

The report emphasizes the need to extract as much information as possible concerning the identities of the hostage-takers and the captives. The report particularly stresses the need to stall to give officials time to prepare strategy and to tire the captors. Finally it is stated in the report that control of information media is necessary because premature disclosure of police plans and operations can frustrate attempts at a rescue of the hostages.

Horobin, Alfred, "Hostage Taking: coping with a crisis ",
Police Review, Sept. 29, 1978, pp. 1438-1440.

Chief-Superintendent Horobin of the Derbyshire Constabulary in the U.K. lays down some guidelines for police officers who may face a hostage-taking incident. He emphasizes a policeman's primary objective in a hostage incident is to preserve the lives of the hostages, the general public, the police and finally the offenders. He says that the officer must carefully assess the personality of the offender and make early decisions on how to deal with the offender so as to keep the situation as "free of stress" as possible.

Horobin says that the hostage negotiating is a bargaining process and that it is up to the policemen who arrive first on the scene to establish a working relationship with the hostage takers, consume time, obtain information about the incident, and set the stage for further negotiations.

"Hostage Freed, Police Praise Media, Parents", Canadian Press news release, March 29, 1978.

Montreal police say that because of the media blackout during the seven-hour kidnapping of 14-year-old Alana Abracan, they were able to attain her safe release and the capture of a suspect. The parents of the girl also remained calm during the event. After the episode was over the police held a news conference to announce Alana's safe return. The suspect was a 26-year-old Montreal man with no previous criminal record.

Howell, Peter, Wind of Madness: The Role of the Press in Canada during the 1970 October Crisis, Unpublished Carleton University B.J. Thesis, May 28, 1978.

Howell says the Canadian media share the blame for creating the panic situation which prompted the government to invoke the War Measures Act. He says the news media spent a great deal of time interviewing each other, chasing rumours, and speculating.

With the government negotiating with the FLQ, the media assumed it must be a substantial group of terrorists. It became a big story, combining all the aspects of sensational news.

At least one radio station circulated memos to its reporters, telling them not to go overboard in their broadcasting of FLQ events; this action came after calls to the station from nervous, English-speaking people in Montreal.

In their desire to get the latest angle first, reporters sometimes went to great lengths. One, for example, rented a limousine in which he crossed RCMP ranks right up to the house where Cross was held.

The FLQ used French language stations to broadcast their manifestos. One reporter thus "used" claimed the FLQ crisis was a big story, in effect the Canadian equivalent of the Kennedy assassination.

Jackson, Robert J., Kelly, Michael J., and Mitchell, Thomas H., "Collective Conflict, Violence and the Media in Canada", The Royal Commission on Violence in the Communications Industry, Toronto, 1976.

After scanning the literature on media and violence, the authors examine the relationship between media and violence in the 18 countries which have a free press and a level of economic development like that of Canada. With the exception of one case of hijacking in 1971, the acts of violence studied are riots, demonstrations, bombings, and so on.

The report examines how the Globe and Mail, The Ottawa Citizen, and The Toronto Star covered events such as an anti-Nazi demonstration in Toronto in 1965, a labour strike at the Texpack plant in Brantford in 1971, and a clash between Native Indians and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police on Parliament Hill in 1974. A series of interviews with participants, newsmen, and police tries to establish whether the media's presence affected the events and their consequences.

The report concludes that both the police and the media have their own priorities, so they often 'clash' during such events.

Among other conclusions are: the literature on the effects of the media on violence is not conclusive; the violence in Canada has generally been episodic and only a few violent-prone groups have existed over a long period of time; and, police-press relations need to be improved.

Among the recommendations are: the press should concentrate on the issues in the confrontation as well as describing the events; inflammatory language about groups should be avoided; the most experienced journalists should be used to cover disturbances; and, guidelines should be set for dealing with rapidly escalating violence.

Johnpoll, Bernard, "Terrorism and the Mass Media in the United States", in Alexander, Yonah and Finger, Seymour Maxwell (editors), Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New York: The John Hay Press, 1977, pp. 158-165.

Johnpoll writes that the news media justifiably cover terrorism because it is newsworthy -- it fits traditional news values. Papers and broadcast media merely transmit information. Johnpoll maintains that the media's actual involvement in terrorist activities is rare and he traces the limited history of such involvement in the United States. He traces the development of the terrorist group Students for a Democratic Society in the United States in the late 1960's and early 1970's. He touches briefly on the media coverage of the Symbionese Liberation Army and the National Front Army of Puerto Rico. He concludes that media publicity does not spawn terrorism, and the media should not have restrictions placed upon them.

Kelly, Michael J., and Mitchell, Thomas H., Transnational Terrorism and the Western Elite Press, unpublished paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, May 30, 1979.

This paper seeks to analyse transnational terrorism as a means of political communication or, in simpler terms, propaganda.

In order to examine the terrorism-media relationship the authors examined the manner in which 158 incidents of transnational terrorism were covered in the New York Times and the Times of London.

Their findings are interesting: A sizeable minority of terrorist incidents go unnoticed by the Western media. The best predictor of the volume of coverage an incident received was the number of people killed. Groups operating out of the Middle East, especially the Palestinians, received more media attention. The media communicate the terrorist act to the world, but seldom motivation or cause. To quote their final conclusion, "The media's unwillingness to report anything beyond the action of a terrorist incident places the terrorist in an insidious trap. The terrorist cannot discontinue his activities because his power is based on publicity but, at the same time, the kind of publicity he receives deprives him of the ability to rally support for his cause. In the end it may be the media that winds up exploiting the terrorist. Violence is news. Terrorists will go on killing and the media will continue to attract attention to them. Unfortunately the spiral of violence seems never-ending."

Knopf, Terry Ann, "Media myths on Violence", Columbia Journalism Review, Spring 1970, pp. 17-25.

The handling of crisis situations by the media, argues Knopf, needs room for improvement, especially in the reporting of race riots (this term she says is overused). After researching media reports of such instances as the 1968 "Cleveland shoot-out", in which black nationalists clashed with National Guardsmen, resulting in nine deaths, Knopf says that the media do not set the social scene in their stories but go after the often inaccurate headlines that result in the creation of myths about sectors of the American population.

Knopf says that with new technology in the media world, the major newspapers and wire services feed off each other during the coverage of acts of violence and thus allow for the reinforcement of bias in social views (rather than introducing change). However Knopf underlines what she sees as the important role the media play in crisis situations. "Crisis situations increase the need for news" she says ... "So important is the flow of news through established channels that its continued absence can help precipitate a crisis. "Knopf argues that superlatives and adjectives in "scare" headlines should be eliminated as they may only succeed in further upsetting the public.

However, lack of news may also cause panic. Knopf cites a 1968 protracted Detroit strike during which the absence of papers "helped create a panic" as rumour sprang up concerning the possibility of black attacks on the white community (rumours unverified by the press).

Knopf is critical of the wire services in reporting violence in the States and says that many of the rumours and social biases stem from unverified reports that are picked up by the major newspapers. Knopf argues that, in many instances, the media overplay a story on violence and "equate bad news with big news thus confusing the obvious with the relevant." (page 19). Knopf says that the media should push for reform with regard to stereotyped social attitudes by taking greater care in their analysis of a story and by trying to understand violence as "an expression of protest against oppressive conditions." (p.22)

Kobetz, Richard W., "Hostage Incidents: The New Police Priority", The Police Chief, May 1975, pp. 34-35.

Kobetz discusses the growing popularity of hostage taking and gives two reasons for it: (1) there is a "contagion" factor in society which spurs imitative acts and; (2) society is not only becoming more violent, but is more readily accepting violence and the threat of violence.

Kobetz says the media are partly responsible for the spread of the contagion factor since they publicize all available details of the event; this triggers imitative guidelines for their own planned crime.

Kobetz refers to Toch's thesis that violence is habit-forming -- the probability of violence increases with each new act of aggression. Society has a similar reaction and each new violent incident eventually become "routine" to the public. For example, the media gave heavy coverage to the first hostage-taking but subsequent events receive less and less attention.

Kobetz outlines police measures for dealing with hostage takings and terrorism, and the techniques for coping with the various types of hostage takers. He notes that law enforcement agencies have not managed to maintain an active network for the sharing of information as terrorist groups have.

Kopkind, Andrew, "Publish and Perish", More, April 1978, pp. 13-15.

Journalists have traditionally played a number of social roles-- crusaders, critics, etc. -- but now they are playing a new role, targets for terror. This has developed because journalists have a measure of protection from legal repression -- the state must pay lip-service to the myths of press freedom -- and so governments who wish to dispense with troublesome journalists step outside of their own laws or encourage others to do so. Examples of this are Nicaraguan editor Joaquin Chamorro, killed in 1978, and Argentinian columnist Rodolfo Walsh who disappeared hours after writing a letter to Argentine President Videla protesting the government's violations of human rights. The journalists who were the victims of this terror had become political actors, they were no longer merely conduits of information.

The terror against the press takes two forms, depending on whether it comes from the left or the right. The left use terror in a symbolic way, to protest against the tokens of society that frustrate social change. This is the case in Italy, where the Red Brigades have been shooting journalists in the legs. The right uses terror for specific political enforcement. This accounts for the majority of cases of terror against the press.

Kupperman, Robert H., Facing Tomorrow's Terrorist Incident Today, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, D.C.. October, 1977.

As chief scientist for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kupperman explains how countries can defend themselves against terrorism. He discusses the characteristics of terrorists, with references to terrorist organizations throughout the world. He makes suggestions on how to handle hostage takings and other terrorist events. Such events, he says, are staged for the media; if the media were not to report them, there would probably be an increase in such incidents in order to attract media attention.

Lang, Daniel, "A Reporter at Large - The Bank Drama", The New Yorker, 1974, pp. 56-98.

Lang gives a detailed account of the hostage-taking incident at the Sveriges Kreditbank in Stockholm on Aug. 23, 1973. Ex-convict, Jan-Erik Olsson, an intelligent 32-year-old man, took four people hostage for six days.

The incident, says Lang, had all of Sweden (the police, the government, the public and the media) enthralled by the series of events that was to be called "the bank drama." The captor spoke English so as to disguise his identity, but Lang reports that he listened intently during the initial 6-day period to Swedish newscasts.

Through a series of interviews with three female hostages, one male hostage and Olsson, Lang tries to recreate the atmosphere that developed over the six day period in the bank, in which the hostages and the hostage-taker developed a relationship of mutual trust and concern.

Olsson allowed the women freedom to call their families, talk to the authorities, and move about in their confined quarters. Lang says the hostages never tried to convince Olsson to give up, and that instead, they reported greater fear towards the officials attempting a raid than towards their captor. The hostages pleaded with the authorities to allow Olsson to escape even if it meant that they had to go as well.

Lang says the bond that developed between the hostages was weaker than that between the hostages and the hostage takers. "Each show of friendliness on Olsson's part reinforced his leadership," says Lang. Lang also reveals the thoughts of the hostages throughout the ordeal, one of whom could think of nothing but her children, another of nothing but her parents.

At the end of the ordeal the hostages showed genuine concern for the fate of their captors who had let them go uninjured. Lang concludes his article with a description of the interview he had with Olsson in prison during which Olsson expressed concern for his past hostages, showing that the relationship had not been one-sided

Lasky, Melvin J., "Ulrike Meinhof & the Baader-Meinhof Gang" in Encounter, June 1975, pp. 9-22.

Lasky recounts the adventures and misfortunes of the Baader-Meinhof gang. He says that although most of the members are now serving terms in security jails of Western Germany, they continue to influence the outside world. Their cause has become known; manifestos continue to be written within the prison walls.

Linstead, John, "Attica: Where Media Went Wrong", Chicago Journalism Review, November 1971, Vol. 4, pp. 10-11.

John Linstead discusses how the press got information about what went on during the Attica prison riot (in which 42 men died after an attack on the prison by the state troopers and sheriff's deputies). He says that the attorney general's office had invoked the New York press black-out statute that forced members of the press to seek "ways of circumventing the authorities" to acquire information. The press talked to the families of inmates camped outside the prison gates, nearby residents, and doctors, priests and negotiators who had been allowed inside.

Linstead argues that by going to these sources of information the attitude of the press towards the inmates became sympathetic. Reporting pools were organized by prison officials and a selected group of reporters went inside the prison. The vast majority of the reporters covering the story had to go on the reports of these reporters (who were not always cooperative as they tried to scoop their dailies) and on television and radio. It was the prisoners' insistence on press coverage that enabled reporters to get direct links with the inside.

Official reports came after the attack by the troopers and were not only contradictory but later proved untrue, says Linstead. Russell G. Oswald, state commissioner of correctional services, is quoted by Linstead as having told reporters that nine hostages were killed, while Gerry Houlihan, the public relation man for the New York Correction Department, is said to have reported that only eight were dead. After the attack on the prison Linstead says that the press "succumbed to the lure of a dramatic account that would make bloody headlines" and swallowed the reports given by officials without verifying the statistics. Other accounts accepted by the press came from troopers, blindfolded hostages in fear of their lives and negotiators.

What Linstead argues is that the truth about the hostages being killed by their rescuers would have made far better headlines than the deaths reported by the officials.

Liston, Robert A., Terrorism, New York: Thomas Nelson, 1977.

Liston provides a short overview of international terrorism. He writes that achieving publicity is a primary aim of terrorist acts. Liston believes the world press, particularly of the free world, should make a greater effort to reduce the publicity afforded terrorists and counter their liberationist claims. Israel's side of the Palestine question has not, according to Liston, received the publicity afforded Palestinian terrorists. To quote, "Nor has Britain, Ireland, Canada or Spain taken proper steps to point out that the terrorists are liberating no one, but imposing tyranny on many. Publicity can work both ways, and it is patently ridiculous that terrorists should have all the best of it."

Mark, Sir Robert, "Kidnapping, Terrorism, and the Media", Nieman Reports, Spring 1976, pp. 15-18.

Responsibility for dealing with kidnapping and terrorism lies with the police, so it is up to them to reach agreement with the media about how their joint interest is best served. An example of such an agreement is a code drawn up in 1972 between the London Metropolitan Police and senior representatives of national, provincial and foreign press, radio and television. It recognizes that when police are aware of news it should be released to the public unless it is sub judice or impairs the privacy of an individual. In Britain the sub judice rules are tighter than in America.

There are, however, complications to this general agreement. First, if there are hostages the police may want to ask the press not to publish details of tactical planning. Second, if the military is involved they will be included in the responsibility for press relations.

From the point of view of police/press liaison, kidnapping is to be treated differently from other forms of hostage-taking. Kidnapping demands secrecy for success -- usually the first condition for release is that the police not be informed -- while the other forms demand publicity for success.

In two cases it has been necessary to ask for exceptional co-operation from the media. The first was the Spaghetti House siege where three men held some Italians hostage for six days. It was thought that the ethnic press might misrepresent the incident and possibly damage Italian/British relations. The police withheld certain information under the sub judice rules, but revealed everything else relevant to the case, asking the press to avoid provoking tension between the hostage takers and the hostages. The restraint of the press was beyond praise, and the incident ended with no one receiving injuries.

In the other case a girl was kidnapped and the police revealed all the information to the press, asking them not to publish for the sake of the girl's safety. The girl was held for nine days and, during that time, there was no mention of the case in the media. The ransom was paid and the girl released unharmed.

Merry, Robert W., "On-the-Air Hindrance? Broadcasters Search Souls over Coverage", The National Observer, February 4, 1977.

Professor Abraham Miller of the University of Cincinnati says television and radio reporters have become more hindrance than help in their reporting of hostage takings. One example is the Hanafi Muslim siege in Washington where some reporters were drawn into the incident, becoming participants, not recorders.

Some of the networks are aware of the problem and at least one, CBS, has drafted guidelines to cover the area. The guidelines include whether the network should refrain from live coverage of hostage situations, and if so, whether the hostage taker's demands should be in a paraphrased version, or his actual voice.

Some critics maintain it is not the networks, but the local stations which are the problem -- with their constant manoeuvring for every scrap of information.

A more general bad effect of media coverage of hostage taking, according to some critics, is that the coverage has a contagious effect on unbalanced persons. Miller goes so far as to say the hostage taker goes for bigger and bigger events just to attract the media. But the biggest problem, according to Miller, is that a hostage taking is a delicate balance between the hostage taker and the police, and the media upset that balance. In order to minimize this, the New York police have the telephone company embargo ingoing calls and have outgoing calls transferred automatically to the police.

Miron, Murray S., and Goldstein, Arnold P., Hostage, Kalamazoo, Michigan: Behaviordelia, Inc., 1978, pp. 81-107, 166, 169.

The authors describe the media's responsibility in covering hostage takings. They say that reporting police tactics, tying up phone lines, and harrassing police personnel have been criticized for endangering the lives of the hostages or interfering with law enforcement efforts. Guidelines developed by some American media are cited as evidence that the media are considering the problems in such coverage. One chapter is devoted to information on hostage negotiation procedures.

Morf, Dr. Gustave, Le Terrorisme Québécois, Montréal: Les Editions de L'homme, 1970.

This is a historical and psychological study of terrorism in Quebec. The book centers on the background of the Front de la Libération du Québec. Morf says the terrorist has at his disposal adult techniques yet his mind has elements of childishness: he names Hitler as an example. He discusses the role of the underground press, including such newspapers as "La Victoire" and "Pouvoir Ouvrier".

Morris, Roger, "Patty Hearst and the New Terror", The New Republic, November 22, 1975, pp. 8-10.

Morris accuses the American media of sensationalizing and simplifying the events connected with the kidnapping of Patty Hearst. Journalism was reduced to "yellow press", emphasizing the trivia of the story, and making it seem less serious than it was. If the media were to thoroughly examine the ideology of the Symbionese Liberation Army, it might have to cope with the similarities as well as the differences between our social and political order and theirs.

National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, "Civil Authorities and the Media", Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, Washington, 1976, pp. 65-67.

The media can be influential in setting the tone for a proper response by civil authorities to acts of terror. It can provide an outlet for public concern, and act as a safety valve. It can, using public concern, bring about changes in official policies. It can generate public concern in positive ways to have an indirect impact on the perceptions of, and potential for, violence in the community.

Civil authorities should set up procedures for providing the media with full information on every aspect of their policies and operations. Specially trained officers should provide information and collaborate with individual members of the media to bring information to the public.

During an emergency, civil authorities should make special arrangements with the media for publicizing both the emergency and instructions to the public. During incidents of terrorism -- especially those in which the perpetrators are seeking to utilize the media for publicity -- the civil authority should be prepared to work closely with the media to frustrate these ends. Civil Authorities and representatives of the media should consider jointly drawing up detailed standards to serve as a guide when the media becomes part of the terrorist design.

National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, "Followup Reporting of Extraordinary Violence by News Media", Disorders and Terrorism: Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, Washington, 1976, pp. 401-404.

The followup coverage of incidents of extraordinary violence is ultimately of more significance than the on-the-spot coverage, because it is from the followup that the public receives the bulk of its knowledge about disorder, terrorism, and quasi-terrorism, and the official response to them.

The media should make a complete, non-inflammatory presentation to put extraordinary violence in context. This would include facts about the effects of such violence, about the fates of those responsible, and about official efforts to address social conditions leading to extraordinary violence.

National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, "News Media Self-Regulation in Contemporaneous Coverage of Terrorism and Disorder", Disorders and Terrorism: Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, Washington, 1976, pp. 387-390.

Guidelines for media coverage of extraordinary violence must come from the media themselves, but the general principle for such coverage can be summarized as "minimum intrusiveness."

Some elements of the guidelines could be: the use of pool reporters to cover activities at the scene of the incident; limitations on the use of high-intensity television lighting and other news-gathering technologies; limitations of interviews with hostage-takers; reliance on official spokesmen as sources of information concerning operations; avoiding questions which might give information about police tactics.

Further guidelines, for complete unobtrusiveness, are as follows: delaying information which may aggravate the incident; delaying information of incident location when that knowledge is not likely to become public knowledge; delaying disclosure of tactical planning; mixing reports from the hostage-taker with comments from official sources; verifying all information about injuries and property destruction before disclosure; avoiding coverage which emphasizes the spectacular quality of an incident.

National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals "Standards and Goals for Corrections (1) Prison Disorders: Relations with the News Media", Disorders and Terrorism: Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, Washington, 1976, pp. 318-320.

It is possible for the media to influence ongoing terrorist events by its coverage. This is especially true in prison disturbances. Although no attempt should be made to influence media coverage of such events, the liaison officer should discuss with the press the extent and type of coverage in order to avoid provoking further disorder.

In order to facilitate this, the institution should have a policy of promoting press/institution exchanges during times of calm, thereby reducing the need for violence as a way of drawing public attention to institutional grievances.

National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals "Standards and Goals for the Courts: Relations with the News Media", Disorders and Terrorism: Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, Washington, 1976. pp. 286-288.

In all cases involving crimes of extraordinary violence, the judiciary should avoid disclosures to the media which may prejudice the rights of defendants. However, thorough coverage of such cases should be encouraged. Recommended in particular is that detailed guidelines for media relations in particularly notorious cases be established through a pre-trial conference of the judge and the attorneys for all parties.

National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, "Standards and Goals for the Unofficial Community: News and Entertainment Media Responsibility for the Prevention of Extraordinary Violence", Disorders and Terrorism: Report of The Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, Washington, 1976. pp. 366-369.

Reports of extraordinary violence -- whether fictional or fact -- play an important part in the decision of an individual about whether to participate in such an incident. These reports are also important in influencing public fears and expectations.

The media must report extraordinary violence as long as it is a fact of life but, because of the influence the media has, it should do so only under the dictates of some guiding principles. They include: that the report be accurate; that it give appropriate emphasis to the consequences of such actions; that no unnecessary glamorization of the incident be made; that the capacity of law enforcement agencies to respond to such an incident be noted.

Fictional presentations of extraordinary violence should avoid the impression that such violence is glamorous, and should avoid giving the impression that law enforcement agencies are either incompetent or prone to use extreme force. These presentations should also present positive images of private individuals and officials dealing effectively with extraordinary violence.

National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, "Standards for the Police: Relations with the News Media", in Disorders and Terrorism: Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, Washington, 1976, pp. 236-238.

Two principles should govern police contact with the media -- police should be as candid and complete as considerations of law enforcement allow; and police should attempt to acquaint the media with the kinds of problems reporting may create.

Based on these principles, some policies can be generated: coverage of routine policework relating to extraordinary violence should be encouraged; police should support and advocate the development by the media of professional standards for self-regulation of reporting during extraordinary events; police should organize regular local forums for the exchange of police and media views on the quality of news coverage; police should develop departmental policies to maximize media access to reliable, accurate information; police should develop departmental policies to encourage follow-up reporting of incidents of extraordinary violence.

National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,
"Standard 1.7: News Media Relations" Police, 1973, pp. 44-46.

Police-media relations are discussed in this U.S. article, written from the police agencies' point of view. The author says that as long as individual freedom is protected, police should let the media receive information on request.

Nation's Police Chiefs, Media Differ on Terrorism Coverage Year Long Study Shows, Northridge, California, California State University, August 17, 1978.

A year-long study of attitudes toward terrorism coverage held by police chiefs, television and radio directors, and newspaper editors shows the police and the media differ about the effects of media coverage of terrorism. The study, headed by Michael Sommer, CSUN Associate Professor of Journalism, includes the following highlights.

1. Nearly all the police chiefs (95%) believe live television coverage of terrorism encourages terrorism. 43% of the newspaper editors agree, and 35% of the T.V. news directors agree.
2. The media and the police disagree sharply about the extent to which live television coverage is a threat to hostage safety.
3. The police differ sharply with T.V. news directors about whether T.V. reporters should communicate with terrorists while the terrorists are engaged in criminal activity.
4. A plurality of all three media groups believe communication with terrorists should take place with official consent.
5. More than half the police chiefs believe the judgments of on-the-scene television reporters covering terrorist stories are "average" or "poor".

Needham, James P., Neutralization of Prison Hostage Situations, Criminal Justice Monograph, Huntsville, Texas, Institute of Contemporary Corrections and the Behavioural Sciences, Volume 8, Number 1.

The philosophy of handling hostage situations has changed from the one prominent last century -- either giving in to all the demands or attacking the hostage taker -- to negotiation, attempting to reduce demands and buy time.

The tendency to negotiation grew from one concept in riot control, that of confrontation management--reducing intensity rather than total suppression. This concept was not well received, however, until the mid-sixties. It has as its prime consideration the protection of the safety of the hostages.

In order to cope with a hostage taking in a prison, all prisons should have a plan which would outline two missions. The first would be the safe release of the hostages, and the second the apprehension of the hostage taker. Within this plan there should be flexibility, but it should be understood that the greatest success in the past in handling hostage situations has been to negotiate with the hostage takers.

For the future, the development of a sophisticated, non-lethal weapon which will incapacitate the hostage taker, will be an important asset in dealing with the hostage situations. The paper states power of media but does not deal with it.

"Newsmen Want Pictures on Cards", Press Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1978, p. 7.

This article gives some of the media reactions to the new identification cards and police news release policy used by the Metropolitan Toronto Police since January 1978. It is noted that CFTO has its own guidelines for coverage of terrorist and hostage incidents; the television station will not suppress such stories since they affect the lives of people and since suppression could lead to loss of credibility. CFTO, however, will not phone hostage-takers, and will endeavour not to provide a platform for terrorists. Personnel, if somehow drawn into an event, will cease reporting and follow police instructions.

Nielsen, Richard, "The Media: Must we Serve as Tools for Terrorists?" in Singer, Benjamin D. (editor), Communications in Canadian Society, Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing, 1972, pp. 386-390.

Nielsen questions whether the FLQ would have succeeded in a political sense, without radio and television's extensive coverage. The alternative to more similar incidents is to get the media to agree not to immediately report political acts which specifically threaten violence to governments. Furthermore, the media should restrict politicians and others from communicating with the kidnapers through the media.

Northorp, Bruce L., Press Handling of Terrorism and Violence, unpublished paper at the 13th Commonwealth Press Union Conference, Toronto; September 15, 1978, pp.1-6.

Northorp says that he, (representing the RCMP), could not seriously envisage the police requesting the media to publish a false story to aid the police in solving a crime. He says that such action would "shoot down" the credibility of the media and the police to the benefit of no one. While Northorp says that he agrees with Hacker's argument that the terrorist craves publicity, and that the mass media crave the sensationalism of the terrorist incident, he does not support the notion of a blackout in the case of the event.

Instead he prefers that media work with the police. Calling on his experience in previous hostage-takings, Northorp outlines a few concepts that relate to the media's role in covering a hostage event. Northorp says that he insists that reporters and network crew respect police perimeter control. He says that if the press get in the line of vision of the terrorist(s) with something that may not be perceived as a camera it could result in harm to either the hostages or the members of the media.

Northorp says that the hostage-takers in prison incidents are distrustful of the media and often suspect a police-media plot (he cites the case of the B.C. Penitentiary 1978). Northorp recommends that the media members not report speculation or use terminology that would antagonize the hostage-takers.

He also says that in his experience, the hostage-takers may not rely on the promises made by the police unless they state their intentions to the press first. Northorp is grateful to the media for providing this sort of assistance.

Northorp argues that media publication or airing of the strategy used by the police in hostage situations has made the job of the police more difficult in every subsequent incident as the hostage-takers use the information as textbooks.

Olderman, Murray, "Extra! Extra! Read All About It", The Quill, Nov. 1975, pp. 16-19.

Olderman discusses the coverage of the arrest of Patricia Hearst, and the two attempts on the life of Gerald Ford. The media were criticized for over-reporting and sensationalizing the events, as well as intruding on the right of a fair trial. Furthermore, Olderman describes the Symbionese Liberation Army's manipulation of the press; for example, television stations carried "messages to the people" prepared by the SLA. More and more, however, the media is taking a critical look at itself, examining the way it covers such events.

Olderman, Murray, "Patricia Hearst is Kidnapped: And the Press too is Made Captive", The Quill, April 1974, pp. 17-19.

Olderman quotes journalists who criticize the media's handling of the Patty Hearst kidnapping. The media, they say, gave the SLA more coverage than they deserved, making them bigger than they were. Furthermore, the worst kind of pack journalism was practised. Reporters who dug out facts pertaining to the SLA were told by their editors that they couldn't publish their stories because they would offend the terrorist group.

Parry, Albert, "The New Robin Hoods, the Media and the Police", Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat, New York: The Vanguard Press, 1976, pp. 516-524.

Traditionally, terrorism has not been directed against the lower echelons of the police. A defining feature of modern terrorism, however, is the increase of violence directed against low-ranking policemen. Another feature of modern terrorism is the Robin Hood tactic of kidnapping or murdering influential people in order to compel firms to deliver ransom to the poor. This can result, in the short run, in gaining the sympathy of some of the lower classes and intellectuals. A good example is when the Symbionese Liberation Army kidnapped Patty Hearst and demanded that her father distribute food to the slum dwellers of San Francisco.

This tactic is aided by the streamlined technology of today's media. The instant coverage arouses sympathy for the terrorist and inhibits sympathy for the victim. The media also tend to give terrorism a glamorous image. Occasionally the coverage is not voluntary on the part of the media; there was demand that the Hearst papers publish the communiqués of the Symbionese Liberation Army. The papers did not dare publish anything which the terrorists might be offended by.

In West Germany, one of the conditions set for the freeing of Peter Lorenz was that five of the terrorists' comrades be released and that the state television network televise the release. The station did so and was, in effect, in the control of the terrorists for 72 hours.

Parry, James, "The Frightening Boom in Corporate Kidnaps", Canadian Business, November 1977, pp. 66, 110, 114.

Parry tells business executives what to do in preparation for the possibility of being kidnapped, or of a member of the family being kidnapped. He quotes Captain Detective Douglas Stone, specialist in kidnapping and extortion with the Montreal Urban Community Police, who advises not contacting the media since extensive press coverage during the critical first few days after such an event can affect the outcome.

Parry also notes how two reporters were designated by the kidnapers of Charles Marion, a credit manager with the Caisse Populaire of Sherbrooke East, Quebec, to deliver the ransom. He says that during that kidnapping, relations between the press and authorities were strained to the limit. Parry says the conflict of interest will no doubt be repeated in future kidnappings.

Pierre, Andrew J., "Coping with International Terrorism",
----- pp. 60-65.

International terrorism is a rapidly growing phenomenon. In the past six years there have been over 500 major acts of international terrorism.

International terrorism is usually political in intent and it aims to accomplish one or more of the following: attract publicity for a cause, induce a government to over-react and alienate itself from the people; undermine the authority of the state, make money to finance the cause.

As international terrorism is a problem of politics, not law, the solution will have to include a recognition of the political dimension. Prevention, as well as deterrence, will have to be stressed, and this means proper respect must be shown for dissident groups, and some non-violent channel for protest must be opened.

An example of the need for this is the case of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which, through the use of terrorism, succeeded in bringing the cause of the Palestinian people to world attention. Before the PLO activities, the Palestinian people were ignored.

In the short run, however, deterrence is likely to be most effective. This would include measures such as making sure terrorist acts do not go unpunished, applying sanctions against countries giving asylum to terrorists, cooperation among countries in sharing technological aid to combat terrorists, and the media not giving terrorists undue publicity.

Points of Discussion for Law Enforcement and Media Cooperation in Terrorist Situations, Washington D.C. Police, Washington, D.C., 1979.

There should be established procedures for handling hostage situations which include having a designated information officer from the police, a designated media person the police can contact, and having a media command post on the scene.

Continual live coverage of a terrorist incident is questionable in that it heightens the importance and cause of the terrorist and gives the terrorist a free public platform. Interviews by the media with the hostage-taker may cause phone lines to be tied up, may remind the hostage-taker of demands or of a deadline, or may simply provoke and inflame the hostage-taker.

"Press/Media Guidelines Prompt Responses", Crime Control Digest, December 12, 1977, pp. 7-8.

This article talks about the reactions by police and reporters to Police Chief (Washington, D.C.) Maurice Cullinane's proposed guidelines for the media during hostage or terrorist incidents. The CBS rules on covering terrorism and hostage-taking are spelled out in full. For instance, CBS News will not suppress such an event and will call a hostage-taker after consulting with the police.

"Psyching out Terrorists", Medical World, June 27, 1977, pp. 15-17, 21.

The tactics used by Dutch psychiatrist Dirk Mulder in his negotiations with South Moluccan terrorists holding nearly 170 hostages in a train and school are discussed in some detail. It is noted that the Moluccans had studied newspaper accounts of psychological pressuring by authorities in previous incidents, so they were sophisticated in their knowledge of negotiations. Dr. Mulder explains that publicity in the early stages is desirable in order to minimize risk to the lives of the hostages.

Rabe, Robert L., Terrorism and the Media, paper presented to the Radio-Television News Directors Association meeting, March 24, 1977.

The media is part of the problem in a hostage-taking situation. Since the Munich incident in 1972 the media has been giving terrorists the main ingredient they need: nationwide exposure. Media reports also reduce any tactical advantage the police may have -- informing the hostage taker of police movements and equipment changes. Moreover, reporters have tied up phone lines talking to the hostage taker, impeding police negotiations. This presents an additional danger of upsetting the hostage taker with inflammatory questions. The media should set priorities and guidelines for dealing with a hostage-taking incident.

Rabe, Robert L., Terrorism and the Media: An Issue of Responsible Journalism, Unpublished paper, November 17, 1977.

Rabe's remarks are directed at the small segment of the media which, he says, has caused police the most concern for the safety of hostages in a hostage-taking. He cites incidents in which reporters might have endangered the lives of the victims. For example, during the Hanafi siege in Washington, D.C., one journalist reported over radio and television what appeared to him to be boxes of ammunition being taken into the B'nai B'rith building in preparation for an all-out police assault. In fact the boxes contained food for the hostages.

Thus Rabe encourages "responsible reporting" -- using one's judgment to determine which elements of a hostage-taking can be reported without risking the lives of the victims. He criticizes detailed reports by the media on the tactics being used by the police during such an event.

Furthermore, he says, the media should limit their coverage of a terrorist incident to protect the criminal's right to a fair trial. Adverse pre-trial publicity, for instance, can become grounds for a mistrial or for the case being dismissed. Rabe stressed that he does not advocate a news blackout during such crimes, only that reporters take care in what they tell the public.

Rabe, Robert L., "Terrorism and the Media: A Police Negotiator's Viewpoint", North Carolina Police Officer, Autumn, 1978, pp. 21-25.

Rabe, Assistant Chief of Police in Washington, D.C., has been involved in a number of terrorist incidents including the Hanafi incident and the Georgetown hostage-taking.

He has two major criticisms of the media in their role in these types of incidents. "They are: (1) The practise of conducting telephone interviews with the hostage-takers; and (2) The broadcasting unlimited live coverage from the scene of such incidents."

During the hostage-taking at the Georgetown Boutique police could only contact the hostage-takers four times in three hours; reporters interviewing the hostage-takers tied up the phone line. Live coverage sometimes broadcasts police movements to the hostage-taker. "When a hostage-taker can turn on a radio or television and actually hear of or see police movements, it provides him with a source of intelligence, an advantage not even afforded the police".

Rabe concedes that most media personnel operate responsibly, and that the media perform a vital function in these incidents by stopping the flow of exaggerated rumors. He says media and police must work together to establish voluntary guidelines for media behaviour in terrorist incidents.

"Reporting Conflict in an Age of Change: Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence", Columbia Journalism Review, Spring 1970, pp. 24-25.

This report promotes accurate coverage of violence and conflict -- "providing an accurate perception of the world is the media's most important responsibility." (page 24).

It focuses on the media's role in defusing a social disorder or preventing it from getting out of hand. "Indeed," reports the commission, "how much they do may determine whether it starts at all or how much it grows..."(page 24).

The commission criticizes the news media for not instigating social action (against stereotypical attitudes) which, the report suggests, can be done by allowing "new and different voices" to gain access to the media. Violent aspects of the news, argues the commission, should be kept in perspective.

In the case of a social crisis, news delays, says the commission, may be more beneficial than unverified reports of the events. It also encourages the use of community and media guidelines that can be put into practice.

Revzin, Philip, "A Reporter Looks at Media Role in Terror Threats", Wall Street Journal, March 14, 1977, p. 16.

Using the hostage takings by Cory Moore, Ashby Leach and the Washington Hanafi Muslims as examples, Revzin discusses and worries about the use of the media by terrorists for a political end. He writes that the main problem lies in the fact that the traditional definition of news -- possibility of death; suspense; a defined beginning, middle and end; and violence -- insures the coverage of terrorist acts. He feels that some ethical guidelines need to be developed, in order to curb terrorism and its media manipulation.

Rosenbaum, Ron and Schang, Gabrielle "Now the Urban Guerrillas Have a Real Problem", More, November, 1976, pp.16-21

The Weathermen, and other underground groups are publishing magazines of their own. The Weathermen's magazine, Osawotomie, is published underground and then distributed in bundles by members of the group. Two other magazines written by underground groups are Dragon, and The Urban Guerrilla. These magazines are published above ground, using articles written by the underground group. Osawotomie is used as a link between the underground and the overground, while the other magazines are often used in a much more specific way, to inform the readership and other groups what people or institutions should or will be targets for attacks.

Rowe, Peter, "Strange Allies", The Canadian, May 28, 1977, pp. 4-9.

This article describes the Stockholm Syndrome, also known as "survival identification" or "transference". Rowe cites cases in which in which this phenomenon occurred, explaining how and why it happens. In one instance, a Toronto Star reporter, kidnapped in Beirut by members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, later wrote a news story in which he described the PLO as "very charming" and "always polite".

Hostages identify most often when they are treated with some compassion, but even violence and injury do not necessarily prevent hostage sympathy. For example, a Dutch businessman held hostage and treated badly by the Irish Republican Army later said he felt no great antagonism toward his captors.

One group of people seems to remain immune to the Syndrome. They are the British, usually middle-aged; even long periods of captivity did not encourage the identification process.

Salant, Richard S., "CBS News Issues Guidelines for Coverage of Terrorists", (CBS Radio Network News) CBS News Standards, April 7, 1977, pp. 1-2.

CBS News specifies in its guidelines that the adverse effects of the suppression of news, in the case of a hostage-taking or terrorist incident, would be too great for such action to be taken. They argue that a blackout would give way to erroneous rumours surrounding any incident, would cause the network to lose all credibility, and would distort news judgement.

However the network promotes careful judgement and restraint in the reporting of terrorist events. The network would try to avoid providing the terrorist with a platform for voicing his/her political ideologies (this may mean no live coverage of the terrorist.)

CBS says that reporters should not tie up lines to the hostage-takers, that might be needed by the police, and that they have a responsibility to contact the local authorities and experts in order that they may not interfere with the official handling of the hostage incident. If instructions from the authorities appear as an attempt to suppress news the reporter is advised to contact his superior. Finally, CBS recommends that the network does not overplay a terrorism story to the neglect of the coverage of other news events.

Salant, Richard S., "CBS Rules on Terrorist Coverage", More, June 1977, p. 21.

Guidelines on coverage of terrorists were issued by CBS News President Richard S. Salant on April 7, 1977 in the wake of the Hanafi Muslim incident in Washington, D.C.

CBS is the only American network to have formulated a written policy at the time of the article's publication. Salant says CBS will continue to cover such incidents of terrorism that fit their "normal tests of news judgement," but "there must be thoughtful, conscientious care and restraint." The rules are paraphrased:

- 1) Paraphrase rather than carry live terrorists' demands which are full of rhetoric and propaganda.
- 2) Except with the approval of the CBS News President, there should be no live coverage of the terrorist.
- 3) News personnel should try to ascertain whether their use of telephone lines will interfere with the authorities' communications.
- 4) CBS News representatives should contact experts dealing with the hostage situation to gain guidance in their reportage -- not instruction.
- 5) Local authorities should be given the name or names of CBS News personnel.
- 6) In dealing with a hostage story reporters should obey all police instructions but report immediately to their superiors any such instructions that seem to be intended to manage or suppress the news.
- 7) Coverage of this kind of story should be in such overall balance as to length, that it does not unduly crowd out other important news of the hour/day.

Salomone, Franco, "Terrorism and the Mass Media", in M.C. Bassiouni, ed., International Terrorism and Political Crimes, Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1975, pp. 33-46.

Salomone argues that in the case of the media coverage of terrorist activities, the printed medium has less of a shock impact than the audio-visual media and therefore is relied upon less by the aggressors for publicity. However, he says that the printed media may take a position that will either endorse or oppose terrorist activities which may, in the long run, affect the general attitude of the community towards terrorist activity.

Salomone takes his own paper, Il Tempo, as an example of press influence in a country (Italy) riddled with terrorist problems. He says that the general attitude of the country people is one of total condemnation of terrorist activities.

Salomone brings forth the idea that terrorists seek the media "for itself", not for the position that it takes. They desire only publicity, not sympathy or support. While Salomone supports the notion of the freedom of the press, he says that in a democracy (in the case of terrorist incidents) the press is not totally immune from legal and ethical limitations. The question is then what type of controls can be applied to the press and how can they be enforced.

Salomone insists that there is still the need for empirical data to show what, if any, effect will control of the media have on the control of terrorism. Should it be shown that restraints are beneficial, then Salomone says that the media should form its own council without interference from outside sources, which could develop controls based on the right of the press to freedom of information, and the right of the public to freedom of communication.

Scanlon, Joseph, The Media in Two Hostage Incidents: Part of the Act, Unpublished paper, Association for Education in Journalism, August, 1979, Houston, Texas.

The media finds hostage incidents ideal news. These incidents are clear-cut, involve human life, and have a clear and specific ending. Also, the participants are often media-conscious, sometimes demanding media presence.

Although hostage incidents are attractive in terms of news values, many questions are raised about the role of journalists in society, and about ethics. The Emergency Communications Research Unit at Carleton University has investigated some of the effects of media reporting in hostage incidents and found a number of problems. In a prison hostage-taking a reporter became a negotiator and this affected his ability to be an objective reporter. In the same incident, prison authorities thought a report on the identity of one of the hostages might endanger his life, and so lied when a reporter tried to confirm the identity.

In a different hostage-taking in a small town in Manitoba, reporters phoned in to the hostage-taker and interviewed him. This tied up the telephone lines and police felt it extended the incident by 12-24 hours.

Scanlon, Joe, "What the Police Say About the Press", Journalism Studies Review, Number 3, June 1978.

Police officers at the Canadian Police College in Ottawa were asked to write up a specific police-media incident from their own experience. The resulting 375-400 case studies were analysed as to the nature of the complaint.

The most common complaint -- about 15 percent -- was that the media present allegations without giving the police a chance to present their side. Other complaints revolve around the behaviour of the reporters during incidents, such as hostage-takings. In one case, reporters phoned the hostage-takers while they were cornered and broadcast the comments. In another case, a radio reporter phoned a hostage-taker and asked why so little ransom was being asked. And in another case a television show gave little coverage of a shoot-out situation and the coverage was monitored by the gunmen who were able to use information to counter police action.

Scanlon, Joseph with Taylor, Brian and Blum, Wendy, The Dorchester Hostage-Taking: Communications in the Wake of an Unexpected Event, ECRU Field Report, Ottawa: Carleton University, 1976.

This report, compiled mostly using survey techniques, deals with communications during the hostage taking at the Dorchester maximum security institution at Dorchester, New Brunswick in October, 1976. A prisoner took a guard hostage, was joined in his task by three other prisoners, and later took another prisoner hostage.

The report deals with two main facets of the event's communications. The first is the general flow of information concerning the hostage-taking in the Dorchester community. The second deals more particularly with the role of the media, not only in the overall flow, but also in the hostage-taking itself.

While a large percentage of the sample interviewed in the community were unable to remember when and where and how they first heard of the incident, most had heard first from the mass media. The report outlines the media's role in this case study and attempts to use it to raise questions on the topic of the role of the media in hostage-takings in general.

Scanlon says the responsibility of the prison staff is clearly to prevent the release of any information which could damage the hostages. But he adds that the duty of the reporter, who is often unfamiliar with prisons, is not clear. "Should they accept the word of prison authorities about what should be published or not published? If they do this will they lose their credibility? Do they have a responsibility to protect the lives of hostage victims? Is the public's need to know of greater importance than a potential threat to individuals? Is a responsibility to protect greater than the need for retaining their credibility by accurate reports? On what basis do they make such judgments? And who calls them to account if their judgments are wrong?" Scanlon makes no judgments concluding, "Frankly, we have no answers to most of these questions. We raise them to point out that the area is a most difficult one and one that appears not to have been covered very well in the past."

Scanlon, Joe, Taylor, Brian and Tait, David, The Oak Lake Incident: A Report on Media-Police Relations in a Hostage Taking Situation, Restricted ECRU Field Report, Ottawa: Emergency Communications Research Unit, 1978.

The authors describe the events of a hostage taking in Oak Lake, Man., in which a man held three hostages in a doctor's house for about four days. Among the findings of the report are:

- the media will find out about such an event, even without the help of the police.
- once the media learn of such an event they will report it.
- some residents first heard about the hostage taking from reporters calling to ask for more details.
- as the week wore on, the townspeople came to know more about what was going on but they became increasingly uncooperative with the press.
- the media cooperated when the police asked for cooperation and promised something in return.

It was also known that the hostage taker had two television sets and a number of radios going all the time. Some of the news broadcasts disturbed him.

Police in Calgary asked the media to cooperate in not publishing news of the connection between the hostage taking and a murder in Calgary. The media cooperated.

The authors suggest that two kinds of press specialists should be appointed by police during such incidents. One should be a media spokesman, who will appear on camera and make comments for public use. The other should be someone who understands the way media operate, and can provide the sort of guidance the media ask for.

Schreiber, Jan, The Ultimate Weapon: Terrorists and World Order, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1978.

Schreiber investigates the social, legal, political and psychological aspects of terrorism. Among the specific areas covered in this book are the "Stockholm Syndrome", the motives of terrorist groups, the terrorist in captivity, and the media's role and importance in such incidents. Schreiber discusses the techniques of some terrorists, and why they succeeded or failed. What can be done about this crime is put forth, as well as what cannot.

Schultz, Ernie, Coverage of Terrorist-Hostage Situations. Paper delivered to Radio and Television News Directors Association seminar, Indiana, USA.

Broadcast news is receiving its sharpest criticism since Nixon, over the issue of hostage-taking reporting, but, in view of the range of problems in the business, the hostage controversy is a bit exaggerated.

The criticisms of the media come from sources which range from the government to the media itself. Andrew Young accused the media of advertising to neurotic people that the easy way to get something done is to do something suicidal, or ridiculous. Cleveland news director Virgil Dominic said the media was glorifying law breakers.

Some mistakes have been made -- phone lines have been tied up by newsmen, police movements have been reported to kidnappers, and there may have been some incidents receiving too much coverage. The problem is to do something about it. Walter Cronkite says that if the incidents are not covered at all, the public will doubt the press is fully covering any story -- media credibility will suffer. Some critics have suggested guidelines but there are problems with them as well. Rabe suggests not interviewing hostage-takers at all, but if the kidnapper makes an interview a part of his demands, what position should the media take?

In fact, each situation has to be handled differently. Some incidents deserve little attention. Others, where there is danger to the public, need wider attention. The National News council is collecting guidelines from all the organizations which have them and will distribute them to the news media.

Shales, Tom, "The Crisis and the Media", The Washington Post, Washington, D.C., March 11, 1977, pp. B1 and B11.

The distinction between the reporter and the participant became blurred during a 39-hour hostage taking in Washington. For example the first radio reporter to speak to the hostages live on air became himself the centre of media attention. He was contacted by all the major dailies and is now considering writing a book on the incident.

During the hostage taking the best source of information was telephone conversations with the hostage takers. Reporters on the scene, on the other hand, were frustrated by the lack of official reports and general lack of activity.

Many decisions were made by members of the media, during the incident, regarding media responsibility to the hostages and to the public. One live radio interview with a hostage taker was cut short and not reproduced on the evening newscast, because of a police request.

Because one reporter was shot at the outset, Shales says many reporters found it difficult to remain objective while covering this particular event. A former newsman was one of the hostages and acted as a go-between for hostage takers and the police and media.

Shales also says that a local television station cancelled two movies related to hostage taking and replaced them with comedies. One station hired a psychiatrist to predict what the outcome of the event would be. Many beats were left unstaffed while everyone turned their attention to the hostage incident.

Shales says that no one determined what, if any, coverage the hostage takers were listening to. He says that radio broadcasters were frightened they might say something that would anger one of the hostage takers who then might kill a hostage.

Shandler, Phillip, "Phone Company Seeks Authority to Limit Calls During Sieges", Washington Star, June 21, 1977 p.B1.

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company is requesting authority from the D.C. Public Service Commission to limit phone calls when the police consider limitation necessary to protect lives. An official of the American Civil Liberties Union said the language of the request was dangerously broad and such authority might result in misuse.

Shesgreen, Sean, "Missing the Story in Northern Ireland", Chicago Journalism Review, Chicago; Nov. 1971, Vol. 4, No. 11, pp. 11-12.

Shesgreen accuses the American press of largely showing pro-British bias in their reports on the activities in Northern Ireland. He cites the terminology used by the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times in referring to the Catholics in Northern Ireland as "gunmen" and "terrorists". Shesgreen says that it is the Catholics in Northern Ireland who are being discriminated against. He uses examples like the high unemployment figures in the Catholic sector as compared to low unemployment in the Protestant sector of Northern Ireland to argue that (what he sees as) the anti-IRA coverage by the American press is unjust. Instead of referring to Catholics in Northern Ireland as "terrorists", Shesgreen feels that the American press should see these people as "oppressed, unemployed, disenfranchised, ghettoized and very human people."

"Some points included in guidelines issued by NEC", (unpublished)

1. Assume the terrorists know everything being broadcast.
2. Qualify all information carried and withhold rumors until verified.
3. Competitive pressures should not override professional journalistic judgment.
4. Give the news staff time to rest; tired people make mistakes.

Stratton, John G., "The Terrorist Act of Hostage-Taking: A View of Violence and the Perpetrators", Journal of Police Science and Administration.
----- 1978, pp. 1-9.

John Stratton defines all hostage takers as terrorists with different "causes, motives and rationale". He identifies three categories of terrorists: social, political or religious crusaders; criminal terrorists; mentally ill terrorists.

Those who fall in the first category, says Stratton, are familiar with the law, societal reactions, the actions of other terrorist organizations and how to get publicity via the media. The second group of people, he says, take hostages as a "last resort" when trying to avoid arrest for another crime. The third category of terrorist as seen by Stratton, is trying to acquire power and recognition and has learnt that the taking of hostages can gain one publicity through the press.

It is with the mentally ill hostage taker that Stratton says the police have to be most careful as they are hard, if not impossible, to categorize and police must be trained to see things from their viewpoint when communicating with them.

He says that one must approach the terrorist with the goal of determining his potential for violence. Stratton argues that terrorism, "like violence, has presented itself through history" although we are more acutely aware of it because of the mass media. Stratton says that television has an enormous impact on how society views violence "and in fact may influence how violent our society becomes."

Stratton also says that we have substantially reduced skyjackings through airport security and that we have attempted to categorize hostage-takers by the use of profile charts based on the backgrounds and physical appearance of previous terrorists. He is sceptical, however, of categorizing criminals on a psychological basis.

Strentz, Thomas, The Stockholm Syndrome: Law Enforcement Policy and Ego Defenses of the Hostage, unpublished paper.

Strentz explains the "Stockholm Syndrome, " including such characteristics as the hostage's attachment to the hostage taker caused by dependence on the hostage-taker for the gift of life. He compares such an event with an infant's dependence on its mother to see to its needs and protect it from the outside world. Strentz also notes the fear of the police, which is felt by the hostage who believes that the police have let him down by allowing the crime to happen, and by the police's possession of weapons which the hostage comes to believe are deployed against him as well as against the hostage taker. Strentz recognizes that each victim's reaction depends on his contact with the hostage taker. See p.1 for the only reference to the media's role in the Stockholm hostage taking.

Swietnicki, Edward M., "Gaps in Crime Reporting are Noted at Symposium", Editor and Publisher, June 9, 1973, pp. 14, 28.

Swietnicki summarized the criticisms of the media which were made at the first national symposium on crime and the media. For example, reporters were criticized for not interviewing inmates as often as they could. They were also accused of blowing out of proportion crime events. For instance, when a motorist was killed in a parking lot by a group of juveniles, radio and TV repeatedly referred to the crime as "one more instance of San Francisco's crime wave". Yet, when the charge was dismissed by the courts after testimony that the motorist had initiated the fight, the dismissal only got on the air for a few seconds. The one specific reference to skyjacking was the media's impact on the kind and number of airplane skyjackings ("It's not entirely coincidental that when we report a hijacking another one occurs. Someone else gets the same idea." p. 28)

Tait, Dave, Police Policy Regarding the Media During Hostage-taking Incidents: a Case Study, paper prepared for criminology course at Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, 1978, pp. 1-30.

In January 1978 three people were taken hostage in Oak Lake, Manitoba, a town of about 400 located 15 miles east of Virden in southern Manitoba close to the Saskatchewan border. A police officer was killed and two others wounded by a couple who then proceeded to hold three hostages in the home of a local doctor. The female captor was taken to hospital at the outset which left a single male hostage taker in the house. The incident lasted from Monday to Friday.

Tait says that the police called to the scene were not prepared to handle a barrage of some 40 reporters who came to cover the story. The newspeople, says Tait, outnumbered the RCMP personnel and early conflicts developed when police officers decided to take the "adversary approach" to the news media.

The media members then, says Tait, had to circumvent official channels in order to meet their deadlines (while acutely aware of the explosiveness of the situation). The telephone line to the hostage taker was used by radio broadcasters and press reporters who conducted long interviews with the captor. The frustrated police force says they tried to stop this and keep the lines clear. However, says Tait, they made the mistake of not asking the media people directly and consequently the interviews were said to have boosted the morale of the hostage taker who felt the publicity would guarantee that his demands would be met.

The police assigned an officer, inexperienced in press/police relations, to deal with the media. Tait says that he held press conferences but revealed little and did not tell the press members what to say and what not to say. The media members, says Tait, had to censor themselves.

Not until the very end of the episode did the police ask the press to withhold information. This was when the hostage taker was ready to give himself up and the police had arranged for the press to take pictures as long as they didn't phone their editors until the incident was over. They cooperated.

Tait argues that the press can be trusted to be responsible and cooperate with police as long as the police are straightforward with their information and requests. He cites the example of the Calgary media who sat on a story about a possible Calgary murder link to the hostage-taking incident at the request of the RCMP.

Tait recommends that the police have a plan prepared to deal with the media prior to a crisis and that they appoint a liaison (experienced) officer at the outset to facilitate conditions and allow both the media and the police to do their jobs.

"Terrorism and Censorship!" Editor and Publisher, 1977, March 19.

President Carter said he has no desire to seek legislation as a solution to the problem of press coverage of terrorism. In fact, because of the first amendment, Carter could not seek this legislation. It is true that reporters have severe problems in the coverage of terrorism -- the media tends to be used by the terrorists -- but in general the press has done a good job in covering terrorism.

"Terrorism and Fit News", New York Times, (editorial) ----- .

Ambassador Andrew Young criticized the press after the Hanafi Moslem hostage incident, saying that the press was advertising to neurotic people that suicidal actions can be a solution to their problems. Young proposed restricting the press by law in its coverage of violent crimes. But this exacts a price -- how is it possible to ensure the restrictions would only apply to terrorists?

"That Document is Only A Draft", Content, Vol. 30, 1973, pp. 7-8.

Representatives of the Canadian Association of Broadcasters argue that the set of guidelines drawn up by the CAB and the Association of Police Chiefs of Canada concerning the coverage of crisis by broadcasters, are not an infringement on the rights of a free press.

The spokesman says that the news media did not consult with the CAB before publishing a lot of "misinformation." He says that the guidelines are the result of poor media coverage of the Quebec crisis and lay a foundation for better working relations between broadcasters and police in Canada. The spokesman says that the CAB would not accept, under any circumstances, the "control" or "suppression" of the news by the police. Accusations to this effect, made by the print media after the "Media 73" meeting in which the CAB presented their draft of the guidelines, are unfounded, says the CAB spokesman.

Trounstine, Philip J., "We Interrupt this Program: Indiana Kidnapper Directs Live Newscasts with Shotgun", More, June 1977, pp. 14-16.

Trounstine outlines the events of a 62-hour siege in February 1977 in Indianapolis where Anthony Kiritsis abducted as a hostage company executive Richard Hall and imprisoned him in an apartment. A number of reporters descended upon the site. The hostage taker emerged from the building holding a shotgun to the hostage's head. The media, through off-the-record statements by the mayor, were led to believe the hostage taker wanted to make a final statement before members of the press and live television cameras before surrendering. NBC covered the hostage taker live and ABC soon followed.

Instead of surrendering, the hostage-taker delivered a 25-minute tirade riddled with obscenities and continually threatened to kill his hostage. Some stations carried the entire drama live, while others left sometime during the incident. The hostage taker eventually surrendered.

Trounstine merely recounts the events and makes no judgements of the media effects or decisions. But he does point out the questions raised by the incident. To quote, "Along with the instantaneous decision of whether to stay on the air, other serious questions were raised by the Indianapolis incident. Was the story worthy of the detailed coverage it received? How much should be broadcast that might endanger the hostage if the kidnapper hears about it? Should newsmen become involved in negotiations?"

"TV Newsmen Split on Air Time for Terrorists", More, June 1977, p. 20.

In the wake of the Kiritsis and Hanafi terrorist incidents, More queried television newsmen around the country to determine if individual stations are drafting ethical codes to guide their news coverage. The answer, in general, was no. But the dozen journalists interviewed expressed pointed and sometimes contradictory opinions. For instance, reporter Jim Warren from KPHO-TV in Phoenix said, "We pretty much accede to what the authorities want." But Lou Rothbart, news director for KTLA-TV in Los Angeles responded, "If the media doesn't play an adversary role, the police might take justice further than they should."

"Unauthorized Broadcast of Federal Aviation Administration Communication .
By Broadcast and Other Federal Communications Licensees", Public Notice FCC
Washington D.C., Feb. 2, 1972, pp. 1-2.

This is a warning to broadcasters, issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on behalf of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), that they are not to use communications via radio for public broadcast (either live or taped) during the time of a hostage incident (or other crisis). While the FCC says that they do not want to impinge on the right of a network to collect news information on air events, they are concerned about frightening the public by the broadcasting of rumours of possible hijackings (that are picked up on the FAA frequency). The FCC says that FAA officials will help the media in gathering information, but that the broadcasting of air-ground communications without FAA permission is in violation of Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 and could result in prosecution of broadcasters.

Walker, Jerry, "Psychologist Proposes News Guides", Editor and Publisher,
Sept. 17, 1977.

Preston Hostman, a police officer turned psychologist, recommends six ways the media can help avoid the spread of hostage situations; these are:

1. Not naming the hostage-takers, not talking about their methods, not reporting anything they say, not reporting their demands, and not saying why they did it.
2. If media coverage is part of the negotiated demand, the coverage should be as limited as possible.
3. The media should show an image of the hostage-taker as a loser, and his act as being despicable.
4. The media should say that no hostage situation has ever been successful for the hostage taker.
5. The media should never call the hostage-taker directly.
6. Continued live coverage should be eliminated.

Hostman made the suggestions during a panel session which included David Bryan of WCBM radio in Baltimore. Bryan had been in contact with a hostage-taker in 1975 when he called a bank hold-up man from his (Bryan's) studio. Bryan made a tape of that incident and in it he showed that he had a calming effect on the hostage-taker, and the policeman had a disruptive effect. Bryan said reporters are more sensitive and therefore make better negotiators than police.

Waltzer, Michael, "The New Terrorists", The New Republic, August 30, 1973, p. 12-14.

Waltzer says that terrorism is roughly a hundred years old. He maintains that what makes contemporary terrorism new is that it is aimed at the whole society, including innocent people. He cites three historical cases from different parts of the world where the terror was aimed at specific individuals. When innocent lives were threatened, the terrorists retreated. When innocent lives were mistakenly taken by the terrorists, they were horrified. But today, according to Waltzer, terrorists try to strike fear into everyone's hearts and too many people rationalize terror. The media are part of this permissive atmosphere surrounding terrorism. "Statesmen rush about to make bargains with them; journalists construct elaborate 'apologies' on their behalf." That is the only media reference.

Wilkinson, Paul, "Terrorism and the Media ", Journalism Quarterly, No. 3, Summer 1978, pp. 2-6.

Wilkinson states that while it is unfair to blame the media for the invention and increasing scale of terrorism, it is also clearly the case that modern mass media have contributed to the effectiveness of terrorism as international propaganda. But, he argues, this is just one reason for the escalation of terrorist incidents and a responsible, well-informed press can work effectively against terrorism and often does. Government pressures, according to Wilkinson, to control the media should be strongly resisted. Faithful cooperation between media, public, police and government can only be achieved, in Wilkinson's opinion, by informal understanding, goodwill, and voluntary self-restraint on the part of the media.

Wilkinson, Paul, "Terrorism vs. Liberal Democracy -- the Problems of Response", Conflict Studies No. 67. The Council of the Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1976.

It is particularly hard for Liberal Democracies to deal with terrorism, as they cannot respond with the sort of draconian measures that would eliminate terrorism. However, the Liberal Democracies should not opt for a soft response; rather, they should take a hard line, but stay within the democratic framework. This consists principally in not acceding to terrorists' demands, particularly when those demands are the release of other, imprisoned comrades.

Wilson, Jerry, "News Media Relations ", Police Report; A View of Law Enforcement, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Ltd., 1975. pp. 104-107.

Wilson briefly discusses the relationship between the media and the police in the case of civil disorders and demonstrations.

He says that in the case of a "major special event, demonstration, or disorder" that would involve more than the regular beat reporters, the police department should establish a strong public information office. The information officers are to act as buffers between the news media and the policemen, both on location and at the headquarters, to minimize media interference with police activity while enabling the media to get "good coverage" of the event. Wilson suggests that the officers be available at headquarters, to provide non-local reporters with statistical information about the area, and in the field, to shepherd the reporters and camera crews so that they get "good coverage".

He says that the attitudes of the police involved in the event towards the media will be determined by the rank and file at the police department. Wilson argues that the media became aware of how it could influence the actions and reactions of people during urban riots and civil disorders in the 1960's, and has since made a conscious effort not to play up minor events to the point where they become major disorders. Past mistakes made by the media during the coverage of disorders should not affect the way they are treated by the police today, argues Wilson.

Winfrey, Carey, "Hanafi Seizure Fans new Debate on Press Coverage of Terrorists", The New York Times,

Winfrey quotes journalists and politicians who express differing views on whether the media should take restraints in their coverage of terrorist events. This debate was renewed by coverage of the Hanafi Moslem holding of 135 hostages in Washington. James Reston, writing in The New York Times during the siege, said the media was being used by the terrorists. In a newspaper column, Ronald Reagan called on radio and television news directors to stop all live coverage of terrorist events which only inspired others to similar acts.

4. READING LIST

READING LIST

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