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
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*Report of the Proceedings*

# **Workshop on Police Productivity and Performance**

*May 25 and 26, 1978*



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REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

WORKSHOP ON POLICE PRODUCTIVITY AND PERFORMANCE

May 25 and 26, 1978

edited by

PETER ENGSTAD and MICHÈLE LIOY

Law Enforcement Section  
Research Division  
Programs Branch  
Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada



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The Research Division of the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police in the planning of the Workshop.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank all the participants for sharing their ideas and their experiences. In particular, we would like to thank Chief R. Lunney, Prof. V.N. Macdonald, Mr. J. Needle, Mr. R. Clarke, Mr. A. Burrows, Mr. D. Farmer, Supt. R.N. Hewyood, Prof. A. Grant, and Dr. G. Kelling, each of whom presented a paper at the Workshop. These papers stimulated much valuable discussion among Workshop participants and we anticipate that they will be equally stimulating to the wider audience of these proceedings.

We would also like to thank Mr. B.C. Hofley, Assistant Deputy Minister, Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada, for defining the major issues which were to be discussed during the Workshop; Mr. André Bissonnette, Deputy Solicitor General of Canada, who outlined the Ministry's view of the function and importance of research; Chief Brian Sawyer, who delivered a spirited and challenging address after the banquet; and Dep./Comm'r. J.R.R. Quintal, who discussed the "Future of Policing in Canada" at the luncheon.

In addition, it is important to recognize the substantial contribution made by the discussion group leaders and their assistants.

Our grateful appreciation is also extended to C/Supt. R.G. Moffatt and the staff of the Canadian Police College for their cooperation with the Law Enforcement Research staff in the planning of the Workshop, for the use of their facilities, and for the hospitality they extended to Workshop participants.

Finally, we would like to thank our secretary, Rita Rouleau, for her valuable assistance.

Peter Engstad, Workshop Chairperson  
Michèle Lioy, Workshop Coordinator

FOREWORD

by

*Peter A. Engstad*  
*Ministry of the Solicitor General*

Faced with rapidly escalating costs and restraint in government spending, police officials at all levels are under intense pressure to set objectives and formulate policies aimed at maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations.

In order to assist police officials in responding to the challenge posed by these developments, the Research Division of the Ministry of the Solicitor General, in collaboration with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, held a two-day Workshop on Police Productivity and Performance at the Canadian Police College.

It was intended that the Workshop would serve to:

1. Acquaint key figures in the Canadian police and research communities with Canadian, U.S., and British research and experience in the conceptualization and measurement of police productivity and performance;
2. To examine critically both traditional and innovative approaches to the conceptualization and measurement of police productivity and performance;
3. To identify and examine key philosophical, political, policy and operational concerns facing police departments seeking to maximize department productivity, the performance of individual members, and public satisfaction with the delivery of police services in their respective communities;

4. To assist the Ministry of the Solicitor General in formulating a program of research in the area of police productivity and performance which is responsive to the needs of the Canadian police community.

We were hopeful, moreover, that by bringing together knowledgeable and experienced police officials and capable researchers, the Workshop would serve to enhance understanding, rapport, and effective collaboration between the Canadian police and research communities. Looking ahead, we hope that by combining the knowledge and experience of police officials with the kind of knowledge and understanding that good research can make available, police and researchers will, together, be able to make significant advances in improving efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of police services.

The eighty Workshop participants were drawn almost equally from the Canadian police community and from the research community involved in law enforcement research in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom.

A binder of background material, including a number of major studies done in the area of police productivity, was forwarded to all the participants a few weeks before the Workshop in order to ensure consistency of background information. The list of these papers is included at the end of these proceedings. As a lack of readily available Canadian studies was noted while compiling this binder of materials, a search for Canadian material was initiated, and we are presently examining the possibility of publishing a reader containing Canadian studies on police productivity.

These proceedings include the papers given during the plenary sessions, followed by an edited transcript of the discussions which took place after the presentations; the addresses delivered at the banquet and the official luncheon; and the reports prepared by the leaders of each of the discussion groups.

The following guidelines were suggested to group leaders for their consideration when preparing their report for publication. Each issue area was to be examined from the point of view of:

1. How can the productivity of prevailing police practices be increased;
2. Identifying innovative policies and/or procedures which might enhance police productivity;
3. Identifying with as much precision as possible those research questions which have potential for contributing to productivity;
4. Identifying, insofar as possible, to what extent experiences in other countries (both operational and research) are relevant to the Canadian situation and might be advantageously adapted for Canadian use.

It should be noted that the group leaders prepared their reports after the Workshop and while the group members have not reviewed these reports, we trust they are an accurate reflection of the discussions which took place.

As Deputy Minister Bissonnette indicated in his banquet address, it is our hope that the publication of these proceedings will interest and stimulate police, government officials, and researchers to join those of us in attendance at the Workshop in intensifying our efforts to find ways of maximizing police productivity and performance.

To this end, we wish to extend an invitation to researchers and Canadian police who are interested in carrying out research in the area of police productivity to address their requests to the Law Enforcement Section, Research Division, Ministry of the Solicitor General.

Finally, we wish to thank all the Workshop participants for their contribution to the Workshop and to these proceedings.

OPENING ADDRESS

by

*Bernard C. Hofley*  
*Assistant Deputy Minister\**  
*Research & Systems Development Branch*  
*Ministry of the Solicitor General*  
*Ottawa, Ontario*

Lady and Gentlemen:

On behalf of the Solicitor General, The Honourable Jean-Jacques Blais, I would like to welcome you to this Workshop. I am particularly pleased to be here this morning and to have this opportunity to speak to you.

We live in a rapidly changing and increasingly complex society.

Police administrators, and indeed administrators and managers throughout the public and private sectors, are having to adapt to changes in economic, social, demographic characteristics of their communities, challenges to their traditional beliefs and time-honored ways of carrying out their work; and increasing demands for fiscal, legal and social accountability.

Managerial responses to these challenges vary. In the private sector, some have prospered, while those least responsive to these challenges have faded from view.

\* Mr. B.C. Hofley is now Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada. The Research and Systems Development Branch of the Ministry of the Solicitor General is now part of the Programs Branch.

In the public sector, we are still here! In fact, our agencies and institutions have, almost without exception, grown in size and number. While the obvious explanation is that we have shown ourselves to be unerringly perceptive; infinitely adaptable; unusually thrifty; and unfailingly responsible.

Heretics have emerged in our midst who are becoming increasingly persistent in their questioning of what we are doing, the way we are doing things and how well we are doing them.

The law enforcement community, now, and in the years to come, faces awesome challenges and more numerous and articulate "heretics" than ever before.

Looking around this auditorium, I am pleased to note that many of the heretics appear to be here with us this morning

Without pointing any fingers, or mentioning any names, I will simply observe that:

They include researchers and consultants who, at the invitation of police working in the field, have applied their skills in the behavioural and management sciences in ways which have raised serious questions about patrol, investigative, management, and other established police practices. In the process, they have stimulated further research and advanced our understanding of the efficiency and effectiveness of alternative methods of delivering police services;

They include courageous police administrators, who, through a desire to better serve their communities, have allowed their policies and operations to be rigorously and often publicly examined;

They include, as well, many concerned and thoughtful police officials who are continuing to provide leadership, not only within their own jurisdictions, but also within the Canadian police community;

And they include government officials whose agencies have encouraged innovation and experimentation aimed at improving service to the public, and still others whose sometimes embarrassing questions about where the money goes, have contributed to the development of increasingly sophisticated managerial, accounting, monitoring, and evaluative practices.

Have I left anybody out?

For two days we will be examining a limited number of the numerous and demanding questions relating to police productivity and performance.

Paraphrasing the statement of objectives for the Workshop, it is intended that our deliberations will

1. Acquaint key figures in the Canadian police and research communities with Canadian and foreign research and experience in respect to the conceptualization and measurement of police productivity and performance; and identify, insofar as possible, the extent to which research and practice in other countries may be relevant to the Canadian situation;
2. Critically examine both traditional and innovative approaches to the conceptualization and measurement of police productivity and performance;
3. Identify and examine key philosophical, legal, and operational concerns facing police departments seeking to maximize productivity, and public satisfaction with the delivery of police services in their respective communities;

and

4. Assist the Ministry of the Solicitor General in formulating a program of research in the area of police productivity and performance which is responsive to the needs of the Canadian police community.

We are hopeful, moreover, that by bringing together knowledgeable and experienced police officials and capable researchers, the Workshop will serve to enhance understanding, rapport, and effective collaboration between the Canadian police and research communities.

Looking ahead, we believe that by combining the knowledge and experience of police officials with the kind of knowledge and understanding that good research can make available, police and researchers will together be able to make significant advances in improving efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of police services.

While the published proceedings of this Workshop may not sustain the argument that police officials are unerringly perceptive, infinitely adaptable, unusually thrifty, or unfailingly responsible,..... These proceedings will bear witness to the fact that police officials at all levels are pursuing their commitment to serve the public with imagination, resourcefulness, and openness, and that challenges which once provoked a strong defence are increasingly being viewed as opportunities requiring a strong offence.

THE PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND  
MEASUREMENT OF POLICE PRODUCTIVITY

by

*Chief R.F. Lunney*  
*Edmonton Police Department*  
*Edmonton, Alberta*

The Conference Chairman has requested me to provide a keynote paper on the Problems of Definition and Measurement of Police Productivity. I shall begin by stating my preferred definition of productivity taken from a paper by Dr. George H. Kuper, "Productivity: A National Concern":

"Any activity that uses resources of one kind to produce a result of another, can be said to be productivity."

Productivity, then, refers to the relationship between the resources used and the results produced. Increasing productivity means getting more and better results from resources consumed, or using fewer resources to maintain a basic level of output.

Why be concerned with increasing productivity? There are several reasons. Police departments are experiencing increased scrutiny of budgets by government administrators, elected representatives, the media and the public resulting from the escalating police share of total public budgets. Negative decisions as a result of this scrutiny has resulted, for some departments, on restrictions on growth or prohibitions on replacing losses through attrition. On another plane, productivity is a measure of managerial competence and attention to productivity is a requirement in pursuit of a

rational approach to management. The data base developed in response to concerns for productivity also serves the requirement to satisfy a variety of periodic demands and inquiries emanating from governments at all levels, the news media and the public.

The approach to the process of increasing productivity begins with setting objectives. Objectives for police in a contemporary sense usually includes the elements of maintaining peace and good order, protecting lives and property, enforcing regulatory laws and responding to developing community needs. If I may be permitted an observation here, public demands relative to the social role of police are increasing and forcing a more specific definition upon the "response to needs" function. Because of this departmental or agency objectives require continuing review and redefinition. The second stage of development requires the establishment of goals. Goals directed towards the attainment of objectives must be clear, specific, and measurable over time. The third stage of development is the program evaluation process which requires identification of indicators of performance to measure the degree to which goals are achieved.

There are two kinds of indicators: effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness is achieving defined results or outcomes without regard for money or manpower. Efficiency is achieving any given result with the minimum expenditure of effort. More succinctly: effectiveness is doing the right things; efficiency is doing things right. Productivity is a combination of the two concepts.

Traditionally, performance indicators in policing have leaned heavily upon crime statistics including crime rates and clearance rates. In their application, however, police and other criminal justice system users have been plagued by varying definitions and conditions despite the uniform crime reporting structure. Variations in data loss from jurisdiction to jurisdiction has further compounded the confusion. The credibility of national

crime statistics has further suffered due to inappropriate use, particularly inter-city comparisons. The greatest distortion occurs in comparing cities featuring a unitary governmental system with cities surrounded by large suburban or semi-rural municipalities. It is notable that the crime rate leaders, according to uniform crime reporting statistics up to 1976, were the cities of Vancouver, Edmonton and Hamilton. All three cities are surrounded by densely populated separate jurisdictions. It is reasonable to assume that the suburban users of recreational and business services in the central city also contribute to criminal occurrences, however, the calculation of crime rate is based upon the population of the central city only. In the Edmonton area, 19.5% of the metropolitan population resides outside the city boundaries and this will increase to 25% by 1981. Furthermore, crime rates in widely separated jurisdictions are affected by the varying mores of the community, individual police priorities, and the varying incidents of specific crime occurrences for geographic or sociological reasons. The use of crime rates for inter-city comparisons is grossly misleading.

Accepting that crime statistics have some validity in terms of measuring performance within individual jurisdictions, it remains to develop a comprehensive approach to the balance of the problem. The contemporary appreciation is that performance must be measured by an array of inter-dependent indicators - no single one of which is sufficient to determine departmental performance. In this context indicators must be developed with application to all activities, and it is highly desirable they be applicable to a performance budgeting system. Indicators in the array must be useful for identifying trends and applicable to strategic and operational planning.

Initiation of a performance indicator system requires a frame of reference or structure which may vary according to budgetary or organizational structure. One such satisfactory structure involves allocation of indicators to three functions of a police department; operations; information; and administration.

Examples of operational indicators applicable to patrol car operations include response time, travel time, service time and utilization time. Crime statistics and crime rates are useful operational indicators as noted. Case loads have been used successfully in experimental models. Crime clearance rates may be used applicable to the department as a whole, but also to patrol organizations and criminal investigation units. Victimization studies show promise as a useful operational indicator although the cost and time burden of state-of-the-art methods is likely prohibitive for most Canadian cities. Public attitude surveys are perhaps one of the best performance indicators if scientifically designed and consistently applied.

Informational performance indicators are concerned with timeliness and accuracy. Dispatch delay within a communications unit is a useful indicator as well as indicators of response time to requests for wanted persons, vehicle data, etc.

Administrative performance indicators within a police department relate mainly to the management of human resources. Traditionally, we have made use of attrition rates, absenteeism rates, measures of the effectiveness of the performance appraisal system, and the effectiveness of the promotion system. Progressive police departments increasingly will employ the concepts of organizational development to measure such indicators of organizational health as the state of system interaction between units; the degree of teamwork evident; the degree to which a climate of optimism prevails; and the degree to which a capacity for renewal and revitalization is demonstrated. The latter indicators contain a high degree of subjective data which is nonetheless relevant.

Budget indicators apply universally to all functions of police department operation and with the application of cost benefit analysis where appropriate budget indicators are currently the most powerful management tool.

The implementation of a performance indicator system within a department must be regarded as a long-term program. As with all opportunities in the systems age, results must be preceded by an investment of resources, almost always considerable, in the process of "tool building". Resource requirements include an investment in skills acquisition, time, modifications to existing technology which are often major, and a process of internal preparation which in today's world must involve the police association and an educational process for the total membership.

In the design of an array of indicators police management must make an early choice as to whether they intend to measure individual performance or unit performance. In the early stages of application, concentration on unit performance indicators is highly recommended. There is a real danger of thwarting the program completely if individual indicators are initially preferred since there is every probability of alienating the work force from the very beginning. In the case of my own department we made a deliberate choice to concentrate on indicators of unit performance, a choice which is consistent with internal goals of promoting teamwork and unity. Later in the process, individual performance indicators may prove acceptable.

The development of indicators begs the question of development of standards. Data available from an indicator system may inform management of what is happening on the street in terms of response time, but still to be established is that level of response demanded or accepted by the public and meeting professional expectations internally. Development of standards requires significant experience with the data. It is a process of tentative identification, continuing evaluation, establishing internal acceptance and commitment. External acceptance rests with the police commission, local government and the public as established through surveys of public attitude. Public education in the intricacies of service standards may often times be effectively accomplished through employing the media in explanation of complaints.

Performance measurement systems should be localized to each department or agency. Geographic and operational differences make inter-jurisdictional comparisons misleading and useless, the same reasons for the failure of traditional indicators to measure inter-jurisdictional differences. However, agreement on the definitions of performance indicators would assist research and development.

The bottom line in the management of police resources is public satisfaction. But measurement is nebulous. Survey methods are slow and require testing. They must be consistently applied over time. The problem could be amenable to new ways of establishing public opinion such as automated systems polling through integrated television circuits were this available at some future time in Canadian cities. In the short-term, the public at large is likely to be as interested in micro-indicators as they are in reading and analyzing financial statements. There is also a contradiction in terms of the priorities of government administrators and elected officials. It has been our experience that the development and implementation of indicators is met with disinterest by these same administrators and officials who demand development of a program. It is then you learn that when they say they want you to increase productivity, they really mean they want you to reduce costs or cost trends, and they are not fussy about how you do it so long as it doesn't result in public outcry.

I suggest that the bottom line to the public is measured in terms of: success in solving major cases; perceived operational efficiency in regulatory activities such as traffic; and in terms of courtesy and disciplined behavior. We need to know a great deal more about public attitudes and expectations, and development of public attitude indicators should be given priority treatment, difficult as that may be. With better data on public attitude reflecting the degree of satisfaction on hand, the way may be opened for more accurate solutions to the problem of identifying police program objectives and for improving performance measurement and productivity.

SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS  
AFFECTING PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT  
IN  
PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS

*by*

*Victor N. MacDonald, Professor*  
*School of Business*  
*Queen's University*  
*Kingston, Ontario*

INTRODUCTION

This paper is based upon the experience obtained and the events which transpired during a long-term experiment in management improvement in local government.<sup>1</sup> Thirty-five municipal departments or semi autonomous divisions, in three municipalities, participated in the experiment as indicated in Table 1. Eight departments did not join in the Project but six of these were located in one municipality.<sup>2</sup>

The local Government Management Project had been initiated with the belief, after surveying attempts at management improvement in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, that the establishing of goals and objectives was a fundamental part of effective management and that objectives were a basic tool in the operation of any organization. Four years later the Project Team has learned that appropriate goals and objectives will only exist where managers understand the purpose of their jobs and have clearly defined their roles before they begin to establish goals and objectives.

In fact, where purpose is misunderstood or not appropriate to the needs of the public, goals and objectives of public agencies may actually engender more harm than good.

Although police participation in the LGMP was limited,<sup>3</sup> the Project was still a major experiment in the adaptation of techniques and management processes to meet the needs of local government managers. The processes introduced and the Project itself varied greatly from one municipality to another but certain common strands, all tied to a systematic management process, do seem to emerge. There is some risk in generalizing the applicability of techniques which helped managers to operate more effectively or efficiently in particular situations. There appears to be little risk, however, in identifying some general management problems which seemed to pervade the public domain and in suggesting some processes of management which appeared to be generally helpful in alleviating those problems.

Each municipality and each department was encouraged to adapt processes such as goal and objective setting, teamwork, problem identification, reorganization, strategic and corporate planning, etc., to meet their own needs. Table 1 indicates the extent of departmental involvement in the LGMP by functional area as well as apparent impact of the LGMP processes, evaluated as described in Footnote #4. The depth and effectiveness of the involvement of municipal departments is described in the three documentaries of LGMP experience.<sup>5</sup>

#### MANAGEMENT PROBLEM AREAS

As a result of the LGMP experience, the Project Team and the municipal Project Leaders were left with few doubts regarding the reason why most attempts at management improvement encounter difficulty. The following management problem areas appear to be general to municipalities and probably to other areas of public management as well. Unless they are understood and successfully combatted, productivity

efforts have little possibility of success.

- 1) Inadequate clarification and, therefore, understanding of the purpose of public service organizations.
- 2) Unclear and uncertain role, goal, and broad objective definition of the organization and its elements.
- 3) Little or no effort to define major programs, both long and short term, and the priorities of those programs.
- 4) Inadequate knowledge or understanding of management fundamentals including:
  - (a) management roles or functions;
  - (b) assignment of responsibility; and
  - (c) delegation of authority.
- 5) Inadequate communication and mutual understanding between units and between management levels including:
  - (a) inadequate direction from upper levels, e.g. with regard to higher level goals and objectives;
  - (b) lack of awareness at higher levels of management regarding operational problems being experienced by lower levels; and
  - (c) lack of knowledge of or concern with mutual problem areas, overlapping goals and objectives, and potential joint solutions.
- 6) Inadequate utilization of human resources in identifying problems and in suggesting solutions to those problems.

- 7) Inadequate involvement of managers and employees in the development of performance and productivity measures for their own operations.
- 8) Inadequate, or even no, management reviews and revitalization processes.
- 9) Ineffective development, handling and use of management information.

Each of these problem areas will be discussed briefly with some examples to indicate their impact upon management. Table 2 supplements this discussion with an outline of the symptoms of such problems and identifies some of the solutions which proved to be effective during the LGMP.

#### 1. Inadequate Clarification of Purpose

Municipal councillors and administrators had seldom, if ever, taken the time to do a thorough assessment of the purpose of local government, in particular its political function in the municipality. The same confusion existed regarding the relative purpose and roles of council and administration, resulting in problems in policy enunciation. It appears that the same problem may exist in regard to the purpose of police forces, affecting dealings with the public and with other public service agencies concerned with criminal and civil justice.

We must disagree with Lind and Lipsky, when they state that the activities of the police cannot be measured and evaluated without reference to the totality of the criminal justice system.<sup>6</sup> Once the public service purpose of a police force has been defined and special roles, goals and objectives have been identified, the effectiveness of the force can be evaluated relative to those criteria. Efficiency can always be measured relative to past

operation or in terms of the cost of maintaining a particular level of detection of offences or proportion of arrests, for example; recognizing that these examples may not represent appropriate criteria for the measurement of effectiveness.

In the case where a police force defines its own purpose and goals without input from other agencies it could be that police operations will not be well integrated with other agencies and authorities dealing with criminal justice. Police top management might continue to argue that such was the case and that either police purposes need to be redefined or other agencies need to look closely at their purpose and roles or both. It is even probable that, without the joint definition and redefinition of purpose necessary to promote integrated roles, the assumption that there is a "system" of justice is probably erroneous. Notwithstanding those needs for joint action, however, police forces can proceed to define their own roles and purposes and to measure the effectiveness of their activities in achieving those roles and purposes. Eventually a more general redefinition of the primary purposes of all criminal justice agencies can be carried out.

## 2. Unclear and Uncertain Definition of Roles, Goals and Broad Objectives

Generally, but not necessarily, organizations involved in the LGMP, which were confused with regard to purpose, were also confused with regard to the roles both of the organization and its elements. Where roles, e.g., the operational contribution of various elements of the organization were clear at the outset, the redefinition of purpose resulted in a fairly easy redirection of coordinated efforts and role shifts. Working from a well known operational base, when shifts in operation and roles are necessary, is much easier than trying to establish direction in an uncertain or confused organization.

It is fundamental to effective or efficient management, including co-ordination, co-operation, delegation of authority and assignment of responsibility that the roles of the total organization, each organisational sub-unit, and each level of management are clear.

A comprehensive effort to clarify roles should precede the definition of management goals, or key result areas, which essentially represent ongoing activities necessary to fulfill roles.

To use an example from local government, councils often mis-define or do not recognize the importance and character of their political roles (obtaining consensus and resolving conflict without discrimination where concensus is lacking). Where this happens administrators are frequently left with the responsibility of designing and implementing transportation systems, for example; suddenly to discover that what appeared to be a rational operational decision was not a rational political decision and much of their technically proficient effort had been wasted. Quite obviously the same problem is evident in the design and implementation of legal systems, and police are often left in the unfortunate position of attempting to implement inadequately defined or unnecessary regulations which have not been fully considered in regard to their political and human considerations.

The most police forces can probably do with regard to their overall social roles is to identify, what appears to be, anomalies on their operations. Fiscal constraints may, in fact, act as a catalyst in encouraging public and, therefore, government interest in a redefinition of police roles.

To orient internal operations, Forces can proceed to define their overall roles within the constraints which exist, however, and then to determine the contributing roles to be played by components of the police operation. Sometimes major revisions in purpose or role may require reorganization. Such reorganizations should only be made when it is obvious that roles, management goals and broad objectives would be more easily accomplished with a different structure. Functions need to be outlined and grouped and interactions between various functions need to be understood before reorganization is viable.<sup>7</sup>

Broad objectives enunciated by higher management levels provide direction for lower management levels. At lower levels, activities need to be assigned to accomplish the objectives and definite times and levels of service determined in accordance with existing manpower. Broad objectives at higher levels also facilitate the assignment of responsibility and delegation of authority to lower level managers. Specific operational objectives and measures of performance should be determined at the relevant operational level, however, so managers at those levels take responsibility for planning, objective accomplishment, co-operation, co-ordination, and productivity and performance improvement in their key result areas.

One of higher level management's primary objectives should be the facilitation of co-ordination and co-operation through the encouragement of teamwork at lower levels.

### 3. Lack of Definition of Major Programs

Particularly in support and "soft" service municipal departments, the LGMP found that purpose, roles and programs to accomplish particular goals and broad objectives were poorly outlined. Longer term programs need clear goals, whereas all programs need clear definitive objectives which will indicate whether or not the program should be changed, how efficient it is, and to have some established criteria which would determine whether or not it should be continued. In addition, programs should be prioritized relative to other operations and programs. This essentially incorporates a type of ongoing zero-based-budgeting and has been a fundamental, if seldom accomplished, aspect of most management systems, such as MBO and PPB, etc.

Lower level managers, using LGMP processes, responded well to involvement in the determination of program goals and objectives and set up their own monitoring processes to ensure that programs were on track and achieving their objectives. It appears that quite low ranking

policemen essentially represent the police organization in dealing with the public and that involvement in the establishment of program procedures, objectives and possibly even goals could improve both their motivation and operational effectiveness at little cost in terms of time.

#### 4. Inadequate Knowledge of Management Fundamentals

Managers customarily think of objectives only in terms of output, thereby ignoring some fundamental aspects of the management role. Since they do not set objectives to improve processes and procedures; to make meetings more productive, to delegate more, to clarify responsibility, etc., a large area of management improvement is being ignored. The LGMP found that many good technical staff were unaware of the requirements of effective management. In particular, they had trouble delegating authority and in assigning responsibility to subordinates.

From our initial work in the development of police management seminars it is obvious that knowledge of management fundamentals is lacking in the lower management levels of many police forces as well. Lower level police managers certainly need high levels of technical expertise so they can act as advisors to constables. On the other hand, they probably need human relations expertise (interpersonal and group relations) more than higher police levels, as well, because they are the people who must help in motivating and directing the constables and corporals who are in direct contact with the public.

Exercises in delegation, communication, problem identification and problem solving were helpful during the LGMP. Primarily though, the technical manager needs to enlarge and develop his concept of management so he is aware of the wide range of functions he must perform. It's probable that the ability of police forces to carry out certain identifiable and measureable processes, e.g. the integration of community resources in combatting crime, is an important aspect of police management.

5. Inadequate Communication and Mutual Understanding Between Units and Between Management Levels.

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Surprisingly enough the LGMP uncovered problems in communication of higher level goals and objectives to lower levels of management and employees in almost all organizations. This resulted in the reinforcement of the "we" - "they" syndrome and created real problems in orienting operations, planning and forecasting at lower levels. Apparent changes in plans, which were often only symptoms of lack of communication, caused crises at almost all administrative levels. Actually, the LGMP staff found that the political level did not change or reverse plans as frequently as many administrators thought. It was just that there was a lack of definite direction in the first place and councils often reacted to rather questionable public input (e.g. from minority groups) as a result.

The most startling discovery during the LGMP was a lack of knowledge and understanding of the problems which affected the productivity of lower level personnel on the part of upper levels of management. Defensiveness by the upper level managers to inputs from subordinates tended to partially destroy this very important source of information. Problem identification techniques, involving two levels of management, incorporated throughout the management structure, were found to be of the most important and effective methods of improving communication between management levels.

Concern for lateral co-ordination and co-operation had to be developed and once again problem identification and problem solving or objective setting workshops involving two levels of management (a manager and the people reporting to him) were found to be an effective method of improving lateral communication. Team reviews of objectives by the same groups on a monthly basis, helped to keep the co-ordinative process operational and semi-annual problem identification and objective setting sessions seemed to fill the requirement in that area. There is no question that communication will

unless structures are established to ensure that it flourishes. An "open door" policy is not sufficient.

#### 6. Inadequate Utilization of Human Resources

The LGMP staff have encountered the same misguided concept in both industry and local government, that participative management is a means of motivating people, of making them "feel" part of the organization and nothing more. Nothing could be further from the truth. We have already described the role of problem identification in uncovering operational problem areas. The LGMP experience with problem-solving exercises also indicated that a very high level of useful suggestions and input was the norm rather than the exception. Of course, motivation is improved through involvement in decisions and the resolution of problems but there is a real source of knowledge, expertise and energy which can be released through participative management practices as well.

#### 7. Inadequate Involvement of Managers and Employees in the Development of Meaningful Performance and Productivity Measures for their own Operations

The LGMP staff found an unhealthy academic preoccupation with the development of concrete measures of productivity and performance in municipal services, including police and fire. Certainly many of the measures which have been generated, e.g. response time, are useful in a given context. They are not, however, effective when they are superimposed upon managers and employees, with the possible exception of well defined standards of operation such as the Ontario Ministry of Transportation and Communications' "Municipal Maintenance Management System".

Every operation is different and managers and employees in each operation will fill somewhat unique roles. Measures which indicate how well they are filling those roles are most meaningful and, since the roles are unique, must be generated by the managers involved. Preferably they will be discussed with senior managers who can then ensure that the lower

level operation is contributing to higher level objectives.

One of the major contributions of the LGMP was the emphasis placed upon process improvement and measures of process effectiveness. Initiatives in this area were stimulated by managers' general lack of concern with the improvement of effectiveness and efficiency in areas other than service or production output. Management time spent on unnecessary routines, ineffective use of committees, unnecessarily long meetings, lack of concern with the process of communication, lack of specific efforts to improve the level of trust or the accuracy of communication were all symptoms of major problems in management efficiency and effectiveness. Objective setting in those areas contributed to a streamlined operation and drastically cut the administrative time involved in the processes in question.

#### 8. Inadequate Management Reviews and Revitalization Processes

Contrary to the LGMP staff's expectations, the initiation of purpose and role identification, goal and objective setting and problem identification techniques did not automatically result in the adoption of effective management reviews. Review processes had to be thoroughly discussed with the staff involved, adapted to their perceived needs, made specific through concretely described procedures, and scheduled. Unless this follow-up took place, management reviews were not initiated and the effectiveness of all the other processes which have been discussed, rapidly deteriorated.

Individual managers were encouraged to make ongoing reviews of their objectives and operations (the LGMP encouraged objectives primarily where problem solving was necessary or where detailed changes in procedures or methods were required). Team reviews of objectives (usually on an exception basis) seemed most appropriate at about one month intervals with problem identification and objective setting team workshops twice annually. While the LGMP encouraged superior-subordinate reviews and objective setting at least once annually, some departments felt that team

reviews were sufficient. Superior/subordinate reviews as recommended, emphasized development rather than pay or promotion and detailed formats for interview preparation were circulated to the departments involved.

#### 9. Ineffective Development, Handling and Use of Management Information

This is a serious management problem in local government which is, from our observations, not nearly as serious in police management. The LGMP book on information improvement<sup>8</sup> describes a process whereby individual managers may improve their own information networks and provide a basis for formal information which will meet management needs.

Since this is the one problem area that we feel does not apply to police organizations, at least in the same context, it will not be discussed further in this paper.

#### A FRAMEWORK FOR A MANAGEMENT CONTRIBUTION TO PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT<sup>9</sup>

The major theme of this paper has been the degree to which improvements in productivity are dependent upon effective and efficient management processes. In this context, productivity improvement is regarded as a regular function of management, interrelated with and dependent upon other aspects of the management process.

For example, productivity improvement is only possible when organizational purpose is well defined and roles are clearly understood. The motivation to improve productivity will not be present unless managers understand the reason why improvement is needed and become involved in the process. Particularly in Police work where each individual is to a large extent an individual operator, involvement in defining role, purpose and programs appears to be important.

The following steps seem to represent a comprehensive, and yet relatively easy to implement, approach to productivity improvement.

1. Development of a Clear and Distinct Understanding of the Purpose of the Police Force and of Each Element and Manager within the Force.

A "Pattern Planning Technique" or the Delphi Technique might be helpful in defining the purpose of a police force. Representatives of other law enforcement agencies would probably need to be present to help to redefine or confirm the overall purpose of the police function. The purpose of elements of the forces can be identified by upper level police management once the purpose of the force itself has been defined.<sup>10</sup>

2. Clear Definition of Roles

Roles need to be defined

- a) relative to other agencies concerned with criminal justice;
- b) relative to other forces;
- c) with respect to the internal roles of elements of the force.

Roles relative to other agencies and other forces could be determined through meetings with those agencies or forces or probably better through a "Pattern Planning Technique". Roles at lower management levels are probably best determined through a series of meetings, involving at least two levels of management, throughout the vertical structure of the organization in which the role of the particular sub elements within the force would be defined.

3. Determination of Programs and Program Purpose, Goals and Objectives.<sup>11 & 12</sup>

To be effective, management by programs requires definitive objectives for each program, determination of the priority of each program relative to other programs, sources of measurement or feedback (external for public service and internal for support services), program continuation/discontinuation criteria and acceptance of anticipated levels of performance.

#### 4. Identification of Management Problems Affecting Productivity

Until purposes and roles are clear and some attempt has been made to establish goals and broad objectives, problem identification and particularly problem solving may be misdirected. The LGMP experience indicated that problem identification processes were most effective if they took place in management teams (superior and subordinates) and were very task directed. An answer to the questions: "Why am I not doing the most effective job possible?" and "What could anyone within this organization or in the environment do to help me to do a better job?" by each individual during the team meeting was the central core of the problem identification process.

#### 5. Setting Objectives to Overcome Problems

The LGMP staff are not enthralled with MBO processes which call for objectives which encompass all aspects of a manager's task. When, however, specific problems have been identified, solutions need to be generated and the organizational level or unit creating the problem should be informed and placed under pressure to come up with a solution. Where outside agencies are involved they too should be informed and placed under any available pressure to provide a solution.

Managers should examine all management and production processes and should treat productivity as an ongoing target for problem identification. A brief description of management process measures was presented earlier and improvement in such areas should be given equal priority with direct output measures.

Well designed objectives probably offer the best method of productivity improvement. Unless a program has well defined objectives and/or a definite clientele the effectiveness of that program is very difficult to measure. Productivity measures need to be related to objectives and to unit or program purpose. After a policeman or police manager

has properly defined what he should be achieving, an effective productivity measure tells him how well and how economically the objective of his work is actually being achieved.

#### 6. Review and Measurement of Program Effectiveness and Management Performance.

Ongoing individual reviews of objectives can become an accepted aspect of management - possibly through routinizing them at first. Team reviews can be scheduled on a monthly basis and should concentrate on issues of interest to the whole team. Where issues arise which are of interest to only one or two team members those issues can be resolved in separate discussions.

Superior/subordinate reviews aimed at emphasizing management strengths, the development of managers and at overcoming management weaknesses need to be scheduled, preplanned by both participants and carried out in a calm relaxing atmosphere. Productivity improvement is most likely to occur in a developmental, task oriented, trusting climate where everyone is aware that effective performance will be recognized.

#### SUMMARY

This is a very general paper which contains an attempt to summarize those LGMP experiences and processes which might have some relevance for the improvement of police productivity. A brief framework of a process designed to involve managers in productivity improvement is outlined in the final section. Table 2 enlarges upon the information contained in the paper and includes a discussion of symptoms of problems.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The four year Project was known as the Local Government Management Project (LGMP) and was jointly sponsored by the Province of Ontario and four participating municipalities; the Cities of London, Ottawa and St. Catharines and the Regional Municipality of Niagara. The training,

evaluation and documentation aspects of the Project were carried out by a Project Team under the guidance, initially of two, and later of one member of the faculty of the School of Business, Queen's University (J.R. Nininger, now Executive Vice President of the Conference Board in Canada and the author who is still on the Faculty of the School of Business, Queen's University).

2. Only three departments out of nine in the City of Ottawa joined the Project at the outset. In spite of considerable pressure from the participants the other six did not become involved at a later date.
3. The City of Ottawa Police Department and the Police Force in the Regional Municipality of Niagara did not express an interest in involvement.
4. The Impact of Project processes was judged by:
  - i) the number of changes in management processes which occurred during the implementation stage of the Project. (A Basic Organization Questionnaire formed a base from which changes in management processes could be identified.);
  - ii) the number of new techniques of management which were attempted;
  - iii) the duration of the use of the new techniques;
  - iv) a subjective evaluation by the Project Team and municipal Project Leaders regarding the extent to which the Project had an impact;
  - v) changes in attitudes by managers in one department as compared to other departments, or to the municipality in general, as measured by an Individual Manager Questionnaire.

5. The LGMP Experience: Phases I, II and III, Queen's University, 1977-78 (Available through the Ontario Government Publications Centre).
6. Lind, R.C. & Lipsky, J.P. The Measurement of Police Output: Conception Issues and Alternative Approaches, Law and Contemporary Problems, 1971.
7. A short procedural description of a process for reorganization is included in "The LGMP Experience: Guidelines for Organizational Change", Ontario Government Publications Centre, 1977.
8. V. N. MacDonald, & Jean MacLeod, "Improving Management Performance: The Role of Management Information, Ontario Government Publications Centre, 1978.
9. Productivity as it is used here refers to doing the required task as efficiently as possible, in other words a combination of efficiency and effectiveness.
10. As suggested earlier in this paper, failing general agreement upon the purpose of police operations with the other agencies involved, police chiefs, working with their senior staff must make their own definition of purpose and then define roles, etc. to achieve that purpose. As this internal definition is made public, other agencies and the public will provide feedback which can be incorporated over time.
11. Inclusion of the first three steps may seem to the reader to be unnecessary in working toward productivity improvement. Four years ago the author would have agreed, however, in the meantime he has encountered too many cases where purpose and roles were not clear and where structured programs did not exist; situations where efforts devoted to productivity measurement would have been wasted.

12. The LGMP publication by V.N. MacDonald, and P.J. Lawton, "Improving Management Performance and the Contribution of Performance and Productivity Measurement", Ontario Government Publication Centre, 1977, refers to this problem as does another LGMP publication, "The LGMP Experience: Guidelines for Organizational Change in Local Government."

TABLE 1

EXTENT OF INVOLVEMENT AND DEGREE OF IMPACT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
MANAGEMENT PROJECT PROCESSES IN MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENTS AND MAJOR DIVISIONS

Department	Possible Involvement	Extent of Involvement			Degree of Impact		
		Not Involved	Lip Service	Sincere Effort	Little	Moderate	High
Clerk	4	1	1	2	1	1	1
Community Development (Composite)	2		2		2		
Engineering	4			4	1	1	2
Finance	4			4		3	1
Fire	3	1		2		2	
Homes for Aged	2		1	1	1		1
Industrial or Urban Development	3	1	1	1	1		1
Legal	4	2	1	1	2		
Parks & Recreation	2		1	1	1		1
Personnel	4	1	2	1	2	1	
Planning	4		1	3	1	3	
Police	3	2		1		1	
Social Services	3		2	1	2	1	
Supplies & Services	1			1		1	
<b>Total</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>6</b>

TABLE 2

MANAGEMENT PROBLEM AREAS, SYMPTOMS AND COPING TECHNIQUES (LGMP 1974-77)

PROBLEM AREA	SYMPTOMS	GENERAL MEANS OF COPING (LGMP)	POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES
<p>1. Misdefinition and misunderstanding of organizational purpose.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Clashes with public values or conflict with other agencies, boards or bodies.</li> <li>- Negative responses by public or clients - particularly with reference to discrimination.</li> <li>- Internal disagreement regarding goals.</li> <li>- Problem in integrating efforts within a police force or in coordinating with other forces.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Examination of purpose by higher level management and/or clients, or after thoughtful consideration with peers and immediate subordinates at lower organizational levels.</li> <li>- (Usually a top management team, consisting of the senior managers and those reporting to him, which takes the necessary time, can reach appropriate conclusions regarding the purpose of a management unit.)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Delphi Technique.</li> <li>- Nominal Group Technique.</li> <li>- Pattern Planning Technique.</li> </ul>
<p>2. Unclear and uncertain roles, goals and broad objectives.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Management overload as a result of confusion.</li> <li>- Lack of clear direction.</li> <li>- Disagreements regarding policy with other agencies or between divisions.</li> <li>- Misunderstanding between management levels.</li> <li>- Apparent control problems.</li> <li>- Overlaps in responsibility.</li> <li>- Empire building.</li> <li>- Crisis management.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Once purpose has been clearly defined and is understood, role definition can commence. Usually two or even three management levels can work together to define responsibility for each level and each division, section, etc.</li> <li>- When roles are being determined (at police department level - other forces or agencies might need to be involved.)</li> <li>- Goal setting (establishment of key result areas can begin). Goal areas identify the ongoing management requirements - whereas objectives define more specific targets.</li> </ul>	<p>As above (particularly "Patterned Planning Technique") and inter-group conflict resolution techniques.</p>

TABLE 2 (CONT'D)

PROBLEM AREA	SYMPTOMS	GENERAL MEANS OF COPING (LGMP)	POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES
<p>3. Little or no definition of major programs, both long and short term and of the priorities of those programs.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Uncertainty regarding the purpose of certain activities and the inter-connectedness of activities.</li> <li>- Uncertainty regarding cost allocations - what is being achieved for money expended.</li> <li>- Uncertainty regarding which operations would be cut and why in the case of a budget squeeze.</li> <li>- Doubt regarding specific responsibilities and authority or apparent overlap in responsibility.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- At each level of management examine the role and purpose of each activity and determine those which influence other activities.</li> <li>- Activities with similar or related purposes can usually be grouped into programs.</li> <li>- Looking at each role and key result area as defined above, what can be done in an organized way to contribute to that role or key result area.</li> <li>- Assign specific responsibility for programs.</li> <li>- Determine program objectives, priorities and cutoff points - priorities will usually be determined by a top management team.</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Categorization of functions.</li> <li>2. Various techniques, for priority determination, e.g. Hickling's strategic planning process.</li> </ol> <p>Allen Hickling, "Aids to Strategic Choice," Centre for Continuing Education, The University of British Columbia.</p>
<p>4. Inadequate knowledge of management fundamentals.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Managerial roles or functions.</li> <li>b) Assignment of responsibility.</li> <li>c) Delegation of authority.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- a) Management overload. Conflict over areas of responsibility. Confused communication channels.</li> <li>- b) Frustration of subordinates (feeling they are not trusted yes men).</li> <li>- c) Uncertainty regarding roles, etc. at lower levels.</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Group exercise in defining a manager's job.</li> <li>2. Case exercises and role plays in delegation.</li> <li>3. Simulations involving participative management.</li> <li>4. Encouragement of delegation by upper level managers (through support for delegating manager).</li> <li>5. Involvement in determining objectives (and identifying problems).</li> </ol>	<p>(Force Field Analysis) Strengths and weaknesses of delegating.)</p> <p>Assignment of specific objectives by higher level managers (strong direction is better than none at all).</p>

TABLE 2 (CONT'D)

PROBLEM AREA	SYMPTOMS	GENERAL MEANS OF COPING (LGMP)	POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES
<p>5. Inadequate communication and mutual understanding between units and between management levels, including:</p> <p>a) inadequate direction from upper levels, e.g. with regard to higher level goals and objectives;</p> <p>b) lack of awareness at higher levels of management regarding operational problems being experienced by lower levels;</p> <p>c) lack of knowledge of or concern with mutual problem areas, overlapping goals and objectives, and potential joint solutions.</p>	<p>a) Confusion regarding roles and tasks at lower levels. Misdirection of efforts.</p> <p>b) Lack of respect for higher level managers. Resignation, absenteeism and low motivation to improve effectiveness.</p> <p>c) Overlapping responsibility. Competition rather than co-operation. Lack of team work and coordination. Duplication of effort and equipment.</p>	<p>a) Involvement of two management levels in goal and objective determination (supervisor and team of subordinates).</p> <p>b) Problem identification process. Conflict resolution process to encourage joint problem solving.</p> <p>c) Team goal and objective setting and monthly team reviews in addition to individual reviews.</p>	<p>i) Special issue identification interventions providing instant feedback.</p> <p>ii) The ongoing use of validated questionnaires.</p>
			<p>.....</p>

PROBLEM AREA	SYMPTOMS	GENERAL MEANS OF COPING (LGMP)	POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES
6. Inadequate utilization of human resources in identifying problems and in suggesting solutions to those problems.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Separation between management levels ("us" and "they" syndrome).</li> <li>- Low motivation and acceptance of status quo.</li> <li>- Low commitment to organization.</li> <li>- High resistance to change.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Primarily a good problem identification process.</li> <li>- Involvement in problem solving where the lower level managers or employees can obviously contribute to the implementation of a solution.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Participation in decision-making.</li> <li>- Decision-making, training, etc.</li> <li>- Kepner Tregoe</li> </ul>
7. Inadequate involvement of managers and employees in the development of performance and productivity measures for their own operations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Inaccurate data.</li> <li>-Resistance to measurement.</li> <li>-Low levels of trust.</li> <li>-Irrelevant or inadequate measures and lack of motivation to improve effectiveness.</li> <li>-Inadequate reviews and correction.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Each manager encouraged to establish goals and objectives for his own job or program and to set standards or objectives to improve performance over time. (Consultant help is generally required in developing effective measures.</li> <li>b) A team, individual and superior/subordinate review process.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Workshops on the measurement of productivity and performance.</li> <li>b) Effective appraisal systems.</li> </ul>
8. Inadequate management reviews and revitalization processes.	Other initiatives which had been developed, e.g. teamwork, goal and objective setting, problem identification, the development of productivity measures and the improvement of productivity, begin to deteriorate and disappear.	A firm review process including an ongoing individual review, team reviews (a manager and subordinates) usually on an exception basis (once a month) and superior/subordinate reviews of objectives, effectiveness, need for training, desires, career path, etc.	Appraisal by objectives (not favoured by LGMP staff).
			....

TABLE 2 (CONT'D)

PROBLEM AREA	SYMPTOMS	GENERAL MEANS OF COPING (LGMP)	POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES
<p>9. Ineffective development, handling and use of management information.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Duplication of Files.</li> <li>- Confusion in filing and storage</li> <li>- Trend to disuse of formal information.</li> <li>- Development of detailed information systems within units which duplicate those of other units.</li> <li>- Massive amounts of unused formal information.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Better management understanding of decision-making and information needs. (A detailed process outlined in the LGMP paper on information systems.)</li> <li>- Development of a common filing and storage system.</li> </ul> <p>V.N. MacDonald and Jean Macleod, Improving Management Performance: The Role of Management Information, Toronto: The Ontario Government Publication Centre.</p>	

POLICE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT  
A Scheme for Gauging Effectiveness and Productivity

by

*Jerome A. Needle, Director and Michael W. O'Neill*  
*National Project to Develop Police Program Performance Measures*  
*American Justice Institute, Sacramento, California*

At first glance, measuring police performance would seem simple and straightforward. We hire police to cut down crime, so measuring performance should be the same as measuring crime prevention.

But as anyone knows who has tried to assess municipal law enforcement, the problem is much more complex -- and sometimes even confusing. Crime prevention, for one thing, cannot be measured directly, since that would mean counting crimes that do not occur, "non-events." Clearly, you cannot count things that do not exist.

Furthermore, crime prevention -- even if we could find a way to measure it -- would not present a fair and complete picture of what police accomplish. The level of crime in a community is subject to many factors beyond police control. Economic cycles, cultural values, even the weather, all influence the amount of crime that takes place, and often there is nothing the police -- even with the best of efforts -- can do about it.

But still further, preventing crime is not the only thing police do. Much police work is directed toward controlling crime -- toward solving cases, prosecuting criminals, recovering property -- after it occurs. Even more effort goes into providing miscellaneous

and general services of government, such as traffic regulation, conflict resolution, emergency medical assistance (first aid), and a wide range of similar duties. A truly fair and comprehensive scheme of performance measurement should take all these responsibilities into account.

#### WHAT IS POLICE PERFORMANCE?

Police "performance" is a generic concept. It encompasses a broad range of considerations for which police can properly be held accountable. Among these are:

1. The degree to which the expectations of the public are determined and satisfied. Police are expected to determine what law enforcement goals the public would like accomplished, emphasized, or de-emphasized. Does the public want an intensive level of patrol, or does it prefer less intensive patrol and lower costs? Does the public want marijuana laws vigorously enforced, or would people prefer a looser interpretation of statutes? Once expectations have been established, it is appropriate to gauge the degree to which they are being satisfied.
2. The degree to which police operations conform to legal, executive, and legislative directive. Police must be responsive to the demands of superior governmental authorities. If directed to enforce aggressively the laws against public drunkenness, for example, police must enforce those laws, regardless of personal feelings about the rules' effectiveness.

3. The degree to which objectives and priorities conform to those established by parent governments. Police must emphasize and pursue objectives in a pattern that meets the expectations of city management and the legislative body. Enforcement priorities should also be consistent with demands of municipal superiors.
4. The degree to which departmental objectives are achieved. Police organizations are expected to maximize the achievement of all departmental objectives. They are expected to maximize, simultaneously, the degree to which they prevent crime, arrest offenders, serve the public, and meet the many other objectives to which they are committed.
5. The cost incurred to achieve objectives. Police are expected to minimize the costs of achieving their objectives--to minimize the cost per clearance, the cost of locating and returning stolen property, or the cost of preventing residential burglaries, for example. The most desirable of all conditions would involve maximizing achievement of all objectives while minimizing all costs.
6. The efficiency with which activities are conducted. Police are expected to minimize the costs of conducting individual activities--patrolling, investigating, or preparing cases for prosecution, for example.

7. The quality of management. Those who manage departmental operations are expected to do so with competence and skill.
8. The degree to which policies and procedures meet professional standards. There should be a substantial agreement between the policies and procedures administered by a department and those recommended by respected police leaders and scientists.
9. The efficiency with which officers conduct activities. Police officers are expected to be efficient and industrious, individually and collectively, when carrying out activities for which they are responsible.
10. The integrity of fiscal operations. Departments are expected to manage their funds scrupulously, honestly, and efficiently.
11. The degree to which objectives of police officers are achieved. Individual police officers are expected to have a firm understanding of the objectives toward which they are directed, and to maximize the accomplishment of those objectives.
12. The behavioral integrity of police officers. Police officers are expected to conduct themselves professionally when representing their department, and to refrain from behavior that is financially or ethically questionable.

These components of police performance become more clear when they are grouped into common clusters. A number of the components

Figure 1

## COMPONENTS OF POLICE PERFORMANCE

PERFORMANCE TOWARD CLIENTELE	DEPARTMENT (PROGRAM) PERFORMANCE	PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DEGREE TO WHICH PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS ARE DETERMINED AND SATISFIED</li> <li>• DEGREE TO WHICH OPERATIONS CONFORM TO DICTATES OF PUBLIC LAW, AND EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE DIRECTIVE</li> <li>• DEGREE TO WHICH DEPARTMENTAL OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES CONFORM TO THOSE ESTABLISHED BY PARENT GOVERNMENTS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DEGREE TO WHICH DEPARTMENTAL OBJECTIVES ARE ACHIEVED.</li> <li>• COST OF ACHIEVING DEPARTMENTAL OBJECTIVES</li> <li>• EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH POLICE ACTIVITIES AND TASKS ARE CONDUCTED</li> <li>• QUALITY OF DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT</li> <li>• DEGREE TO WHICH DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MEET PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS</li> <li>• INTEGRITY OF DEPARTMENTAL FISCAL OPERATIONS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DEGREE TO WHICH POLICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES</li> <li>• EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH POLICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES CONDUCT ACTIVITIES AND TASKS</li> <li>• BEHAVIORAL INTEGRITY OF POLICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES</li> </ul>

concern the responsiveness of police departments to superior clientele such as the public, policy making officials in government, and the law. A second group of components commonly concerns objectives, policies, procedures, and activities of the department. The third group of components bear common focus on individual police personnel. Figure 1, "Components of Police Performance," displays components within the three clusters.

#### Effectiveness and Productivity

Two of the components of police performance introduced above were the degree to which a department's objectives are achieved, and the cost incurred to achieve these objectives. The degree to which departmental objectives are achieved is called effectiveness. The cost incurred to achieve these objectives is productivity.

Those who deal with performance measurement commonly and consistently

Effectiveness and productivity always denote successful achievement of objectives.

refer to the degree to which departmental objectives are achieved as effectiveness. Writers refer less consistently to the cost of achieving departmental

objectives as productivity. Often the label "productivity" is erroneously applied to the ratio between the cost of conducting police activities and the number of activities that are conducted. This ratio, more easily remembered as the unit cost per activity, is properly labelled "efficiency." The concept of productivity, like effectiveness, always implies the successful achievement of objectives.

An example from traffic enforcement may illustrate the distinction between efficiency and productivity. Traffic enforcement officers are deployed, often on motorcycles, to detect and cite hazardous driving violations. The efficiency of this enforcement effort is commonly expressed in terms of citations per officer per month, or per unit per shift.

Productivity, however, assess the cost of achieving ultimate goals. In traffic enforcement, the outcome objective is the prevention of accidents--we write citations and cut down the accident rate--so a productivity measure would relate a reduction in accidents to the number of officers on traffic patrol. One might say, thus, that the productivity of a motor unit (for a certain period) was a reduction of 50 accidents per officer deployed.

#### POLICE OBJECTIVES

Police personnel are familiar with two kinds of departmental objectives, outcome and process. The ultimate ends or goals that

Outcome objectives establish ultimate ends or goals.

police are in business to achieve are commonly referred to as outcomes. Outcome objectives, then, are statements that establish ultimate ends or outcomes.

On the other hand, the activities, tasks, or processes that are conducted to attain police outcomes have goals of their own. These more immediate purposes or methods are commonly referred to as "process objectives." It is useful to think of outcomes as the ultimate "outputs," and activities, tasks, and processes as "inputs."

An example of an outcome objective is "to minimize the consequences resulting from inter-personal conflict." This is an ultimate end that police seek to achieve. One way police achieve this end is by responding to conflict incidents, say domestic disturbances, as expeditiously as possible--by minimizing response time. "Minimizing response time" is a process objective. It is a goal of a police activity that is undertaken only to achieve an ultimate end or outcome. It is sought because it is believed to lead to achievement of the outcome objective, not because it is intrinsically worthwhile. Figure 2, "Outcome and Process Objectives," illustrates

the distinction between outcome and process objectives, by juxtaposing typical objectives of each type.<sup>1</sup>

Effectiveness and productivity deal solely with outcome objectives--with police department ends only. Process objectives are not the subject of effectiveness, productivity, or their measurement.

Effectiveness and productivity deal with outcome objectives only--with the ends police departments strive to achieve.

If we are to establish a sound basis for measuring police performance, it is crucial to recognize the distinction between outcome and process objectives. Effectiveness, it is stressed, is the degree to which outcome objectives are achieved. Productivity is the cost incurred to achieve those outcome objectives. Workload and efficiency deal with processes.

#### EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT

Each of the several components of performance is a proper subject for measurement. Each ought to be measured. Each component is not, however, of equal significance. To the contrary, two components, effectiveness and productivity, are central to police administration. Police departments have been established and are

Among all aspects of performance, effectiveness and productivity are supreme.

maintained to achieve specific objectives--to reach specific outcomes. It follows that the component of performance that is crucial for measurement and

evaluation is the degree to which these outcome objectives are achieved--the component of effectiveness. Productivity, the cost of achieving objectives, is the monetary correlate of effectiveness and, therefore, is also supreme in importance.



HOW CAN WE MEASURE EFFECTIVENESS?

If effectiveness means the achievement of police outcome objectives, the first thing that is required in order to measure effectiveness is a clear statement of those objectives.

Measurable Objectives. Most police departments subscribe to an array of outcome objectives, and many agencies have set these out explicitly. Involving concepts such as preventing crime, apprehending

Police department objectives form the basic framework of a system of effectiveness measurement.

offenders, and facilitating the flow of traffic, these officially-acknowledged outcome statements are often expressed in budgets, annual reports, and other formal, agency documents. When available, they

can form the basic framework of a comprehensive and integrated system of departmental effectiveness (and productivity) measurement.

Many police departments have not officially articulated their ultimate goals, however, and many have expressed their objectives in a fashion that is too unrealistic, too abstract, or too general for measurement. In those cases, goal statements must be refined and restated so as to be achievable, discrete, and concrete.

As part of the National Project to Develop Police Program Performance Measures (PPPM), the American Justice Institute constructed a model Structure of Police Objectives, specifically adapted for measurement purposes.<sup>2</sup> This Structure begins with a general Mission Statement ("To promote and maintain public security and order under law, and a sense of well-being in the community") and goes on to articulate 46 concrete, measurable, outcome objectives in five general areas:

1. Crime Prevention
  - a. Part I, personal crimes
  - b. Part I, property crimes
  - c. Part II, crimes (selected)
  
2. Crime Control
  - a. Public reporting to police
  - b. Case closure (solution)
  - c. Case preparation and testimony
  - d. Stolen property return
  - e. Constitutional propriety
  - f. Custody of prisoners
  
3. Conflict Resolution
  - a. Inter-personal conflict
  - b. Inter-group conflict
  - c. Personal stress
  
4. General Service
  - a. Traffic
  - b. Miscellaneous services (to the public)
  - c. Auxiliary services (to the criminal justice system)
  - d. Communication with the public
  
5. Police Administration
  - a. Police integrity
  - b. Community leadership
  - c. Coordination with other agencies

Full exposition of objectives and measures is given in the Appendix.

The PPPM Structure of Objectives has been referred to as a cafeteria, as each measurable objective can be withdrawn and used independently of the others. Not all of the 46 objectives will

The PPPM System is constructed as a cafeteria.

appeal to every police department and there may be some agencies to which none of them, as they are formally expressed, applies.

However, most departments will find in the Structure a measurable restatement of most of their goals. Any remaining objectives can be reformulated as needs dictate.

Effectiveness Measures. A second necessity for measuring effectiveness is a set of objective-specific measures. Each objective must be associated with at least one measure of performance. These measures should reflect the substance of their objectives, and they should include every meaningful aspect of those goals. If more than one measure is necessary to tap the objective fully, as many should be combined as are necessary.

A distinction is often made between a performance measure and an indicator. A measure is a quantitative formula that directly assessed the objective or characteristic under consideration. Feet and inches are measures of height, as the proportion of stolen articles that are returned to owners is a measure of property-return effectiveness. "Indicator," on the other hand, is a more general term that does not imply a direct linkage. Sometimes, when the characteristic of interest is too abstract or otherwise difficult to measure, we employ indirect indicators, measures of related issues, to estimate or triangulate the quality under consideration.

Prior attention in performance measurement has focused on a search for performance indicators to the exclusion of objectives and measures. Indicators are subordinate to measures, however, and should be used only when measures cannot be constructed. The experience of the PPPM project has shown that, if objectives are properly stated, measures generally fall into place logically and easily. A

total of 65 effectiveness measures reflect the PPPM objectives (see Appendix).

Productivity Measures. Many police outcome objectives submit themselves to productivity as well as effectiveness measurement. Since productivity is by definition the cost of effectiveness, the productivity measure in those cases is merely the effectiveness measure divided by the cost of resources (personnel time, equipment, etc.) devoted toward achieving that goal. As the effectiveness measure for the solution of violent, personal crimes is the independently verified case closure rate for those crimes (murder, rape, robbery, assault), so the productivity measure for that objective is the verified closure rate divided by the patrol, investigative, etc. resources devoted to closure of violent, personal crimes.

Some objectives do not submit to productivity measurement. Particularly when the goal is to refrain from some activity (for instance, to refrain from corruption), it makes no sense to speak of productivity measurement.

Other Measurement Needs. As we noted, each objective must be reflected in at least one effectiveness (or productivity) measure. Similarly, each measure must be associated with a set of computation rules and at least one performance standard.

Computation rules serve to standardize data collection procedures. Since most effectiveness and productivity measures involve the manipulation and tabulation of large masses of data, standardization is necessary to ensure that successive measurements are reliable, valid, and internally consistent. In our PPPM research, we have found it useful to specify and define explicitly the individual data elements required to compute each measure, the tabulation procedures for counting the elements, and the computation procedures for combining elements into a measurement "score."

Performance standards typically describe a police department's performance in a previous period, or the experience of typical, similar agencies, and serve to give meaning to the computed measurement scores. They provide a context for interpreting raw data, allowing one to judge whether an agency's current performance is good or bad, better than before, or worse than a neighboring department. Standards may give an internal (same department) or external (other agencies) perspective, and they may describe trends or set norms (targets).

The full range of requisites for effectiveness and productivity measurement is illustrated in Figure 3. As the display shows, these measurement tools include (a) a concrete, measurable, outcome objective, (b) at least one effectiveness (or productivity) measure, (c) a set of instructions (computation rules), and (d) one or more performance standards.


#### USING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

After a department has selected which of its objectives it will measure, mechanisms must be established to collect data systematically and regularly, so as to produce consistent and reliable measurements. (Procedures for establishing such mechanisms are far too complex to detail in this paper. They are described in Measuring Police Effectiveness and Productivity: A Package of Concepts, Tools, and Guidelines.<sup>3</sup>) Once such mechanisms have been established, data can be collected and performance (effectiveness or productivity) scores computed. What use can these measures be put to?

Reporting Accomplishments. Perhaps the most fundamental usage of performance measurement is in what the municipal administration world calls public accountability. Police departments have both the

Figure 3

WHAT DO YOU NEED  
TO MEASURE EFFECTIVENESS?



Police departments have both the right and the obligation to inform their citizenry.

right and the obligation to inform their citizenry--the people who ultimately hire them--about organizational goals and accomplishments. The public, whose support is essential to any democratic form of government, has a right to be told what its agencies have attempted and achieved. Effectiveness measurement provides a context for this communication to take place.

Effectiveness reports can be incorporated into departments' budget requests or annual reports, or into other similar contexts. Simply by manipulating materials already available, these reports can show a full statement of organizational objectives, and levels of achievement--both raw and in comparison with other periods or agencies. Further comment might summarize and interpret conclusions.

An example of a department's effectiveness report (hypothetical) is shown in Figure 4. The use of reports such as this will go far toward enhancing police organizations' accountability, and improving their credibility with the public and with superior governmental bodies.

Improving Police Management. Another important context for performance measurement is in the internal administration of police operations. Police functions that can be improved by data on organizational effectiveness include evaluating current and new programs, ordering and re-ordering priorities, allocating or re-allocating resources, and demonstrating police needs persuasively.

Performance measurement can help police evaluate progress, order priorities, allocate resources, and demonstrate needs.

The purpose of current program evaluation is to determine whether current programs contribute significantly to departmental objectives.

FIGURE 4

DEPARTMENT PROFILE

OBJECTIVE	MEASURE	THIS YEAR	LAST YEAR	NORM	CHANGE AND INTERPRETATION
1.1 To minimize the total number (reported plus unreported) of major, violent crimes against persons that are preventable.	Rate of the total (reported plus unreported), major, violent crimes against persons that are preventable, per 1,000 population.	2.1	2.6	2.4	<u>IMPROVED.</u> This objective shows significant progress against both the previous year's level and the norm. Concentrated, directed patrol in the downtown area is believed responsible.
1.2 To minimize the number of reported, major violent crimes against persons that are preventable.	Rate of reported, major, violent crimes against persons that are preventable, per 1,000 population.	1.5	1.8	1.7	<u>IMPROVED.</u> Results are consistent with objective 1.1 and other crime prevention objectives.
1.3 To minimize the total number (reported plus unreported) of major crimes against property that are preventable.	Rate of the total (reported plus unreported), major crimes against property that are preventable, per 1,000 population.	31	43	40	<u>IMPROVED.</u> Results are consistent with objective 1.1 and other crime prevention objectives.
1.4 To minimize the number of reported, major crimes against property that are preventable.	Rate of the reported, major crimes against property that are preventable, per 1,000 population.	11	15	14	<u>IMPROVED.</u> Results are consistent with objective 1.1 and other crime prevention objectives.
1.5 To minimize, consistent with community expectations, the number of reported, lesser crimes against persons and property that are preventable.	Rate of reported, lesser crimes against persons or property that are preventable, per 1,000 population.	10	14	14	<u>IMPROVED.</u> Results are consistent with objective 1.1 and other crime prevention objectives.
2.1 To maximize the number of reported major crimes against persons successfully closed by the police after judicial verification.	Proportion of reported, major crimes against persons successfully closed by the police after judicial verification.	19%	14%	17%	<u>IMPROVED.</u> Rate is enhanced over both previous year's level and norm. Improvement is believed due to increased supervisory attention given to case preparation.
2.2 To maximize the number of reported, major crimes against property successfully closed by the police after judicial verification.	Proportion of reported, major crimes against property successfully closed by the police after judicial verification.	7%	4%	6%	<u>IMPROVED.</u> Results are consistent with objectives 2.1 and 2.3.
2.3 To maximize, consistent with community expectations, the number of the reported, lesser personal and property crimes successfully closed by the police after judicial verification.	Proportion of reported, lesser, personal and property crimes successfully closed by the police after judicial verification.	17%	15%	14%	<u>IMPROVED.</u> Results are consistent with objectives 2.1 and 2.2.

FIGURE 4 (CONT'D)

OBJECTIVE	MEASURE	THIS YEAR	LAST YEAR	NORM	CHANGE AND INTERPRETATION
2.4 To maximize the quality of case preparation.	Proportion of cases in which the quality of case preparation is rated to be satisfactory by the prosecutor.	91%	82%	84%	<u>IMPROVED.</u> Case preparation ratings have risen substantially, reflecting increased supervisory attention.
2.5 To maximize the number of cases in which stolen and other crime-related articles are recovered and returned to owner.	Proportion of cases involving stolen or crime-related property in which the articles are recovered and returned to owner.	8.3%	10%	10%	<u>DECLINED.</u> Departmental effectiveness against this objective has fallen behind previous levels. This decrease in performance is believed due to the shift of investigative attention toward case preparation.
3.1 To minimize deaths, injuries, property damage, and criminal consequences resulting from inter-personal conflicts such as, but not limited to, the following kinds: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. domestic disturbance</li> <li>. landlord/tenant</li> <li>. neighbor/neighbor</li> <li>. merchant/customer</li> <li>. creditor/debtor</li> </ul> subsequent to police intervention.	Proportion of inter-personal conflict incidents (of each kind) in which there was, subsequent to police intervention, an escalation including: additional deaths or injuries to citizen or officers; increased property damage; invocation of additional or more significant criminal consequences that would have originally been applied.	10%	9%	10%	<u>UNCHANGED.</u> Performance is within the range established in previous years.
3.2 To minimize deaths, injuries, property damage, and criminal consequences resulting from inter-group conflicts such as, but not limited to, the following kinds: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. youth gangs</li> <li>. labor and management groups</li> <li>. political and/or social factions</li> </ul> subsequent to police intervention.	Proportion of inter-group conflict incidents (of each kind) in which there was, subsequent to police intervention, an escalation including: additional deaths or injuries to citizen or officers; increased property damage; invocation of additional or more significant criminal consequences than would have originally been applied.	10%	9%	10%	<u>UNCHANGED.</u> Performance is within the range established in previous years.
3.3 To minimize deaths, injuries, property damage, and to prevent further stress-related criminal consequences brought about by, but not limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. alcoholism or drunkenness</li> <li>. drug abuse</li> <li>. mental illness</li> </ul> subsequent to police intervention.	Proportion of intra-personal stress and personal disorganization incidents (of each kind) in which there was, subsequent to police intervention, an escalation including: additional deaths or injuries to citizen or officers; increased property damage; invocation of additional or more significant criminal consequences than would have originally been applied.	20%	20%	20%	<u>UNCHANGED.</u> Performance is within the range established in previous years.

FIGURE 4 (CONT'D)

OBJECTIVE	MEASURE	THIS YEAR	LAST YEAR	NORM	CHANGE AND INTERPRETATION
4.1 To minimize the number of motor vehicle accidents.	Rate of reported traffic accidents involving local drivers, per 1,000 population.	23	27	23	<u>IMPROVED.</u> Last year's decline in performance has been reversed, by a reassignment of personnel to traffic patrol and increased attention to selective enforcement.
4.2 To minimize the loss of life and degree of injury in all medical emergencies coming to the attention of the police.	Proportion of incidents in which hospital emergency personnel rate the appropriateness and timeliness of police emergency medical assistance to be satisfactory.	95%	94%	96%	<u>UNCHANGED.</u> Performance is within the range established by previous years.
4.3 To maximize the number of citizen requests to the police for information and/or assistance responded to with accuracy and courtesy.	Proportion of citizens who have requested information and/or assistance and are satisfied with the accuracy of the information and with the courtesy of the response.	90%	91%	90%	<u>UNCHANGED.</u> Performance is within the range established in previous years.
4.4 To maximize the number of missing persons located, and when appropriate, returned.	Proportion of persons reported missing who are located through police action.	7.1%	8.3%	9.0%	<u>DECLINED.</u> Effectiveness against this objective has continued a slow, but steady erosion from earlier levels. Change appears primarily due to a decrease in the rate of reported juvenile runaways. The location of missing adults is not among the highest police priorities.

This is accomplished by establishing the degree to which objectives are being achieved, and appraising whether those levels of achievement are satisfactory. When police managers understand that objectives are being achieved satisfactorily, they will evaluate current programs favorably. When objectives are not being achieved satisfactorily, managers will scrutinize current programs for defects.

The ability to evaluate current programs depends largely upon the ability to complete the first procedural step--to specify the degree to which objectives are achieved. Agencies that cannot measure their objectives adequately cannot execute this step; they cannot, therefore, conduct this management function properly. Those organizations that can specify achievement can thus evaluate their programs competently.

New program evaluation serves to determine whether new programs--functions that are introduced to improve the degree to which objectives are achieved--actually do so. This evaluation establishes the level at which objectives are currently being achieved; it measures the degree to which the new programs achieve objectives, and then compares the two levels of achievement.

Police managers constantly strive to "balance" their performance record, to shore up areas where effectiveness is declining or where it has never met expectations. This is normally accomplished by emphasizing these objectives while maintaining or decreasing the stress on objectives that are being achieved satisfactorily. To perform this function rationally, agencies must be able to specify how well most objectives are being achieved. Police departments that cannot measure their objectives cannot order or re-order priorities rationally.

Ordering or re-ordering priorities is often accompanied by a need to trade-off current resources. The pursuit of new priorities will probably produce new or expanded program efforts. These programs

must usually be funded with resources transferred from other programs-- activities carried out to achieve objectives receiving less emphasis. Clearly, if resources are to be allocated rationally, current achievements must be known.

A recurring responsibility of police management is to assemble the resources required to achieve objectives. Whether the manager is a command staffer petitioning his chief, or the chief petitioning his city executive, he will be more successful if he can demonstrate the degree to which he is currently achieving objectives, and if he has the capacity to demonstrate the level of performance a year hence, should resources be provided.

#### PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

We established, at the beginning of this paper, that measuring police performance is more complicated than simply reading some barometer of crime prevention. The remainder of this discussion shows, however, that the issue is not so entangled as to be beyond the capability of current technology. Once it has been established that effectiveness (or productivity) is the particular aspect of performance to be assessed, the task becomes a matter of specifying an organization's objectives, selecting measures, collecting data, and interpreting results.

The PPPM system, referenced repeatedly throughout this paper, was established to work out the major conceptual problems of performance measurement and to prepare a model scheme for police departments to follow in establishing their own measurement programs. That scheme, which elaborates the model of measurable objective--effectiveness (productivity) measure--computation rule--performance standard that was explained in this paper, has been developed and successfully tested in the three American cities of Cincinnati, Ohio, Portland, Oregon, and San Diego, California. Results of that pilot test show that the basic framework is sound, and that nearly all the objectives and measures are practical for police use. Cost projections show that the

total structure can probably be implemented and measured in a department of 500 to 1,000 officers for under \$100,000 the first year, and less in succeeding periods.

But perhaps the most important conclusion to evolve out of our field test is the observation that each of the three agencies that participated was able to improve its performance measurement capabilities. Whether it was through measuring anew the objectives that heretofore had not been measured, or by measuring better those outcome goals that had previously been measured imperfectly, each of the three departments advanced its own abilities just by testing the system.

It would be tempting to overrate the significance of our pilot test experience. That procedure was, after all, merely a simulation exercise, conducted under very favorable conditions. It appears clear, however, that the potential for measurement improvement is so great, and the need for advance so pressing, that many police departments feel an urgent mandate to increase their abilities. The PPPM system is practically oriented and currently usable; it constitutes an incremental, and, we believe, significant advance to performance measurement technology.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. All of the objectives in the Table are authentic, and culled from police budgets or annual reports.
2. See Measuring Police Department Effectiveness and Productivity (Volume I: Concepts and Tools). American Justice Institute, Sacramento, California, 1976.
3. J. Needle, et.al., Measuring Police Effectiveness and Productivity: A Package of Concepts, Tools, and Guidelines.



OBJECTIVES AND MEASURES  
OF  
EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY

# CRIME PREVENTION

## BASIC OBJECTIVE

1.0 To minimize the occurrence of crime.

### MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES: MAJOR, PERSONAL CRIME

1.1.1 To minimize the number of those major, violent crimes against persons:

- . homicide
- . forcible rape
- . robbery
- . aggravated assault

that are preventable under the following circumstances:

- . in public,
- . in commercial or industrial establishments that are police hazards, or
- . in situations where police assistance could have been provided in time to prevent a crime or an escalation of an incident to a crime,

as estimated from crimes reported to the police.

1.1.2 To minimize the number of those major, violent crimes against persons:

- . forcible rape
- . robbery
- . aggravated assault

that are preventable under the following circumstances:

- . in public,
- . in commercial or industrial establishments that are police hazards, or
- . in situations where police assistance could be provided in time to prevent a crime or an escalation of the incident to a crime,

as estimated from a victimization survey.

### EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES

● E1.1.1 Rate of those major, violent crimes against persons referenced in the objective that are preventable under the specified circumstances, per 1,000 population, as estimated from crimes reported to the police.

● E1.1.2 Rate of those major, violent crimes against persons referenced in the objective that are preventable under the specified circumstances, per 1,000 population, as estimated from a victimization survey.

### MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES: MAJOR, PROPERTY CRIME

1.2.1 To minimize the number of those major crimes against property:

- . burglary
- . larceny
- . vehicle theft

that are preventable under the following circumstances:

- . in public,
- . in commercial or industrial establishments that are police hazards, or
- . in situations where police assistance could have been provided in time to prevent a crime or an escalation of the incident to a crime,

as estimated from crimes reported to the police.

### EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES

● E1.2.1 Rate of those major crimes against property referenced in the objective that are preventable under the specified circumstances, per 1,000 population, as estimated from crimes reported to the police.

**MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES:  
MAJOR, PROPERTY CRIME (CONT'D)**

1.2.2 To minimize the number of those major crimes against property:

- . burglary
- . larceny
- . vehicle theft

that are preventable under the following circumstances:

- . in public,
- . in commercial or industrial establishments that are police hazards, or
- . in situations where police assistance could be provided in time to prevent a crime or an escalation of the incident to a crime,

as estimated from a victimization survey.

**EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY  
MEASURES**

● E1.2.2 Rate of those major crimes against property referenced in the objective that are preventable under the specified circumstances, per 1,000 population, as estimated from a victimization survey.

**MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES:  
SELECTED, LESSER CRIMES**

1.3.1 To minimize, consistent with community expectations, the number of each of the lesser crimes against persons and property, including:

- . other assaults
- . arson
- . forgery
- . counterfeiting
- . fraud
- . embezzlement
- . stolen property; buying, receiving, possessing
- . vandalism
- . prostitution and commercialized vice
- . sex offenses (except forcible rape, prostitution, and commercialized vice)
- . narcotic drug laws
- . gambling
- . offenses against the family and children
- . driving under the influence
- . liquor law violations
- . drunkenness
- . disorderly conduct
- . other lesser offenses

that are preventable under the following circumstances:

- . in public,
- . in commercial or industrial establishments that are police hazards, or
- . in situations where police assistance could have been provided in time to prevent a crime or an escalation of the incident to a crime,

as estimated from crimes reported to the police.

1.3.2 To minimize, consistent with community expectations, the number of each of the lesser crimes against persons and property, including:

- . all other assaults
- . arson
- . forgery
- . counterfeiting
- . vandalism
- . sex offenses (except forcible rape, prostitution, and commercialized vice)
- . offenses against the family and children
- . other lesser offenses

that are preventable under the following circumstances:

- . in public,
- . in commercial or industrial establishments that are police hazards, or
- . in situations where police assistance could be provided in time to prevent a crime or an escalation of the incident to a crime,

as estimated from a victimization survey.

**EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY  
MEASURES**

● E1.3.1 Rate of each of the lesser crimes against persons or property referenced in the objective that are preventable under the specified circumstances, per 1,000 population, as estimated from crimes reported to the police.

● E1.3.2 Rate of each of the lesser crimes against persons and property referenced in the objective that are preventable under the specified circumstances, per 1,000 population, as estimated from a victimization survey.

## CRIME CONTROL

### BASIC OBJECTIVE

2.0 To maximize police knowledge of crime; successfully close reported crimes; maximize adherence to constitutional safeguards; present all relevant facts to, and participate as required in, the judicial process; and to recover and return crime-related and stolen property.

### MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES: POLICE KNOWLEDGE OF CRIMES

2.1.1 To maximize the reporting of major crimes against persons:

- . forcible rape
- . robbery
- . aggravated assault

2.1.2 To maximize the reporting of major crimes against property:

- . burglary
- . larceny
- . vehicle theft

2.1.3 To maximize the reporting of each lesser crime, consistent with community expectations:

- . other assaults
- . arson
- . forgery
- . counterfeiting
- . vandalism
- . sex offenses (except forcible rape, prostitution, and commercialized vice)
- . offenses against the family and children
- . other offenses

### MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES: CRIME CASE CLOSURE

2.2.1 To maximize the number of reported, major crimes against persons:

- . homicide
- . forcible rape
- . robbery
- . aggravated assault

that are closed successfully by the police after independent verification, such as:

- . formal diversion,
- . prosecutor acceptance of the case,
- . judicial acceptance of the case,
- . conviction.

### EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES

● E2.1.1 Proportion of the total (reported plus unreported) major crimes referenced in the objective that are reported to the police.

● E2.1.2 Proportion of the total (reported plus unreported) major crimes referenced in the objective that are reported to the police.

● E2.1.3 Proportion of total (reported plus unreported) of each lesser crime referenced in the objective that are reported to the police.

### EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES

● E2.2.1 Proportion of reported, major crimes against persons referenced in the objective that are closed successfully by the police after independent verification, through at least one of the specified actions.

● P2.2.1 The total number of reported, major crimes against persons referenced in the objective that are closed successfully by the police after independent verification, through at least one of the specified actions, per employee-month expended in the processing, investigation, and preparation of all major crimes against persons.

**MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES:  
CRIME CASE CLOSURE (CONT'D)**

**2.2.2** To maximize the number of reported major crimes against property:

- . burglary
- . larceny
- . vehicle theft

that are closed successfully by the police after independent verification, such as:

- . formal diversion,
- . prosecutor acceptance of the case,
- . judicial acceptance of the case,
- . conviction.

**2.2.3** To maximize, consistent with community expectations, the number of each of the reported lesser personal and property crimes:

- . other assaults
- . arson
- . forgery and counterfeiting
- . fraud
- . embezzlement
- . stolen property: buying, receiving, possessing
- . vandalism
- . weapons: carrying, possessing, etc.
- . prostitution and commercialized vice
- . sex offenses (except forcible rape, prostitution, and commercialized vice)
- . narcotic drug laws
- . gambling
- . offenses against the family and children
- . driving under the influence
- . liquor laws
- . drunkenness
- . disorderly conduct
- . vagrancy
- . all other offenses
- . curfew and loitering (Juveniles)
- . runaway (Juveniles)

that are closed successfully by the police after independent verification, such as:

- . formal diversion,
- . prosecutor acceptance of the case,
- . judicial acceptance of the case,
- . conviction.

**EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY  
MEASURES**

● **E2.2.2** Proportion of reported, major crimes against property referenced in the objective that are closed successfully by the police after judicial verification, through at least one of the specified actions.

● **P2.2.2** The total number of reported, major crimes against property referenced in the objective that are closed successfully by the police after independent verification, through at least one of the specified actions, per employee-month expended in the processing, investigation, and preparation of all major crimes against property.

● **E2.2.3** Proportion of each of the reported, lesser personal and property crimes referenced in the objective that are closed successfully by the police after independent verification, through at least one of the specified actions.

● **P2.2.3** The number of each of the reported, lesser personal and property crimes referenced in the objective that are closed successfully by the police after independent verification, through at least one of the specified actions, per employee-month expended in the processing, investigation, and preparation of all lesser crimes.

**MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES:  
CASE PREPARATION AND TESTIMONY**

**2.3.1** To maximize the quality of case preparation.

**2.3.2** To maximize the quality of testimony given in legal proceedings.

**EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY  
MEASURES**

● **E2.3.1** Proportion of cases in which the quality of the case preparation is rated satisfactory by both the police and prosecutor.

● **E2.3.2** Proportion of instances in which the quality of police testimony is rated satisfactory or better by the prosecutor.

**MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES:  
STOLEN PROPERTY RETURN**

**2.4.1** To maximize the proportion of the total value of stolen and other crime-related articles that is recovered and returned to owners.

**EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY  
MEASURES**

● **E2.4.1** Proportion of total value of stolen and other crime-related articles that is recovered and returned to owners.

● **P2.4.1** The total value of all stolen and other crime-related articles that are recovered and returned to owners, per employee-year expended in the recovery, ownership identification, storage or safekeeping, and return of stolen or crime-related property.

**MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES:  
STOLEN PROPERTY RETURN (CONT'D)**

2.4.2 To minimize the time that the owners of stolen and other crime-related articles are deprived of the possession and use of that property.

**MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES:  
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPRIETY**

2.5.1 To minimize the number of complaints alleging violations of legal safeguards, such as:

- . unlawful arrest
- . illegal stop, search, and seizure
- . violation of the right against self-incrimination

2.5.2 To minimize the number of verified violations of constitutional safeguards, such as:

- . unlawful arrest
- . illegal stop, search, and seizure
- . violation of the right against self-incrimination

**MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES:  
CUSTODY OF PRISONERS**

2.6.1 To maximize the secure detention of persons held in police custody.

2.6.2 To maximize the personal safety of legal rights to persons held in police custody.

2.6.3 To maximize the extension of legal rights to persons held in police custody.

**EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY  
MEASURES**

● E2.4.2 Average length of time that the owners of stolen and other crime-related articles are deprived of the possession and use of that property.

**EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY  
MEASURES**

● E2.5.1a Proportion of complaints of violations of constitutional safeguards referenced in the objective, to total police arrests.

● E2.5.1b Rate of complaints of violations of constitutional safeguards referenced in the objective, per 1,000 population.

● E2.5.2a Proportion of verified violations of constitutional safeguards referenced in the objective, to total police arrests.

● E2.5.2b Rate of verified violations of constitutional safeguards referenced in the objective, per 1,000 population.

● E2.5.2c Proportion of verified violations of constitutional safeguards referenced in the objective, to complaints of violations of such constitutional safeguards.

**EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY  
MEASURES**

● E2.6.1 Proportion of individuals who escape from police custody.

● E2.6.2 Proportion of individuals who suffer death or injuries from other than the legal use of force while in police custody.

● E2.6.3 Rate of verified violations of legal rights of individuals held in police custody, per 100 such individuals.

# CONFLICT RESOLUTION

## BASIC OBJECTIVE

3.0 To minimize disorder resulting from inter-personal and inter-group conflict and from personal stress and disorganization, subsequent to police intervention.

### MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES: INTER-PERSONAL CONFLICT

3.1.1 To minimize deaths, injuries, property damage, and criminal consequences resulting from interpersonal conflicts, such as:

- . domestic disturbances
- . landlord/tenant disputes
- . neighbor/neighbor disputes
- . merchant/customer disputes

subsequent to police intervention.

### EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES.

- E3.1.1a Proportion of inter-personal conflict incidents (of each kind) in which there was, subsequent to police intervention, an escalation including: additional deaths or injuries to citizens or officers; increased property damage; invocation of additional or more significant criminal consequences than would have originally been applied.
- E3.1.1b Proportion of inter-personal conflict incidents (of each kind) in which there was an escalation and which required another police intervention within 15 days.

### MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES: INTER-GROUP CONFLICT

3.2.1 To minimize deaths, injuries, property damage, and criminal consequences resulting from conflict between groups, such as:

- . youth gangs
- . labor and management groups
- . political or social factions

subsequent to police intervention.

### EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES

- E3.2.1a Proportion of inter-group conflict incidents (of each kind) in which there was, subsequent to police intervention, an escalation including: additional deaths or injuries to citizens or officers; increased property damage; invocation of additional or more significant criminal consequences than would have originally been applied.
- E3.2.1b Proportion of inter-group conflict incidents (of each kind) in which there was an escalation and which required another police intervention within 15 days.

### MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES: PERSONAL STRESS

3.3.1 To minimize deaths, injuries, property damage, and criminal consequences brought about by personal stress or disorientation problems such as:

- . alcoholism or drunkenness
- . drug abuse
- . mental illness

subsequent to police intervention.

### EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES

- E3.3.1a Proportion of intra-personal stress or personal disorganization incidents (of each kind) in which there was, subsequent to police intervention, an escalation including: additional deaths or injuries to citizens or officers; increased property damage; invocation of additional or more significant criminal consequences than would have originally been applied.
- E3.3.1b Proportion of intra-personal stress or personal disorganization incidents (of each kind) in which there was an escalation and which required another police intervention within 15 days.

# SERVICES

## BASIC OBJECTIVE

4.0 To maximize the level and quality of those police services authorized or required by federal, state, and/or local governments provided to the community and/or local governments.

### MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES: TRAFFIC SERVICES

4.1.1 To minimize the number of motor vehicle accidents, the number and severity of related injuries, and the amount of property damage.

4.1.2 To minimize stress and confusion at the scene of traffic accidents, and to maximize the quality of information concerning rights and responsibilities that is provided to the participants.

4.1.3 To minimize traffic congestion.

4.1.4 To maximize the proportion of instances in which stranded motorists are assisted in a timely and satisfactory way.

### EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES

- E4.1.1a Rate of reported traffic accidents, per 1,000 population.
- P4.1.1a Total number of reported traffic accidents, per employee-day and other resources expended on traffic enforcement and education.
- E4.1.1b Proportion of reported traffic accidents resulting in death or injuries requiring hospitalization.
- E4.1.1c Proportion of value of locally registered vehicles that is damaged in traffic accidents.
- E4.1.2 Proportion of accident participants who rate police conduct as satisfactory in regard to each of the following aspects of accident management: speed of arrival on the scene, reduction of tension, equity of treatment of participants, and provision of information on participants' rights and responsibilities.
- E4.1.3 Ratio between the actual time required to travel between sample of geographic points compared to optimum time at posted speeds in peak traffic, and the optimum time for traveling such routes.
- P4.1.3 Reduction in average travel time, per employee-day expended in the control of congestion.
- E4.1.4a Average elapsed time between the time a motorist becomes stranded and the time that police assistance is provided.
- E4.1.4b Proportion of cases involving assistance to stranded motorists in which police service is rated as satisfactory by the recipient of the assistance in terms of waiting time and service received.

### MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES: SERVICES TO PUBLIC

4.2.1 To minimize the loss of life and degree of injury in all medical emergencies coming to the attention of the police.

4.2.2 To maximize the safety of the individual citizen's person and property in situations where the circumstances or limitations of the citizen require extraordinary police attention, such as:

- providing escorts when special safety or security problems exist,
- aiding the aged and infirmed in potentially difficult or dangerous situations,
- protecting persons and property under serious threat of harm.

### EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES

- E4.2.1 Proportion of cases in which hospital emergency personnel rate the appropriateness and timeliness of police emergency medical assistance to be satisfactory.
- E4.2.2 Proportion of the reported incidents in which the safety of the individual citizen's person or property is satisfactorily protected in each of the following categories referenced in the objective.
- P4.2.2 Total number of security services successfully extended, per employee-day expended in such activities.

**MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES:  
SERVICES TO PUBLIC (CONT'D)**

4.2.3 To maximize the number of missing persons that are located.

4.2.4 To maximize the number of articles and the value of property found and returned to owners.

**MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES:  
INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE**

4.3.1 To maximize the convenience, effectiveness, and courtesy of police response to citizens' requests for information and assistance.

**MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES:  
SERVICES TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM**

4.4.1 To maximize the level and quality of service provided to other elements of the criminal justice system, such as serving warrants and subpoenas.

4.4.2 To maximize the quality of service provided to selected public and private agencies, such as:

- . counseling school
- . offering crime prevention programs for retail merchants associations
- . developing and presenting traffic safety programs with local safety council
- . transporting emergency supplies for local medical facilities

4.4.3 To maximize the quality of services provided to other local government agencies, such as:

- . participation in traffic flow analysis
- . cooperation with parks and recreation on vandalism problems
- . dispatching for some or all local government agencies

**EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY  
MEASURES**

- E4.2.3 Proportion of adults and juveniles who are reported missing and are subsequently located through police action.
- P4.2.3 Total number of missing persons who are located through police action, per employee-month expended in locating missing persons.
- E4.2.4a Proportion of found articles that is returned to owners.
- E4.2.4b Proportion of the value of found articles that is returned to their owners.
- P4.2.4b Total value of found articles that are returned to owners, per employee-day expended in the identification, storage, and return of found property.

**EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY  
MEASURES**

- E4.3.1 Proportion of citizens who have requested information or assistance and are satisfied with the convenience, effectiveness, and courtesy of the response.

**EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY  
MEASURES**

- E4.4.1a Proportion of warrants that are served.
- P4.4.1a The number of warrants served per employee-day expended in serving warrants.
- E4.4.1b Average time elapsed between the receipt of warrants by the police and their service.
- E4.4.1c Proportion of subpoenas that are served.
- P4.4.1c The number of subpoenas served per employee-day expended in serving subpoenas.
- E4.4.1d Average time elapsed between the receipt of subpoenas by the police and service.
- E4.4.2 Proportion of public and private agencies that use police services and rate that service to be satisfactory.
- E4.4.3 Proportion of other local government agencies that use police services and rate that service to be satisfactory.

# ADMINISTRATION

## BASIC OBJECTIVE

5.0 To maximize the achievement of those objectives which facilitate the fulfillment of the primary responsibilities of the local police and their parent local government.

### MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES: INTEGRITY AND COMPETENCE

5.1.1 To maximize departmental integrity by minimizing acts of police corruption, such as:

- . solicitation of bribes or gratuities
- . acceptance of bribes or gratuities
- . protecting law violators from arrest or prosecution
- . violation of public trust.

5.1.2 To maximize professional police behavior by minimizing instances of police misconduct and incompetence, such as:

- . misconduct
  - . discourtesy
  - . verbal abuse
  - . harassment
  - . excessive use of force, including unauthorized discharge of firearms
  - . violations of department code of personal conduct
- . incompetence
  - . negligent operation of departmental equipment
  - . failure to adhere to departmental operation procedures.

### MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES: COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP

5.2.1 To maximize public esteem for the department by maintaining the highest possible number of instances in which individuals who wish to register positive or negative feedback, including officially recognized complaints, are able to do so without encountering resistance, discourtesy, or unsatisfactory service.

5.2.2 To maximize the degree to which the public possesses accurate knowledge of the level and location of crime.

5.2.3 To maximize public understanding of police objectives, the ability of the police to achieve those objectives, and citizens' roles and responsibilities in the prevention and control of crime.

### EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES

- ES.1.1a Proportion of formal complaints of police corruption (as referenced in the objective) that are supported by some evidence.
- ES.1.1b Rate of verified acts of police corruption (referenced in the objective), per 100 sworn police employees.
- ES.1.2a Proportion of all formal complaints of police misconduct or incompetence referenced in the objective that are supported by some evidence.
- ES.1.2b Rate of verified instances of police misconduct or incompetence referenced in the objective, per 100 sworn police employees.

### EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES

- ES.2.1a Proportion of citizens who register positive or negative feedback, including officially recognized complaints, and rate the department's handling of their comments as satisfactory insofar as: willingness to accept comment, courtesy, and service are concerned.
- ES.2.1b Proportion of the public who are willing to register positive or negative feedback, including complaints.
- ES.2.2 Degree to which the public possesses accurate knowledge of the level and location of crime, as indicated by average score on a test of such knowledge given to a sample of citizens.
- ES.2.3a Degree of public understanding of police objectives.
- ES.2.3b Degree of public understanding of citizens' roles and responsibilities in the prevention and control of crime, as manifested by average scores on a test of such understanding (knowledge) given to a sample of citizens.

**MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES:  
COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP (CONT'D)**

**5.2.4** To maximize the police community leadership role in crime prevention and control planning, and to coordinate, cooperate and plan with other elements of the criminal justice system, with appropriate public and private agencies, and with other units of local government.

**MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES:  
COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES**

**5.3.1** To maximize the number of instances in which:

- . other criminal justice agencies
- . local government agencies

are persuaded to conduct activities that will facilitate the fulfillment of primary police responsibilities.

**5.3.2** To maximize continuous adherence to established executive, legislative, and judicial norms or policies, such as:

- . public accountability
- . fiscal responsibility
- . affirmative action in personnel practices

**5.3.3** To maximize the number of instances in which the police conduct activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of:

- . other criminal justice agencies
- . other local government agencies

without interfering with the fulfillment of primary police responsibilities.

**5.3.4** To maximize the number of instances of cooperative planning between the police and:

- . other criminal justice agencies
- . other local government agencies

to assure the compatibility of objectives and procedures.

**EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY  
MEASURES**

● **E5.2.4a** Composite rating of police community leadership role in crime prevention and control planning, and level of coordination, cooperation, and planning with other elements of the criminal justice system, with appropriate public and private agencies, and with other units of local government, as determined by rating instruments administered to city administrators and heads of other public and private agencies.

● **E5.2.4b** Proportion of public who recognize the chief of police as a community leader.

● **E5.2.4c** Proportion of public who know of the police position on community issues.

**EFFECTIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY  
MEASURES**

● **E5.3.1** Number of instances in which other criminal justice agencies and other local government agencies are persuaded to conduct activities that will facilitate the fulfillment of primary police responsibilities.

● **E5.3.2** Degree of adherence to established executive, legislative, and judicial norms and policies, as evaluated by local executive, legislative and judicial officials.

● **E5.3.3** Extent to which the police conduct activities which contribute to the achievement of the objectives of other criminal justice agencies and other local government agencies.

● **E5.3.4** Extent to which the police participate in cooperative planning with other criminal justice agencies, and other local government agencies to assure the compatibility of objectives and procedures, as evaluated by the heads of such agencies.

POLICE EFFECTIVENESS IN DEALING WITH CRIME:  
SOME CURRENT BRITISH RESEARCH

*by*

*R.V.G. Clarke, Senior Principal Research Officer<sup>1</sup>*

*and*

*K.H. Heal, Principal Research Officer*

*Research Unit, Home Office  
London, U.K.*

Introduction

Most people believe that a solution to rising crime rates will be found in the strengthening of the police force. This is based on the conventional wisdom that policing consists essentially of the detection and apprehension of offenders and that more efforts in this direction will constitute a greater deterrent to criminal activity. Leaving aside that this represents a somewhat narrow view of the police's crime prevention role - they attempt also to increase the public's security consciousness and to raise commitment to the law through various means

of involving the community - it ignores the fact that most police time is taken up with work that is only marginally related to crime; traffic duties, attendance at accidents and fires, crowd control, tracing of missing persons, intervention in domestic disputes and so on. It is also not a very practicable solution at a time of severe constraints on public expenditure.

More to the point, however, it seems to be essentially misguided. It is not generally recognized that in the period since 1964, during which crime has continued to rise, police manpower in England and Wales has increased by a third and civilian staff have more than doubled. Moreover, there has been a steady stream of research, mainly from the United States, that has begun to call into question much that is central to the police's deterrent role. Thus the effectiveness of preventive patrolling (Bright, 1969; Kelling et al., 1974), of fast response to public calls for assistance (Pate et al., 1976), and even of present methods of criminal investigation (Greenwood et al., 1975) is now in doubt. Whilst few would seriously question that some police presence is essential as the experience of some, but not all, police strikes suggests (Meyer, 1976; Reynolds and Judge, 1968) - there is now a growing body of commentators who see the deterrent value of the police as residing primarily in their symbolic function of upholders and enforcers of the law (e.g. Manning, 1977). The critics further believe that there are few foreseeable changes in policing levels or operational strategies that would have a discernible effect on crime and which would be both acceptable to the public and economically viable.<sup>2</sup>

The reasons are thought to lie in the nature of crime itself. Though the aggregated crime statistics seem to represent an overwhelming problem, the number of incidents is really very small if account is taken of the number of opportunities for crime inherent in the activities

of a huge population of citizens for the 24 hours of the day. And these relatively few incidents are distributed over an extensive geographical area which the police need to cover - an average foot-beat in a large city covers in the region of 200 acres, 4-5 miles of public roadway, and a population of about 4,000, while a mobile beat is three times this size. Moreover, much crime takes place in private and that which occurs in public is often accomplished quickly, stealthily, and without warning by strangers. The chances of the police witnessing or being in a position to intervene in such events are therefore tiny and so in the great majority of cases they are likely to be faced with the much more difficult and time-consuming problems of investigation.

It might seem, in the face of this accumulation of negative evidence, that further work into police effectiveness in dealing with crime is scarcely required. But little of the work has been done in Britain (see Appendix 1 for a brief account of the traditions of police research in the UK) and findings obtained in the United States may not always hold in the very different policing context in our country. Moreover, there are many activities falling under the head of preventive policing, especially those concerned with increasing security and public commitment to the law, which as far as can be ascertained have nowhere been evaluated, and the police cannot be advised on the basis of research findings which of their efforts might at present be misdirected and which might in the future be intensified.

For these reasons, it seemed to those of us in the Home Office Research Unit<sup>3</sup>, when recently charged with the task of formulating a programme of research concerned with the police, that issues of effectiveness would provide a valuable focus for this work. There is a tradition of evaluative research within the Unit (mainly undertaken in the context of penal treatment) and an additional advantage of concentrating on questions of effectiveness (rather than on, say, equally broad and important questions of the balance

between police discretion and accountability for their decisions) is that it would enable the police research to fit in with the longer-term objectives governing much of the Unit's other criminological work: the identification of effective and realistic policies for dealing with crime.<sup>4</sup>

Not all the police research now underway in the Unit is dealing directly with effectiveness. Some other problems concerned with such matters as recruitment, management, and community relations have needed attention or have been met through the funding of extramural research (see Appendix 2 for a list of the current programme of research with relevance to the police). And because of limited resources and relative unfamiliarity with the field, the four projects concerned with diverse aspects of effectiveness (described below) are small scale and modest in conception. They reflect also a preference for small, and hopefully precise, studies each one of which is carried out to provide information on a different aspect of a particular problem. During a period of familiarization it was decided to deal with some of the less complex if peripheral of police crime-related activities, and to resist the temptation (and occasionally the request) to pursue large-scale research aiming to evaluate a battery of police activities. For the future, it is hoped that a current survey of the literature (see Appendix 2) will serve to identify potentially useful research concerne with the more central preventive policing activities such as patrolling or criminal investigation.

This introduction has outlined how effectiveness in dealing with crime was chosen as the focus of the Research Unit's police research. Before describing the current work it may be useful to examine briefly the relationship between 'effectiveness' and 'productivity', the subject of this Workshop. In this paper policing is understood to be effective to the extent to which it achieves its objectives. Policing is productive to the extent to which it achieves these objectives cost-effectively (taking a broad definition of cost to include economic, social and organizational aspects). Assessing police effectiveness is therefore a process logically prior to assessing productivity; and the limitations to research on police effectiveness bear directly on the extent to which police productivity can be measured.

CURRENT RESEARCH UNIT STUDIES CONCERNED WITH EFFECTIVENESS

Public calls for assistance and the deployment of police resources

In 1975 a 'command-and-control' computer system for the despatching of uniformed patrols became operational in one of Britain's larger conurbations. A year later one of the Research Unit staff (J.M. Hough) began a project the main aim of which was to see how the Management Information System (MIS) allied to the command-and-control computer<sup>5</sup> could be used to improve the allocation of patrol resources in the area. It was hoped that the MIS could be used in conjunction with demographic data to show the consequences of existing deployment policies - particularly in terms of crime - and to see if demographic aspects of areas could be taken into account in deploying resources.

It had been originally expected that the management of uniformed patrols would be concerned with the tactical redeployment of manpower in response to changes in criminal activity. However it was found that this was a tightly circumscribed process, concerned with implementing a 'ground cover' system which had been laid down in detail some three years earlier. Beat boundaries, patrol types and shift systems were constraints on management and their job - by no means an easy one - was to juggle with limited manpower so as to approximate to the ground-cover plan and to be in a position to respond adequately to demands for police assistance.

The police saw themselves as confronted with two levels of management problems. Within the confines of existing patrolling methods, they were concerned to make better use of available manpower. At a more fundamental level there was considerable uncertainty about the validity of conventional methods of patrol.

The project's fieldwork was mainly concerned with the first level of problem and consisted of a fairly straightforward 'resource-matching' exercise in which inequalities of workload were identified over area, time and patrol type. For example the now familiar picture of urban policing emerged - that calls for police assistance increase throughout the day,

peaking in the late evening. For historical reasons however - and also as a result of 'grass-roots' resistance to changes in the shift system - manpower remained at a fairly constant level throughout the day and night.

Information of this sort could lead to a more equitable distribution of workload between personnel and a consequent improvement in police service to the public; but the work had all the shortcomings characteristic of the 'workload formula' approach to police management. It met with the problems of inaccurate and incomplete data which one suspects are endemic to police information systems and particularly to those based on computerized despatching systems. More fundamentally (as the project report, now in preparation, is likely to argue) the approach rests on the assumption that what patrols do is what they should do. But research of the last decade has increasingly questioned the value of patrol work and until it is known what constitutes effective patrolling, computerized information and despatch systems will not help to solve the major problems of patrol management.

It is clear that in order to advance beyond the conclusions of this work, one thing that will have to be done is to examine in greater detail the rationale for the work undertaken by uniformed patrols. This is one of the objectives of some research, which it is planned to undertake in collaboration with the Police Foundation, to begin in the late summer. It will examine the reasons why people call the police, the nature of the assistance they require and their satisfaction with the service they receive; it will also examine how far satisfaction is affected by the way in which patrols are despatched.

#### The effectiveness of police truancy patrols in reducing crime

In Britain, something over 2% of compulsory pupils in secondary schools (catering for 11-16 year olds) play truant each day. It is commonly believed by many police and others that truants are responsible for an appreciable proportion of day-time crime and, in recent years, a growing number of British police forces have instituted so-called 'truancy patrols', with a view to cutting crime. The method adopted by the force we studied is typical; a uniformed policeman and policewoman, accompanied by an


education welfare officer (responsible for school attendance) patrol a given area as a group, interviewing children alone on the streets, and where necessary, returning them to school. One or two such patrols would normally cover a suburb or a central business district and they would operate for about a week in each school term.

The effectiveness of these patrols has never been adequately evaluated and in an attempt to remedy this a study was undertaken (by P.J. Ekblom) with the help of the police force of a city in the West of England. The design, illustrated in Figure 1, was experimental in nature; various measures were taken before, during and after a week's patrolling; one series before the half-term break, one after it. Two patrols operated in each series, one on foot in the city's central shopping area (A), the other by car in the suburb (B). In the second series, the patrol in B took place a week before the patrol in A to check whether the former displaced truants into the city centre. The patrols in A and B in the second series were originally each set for a week earlier, but because of an unusually heavy fall of snow, which closed the schools during week 6, the timing shown in Figure 1 was adopted. The patrols were kept as routine as possible so that the results could be of lasting validity: there was no publicity and the co-operation of teachers was not sought.

As it was thought inadvisable to rely solely on school attendance records to measure truancy, it was decided to cover systematically the same routes as the patrols in A and B and to record the number of children visible on the streets during school hours. Clearly only a certain proportion of these would be truants, but it was assumed that if this proportion changed it would only do so to reflect the effects of patrolling. Counts were also taken each day of those children seen entering a large department store (S) in A. In addition, records were kept by store detectives in a number of stores in A of children caught, or suspected of shoplifting, and the police granted access to daily crime reports and juvenile arrest figures.

In the two series of patrols, the police picked up some 61 children in A (roughly 28% of whom had unacceptable excuses) and 263 in B (38% with unacceptable excuses). The evidence so far analyzed is complicated and is also contaminated by a number of unkind outside events, but it suggests that

Figure 1: Truancy patrol research design



the patrols may have achieved some reduction in the numbers of children around, both in the patrol week itself and in the week following it. In the first series, the falls in numbers of children counted by the researchers from the pre- to post-patrol week were 26% in A, 47% in S (significant at the .001 level) and non-existent in B (where, paradoxically, the numbers dealt with by the police were higher). In the second series, all counts show falls from the week preceding the relevant patrol to the week after it: 24% (A), 67% (S) and 39% (B), all of which were statistically significant drops. There are reasons to think, however, that the effect of patrols may be rather less than these figures suggest. First, whilst numbers did fall during patrol weeks, examination of the day-to-day counts reveals that low totals started right from the beginning of each patrol week, and if anything, tended to increase at the end of the week, when one would suppose the patrol effect to be strongest. Secondly, the fact that patterns of school attendance (which to some extent were reflected in street count figures) were similar both for schools within and outside the patrol areas, suggested that falls in numbers of children in the street may have resulted from things other than patrol activity.

While patrols may have reduced the numbers of children on the streets, there was no indication that local crime fell during school hours as a result of the police action. It must be said, however, that from the data available it is probable that only a substantial fall in crime could have been detected. There is no evidence of displacement from B to A in week 7, nor, during A patrols, from the streets of A to the store, nor of shoplifting from school hours to the rest of the day.

In summary, the research has been unable to show that the truancy patrols reduced crime, and there is some doubt as to whether the apparent effect on numbers of children at large was accounted for entirely by patrol activity. These results, therefore, do not suggest that truancy patrols, at least of the type described here, have more than a marginal contribution to make to crime prevention.

The effect of publicity campaigns on vehicle security

Another facet of modern policing practice which the Research Unit has been evaluating - one that central government itself expends considerable resources on - has been the use of the mass-media to disseminate crime prevention advice to the public, particularly that stressing the need to secure property adequately against theft. The study undertaken (by J.N. Burrows) concerns the effectiveness of car security campaigns; these campaigns were selected principally for the methodological advantage that the behavioural response of the car driver is easily checked. The principal component of the research project<sup>6</sup> consists of the evaluation of a campaign - comprising radio, press, and TV coverage, and wide distribution of posters and handbills - conducted by the police in one city in the West Country over a five week period during the months of November and December 1977.

Two measures of effectiveness were used. A series of vehicle security checks were carried out by uniformed police officers, accompanied by researchers, along fixed routes on (a) the day preceding the start of the campaign, (b) at intervals during the campaign, and (c) at its close. These were carried out in the evening - a high risk time for offences of this nature - in order to reduce the visibility of those carrying out the checks, and the details of cars found insecure were recorded; from this information it was possible to identify what proportion of those cars left insecure belonged to visitors to the city, living outside the campaign area. Secondly, an examination is currently being carried out to determine whether there was any change in the number of thefts of and from vehicles known to the police during or after the campaign, and whether there is any evidence of the displacement of crime to other areas. The 'expected' level of crime will be determined by extrapolation from the pattern of vehicle thefts in the city in the previous year, and - for control purposes - an examination will be made of the incidence of vehicle thefts in two comparable towns removed from the campaign publicity.

Some results are already to hand. The pre-campaign check showed 19% of the vehicles selected were insecure in some manner (doors or boot unlocked, or windows open) and the three subsequent checks revealed insecurity levels

of 20.9%, 21.7% and 19.2% - statistically insignificant fluctuations which clearly illustrate the failure of the campaign to alter car-locking behaviour. It is unlikely that this result can be attributed to any shortcoming of the campaign itself. Two small interview surveys of car drivers in the city confirmed that a high proportion of motorists were aware of the campaign.

Though perhaps instructive for the police, this failure was disappointing for as a result there was no opportunity to examine how improved security levels would affect car crime (and thus the validity of the central axiom underlying campaigns of this nature - that carelessness by car drivers contributes significantly to the occurrence of these crimes). The possibility that despite stable security levels the campaign effected a reduction in the number of vehicle thefts committed through deterring potential offenders remains to be explored.

#### Target hardening and burglary from dwellings

The police are under great difficulties in dealing with burglary from dwellings. Most offences take place when premises are unoccupied (Repetto, 1974)<sup>7</sup> and so the chances of catching a burglar red-handed are very slim. The size of the problem (in 1976 there were 230,236 burglaries from residential premises in England and Wales - Home Office, 1977) means that only minimal investigatory work is feasible in most cases, unless unusually large sums of money are involved or the intruder has offered violence to occupants. These facts help to explain why in London only about 10% of residential burglaries are cleared up, of which a large proportion are 'offences taken into consideration' (Metropolitan Police, 1977).

One of the main ways in which the police attempt to deal with burglary is by encouraging householders, either through publicity campaigns or advice to individuals, to take greater security precautions. These may range from very simple measures such as locking doors and shutting windows when leaving the house<sup>8</sup> (Home Office, 1974) through the purchase of window-locks and a dog for protection, to the fitting of elaborate electronic surveillance devices.

The effectiveness of these various means of 'target hardening' is

open to some question. While those who take precautions may achieve a degree of protection from opportunistic burglary (about 25% of burglaries in London are thought to be 'walk-ins', Metropolitan Police, 1977), it is very difficult to stop a determined intruder. From the police point of view it is particularly difficult to tell whether 'target hardening' brings about an overall reduction in burglary rates and thereby reduces police workload or whether burglary is merely 'displaced' to less well protected property.

A research project that is presently being negotiated (to be undertaken by S.W.C. Winchester) aims to consider both the degree of protection afforded to individual householders by increased security and the amount of scope that exists for reducing the overall rate of burglary through target hardening. The research will fall into two parts. First, a representative sample of approximately 1,000 householders in one area of South-East England will be contacted in order (i) to estimate the 'pool' of unoccupied houses at particular points in the day, and (ii) to obtain a more precise picture of the security precautions taken by householders. Secondly, a sample of about 600 incidents of burglary in the same area will be studied to see whether households which have been victimised differ in terms of occupancy or security (taking into account the 'desirability' of the contents) from households that have not been burgled.

We anticipate that the study will show that target hardening, in an attempt to reduce rates of burglary, is an unpromising strategy from the police point of view. The reasons for this are fourfold: first, the risk of burglary to any given dwelling is not especially high (we have estimated that in England and Wales about 1 in 70 households are burgled in any one year); secondly, the study may well show that this risk is only slightly less for householders who take greater security precautions; thirdly, it is likely that overall occupancy and security levels will be found to be remarkably low; and finally, that it is most unlikely that police effort will result in great improvements in levels of security.

Such a conclusion would not mean, of course, that target hardening is an ineffective strategy in all circumstances. For example, it may be effective in dealing with burglary to commercial premises where risk levels are higher, where possibilities of increasing security may be greater, and where there are

fewer alternative targets. Also, it has been suggested (Maybew et al., 1976) that the fitting of steering column locks to all new cars in the United Kingdom since 1971 (a form of target hardening), which because of displacement has not so far reduced levels of autocrime, will eventually result in a sufficient proportion of cars being protected to achieve just such a reduction.

#### METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN STUDYING EFFECTIVENESS

##### Experimental designs

Modest as these studies of effectiveness are, they have entailed consideration of some of the formidable methodological problems in this field - one group of which concerns the use of experimental designs. As most of the social, economic and physical determinants of crime are beyond the influence of the police, the effectiveness of their crime prevention work can only be assessed in relative terms: the value of a particular activity will usually need to be compared with that of another one or a state of affairs when nothing specific is being done. Such comparisons yield the clearest results when the researcher has been able to exercise some degree of experimental control over the activities being studied, but the need for this control is often difficult for police (or any other practitioners) to accept. This is especially so when the research design demands that the police undertake activities which they believe to be fruitless or to neglect others which they think are important. In fact, the police were not unwilling to agree to the small experiments involved in the work on truancy patrols and autocrime publicity, but there were difficulties in implementing the designs in the way that had been set out: in the truancy study, patrols, despite repeated requests, did not record the numbers of children whose excuses they accepted and those they did not; in the car security study, despite careful briefing of police, there was an accidental, but luckily minor, pre-release of campaign information to the press.<sup>9</sup>

An additional hazard is presented by confounding external events which can mar a carefully designed study. In the truancy study, schools were closed for a few days during the second series of observations by an unusually heavy fall of snow, though in the end this made little difference<sup>10</sup>. In one of the

other Unit's studies, not directly concerned with the police, the evaluation of an anti-vandalism TV campaign has been complicated by a technician's strike which delayed transmission of the films. Even more problematic than such 'chance' events, are changes in levels of crime which are of unknown origin but which from the point of view of the evaluation are spurious. In the case of the truancy research the design, which consisted of two separate time series of observations, would have been perfectly adequate for coping with an increase or a decline in truancy throughout the term, but could not happily deal with the half-termly fluctuations in truancy that seemed to have taken place. With more elaborate, and therefore more costly designs, the chances of spurious factors undermining a design can be minimized, but there will always be some studies that fall victim to them and one may never achieve completely unequivocal results.

#### Criteria

A further cluster of problems surround the criteria of effectiveness. Certain difficulties that are by now well known are involved in using crime rates as a measure: only a small proportion of crimes committed are reported to the police<sup>11</sup> and, for a variety of reasons, those reported do not always appear in the records. This means that increased police effort, whatever its effect on the commission of crime, can lead to an apparent increase in offending because of better reporting and recording. Some police statistics are more reliable than others however - for example those concerning car theft where there is an insurance requirement to report the offence and also the likelihood of followup enquiries from the insurance company. But generally there is ample scope for error, bias, and missing information to make the interpretation equivocal of evaluations based solely on crime rates.

In order to get round these difficulties - and to find out about the circumstances surrounding offences as well as the public's view of crime and their experience of being victimised - use has sometimes been made of 'victim' surveys of people in the target areas. Victim surveys are heavy on resources, however, and when dealing with low incidence offences, such as rape or serious robbery, one may have to employ a sample so huge to pick up enough cases that

the expense becomes prohibitive. This is especially so when measuring effectiveness of police action as surveys may have to be repeated at intervals.

It is sometimes possible to use other direct measures of effectiveness: thus in the car publicity campaign car doors and windows were physically checked to see whether a change in the level of insecurity occurred during the campaign; in the truancy study, counts were made in school hours of children in the patrol area. Also, it would have been methodologically feasible to follow children who entered large stores to see whether they shoplifted, but ethical and legal problems ruled this out, at least for our study.

### Displacement

In evaluating any of the preventive activities of the police one must always be alert to the possibility of displacement i.e. instead of crime being prevented it may be that offenders are merely shifting their activities to localities where the police have not intensified their efforts or to targets that have not been given special protection. In addition, where specific forms of crime such as residential burglary are the objects of the preventive measures, the possibility must always be guarded against that offenders will turn instead to other forms of crime such as robbery or shopbreaking. These contingencies can be difficult to cope with in a research design, but attempts to measure displacement have been made in a number of studies including those described above.

An understanding of particular forms of crime and of the individuals involved is especially needed in dealing with displacement. An important distinction is the degree to which particular offences require planning, skill and determination and how much they depend on opportunity. The number of opportunities available, expressed in relation to a given degree of effort on the part of the offender, is also important. For example, it is likely that offences such as vandalism and shoplifting, which may be heavily dependent on the temptations and opportunities of the situations in which offenders find themselves, could be cut by protecting individual targets. The rates of other offences such as car theft and residential burglary which depend to

some extent on opportunities, but opportunities which have to be sought out, may not be so easily reduced by protecting particular targets, even though the targets that are given protection may themselves escape attack. The reason is that within easy reach of every house with a burglar alarm or car with an anti-theft device, there are many others without these forms of protection. For crimes such as bank robbery which are by and large the province of professional criminals, protection of a particular bank will almost certainly displace attention to another. This is not to say, however, that the rates of bank robbery could not be reduced by providing additional protection to all or most banks. The difficulty might then be that bank robbers would increase the amount of force needed in order to achieve their ends.

The idea that preventing one type of crime will be likely to lead to a rise in another rests, to an extent, on the somewhat discredited view that crime is committed by people with a propensity to criminal behaviour which will be expressed in one form or another whatever the hindrances and impediments. In fact, a great deal of crime is committed by people who would not ordinarily be thought of as 'criminal' and is heavily influenced by particular situational inducements and the balance of risks and rewards involved. To make the point through a somewhat extreme example, if housewives were prevented from the occasional shoplifting in their neighbourhood supermarket it is very unlikely that they would turn instead to mugging local residents. And it is also unlikely that if burglars were prevented from breaking into houses they would turn to robbery since this involves the confrontation with victims which many burglars go to great lengths to avoid. The point is an obvious one: while people may be willing to commit offences which they think will not particularly harm anyone, this does not mean they would be willing to turn to other forms of crime. They may also be prepared to run the comparatively small risks of being caught or being assaulted by victims that are involved in shoplifting, but not the slightly greater risks of these things happening which are attendant on burglary or mugging. In other words, there are a number of subtle influences at play in the decision whether or not to commit an offence. Too little is known about these and it would seem that studies of police effectiveness

need to be complemented by further work concerned with the nature of crime and the psychological processes involved in a criminal act if the results are to be of practical assistance to the police in tailoring their activities to the facts of crime.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As mentioned above it is planned to undertake research into the effectiveness of some of the more central deterrent activities of the police, such as conventional patrol, surveillance and criminal investigation. The consequences of improvements in security will continue to be studied and it will also be necessary to mount what are likely to be difficult evaluations of those activities (e.g. work concerned with school liaison, juvenile bureaux, community relations) which are designed to raise public commitment to the law. But we should be prepared for the fact that the outcome of this programme of research may simply be to lend weight to the interpretation already being placed upon the results of existing research, namely that the crime prevention value of a police force rests less on precisely what it does than on the symbolic belief in its effectiveness.

If the chances are therefore slight of isolating the effect of specific preventive activities, then so must be the chances, and indeed the value, of developing routine measures of productivity; and rather than seeing research as providing direct technical input to management decision-making, it may be more useful to see it as building a body of knowledge about policing which can inform the judgement of managers.

A further implication of this line of research is that if the deterrent value of the police relies upon a public belief in their effectiveness, then showing that this rests upon misconceptions about their work may both weaken effectiveness and increase the fear of crime (a phenomenon which is perhaps only marginally related to the objective risk of becoming a victim). It might therefore appear that this kind of research should be stopped, but this would not be realistic given that much research is undertaken by independent bodies. Rather it would seem that other means of preventing crime should be explored -

as is the intention within the Research Unit. And as far as the police themselves are concerned, there is every reason to believe that they would have far greater scope for improving the quality and efficiency of their service if they were freed from unrealistic expectations of crime control.

FOOTNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Respectively Senior Principal Research Officer and Principal Research Officer dealing with police research in the Home Office Research Unit. We should like to thank the colleagues mentioned at various points in this paper, especially J.M. Hough, for their help in preparing the draft.
- <sup>2</sup> No attempt is made in this paper to review research concerned with the enforcement of traffic regulations by the police which may bear upon their general effectiveness in preventing crime. The violation of a traffic regulation, though it may have as serious consequences as any other form of offence, most frequently arises from negligence rather than criminal intent, a distinction which possibly accounts for the fact that most work on this topic appears to have defined effectiveness in terms of accident prevention.
- <sup>3</sup> A brief description of the Home Office Research Unit and its work is to be found in Appendix 3.
- <sup>4</sup> The contribution that can be made by the criminal justice system through deterrence, treatment and incarceration will be further explored, and studies of physical measures designed to restrict the opportunities for crime are being made as well as some assessment of the value of social and educational measures designed to compensate for the deprivations that are assumed to lead to crime.

- 5 The command-and-control computer aids the process of patrol-despatch by providing radio-controllers with up-to-date information on incidents and on the location and availability of patrols. The information captured by the computer is subsequently analysed for presentation to police managers by the Management Information System.
- 6 In addition, it is planned to examine the evidence relating to several police campaigns that have been reported to have successfully reduced either vehicle insecurity or crime, and to review some of the alternative methods police forces have used to combat vehicle crime.
- 7 Repetto (1974) found that in 92% of a sample of 1910 burglaries the premises were unoccupied when the burglary occurred.
- 8 A survey undertaken by the Kent Police and reported in the Home Office 'Crime Prevention Newsletter No. 24' December 1974, found that of 1400 people interviewed in the street who had left their house unoccupied, 21% may have left either the door unlocked or windows open.
- 9 Due to some prompt remedial action by the police, only a very small amount of information was published - amounting to little more than a routine reminder to the public of the dangers of leaving their cars unlocked.
- 10 Through the co-operation of the police it was possible to change the weeks on which the patrol operated.
- 11 Sparks et al (1977) estimated on the basis of a large-scale victim survey in three areas of London that only some 10% of the crimes committed appeared in police statistics.

## APPENDIX 1: TRADITIONS OF POLICE RESEARCH IN BRITAIN

Responsibility for technological police research in Britain rests primarily with the Police Scientific Development Branch. Developments in this area of research are the subject of Mr. Burrows' Workshop paper and this Appendix focusses on social research. Sparse though such research on the British police has been, it is helpful to review the studies under three broad heads; first, studies concerned with constitutional issues; secondly, those which comment on the function and organization of the police; and, finally, studies relevant to police/public relations.

### The constitutional position of the police

In Britain (as elsewhere) research has been undertaken to document the nature of police powers and police discretion in the exercise of these powers (Bottomley, 1973; Leigh, 1973, 1975; Wilcox, 1972). These studies have been of value both in undermining the widely held belief that the police had little or no discretion, and in underpinning research on police decisions regarding prosecution (police cautioning)<sup>1</sup>, police accountability, and police complaints.

Police cautioning has attracted attention for two reasons: first, because it offers a way of diverting offenders from the judicial system; and secondly, as considerable variation exists between forces in the use of the caution, issues of police accountability are raised. Work by Steer (1970) catalogues the principal reasons given by the police for cautioning offenders, while Ditchfield (1975), Rainton (1964) and Somerville (1969) document the variation between forces in the use of the caution and ascribe this variation to differences in force policy.

Studies of the relationship between chief constables and local police authorities<sup>2</sup> provide further insight into police accountability. Brogden (1977), for example, concludes that at present police authorities do not exercise their statutory powers, while Banton (1975)

has argued that the police authority should accept wider responsibilities, and possibly co-ordinate police activities and the action of other local organizations.

Although subject to constant review by the police and those responsible for the management of the service, the procedures followed when the police misuse power or overstep the bounds of discretion, have received little attention from researchers. Russell (1976) proves an exception, reaching the conclusion that the procedures operating at the time of the research (new procedures are now in operation) worked to the disadvantage of certain groups, notably the less well educated among the lower social class.

#### Police function and organization

Comparatively speaking (at least within the British context) research into the function of the police is well established. Banton's (1964) work, which differentiates between the tasks of the police officer and the law enforcer, has been followed-up, although in a rather different fashion, by Punch and Naylor (1973) and Comrie and Kings (1974, 1975) who, in examining the nature of calls for police assistance, have illustrated the considerable diversity to be found within the police role.

Important though these studies undoubtedly are, McCabe (1975) has noted the failure of research (only recently redressed) to document the part played by the police in defining the crime it is their function to control. Studies by McCabe, and Coleman and Bottomley (1976) have gone, or are going (McCabe's work has yet to be concluded) some way to fill the gap.

Police organization and the working ethos has been described by Cain (1973), Chatterton (1975), and Holdaway (1977). Cain, for example, having shown that crime fighting activities (the principal interest of the police constable) occupy only a minor part of the working day, documents the methods employed by the police to relieve the monotony of their routine tasks.

Since the completion of Cain's research (and that of Chatterton which examined the supervision of patrol work under the Fixed Point System), a number of changes have occurred, notably the introduction of the Unit Beat System of patrolling and a move towards the greater professionalisation of the service. Holdaway (1977) assesses the importance of these developments upon Cain's analysis and reaches the conclusion that the primary occupational values described by Cain remain dominant and the strategies for control have been strengthened. The widespread use of 'panda' cars and two-way radios has meant, however, that the patrolling policeman now has different ways open to him of relieving the monotony of the day.

Within this general area of enquiry, questions of recruitment, wastage and the attitudes of officers to their work, have been examined (largely as a result of work commissioned by the Home Office or the police themselves), while Reinder (1978), pursuing a rather different course, has studied the development of police unionism.

#### Police/public relations

Only limited research has been conducted on this subject. Some of the many schemes instigated to improve police/public relations have been evaluated by the police and considerable successes claimed, but few independent researchers have entered this difficult area of enquiry: Belson (1972) and Shaw and Williamson (1972) have examined public attitudes towards the police, but only Lambert (1970) has been successful in providing information on police/immigrant relations. Contrary to expectation, Lambert's study found that coloured people were under-represented in the totals of persons arrested for crime even though they inhabited areas which had the highest rates of crime.<sup>3</sup>

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> The formal police caution is officially regarded as an alternative to prosecution. For indictable offences, it almost invariably takes the form of an oral warning by a senior uniformed police officer about the offender's conduct and about the possibility of future prosecution if a further offence is committed. The caution can only be given if the

offender admits his guilt, if the police are satisfied they have a provable case, and if the complainant does not insist on a prosecution. As such, the caution is most often given to first or minor offenders.

- 2 Police authorities were established by the Police Act 1964; one third of their membership being drawn from local magistrates, the remainder being elected members. The functions of the Police Authority have been defined as follows: (a) to provide as its primary duty an adequate and efficient police force for the area under its jurisdiction; (b) to appoint the Chief Constable and his immediate officers; (c) to determine the police establishment and the number of persons of each rank.
- 3 This area of enquiry has been continued within the Research Unit; the results of the study conducted in the London area will be available shortly.

APPENDIX 2: HOME OFFICE RESEARCH UNIT PROGRAMME OF RESEARCH 1978/79:  
STUDIES RELEVANT TO THE POLICE.

INTERNAL RESEARCH

Police strategies

A review of research on policing strategies and their effectiveness in preventing and detecting crime.

Public calls for assistance and the deployment of police resources

(See text)

Radio controllers (despatchers)

(See text)

The effect of publicity campaigns on vehicle security

(See text)

The effectiveness of truancy patrols in reducing crime

(See text)

Target hardening and burglary from dwellings

(See text)

Juveniles and the police

A study comparing the ways in which juveniles come to police attention in different forces and how they are dealt with.

Women police

Survey of the role of women police officers and their attitudes to their work.

Ethnicity and crime

An ecological study of crime rates and minority settlements.

RESEARCH SUPPORTED BY HOME OFFICE GRANT

Police discretion

A study of police discretion in the prosecution process in some European countries. (London School of Economics).

Police organization

A fellowship funded by the Home Office at the University of Sheffield will be taken up with a study of police organization.

Voice identification

A study of the ways in which voice identifications are made. (North East London Polytechnic).

Visual identification

A study of the ways in which visual identifications are made and their relevance for eye-witness evidence. University of Aberdeen).

Crime prevention in urban public space

A study of public places in which violent offences have taken place. (Tavistock Institute).

APPENDIX 3: THE HOME OFFICE RESEARCH UNIT

The Home Office Research Unit employs some 50 research workers, trained in various disciplines and in the methods of the social sciences, and now undertakes research on a range of topics which include crime prevention, race relations, the administration of justice, the effectiveness of sentencing, and the police. It also provides advice and information to other departments of the Home Office about criminological research and other research in the social sciences. It is responsible for its work to the Chief Scientist of the Home Office and so is not directly accountable to any particular administrative or operational department of the Home Office, except insofar as the customer/contractor principle is involved. The results of its research are published in the Home Office Research Studies series (published by HMSO), the Home Office Research Unit Bulletin, and in learned journals. At present some 30 reports and papers are published in these various sources each year. As well as undertaking its own in-house work the Research Unit manages a programme of Home Office funded research in universities and other institutions.

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THE POLICE SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT BRANCH  
ROLE AND APPROACH TO POLICE PRODUCTIVITY

by

*Arthur Burrows, Director*  
*Police Scientific Development Branch*  
*Home Office*  
*London, U.K.*

INTRODUCTION

1. The Home Office will be represented at the Workshop by Dr. Clarke of the Home Office Research Unit (HORU) and by Mr. Burrows of the Police Scientific Development Branch (PSDB). Each scientist will describe the role of his branch and how it works to promote productivity. The two branches have very different roles and their manning reflects these differences. HORU, staffed largely by social scientists has the more speculative approach and the wider terms of reference. PSDB staffed largely by physicists and engineers is the more pragmatic and, accepting the precepts on which UK policing is based, concentrates on helping the police to carry out their day-to-day work more efficiently. The two branches (somewhat to their surprise) now work well together and more joint projects are being planned.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

2. The PSDB was established in 1963 on the recommendation of the Royal Commission on The Police<sup>1</sup> which expressed the requirement in the following terms:-

It appears to us that there is a major requirement in the central police organization which the arrangements we have

described so far do not adequately meet, and cannot be adapted to meet. This requirement is for the provision of a central Government unit, charged with the planning of police methods, the development of new equipment (such as communications facilities, and the design and standardization of vehicles), and the study of new techniques, so as to enable the police service to deal promptly and effectively with changes in the pattern of crime and in the behaviour of criminals. We recommend the establishment of such a unit, adequately staffed and with provision for expert scientific advice. The unit should work under the general direction of the chief inspector of constabulary. We should expect it to make full use of existing agencies, both inside and outside the police service, and it might well have occasion to enlist the help of specialists in particular fields. In developing and testing new equipment and techniques the unit would have to rely on the cooperation of selected police forces. But we are strongly of the opinion that the Government should not hesitate, where appropriate, to set up new establishments to carry out research and development into police problems. Such arrangements would not be inexpensive. But the amount of money at present devoted to research into police problems is insignificant compared with the cost of the research programmes of the fighting services; and the community should, in our opinion, accept the burden of a properly conducted programme of research on the lines which we have indicated as an essential part of the cost of the war against crime.

3. Prior to the establishment of the branch the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) had formed a research committee to coordinate work undertaken by individual chief constables with the backing of their police authorities. The setting up of the new branch enabled this work to be augmented by work commissioned

centrally. PSDB's initial tasks were therefore extensions of an existing police programme with a high level of police input and the first two directors were police officers. This close scientist/police relationship has been continued to the present day. The police officers are no longer on the established strength of PSDB but are grouped into a separate Police Research Services Unit (PRSU) which makes 14 police officers of supervisory grade readily available for consultation and cooperative work. The senior police officer in the Home Office is the Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMCIC) who personally and through his Assistant Chief Constable responsible for Technical Services is involved in all Home Office discussions on police matters. PSDB liaison with the police service is close both as a result of project work with specific forces and also because its director has his headquarters physically located in the Home Office in London. Senior scientists are therefore available to play a full part in day-to-day discussions of police matters.

#### PSDB PROGRAMME

4. The programme of work for each year is drawn up in consultation with the Inspectorate and with relevant divisions of the police department during the previous summer and is in the Autumn presented to a joint Home Office/Police Committee called the Police Scientific Consultative Committee (PSCC). The Home Office representatives are officials having financial or administrative interests and members of the Inspectorate; the police are represented by the President of ACPO, the Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and by the chairmen of ACPO Committees - CID, Traffic and General Purpose. After amendment as a result of PSCC discussions, and after the necessary financial approvals have been obtained from the Treasury, the programme is formally published and the project planning necessary to implement the programme starts. Currently approximately £2m is made available annually to augment the in-house effort of about 90 scientists and technologists and to purchase the equipment needed for research and development work.

5. A weakness of this procedure is that the chief constables attending a once-a-year meeting of this type find it difficult to get themselves well enough briefed to be able to play as full a part in the proceedings as they and we would wish. It has now been agreed that the formal annual meeting should be augmented by additional meetings with relevant ACPO Committees.

6. The programme should accurately reflect the role with which we were charged of

"planning of police methods, the development of new equipment and the study of new techniques"

but perusal will show a heavy bias towards equipment and systems at the expense of planning and new techniques. The reasons for this are historic and will be of interest to departments with responsibilities similar to those of PSDB. When the branch was formed in 1963 the first problems to be tackled were complex and many required an operational research approach. Typical entries in the index of branch reports for that era are:

a study of criminal investigation methods;  
experiments to measure the effectiveness of foot patrols;  
detective case loads.

The quick results anticipated by the police service did not materialise and the high hopes with which the branch was first set up tended to evaporate. To be fair to those responsible for the branch in those early days it must be pointed out that it was in 1966-67 that the Unit Beat Policing Scheme - a large scale project that brought about important changes - was introduced with the following aims:-

- a. to increase police efficiency
- b. to cultivate a better understanding with members of the public by:-
  - closer contact with the man on the beat;
  - swifter response to calls for assistance and complaints
- c. to increase and improve the information flow
- d. by combining resources to overcome the shortage of officers

- e. to create a new challenge by the method of beat working, particularly for the younger constables.

7. It was in 1966 that the Police Advisory Board made up of representatives of the Home Office, the Local Authority Associations and all ranks of the police service of England and Wales set up three working parties "to consider problems of police manpower; equipment, and operational efficiency and management". A Steering Committee to coordinate their work was set up by the Home Office. The publication of the report of these working parties<sup>2</sup> was one of the major factors that resulted in a reorganization in the early 1970s of the research and supporting police resources within the Police Department. The report includes the recommendation that

"the police must make the greatest possible economy in their use of manpower. The fullest exploitation of modern equipment is one means to this end."

Following the publication of this report projects that could show quick results were selected and the introduction of surveillance equipment, mostly of defence origin, was given priority. As a result of this policy police appreciation of the branch is now high and advice both through formal channels and through the informal channels that have been created by project work with forces, is sought from scientists in the branch on a wide range of subjects. PSDP responsibilities however are wider than our current programme would suggest and the aim now is to take advantage of our standing with the police service to introduce projects of a more fundamental character as was originally envisaged. The requirement now is for a project mix with sufficient short-term content to enable research branches to maintain credibility with their police customers but with a hard core of work studying the precepts on which police work in the UK is founded so as to lay sound foundations for the future. This is now possible as a result of a further reorganization within the police department. In 1977 all the technical and scientific branches of the Home Office came under the policy control of a new Head of Technical Services, and the Headquarters of the Telecommunications,

Forensic, National Computer and Scientific Development Branches are now co-located in one building in London. Fully coordinated work is now possible and the Technical Services organization can now be the formal sponsor of planning and organizational projects that are necessary for long-term police efficiency.

#### PRODUCTIVITY

8. Police productivity and performance in the UK is, in our view, best improved by the introduction of improved equipment, improved systems and improved techniques of policing. The police forces in the UK have, compared with their colleagues across the Atlantic, been late in the introduction of computer technology. The reasons for this make interesting study and factors such as the nature of policing in the UK and the educational profile of a typical force are relevant. This late start has however had advantages as it was possible to move directly into real-time processing and to skip the punch card/data preparation phase. Once persuaded of the advantages to be gained from the use of such technology however, the rate of introduction has been very rapid and new equipment and systems are currently being brought into service in the UK at a faster rate than in probably any other area in the world.

9. The policy assumptions on which the branch's programme has evolved and is still evolving are:

- a. that over the period of their existence, nearly 150 years, the police, by a process of trial and error have arrived at methods of performing their duties which are both reasonably successful and acceptable to society;
- b. that the first priority for the scientist is to evaluate how the application of modern technology might augment police performance and to bring relevant technology within reach of the police service;
- c. that the second priority is, when a mix of man and modern technology has been found to be worthwhile and has been implemented, to consider what changes of tactics would make more efficient use of police manpower.

The command and control programme on which the development effort allotted to uniform policing has been largely spent during the last few years is an example of how this policy works in practice. When it was decided to install an experimental computer system in Birmingham in 1969 the method of uniform policing then in use was not questioned. Although all 999 calls were received at the headquarters, the resources on VHF radio under headquarters control were very limited, the bulk of resources being under sub-divisional control via local UHF nets. This "two-tier" system is the one most commonly used in the UK. The despatcher is, in effect, located in the area being policed and among the advantages claimed is that of complete familiarity with the area and personal knowledge of the capability of the resources being deployed. The system that was then in use was computerised with only minor changes. The computer was accepted by the user because police operators found it more convenient to record and switch information from the centre to sub-division and vice versa by VDU than by pen, paper and telephone. But what was of considerable importance was that police managers from sergeant upward found that accurate records of incidents and of resource availability and deployment were for the first time available. Shortly after the system went live a major reorganization of sub-divisional boundaries was found to be necessary. Computer print out of work load by area was ordered and the information obtained was the major factor in deciding the new boundaries. Birmingham is not one of the forces mentioned when the development of management information system (MIS) is discussed but in a small but effective way output from the operational computer system has been found to be important in producing accurate facts for decision making processes. In 1975-76 the Birmingham force was amalgamated with others to form the much larger West Midland force. It was decided to scrap the prototype computer system and install a much larger system to serve the whole new force. Experience of the man/machine mix in Birmingham suggested alternative resource dispositions. The system that goes live later this year is still of the two-tier type but uses a very different allocation of resources than that which existed when the first prototype was introduced. It is important to note that it was the force itself that decided to make the organizational changes as a result of experience gained from the operational use of modern technology. Work to assess the effectiveness of the

new allocation of resources has been proposed and in planning assessment work of this type the ready availability of data from the operational computer system is an attractive feature. Examples of the way in which productivity and performance are being promoted by the use of better equipment and then in the areas of uniform (ground cover), crime and traffic policing are now considered.

#### EQUIPMENT

10. The resources of the branch are split between two locations, about two-thirds being deployed in central London and one-third at Sandridge near St. Albans about 30 miles north. The laboratories are at Sandridge and this is where the bulk of equipment development takes place. The terms of reference of the equipment groups are very wide and work is in hand in the areas of electronics, optics, acoustics and protective clothing and equipment. The guidelines can be summarized in the following terms:-

- a. To develop for police forces the equipment they need to do their work at a price they can afford.
- b. To develop only items which cannot be procured satisfactorily from the civil market.
- c. Where items are already commercially available to carry out trials to derive minimum standards so as to be able to provide advice to forces considering purchase.
- d. NOT to duplicate work already being carried out by other technical services.

Mr. Rapsey who heads the Sandridge establishment described his work in detail at an earlier meeting in Canada so this will not be repeated except to point out that within the last year more attention has had to be paid to equipment to help police to cope with civil disturbances. A summary of work currently in hand is attached as Appendix 1. Fortunately the branch

does not have to consider such questions as to whether or not "the uncontrolled drift towards reliance on harmless weapons ... threatens the delicate web of existing social order"<sup>3</sup> or the extent to which riot shields are in themselves provocative, but merely to advise chief constables as to the advantages or disadvantages of items that are available.

11. The major problem in the equipment area was, until recently, how to bridge the gap between the successful development of prototypes of complex items and their introduction into operational service. Local Authority Police Committees who authorize expenditure at local level are not easily persuaded of the cost effectiveness of expensive and novel devices and in general are more appalled than attracted by an invitation to be the first in the field. The solution to this dilemma was the introduction of the TSU (Technical Support Unit) concept to bridge the gap between the scientist and the police user and to give the smaller forces access to expensive equipment they would use infrequently.

#### TSU's

12. Where two or more chief constables are prepared to get together to set up a unit the Home Office will now encourage and support the forces submitting the proposal. PSDB advise as to inventories and will attach technical staff (on repayment) to ensure that equipment is used to best effect and kept in running order. It is through TSUs that new devices will be tested and assessed in operational conditions. Chief constables find the concept attractive and four TSUs covering fifteen forces have already been approved. PSDB finds the concept attractive because it eliminates any tendency for scientists to become remote from their police customer. We feel that, in this concept, we have an effective method of improving police productivity and performance as far as items of equipment are concerned. What we have not yet done is to tackle the difficult problem of measurement. Research to identify items that prove to be the most cost effective in service and to look critically at the rest of the inventory should be possible once all TSUs planned are operational. The derivation of the right

equipment mix for a given set of operational circumstances and a given expenditure of money will not be easy but is an essential part of the TSU concept.

#### UNIFORM POLICING

13. Reference was made to the command and control programme in paragraph 8 above. The general concepts are now well known and the paper bringing the story up to date is attached at **Appendix 2**. To date, four systems are operational and another three will become operational shortly. This may seem insignificant compared with a total of 43 police forces in the UK, but it is in fact only the tip of an iceberg. A high percentage of forces have set up project teams to investigate their requirements for operational computer systems and all the major forces including New Scotland Yard now have project teams in action. It is however the method of approach that is of relevance to this Workshop. It is now realized in the UK that computerisation of operational functions has a profound affect on organization and therefore that the first step in any computerization project is to look critically at force structure and organization. In some cases (.e.g. Merseyside) Management Consultants are called in to do this work while in others (e.g. New Scotland Yard) the work is undertaken by in-house teams assembled to carry out force restructuring reviews. There is therefore in the eyes of the UK police service a correlation between computerization and Productivity and Performance.

#### CRIMINAL INFORMATION

14. The present situation is that Computer Aided Despatch (CAD) is already generally accepted as worthwhile and as the most convenient method of collecting data for management purposes. Thus priority is now being given to the development of information systems. Information useful to the man on the beat and to the detective working with him can come from three main sources:-

- a. CRIME REPORTS
- b. COLLATORS RECORDS
- c. CRIMINAL RECORDS

Although there are local enhancements there is a standard crime report system in use in the UK in which the completion of a crime report is one of the first steps in a sequence of events that is completed when national crime statistics are published. The Collator System was instituted with the Unit Beat Policing Scheme referred to in paragraph 6 above and is, in effect, the system of recording and cross-referencing, i.e. collating, the intelligence collected by the debriefing of resident beat and other patrolling officers. The National Criminal Record Authority is B13 branch of New Scotland Yard. Separately a Police National Computer (PNC) maintains an index of these national records of convicted people and their fingerprints. This computer also keeps a record of stolen vehicles and particulars of owners of vehicles.

15. Much of the record information held nationally is also held locally to meet the CID requirement for immediate access to records for investigative purposes and such local records are augmented by records of minor offenders whose convictions need not be recorded nationally. We do not yet know whether it will be enough to computerize a force record system and leave it at that with no thought of linking it to computers in other forces. (There is no question of using the PNC to pass so called intelligence information). But it would be prudent to investigate the compatibility of those force computers that handle records. The problems that now arise include the following:

- a. Each force has, over the years, developed its own method of recording such items as names. Names will appear in force Crime Reports, Collators Records and Criminal Records. For a force criminal information computer system one standard must be adopted. Should we standardize on PNC procedures? Are they suitable for the mini-computers that will be found at force level?

- b. Apart from such items as names, addresses and vehicle records, what else must be standardized remembering that as a result of the use of competitive tendering procurement, there will be a wide variety of computer equipment at local level and each force will wish to exploit the software packages available from the contractor. Can such diversity of hardware be tolerated?
  
- c. What are the privacy implications? Will future legislation allow the information on suspects and associates to be found in many crime reports and collators records to be computerized and made available to a neighbouring force by electrical means?

These are but a few of the problems that must now be tackled as a direct result of the spread of operational computer systems at force level. As happened earlier with the Command and Control programme, it is now realized that the first step towards computerization is rationalization. With Criminal Information Systems however the problem is made much more complex by the presence of national records and indexes and, at the same time, local practices and procedures. Once the organizational and technical problems are solved however, the effect on police productivity and performance resulting from the fuller utilization of information should be commensurate with the magnitude of the problems now being tackled.

#### TRAFFIC POLICING

16. Effectiveness is obviously increased by the use of devices such as radar for speed limit enforcement and by better signing and lighting at the site of accidents but little work seems to have been done to help traffic police to perform their main functions of the promotion of traffic flow and the prevention of accidents. Work on these aspects in the UK started 4 years ago when a traffic zone in Sussex was equipped with 25 microprocessor roadside devices feeding a central computer facility. This research installation enabled both driver behavioural characteristics and traffic police operational requirements to be investigated. We now know, in

quantitative terms, the effects of such traffic policing tactics as warning signs, marked cars, radar checks and motorcycle teams. We have also gathered together information to help police decide when and where tactics are likely to be most effective in reducing the number of accidents. The lessons learned are being built into a Traffic Policing Package of four transportable roadside units with suitable traffic sensors and a central decoder that is about to undergo operational trials. The roadside units have been preprogrammed to measure traffic flow and the distribution of vehicle speeds which we know from the earlier research work can be put to good practical use by the police. At the direction of their supervising officers, traffic constables set up the units and sensors and subsequently collect the recorded data for central storage analysis and display. The aim is to extend the eyes and ears of the police traffic departments - to increase their productivity.

#### SUMMARY

17. PSDB was established to promote increased productivity in UK police forces by the use of modern technology. The way this mandate is being approached has been described and examples of the way in which technology is being introduced as an aid to operational policing have been given. Reasons are also given why we feel that the stage has now been reached for this equipment and systems work to be supplemented by longer term studies of overall effectiveness. The author will in his presentation at the Workshop, enlarge upon selected items from the paper.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Royal Commission on the Police 1962.  
Final Report. Comnd 1728. HMSO.
2. Police Manpower, Equipment and Efficiency.  
Reports of three Working Parties. HMSO 1967.
3. New Scientist of 30 March 1978 reviewing a report by the Council for Science and Society with comment by the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science.

APPENDIX 1

SUMMARY OF CURRENT WDRK BY EQUIPMENT GROUPS

1. Study of equipment for use in public order situations, especially personal protection equipment.
2. Development of improved vehicle tracking equipment.
3. Development of alarm systems using microprocessors.
4. Design of equipment to read vehicle number plates automatically.
5. Trials of recently developed hand-held thermal viewer.
6. Completion of development of I.R. luminescence equipment for document examination.
7. Evaluation of commercially available explosive detectors.
8. Trials of newly developed radio-link television equipment.
9. Improvement of techniques for weighing vehicles.
10. Development of digital techniques for the improvement of degraded tape recordings.
11. Study of bullet resistant materials for body protection.
12. The establishing of an information system on public equipment to provide police forces with up-to-date details of availability and suitability.

APPENDIX 2

COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE UK - SECOND PHASE

INTRODUCTION

1. The manner in which command and control technology was introduced into UK Police Forces has been described at earlier meetings. The aim of this paper is to describe what has happened subsequently and to explain the new areas into which research and development effort on police systems is now being switched. The meaning given to the words command and control is explained later but it is necessary to point out ab initio that this paper is not concerned with the Resource Availability Systems that are to be found in nearly every force headquarters in the UK. Resource Availability Systems of considerable complexity and using general purpose computers rather than the hard wired logic devices of earlier systems are now being developed and the facilities available from them are becoming more sophisticated. Command and control for the purpose of this paper involves as a minimum Resource Availability of all resources in the force (rather than resources on VHF nets only) and the use of an incident proforma using free text.

PRESENT SITUATION

BIRMINGHAM

2. Experimental work for urban forces as has already been reported started in Birmingham in 1968 and was switched to Glasgow in 1972. These forces, like many police forces in the UK were greatly affected by a reorganization of local government that occurred in 1975-76. As part of this reorganization, the Birmingham force merged with two others to form a new West Midland Metropolitan Force and more than doubled its size. Its uniform strength is now 6,500 officers. The one computerized and two other control rooms now to be found in the new West Midland

Force will all close in 1978 when a new computer complex in the Birmingham area becomes the new operational centre for the enlarged force. This will be the site for police visitors to inspect from late 1978 onwards. It is of interest that this force with more experience in the operational use of computers than any other in the UK is introducing a system that is simple in concept. The facilities being provided are listed below.

FACILITIES OF WEST MIDLANDS SYSTEM

3.       a. Command and control
  - Incident Logging
  - Incident Recall
  - Incident Switching
  
  - Resource Status and Location
  - Resource Availability
  
  - Address Referencing and Tagging
  
  - Burglar Alarm System
  
  - Duty State
  
  - Message Switch
  - Integrated Data Communication
- b. Management Information System
  - Basic only.

GLASGOW

4.       The Glasgow, like the old Birmingham force, no longer exists. Glasgow is now the headquarters of the new Strathclyde Metropolitan Force which has a uniform strength of 7,000 and polices an area of about

half of Scotland. The computer system introduced by the old City force is currently being extended by the addition of a third processor which will go live before the end of 1978. The existing control room with two supervisory and 6 control positions will handle the workload which it is estimated will be up to 2,000 calls for service a day. The command and control facilities to be provided are very much the same as those that will be found at the West Midland headquarters and indeed at any other major police headquarters in the UK in future. The police requirement now appears to have been largely met although refinements will continue to be made. One such refinement developed in Glasgow was the introduction of a major incident facility. A similar facility is now to be found in several other forces but by the (possibly) simpler method of "open ending" the ACTION TAKEN field of the incident proforma. It is too early to say which option will find the more general acceptance. Probably Glasgow with its numerous incidents in which information and requests for assistance arrive via several separate police headquarters and control positions will always require a major incident handling facility as specialized as the one it now uses.

5. Apart from the command and control package that is now becoming standard, the Strathclyde force is introducing the following new features:

- a. A Management Information System that is more highly developed than any other yet in service in the UK.
- b. Crime and Traffic Recording Systems.

6. The Management Information concept is now generally understood. The Crime and Traffic Records systems exploit the integrated data communication facility of the command and control package. Crimes and Traffic Accident Reports were, as part of the normal clerical process, typed. Under the new arrangements the typing is now carried out using a teleprinter rather than a typewriter. This gets the information necessary for processing and subsequent interrogation and routine printout into the

computer system. Considerable saving in manpower has resulted in the introduction of these systems. Strathclyde is recommended as well worth a visit and these additional facilities worthy of detailed examination.

#### OTHER FORCES

7. Apart from the major Metropolitan Forces described above, the following forces serving areas that are a mixture of country side and small towns already have or will shortly have systems operational that have special features that are worthy of mention.

a. Stafford

Chosen by the Home Office as typical of the many "county type" forces and therefore the recipient of considerable Home Office support. Duty State has been developed as a general administrative package rather than as part of a command and control facility. The cost effectiveness of this additional development will be investigated.

b. Suffolk

A simple Information Retrieval facility was introduced at very low cost. This is proving to be of more value to the operational policeman than any other feature.

c. Dorset

Very elaborate Management Information facilities produced partly on the police and partly on a local authority computer. The cost effectiveness of each facility will be investigated as part of a Home Office research programme.

8. A common feature of these police operational computer systems is that they are all of low cost and all use two or more minis. There is no national police organization in the UK and each force has had to justify the expenditure required for computerization in competition with other local authority services. Mainframe computers were therefore ruled out on cost grounds. Expenditure on computer staff has also been tightly controlled and

even in very large Metropolitan forces the analyst/programmer team is seldom more than two or three in strength. All the above systems have been developed in collaboration with the Home Office. Because the procurement method used was competitive tender a range of computer hardware will now be found to be in use but all forces use a common procurement procedure, a common documentation standard (NCC) and a common high level language. Several firms have now considerable experience in installing command and control systems. Commercial competition is keen and a standard system as described above can now be introduced at very low cost. While forces are keen to explain and to extol the merits of the systems they have specified, the "not invented here" syndrome has not yet appeared and the experience gained at any one location has been fully utilized in the design of the system for the next location. A tour including the forces referred to above will therefore give a very accurate picture of the advanced state of the art in the exploitation of mini technology for police operational purposes.

#### THE FUTURE

9. The interest that was taken by UK police forces in the development of command and control systems in the mid 1970s is, now that the police requirement has to a large extent been met, now being taken in the development of crime packages to enable police officers to fully exploit the information held in forces often in inaccessible form.

10. The main source of information to all police forces in the UK about vehicles and criminals is the Police National Computer (equivalent to the NCIC in the US). The indices presently in use are:-

- a. Stolen, suspect and found vehicles
- b. Chassis and engine numbers
- c. Vehicle owners
- d. Criminal names
- e. Wanted and missing persons

and a major force can be expected to make about 1,000 enquiries a day via the national data network. There are however severe restrictions as to the

type of information that can be held nationally and every UK force supplements PNC facilities with local record/information systems that is the new focus of interest. In most (but not all) cases a basic command and control system is first introduced in order to provide the in-force data communication network of VDUs and teleprinters, and the record/information system on separate processor(s) follows.

11. The use of separate but interconnected processors each performing separate operational functions has the following attractions:-

- a. It enables forces to introduce a step by step approach, adding new facilities as a result of operational experience as the necessary finance becomes available.
- b. High resilience is achieved as the failure of any one processor means that a facility rather than a complete system is out of commission.
- c. Full advantage can be taken of the considerable r and d effort now being spent internationally on distributed networks.
- d. Systems introduced by this means do not easily get out of date as the component parts can be replaced as the state of the art dictates.

12. This technical approach is however relatively new and the technical departments of the Home Office responsible for giving advice to forces have already found that the experience necessary to give sound advice is not readily available. A few of the problems that have already arisen are given below:-

- a. If all the information held in a force is computerized, the system becomes too large to be economically feasible. What criteria should be used to select items for computerization?

How should the remaining items be dealt with?

- b. Modern data base management systems can set up links between data such that every item inserted can be automatically checked for correlation against every item already held. The cost in computer power has already been shown to be exorbitant and to be detrimental to the requirement for more routine searches.
- c. The several processors of which a system is built up can be so inter-connected that resilience is very high - but the cost in storage and processor power is correspondingly high. What are the best design criteria for a police operational system?

13. Work in this area has already shown that the problem now to be faced is that of cost effectiveness and that the distributed processing approach to the handling of complex data structures is a field in which there are at present more questions than answers.

14. The locations in chronological order, where record/information retrieval work is in hand are shown below:

- a. IPSWICH (HQ Suffolk Police)

Where a basic low cost information retrieval facility has been added to a command and control system.

Status - Operational

- b. STAFFORD (HQ Staffordshire Constabulary)

A rather more comprehensive Information Retrieval system on a separate processor connected to an existing command and control system.

Status - Operational late 1979

c. SHEFFIELD (HQ South Yorkshire Police)

A contract for a system with more complex linkages and with its own in-force communication system (NOT connected with a command and control facility) will be placed shortly.

Status - Operational late 1980

SUMMARY

The operational computer requirement of a typical UK police force can be considered under three headings:

- a. Command and Control
- b. Management Information
- c. Crime Information

Considerable experience in the development of low cost command and control systems based on mini computer technology is now available in the UK although development of command and control software to produce better standards and to increase cost effectiveness is in hand, few changes from an operational point of view are anticipated.

The development of Management Information facilities continues as more forces acquire computer systems and learn to utilize the management tools now available to them.

The major development effort is now being allotted to the record/information retrieval field where, although nearly all facilities can be provided, the cost is beyond the reach of UK police forces. The problem now is to develop methods of achieving the maximum operational utility from the fixed sum of money that can be allotted. To solve this dilemma requires fine judgement and flexibility by police officers as to their requirements.

RESEARCH AND POLICE PRODUCTIVITY: THE  
UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE

by

*David Farmer, Director*  
*Police Division*  
*Law Enforcement Assistance Administration*  
*Washington, D.C.*

What can police research in the United States tell us about police productivity? In addressing this question, I would like to highlight some of the significant research which has been conducted in the United States on police operations, outline relevant research which we are planning at the National Institute, and discuss some of the problems and opportunities we experience in undertaking police research of this kind.

Research Results

Research in the United States on patrol, on criminal investigations and on forensics has cast new light on the management of police operations. It suggests both the need and the opportunity for a radical restructuring of the entire police field services delivery system. I would like to show this by highlighting four studies - the first on police response time, the second on police preventive patrol, the third on the criminal investigation process and the fourth on forensics.

Each of these studies provides significant information on an aspect of the field services delivery system. The response time study questions traditional views of the character of police response activity.

The preventive patrol study indicates the need to re-think the use made of officer time for routine preventive patrol. The criminal investigation study points up the necessity of re-examining the use made of detectives, and the crime laboratory proficiency study raises questions concerning the utilization of forensics. But it is when the results of the four studies are examined together that the conclusions and implications offer added insight. In this sense, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. When the results are considered in conjunction, it is clear that substantial changes in the entire police operational system are possible and desirable.

In focusing on police operations in this talk, we are choosing to ignore the research undertaken in other topic areas such as police management and police interrelationships with other elements of the criminal justice system and with other elements of society. The National Institute has undertaken work in both these topic areas. An example is the study on Police Programs Performance Measurements discussed earlier in this workshop.

a) Police Response Time:

A major five-year study of police response time, supported by the National Institute, is now being completed in the Kansas City Police Department. Through the use of civilian observers, analyses of the communications center's tapes, and interviews with victims and witnesses, the project has assembled a wealth of data. At this time, analysis of the data on 949 Part I crimes has been completed, and a report will be published shortly. The remaining data is on some 6000 Part II crime calls, potential crime calls (e.g. disturbance, prowler, suspicious persons), and general service calls, and reports on this analysis are scheduled for completion during the balance of the year. Unlike earlier studies of police response time (e.g. Isaacs, 1967; Furstenberg, 1971), this study did not rely upon officer self-reporting for the data. This and the meticulous methodology give significant confidence in the results.

Based on the analysis of the Part I incidents included in the research, the Response Time Study shows the necessity of departing from the traditional view of conceptualizing response time as consisting of only communications and dispatch processing and police travel time. Response time includes not only the police response but also citizen mobilization time. The study also shows that because of the substantial amount of time citizens take to report crimes, immediate response may be appropriate for only a fraction of calls and these may not necessarily be crimes. In terms of making arrests, servicing witnesses and reducing injury, rapid response time is not a critical factor in the vast majority of incidents. However, a fraction of cases (e.g. involvement burglaries) do require rapid response. The study also finds that citizen satisfaction with police response time is more a function of expectations, estimation of need, and perception of time than of speed of response.

Details of the study can be found in the report to be published shortly by the U.S. Government Printing Office - Response Time Analysis: Executive Summary Response Time Analysis: Volume I, Methodology, and Response Time Analysis: Volume II, Analysis. Four basic conclusions concerning the relationship of response time to incident outcomes are documented in the report. "First, although some patrol strategies affect police response time, a large proportion of Part I crimes are not susceptible to the impact of rapid police response. Secondly, for the proportion of crimes that can be influenced by response time, the time taken to report the incident largely predetermines the effect of police response time. Thirdly, the factors which produce reporting delays are primarily citizens' attitudes and voluntary actions rather than uncontrollable problems they encounter. Fourthly, if reporting time is not so long as to hamper police efforts, prompt field officer response has significant impact on certain types of crimes but limited impact on crime outcomes in general." And the report characterizes as "dubious" the assumption that rapid response time is essential in producing favourable crime outcomes or citizen satisfaction in a substantial proportion of serious crimes.

Most crimes are discovered after their occurrence and after the

suspect has left the scene; this was true of 62.3 percent of the Part I crimes in this study. Clearly, rapid response in such cases cannot be a factor affecting chances of making an arrest or locating a witness. Of those other cases where a victim or witness was involved during the commission of a crime (37.7 percent in this sample), the potential impact of police response time is largely a function of the speed of citizen reporting. As the report notes, "Reporting time comprised a large proportion of the total response time continuum. For all Part I crimes, it involved nearly one-half of the total time (48.1 percent), with a median time of 6 minutes, 17 seconds." Such delay in reporting Part I crimes to the police is attributed by the study to such voluntary citizen actions as telephoning another person before calling the police, waiting or observing the situation, investigating the incident scene, and contacting a supervisor or security guard.

Rapid police response is not necessary in terms of the chances of affecting the outcome of a large percentage of incidents, as suggested by data such as that just noted. It is also unnecessary in a large percentage of cases in terms of citizen expectations. Illustrating the conclusion that a major determinant of citizen satisfaction is the citizen's expectation, the report noted that "A citizen was more dissatisfied if police response was expected to take 10 minutes and perceived that it took 15 minutes, than if the citizen expected a response of 60 minutes and perceived that it took 65 minutes."

The study team, directed by William Bieck, reported the following as among the implications of their work:

- Because of the time citizens take to report crimes, the application of technological innovations and human resources to reduce police response time will have negligible impact on crime outcomes.
  
- Procedures developed to discriminate accurately between emergency and non-emergency calls will achieve more productive outcome if coordinated with patrol resource allocation.

- Because direct and rapid police response by non-dispatched officers to robbery incidents or to the immediate vicinity surrounding robbery scenes is not effective in achieving response related arrests, alternative response strategies for robberies should be developed, tested and evaluated.

Unfortunately, ground-breaking studies such as this are open to some misinterpretation. A point of the study from the operational viewpoint is not that police response capability should be reduced, but the strategies regarding response speed and response resources should be revised. As the report itself notes, "Although massive expenditures to reduce police dispatching and travel time do not appear justified, the reduction of response capabilities is not recommended either. Rather, strategies regarding the speed of response and response resources need to be refined for operational purposes and implemented when warranted ... The differences between types of crime have to be recognized, and alternate procedures developed for those crimes unaffected by fast response. More emphasis needs to be placed on the reporting portion of the response time continuum, both as a determinant of those calls requiring rapid police response and as a potential bottleneck which impedes the flow of information. More attention must also be paid to persons reporting crimes and their problems and less to the system used..."

b) Police Preventive Patrol:

Traditional preventive patrol uses uniformed police officers who patrol at random in assigned geographical areas. They respond to calls for service and, in the remaining available time, drive their vehicles or walk their beats for preventive patrol purposes. The assumption is that the patrols create a feeling of police omnipresence and thus deter potential criminals. By intercepting crimes in progress, the general patrol officer on the beat is thought to be in a good position to respond rapidly to a call for service.

Some police administrators have been dissatisfied with traditional preventive patrol because these assumptions are open to question. They are concerned about the cost effectiveness of the traditional concept and with the desirability of developing more effective strategies. Until recently, common sense and ad hoc experience have been the administrator's only guides, and these may conflict. The traditional view holds that conspicuous patrol - involving highly distinctive uniforms and marked vehicles - seems the most effective way to deter the potential criminal. Yet recent experience in a few departments (e.g. New York City) has seemed to indicate the efficacy of supplementary patrol in casual clothes. The same uncertainty is felt about the chance of interception during patrol. Interceptions sometimes do occur. The anecdotal evidence of the station house is strong, despite the relative infrequency of such occurrences. In reality, the randomly patrolling officer has a small chance of intercepting crime in progress, particularly as so many crimes occur in private places. The mathematics of probability are against it, as Richard Larson in his Urban Police Analysis, and others, have shown.

The Police Foundation's Proactive-Reactive Experiment in the Kansas City Police Department has cast serious doubt on the effectiveness of traditional preventive patrol. In the words of former Kansas City Police Chief Joseph McNamara, it suggests that "routine patrol in marked police cars has little value in preventing crime or making citizens feel safe," and that the substantial amount of time spent on routine preventive patrol might be devoted to more productive assignments.

The experiment on which these conclusions are based is detailed in The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report and a Technical Report, The Police Foundation, Washington, D.C. 1974. In fact, the authors - Dr. George L. Kelling and Dr. Tony Pate - are in the audience now.

A 15-beat segment of the city was used for the experiment. Five of the beats were designated as reactive: officers responded only to calls for service and preventive patrol was discontinued. Five matched beats

served as control areas: here preventive patrol was maintained at normal levels. The remaining five beats were designated as proactive areas: preventive patrol was increased up to three times the normal levels. Victimization surveys are conducted to measure unreported crime. Community surveys were undertaken to assess citizen and business satisfaction. Reported crimes and other data were analyzed. In general, the differences between the three sets of beats (i.e. the three levels of patrol coverage) were not significant in terms of reported and unreported crime, of citizen satisfaction, and of citizens' perceptions of their own security.

It should be noted that the validity of this study has been questioned. The most significant criticisms concern the location of the cars withdrawn from reactive beats when not responding to calls for service; the small sizes of the beats, presenting uncertainty concerning public perceptions of variations in patrol levels; and the small sizes utilized in the surveys. (For an assessment of the study, see the report of the National Evaluation Program Phase I study, A Review and Assessment of Traditional Preventive Patrol, University of Science Center, Philadelphia, Pa., 1975). Whatever its limitations, the Proactive-Reactive Patrol study does appear to suggest, at a minimum, that police commanders have far more discretion in the spatial deployment of patrol forces than is usually supposed.

c) Criminal Investigation Process:

In 1975, the Rand Corporation completed a two-year study (supported by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice) of the criminal investigation process. Information was collected from 153 jurisdictions in the United States, and more detailed study was undertaken in 25 police agencies. The report was published in three volumes - The Rand Corporation, The Criminal Investigation Process: Volume I, Summary and Policy Implications; Volume II, Survey of Municipal and County Police Departments; Volume III, Observations and Analysis: The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1975. For a summary of the report, a critique of the study, and a counter-response by the researchers, see National Institute of Law Enforcement and

Criminal Justice, The Criminal Investigation Process: A Dialogue on Research Findings, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1977. The study was directed by Dr. Peter Greenwood, who is also currently in this audience.

Essentially, the Rand Study is an evaluation of detective and investigative practices in the United States, and its conclusions confirm the suspicions of many police administrators that the investigative function can be much better managed. Among its findings:

- More than half of all serious reported crime receive no more than superficial attention from investigators.
- An investigator's time is mainly taken up in work on cases that experience indicates will not be solved.
- For solved cases, the investigator spends more time on post-arrest processing than was spent on the pre-arrest phase.
- The single most important determinant of whether a case will be solved is the information the victim supplies to the immediately-responding patrol officer.
- Of solved cases in which the offender is not identifiable at the time of the initial report, almost all were cleared as a result of routine police procedures.
- In many departments, investigators do not consistently and thoroughly document the key evidentiary facts, with untoward consequences for prosecutors.

The Rand Study does not suggest that detectives are expendable. Rather, the value of the study is that it questions the detective mystique. Detective bureaus typically have been one of the areas of police service most resistant to change, and they have been the guardians not only of tradition but also of some questionable management practices. As the

Rand report indicates, the police administrator concerned with effectiveness and productivity can find criminal investigation activities a useful subject for analysis and for reform.

d) Crime Laboratory Proficiency:

In 1974, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice awarded a grant to the Forensic Sciences Foundation to develop and to conduct (with support from the National Bureau of Standards) a nationwide testing program for crime laboratories. The U.S. Government Printing Office is scheduled to publish the report this summer. The report shows that there are significant problems in evidence analysis in some crime laboratories in the United States.

There is a need to upgrade the quality of physical evidence examinations now performed in the nation's 250 crime laboratories. The Forensic Sciences Foundation report documents a wide range of proficiency levels among the country's crime laboratories, and comments that "there are several physical evidence types with which the laboratories are having serious difficulties." The proficiencies demonstrated by the participating laboratories were characterized as unacceptably low. The unacceptable proficiencies generally resulted from one or more of the following - misinterpretation of the test results by the examiner resulting from inadequate training; lack of expertise or carelessness; the failure to employ adequate or appropriate methodologies; mislabelled or contaminated primary standards in the laboratory; and inadequate data bases or standard reference spectra.

Table I of the report on the study shows the percentage of laboratories whose results indicated unacceptably low levels of proficiency. Among the larger figures are:

Firearms	28.2 unacceptable
Blood	71.2% unacceptable
Paint	51.4% unacceptable
Soil	35.5% unacceptable
Arson	28.8% unacceptable

Hair, cow	67.0% unacceptable
deer	54.5% unacceptable
cat	27.8% unacceptable

Some of the sample results were much better (e.g. drugs - 1.7%, fibers - 1.7%). But the general point is clear.

National Institute Plans

One of the ten long-range goals of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice is to continue to deepen understanding concerning the allocation and deployment of police resources. Thus, this Institute priority encompasses work directed toward improving the field service delivery system, focusing on those police services provided directly to the public and on the support and management service necessary for the effective operation of the police field service delivery system. Major functional elements constituting services provided directly to the public are patrol, criminal investigation, traffic law enforcement and specialized activities such as vice law enforcement and the policing of special problems such as organized crime. Examples of support services are community relations and intelligence: command and control is an example of a management service. With this priority the Institute has taken steps to build on the research results such as those just described in discussing the response time, preventive patrol, criminal investigation, and crime laboratory proficiency studies.

Carrying work forward in this priority area, it is the Institute's intention to develop three types of information on the utilization and deployment of police resources. The first is to seek additional insights into the nature of current police operations, and in particular on the operating assumptions, the effectiveness, efficiency and the implications of these operations. The second is to develop additional useful information on alternative approaches for providing field services - that is, better ways of achieving desired results. The latter would include data on operational strategies and tactics. It would also include data on managerial implications of operational alternatives - on the managerial

framework and organizational forms necessary and desirable for the successful implementation of operational improvements. A footnote should be added to this outline of the Institute's plans in this priority area. The term "field service delivery system" is understood not to confine research to improving the utilization and deployment of police resources within existing organizational arrangements. In any geographical area, the possibility is that several police agencies will exist to provide services. The thrust of this priority is to improve the entire delivery system, and not merely the systems within current organizations.

I do not wish to list all the projects completed, in progress or planned by the Institute. For these, it is possible to refer to the various annual reports and program plans published by the Institute. But I would like to highlight a few which are particularly interesting, as an illustration of our general plan in this priority area.

The first theme in this priority area is to add to information on the nature of current police operations. For this purpose a solicitation was recently issued to replicate the citizen reporting component of the Kansas City Response Time Analysis Project. The major purpose was to explore further the findings of the earlier Institute-supported project, conducted in the Kansas City Police Department, on police response time. This project will examine the generalizability of the findings and undertake a more detailed analysis of the variables affecting voluntary actions of citizens in reporting incidents to the police.

Also bearing on the issue of adding information on the nature of current police operations is a project which was funded recently to synthesize and analyze the results of research on police operations. The basic view here is that there is a need to integrate the findings of various studies: the intention is to begin the synthesis process with this project. Among the other studies in progress in this area, one of particular interest is a study of Police Referral Systems being undertaken by Dr. Eleanor Ostrum at the University of Indiana. It will examine the ways in which departments cope with non-crime calls for

service. Another study of interest is being conducted by the City of Wilmington Police Department, which is undertaking a program to examine the extent to which a police department can "manage" the public demand for police service.

The second theme in this priority area is to collect information on the overall objectives of police operations. In this connection, a project has been funded which has the intention of reconceptualizing the operational role of the police by analyzing what police are expected to do, what they actually do, and how these activities are perceived, and by examining the primary determinants of police behavior. Solicitations have also been developed and issued **recently by police** Operational Decision-Making and on Citizen-Police Relations in Police Policy Setting. The purpose of the former is to increase basic understanding of police decision-making in operational situations; the purpose of the latter is to increase understanding of police-citizen interactions in determining particular police policies.

The third theme is the collection of information on alternative approaches for providing field services - examining operational strategies and the managerial and other adjustments required in achieving improved operational results. Under this heading, the City of Birmingham Police Department is undertaking a project to examine the range of organizational and operational strategies available in adopting a differential police response approach. The plan is to build on the findings of the response time study and to explore alternative methods of handling calls for police service. Another project is developing techniques for making resource allocation calculations on a mini-computer, thus eliminating the need for the large ADP capability currently required for such planning. A third example is a project, undertaken by the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York, that will assist police administrators to develop management systems for coping with the corruption hazard.

Problems and Opportunities.

Among the problems faced as we seek to deepen understanding in the police area, three deserve mention at this Conference because they relate to practitioners' utilization of research results.

The first refers to the quality of many researchers. We must accept that in police research we have a wide range in the quality of researchers. We do indeed have excellent researchers. We also have pedestrian ones and we have terrible ones. Actually, the same holds true of practitioners. The problem this presents is that it does make some practitioners more wary of research than they need be.

The second refers to the nature of the four studies discussed earlier on response time, preventive patrol, criminal investigation and crime laboratory proficiency. They are often seen as negative in that they describe problems in the existing operation, and this too inclines some practitioners away from research. Police science is however only a fledgling subject and it is natural that a young "academic field" should begin by examining and criticizing existing arrangements: this seems a natural feature of the youth of the discipline. But it is worth emphasizing that much police research is directed toward providing tools and models for the practitioner.

The third refers to our expectations of research: these expectations are often unrealistic. Research does not provide instantly-implementable results. Rather it offers, at best, relatively isolated pieces of information of varying levels of confidence. No one should expect research results to be certainties. That is not the nature of research. Research gives clues and it sheds light. That in itself is a major accomplishment. From this beginning it is possible to develop corrective models. No one should expect that the researcher who raises the doubt must also have the answer.

Police science is still an ad hoc of infant; but it is no longer embryonic, no longer just a collection of opinions. Before 1968, there were in the United States studies of policing, but they can be characterized as sporadic and quite isolated. With the creation of LEAA and the significant infusion of Federal funds, there has been in the United States a revolution in police research and we now have significant studies. We are not starting from ground-zero anymore; we are building a significant body of knowledge. Some of it is counterintuitive, like the response time study; some of it is confirming what some of us knew: but we do have a body of knowledge which is rapidly developing.

Police science, as it grows, must transcend geographical boundaries. We should mesh our results with the knowledge you have developed - in Canada, England and elsewhere. We should learn more about one another's achievements. Certainly the needs of one country must differ from another: in a lesser way, the needs of intra-national jurisdictions usually differ from one another. But having acknowledged the reality and importance of national idiosyncracies and differing environments, it should be added that Police Science - like Psychology, Economics, Sociology or any social science - will only be a science if it transcends geographical boundaries.

This is one opportunity, surely. At a minimum, the countries represented here (Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States) and others should take opportunities to work together in advancing police science. There is no advantage in re-discovering the wheel, and there is no disadvantage in learning from one another. Perhaps a program of parallel research, conducted in several countries and focusing on a common topic (say, investigative information systems or the criminal investigation process in general) would be a practical step toward encouraging this cooperation.

The opportunity of police research is to provide the practitioners with information which can be used to upgrade effectiveness and efficiency. Research results achieved to date have demonstrated the potential and have indicated the directions of change. We must build on this. And we can best build on it if we cooperate in the common enterprise.

QUESTION PERIOD - DAY 1

Discussion that followed the papers presented by Chief Lunney, Prof. V.N. Macdonald, Jerry Needle, Ron Clarke, Arthur Burrows, and David Farmer, reflected some specific concerns as well as some broader concerns related to the issue of productivity research in the law enforcement area.

The first question asked by Chief Miles was directed to Jerry Needle: "In your definition of measurement of performance, the first indicator you mentioned was the degree to which public expectation was successfully met. Was this indicator mentioned first by design or by accident?"

Mr. Needle indicated that the order in which criteria were discussed was not related to their priority.

The next question was asked by Mr. Lajoie, from the Quebec Justice Department, and was addressed to David Farmer: "Why do you always refer to Kansas City? Is it possible to generalize on the basis of the Kansas City findings?"

Mr. Farmer indicated that there weren't many rigorous studies of policing methods and that the Kansas City Police Department should be paid a tribute for having initiated this kind of study. He pointed out that the RAND study, the other study to which he referred, is not confined to Kansas City, but includes 149 police departments.

Mr. Farmer recognized that the issue of generalization is a very important one. He explained that LEAA has granted money to replicate

the citizen component of the Kansas City study and that they also hope to replicate the preventive patrol study in the future in order to test the portability of research results.

Dr. Rizkalla, of the International Centre for Comparative Criminology, commented that police departments have often been accused of not wanting to be evaluated. He then asked whether one can develop instruments for evaluating police performance which are simple enough and which are easily operationalized by police departments so that they may be able to evaluate their own performance on a regular basis?

Jerome Needle responded to the question by specifying the following points:

1. he didn't wish to emphasize the fact that police resist evaluation; this is less and less true;
2. the measures which his research team have put together have been operationalized in three police agencies where the study is ongoing;
3. these materials are designed for repeated use.

Mr. Lambert, from la Sûreté du Québec, asked for clarification about Jerome Needle's statement regarding the fact that police forces resist evaluation. Mr. Needle answered that there are police departments which do resist evaluation, but he added that he spent a good portion of his life as a budget examiner, and that the resistance to evaluation is not specific to police, but is very common. He stated that one of the reasons that agencies resist evaluation is that they feel researchers

do not understand them; indeed, that nobody understands them. The police, like the rest of us perhaps, do not like to be evaluated, since evaluation frequently brings negative findings and is sometimes painful.

Mr. Farmer concurred with Mr. Needle's statement and added that police departments are more likely than other criminal justice system components to submit to rigorous evaluation. Some police administrators have been very courageous in letting researchers in. It may be very embarrassing to have one's problems exposed; he felt that one should be proud of the police community because of the number of Chiefs who have been courageous enough to do so.

Mr. Needle emphasized that they were surprised at the welcome they experienced in many areas. For instance, the San Diego Police Department was very interested in seeking their cooperation to pilot the program there. Another police agency asked them for the tools so that they could submit themselves to evaluation. He feels that more and more police agencies wish to be evaluated.

Mr. Elton, of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, concurred that in their experience, representatives of the police community are much more cooperative than either judges or lawyers.

The Workshop Chairperson, Peter Engstad, added that the Research Division of the Solicitor General of Canada received many more requests for research from the police community than the Division has been able to respond to. He added that the Canadian police community is becoming increasingly willing to become involved in research. This Workshop

was intended to promote future research and an even more effective collaboration between the two communities.

Insp. Fortier, of the San Diego Police Department, mentioned that his department at first resisted evaluation. Now, they use the results of research, and as a consequence have developed much more informed management practices.

Dr. Kelling, from the Police Foundation, commented that although he agrees that the police are becoming involved in a great deal more of experimentation and evaluation, police research remains difficult and expensive. There is a big difference, he added, between saying "yes we want to do research in our police department" and securing and maintaining effective collaboration between police and researchers over the course of a research project.

Mr. Jessup, of the City of Vancouver, after stating that he believed there was a difference between productivity measures which focus on process and measures of effectiveness which focus on results, indicated that he felt that police should stop using measures of effectiveness and examine to which degree police objectives are being attained. Mr. Jessup then asked Mr. Needle whether he would comment on the statement with particular reference to the distinction between measures of productivity and measures of effectiveness and how they related to each other.

Mr. Needle defined effectiveness as the degree to which one achieves an objective, i.e., something the police try to achieve. For instance, when talking about the investigation process, the

objective is to clear and close the case. When one talks about effectiveness in this context, one talks about the clearance of the case. He then defined productivity as the cost of successfully achieving outcomes. In the above example, productivity will be the cost of successful clearance. The cost of the investigation (the input) is a measure of efficiency, not of productivity. He stressed that it is important to realize that investigation does not have to be successful to be efficient. He indicated that the relationship between these various elements are very complex and couldn't be discussed in the brief time available, but that one important point had to be stressed: the outcome has to be successful to be productive. Efficiency should also be considered; for instance, the cost for an investigation or the number of investigations conducted with a certain level of resources is an important indicator. However, he concluded, there is no direct relationship between productivity and effectiveness. It is not necessarily the case that being more effective will lead to being more productive.

The issue of how the results of the Workshop would be disseminated to people who were not present, particularly to private citizens, was raised from the floor. The Chairperson indicated that while the proceedings would be published, the Workshop participants may wish to suggest additional mechanisms for ensuring the widest possible distribution of the proceedings. He then adjourned the first plenary session, thanking the speakers for their contribution.

BANQUET ADDRESS

by

*Andr  Bissonnette  
Deputy Solicitor General  
Ottawa, Ontario*

To carry out my responsibilities, I must seek the advice and counsel of a large number of officials within the Ministry, including the staff of the Research Division who have organized this workshop in consultation with the RCMP.

Recent years have witnessed a rapid escalation in the cost of administering the criminal justice system. Gross expenditures for policing at the federal, provincial and local levels have risen from less than 200 million in 1961 to nearly 2 billion today.

Discounting the effects of inflation, this represents an increase of over 300%, and indications are that policing costs will continue to escalate.

As the task force on policing in Ontario, the Saulnier report on the organization and function of police in Quebec and others have observed, governments are fast approaching the limit of their ability to pay, and it seems to me to be imperative that police administrators seek more cost-effective means of delivering police services.

It is in response to the magnitude and urgency of these pressures that we have organized this workshop, and set, as one of our objectives, the development of a program of social science research

in the area of police productivity which is responsive to the needs of the Canadian police community.

Together with many of you in this room, I hold firmly to the belief that well executed research is a vital aid to decision-making, both in terms of avoiding unnecessary increases in spending and deriving maximum benefit from existing resources.

It is generally recognized, however, that there is sometimes a failure to take full advantage of the research resources available to us in our respective departments or communities.

Why don't we make optimal use of research?

Perhaps the most important reason is that research is very often threatening.

Threatening, primarily because we often advocate the adoption of particular policies and programs as though they were certain to be successful.

In these situations, it is quite natural for administrators to resist rigorous evaluation.

There is, however, a relatively simple way of reducing this problem.

And that is for an administrator to draw attention to the seriousness of a problem and to his or her determination to find policies or programs which provide effective solutions.

If it is made explicit, at the outset, that the policy or program being adopted is one of several plausible alternatives that could be employed, and that alternative programs will be tried if the one being proposed fails, an honest evaluation of outcomes need not be threatening.

Rather, evaluation becomes an integral part of the policy development process.

While it will still require courage and openness on the part of administrators, this approach will almost certainly contribute to the more effective use of research, and to the development of more cost-effective policies and programs.

The second reason why less than optimum use of research is made is that we sometimes fail to appreciate how long it takes to carry out high quality research which would inform us as to the effectiveness of our programs.

Because research takes a long time, and is costly, and for most of us a relatively scarce resource, I think it appropriate to concentrate our research efforts on perennial, long term problems, about which we will always require information and advice.

Even though we will sometimes have to divert research resources into so-called "Quick & Dirty" evaluation of isolated programs, I believe that by focusing our research efforts on perennial criminal justice system problems we will again contribute to better research and increased productivity.

Within the Ministry, we currently have, or are developing long-term programs of research in the areas of victimization, diversion, identification of dangerous offenders, public attitudes, crisis intervention, police productivity, policing costs and crim prevention, to name just a few.

And, in recognition of the ongoing information needs each of these programs of study are structured so as to provide periodic reports as information pertinent to their operations become available.

Another question that has profound implications for Canadian criminal justice system for those wanting to make optimum use of research is:

To what extent, if at all, are the results of U.S. research

transportable to Canada? And related to that,

How can we extract maximum benefit from research carried out in the U.S., or other countries for that matter?

In the absence of a clear understanding of the many factors affecting the applicability of research results to related Canadian criminal justice system settings, we are frequently unable to assess either the validity of the research findings or their implications for our criminal justice system policies and operations.

It seems to me that both Canadian criminal justice system administrators and researchers have to address themselves to these questions.

We must not be so ethnocentric as to deny ourselves the benefits that can be derived from the experiences of others;

Nor so directed in our thinking by the experience of others that we fail to develop policies and programs which respect those aspects of our history, legislation, criminal justice system, and culture which are uniquely Canadian.

Let me describe an example which illustrates how we are approaching this problem.

In the United States, approximately \$50,000,000 has been spent during the last seven or eight years on victimization studies aimed at measuring the incidence of crime, changes in crime rates, and the characteristics of victims of crime, and just over a year ago, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences spent about \$300,000 to evaluate these surveys.

With this information and experience available to us, our Research Division, in collaboration with Statistics Canada, developed and tested a methodology for a victimization research which is much

less costly and is tailored to our particular needs.

We are hopeful that our first major victimization survey will be conducted in January 1979, and that the results will be available by this time next year.

In addition, we are exploring ways of adapting the research instrument for use as one of the many measures one would want to employ in assessing the effectiveness of crime prevention programs at the local level.

I think our program of victimization research provides a sound example of how research in other countries can be effectively and economically adapted to serve the interests of Canadian criminal justice system officials, researchers and the general public, and it may be possible to derive similar benefits from foreign research and practice in respect to police productivity and performance.

In my opinion, efforts aimed at identifying those ideas and policies which are transportable and those which are not, will reap handsome rewards.

Finally, I hope that you are finding this workshop on police productivity and performance to be as productive as we intended.

I am also hopeful that the workshop proceedings will stimulate and interest your colleagues, and that they will join those of us here in intensifying our efforts to find ways to maximize police productivity and performance.

A BACKWARD GLANCE AT POLICE PRODUCTIVITY

by

*Chief Brian Sawyer  
Calgary City Police*

*Calgary, Alberta.*

While I was pleased to be invited to participate in this workshop, I am apprehensive about being asked to say a few words to the participants at this stage of the proceedings. We have had a stimulating day but a long one, and there's a clear danger that your attention span is just about exhausted.

But perhaps there's time for a few more words.

This is, of course, a workshop on police productivity, and although I've been critical of some of my colleagues for continually looking over their shoulder, to a time when managing the police function was a simpler business, that, in a sense, is what I'm going to do this evening. I'd like to present a highly simplified and personal view of where I think we are and where we ought to be going.

We've listened with interest to the speakers today. Peter Engstad and the Ministry are to be commended for bringing together so many highly qualified people to speak on topics that are of interest - current interest - to us all. To my way of thinking, a very interesting issue was established this morning. We had Mr. Needle and Mr. Farmer, on the one hand, talk about the very systematic approach that is being taken towards the crime

problem in the United States. They have told us about studies and programs that are going on in San Diego, Kansas City, Minneapolis and Oakland; the development of clusters of performance indicators, and so forth. Then we had Mr. Burrows and Mr. Clark speaking of the British experience, and how they weren't doing any of that sort of thing at all! Possibly this is an example of the U.K. tendency to say that, while there are problems, things are really not that bad, and "we'll muddle through". By comparison, it sometimes appears as though our American colleagues assume that if a problem can be analyzed and studied and measured and systematized, an answer will reveal itself in due course. Please, I don't mean to put anybody down! But it is a fact that there are significant differences in the approach in the U.K., the U.S. and Canada.

Mr. Farmer has succinctly outlined the significance of the various studies that have gone on in the United States. My colleagues and I have read with interest the results of some of these projects, including the preventive patrol experiment; the study into response time; the study into one-officer/two-officer manning of patrol vehicles; the study of the role of the detective. The published results have stimulated thought, discussion and controversy and have given us reason to think very carefully about just what it is we are trying to do. Of course, there are some of us who would say, with respect to the results, that we knew it all the time, but we are clearly in debt to all those who have worked so hard to bring us to the stage we are at now.

However, as important as these studies are, they may cause us to miss the point. I'd like to offer the minority view that many, if not most, of the important elements which go to make up an effective police service may not be measurable; at least not in a manner that is objective, and comparable. Because so much of what policemen do involves people and the inter-relationship between them, the results often cannot be readily quantified. To most policemen, this is a self-evident truth.

I listened with interest this morning to the discussion about the difference between effectiveness and efficiency. To be sure, they are different, even though most people won't spend a great deal of time thinking about it. Agreed, no police manager worth his salt will ignore the need to be efficient, particularly in this day of rapidly rising costs and diminishing taxpayers' dollars. But the question which is most relevant is the effectiveness of the police service, and it has both current and historical significance. And whether one talks of efficiency or effectiveness, one presupposes that the role has been clearly defined in the first instance. I wonder? Mr. Farmer's comment this morning, to the effect that the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has decided to have the Police Foundation study the role of the police, is intriguing. One could say, it's about time!

Of course, it's not a new question. In a recent book about the police, Peter Evans, an English journalist, suggested that the role of the police is "to save people from the worst that they can do to themselves, to each other, and to the government." It's an interesting definition. The only problem I have with it is that it requires enlargement and interpretation if it is to be useful to the people who do the work - police constables and sergeants on the street. Though neat and perceptive, it leaves too many options as to what the police role really is.

At this point, I'd like to take a giant leap backward. I don't think anyone has really improved on the rules laid down by Robert Peel in the 1820's. I assume you are all familiar with Peel's Rules although, interestingly enough, I didn't learn about them until I'd been a policeman for more than 20 years. It may have been my fault, or it may have been the fault of my leaders, but the fact remains that, for far too long I was unaware of Peel's Rules.

Now I talk about them whenever I get the chance, for I think they are the very essence of what the police are all about. They describe police objectives clearly. Not only do they tell us what the police ought to be doing, but they tell us why. This evening, I'd like to mention a few of them, and provide some editorial comment on the side.

It may or may not be Peel's first principle - it depends on what text you are reading whether there are 9 or 11 principles, but that's not the point - the rule that usually heads the list is the one which states that the basic mission of the police is to prevent crime and disorder as opposed to its repression by military force. That, of course, is why we carry sidearms, a nightstick, handcuffs, and a shotgun in our cars.

Another rule states that the police must secure the willing co-operation of the public. That, of course, is why we treat victims and witnesses with such unflinching consideration.

A further rule states that the co-operation of the public will decrease as the use of force by the police increases. Those who break the law, however, are not considered to be members of the public and, therefore, anything goes!

And then there's the rule which became the title for a comprehensive report issued by the Ontario Police Commission: the police are the public and the public are the police. The police must not be seen to be an external, disassociated agency maintaining public order but, instead, it must be seen to be every citizen's duty to maintain public order. In other words, the police are merely agents acting on behalf of the public interest. While I won't editorialize on that rule, I'll note in passing that the police spend relatively little time conveying to the public just what it is that the police do, and why and how they do it.

The final rule that I will mention this evening is the one that I think summarizes it all: the ultimate measure of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder in the community. It is a fact that static or lessening crime rates create problems for police management at budget time, and we still spend an inordinate amount of time thinking and talking about the crooks we catch (clearance rates) rather than the crimes we prevent. Of course catching criminals is readily measurable; preventing crime much less so.

I remain convinced that if we could somehow implant Peel's rules in the minds of every serving police officer so that they became a guidance system for every decision that he makes, most of the police problems that we face would be sharply reduced. Certainly, we would need to continue the police science research that is now going on in order to do our job more efficiently. But that brings us back to the question of efficiency vs. effectiveness. I think that to do what Robert Peel says would make us effective. I think that to do what the social scientists say might well make us more efficient, but I think it is first and foremost necessary that we be effective in our role.

With the emphasis on effectiveness, the role of the social scientist shifts into an admittedly difficult area, and that is determining what makes an effective police officer. I have yet to find any literature that tells me how to go about guaranteeing that I'm going to hire effective police officers. All the studies that I've read, whether published in the U.K., the United States or in Canada, tell me that it's a difficult problem. I know that! Until I am shown a better way, we'll probably continue to hire candidates who possess those attributes that other, serving police officers consider to be important in a policeman. We'll train them as well as we know how, then watch them closely during the first two or three years of their career in order to guide and shape them into what we think makes an effective police officer.

This raises a number of questions about the kind of training that police officers and supervisors ought to receive. I think there ought to be more importance placed nationally on the question of training standards. I believe that the key to an effective police service lies at the sergeant level. While the things that I do (or don't do) may have an impact on day-to-day operations, the quality of the service will stand or fall on the effectiveness of the first line supervisor.

But how do we teach these men? Why is it that, generally speaking, I must either develop the course material myself or else go to the United States for films, film-strips, work books and other aids in order to teach my officers how to be better at their job. And I should emphasize that I'm talking about attitude-shaping rather than technical competence. Perhaps the time has come to develop a national program of modular learning so that training programs can be used by all police agencies in the country, each according to its needs.

We have such an expanded capacity for acquiring, storing, and analyzing information that we sometimes overlook the wisdom of an earlier time. Without in any way denigrating the efforts of the police social scientist, several of whom are gathered here today, I think it may benefit us all if we pause to look backward at what's been said before. What Sir Robert Peel wrote is as relevant today as it was 150 years ago.

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TRADITIONAL AND INNOVATIVE POLICING

by  
Supt. R.N. Heywood  
Surrey Detachment  
R.C.M. Police  
Surrey, B.C.

Introduction

In a comparative framework, this paper attempts to illustrate the significance of recent innovations in police methodology and suggests future possibilities.

Further, this paper is intended to have a positive impact. Hopefully it will tempt those light hearted police managers that have been shielding their operations from scrutiny and defending the status quo to venture forth into the challenging world of experimentation and development. It is intended to suggest that policing is as complex as life itself and that innovation and development are essential if we are to continue to assist the public to maintain an orderly environment.

Police budgets are growing, not only in absolute terms, but as a percentage of the tax dollar. Police operations are receiving increasingly closer examination from those elected or appointed to this task. Also such people are becoming more informed and better able to make useful judgments about police efficiency and effectiveness.

Careful examination will reveal that a great many tasks performed by police today, particularly in the urban environment, are not as productive or successful as they were in previous times. It is paradoxical when one considers that police are better trained, equipped and organized than ever before, but solve less of the total crime than they did in previous periods.

Technology and improved techniques have undoubtedly been of great assistance in dealing with serious crime and committed criminals. However these advantages are not available to be deployed on the high volume community type crime which is consuming a substantial amount of police effort.

At the community level the factors that have been important to providing police service have remained unchanged. It is the level of cooperation and interaction that exist between the police and the community that that determines effectiveness. At the end of the day the police only solve as much crime as the community allows them to.

The approach has been to regularize and prescribe most, if not all, police activity. This slavishness for consistency and conformity to procedures has prevented the police from responding to the changing environmental situations. By limiting interaction to investigative strategies, police management has been able to ignore much of the social change that has taken place.

Recent initiatives by the police have made some progress in re-establishing a more positive relationship with the community. But much of this has been at a very superficial level centering around 'fad like' programs. Contemplated in this paper is a much more intensive and meaningful involvement of the public. It is only through this type of action will the citizen be able to discharge his responsibility in regard to order, thereby enabling the police to focus on those aspects of crime and criminals that is beyond the competency of the community to handle.

#### Traditional Police Model

The application of the classical bureaucratic model of organization to police administration was first clearly articulated by O.W. Wilson in his text book on "Police Administration" first published in 1952.

This approach emphasizes the hierarchical, or bureaucratic form of organization utilizing the concepts of work specialization, line of command, ritualized procedures, discipline and formality as criteria upon which to evaluate performance. The emphasis is on means. The principal characteristics of this type of organization are summarized as follows:

1. Routine tasks occurring in stable conditions
2. Task specialization (division of labour)
3. Means ( proper way to do a job) are emphasized
4. Conflict within the Organization is adjudicated from the top
5. "Responsibility" (what one is supposed to do, formal job description) is emphasized
6. One's primary sense of responsibility and loyalty are to the bureaucratic sub unit to which one is assigned

7. The organization is perceived as a hierarchic structure (pyramid)
8. Knowledge is inclusive only at the top of the hierarchy (only the chief knows everything)
9. Interaction between people in the organization tends to be vertical (i.e. take orders from above and transmits them below)
10. The style of interaction is directed toward obedience, command, and clear superordinate/subordinate relationships.
11. Loyalty and obedience to one's superior and the organization generally are emphasized.
12. Prestige is internalized; that is personal status in the organization is determined largely by one's office and rank.<sup>1</sup>

The examination of any police organization in Canada today will reveal the presence of these characteristics, some more vividly illustrated than others. Viewed in a legalistic framework, the function of the police is seen as operating within fairly clearly defined legal guidelines relating to evidence gathering and case preparation. This form of organizational design has many attributes.

The law, and its application by successive levels of Judiciary, is a stabilizing influence in society. When the primary thrust of police initiative is directed towards the court then it is reasonable to expect the stability and formality surrounding the legal system to be reflected in the organizational characteristics of the police.

When stability exists then rules and procedures can be determined and developed whereby consistency in the product is achieved. Stable conditions, predictable courses of action are the environment in which a structured bureaucratic organization can exist.<sup>2</sup>

This consistency of process allows for detailed instructions and procedure manuals to be developed. The policeman is expected to learn these procedures and conform to their requirements. Much of the management and supervisory effort is directed to ensuring a high level of conformity to

these predetermined rules and guidelines. The focus is on process, not on results.

The concept of work specialization has been extensively applied in police organizational design. Specialized departments have been created for almost every type of activity in which the police become engaged. Historically, specialized investigative sections have been created for various types of offence investigations. Departments have, to varying degrees, often depending on their size, identified specific units to handle Frauds, Homicides, Drug offences, Sex offences, Auto thefts and burglaries, to name a few. In recent years specialized units have been created to handle Juveniles, Crime Prevention, School Liaison, Traffic Enforcement and others.

The rationale for this specialization is not always clear. In some cases units are created in response to outside pressures arising from a perceived problem. For example, in recent times many communities have expressed concern about Juvenile problems and have pressured the police to respond. The Police Chief may use this situation as the basis for requesting additional resources to create a new 'specialized unit' to respond to the situation.

Other specialized units are created because the work does not 'fit' within the smooth running shifting arrangement used in the Patrol Division. Many patrol units are designed to allocate resources to give 'police presence' and to respond to calls from the public. They often only undertake that amount of follow up investigative work that can be conveniently handled within the constraints of the shift rotation system. Problems requiring periodic or extended attention are best allocated to a special unit so that the Patrol Division operation is uninterrupted.

While these strategies may well facilitate administrative clarity and simplicity, they may not result in the greatest achievement of policing objectives in the community. Sometimes a specialized unit becomes very efficient in its ability to handle specific task or investigations, but the remainder of the Department is now able to abdicate responsibility for the specific area and remain isolated from those peripheral areas where any

innovation or development can occur. Cleavages develop in the organization as a result of abusing the use of 'specialization' that result in long term reduced effectiveness.

In support of this style of organizational design it is pointed out that this model is most effective in certain situations. The argument will be made in the next section of this paper that the structured bureaucratic formalized model as previously described is not sufficiently adaptive to respond to changing local demands and does not allow for the utilization of alternative strategies to those described in procedural manuals. However, there are dimensions of policing that are best approached from a prescribed approach. In these situations conformity to laid down procedures is important and can be achieved by a system that focuses on process.

When the focus of police effort is on the more skilled criminal, alternatives to rigorous investigation are less effective. In these areas the police operate independent of the community and rely on good investigative techniques to produce the necessary evidence for Court. Examples of this can be cited in respect to major crimes such as drug trafficking, armed robberies, homicides, frauds. Experience has produced a variety of investigative strategies that the police employ to secure evidence. In these situations the police must function within determined guidelines arrived at through application of various legislative enactments, court interpretation and experience.

The investigative methods become the stable element that influence the organizational style. The places, offences and participants will change, but the police methodology, refined by experience, becomes predictable and thereby provides the stable basis on which the police can structure an organization. It is when these predetermined responses are inadequate and alternative approaches must be developed that the bureaucratic model becomes a bar to innovation, creativity, and development of alternative responses.

The traditional model has been and to a large extent remains the principal organization style of the policing sector. A promotional system that recognizes effective investigators and elevates them to management positions has a built in resistance to change. Investigative solutions get priority even though other alternatives may provide more lasting solutions.

### Community Policing Model

Contemporary literature abounds with a variety of descriptions of police organizational techniques popularly called 'Team Policing', 'Zone Policing', 'Community Policing'. In 1975 Dr. David WASSON did a review of several police forces currently utilizing variations of this new style. In his document prepared under contract with the Solicitor General he identified certain characteristics that are 'key elements' of this system. They are:

1. *Geographic stability of assignment.* This concept encompasses the requirement that policemen be assigned to and be responsible for a specific geographic area.
2. *Decentralization of authority.* The person in charge of an area must have the authority to alter the delivery of the policing service to respond to local conditions.
3. *Emphasis on Crime Prevention.* Implicit in this concept is the notion that the community (its individual members or specific groups) must protect itself to some reasonable level.
4. *Emphasis on Community Relations.* A two way concept whereby the police receive input from the community to assess problems and priorities and give to the community the appropriate assistance to assist them with that portion of the problem that they are competent to influence.
5. *Mechanisms for Improved Internal Police Dept. Communication.* No longer is rule compliance adequate. As the Dept. increases its strategies and becomes more differentiated, it follows that improved communication is necessary to integrate the various components.
6. *Reduced reliance of the police department on the use of police specialists.* The guiding principle is 'Generalize when possible and specialize when necessary'. This is consistent with the notion of decentralized authority and the 'total policeman' concept.<sup>3</sup>

A major difference between the Traditional Policing approach and the Community Policing approach is that the former focuses on process while the latter focuses on results. As previously stated the Traditional model

is a structured organization around a stable set of practices, regulations and rules. Conformity and efficiency are the watch words of such an organization. The Community Policing model, on the other hand focuses on achievement of stated objectives; on the results achieved by choosing between alternative strategies.

In the Traditional model the policeman approaches the Community with a predetermined set of investigative and enforcement procedures and skills and interacts at the level of offences with these attributes. He then follows well established and prescribed procedures to handle the incident in question.

In the Community Policing model the ingredients of the Traditional model are still required, but their application will vary in relation to a predetermined set of priorities. In this situation, in addition to responding to individual incidents the policeman is required to analyse the total problem and assess the relative merits of various approaches. These various approaches may range from community performance in relation to certain offences, to very traditional police investigative or enforcement strategies.

Considered in another way the long term solutions to any given crime problem are to be determined by changing one or more of the conditions necessary for the offence to occur. This change (or changes) must occur before the offence happens. For an offence to occur certain conditions must exist.

1. *First it must be an offence in law.* The act must be identified in law as an offence. This is basic.
2. *There must be an opportunity for the offence to occur.*  
All offences have dimensions of space and time. They occur in an environment. This introduces analysis of all factors that can influence the environment (i.e. security, lighting etc.).
3. *There is a victim.* What aspect of the victims characteristics or behaviour could have been altered to reduce the vulnerability to the offence in question. This also raises the whole issue of security, citizens responsibility, awareness, etc.

4. *There is an offender.* What courses of action can be taken to detect early delinquency, change behaviour, divert energy into less harmful challenges, adolescence.<sup>4</sup>

Once the problem is viewed from the perspective of the total environment it can be seen that a great range of alternatives can be developed. Some would be completely within the competency of the community, or at least specific parts of the community, while others would properly be the responsibility of specific agencies, or the police.

Even this cursory examination of the dynamics of 'Community Policing' gives rise to obvious ramifications for organizational design and management style. While investigative and enforcement strategies remain unchanged the broader based analysis contemplated above requires a variety of alternate strategies and interaction with various aspects of the community. The type of action undertaken by the policeman would depend on the response from the community involved and its ability to respond to the identified need.

Alternate courses of action conflict with the traditional management style that demands a high level of conformity to predetermined procedures. In the traditional style the focus had been on following established procedures. In the Community Policing model the emphasis is on problem identification analysis and longer term solutions. This requires interaction and cooperation with the community. The Management process must therefore encompass consultative and problem solving dimensions, along with determination of goals and strategies to achieve those goals.

#### 'Second Generation' Community Policing'

Even before community policing has been thoroughly developed, or for that matter accepted, new and additional concepts are emerging that can enhance the policing function.

In the preceding discussions on the Traditional model and the Community model of policing the focal point of the analysis was the interaction between the police and the community at the patrolman level. The discussions contemplated an organizational structure behind the front line

performer determining the strategies being utilized.

In one case the procedures are clearly defined and management is concerned with conformity and efficiency. In the other case broader issues are brought into play and, in addition to short term responses, management is required to assist with the development of longer term solutions.

In the Traditional model management is primarily concerned with the performance of the practitioners and is not significantly involved with the affected environment. The relevant environment is 'offences' and 'offenders' to which the policeman responds and applies his technical skills. Management reviews the efficiency of that response and concerns itself with correcting inadequacies either personal or policy.

In the Community Policing model the analysis of the total problem gives rise to a variety of possible solutions that require action at the policy level and thereby directly involve the police manager in the process. Given the background of many police leaders this type of consultation/negotiation/policy making process may be viewed as outside 'legitimate' police work and generally avoided.

This concept can be further illustrated by the idea of viewing the community from a high altitude with a time camera that only records the trails of police units. Points that were attracting an inordinate amount of police resources over time would soon become evident.

Every community has those places which require more police attention than others. The nature of these places depends on the type of community. In one community an examination revealed that licensed liquor outlets were requiring considerable police attention. In another a popular fast food outlet was the centre of seasonal activity. In another a large high density rental residential complex was the source of many calls for police service.

In all of these examples the traditional response is to deal with the individual calls on a fast, efficient, impersonal basis and provide a consistent service response particularly in terms of initiating legal

follow up action.

Supervision is applied to the individual case. Supervisors are generally responsible for the performance of policemen on their shift. They are not responsible or accountable for the service provided in any specific community over time, or for any particular ongoing problem in a community. They are only responsible for handling that portion that occurs on their tour of duty.

The Community Policing approach results in analysis of the total environment giving rise to the demand for policing services. In the case of the licensed liquor outlets, analysis of the environment where considerable trouble was being experienced with drunks revealed that several factors were relevant. It was found that interior design allowed large groups to gather which became difficult to control; premise security was inadequate and barred and underage patrons could not be controlled. Staff were not trained in 'cooling down' situations or even when and how to use force.

In the case of the fast food outlet the analysis revealed some interesting facts. The firm had placed its pre-planned, pre-programmed outlet into a community that was already experiencing certain types of social unrest. It was a focal point for large numbers of youth. The firm did not respond to this environment but proceeded with their 'usual' operation and then called the police when problems developed. Staff deployment in the facility provided no floor supervision of patrons. No control existed on the use of the washrooms. Exterior lighting was inadequate. Certain aesthetic features, like seats and shrubs, were a meeting place that was unsupervised. The access to the facility from adjacent parking areas and other facilities was not controlled by judicious use of fencing that would fit the surroundings.

The high density housing complex presented a variety of factors that can be adjusted to affect the crime situation. Examination revealed that parking lots and play areas were out of sight of apartment windows. Underground parking was poorly lighted with uncontrolled access. Poor locks on doors and windows existed throughout. Yard and hallway lights were inadequate.

Most important was the absence of any real 'on site' management. No rules were enforced regarding behaviour of adults, children, visitors or anybody. Facilities for recreational activities, if provided, were under utilized.

All of these examples give rise to questions like, who is responsible? Is it appropriate for someone to create an environment and be able to walk away from future responsibility for order issues in that environment? Should the downstream costs of maintaining an orderly environment be passed on to the tax payer and draw on publicly provided services, including police? To what extent can, or should the person that controls the environment be held to account? At some point he will be incompetent to deal with the problems? How will this be decided?

The Community Policing model surfaces these and other questions that require police management to participate in development strategies to work out adequate solutions. In the initial stages police management must seek out the people responsible for the various environments and through a consultative/negotiative process determine appropriate courses of action for all persons involved. Some strategies will utilize Police resources. Some will not. Some will be shared.

Ultimately legislation will be required in many areas to ensure standards of performance by the various actors. Building standards are a Federal responsibility. Provincial law regulates Landlord and Tenant relations, bonding and other aspects of regulating management. Municipal By-laws affect various aspects of the environments.

Clearly, interaction with people that create and operate the structures in which we live, work or play, is beyond the scope of the young policeman, however ambitious he may be. It is a task for Management. It is part of the task of ensuring that every citizen, in an individual or corporate sense, discharges his responsibility in respect to order.

#### Conclusion

As stated in the beginning the task of policing is as complex as life itself and continuous growth and development is necessary to ensure that

a state of order exists in society to achieve that delicate balance between avoidance of fear on one hand and maximum individual freedom on the other.

Much needs to be done to determine what should be done by the citizen, individually or collectively, and what should be done by public institutions. At what point does 'community competency' end and professional specialization begin in regard to crime control?

The challenge exists for police managers, researchers and other policy makers to give more attention to this important area of social growth and develop strategies to ensure our ability keeps pace with our needs.

Footnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Nicholas, Henry, Public Administration and Public Affairs (1975)  
pp 57 - 58
- <sup>2</sup> Tosi, Henry L. and Carroll, Stephen, J. - Management: Contingencies,  
Structure and Process. St. Clair Press, Chicago. 1976. pp 173 - 174.
- <sup>3</sup> Wasson, David K. Community-based Preventive Policing: A Review.  
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OBSTACLES IN MAXIMIZING PRODUCTIVITY

Some Philosophical, Political, Policy and  
Operational Concerns in the Delivery of Police Services

by

*Alan Grant, Professor  
Osgoode Hall Law School  
York University  
Toronto, Ontario.*

INTRODUCTION

In the economic sphere productivity has been said to be "the relationship between the output of goods and services and the inputs used in producing them, such as, land, capital and labour or all (such) factors combined".<sup>1</sup> That senior police managers are (and should be) involved in the consideration of the fundamentals of enterprise and the acquisition, use and evaluation of and, labour and capital resources, is a phenomenon which has not always been sufficiently recognized in police circles, not least because long service in junior ranks before elevation to policy-making responsibilities, can prove to be a poor - even counter-productive - training ground for the acquisition of the necessary skills.<sup>2</sup>

It is important, however, to see police organizational and administrative problems not just in the context of other productive enterprises, but especially in the context of public administration. If the expressed domestic policy of government is to produce conditions in which the quality of life of its citizens is enhanced to the best level possible, then what becomes immediately clear is that the

yardsticks by which industrial production might be measured will be hopelessly inadequate for evaluating success or failure in such nebulous areas as "freedom from sickness and pain, safety on the streets, clean air and (equal) opportunities for achievement".<sup>3</sup> Thus, the police, in common with others in public administration, are faced with trying to find and develop more accurate ways of ascertaining how well society is served by the policing arrangements being offered. In the past, this often led to an emphasis on quantitative research with insufficient attention being paid to aspects of quality.

#### SOME PROBLEMS WITH "CRIME"

A current example of this trend is the form in which most countries maintain their crime statistics. Despite research showing that a simple annual counting of figures can be misleading,<sup>4</sup> and, on occasion, positively mischievous,<sup>5</sup> it is still true to say that, by and large, official crime statistics pursue quantity and often ignore the cry from other areas of public administration for more sensitive indicators and new techniques of social analysis.

Though the totality of police work is not always (or even often) about crime, let us pursue this a little further. Professor Radzinowicz has said, "in trying to account for crime in an affluent society, we cannot ignore criminal opportunities... To put it bluntly there are far more goods to be stolen and their owners are far more careless with them. There are far more transactions and far more opportunities to cheat".<sup>6</sup> This point, at least as old as the Italian criminologist Enrico Ferri,<sup>7</sup> could well have been the base-line for a whole development of property-crime statistics expressed as a percentage of gross-domestic product; or house-breakings expressed as a percentage of available housing stocks; or vehicle thefts expressed as a percentage of vehicles known to be registered in the particular area. It has not, however, proved to be so. Would the twin phenomena of growing affluence and growing criminality<sup>B</sup> be somewhat less "phenomenal" if research on the above lines were to elicit that, for example, non-violent property crime has occupied a stationary or even

declining percentage of all economic activity? We can never know if we blindly accept larger raw figures for theft, year-by-year, as conclusive evidence that we are at the mercy of a "crime wave".

There is another problem. A politician may go to the hustings and use "crime in the streets" as a scare-tactic to drum up public support (and, unfortunately, paranoia). A police chief, secure in the knowledge that police budgets are less likely to be cut-back when such a political platform is being occupied, may be tempted to agree with the politician. But the "factual" basis for the assertion that "crime is rampant" is often sadly lacking. Even crimes of violence against the person which may well be increasing faster than can be accounted for by population growth, occur mainly amongst members of the same family or between relatives, friends or acquaintances. Assaults by total strangers are always in the minority.<sup>9</sup> But when the headlines blare-out the increased percentage of violent crime over the previous year, the reader's mind conjures up the evil stranger waiting around a dark corner. But we know that the best preventive advice to the prospective victim would be the highly impractical but factually accurate, "don't go home tonight", or "don't go out with your friends". They are still assaults, however. It is their nature not their number that is often misunderstood.

Thus there are two categories of problems arising here. First, many of our basic counting systems for crime are inaccurate and misleading and, second, even where our counting techniques become more sophisticated (e.g., identifying the relationships between victims and assailants) the police might be said to have a vested interest in not bringing home the message to the public because a public afraid of crime might be thought to be a public more supportive (or less likely to be critical) of the police. Action is necessary on both fronts. Let us concentrate on more effective ways of gathering statistics and in defusing needless public paranoia about crime. At the same time, when more reliable data

indicate that there is cause for public concern this too, has to be communicated. In a democracy the public must be given the facts, however unpalatable they may prove to be for the authorities concerned.

The third problem about crime statistics which has to be faced is the so called "dark figure of crime"<sup>10</sup> i.e. those crimes which, for a variety of reasons, do not appear in official criminal statistics at all. Obviously the extent of the dark figure will vary according to the particular crime under discussion. Thus there will be fewer unreported murders than unreported petty thefts. But this is not, for me, the significant aspect of the "dark figure" since, even if the true figures for murder and theft were known, the profile of those crimes would not be all that different; i.e. there would be relatively few murders and a vast amount of petty theft. It is surely in the area of clandestine predatory crime (e.g. fraud and corruption) rather than in areas of overt predatory crime that the existence of the "dark figure" totally distorts our ideas about the nature and content of much non-violent property crime.

One of the important factors involved in determining what crimes will or will not become "known to the police" is clearly the type of policing arrangements that are made in a particular jurisdiction. Societies may well have the criminals they deserve but a more accurate statement might rather be that societies have the criminals which they organize their police forces to catch. Thus, in the non-violent property crime area, for example, we have the major proportion of our police deployed on the streets, in a largely "service-preventive" role, producing a voluminous, but essentially petty, "catch" of thieves and handlers of stolen property. Some people are (wrongly in my view) led to believe that this "catch" represents a fairly accurate cross-section of those committing non-violent property crime in our society.

But much modern property exists in a form to which the street-criminal has no access (e.g. computerized accounting systems, stocks,

bonds and bankers' lines of credit<sup>11</sup>). The granting of planning permission on real estate development, with the inherent problems of the possible corruption of public officials, is an even less tangible piece of very desirable "property".<sup>12</sup>

Even if access to such people and places could be gained by the "street-criminal" he would be most unlikely to possess the knowledge or abilities to make any use of it, let alone an illegal, fraudulent one. The result is that a great deal of the opportunity to commit non-violent property crime is removed into the exclusive hands of the professionally educated and already well remunerated. This is compounded by the fact that rising tax rates in industrial countries increase the pressures on corporations and individuals to seek sources of income which, by their nature, are hidden from the authorities.

But our preventive-patrols and many of our detective strategies still tend to concentrate almost exclusively on street crime. Thus the courts are filled with this category of non-violent property offence and seldom, if ever, with the modern, sophisticated thief. This would suggest that the cross-section of those in prison has no reference to those actually committing non-violent property crimes in society as a whole. What is represented there, however, is an excellent indication of where and how we have our police deployed.

In a long-delayed Home Office report of a study done in 1972, researchers randomly sampled 771 men in prison in south-east England on a given day. Their crimes showed no obvious competence and planning and they gained little from their thefts. 94% had committed property offences totalling less than £1,000 in their entire criminal careers<sup>13</sup> and 90% of them had no "0" levels or the equivalent. Similar studies in Canada would not produce a significantly different picture, in my view, simply because we are dealing with a similar law enforcement policy - which prevails in western society generally - and requires radical re-appraisal.

But when issues like this are raised they are invariably met by two objections, in my experience. First it is said, the ordinary person is not concerned with sophisticated crime. He wants the policeman to concentrate his attentions on the street and is not interested if fraudsmen can "rip off" a few rich people who can afford it anyway. Second, I am told, we have to look at cost-effectiveness. We simply do not have the resources to concentrate attention on large-scale frauds or corruption. It would cost a fortune and take a long time both in investigation and (especially) at trial.

Let us look at these two objections. First, the attitude of the ordinary man in the street, in whose name we are sometimes too quick to hold opinions. Formal criminal statistics tell us nothing about his views but attempts at alternative social analyses are becoming more familiar to us. It is of interest to note that in a study conducted in London, England recently by Dr. William A. Belson<sup>14</sup> adult Londoners rated "catching professional criminals" as the most important police job but graded it only 8th in a list of 18 duties in terms of how well it was done! Maybe the man in the street is not so parochial in his views of crime as we sometimes like to think. As for the cost-effectiveness argument, it can only be taken seriously if we accept that the present system (under which the under-educated, the socio-economically under-privileged, the homeless and the mentally disordered<sup>15</sup> fly in and out of the revolving door of our courts mainly charged with petty non-violent property crime), is itself a "cost-effective" proposition. Clearly it is not. This aspect of law enforcement is, by definition, a loss-leader. When prevention has failed, processing "the failures" is bound to be a costly business. But how can we even remotely claim that liberal democracy is the best (or even least-worst) political system when we only count the cost of creating an adequate investigative and prosecutorial system when the defendants are to be drawn from the more fortunate sections of the public but not otherwise. This is a challenge which I believe liberal-democracy should be able to meet, but recent developments have shown that the problem will not go away.

Indeed the most challenging contribution to recent criminological literature has been that of the radical criminologists who would clearly classify my remarks so far as, at best, misguided liberalism.<sup>16</sup>

Radical criminologists classify research and writing on crime into three broad categories which they call "conservative", "liberal" and "radical". For them the conservative approach is largely descriptive of existing social arrangements and into this category they would consign much of what they term 'police college' criminology (e.g. adjudicating on the merits of beat-police against car-police<sup>17</sup> and no doubt much of what is discussed at workshops on police productivity. The liberal approach, on the other hand, is more concerned with change, and is willing to say what ought to be done. It goes beyond the conservative ideas of social control and containment but is said to avoid facing real contradictions in the system (e.g. the concentration of the criminal justice system on the relatively powerless in society).<sup>18</sup> The radical approach to criminology would take exception to my attempt to place a higher priority on the investigation and prosecution of financial swindles, high-class fraud and the bribery and corruption of officials, on the grounds that no such "detailed exposé will act evangelically as a catalyst for the creation of a genuinely moral society".<sup>19</sup> The radical criminologist sets himself no less a task than showing that structural positions occupied by powerful men lead not just to "exceptional transgressions, but (to) regularized infractions which can only be removed by more fundamental and radical change".<sup>20</sup> The political implications are clear. At stake is the design of society itself and the preferred design of the radical criminologists is solidly based on Marxist principles.

There is, therefore, a messianic quality about this future state of being to which the radical criminologist aspires. There, one assumes, the societal structures having been perfected, crime would either be eliminated or be greatly reduced. I reserve the right to be sceptical of this formulation. Nothing created and staffed by human beings is ever likely to be so perfect. But its wide appeal when applied to systems of political economy

in this century alone should lead no one to take its challenge lightly.

Long before it should be necessary or desirable to change the fundamental structure of society we should try to make the one we have work at its full potential. Let me touch on just two of the factors which have prevented policing in the liberal democracies from being as efficient and effective as it might have been.

LIBERAL SCEPTICISM OF THE EFFICACY OF POLICING AS A CONCEPT

"If it were possible to make an accurate calculation of the evils which police regulations occasion, and of those which they prevent, the number of the former would ---in all cases exceed that of the latter."<sup>21</sup>

This may have been the high-water mark of liberal scepticism of the efficacy of police but it is certainly true that classic liberalism concentrated on trying to limit the ambit of the criminal law to clearly defined prior laws and to reducing arbitrary executive action and curbing judicial discretion. "The idea of an official agency charged permanently with the control of crime, however hedged around with guarantees of individual liberty, was antipathetic to the liberal mind and its vision of a free society."<sup>22</sup>

Although tempered by later events, strong elements of this approach can still be traced in modern writing about crime. Thus, in a recent report by a Royal Commission<sup>23</sup> which was set up to look into the increasing evidence of the corruption of certain U.K. local government officials by leading figures in the construction industry who were seeking public-works contracts, we read<sup>24</sup>

"---we are sure that the police should not take on the task of general surveillance of public bodies, or any other organizations, merely on the off-chance that evidence of crime might turn up."

At the same time, in an illuminating addendum by one of the Commissioners, Mrs. Ward-Jackson,<sup>25</sup> we learn that "almost all of the investigations that have led to prosecutions have been sparked off either by "Private Eye" (an anti-establishment, humorous weekly magazine) or by commercial television or by other branches of the media or by other unofficial bodies or individuals. They have not been initiated from any official source".<sup>26</sup>

It is hardly surprising that official sources have been so unproductive. While it is perfectly acceptable to engage in general surveillance of overt predatory crime on the off-chance that evidence of crime might turn up, it is not at all acceptable that such general prevention action or its equivalent be adopted as a policing strategy in respect of clandestine predatory crime. I do not underestimate the difficulties involved. Clearly they are immense. But it cannot be that police managers organizing their resources in the latter part of the 20th century can continue to view with equanimity the colossal imbalance of police priorities in favour of one category of non-violent property crime over another unless the ramifications have been fully explored and satisfactory rational explanations found to justify current practices.

Just as "targeting" of potential bank robbers has become an acceptable police response, involving as it does the prior surveillance and associated background inquiries of likely individuals, attention will one day have to be similarly paid to ostensibly respectable people in the fraud and corruption area. Indeed it could be argued that the case for "targeting" in clandestine crime is the greater, since there will seldom, if ever, be a complaint to the police in such cases. The total aridity of a policy which requires that the police sit back and wait for such a complaint is shown by the fact that the biggest financial swindles have been uncovered without the victims being aware of it or, more sinister, with the victim remaining silent about it. Thus, a \$1.5 million fraud on a New York Bank and a \$2,000 million insurance fund fraud in Los Angeles were undetected by external audit over three years and, more particularly, "in both cases detection of the acts occurred independently of any protective

acts of the victims".<sup>27</sup> Much worse is the case where certain banks may be willing to make a loan backed by a stolen or counterfeit security as collateral in the knowledge that " they would have no difficulty in passing on the bad paper".<sup>28</sup> Despite all of this it is the policy of many police fraud-squads never to commence an enquiry unless there is a complaint from an aggrieved person.<sup>29</sup>

It has been suggested that there may be so much stolen and counterfeit "commercial paper" in existence that "a financial catastrophe would ensue if all were recovered and identified".<sup>30</sup> This may be a gross exaggeration but whether it is or not, this kind of fear may be behind a rather subtle reason which has been suggested to dissuade law enforcement authorities from taking any interest in the field, viz.

"Reformists usually favour heavy penalties for business malpractice and white collar crime in the expectation that private enterprise like private medical practice will eventually be made illegal."<sup>31</sup>

Surely this is to be over-sensitive. Police business must include the investigation of major crime and unless police capability to handle it across all socio-economic barriers is achieved, the police role will be circumscribed. Even as things stand at present, there is always the danger that growing specialized units, e.g. those attached to Justice, Treasury, I.R.S. and S.E.C. in the U.S.A., will occupy the sophisticated end of the law enforcement market with increased private security operations taking over more of the watchman and patrol functions. The danger signs may already be there.<sup>32</sup> This would leave the police as a form of continental "third force" - a quasi-military organization with essentially peace-keeping functions to perform. The paradox of the challenge appears to be that to maintain its generalist capabilities our police forces will have to specialize in areas of crime involving forms of property with

which traditional law enforcement has had only limited experience. In short, liberal scepticism to policing has been overcome in respect of overt predatory crime but not in respect of clandestine predatory crime.

WHO ARE OUR POLICEMEN?

"It was (Sir Robert) Peel's deliberate policy, by offering a low wage of a guinea a week, to recruit only men "who had not the rank, habits or station of gentlemen" and all promotions were to be made from the ranks."<sup>33</sup>

Since those pioneer days, we are told by an eminent police historian that "the aim for many years, has been to recruit police from every stratum of society".<sup>34</sup>

Dr. Belson in his recent study of the London Metropolitan Police<sup>35</sup> found that compared to the general public fathers of police officers were drawn slightly less from the A.B.C. 1 classes (upper middle, middle and lower middle classes) much more from the C2 classes (the skilled working class) and much less from the D.E. classes (i.e. unskilled working classes and those at the lower levels of subsistence). Can it be just a coincidence that this is the group from which the bulk of the prison population is drawn, or is it inevitable, in any society, that the police will have their greatest "success" against their immediate socio-economic inferiors? Despite the so-called aim of broad recruiting it seems that the British police are still mainly drawn from the skilled working class. In the U.S.A., police have been said to be "for the most part white, upwardly mobile, lower middle class, conservative in ideology and resistant to change".<sup>36</sup> I have not read of any attempted profile of the Canadian policeman, and would welcome some research into this area because policies in law enforcement cannot be discussed without reference to the nature of the resources available. Indeed, compared with many other enterprises where land and capital may loom large, the human resource in policing is the

aspect which probably plays the most important role.

Dr. Belson also found that the levels of newspaper readership amongst London Metropolitan policemen were sharply out of line with those of the general public,<sup>37</sup> the police favouring newspapers with overtly conservative views more than twice as much as the public generally. Now this may not be significant if the police, both in theory and in practice, can operate purely apolitically. This traditional and comforting view is often voiced by the judiciary. "The police are not to be required in any circumstances to exercise political judgment. Their role is the maintenance of public order - no more, no less" wrote Lord Justice Scarman recently.<sup>38</sup> This approach is now under fire as being much too simplistic, e.g. in the field of public order,<sup>39</sup> in industrial disputes<sup>40</sup> and, more obviously, in "national security" operations.<sup>41</sup> Indeed, the police, themselves, have admitted as much in respect of "picketing".<sup>42</sup>

Mention of a characteristic police-type is always received with impatience, if not, annoyance in police circles. But let us pursue this just a little further. It is sometimes said that police work at the moment attracts the "mesomorphs" of psychological typology. Such people are said to be self assertive and, to be willing to take responsibility; they display a certain psychological callousness, lack squeamishness in the drive towards objectives, obtain satisfaction at getting things done and have no hampering tendency to see both sides unduly.<sup>43</sup> What do police officers, themselves, say about the qualities most admired by their colleagues and looked-for in their leaders? Jennifer Hilton, a police officer with post-graduate psychology qualifications has written,<sup>44</sup>

"Police behavioural norms that are generally admired are those of rapid, decisive action and "tough" rather than "soft" behaviour. The man who makes arrests (even unnecessarily) is thought more admirable than the man of honey-tongue who resolves all his disputes into 'no cause for police action'."

In the admittedly controversial area of the so-called authoritarian police-personality she adds, significantly, that if it is true then it would be "a further factor encouraging rapid definitive action rather than prolonged exploration of a complex situation".<sup>45</sup>

Now, it seems to me, that this last issue may be of fundamental importance if police are ever to do more than pay lip-service to the investigation of clandestine predatory crime. Recruiting in the past, may well have been subconsciously or wilfully conducted with overt predatory crime and public order-keeping in mind. New forms of property and new forms of committing crimes will clearly require a more diverse psychological profile to provide the necessary investigators. From my own experience, I can only say that (with a few honourable exceptions) I am met with almost universal impatience and sometimes open hostility by senior police officers when the subject of setting objectives, which would increase the priority given to sophisticated fraud and corruption, is raised. Insofar as this is caused by inadequate current resources to handle even street crime, let alone anything more complex, I sympathize with their sentiments. Insofar as this is caused by a world-view which has no difficulty in identifying "breaking and entry" as a crime but which has a problem in comprehending the illegality involved in bid-rigging by public works contractors with the inevitable corruption of public officials and false accounting practices by which it is disguised, then sympathy is surely misplaced.

There is, unfortunately, some evidence that the recruiting problem is not being faced. Here are two recent examples. An English Chief Constable writes,

"More and more, the public must put their trust in the younger officer. Twenty-two percent of my men are under 25 years of age and nearly 14% of the force are probationary constables with less than two years service... The preponderance of recruits to my force are men without formal qualifications of any kind. Two in five recruits only have had the benefit of a grammar school education..."<sup>46</sup>

Despite this rather grim picture of the raw material from which the Chief Constables of the future will, on current policies, have to be selected, the writer is able to go on to say

"This level of recruitment is not in itself a matter of great concern; give me a man educated in life and exuding common sense and I can make him into a good policeman." <sup>47</sup>

We are then told that such officers have to use the latest in technical developments and be able to cope with legislation so complex that lawyers are confused by it. How, then, can it be that this level of recruiting is not a cause for concern?

Even Sir Robert Mark, who has done so much to further the claims of a genuine police professionalism based, in part, upon systematic writing on police science rather than the more orthodox flirtation with the hardware of modern technology to which certain police chiefs have succumbed, has not really faced up to the recruiting dilemma. He has written recently <sup>48</sup>

"...the prospects for achieving a high professional and academic standard for the service generally has never been so good."

The research of Dr. John Tobias, however, shows that, despite such grandiloquent claims, overall recruiting standards are falling. Worse than this, the ability of serving officers to "grow" once in the police has been greatly reduced compared with the past when less opportunity for educational advancement caused considerable numbers of people with high potential to join the police force. Educational reform has corrected this with the result that more and more potential "late-starters" are being sifted out from the police-recruiting catchment area. <sup>49</sup> None of this would matter if a career in the police service was an attractive proposition for graduates holding good quality degrees. This does not appear to be so in the U.K.,

although the North American experience may be different in this respect.<sup>50</sup> But in a major respect it is the same; as a general rule every recruit starts right at the foot of the promotion ladder.

People are entitled to equal rights but they are patently not of equal ability. The police have to attract some share of the very best talent available as well as a fair cross-section of others. Starting at the bottom of the ladder is a real disincentive to attracting the best talent. Police management and unions have refused to grasp this particular nettle. Like it or not, it will have to be grasped.

#### THE NEW PHYSIOGNOMY OF CRIME

Under the above title, Professor Radzinowicz<sup>51</sup> identified eight "growth" areas as follows<sup>52</sup>

1. Motiveless destruction and hooliganism.
2. Violence.
3. New forms of stealing.
4. Asocial behaviour and drug taking.
5. Occupational crime, in particular illegal conduct by those generally presumed to be law-abiding.
6. A stronger contingent of offenders from the middle strata of society as compared with the working classes.
7. More youth and young adult crime.
8. More first offenders relative to recidivists.

Police re-organization to deal with categories 3, 5 and 6, I suggest, has not kept pace, although it is nearly thirty years since the pioneering work by Sutherland into white-collar crime<sup>53</sup> and twelve years since Radzinowicz drew attention to its tendency for further growth. Though the point was also recognized by Sutherland,<sup>54</sup> Dr. Donald Cressey has quite properly reminded us that "sooner or

later we must acknowledge as outmoded and out of date the crime control ideology that merely asks criminal justice administrators to detect, arrest, convict and punish criminals".<sup>55</sup> But the fact remains that we do go on detecting, arresting and convicting criminals for property offences, and intelligent people have to ask why it is that those in prison represent such a very one-sided version of such crimes<sup>56</sup> in our society. A fair and just society would organize its law enforcement resources in such a way that the qualitative imbalance (which itself adds potency to the arguments of those who would advocate more radical reforms in political economy), would be redressed as a matter of urgency.

THE TECHNOLOGY TRAP: OR GETTING BETTER AT DOING MORE OF THE SAME OLD THING

"Measured by the time taken to handle emergency calls and to check people and vehicles, assessment of results suggests that the computer increases police productivity by 100% - 150%."

Police communications centres are becoming increasingly more automated and supervisors can more readily than ever monitor the speed with which a call from the public is answered, the rapidity with which a police car is dispatched to the scene, the alacrity with which the crew can deal with the incident and "get back on the air" to accept further calls and much else in addition.

But there are grave dangers associated with the admitted benefits of advancing technology. Just as current pre-occupation with essentially petty crime produces voluminous figures from which can be derived data on the population: crime ratio or the police strength: crime ratio, so modern communications can supply us with many more details than were previously available on the number and nature of calls on police services and the ratio of calls received to the number

of police or vehicles deployed and similar useful information. But, in the highly important "service" role upon which all western police forces seem to expend a large part of their resources, this inevitable statistical emphasis on the number of calls received and the speed with which they are handled can tend to trap the police manager into a very re-active posture. This does nothing to ascertain the root cause of a particular trouble-spot by concentrating the efforts of police and other social agencies on e.g. a "problem family" responsible for a high number of calls for police assistance. The essential visit to the house may be the one made when no emergency is in progress. Then, perhaps, an opportunity can be taken more calmly to assess what, if anything can be done. In other words, the availability of more accurate and detailed records of calls for police service should in every organization lead to careful analysis of the sources and nature of those calls and the development of pro-active strategies to be implemented under non-emergency conditions. The police task is thus not complete when the statistics have been compiled, indeed, the creative management options are more likely to begin then.

In the same vein the challenge of the police computer is to find new things for it to do. If it is simply to be more efficiently loaded with the same sort of information that was previously kept on the much less efficient manual card indexes then again, an important resource will not achieve anything like its full potential. Computerized lists of stolen property including stolen motor vehicles (especially when interfaced with official registries of vehicles maintained by government bodies) makes the task of dealing with the theft of readily identifiable property a great deal easier than it ever was in the past. But the essential point to bear in mind is that it is still the police dealing with, e.g. vehicle thefts, i.e. something which they have done since the invention of the motor car. It does not necessarily open up new vistas or add anything to police capability to deal with, for example, categories 5 and 6 of Radzinowicz's so-called "new physiognomy of crime". Indeed, to the extent that scarce resources

are increasingly engaged in the more effective enforcement of vehicle theft there will be a tendency to do even less in other areas. Thus, it has been said,

"By 1980 criminals may well estimate their chances by the number of police patrols they pass on the road; the anonymity of the car driver is nearly over."<sup>58</sup>

But the danger is that better policing of traditional areas of concern will simply increase the imbalance of enforcement with which the early part of this paper was concerned. Most references to the new technology tend to stress only the better enforcement of overt predatory crime. For example, in dealing with electronic surveillance techniques, a recent writer claims that,

"Correctly used in selected areas over a period of a week, they have produced a 100% haul of criminals attempting break-ins."<sup>59</sup>

This is not to disparage enforcement against overt predatory crime merely to highlight the problem of using the new technology exclusively to increase police effectiveness in one area to the detriment of others which have an equally valid claim for consideration.

#### CONCLUSION

The quality of work done probably varies inversely with the amount of work undertaken. If a cost-conscious public purse requires the police to produce voluminous figures of, for example, service calls undertaken or arrests made in order to justify police budgets then it is clear that there will be a greatly increased danger of "quantity" in all cases pushing out "quality". To introduce the quality element into our measures of "work done", questions will have to be asked about what, if any, analysis of calls is being undertaken and with what result; what, if any, use is being made of computers to police areas which were not traditionally policed with any degree of regularity or success by prior methods. The "numbers game"

which has been so effective in distorting police attention to overt predatory crime will have the same tendency in the "service" role too. The challenge for the police is to break out of that re-active strategy into a more broadly-based system. It must not be too readily assumed that there is no public demand for such a change because that is another question which is seldom scientifically determined.<sup>60</sup> The studies in Canada, England and the U.S.A. which usually show that the public are broadly "satisfied" with the police, and, relative to other public institutions, "very satisfied", must not be used to breed complacency and resistance to change.

The call for "productivity" must not result in a headlong rush simply to produce more of the same for the same price. Any proposals for a research strategy must include serious attention being paid to police powers and investigative capability in major fraud and corruption situations and to the exploitation of new technology by undertaking tasks which traditional policing, by necessity or design, left untouched.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Book VIII, p. 229.
2. Grant, A.: Towards a Model for Police Management Training (1977) 19 Crim. Law Quarterly 291 at 292-296.
3. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Book XV, at p. 185.
4. Engstad, P.: Environmental Opportunities and the Ecology of Crime in "Crime in Canadian Society" (Silverman and Teevan, Eds.) Butterworths of Canada (1975) at p. 193.
5. J.W. Mohr: Facts, Figures, Perceptions and Myths: Ways of Describing and Understanding Crime, in "Crime in Canadian Society", Butterworths of Canada (Silverman and Teevan, Eds.) (1975) at p. 57.

6. Ideology and Crime (1966) Heinemann Educational Books, London, at pp. 98 and 99.
7. See, John A. Mack, The Crime Industry (1975), Saxon House, at pp. 10 and 55.
8. Radzinowicz, op. cit., fn. 6, p.90.
9. See, e.g., Criminal Statistics, England and Wales (1975), H.M.S.O., Cmd. 6566 (Issued July 1976), over 75% of homicides occur when the victim knows the principal suspect which, in part, accounts for the high detection rate.
10. Radzinowicz, op. cit., 'fn. 6, pp.63, 64 points out that the phrase has gained currency in every major language ("Dunkelziffer" say the Germans, "le chiffre noir" and "il ciffro nero" the French and Italians").
11. Dirty Money by Thurston Clarke and John J. Tighe Jr. (1975) Millington Books, London, is an excellent account of how the vast legal movements of funds through the world banking system is used to cloak the relatively smaller, illegal deals.
12. Report of the Royal Commission on Standards of Conduct in Public Life (1974-76) (Lord Salmon) Cmmd. 6524 H.M.S.O. (1976) outlines the existing machinery for dealing with fraud and corruption in the U.K. and makes many recommendations for improved investigation and detection strategies (see especially paras 80, 86, 88 and paras 258, 269-286). See also p. 111-116 on the role of the income tax authorities in reporting suspected corruption. The Commissioners were divided in their views of this topic.

13. The Times Newspaper 16/3/78 p.5 quoting Mr. Martin Wright - Director, Howard League for Penal Reform.
14. The Police and the Public (1975) Harper & Row (Publishers), p.69.
15. Times Newspaper op. cit. fn. 11.
16. A general collection of such writings is contained in: Critical Criminology (Taylor, Walton, Young, Eds) (1975) Routledge & Kegan Paul (London).
17. Ibid pp. 21, 22.
18. Ibid p. 23.
19. Ibid pp. 30, 31.
20. Ibid pp. 30, 31.
21. W. Von Humboldt: The Sphere and Duties of Government (English Edn. 1854 p. 112) quoted in Radzinowicz, op. cit. fn. 6 at p. 14.
22. Radzinowicz, op. cit., fn. 6 pp. 13, 14.
23. Supra fn. 12.
24. Ibid para 260.
25. Ibid p. 117 at p. 119 para. 8.
26. Emphasis added.
27. Mack: The Crime Industry, op. cit. fn. 7, p. 156.
28. Clarke & Tigue: Dirty Money, op. cit. fn. 11, p. 203.

29. See e.g. Lewis R.: A Force for the Future: The role of the police over the next ten years. (Temple Smith, London)(1976) p. 232 where the policy of the Scotland Yard Fraud Squad is discussed.
30. Clarke & Tigue, op. cit. fn. 11, p. 182.
31. Lewis R.: op. cit. fn. 29 at pp. 162, 163.
32. Lewis R.: op. cit. fn. 29, p. 37 shows the growing range of agencies so employed in the U.K.
33. T.A. Critchley, The Idea of Policing in Britain: Success or Failure? in "The Police We Deserve" (Alderson and Stead, Eds.) Wolfe Publishing (1973) p. 31.
34. Ibid., p. 36.
35. Op. cit. fn. 14, p. 63.
36. Law and Order Reconsidered (1970) Praeger Publishers Inc. Sahid, Stang (Eds.)).
37. Op. cit. fn. 14, pp.65,66.
38. Report of the Inquiry into Red Lion Square Disorders, Cmmd. 5919 (1975). For an "alternative" view of the police handling of this demonstration see Gilbert T.: "Only One Died" (1975), Kay Beauchamp (London).

39. Arrowsmith v. Jenkins (1963) 2 Q.B. 561 and Griffith J.A.G.: The Politics of the Judiciary (1977) Fontana Books, p. 84. Judicial decisions "supportive" of the police do not necessarily make for easier police-public relations. See, e.g. Grant: "The Supreme Court of Canada and the Police 1970-1976", 20 *Crim. Law Quarterly* 152-166. (1978).
40. Lewis, R., *op. cit.* fn. 29, p. 95.
41. Robertson, G.; "Reluctant Judas: The Life and Death of the Special Branch Informer, Kenneth Lennon" (1976) Maurice Temple-Smith (London).
42. Police Journal (October-December) 1974.
43. Lewis, R., *op. cit.* fn. 29, p. 173.
44. Psychology and Police Work, in The Police We Deserve (Alderson and Stead, Eds.), p. 93 at 100.
45. *Ibid.* See also Cain, M.: Society and the Policeman's Role (1973) Routledge and Kegan, Paul p. 182 where, in answer to a questionnaire, police officers identified "decisiveness", amongst other categories, they considered to be necessary in superiors.
46. Stansfield, W., Being a Chief Constable in The Police We Deserve p. 90, *op. cit.* fn. 33.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Policing a Perplexed Society (1977), Geo. Allen & Unwin p. 42.

49. Articles by Dr. Tobias on this problem appear in The Police Journal 1972 (October-December) 1973 (April-June) and 1974 (October-December).
50. These problems are discussed in more detail in Grant: Some Reflections on Police Education and Training in Canada, 18 Crim. Law Quarterly pp. 218-234 (1976).
51. Radzinowicz, op. cit. fn. 6, pp. 65, 66.
52. Paraphrased.
53. Sutherland, E.H.: White Collar Crime (first published 1949), 1961 Edn. with preface by Dr. Cressey.
54. Sutherland E.H.: The Professional Thief (1937) U. of Chicago Press, p. 229.
55. Criminal Organization (1972), Heinemann Educational Books Ltd. p. 101.
56. Douglas J.W.B. et al (1966) Delinquency and Social Class, Brit. J. of Crim. Vol. 6 Pt-3 pp. 294-302; American Friends Service Committee (1971) Struggle for Justice; Task Force Report on Corrections; Pres. Com. on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967) p. 3.
57. Lewis, R.: A Force for the Future, op. cit. fn. 29, p. 218.
58. Ibid., p. 242.
59. Ibid., p. 248.
60. See footnote 14 for details of an excellent attempt to ask the public somewhat more penetrating questions than whether they are "satisfied" with the police.

QUESTION PERIOD - DAY 2

FIRST QUESTION PERIOD

After the presentations made by Supt. R.N. Heywood and Prof. A. Grant, the first question from the floor was asked by Insp. B. Adam and addressed to Prof. Grant: "In your discussion of non-violent crime, from sophisticated crime down to petty crime, you quoted statistics from the U.K. and from the U.S. where many regulatory agencies have been established. Is the same thing occurring in Canada as is occurring in the U.S. and the U.K.?"

Prof. Grant indicated that, according to him, it was worse in Canada, because at least in the U.S. and the U.K., somebody was doing something about non-violent crime. Canada has, overall, not created investigative detective devices, nor specialists who should be in charge of the "sophisticated" non-violent crimes, while the other countries, at least, have done that. However, he indicated that the advantage for Canada is that it is still able to produce an investigative detective capability which can enter the field more effectively by involving policemen on a broader base. The danger for England and the U.S., he pointed out, is that they have already taken steps to deal with non-violent crime without always involving the police and this could be a drawback. Prof. Grant commented further that in Canada the Commercial Crime Squad and the R.C.M. Police are doing fabulous work which they were not doing three years ago, but the present known population of non-violent property criminals is

still not representative of those committing non-violent crime in our society; one of the many reasons for that, he feels, is the form of investigative detective devices which Canada has chosen to use to deal with non-violent property crime. Insp. Adam queried: "If the police in Canada, not just the RCMP, but any other police force, were to involve themselves to the extent that you advocate, would we not then be coming to a state that would be very highly controlled, and where the public and private lives of citizens would be infiltrated even more than they are now by a very sophisticated force?"

Prof. Grant replied that it was interesting that the only way one can get policemen concerned about civil and individual liberty and rights was to start talking of detective devices that might actually be used against people that they know as friends; he commented that in general the degree to which one becomes concerned about civil liberties is proportional to the degree that one thinks investigative devices which are created might one day be used against one.

The next question from the floor was asked by Mr. Al Evelyn, of the Metro Toronto Police Association. "Prof. Grant, you speak about the academic standards of the recruits; you were a recruit yourself and you became an academic. Why didn't you stay and how do forces keep people like you on the force?"

In his reply, Prof. Grant commented that in his new book on the future of policing, Roy Lewis stated that it is a good thing there is

a high wastage in the English police because that way the wrong people leave. Prof. Grant than explained that his reason for leaving was that he felt he was the wrong person to be in policing. He found himself asking questions about his job constantly and this created difficult professional problems for him. He stated that troublemakers are not liked in organizations like the police, that if one keeps saying to his chief superintendent, "I don't really understand why this is being done this way", and one keeps it up long enough, eventually one knows that although he is the youngest chief inspector on the force, he is going to be the oldest chief inspector. Since he left the London Police Force seven or eight years ago he has still been in contact with police and police have let him come and tell them what he thinks ought to be changed, although some would not talk to him. Prof. Grant concluded that people leave the police because traditional police forces are structured in such a way that some people don't fit in. Not only the wrong people leave, as Lewis said, but also those who try to promote change.

Mr. Burrows of the Home Office wondered what options were open to the police, He accepted, on the one hand, that new technology which is at present focusing on traditional areas of policing would create an imbalance in enforcement, but on the other hand, investigating fraud as suggested by Prof. Grant would become such a specialized activity that the detectives would have to spend most of their time being trained at the university; they would become a new type of policeman. Mr. Burrows asked Prof. Grant if he felt it would be possible to encompass

that sort of work within the normal range of activity of the average force.

Prof. Grant not only agreed that we would get a different type of policeman, but said that we should be aiming towards a new kind of policeman. In this regard, what Supt. Heywood said in his presentation is important, because, if we can have some policemen doing community policing and taking care of problems which create lots of crimes, then we can release other police to do more sophisticated things. Community policing may be a start toward a new kind of police. He warned that as long as traditional forces overuse technology, there would be no progress towards community policing as described by Supt. Heywood. In answer to Mr. Burrows' specific question, Prof. Grant said that it is harder to conceptualize a police force capable of handling such a spectrum of activities in Canada, where many police forces are small, but he felt that the detective function should be better used as detectives are now under-used and misused.

Ted Zaharchuk, from Decision Dynamics Corporation, asked Supt. Heywood whether he could comment on the kind of constraints and problems he had to overcome when implementing team policing, and the kind of inhibitions that exist in the ranks as well as at management levels. He wondered how Supt. Heywood implemented the transformation of police resources.

Supt. Heywood explained that when he shifted to a community-based policing model and changed the role of the detectives quite substantially, from follow-up investigative work to an intelligence-

centred targeting approach at the local General Investigative Services section level, there was a lot of anxiety among those detectives whose role was being changed. Consultations and discussions were extensively used to alleviate anxieties. It was pointed out to them that there was a segment of the criminal community that they were not touching. After examining the B & E reports, they realized that the expert and sophisticated criminals in the community were being left largely untouched. It was decided that this area had to be penetrated. Consequently, a better intelligence base to work from was necessary and policemen were trained especially to handle these criminals. As they started to succeed they gradually shifted their focus upwards in the criminal strata of the community. The level of satisfaction increased as they were now arresting people who cost a lot of money to the community. There are now four or five detectives who are at the university on a part-time basis. Before some patrolmen were at university, but no detectives. Supt. Heywood stressed the fact that once the anxiety about their new role was reduced, the training process became incremental as they were moving gently into their new role. For example, Supt. Heywood explained that during stage one, they talked about getting into the public schools, which was seen at the time as being very superficial. The issue was raised as to why should police be going to the schools. In terms of team policing, Supt. Heywood explained that schools can be seen as an industry where there are 1800 teachers that have regular face-to-face contact and involvement with 30,000 young people, who are the kind of people causing 50% of the problems that police are wrestling with. The

teachers have the teaching responsibility, the policemen have the policing responsibility, but they can rub shoulders. They have the same clientele to a large extent. It was felt that police and teachers could cooperate. Going into the schools was not perceived any longer as only a public relations job. It was a conscious approach to work with a big community industry, that is, accepting the environment we are dealing with. Gradually constables became less and less nervous about interacting with teachers. The first year, it was done on a voluntary basis. The policemen who were a bit more self-confident went ahead and did it. The second year more demand was put on the policemen who didn't want to do it, and now, it is not negotiable; now, it is an integral part of their task. In terms of team policing, Supt. Heywood stressed, part of the policemen's role is to use the attributes of the community to try and control the crime problem. This state is reached as a result of team meetings, of discussion of what police are trying to do in the zone, of working out a whole total approach and getting comfortable with it; making policemen become self-confident was the key, and as they become successful they get turned on by it.

Dr. Zaharchuk asked one more question of Supt. Heywood: "Do you have any confidence that community policing, with an emphasis on crime prevention and interface with the community, is going to work?"

Supt. Heywood commented that whether it will work was not really the question. The question is how well can one make it work.

He said that it will work only if management has a good grasp of the philosophy behind it, can articulate it, can persevere with it, and can refine it; but management cannot go ahead with it just because it is fashionable. Police administrators who do not have an understanding of the philosophy of the sort of growth that has to occur will be getting nervous when traditional controls start to break down and they will rush back to the old style of policing because they cannot really handle the new style. Supt. Heywood cautioned police managers that the new policing style was tougher to manage unless one had a commitment, was ready to run some risks, and to grow with the organization; he stressed again, that one must have a good grasp of the philosophy behind it.

Prof. Grant commented that the question "Is it going to work?" indicated to him a fundamental difference between what Dr. Zaharchuk must have been thinking about, and what he felt he was thinking about. He claimed that according to him there is no final solution, i.e., a solution to a problem generates the next generation of problems. In this sense, nothing ever works, but in another sense, one could say, "I can come up with something which I am going to try to work with and correct as I go along and it is implemented." Prof. Grant stated that he believes that one has to look a problem in an evolutionary way, that one progresses from one generation of problems to the next,

The Chairperson asked Supt. Heywood whether he could describe the negotiations and responsibility-setting exercises that he engaged in with the tavern and beer parlour owners in the community.

Supt. Heywood replied that the first step was to recognize the kind of problems emanating from liquor outlets in the community. The liquor industry had to recognize that they were creating problems, and that because they were operating in the community they had certain responsibilities to function within certain acceptable standards. The police examined what the owners did to control and manage their environment, such as seating arrangements, number of people permitted on the premises, etc. They also looked at the training the bartenders and floor walkers had: they only learned how to use their money changer; they didn't get trained in how to cool down a situation or how to manage a crisis; nor did they learn about their rights and responsibilities; about how much authority they have under the Act; about what kind of force they could use and how to use it judicially. This, he felt, is not a responsible situation. The liquor industry didn't put the amount of effort into managing their environment as they should have. The structure of the environment and the security features of the liquor outlets were examined and suggestions were made in order to prevent further problems. A committee has been set up to develop training seminars for the beer parlour operators, performance in night clubs have also been monitored. The whole program involving liquor outlets has really had an impact on the number of calls received by the police.

In spite of the interest of the participants in pursuing this and other issues, Workshop Chairperson, Peter Engstad, announced that regretfully the time allotted for the first discussion period had elapsed.

THE ROLE OF RESEARCH IN MAXIMIZING  
POLICE PRODUCTIVITY

by

*George L. Kelling*

*Evaluation Field Staff Director  
Police Foundation  
Washington, D.C.*

In Ibsen's play PEER GYNT there is a powerful scene in which Peer, distraught over his life and how he has lived it, finds himself sitting in an onion patch. As he ponders, he picks up an onion, looks at it, thinks about it, and decides that if he can understand that onion, he can understand himself. So, carefully he examines it. Slowly he takes off the outer layer, then the next - and the next, and the next, and so on until he comes to the final layer. And Peer feels existential "angst." He has searched out his self and found neither core nor heart, just one layer after the other.

There are a variety of ways one can approach this story. Ibsen clearly was telling us something about his energetic and robust character, Peer Gynt. The story had psychological, philosophical and religious meanings. Yet if I were to approach Peer not from a psychological, philosophical or theological point of view, but rather from the point of a researcher, my response to him would be something like this "Peer hold on a minute. I understand what motivates you to do this. Further, I understand what predisposes you to look at yourself so harshly. You, at times, have been a nasty fellow. But consider, maybe you have picked the wrong indicators. Maybe the onion has nothing at all to do with the character you've been in the past, the way you are now, or will be in the future. It may well be that your choice of an onion as an

indicator of the nature of your soul misleads you about the past, confuses you about the present, and most seriously, because you still have options in the future, prescribes nothing about the future. You see, Peer, this is terribly important. If you're wrong about the indicators, you're wrong about your understanding of yourself, and you will learn nothing which will help you in the future."

As important I think it is that Peer chose the right indicators, I must confess that the problem for us here at this conference is even more complex. You see, Peer, or Ibsen had an idea of the heart or soul for which he searched. I don't think we do. When we talk of maximizing productivity (getting at the heart of things, if you will) we beg the question. I know what we have chosen as indicators, and I know the myths that research has destroyed in policing, but I really don't know what police productivity is, to use another literary example, it's as if we have written and published Volume 2 of a series prior to publishing volume one. Volume 2 deals with maximizing productivity. Volume one should have dealt with defining just what productivity is.

I've been in this business for ten years now and I don't know what good measures of police productivity are. I can think of no single indicator of productivity that is not seriously flawed. And I know that if you add up a lot of flawed indicators, the result is one large flawed measure<sup>1</sup>. I'm bothered by this, but only slightly. I suppose that in this age of diminishing resources and emphasis on getting more out of the dollar, pound, whatever, I ought to be more concerned about the quality of the measures and about productivity itself. But even as I think about it, I find myself mentally balking. I find myself thinking, productivity for what? Efficiency for what? Do these manufacturing terms fit policing? Are arrests a product? Are lack of arrests a product? We use the term "arrest productivity". The word productivity implies something positive. Is making arrests desirable? When? Sometimes? Arrest who? Always?

What is the difference between a good arrest and a bad arrest? - The

arresting process? Who is arrested? The offense?

You answer, "Well, some arrests are good by some standards, bad by others, irrelevant by yet others." But how do you aggregate them into a measure of arrest productivity either for individual officers or departments? Is the officer who makes 19 arrests better than the officer who makes none? You answer, "Well that depends on the arrests and the non-arrests." I agree. But how does that translate into productivity measures of use to organizations? I, as a researcher, can send out observers, have them observe and describe both the arrests and non-arrests (offense, offender, process, etc.) and make certain judgments and - can perhaps conclude that both officers were very productive.

"O.K." you say. "Arrests are mixed. But let's take citizen satisfaction. Clearly having satisfied citizens is a desirable goal." True. That assumes however a casual link between good police services and citizen satisfaction. At times that may well be true. At other times however, it may well not be. I suspect that during the Boston School Busing strike several years ago, the level of citizen satisfaction with the police by a good share of citizens consuming those services, black and white, was very low. Does that mean the service was poor? There are many citizens who would be just delighted if police would stop blacks from going to particular schools or buying in certain neighborhoods - maybe even a majority. You respond "Good police handling would be evenhanded enforcement of the law." Try to translate that into an organizationally measurable productivity indicator. The same could be said for almost every measure of productivity. The FBI Uniform Crime Reports, although perhaps now better processed, remain bad data. And bad data are not better than no data at all. At least when one has no data one knows one doesn't know. But even if they were accurate, are we still willing, with all we have come to know about police and crime, to see variations in crime mainly attributed to individual or organizational police behavior? Charges, as a measure, can vary independently of police action. Number of summonses served is trivial. Preventive patrol frequency and response time are process variables not outputs. (I will talk more about these two indicators later). The point is, police

productivity is a very mixed and confusing issue. It is not clear what it is to be productive or, beyond that, how to measure it. The need is to define productivity before debating the appropriateness or quality of its measures. But, frighteningly, we will tend to do what we can count.

The issue in policing is not simply one of "productivity" but what kind of productivity. This became increasingly apparent as we produced the Kansas City preventive patrol study and had to cope with contributing to the shattering of one of the major myths of policing. Let me discuss that briefly. The preventive model of policing, which presently dominates in the United States, came about as a result of the progressive reform movement in the cities<sup>2</sup> and was abetted by technological developments. Out of fear that police activities would get out of control, proactive police strategies were proscribed by elected officials until well after the start of the 1900's. Prior to this time the police, whether operating from a fixed post or walking a beat, were essentially responsive. After the reform movement began, police became more and more proactive hoping to prevent or deter crime. Out of this came O.W. Wilson's theory of preventive patrol, (which attempted to create the impression of police omnipresence), special units such as vice, tactical and ultimately S.W.A.T., and arrest oriented rapid response to calls for service. The goals police articulated for these strategies included criminal apprehension, crime prevention and deterrence, reduction of citizen fear, and increased citizen satisfaction with police services. These crime related goals were considered so important by the police that they grumbled about their traditional public service responsibilities, suggesting that public service and crime fighting were dichotomous, and that they could only really solve crime if they could concentrate on it to the exclusion of other responsibilities. Police allocation models more and more emphasized crime. To obtain the crime related goals, the police adopted automobiles, used one and then two-way radios, helicopters (at least one Chief in the U.S. wanted submarines), computers, both to aid dispatch and to predict crime, placed computer terminals in cars, and several cities are now adapting to automatic vehicle locator systems. The preventive model of policing reached its peak in the U.S. during the late 60's and early 70's when the law enforcement

Assistance Administration was not only prepared to pour funds into cities for technological equipment, but on its own initiative was also spending vast sums on equipment such as special vehicles for police. Media focused on the preventive model of policing and other models were rejected as outdated and too expensive (i.e. foot patrol). It was considered axiomatic that the preventive model of policing was, indeed, effective. Belief in this model was so firmly established that only a few voices were heard to question it: those that did were considered incurable unsophisticated romantics longing for long past, pre-modern times. Although there was absolutely no empirical evidence that the preventive model made a difference in those areas the police indicated that it would, preventive patrol was "believed in" in the same sense that others "believed in" psychoanalysis: Good people were doing good things which, given certain assumptions, made sense. It was modern, made use of the latest technology, and, given the use of latest modeling techniques, appeared scientific. (The fact that the complex algorithms were merely mathematical expressions of assumptions, logic, and some extremely rough uncleaned data, made no difference). Police had found their way into the modern technological world. They had their esoteric, often secret, strategies - strategies which "scientifically" allocated officers to beats. The myth of the preventive model had its day.

But it was not only police who believed in these myths. The myths of preventive policing were so pervasively believed that even serious empiricists accepted its efficacy. For many, given that it was accepted that preventive patrol was effective, the only evaluative issue remaining was whether or not the processes of the preventive model were properly executed. Thus, and this operates up to today, police organizations were evaluated, and evaluated themselves, on the basis of short response time. The goal of police was a response time of 3 minutes. Never mind that there was no empirical evidence that short response time was causally related to anything, short response time, because it was logically related to apprehensions, became a measure of police performance. And, by accepting short response time as an indicator of police performance researchers, unwittingly and gullibly, became partners with the police in preserving the status quo. Likewise, serious professional researchers and evaluators, believing in the concept of police omnipresence, seriously suggested that the number of times a patrol car passes a particular place on

a street, be used as an indicator of patrol performance (productivity). Again, never mind the lack of empirical evidence, researchers through their choice of indicators supported occupational myths. In so doing, they unwittingly retarded moves to reform police strategies. Like Peer Gynt they might have chosen the wrong indicators and because of that failed to learn much which was of use in the future. Too often the measurement of what was, came to be thought of as what "ought to be" in policing.

Most of us know what has happened to those police myths over the last decade. Every study of what the police do found that, in spite of their tactical orientation around crime, they continue to spend between 80-85% of their time on public service activities. Proactive patrol is remarkably unproductive of arrests. Preventive patrol has failed to demonstrate its effectiveness. Short response time is unproductive<sup>3</sup>. And I would hypothesize that special units (now under study), in spite of the fact that they might make a significant number of increased arrests, will only be able to do so at financial and organizational costs that will be so great as to be unacceptable. In sum, the preventive model failed to demonstrate its effectiveness and, whether reform is forthcoming or not, it clearly seems called for.

Because the efficacy of preventive patrol could not be demonstrated in Kansas City, we contributed to the destruction of a myth. Think of the alternative, however. Think if preventive patrol had been demonstrated effective. (As defined by the terms in which it was measured, the political push would have been to do more of the same, better; then try to hold back the advocates of more and more anti crime patrol. It's difficult enough to restrain the crime-fighting technocrats even given the myth destruction.) But even if preventive patrol had seemed effective, the research and the response to it would have begged the Volume 1 question of whether preventive patrol is the activity which should occupy the largest amount of police time. There was nothing about the research design which would have permitted the answering of that question or even urged its asking. But because the findings were "negative", some of us have begun to recognize that there are other types of questions to be asked. Do we really want the kind of police agencies which

would result and are resulting from continuing the head long plunge into fire brigade policing?

Essentially the question of what police "ought to do" is a normative rather than empirical question. It has to do with what institutions and people want and how badly they want it. That is, definitions of what the police ought to do can only be arrived at through complex historical, legal, political, and bureaucratic processes. Those processes involve issues of community welfare, power distributions, knowledge of institutional capabilities, cost, human rights, quality of life, and a myriad of others. Furthermore, what the police ought to do is not a "once-and-for-all" issue. It is the best match between current needs which are multiple and not uniform and appropriate police response to those needs. It is an issue that will recur as social needs and/or the articulation of them change. The question of the police role must be viewed within the larger context of what the police can do successfully, at what cost, what they have to do as a result of their legitimate access to force, what other powerful elements in communities insist that they do, what the constitution says government cannot do and what city administration and laws mandate that they must do. That doesn't mean that research is unimportant in this process. It can be very important. Research can be designed to help police think about what they ought to be doing, what citizens actually ask them to do (often that is far different than what citizens abstractly think they should do), how technology impacts on service delivery, in other words what the mix is between needs and performance capacity. Furthermore, research can be designed to determine what police cannot do in terms of legal, attitudinal, and technical constraints. Additionally, research can be designed to compare alternative and perhaps competing police functions. For example, had preventive patrol proved effective in reducing citizen fear or certain kinds of criminal behaviors. It might be far more costly than other activities which might produce the same - or different, but equally desirable goals. It might be too costly in terms of the other types of police services which might have to be foregone in order to increase the productivity of preventive patrol. It is not unlikely that a "floor effect" is operating in a good share of crime normally thought suppressible. If, for example, one were to subtract from the total number of armed robberies,

those in which the victim and offender know each other, those conducted in places inaccessible to the police, and those conducted by skillful professionals, it is not unlikely that the number of remaining suppressible armed robberies is so low that even if we could reduce armed robberies, that is, even if the preventive model was successful, it would be at enormous and perhaps unacceptable cost. In other words, research can be constructed and used to inform the volume I decisions of reformers, the public, administrators and other policy makers. Some of this research will be more difficult, both technically and politically, than research that has been done previously, but it is clearly the case that if research is to have an impact on police productivity in the future, the relatively easy task of myth destruction must be complemented by the more challenging one of assisting to decide just what the police ought to be doing.

Perhaps it would be well at this point to recall what is perhaps the best statement yet in the United States about the police function. Essentially the American Bar Association identified eight objectives of the police.

1. To prevent and control conduct widely recognized as threatening to life and property (serious crime).
2. To aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm, such as the victim of a criminal attack.
3. To protect constitutional guarantees, such as the right of free speech and assembly.
4. To facilitate the movement of people and vehicles.
5. To assist those who cannot care for themselves: The intoxicated, the addicted, the mentally ill, the physically disabled, the old, and the young.
6. To resolve conflict, whether it be between individuals, groups of individuals, or individuals and their government.
7. To identify problems that have the potential for becoming more serious problems for the individual citizen, for the police, or for government.
8. To create and maintain a feeling of security in the community<sup>4</sup>.

The advantage of listing these functions is that it helps understand just how skewed research has been in policing. If we think about most of the major studies of policing over the past 5 years, the Rand Investigative Study, The Kansas City Study, The Response Study, The Wilmington Split Force Study, it becomes apparent that most of it is preoccupied with the crime functions

of the police. Is it not the case that we ought to be equally interested in the protection of constitutional (or other) guarantees? Conflict Resolution? Problem identification? The assistance of those who cannot care for themselves? (The recent decriminalization of drunkenness in the United States begs for study. Since the police are the agency which must do something when something must be done, it would be fascinating to understand how the police are now fulfilling this function). Yet remarkably little is being done in these areas which are **central** to contemporary urban life. When I think of the kind of society most of us live in and ask of myself what the police ought to do to make cities work, what comes into my mind is that one of the key characteristics of cities is that most of a person's interaction are with strangers. That's part of the very nature of cities. And for the most part, those interactions are remarkably smooth. People go about their business in highly predictable ways. In spite of rhetoric to the contrary, city streets are almost astonishingly civil. Essentially people follow the rules. Occasionally some don't. Most often the result is only a minor annoyance or slight embarrassment. At times it leads to conflict. On rare occasions it's threatening and dangerous. In my view we look to the police as that agency that provides the grease to make the city work. They are there to establish civility when the rules begin to break down. They are there, in part, to manage the interactions amongst strangers. For the most part they do this informally, using their moral authority and capitalizing on the fact that almost everyone is prepared to respond civilly to police managing. But try to measure these crucial activities organizationally.

The point is that little or no attention has been given to measuring productivity in non-crime related activities. That fact alone has the organizational consequence of encouraging officers and departments to ignore non-crime related activities because they are unrecognized, not evaluated, and subsequently not rewarded. We can be certain that officers and departments will tend to drift towards recognized and rewarded activities.

As is evident from this paper, it is my feeling that much of our efforts in the area of productivity has been (forgive me) unproductive and often counter-productive. Elsewhere (Kelling 1978) I have suggested that police declare a 10 year moratorium on the use of technology and that police and researchers should concentrate hard on learning just what it is the police should - and can - do. While I would not go that far regarding productivity, I would like to suggest a modest moratorium on the application of crime related productivity measures. Meantime we should concentrate very hard on what it is the police do, what the police should do, not do, how much it costs, and further refine our measurement techniques.

In closing I would like to make a few comments about policing in the United States. Although policing is notoriously decentralized in the United States, it was, in the past, remarkably monolithic on a national level. The International Association of Chiefs of Police, enjoying a cozy relationship with J. Edgar Hoover's FBI, spoke for the police. Up until recently, that was that. Those circumstances have radically changed. The Unions, especially the International Conference of Police Associations, more and more are behaving as truly national unions, and are legitimately speaking out on policing issues. LEAA, after long struggles to establish an identity, has found research focus through the National Institute which is now funding quality basic research into police activities, including the recently published response time and split force studies. The Police Foundation has emerged as a respected, if, at times, controversial voice in policing, and of special interest to us here, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) has formed. That group, made up of approximately 50 chiefs of large cities, has become an exciting forum for debating research ideas, and is conducting its own research. The point is that policing is in a time of rich debate and professional pluralism in the U.S. That bodes well for reform. At the same time, however, the reform chief remains in a difficult, professionally dangerous position.

A good share of them are only a few years away from having requested computer aided dispatch, supported the move to 911 systems, etc, and find themselves caught by the discoveries of the past 3-4 years. For them, it

means they adhered to the wisdom of the field (which many of us supported and/or accepted) and now find the supports for that wisdom undermined. Given that we have taught the public to support low response time preventive patrol, etc. It is more than just slightly tempting for chiefs to continue to use those strategies as an accepted placebo. We should be quite certain in our own minds that our research findings will have important consequences, even, and perhaps most certainly, for those chiefs who really attempt to "bite the bullet". In the future, we must be extremely cautious regarding our empirical work and how it is used. In my judgment we have been too ready to accept many of the myths of policing and have, unwittingly helped chiefs get themselves out on a very dangerous limb.

I am afraid that unless we are more careful and thoughtful than in the past, many chiefs who have been supportive of research in the past (not to mention those who have always been antagonistic to research), will respond to us as a Turkish official responded to a request from the English archaeologist Layard for vital statistics:

My illustrious friend and joy of my lover  
The thing you ask of me is both difficult  
and useless. Although I have passed all my days  
in this place, I have neither counted the houses  
nor have I inquired into the number of inhabitants;  
and as to what one person loads on his mules and  
the other stows away in the bottom of his ship,  
That is no business of mine. But, above all, as  
To the previous history of this city, God only knows  
The amount of dirt and confusion that the infidels  
May have eaten before the coming of the sword of Islam.  
It were unprofitable for us to inquire into it.  
O my Soul! O my Lamb! Seek not after the  
things which concern thee not. Thou comest unto  
us and we welcomed thee; go in peace.

FOOTNOTES

1. I am not encouraging single measures by saying this. Multiple measures avoid the perverse effect of the intensity of the application of just one measure.
2. See Robert M. Fogelson Big-City Police, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1977.
3. For a more detailed discussion of the empirical studies in this area, see George L. Kelling "Police Field Services and Crime: The Presumed Effects of a Capacity" in Crime and Delinquency Vol. 24, Number 2, April 1978, pp 173-184.
4. Taken from Herman Goldstein: Policing in a Free Society, Ballinger Publishing Co., Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. 35.

QUESTION PERIOD - DAY 2

SECOND QUESTION PERIOD

In his address, Dr. Kelling had mentioned that although Prof. Grant's presentation was provocative, well-done, and interesting, he felt that the emphasis was wrong, and dangerous for the future of policing because it focused on crime and on police as crime fighters, not on police services. The Chairperson, Peter Engstad, asked Prof. Grant to respond to Dr. Kelling's statement.

Prof. Grant conceded that he not only had focused on crime, but a very narrow area of crime. However, he didn't intend his presentation to be an overview of his position. He wished to stress again that the police do not deal very much with business crime and he felt that as long as we arrest people and process them through the criminal justice system, we have to be concerned with fairness and justice and whether the prison population is representative of criminals. In the case of murder, rape, or robbery, the distribution of people who commit those crimes in society is probably much more fairly represented by the type of people who are in custody for those crimes, since they cut across all kinds of social, educational, and cultural indicators. He reiterated that when considering the area of non-violent property crime, there is a great discrepancy between the kind of investigative detective resources available to society to answer that challenge and the results which are obtained, and a colossal disparity between the prison population of those convicted of

those crimes and number of individuals who actually commit those crimes. Prof. Grant explained that he chose that area today to emphasize that he sees it as a very important factor in the dark figure of crime. He feels that the day we turn a blind eye to questions like fairness, justice and distribution between those who do things which we say are wrong and those who pay penalties for doing those things, then we will be playing into the hands of those who argue that the form of political economy which exists in Western society is itself to blame and is intrinsically wrong. Prof. Grant emphasized that it was one of the responsibilities of the people in the criminal justice system and researchers to address those political and philosophical issues of fairness and justice.

Dr. Kelling commented that some of Prof. Grant's concerns demonstrated that statistics on arrests did not say anything about the quality of police departments. Statistics on arrests do not say anything on productivity: "Counting bad data is worse than not counting at all." "Arrest productivity" is often used but shouldn't be; it doesn't say anything about what police departments are doing. Dr. Kelling mentioned that he was speaking for himself, not for the Police Foundation which does publish statistics on arrests.

Prof. Peter Manning, of Michigan State University, said he shared Dr. Kelling's feelings about the misconstrued views of statistics of crime, but he wondered about the implications of Dr. Kelling's statement. He commented that Dr. Kelling's point of view was not necessarily conflicting with Prof. Grant's view, but it was rather a

question of emphasis. Prof. Manning then asked two questions of Dr. Kelling. First, what sort of change in structure or in operations follow what you have said in terms of your desired mode of policing? Secondly, are not police in general caught in a bind where they have a mandate which at the moment demands that they focus on their crime activities regardless of whatever else they do?

Dr. Kelling replied that police have helped put themselves in that dilemma. There is no empirical evidence that crime has gone up in the U.S., he said. It has always been the case in history that there were places which were not safe. If one thinks of London back in the mid 1850's there was a time when people did not want to go into some areas of the city during the day, even with armed guards. Crime is nothing new in history, but we manufactured public expectations for safe streets, and having manufactured those expectations, we have to live up to them. The police get the blame if the expectations are not met. It has developed into an industry and now we are stuck with it. Dr. Kelling suggested that we could choose to believe the opposite. We could choose to believe that crime has not gone up as much as everyone says it has and try to change public expectations regarding safety in public streets. The streets are never going to be completely safe. With regard to the structural changes which might be necessary if this position regarding policing was to be adopted, Dr. Kelling said he didn't know what they should be, that the question was not resolved, but that many people were struggling with it. He indicated, however, that the police should capitalize on the fact that people want the police; that even in the U.S., even in the

black areas in the U.S., the amount of public support for the police is incredibly high. Citizens want more police presence as the preventive patrol study and some other small replications of it have shown. However, there are some studies that suggest that what we have done is decrease rather than increase police presence through the use of cars, i.e., we have decreased the amount of perceived police presence. Citizens feel it is great to have police on the street, but many police officers in the United States have lost their street skills. Police are really afraid of streets, and unless they are forced out of their cars, they will not go out. Citizens cannot choose routes where they know the police will be. Dr. Kelling made clear that he was not arguing for foot patrol per se, but that he was stressing that police strategy that started with O.W. Wilson and wound up with Larson and Elliott, in which being in a car is an end in itself, has not paid off. He felt that we know, if nothing else, that we can take police out of their cars for that uncommitted time that they have, and that they can do something in the streets during that time. What can they do? They can talk to people, make them feel that police care, make them feel they are there.

Insp. A. Oosthoek addressed his question to both Dr. Kelling and Prof. Grant. He specified that he was involved both in academia and in the practical business of looking at police management. He explained that he was worried that change might cause damage as well as improvements and wondered how one could decide rationally about steps that should be taken to minimize damage to the protection and safety of the community as well as to minimize damage criminals are capable of doing.

Dr. Kelling explained that, as it was implied in his paper, he thought that police chiefs and police executives were out on a limb. He said that when he works with police chiefs in the U.S., he works very carefully, very quietly. He works behind the scene and says what he has to say very privately. He knows that there are real problems in terms of how to educate politicians and city managers about public expectations. He mentioned that the survival among reform chiefs in the U.S. is very, very low. It seems to him that the issue is how can we carefully and slowly start educating the public about what police can do and can't do. There is empirical evidence that citizens respond to that very well. In the Wilmington study of response time, for example, they found that if you consult citizens carefully, give them explanations and tell them what to expect, they accept it. He said he felt that the public, in terms of expectations, were probably ahead of the police. The police have to state more what they can and what they can't do; for that reason unions have to be involved as well. Police have to start educating the public, but first they have to start educating themselves. For instance, many studies have been conducted on preventive patrol, but there is not one shread of empirical evidence that it works. When we talk about police productivity, we must know that arrest does not mean anything, we must know that clearance rates mean practically nothing, and crime rates do not mean a great deal, because nobody knows exactly what they represent. Dr. Kelling concluded that reforming police departments is not easy, and that

reform chiefs do not last long. The press and the unions are often against them.

Chief R.F. Lunney commented that when he came to the Workshop he expected to talk about the measurement of police productivity which is an urgent matter because of budget constraints. His department will be asked how it measures what it is doing. It does not use crime statistics -- haven't used them for three years -- but to tell city council that one should be talking about the role of police does not work either.

Dr. Kelling said in response that his only answer was not to lie to oneself. Chief Lunney continued that the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada has been studying the role of the police for eight years and although it is making progress, it still hasn't produced anything helpful for budget purposes. During those eight years, police departments have had to produce a budget every year. Chief Lunney expressed his regrets that he had not heard more about productivity measurement. He felt that he had nothing to take back home.

Dr. Kelling replied that according to him it would be an artificial security blanket to suggest that hard indicators of police productivity really exist, and that while he felt that some data ought to be given to city managers, one almost had to educate them about what citizens want and how they respond.

Dr. J. Hogarth from the University of British Columbia Law School commented that he found Dr. Kelling's analysis compelling, that he agreed with him that there had been an over-emphasis on enforcement and

preventive patrol and that more resources should be spent on maintenance and the service role of the police; but he asked Dr. Kelling to consider some of the implications of what he was asking for. On the one hand, if those roles were to be sold to the public it could be a way of increasing police budgets. It is true that other agencies and committee groups have "copped out" in terms of their responsibilities in order maintenance and conflict resolution in the community. On the other hand, Dr. Hogarth wondered if it was wise for the police and police researchers, by emphasizing those particular roles, to encourage the public to believe that the police can solve those kinds of problems in any fundamental sense. He warned that we may be providing, under the guise of police services, a kind of third rate social service for people that ought to be provided in some other way. Are we not in danger, to put it another way, he continued, of becoming a police state? Dr. Hogarth felt that one of the implications of having problems in a social service and order maintenance areas defined as police problems was that almost inevitably researchers will come to the conclusion that the police should be better trained to deal with those kinds of problems. Secondly, almost inevitably certain organizational dilemmas at the community level will be pointed out in terms of emergency conflict, collaboration, calling for the sharing of more and more information on individuals between the police and non-police social agencies, so that the kind of pro-active role of those two areas can be done more effectively. The consequences of some of the

political values Dr. Kelling addressed as being essential and important might be undermined by that kind of development.

Dr. Kelling responded that the fact that they want police officers to be trained in first aid does not mean that one is trying to replace the medical profession. The police are quite often going to be the people that are called upon when there are various kinds of problems, whatever the problems might be. What one is doing is training the police to handle crisis situations and conflicts, and to handle them so that they don't get any worse. Dr. Kelling did not feel the police should follow up and provide complete services or therapy services, although they might want some feedback. However, he pointed out that he had to recognize that people call the police because police have the authority to carry a gun (at least in the U.S.), they have the legitimate use of force, and they can do something about most problems. As long as they (the people) have an agency to call when something needs to be done, one has to give the agency people skills to manage those circumstances, and to deal with problems. This, he said, shouldn't imply a violation of civil rights.

Dr. Kelling also indicated that he wouldn't necessarily agree that the police provide third class services on an emergency basis. He happened to think that the kind of services that the poor get from the police generally are of the same level that the rich get from psychiatric care and the middle class from social workers. In terms of effectiveness, he feels that there is no evidence that they are

getting third class services on an emergency basis. He concluded that the problem of social service role of the police is a problem that the police will have to deal with soon.

[The next question was in French, it translates as follows in English]

Taking into consideration the results of your study regarding motorized police, and what you said earlier about foot patrol, would you consider setting up the same study or a similar study to examine foot patrol preventive action?

Dr. Kelling answered that such a study was in fact necessary. The Police Foundation is doing an experiment in Newark, N.J., in which they are doing the same kind of manipulations that they did in the preventive patrol experiments. They put police officers in areas where foot patrols didn't exist before, removed officers from where they were and held other areas constant. In addition to that experiment, the Police Foundation is also studying foot patrol in four other cities, in which they used departmentally-generated data to do time survey analysis. The Foundation expects a lot of these studies. Dr. Kelling also wanted to mention one of the first and really good experiments conducted in policing, which was done by Bright of the Research Unit of the Home Office. It measured the impact of foot patrol on crime. He kept increasing the level of foot patrols from zero to one to two, etc., up to six. From zero to one there was a marked difference. Between one and two, two and three, etc., there was no difference.

Mr. Larry Hall commented that both Supt. Heywood and Chief Sawyer talked about the role of the police. He wondered whether they had given any thought to how they would measure effectiveness and efficiency once they had the police assuming the role that they are describing.

Supt. Heywood responded that we have heard today that there is no reliable indicator to measure effectiveness and efficiency. However, he didn't feel that police could wait until the research community came up with something. Police, according to him, have to develop a philosophy and then organize and direct police departments, hoping that researchers will find something to help them measure productivity. In the meantime, police have to start the educative process. He also added that community competency is relevant here. Communities can help police, provide them with information. This working relationship between the community and the police is very important, it is itself an important direction.

Dr. Kelling requested the floor to make two further comments before the end of the discussion period. First, he wished to say that he agreed with Supt. Heywood's comments. The purpose of the police is to work with citizens to maintain the normal social controls that operate in communities. Some unfortunate developments however are taking place, at least in the U.S. For instance, in Radzinowicz's latest book, "The Growth of Crime", when the author talks about citizen involvement in crime control, he starts talking about vigilantes, which he felt was bad. Dr. Kelling emphasized again that the responsibility

for crime maintenance of safe streets is the citizens' responsibility. The second comment was regarding research projects. All the research projects in which he had been involved which have been successful came about as a result of the police asking very difficult questions, working with the researchers. It has been a joint enterprise, and every time the police department published the results with pride. When they (the researchers) have gone and said "there is an idea, let's do the research about this department", the project has never been successful. This implies that the research community and the police must work together on the questions the police are asking. The research community can help the police ask the question differently, but it is always a joint enterprise. Police research has to be done by police who have the knowledge and by researchers with technical skills, such as getting money or analysing data.

THE FUTURE OF POLICING IN CANADA

by

*D/Commissioner J.R.R. Quintal  
Canadian Police Services  
R.C.M. Police  
Ottawa, Ontario.*

Ladies and Gentlemen, let me first express Commissioner Simmonds' regrets that a very busy schedule prevents him from joining you at this Workshop. He has asked me to extend his warmest wishes that your deliberations will be most fruitful.

Chief Superintendent Moffatt has already welcomed you to the Canadian Police College and in adding to that welcome on the part of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, I stress our recognition of the importance of the topic of police productivity. The days of budgetary restraints are upon us and as with other public institutions, productivity has become a familiar topic in our midst. Getting more mileage, and I stress - the right kind of mileage - out of resources is part of our daily task. Police services are expensive and every police manager must therefore strive to achieve greater results within his department. It is essential at times to sit back and reflect on this issue and the Research Division of the Solicitor General's Secretariat is to be commended for sponsoring this timely Workshop, providing you with the opportunity to take a few hours away from the humdrum of daily life to discuss these problems.

For us, however, there must be the even greater recognition that in the longer terms, research will become of growing help to us,

not only in being more productive, but in determining what functions we select to be productive in. That is what I have been asked to talk about -- the future of policing and the key issue is identifying the evolving function of police.

I don't pretend to have the answers. I am not a futurologist and in any event, we all know that forecasting the future is not an exact science to say the least. But it is nevertheless important for us to try and anticipate the problems that we will face down the road and that's where I see the need for even greater cooperation between the researchers and police managers. If I knew what kind of society we will have in Canada in 5, 10, 15 years, it would be much easier to identify the kind of policing problems we would likely have to cope with.

The future of policing is an extensive and complex topic and I cannot hope to express a full range of thoughts and speculations. Apparently, about half of you are researchers experienced in the law enforcement field and the other half, policemen as I am. So the approach that will narrow my focus and limit my comments to the few minutes that I have been allowed, is to speak for the half of us who are police to the half of you who are not. I put it that way because the half of you who are researchers and whose efforts are, to put it simply, aimed at explaining and understanding the present and thus at predicting the future, are perhaps more able than I to talk about policing in the years to come, since it is so closely related to the make-up of society.

Much about the future of policing is known; much is unknown. I will very briefly sketch out the first and attempt to challenge you with the second, the unknown.

If we examine police work-load as a function of numbers of people policed, then about 85% of the increase in policing effort to the year 2,000 will fall within 20 urban centres only. Through

birth rates, migration and immigration, that is where population growth will occur. Thirty-five to forty municipal forces will be involved. This growth in needed police effort will be substantial and will be added to the huge burden now handled within those municipalities.

To put some meaning into this shift of emphasis in the policing function, we have to speculate about those urban centres. Some major features will be in the 20 years to come:

- growth and the turbulence of growth
- much higher density of people
- large-scale applications of new or advanced technology, for example, in mass transit, in communications, in computer-based utilities and automated information tentacles and networks
- continued concentration of ethnic minorities
- growth of large-scale organizations as employers and as impersonal, powerful bureaucracies
- concentration of the disaffected and the chronically or occupationally unemployed
- possibly, decaying city cores.

These are well-known highlights and the list is not exhausted. We know that some of these may not come about because of, for example, government intervention.

We can safely say that the rate of crime does not just grow proportionately with population growth. It grows faster particularly by specific types of crimes and the added burden of this rate of growth

again falls on urban policing and compounds the rate of escalating effort needed. Crimes related to gambling and drugs, through a range of white collar crimes to those so-called modern or sophisticated crimes, much of it organized crime, can be expected to increase considerably. Equally, but perhaps more ominously, crimes of violence will grow.

The futuristic scenario does not end there. These urban and modern crimes by their changing nature require a disproportionately greater effort by police to detect and to investigate to a conclusion, and are probably beyond prevention at police force level, unless the population becomes totally involved. Thus, the future for urban policing is not only one of vastly greater effort but of more complex and thus labour intensive effort. By the year 2,000, at least 75% of the policing effort will be required by those few urban centres and the complexity of that effort will grow and add a kind of challenge not imagined when I became a policeman 30 years' ago.

While recognizing this shift to urban centres, let us not overlook the tendency for people to work shorter hours, thereby increasing their hours of leisure. There is a growing trend amongst the people to get out of town for recreational purposes when they have a few days off and this will prevail to a greater extent as our urban centres become more congested. This is bound to influence also the policing function in the non-urban areas.

Nothing in what I have said will be particularly new to you here today. One thought has to be added. Today is commonplace to us and what we tend to overlook, is that the future I have so briefly sketched is the here-and-now to a great degree. Just recently, I was listening to a radio program and the commentator stated that the technology is available now to turn our society into a cashless and chequeless society. Your revenue would be deposited directly into your bank account and subsequent transfers in and out of accounts through computers would look after most, if not all, of our needs. One of the major obstacles

is that adequate security systems have yet to be developed to minimize the risks of abuse to a manageable or acceptable level.

We are late in planning and preparing, for much of the problem is on our desks now, though much excellent response by police is being made and the quality of our Canadian life attests to that. I recall that during the 76 Olympics, many American tourists were amazed that they could stroll along Ste. Catherine Street in Montreal during the evening, without fear of being molested.

My responsibility in the Canadian Police Services includes the Canadian Police Information Centre, centralized Identification Services, the Crime Detection Laboratories and the advanced training resources here at the College. These are available to all police agencies coast-to-coast. These high technology services address the future I described and more are needed. This police infra-structure, if I can call it that, must be further developed at all levels of jurisdiction especially in the computer and communications areas. I note with interest that several police departments have, or are contemplating using computer-aided dispatch systems, in one form or another.

The criminal is now highly mobile and he can and does move swiftly across police jurisdictional boundaries not only within an urban centre but across and between provinces, and between countries. The drug traffic, other organized crimes and large-scale white collar crimes are examples.

Advances largely derived from the hardware technologies, will not exhaust the need. More extensive criminal intelligence, its collation, analysis and accessibility at all levels of policing, is a readily identifiable need.

There is in this context challenges for those of you who are in the management and social sciences.

First, the criminal and the nature of his crime, together, is an important dimension of the police environment as are the geographic and responsibility boundaries between police forces. For example, is there a need to reorganize and restructure some police forces and identify their responsibilities so that boundaries are less of a barrier in fighting urban crime and extensive investigations become routine.

Second, the complexities of such policing, calls up more and more people with highly specialized skills. There will be problems in defining manpower needs and in developing personnel policies to cope with new personnel structures. Much needs to be known, not the least of which is the proper development of the competence and career of the specialists who support the patrolman and the investigator. Some say there is too much specialization and we must return the policeman closer to the people. What is the right blend -- especially in a complex society. That is the challenge.

My next comments will be a short distance removed from the pressing concerns of urban policing in the near future.

I would like to touch briefly on the need for higher educational attainment within the police community.

Projections tell us that the proportion of people, not only achieving full high school, but solid post-secondary qualifications, continues to increase and are preponderant even now. Even though some improvement has been achieved, I suspect that the police, as a group, are lagging behind. Most police departments in Canada, at least the major ones, are now recruiting at the high school level.

Some efforts are also directed at the university level. I don't intend to get into a debate whether a man with a higher education makes necessarily a better policeman. But, I think it is safe to say that if you add higher education to intelligence and motivation, you will likely have a winning combination.

We all recognize that the problems and the challenges awaiting us in the future will be more complex, and sophisticated crimes will increase. Consequently, the question of education becomes crucial. I believe that average educational attainment in a Force at least comparable to that in a community, is a basis for ensuring in the policeman the qualities of an understanding of his environment, and in the police force, the capacity of adaptability and openness to change. We, as police managers, must be sufficiently concerned to ensure that the police community keeps pace with the community at large, because that is the community we have to serve -- the community we must understand and deal with. The remarks of Professor Grant this morning almost caused me to forget about this part of my speech but then I decided it would do no harm for you to hear some of it again.

Related issues include content of education. For example, are degrees in the so-called police sciences of greater intrinsic value than other programmes. Secondly, if an educational programme is undertaken, who should be educated and who should pay. Can we wait, for example, on the process of the slow movement of the younger, better-educated, into positions of responsibility, or, do Officers now in service require priority? An effective, in-service educational up-grading programme requires scarce resources and is expensive. How great and urgent is the need for education during service?

These examples of education and training bring me to a most important point, and it concerns research. Police recognize the value of R. & D. at whatever level. Half of you are scholars and researchers, the other half, police. This split in numbers reflects in part, I am sure, the essential attention that guarantees the relevance of R. & D., that is, that the right targets are defined. The manager and the researcher guide each other.

R. & D. services are long commonplace and have come to be valued as a proper tool of management. We will continue to call on you in the management and social sciences to do research and to consult with us in the application of the broader research project, to our needs.

The constitution and structure of urban society in the future are adequately known, at least for implications for policing. My earlier scenario, while probably valid, is too gross to meet all real needs. Many of you may well claim that the social sciences have well-developed bodies of knowledge in this area. If so, and I am not a scholar and cannot dispute it, then you might ask yourself whether that knowledge and its related theories and concepts is more reflective than predictive and whether it is refined and reinterpreted to be of value to police planners. At one level what will be the size, nature and behavioural outlets of the disaffected. In the same vein, but at another level, will city cores decay and become a centre for crime, or, will they remain vital, become expensive and so displace crime to the surrounding areas. Crucially, what are the determinants of the attitudes of the various segments of society and their expectations of police, and what trends exist.

What will be the make-up of our population? The post-war baby-boom is passed and the declining birthrate will be reflected in an older population. What will be the state of the economy? Will polarization of industry change location and, if so, what population shifts are likely to occur? Even with our present high unemployment, some people in the field predict a manpower shortage in Canada in the years ahead. Will the low birth-rate increase, or will higher immigration become a necessity? If the latter, what kind of immigrant will we get, from what area of the world? Will they be violence-prone, having been raised in an area where violence is almost a way of life?

It seems to me that a lot of valuable information is available but dispersed in many areas. For instance, many government departments at the federal, provincial and municipal level, are involved in long-range planning. Many of their activities have or will have significant

influence on our society, or conversely, may be in response to a particular segment of our society. Numerous indicators they have surfaced or identified, are lost in the labyrinth of bureaucracies. Is there some magic way this information could somehow be tapped and assembled with other research material in an effort to project a more accurate panorama of our future society, including policing requirements? I am not naive enough to think that it would be an easy task, but it is nevertheless, an interesting challenge.

Much is unknown about the future, but one thing is fairly certain, crime will continue to exist as a social phenomenon. The police must continue its efforts to prevent crime as well as to combat it. But, if we are to be effective, society must become more involved in attacking some of the root causes as well as participate in more innovative and properly directed preventive programs. I do not want to downgrade our crime prevention efforts, but the police alone cannot do it. I am not even sure they are the best equipped to effectively prevent crime -- they sometimes are the catalyst which motivates the community to act in the absence of another moving force. Perhaps the answers in preventive policing lie with those of you who are students of society.

I have touched on a few points about knowledge needs for our planning function. Roy Lewis in his book "A Force for the Future", in stressing the need for higher education, also touched on the planning function. I quote:

"If the police ignore this problem (of education), they risk allowing their plans always to be made for them ... they are being forced into a greater role in a more complex society, and are faced with the choice of being junior technicians or fully rounded professionals."

The decision is ours to make. Some of my colleagues may protest and say - "This does not apply to me." If that is the case, I am very

pleased and your department will fare better than the others.

The police cannot demand more of the right research of you, unless they too become students of the world and of the forces they manage, and know how to direct and use the results of your efforts. In this way, they will achieve effective gains in experience and know how to transmit and use that experience within their own law enforcement community. Let me summarize -- The challenge of the future is certain to demand a complexity of effort from all levels of policing: municipal, provincial and federal. This challenge ensures we recognize and support R. & D. efforts, which, as a priority, must serve our planning in sorting out our evolving functions within society.

SMALL GROUP REPORTS

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12(b) Leader: *Mr. R.M. Lajoie*  
*Quebec Department of Justice*  
Assistant: *Mr. L. Hall*  
*Hickling-Johnston Ltd.*

*Pressure to Reduce Costs*

*Discussion Group 1(a)*

Leader: J. Jessup, City of Vancouver

Assistant: A.R. Rice, Ottawa P.D.

Participants: D. Demers, Ministry of the Solicitor General  
S. Fairweather, Ontario Police Commission  
L. Hall, Hickling-Johnston Ltd.  
J.P. Parent, Service de Police de la Communauté  
Urbaine de Montréal

THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF POLITICAL PRESSURES TO REDUCE COSTS

There is a growing evidence that, with few exceptions, political pressure is being brought to bear on many government agencies, including police, to hold the line or even reduce the cost of public services. Several symptoms of this trend have been identified by members of the discussion group. The consensus is that these pressures will not abate, but increase even more so in the years ahead.

The symptoms identified by the group are summarized below in point form:

A. Federal-Provincial Level

1. In both Ontario and Quebec Provinces, the provincial government is exerting pressure on municipalities to reduce the total cost of police services. The provinces have considerable leverage over municipal policing costs, since they control the annual per capita grant to municipalities for local police services.

2. There has been no increase in the manpower complement of the Ontario Provincial Police between 1977 and 1978. This is considered a significant change from the previous trend.
3. In 8 of the 10 provinces in Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (R.C.M.P.) serve as the provincial police force. The cost of providing R.C.M.P. coverage for small to medium communities in these eight provinces has steadily increased over the last 10 to 15 years. It is reported that the R.C.M.P. budget within the Ministry of the Solicitor General has grown from about \$200 million in 1961 to about 1,700 million in 1977. It is believed that a greater proportion of R.C.M.P. costs would be forced onto the provinces in coming years to offset the increasing burden on the Federal treasury.
4. A major consulting firm used by Ontario law enforcement agencies for psychological testing of potential police candidates reports that business has fallen off dramatically in recent years due to cutback in police recruitment programs.

B. Municipal Level

1. Metropolitan Toronto Police now have a freeze on certain components of the police budget. This is viewed as a forerunner of more wide-ranging budget constraints expected in the near future.
2. As early as 1972, Montreal City Council embarked upon a policy of fiscal restraint with regard to police services.

The budget increase from 1977 to 1978 was held at 4%. This is seen as a guideline for future increases in coming years.

3. The Ottawa City Police budget increased 8.5% between 1977 and 1978. While pressure to reduce costs has not yet been felt, police officials sense that any future plans for expansion of the scope or level of police services could meet with considerable resistance at the political level.
4. There was thought to be little interest in restricting expansion of police services in the cities of Calgary and Edmonton where the continuing growth in population and business has produced an increasing property tax revenue base.
5. In the Fall of 1977, Vancouver City Council requested all civic departments, including the Vancouver Police Department, to submit a departmental review for 1978. The review included a detailed description of each departmental program in terms of objectives, staffing, budget, and measures of productivity and effectiveness. The review also included a budget cutting exercise in which departments were asked to indicate specific areas of cutback if they were to effect a 5% budget reduction in 1978.

In conclusion, there is a growing consensus across the country that the public sector has reached its limit to growth. One out of every four Canadians work for government. Forty per cent of Canada's Gross National Product (G.N.P.) is produced by municipal, provincial and federal governments. The prevailing political climate in Canada is thus for fiscal constraint in the public sector. Police departments and law enforcement agencies throughout the country can expect to contribute their share of the cutbacks. Given this situation, police have one consolation. The move to restrict escalating policing costs does not originate from a dissatisfaction with police services or from

a downgrading of the priority of police services at the local level, but from a general questioning of the optimum size of government in an economy plagued by the dual problems of chronic unemployment and inflation.

#### PRACTICAL OPERATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES TO REDUCE COSTS

Several ideas for reducing the cost of police services were identified by members of the discussion group. They are presented below in summary form. Given the limited time available, the choice was made to try to identify as many strategies as possible, even though they would be in abbreviated form. It is left to the reader to decide whether any of these suggestions have potential.

##### 1. Reduce the Scope of Functions Carried Out by Police

Functions not requiring a high level of policing skills could be assigned to civilian or military personnel. Typical functions which might be transferred to civilian personnel include parking by-law enforcement, serving summons and miscellaneous indoor, clerical functions. A function which might be undertaken by military personnel is escort duty.

In Ontario, the average police constable earns about \$22,000 per annum. The cost of a civilian substitute could effect savings in the order of 50%. Transferring escort duty to military personnel would, of course, eliminate entirely the cost of this function from the municipal police force budget.

##### 2. Cutback the Level of Police Service

While in some cases the scope of services carried out by skilled policemen could be transferred to civilian or military personnel, there are other instances where the law enforcement agency could economize by reducing the level of some services. One example is low priority calls, such as household burglaries, where police might consider not responding

at all. In general, where the opportunity has passed for police to halt criminal victimization and to render critical assistance at the scene, or where the probability of apprehending the criminal and recovering stolen property is extremely low, police could forego responding to the call entirely and allow the telephone answering service to provide guidance and advice to the victim. While this would necessitate augmenting the scope of the police emergency telephone answering service, it would doubtlessly generate economies in the call-load of field personnel.

Another example cited by members of the discussion group was where police constables, carrying out preliminary investigation of a crime, might recommend that where the likelihood of apprehending the criminal, recovering stolen property or developing a sound case for prosecution is low, the case be dropped and not followed-up by specialized investigation units.

### 3. Deploy Police Manpower More Effectively

In many municipal police forces there is no planned system of deployment. It is estimated that in the Ontario Provincial Police Force only about 30% of a uniformed policeman's time can be accounted for by the enforcement function. In the Calgary Police Department it is estimated that only about 40% of a uniformed policeman's time can be accounted for by the enforcement function. These figures are not intended to provoke the argument that the Calgary City Police are more effectively deployed than the Ontario Provincial Police, but rather to indicate that on the average less than half a uniformed policeman's time is employed in carrying out specific police functions. The redeployment of some of this surplus, unaccountable manpower to crime prevention strategies was identified as a move likely to increase police productivity.

#### 4. Develop Community Self-Policing

A community self-policing program could well increase police productivity in several ways. First, it would make residents more perceptive of crime in their community and thereby increase the likelihood that police are called to the scene while crimes are still in progress. This would have a potential of reducing the seriousness of criminal victimization in the area. Second, a community self-policing program in an area would make residents more effective observers of crime so as to provide police with more useful information about specific crimes they had witnessed. This would tend to increase the likelihood of apprehending offenders and recovering stolen property. Third, it could reduce the need for routine preventive patrol in residential areas and thereby allow a reassignment of police personnel to more productive functions.

Instilling in the community an appreciation of the potential of neighbourhood self-policing was viewed as a first step towards involving local residents in Neighbourhood Watch and other similar community self-policing programs.

#### 5. Other Possible Strategies for Improving Police Effectiveness

Several other ideas were put forward by members of the discussion group which were not developed in any degree of detail due to a lack of time. These are listed below in summary form:

- a) Specialized police functions such as traffic patrol and general investigation could be returned to the uniformed patrol division. This might create some economies of scale in the general delivery of police services.

- b) Amalgamation of small municipal police departments into larger regional forces could well affect increases in police productivity. This would involve the sharing of sophisticated police equipment and resources. A word of caution was felt to be in order in the sense that there is obviously an optimum balance between too small and too large a police department.
- c) The standardization of some lines of police equipment on a regional or provincial basis and the establishment of a mass procurement program might affect some economies of scale in circumstances where such a proposal is feasible. Specific areas of mass procurement suggested were: patrol cars, uniforms and report forms.
- d) It was envisaged that improved selection criteria for police recruits, in conjunction with better training and better equipment, would enable some police departments to maximize the effectiveness of their present authorized strength.

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

Many of the suggestions identified by the discussion group for increasing police productivity or cost-effectiveness beg feasibility assessment. However, one common need emerges. Clearly there is need for management tools to monitor police productivity in order to determine whether any of these suggestions actually bring about an improvement in police productivity. In the absence of such empirical tools, the ultimate effect of these suggestions on productivity will remain intuitive and hence speculative.

However, before performance monitoring can be accomplished, there are at least two prerequisites which must be met: the development of management skills within the law enforcement agency to enable effective use of these decision making tools; and the creation of a computerized data base which will make the generation of performer indicators possible.

There is no doubt that the concepts and technology necessary for developing a performance accounting system for police services is now available. But the one stumbling block seems to be the lack of awareness of police officials of the benefits which can be derived from use of modern performance accounting techniques. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of police planners and researchers to urgently impress upon police officials that a fine-tuning of the police organization will only be possible with the application of performance accounting techniques.

*Patrol*

*Discussion Group 1(b)*

Leader : G.L. Kelling, Police Foundation  
Assistant: R.N. Heywood, R.C.M. Police  
Participants: S. Rizkalla, Centre Internationale de  
Criminologie Comparee, Universite de Montreal  
W. J. Shrubb, Peterborough P.D.  
K. Deevy, Ministry of the Solicitor General  
D. Forcese, Carleton University

Although patrol was generally perceived of as one of the most central aspects of policing, that is, patrol was the primary means of providing police services to the public, the participants generally did not agree on several issues.

In the first place they did not agree on the value of preventive patrol or rapid response to calls for service. Some felt that research had undermined these two strategies while others felt that conclusion was premature.

The second disagreement had to do with defining just what the police function was. Some felt that the crime related functions of the police had been over-emphasized, to the detriment of other vital police services, while others felt that continued emphasis on crime was essential and consistent with police traditions.

Those disagreements aside, there were areas of strong agreement. The most central one, and all the rest stems from this, was that police generally have large amounts of uncommitted time available. Given that the police are free to experiemnt with using this uncommitted time in a variety of ways several were suggested. Police can develop crime specific plans which concentrate police resources where or when they are needed to deal with specific crimes. Patrol officers can be trained to conduct preliminary investigations. Foot patrol or even fixed posts can be experimented with. Varieties of team policing can be attempted. The focus of these alternative styles of policing would be to increase the quantity and quality of police-citizen interactions. To facilitate these alternatives there were suggestions that the response to calls for service had to be rethought and that perhaps alternatives should be developed to responding to some calls for service (i.e. telephone counselling, referral, appointment setting, encouragement to report to a police station, etc.).

In sum, there was a general agreement that there was a basic freedom to experiment with uncommitted time.

*Criminal Investigation  
Discussion Group 1(c)*

Leader : P. Greenwood, RAND Corp.  
Assistant: W.J. Brown, Edmonton P.D.  
Participants: F.J. Prévost, National Task Force on the  
Administration of Justice  
D.J. Koenig, Ministry of the Solicitor General  
C. Nuttall, Ministry of the Solicitor General  
J. Graham, Macdonald Commission on the R.C.M.P.

This discussion group discussed exclusively the study of criminal investigation completed by the Rand Corporation in 1974. This was a two-year study of police investigation practices which was conducted for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The findings from this study suggest a number of revisions in how the criminal investigation process should be viewed and also suggest a number of policy reforms which might improve the productivity of police apprehension efforts. The study identified several distinguishable functions performed by investigators: preparing cases for prosecution after the suspects are in custody, apprehending known suspects, performing certain routine tasks that may lead to identifying unknown suspects, engaging in intensive investigations when there are no suspects or it is not clear whether a crime has been committed, and pro-active investigations. In addition, investigators engage in various administrative and paperwork tasks related to these functions.

The information provided by this study about the effectiveness of each function provides a basis to begin asking whether the function

should be performed at all and, if so, who should do it. The notion that all these functions must be performed by a single individual, or by officers having similar ranks or capabilities, does not stand up to scrutiny, and in fact many police departments have begun to assign distinguishable functions to separate units. The authors of the Rand study suggest that if a function now assigned to investigators can be performed as well or better but at a lower cost by patrol officers, clerical personnel, or information systems, it should be removed from investigators; if it serves the objectives of the prosecutor, then it should be responsive to the needs of the prosecutor; and if especially competent investigators are required, the function should be assigned to a unit composed of such officers.

#### PREPARING CASES FOR PROSECUTION

Postarrest investigative activity is not only important for prosecution but is also one of the major activities now performed by investigators. This activity can perhaps be performed in a less costly or more effective manner.

The Rand study suggests that the current coordination, or lack thereof, between the police and prosecutorial agencies does not support a healthy working relationship. It allows a situation where each can blame the other for outcomes in court that they view as unfavorable.

Most prosecutors do not have investigators on their staff. If they do, these investigators are usually occupied with "white-collar" offenses rather than street crime. Generally, the prosecutor relies on police investigators to provide the evidence needed to prosecute and convict arrestees. But this situation contains an inherent conflict between prosecutor and police. An arrest is justified by *probable cause*. Often the police are satisfied to document the justification for the arrest rather than expending further investigative efforts to strengthen the evidence so that the prosecutor will be able to prove the case

beyond a reasonable doubt. Many cases appear to be affected by the conflicting incentives of police and prosecutor, as reflected in failures to file, early dismissals, or imbalanced plea bargaining.

One way of ameliorating this problem is to make explicit the types of information the prosecutor and police agree are appropriate to collect and document, given the nature of the crime. The Rand study contains an evidentiary checklist, specifically designed to identify this type of information in robbery cases.

One rationale advanced in some police departments for minimizing the factual content of formal investigative reports is that these reports are subject to discovery by defense counsel and thereby facilitate the impeachment of prosecution witnesses, including policemen. Such departments believe the results of detailed investigations are better communicated orally to the prosecutor's office. The results of the Rand study tend to refute this argument, although they are not conclusive. In the jurisdiction where detailed documentation was prepared, the prosecutor was much more successful in achieving favorable case dispositions.

#### APPREHENDING KNOWN SUSPECTS

The Rand study demonstrated that in a substantial fraction of cases which were ultimately cleared, the identity of the perpetrator could be established readily from information which was available at the scene of the crime. This fact makes it extremely important that the responding patrol officer obtain and make a record of that evidence which will identify the suspect. This requires that the responding officer be permitted adequate time to conduct an initial investigation, including identifying and interviewing all possible witnesses, and that the crime report form be designed in such a way that the presence of information identifying a suspect is unmistakably recorded.

Apprehending a known suspect may or may not be difficult. Assigning all such apprehensions to investigators does not appear to be cost-effective, especially if the investigators are headquartered at some distance from the suspect's location and the patrol officer is nearby. The Rand authors believe that certain patrol officers, whom they call generalist-investigators, could be trained to handle this function in such a way that the arrests are legally proper and a minimum number of innocent persons are brought in for questioning. Only when apprehension proves difficult should investigative units become involved.

#### ROUTINE INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS

For crimes without an initial suspect identification, Rand found that many of those eventually cleared are solved by routine investigative actions. These actions include listing a stolen automobile in the "hot car" file, asking the victim to view a previously assembled collection of mug shots for the crime in question, checking pawnshop slips, awaiting phone calls from the public, tracing ownership of a weapon, etc.

One implication of this finding is that any steps a police department can take to convert investigative tasks into routine actions will increase the number of crimes solved. Technological improvements, especially information systems, produced many of the clearances we identified as "routine." Such clearances might never have occurred in the absence of such systems or might have been difficult to achieve. The ability of patrol officers to check rapidly whether a vehicle is stolen or, more important, whether the owner is wanted for questioning produced numerous case solutions in our samples. Well-organized and maintained mug shot, *modus operandi*, or pawn slip files also lead to clearances.

#### THE ROLE OF THE "PUBLIC"

Rand's research suggests that the public can strongly influence the outcome of cases. The study suggests that police departments should

initiate programs designed to increase the victims desire to cooperate fully with the police. Resources allocated to such programs may serve to increase apprehension rates as well as to improve the quality of prosecutions. Specifically, police departments should announce when major crimes are solved, the particular contribution of members of the public, although the desires for anonymity should be respected. A realistic picture of how crimes are solved will help eliminate the public's distorted image of detectives and will impress on them the importance of their cooperation with the police in order to solve crimes.

#### REALLOCATION OF INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES

The Rand authors claim that if after appropriate test and evaluation their suggestions are proven to be cost-effective, the ultimate implication of this work would be a substantial shift of police resources from investigative to other units. First, most initial investigations would be assigned to patrol units under the direction of local commanders. To improve the quality of initial investigations, the patrol force would have to be augmented with a large number of generalist-investigators. These officers would also perform certain follow up work such as apprehending known suspects and improving communications with victims and witnesses of crimes.

Additional major reallocations of resources away from traditional reactive investigative units would involve the greater use of clerical personnel and the assignment of investigators to the prosecutor's office. If all these changes were made, the only remaining investigative units concerned with Part One crimes would be major offense bureaus which would only handle major crimes in which the police department decided a significant investment should be made, even though it was realized that a solution to that particular crime would be unlikely.

*Two-Man vs One-Man Patrol*

*Discussion Group 1(d)*

Leader: K. Fortier, San Diego P.D.  
Assistant: R.J. Stewart, Vancouver P.D.  
Participants: J.L. Erskine, Ontario Provincial Police  
R.J. Lajoie, Dept. de Justice du Québec  
J.C. Rondou, Service de Police de la Communauté  
Urbaine de Montréal

The following points were raised by the group:

In the San Diego case the issue was a management prerogative while in the Canadian experience it has been established as a working condition and a negotiable item.

There is a mixed reaction from uniform personnel as to their preference of one or two-man cars. Two-man cars with the proper matching of partners will be more effective than mis-matched partnerships which will in fact be more of a liability than an asset.

One of the major issues is whether the deployment is administrative or imposed by arbitration.

When the deployment is by administrative policy it usually includes the ability to use discretion at the original dispatch point and at the operational or line level. One-man car provides higher visibility factor (discussion of the Kansas City experiment).

The question of 'How do we get the Unions to accept the one-man car principle?' was addressed:

The Unions have made their point in negotiations by presenting the safety factor as the only issue. Management has based its case on cost effectiveness and efficiency.

The N.Y.P.D. is presently moving to one-man cars due to the fiscal crisis facing the city. But the issue of safety still has to be addressed. Additional police officers needed to staff two-man cars are expensive and beyond most city's capacity to respond at present. Consequently, present manpower should be re-developed to its maximum effectiveness and a need to be innovative in developing strategies for deployment is developing.

*Assigning Responsibility for Crime Prevention*

*Discussion Group 1(e)*

Leader: J. Hogarth, University of British Columbia  
Assistant: B. Sawyer, Calgary P.D.  
Participants: T. Elton, Law Reform Commission of Canada  
R.F. Lunney, Edmonton P.D.  
R.L. Miles, Central Saanich P.D.

Reviewing the state of crime prevention programs in Canada, the following general observations were made:

- a) There has been an explosion in the number and variety of crime prevention programs in recent years.
- b) Most of these programs are straightforward household security projects built around concepts of Operation Identification and Neighbourhood Watch.
- c) There is now almost total acceptance at the verbal level for crime prevention on the part of senior police administrators in Canada.
- d) There is considerable resistance, if not cynicism, to crime prevention located at the N.C.O. and senior constable ranks in most police forces.
- e) Much of the cynicism is due to the fact that many programs were badly conceived, not followed through or initiated primarily for public relations rather than for hard-nosed crime prevention purposes.

- f) The least resistance to crime prevention exists at the junior constable level.
- g) Many junior constables become disillusioned when they do not receive support or recognition from their senior colleagues.
- h) An examination of police operations in Canada will show that despite lip service being played to crime prevention as a major goal, very few resources, either human or financial, have been provided to give these programs a real chance of success.
- i) Incentive and reward systems such as recognition, promotion, office accommodation, provision of automobiles, etc., are needed to demonstrate that crime prevention is taken seriously at the top.
- j) Very few crime prevention programs have been evaluated in Canada. For the most part the design of the programs did not lend themselves to evaluation. In many instances the need for evaluation is not properly understood by police executives.

In order to overcome the problems identified above, the following recommendations were made:

- a) Crime prevention programs should be based on a concrete analysis of specific crime problems in particular communities.
- b) Crime prevention should not be confused with public relations though in the long term good public relation programs may have an impact on crime.
- c) Clear goals and objectives should be set for new crime prevention programs at the local level with specific targets set capable of verification in both qualitative and quantitative terms.

- d) All levels and ranks should be involved in setting goals and in developing tools of measurement appropriate to those goals.
- e) Funding should be dependent upon the development of a program plan that is capable of evaluation.
- f) It would be helpful if the Solicitor General of Canada and responsible bodies at the provincial level assist in the development of simple, manageable evaluative schemes and criteria which could meet the needs of a wide variety of crime prevention programs.
- g) A system of incentive and reward including promotional schemes should be provided to ensure that the sticks and carrots at the operational level promote involvement in crime prevention as a normal and valued part of total police operations.
- h) There is a need to be much more imaginative in the range and variety of crime prevention programs that can be initiated. In this connection police departments have only begun to work in collaboration with planning agencies at municipal, provincial and federal levels in terms of primary and secondary prevention programs that could be initiated. Examples include urban renewal, development of new communities, building codes, business practice, etc. The police should continue to point out that they cannot prevent crime alone and that a total concentration on after-the-fact law enforcement is both expensive and counter-productive. The police would then become professional advisors and consultants to the community in this area, with primary responsibility assigned to potential victims, government planning bodies, business groups and other professional associations.

*Crime Prevention Programs in Canada*

*Discussion Group 1{6}*

Leader: W. Snowdon, Ministry of the Solicitor General  
Assistant: V. Rawlins, Ministry of the Solicitor General  
Participants: R. Clarke, Home Office, U.K.  
A.C. Evelyn, Metro Toronto Police Association  
C. Kilburn, New Brunswick Police Commission

This discussion group was composed of 5 people; four with police backgrounds and one researcher.

For the purpose of the discussion, crime prevention activities were divided into three main sub-groups. These were: target hardening, attitudinal change and crisis intervention and referral programs. Each of these areas was reviewed by the group.

TARGET HARDENING

Those programs directed at the protection of property

- Identification programs
  - Operation Identification
  - Operation Provident
  - Operation Auto-Mark
  - Operation Boat Mark
  - Operation Bike Mark
  - Operation Ski Mark

All of these programs deal with the marking of goods with an appropriate identification number.

It was agreed that these programs serve two purposes:

- they act as a deterrent to the would be thief;
- the property so marked can be readily identified for court purposes and for return to the owner.

These programs are underway in various forms from Coast to Coast.

It was agreed that these programs have been successful in having a short term effect on crimes directed at property and further, that the most successful programs are those that:

1. involve the active participation of community groups, and
2. receive wide publicity in local media.

The second group of target hardening programs in relation to property are those involving educational programs to assist and encourage the community to adopt better security practices:

- Home Security
- Auto Theft Prevention
- Fraudulent cheque prevention
- Tips to stop shoplifting.

All of these are directed at individuals and businesses to encourage better security measures in relation to property.

There is another group of crime prevention activities which have been developed to encourage groups of people and individuals to take steps to protect themselves against crime.

These programs include:

WOMAN ALONE

A program which attempts to give women some suggestions in relation to reducing their vulnerability to attack.

PROTECTION FOR SENIOR CITIZENS

A program which supplies some tips to senior citizens to reduce his or her likelihood of becoming a victim of crime.

Also in this category are such programs as Block Parent, Block Mother and Block Captain. Also there are a number of programs on Childrens Safety in relation to molestation and also in relation to traffic and bicycle safety.

All of these programs are currently widely employed by Police Agencies in Canada. Each of these programs is designed to reduce the opportunity for the successful completion of a crime. The success of all of these programs depends on the active participation of the community.

The second major group of crime prevention activities are those that are designed to bring about attitudinal changes within the community in general and on the part of the offender in particular.

These programs are usually educational in nature and include:

- Drinking Drive program
- Drug abuse programs
- Anti-shoplifting programs
- Anti-vandalism programs
- Police Community awareness programs.

Again the degree to which these programs can bring about the desired attitudinal change will depend to a large extent on the amount of positive interaction that is taking place between the community and the police.

The third group of crime prevention activities are those which we frequently refer to as Crisis Intervention and referral programs.

These programs are designed to bring on scene quickly the capabilities and the expertise in family crisis, child abuse, mental health and other types of crisis situations which call for special skills or resources.

There are many of these types of programs underway throughout the country. There was a great deal of discussion about these programs, but little consensus was reached as to the effectiveness of most of them.

There was agreement that there should be far more emphasis placed on the collection and evaluation of empirical data in these areas.

The whole question of crime prevention and its effectiveness is an extremely complex one.

While the discussion group did not reach consensus on a number of topics, they did agree on five statements which were articulated to the plenary session for their consideration.

These five statements were:

1. The greatest potential for reducing the incidence of crime in our country lies in activities directed at reducing the opportunities for crime.
2. The police officer in our country should have a very clear recognition of his mandate to be actively engaged in crime prevention activities.
3. The amelioration of criminal ills cannot and should not be the sole responsibility of the criminal justice system but must involve the active participation of a substantial segment of the population.

4. The effectiveness of crime prevention activities in Canada would be significantly enhanced if there were a central vehicle for coordination and communication amongst the police agencies involved.
5. There is an urgent need to develop means to evaluate the effectiveness of specific prevention policing programs on criminal activity and the quality of life in the community.

*Productivity and Standards for the  
Delivery of Police Services*

*Discussion Group 2*

Leader: A. Oosthoek, R.C.M. Police  
Assistant: C.R. Eves, National Research Council  
Participants: J.R. Dufort, Commission de Police de Québec  
R.W. Gertzen, R.C.M. Police  
D.M. Giljam, Saskatchewan Police College  
V.N. Macdonald, Queen's University  
J.A. Needle, American Justice Institute  
R.J. Roche, Newfoundland Constabulary

INTRODUCTION

The topic of this discussion group, and indeed the entire Workshop on Productivity, was to come to terms with the fact that police forces are existing and ongoing institutions.

The significance of this is that we can no longer design a police force, test its operation, and then place it in service. Police forces must continue to operate even while undergoing review, criticism, or redesign. It follows that an approach to productivity measurement that takes into account both the short and long-range perspectives and which is more evolutionary than revolutionary, will make the more practicable contribution to the police productivity problem.

This tension between the need for practicality on the one hand and conceptual or theoretical adequacy on the other, is difficult

to resolve, but was nevertheless kept foremost in the discussions.

#### THE DEFINITION OF POLICE PRODUCTIVITY

The discussion group adopted unanimously a formulation of productivity and efficiency proposed by Mr. J.A. Needle. His broad position was that 'productivity' could be distinguished from 'efficiency' by stating that productivity relates to the cost (in some standard units) of ultimate programme output or end products, while efficiency could be seen as the cost (in some standard unit) as related to elements of programme input or internal utilization. Productivity could then, for instance, be stated to be the cost in investigative hours to produce a certain level of case clearance. Efficiency could be defined as the cost in investigative hours involved per investigation.

It will be clear from these formulations that, while there are close logical and empirical relationships between productivity and efficiency, it is nevertheless possible to achieve a high level of efficiency and simultaneously a low level of productivity. Attention was therefore next directed at strategies to estimate or measure productivity.

Within the plenary sessions, as well as in the research literature, there were obvious indicators that modern police forces are currently engaged in programmes and procedures that may, in fact, not be producing either the intended or required output or product, but also that in many cases, incorrect or inadequate indicators of output have been used. The discussion group concluded that attempts to measure and improve police productivity could only succeed through the most vigorous attention to the police goal-setting procedures and to the details of programme definition.

The discussion group endorsed the position of Prof. Macdonald, that within the police community this capability is still within its infancy stage. It was also concluded that significant improvements in police

productivity by means of increasingly rigorous and specific goal definitions are still some five to six years away, largely because of the absence of clear role definitions for the police.

For purposes of further elaboration of this point, more detailed work recently performed by some group participants can be referenced.<sup>1</sup>

#### SHORT-RANGE CONCERN WITH EFFICIENCY

Recognizing the relatively long-range effort involved in defining and improving productivity in policing, the group next turned to a consideration of what is potentially an intermediate step.

In the absence of definitive statements of what a police force should be doing and how its programmes should be measured from a productivity perspective, there was agreement that there was some merit in using existing data bases produced by current programmes and procedures and producing efficiency measurements.

The suggestion adopted was that with the use of a suitable sampling approach to obtain a minimum data set of man-hours allocated to certain major police functions, and the use of existing data sets of complaints by categories, an efficiency index could, in fact, be created. A somewhat more technical outline of what was intended is contained in another paper.<sup>2</sup>

#### PRODUCTIVITY/EFFICIENCY AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

There was general agreement that moves in the direction of productivity measures are urgently needed and constitute, in fact, the best means of securing rational decisions on man-year requirements. They would furthermore tend to clarify the actual need for the current

cost situation.

There was further agreement that police chiefs, faced with the need to present a statement of annual requirements for man-years, would be well served in the interim with the efficiency approach outlined in the attached Paper. This would constitute an interim basis for estimating and monitoring police requirements, provided such a police chief also recognized the need to move toward productivity considerations that do not simply seek to continue doing what he is doing now more efficiently without consideration for the real need for the procedure or the programme.

Both Mr. Needle and Prof. Macdonald also expressed their concern with the possibility that inflexible standards might be counter-productive and there remains a danger that minimum standards will tend to become standards of maximum output. A suggestion was made that standards derived either under productivity measurements or under efficiency measurements, should be looked at as targets rather than standards.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The discussion group generally held that the maximum amount of usefulness could be derived from our pursuit of productivity measures if a methodological report could be produced that would consider simultaneously the problem and solution of productivity and efficiency measurements. Such a report would be required to furnish a more detailed outline of the analytical approach(es) to be used by any level of government, or any given police department to move toward an increased productivity.

The general opinion of the discussion group was that such a methodological report could be undertaken by any level of government

and would constitute a material contribution to the co-ordination of productivity research in individual police departments. Moreover, such a report might function as a guideline for similar approaches by other departments. Under those circumstances, there would be a higher probability that results would be comparable across departments.

FOOTNOTES

1. See for instance Improving Management Performance, V.N. MacDonald, P.J. Lawton, 1977, as well as the work of Dr. Needle, J.A.
2. See "Police Productivity as it relates to Manpower requirements, specific services, and public acceptability", unpublished paper prepared by A. Oosthoek, Inspector, I/C Policy and Planning, RCMP, District #1, "E" Division, May 1978. In this paper, the use of the word "productivity" should be replaced with the word "efficiency".

*Decision-Making by  
Senior Police Administrators*

*Discussion Group 3*

Leader: W. Johnson, London P.D.  
Assistant: F. Lipsett, National Research Council  
Participants: A. Burrows, Home Office, U.K.  
D. Farmer, LEAA  
L. Scherlowski, R.C.M. Police  
J. Tronrud, Winnipeg P.D.  
T. Zaharchuk, Decision Dynamics Corp.

In discussing the assigned topic there was consensus within the group that "hard data" relevant to the level of command must be available on a regular basis to assist in the decision making process. Furthermore, such data must be balanced against the internal-external social-human factor conditions which also affect productivity.

There was also consensus that the social and public relations function of senior police administrators has a profound effect on the way a given Force is perceived in the community. The study group also recognizes that the decision-making process is diffused throughout the Force in that each level within the police service is charged with specific responsibilities that may not be adequately defined, particularly at lower operational levels.

There was some consensus that decisions are usually based on the following:

"Fixed" information. For example size of city, size of force, size of budget, organization of force, standing policies.

Pressures. For example from parliament, city councils, lobbies, finances, police unions, peers.

Guesses about the future. For example the city's economy and budget, trends in crime, changes in pressures, changes in police ambiance and education.

Policies. For example policies dictated by parliament or city council; standing policies on parking, patrol, drugs, detectives, working conditions, etc.; standing policies on public events, disasters, emergencies, etc.

The group addressed itself to the question "How can better decisions be made?" There seemed to be two main possibilities -

A. Improved gathering and use of information

Computers should be used for keeping track of routine and detailed information. Programs should be revised and refined until properly selected results emerge.

Review. The organization of the force should be reviewed regularly, say every two years. Changes in the budget requirements and related political requirements should be reviewed annually.

Appropriate management science techniques should be used when appropriate.

The latest police research results should be known. This may be done by reading journals and reports. A better way might be to have a professional reader available, and to cultivate colleagues whose judgment on the applicability of innovations to your force is reliable.

Following this the effects (usually of adopting or not adopting) of various innovations may be guessed.

B. Appropriate use of innovations

Style of patrol. For example one-man or two-man cars, preventive or reactive strategy, single or split force, use of analysis and simulation, etc.

Use or disbanding of detectives.

Use of Stanford criteria for pursuing or abandoning cases.

Use of computers for record-keeping, analysis, dispatch, simulations, etc.

Use of recent technology in communications, forensic science, etc.

Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED).

Use of a professional reader for keeping abreast of research results.

Use of contracting out where this accomplishes a particular result most cheaply.

Use of gaming strategies for enforcement of parking, speed or similar regulations.

*The Productivity Issue in the  
Context of Management Training*

*Discussion Group 4*

Leader: M. Martin, Canadian Police College  
Assistant: G. R. Wallace, B.C. Police Commission  
Participants: A. Grant, Osgoode Hall Law School  
W. J. Whetstone, Alberta Solicitor General.

Manager development is tangential in its relationship to the issue of productivity. The group discussion and consensus arrived at, then, could not directly bear on the topic and in the framework of the workshop and in the context of other topics, the group had some difficulty in avoiding platitudes as conclusions.

So given that good managers will enhance productivity, the group consensus involved recognition of three areas only:

- new patterns of development
- the issue of education
- identification and reward systems.

Development patterns were discussed with the shared view that the more traditional, lock-step pattern was inadequate to policing needs; the emphasis was on new patterns that would imbue officers with an amenability to change and more, a capacity to take risks and to innovate. Some practices were raised as indicative of those useful in senior officer development:

- inter-force exchange of officers
- secondment to non-law enforcement positions, e.g. a municipal management position
- the permission of lateral movement within the police community.

The discussion group saw the significant contribution of education upgrading to manager effectiveness in the following:

- development of a broader perspective to law enforcement that is in tune with emerging roles
- a capacity for change
- education attainment on a par with that of their community at large
- a competence to recognize the role of social science research and to handle research as a management tool.

There is a set of problems related to the education of police managers, the more visible one being the inertia of forces in adopting a progressive policy and in providing support. It was conceded that universities are not oriented to law enforcement needs, a consensus perhaps prompted by the contrasting United States experience.

The two areas, manager development and education upgrading, are highlighted more by needs for research rather than abrupt action. Studies are not only needed to determine the more appropriate patterns of development but also to demonstrate and stimulate, thereby, needed change to overcome inertia. In education upgrading, for example, to wait on a generational change or for forces to rely passively on individual effort, are inadequate.

A third area, one less thoroughly discussed but recognized for its significance and potential pay-off as a focus for research, is the identification of managerial talent and the accompanying reward system.

In summary, the manager development discussion reflected, in part through a paucity of action recommendations, the need for a program of studies in the three areas noted above.

*Technical Aspects of Research Aiming at  
the Development of Measures/Indicators  
of Productivity and Program Evaluation*

*Discussion Group 5(a)*

Leader: M. Liroy, Ministry of the Solicitor General  
Assistant: A.M. Pate, Police Foundation  
Participants: B. Adam, R.C.M. Police  
R. Gendron, Commission de police du Québec  
M. Lambert, Sûreté de Québec  
P.K. Manning, Michigan State University  
E.J. Webdale, Manitoba Police Commission

INTRODUCTION

While the researchers in the group tried to focus the discussion on technical problems of research, the police in the group felt that other issues needed to be clarified before research issues in law enforcement could be addressed; in particular they felt there was a need to define productivity and the role of the police.

DEFINITION OF PRODUCTIVITY

Considerable discussion took place regarding the definition of police productivity. It was stressed that the outputs were very difficult to measure: how can one separate the influence of the police from the influence of other factors?

The need for research to identify measures and indicators which would allow one to measure outputs of police productivity was stressed. In particular, it was mentioned that victimization surveys because of their cost: they wondered if the information which could be

obtained from such studies were worth their cost.

It was suggested that to look at productivity one has first to identify what the police are supposed to be doing. In this context, the questions of "why do we have a police force?" and "what does the community expect of the police?" were raised.

#### ROLE OF THE POLICE

The majority of the group felt that police services should reflect the values of the community. The role of the police was defined as being twofold:

1. protection of life and property - this aspect of the role of the police includes prevention of crime and the delivery of essential police services like traffic, and other non-law enforcement services which are generally provided by the police;
2. investigation of crime (enforcement/apprehension).

The community, it was suggested, expects the police to fulfil those two roles, and in order to find out whether the police are productive, one has to go to the community. In this context, the way to evaluate police services would be to use the community as a gauge in order to find out whether the police are providing the services which the community requires. Cost should not be the only factors examined when evaluating police services, priorities should be established according to community values and only then should cost be considered.

RESEARCH ISSUES

Regarding research in the police area, two issues were briefly addressed:

- The portability of research results from one country to another - the consensus of the group was that some caution should be exercised when using research which was done in a different country but that the results could be of some help.
  
- The fact that researchers were now better accepted by the police community - it was stressed, however, that care should be exercised by researchers in order to build and protect their creditibility.

*Use of Research by Police  
Departments to Maximize  
Productivity  
Discussion Group 5(b)*

Leader: L. Scherlowski, R.C.M. Police  
Assistant: G.L. Kelling, Police Foundation  
Participants: M. Martin, Canadian Police College  
s. Rizkalla, Centre Internationale de Criminologie  
Comparée, Université de Montréal  
W.J. Shrubbs, Peterborough P.D.  
G.R. Wallace, B.C. Police Commission  
P.K. Manning, Michigan State University  
R.L. Miles, Central Saanich P.D.

This discussion group was asked to examine the broad topic of "The Role of Research", within the following sub-topics:

- (1) Examine the needs and uses for Law Enforcement Research.
- (2) Police Productivity and its relationship to Research.
- (3) Critically examine issues which enhance the acceptance and implementation of research results.
- (4) Critically examine the resistance to accept and/or implement research results.
- (5) What approaches should be developed to overcome acceptance resistance.

Although the intent was to examine each sub-topic, this was not the case. In general, attention was focused on the different phases of research and what is required to obtain meaningful results.

It was agreed that throughout the research cycle, and of direct relationship to the discussion points, communication between researchers and users was of importance.

The conveying of well defined research problems to the research community is the responsibility of the eventual users of research results. On this being established, users in this case the police, are to be involved in the development of methodology, which is to be applied by the researcher in an effort to satisfy the research need. Development of close working relationships between researchers and police agencies, for whom research is being conducted is necessary in order that during this critical phase a viable information exchange mechanism is operating.

Cooperative working relationships have been found to enhance research efforts for the police and every effort by researchers and users should be made to promote this type of productive research.

*Resistance to Change*

*Discussion Group 6*

Leader: R.J. Stewart, Vancouver P.D.  
Assistant: R.N. Heywood, R.C.M. Police  
Participants: D. Farmer, LEAA  
A.R. Rice, Ottawa P.D.  
W.J. Snowden, Ministry of the Solicitor General  
J. Tronrud, Winnipeg P.D.

The group members discussed change and its implications for police. Outlined in the following narrative are a number of them.

"Change" simply for the sake of change is neither warranted nor good for the organization or its members. "Change" must have a purpose; a goal; a goal shared by both management and members.

Change is seldom considered then, unless it is designed to bring about improved efficiency, improved working conditions, or as a means of better realizing organizational or personal goals. Why then would there be "resistance" to change? Let's examine what form resistance can take.

Resistance to change is a natural phenomena as old as time itself. It means entering into unfamiliar areas; to deal with different problems; to face new challenges. It means to depart from the traditional, accepted routines and includes the risk of failing to effectively accomplish the change.

Resistance by management can simply be due to a lack of confidence in their management skills, including the inability to plan and execute a program of change. The para-military background of Police Departments tends to reduce the opportunity for innovation as most managers have risen through the ranks as the result of a reward system based on performing the traditional roles.

This system has not allowed for changing times. It has been self-perpetuating and internalized, not allowing for flexibility in order to address new problems. Police organizations themselves then have resisted change as a result of this situation. Resistance to change on our organizations requires a thorough examination if we are to effectively keep pace with the demands and expectations of the public we serve.

Whether we have them documented or not, there are goals for the organization as well as goals for the individuals who make up the organization and these goals may often be at variance. Coupled with the fact that the employee has psychological needs unlike the organization, we see a setting conducive to resistance. It is, therefore, necessary in planning change within our Departments that we consider the effective management of change.

The key to success is the properly selected administrator who possesses the technical, human and conceptual skills to effectively analyse, plan and execute a process of change.

The technical skills are necessary to fully understand the mechanics of implementation at the line level. An individual himself may not, in fact, have a complete working knowledge but by a participatory management arrangement he can gather the expertise around him. This would be a departure from the traditional autocratic style predominant in many Departments.

The human skills are required to effectively deal with people and people problems in the organization. This is a vital requirement because people are, in fact, the instruments of change in an organization. It is necessary to understand how change is perceived by people and to manage and lead them through the process. This is when the difference between personal and organizational concerns and needs must be balanced. Once again, a reason for participation.

It is often difficult to get people to change, especially if they believe they are doing the right thing already. You may have to demonstrate the need for change by challenging their effectiveness and comparing it with alternatives. Allowing personnel to participate in planning and making decisions will promote a personal commitment to the process and a desire to succeed. They will also have an opportunity to learn about and compare the goals of the organization with their own.

Conceptual skills are required for the global planning and understanding the effects of change on other related activities, both internal and external to the organization. The list of concerns includes such things as budget, politics, union agreements, public reaction and employee morale.

Once it is determined that a new level of performance is required, the subject must be given full consideration and exposure in such a way that all levels of the organization are cognizant of the need for change.

Following this, there must be an opportunity for input of the creative or innovative variety along with a thorough examination of previously tested projects. The brainstorming or group-think approach is a worthwhile exercise at this point, as it maximizes the sources of input and provides a form of communication. It is important that those persons who will be responsible to ultimately execute the plan are part of the early stages of planning and development. Failure to develop early understanding and

cooperation will require additional time and effort later in the project when line personnel show a lack of enthusiasm over yet another "top level" idea.

As part of the total planning process, consideration must also be given to details such as changes in policy and procedures, updating amending or deleting as required. Policy amendments will require the approval of Police Commissioners and Municipal Councils as the case may be and must be justifiable in those arenas. The changes must be operationally sound and politically acceptable.

Procedures which have been practiced for many years will have to be amended due to new approaches. The best way to handle this concern is to set up new procedures on a trial basis, allowing for a period of testing and evaluation before formally setting them in place. This, again, allows for the input of those line personnel who will be required to accomplish the task.

Implementing change will bring new problems of communication within the organization which must be addressed, if not resolved, in the planning stages.

There will be a need to consider training and re-training of personnel at the outset and during the term of the project. The early planning activities should consider these needs as pre-training is a proper lead-in to a change process. It provides an opportunity to improve personal skills, introduce details of the project for consideration, and to initiate positive attitudinal change.

Almost all change procedures require budget considerations either in additional or re-directed funds. This particular aspect commands the attention of the administrator who must deal with spiralling and exorbitant policing costs.

Another area with major implications is the need to gain the co-operation of the Police and Civilian Union or Association. There will, undoubtedly, be a need to modify job descriptions and changes in working conditions can be expected. Like individual employees, there is a real need to involve the Unions in early discussions. In some jurisdictions, it is already a requirement that Unions be given early notice of changes which affect working conditions.

Every change process introduced into an organization will have a set of implications, whether they be minor or major in degree, which will in turn create a need for further modification. It may mean an adjustment to the organizational structure in terms of the line of authority or require a review of the various job descriptions. Certain job functions may have to undergo analysis and restructuring where appropriate. Traditional lines of communication could no longer be effective and require re-ordering and testing. An ineffective system of communication, whether it be vertical or horizontal, will have serious implications for the organization.

Any change in the organizational structure usually results in more or less positions being identified and this relates eventually to manpower costs for management. Will there be an increase or decrease in budget? In these days of economic restraint, we would assume the goal is decreased costs. It is safe to assume that this process will be resisted by the employees through their respective Associations who, at least, will attempt to preserve the status quo. This is an area for serious consideration by those who are planning and managing change.

The problem of communication within groups has received a lot of attention in the past and is a favourite topic for discussion in all management training programmes and text books. This subject has come to the fore largely because of the rapid pace of change in society in general and so it has become an extremely important issue in our organizations.

How well we do things depends largely on how we communicate, regardless of the form, to one another both within and outside the group. This is particularly true in respect to a service organization who will be evaluated on its performance or level of service as seen by the consumer. It is critical that all employees understand the goals, objectives and tasks as outlined by the organization and that these are communicated to the public. On the other hand, public needs and expectations must be known to the organization which is then responsible for the delivery of the service in an effective manner as the available resources will allow.

There is very little documented information on the various change processes that have taken place in Police Departments in recent years. We do know that those which have been well managed have been the most effective. The successful formula, as previously stated, is in the selection of a sound management team who can recognize the problem and prescribe the correct remedy. Unfortunately, the successfully tested prescriptions are seldom documented and, therefore, unavailable to others who may be experiencing the same problems.

Ironically, Police Departments keep copious amounts of information on all operational activities, but very seldom record the business of the management process. In the future, more attention should be paid to documenting experiences and through a central repository, making those experiences available to the police community throughout the country.

*Internal Indicators/Measures of Productivity*

*Discussion Group 7*

Leader: W.J. Brown, Edmonton P.D.  
Assistant: R. W. Gertzen, R.C.M. Police  
Participants: B. Adam, R.C.M. Police  
R. Gendron, Commission de Police de Québec  
V.N. Macdonald, Queen's University  
J.A. Needle, American Justice Institute  
F.J. Prévost, National Task Force on the  
Administration of Justice  
W.J. Whetstone, Alberta Solicitor General

The approach taken by the group was to discuss a series of issues generated from a literature search of evaluation criteria and measures of productivity. This review had been completed by the leader in preparation for the Workshop and is an attachment to this report.

It was agreed by the group that the first step in performance measurement is to identify or define measurable goals for police agencies, and, in consultation with the proper authorities, to establish priorities for research and implementation. The group felt that there was a need to conduct performance measurement research which seeks to supplement traditional criteria consistent with police agency objectives. Group consensus was the requirement to follow systematic and reliable procedures for performance evaluation and to develop resource personnel with expertise to improve current performance measurement systems. Following considerable discussion, it was agreed that there is a necessity to

establish standards of performance based on cumulative experience and acceptable to the community. On the last point, consensus was not achieved; while several in the group believed it was necessary to use care and caution in interjurisdictional performance comparison, the remainder of the group felt that they were of little value and should be discontinued.

Because of limited time in the group session, it was not possible to discuss basic evaluation criteria; as mentioned, this material is available in the attached report.\*

\* Alternatives in Performance Measurement for Policing. Paper prepared by William T. Brown, Operations Analysis Section, Edmonton Police Department, May, 1978.

*Productivity and Police Associations*

*Discussion Group 8*

Leader: J.C. Rondou, Service de Police de la Communauté  
Urbaine de Montréal

Assistant: D. Forcese, Carleton University

Participants: D.M. Giljam, Saskatchewan Police College  
W. Johnson, London Police Department  
R.J. Roche, Newfoundland Constabulary  
E.J. Webdale, Manitoba Police Commission

Unions were born out of the industrial period. They wrenched workers free from the conditions of bondage to which they had been subjected. People gathered together to confront the exploitation they were subjected to. They began to talk about working conditions, hours, wages, seniority, vested interests and so on.

Employers were confronted with a new situation: negotiating instead of imposing terms. This was the beginning of a new era which was to affect the performance, efficiency, output and productivity of the workers.

The police were no strangers to these developments and in America, policemen organized themselves into associations and brotherhoods. Seventy-five per cent of all policemen are now represented by associations, either exclusively for policemen or affiliated with international unions such as the Teamsters.

The topic our group had for discussion, therefore, was certainly one of current interest and was a particular problem for many police forces.

The participants tried to limit discussion to two aspects of the situation.

First we tried to determine, on the one hand, the role and objective of these associations that are so readily called "the enemy within" and, on the other, the managerial right which the employer must exercise.

More and more, the union seems to be intruding into "employer business". Are we heading toward joint, "union-employer" management, and is this desirable?

The second aspect led us to a discussion of the confrontations and the contempt surrounding contract or collective agreement negotiations and the necessity of maintaining good human relations so that policies and objectives which are part of a plan of action may be established in a calm atmosphere.

The Committee came to an agreement in support of the opinion that the role of police associations is to obtain the best possible working conditions for its members and that on the other hand, police management must obtain the best services at the lowest cost.

The unions also have a responsibility. The future administrators will be chosen from among its ranks; hence, there should be no trend toward collective mediocrity by presentation of excessive and illogical demands.

The administration of a police force must show strong and steadfast leadership in the face of the informal authority flaunted by certain unions.

Both police administrators and unionized policemen have a common goal: to protect citizens. Therefore, the "enemy within" concept should disappear and be replaced by improved dialogue, beneficial discussion and a sincere desire for management to explain the situations and problems it must face. The philosophy of joint management must be studied and, in certain cases, applied. Staff must be involved in decision-making; this will enhance the value of certain duties and give policemen as a body the feeling that they are participating in the organization.

Unionized policemen are choosing leaders who are more and more educated and articulate.

It is therefore of prime importance that the current police administrators retrain and better themselves by taking advantage of the facilities offered to them and the courses which are available almost everywhere in schools, colleges and universities, not to mention the specialized courses at the Canadian Police College.

The discussion group came out in favour of workshops made up of police administrators and unionized workers being organized in order to promote discussion and examine productivity factors.

Lastly, we were all in agreement in opposing membership of both officers and subordinates in the same union.

The group recommended that police administrators do what is necessary for all non-ranking policemen to belong to one union so that the officers can carry out their role and responsibilities adequately and with a view to better productivity.

*External Measures/Indicators of  
Productivity*

*Discussion Group 9*

Leader: A.M. Pate, Police Foundation  
Assistant: B. Sawyer, Calgary P.D.  
Participants: C. Balik, Ministry of the Solicitor General  
M. Lioy, Ministry of the Solicitor General  
F.R. Lipsett, National Research Council  
C. Nuttall, Ministry of the Solicitor General  
J.P. Parent, Service de Police de la  
Communauté Urbaine de Montréal

A number of factors relating to the external measures of productivity were discussed. Some of these were:

Crucial to the determination of external measures of productivity, it was agreed, is a delineation of what the police are expected to produce. Although much of the conference had focused upon the enforcement of law and the maintenance of order, an accumulating body of research indicates that what occupies most of a police officer's time is the provision of services to citizens. It is from the "clients" to whom those services are provided that external measures of police productivity may be derived.

A number of different dimensions might be measured. Citizens might be asked, for example, to describe their behaviours that are relevant to the police. Such questions as whether they have installed security devices, whether they carry weapons, whether they avoid certain areas of their city, and whether they have requested police assistance might be pertinent in this regard. Experiences also might be inquired about. For example, citizens might be asked whether they have been

victimized, whether they have observed others being victimized, or whether they have been stopped by the police.

Citizens might also be asked about their perceptions. In this realm, the extent to which they fear being victimized, the frequency with which they perceive police in their neighborhood and the nature of problems in their area would be among the most pertinent issues to be addressed. Finally, the evaluations of citizens might be elicited regarding the police. For example, citizens could be requested to indicate the extent to which they behave - respectfully, thoroughly, honestly and fairly.

It would be possible to acquire such measures from members of the general public, owners and managers of businesses and institutions, persons requesting police assistance, suspected or convicted offenders, persons questioned by the police and witnesses to arrests. Further information could be obtained from reports of trained observers of police behavior. Finally, certain types of archival data, such as the costs and sales of crime-related insurance, the sales of security devices, commercial revenues and attendance figures at public gatherings might be used as measures of importance to the police.

A large number of methodological issues must be addressed before such external measures may be accepted. The validity and reliability of the scales used must be established; sampling frames must be determined; survey administration techniques must be refined; the frequency of measurement must be ascertained. Because of the complexity of these issues, it is advisable that researchers with experience in the field of survey research and attitude measurement be involved in the process.

Once such measures are obtained, it is possible to use them to make comparisons between individual officers, between units, across time periods, across geographical areas or even across departments.

Using such measures would allow police administrators to evaluate prevailing practices and to identify those areas in which problems existed of sufficient magnitude to justify changes in policy and technique. Such external measures have been utilized in several cities in the United States and, the members of the discussion group agreed, the experiences in those cities might profitably be applied in Canada.

*Steps Involved in Preparing the  
Re-organization of a Police Agency*

*Discussion Group 10*

Leader: T. Zaharchuk, Decision Dynamics Corp.  
Assistant: J.R. Dufort, Commission de Police de Québec  
Participants: S. Fairweather, Ontario Police Commission  
J. Graham, Macdonald Commission on the R.C.M.P.  
J. Jessup, City of Vancouver

This small Group met in the second day of the two-day Workshop. Therefore, many of the issues which arose originated in previous small group discussions or Workshop presentations. We list the issues and the most important discussion points made in the order that they occurred during our session.

1. Re-organization was interpreted to mean structural change:

There are two types of re-organizations that might occur in any agency - a fundamental structural change or a simple "body shuffle". The latter type of re-organization occurs when there is a perceived need to deploy senior officers or when a vacancy occurs because of retirement or other similar circumstances. For the purposes of our discussion, we did not consider this type of re-organization.

Structural change in organization was of more interest to our group. Our first observation was that structural change, although periodically essential to the police agency, is both dangerous to the stability of the organization and community perceptions of what the organization is designed to do. In a presentation made to the Workshop, George Kelling described the disastrous effect of organizational change in

the Dallas Police Department. This illustrated some of the risks of organizational change for police managers.

2. When is there a need for structural change in a police organization?

There were a variety of reasons given for organizational changes. Often they occur because of pressure from higher government authorities, either at the provincial level or through Police Commissions. Often this pressure manifests itself as an interest in reducing costs or improving the efficiency of the police agency. Alternatively, any drastic change in the morale of the police force, particularly as expressed by constables and NCOs is given as a valid reason for re-organizing the agency.

While the above reasons given for re-organization may be valid, and may justify the risks associated with instability in re-organization, another and more powerful reason for engineering a re-organization was mentioned. A re-organization is required if there is a perceived and acknowledged new community demand for particular police services that are not being provided by the existing organization. For example, if there is a demand for more "community policing involving new priorities for crime prevention", the police agency must be re-organized to cope with the new demands which are placed on it. These new demands cannot be grafted into the existing organization by simply establishing a number of new units. The new demands may well require a new "style" of policing and these will require the acknowledgement of a major re-organization.

3. The police chief must believe in the new "style" or philosophy of the re-organization.

Unlike any other organization, the police force is oriented around the style and philosophy of one man: the police chief. Even though many of the officers in a large urban police force may rarely interact with the police chief, they know his philosophy and act accordingly.

4. It takes a great deal of time to develop and implement a structural re-organization of a police force.

Often senior executives believe that the re-organization is complete after the new divisions or units have been created and manpower deployed accordingly. In fact, practical reality suggests a much longer time frame. A re-organization may not be complete, and it may not be absorbed by all evels of command many years after its inception.

To reduce the time required for complete absorption of the re-organization by the police agency, steps must be taken to ensure that all officers believe in the philosophy of the re-organization. The chief must identify with the new process. Some sort of incentive program involving new potential for advancement must be identified with the program. Finally, the new organization should be seen to contribute to job enrichment. If the re-organization makes the day-to-day work of field officers more interesting, it is bound to have an impact on performance and productivity.

5. Structural re-organization should involve the community.

Surprisingly, the entire discussion group agreed with the need for community involvement in police re-organization. We concurred that police are playing an increasingly important community leadership function. The police agency should grow with the community and its general philosophy towards organization as well as law enforcement should reflect community interests. Therefore, the community should be kept completely informed about major changes taking place within the police agency.

The group participants stressed that the increased need for community involvement imposes a new demand on the role of the police chief.

The modern police chief must have refined skills of negotiation and interaction with a wide variety of community agencies. The style of the modern police chief is becoming more oriented towards the "conciliator" and "temporizer", as opposed to the classic "man of action/crime fighter" that predominated ten years ago.

*Need for Interaction and Information  
Sharing Between Police Forces*

*Discussion Group 11*

Leader: B. Anderson, R.C.M. Police  
Assistant: V. Rawlins, Ministry of the Solicitor General  
Participants: A. Burrows, Home Office, U.K.  
K. Deevy, Ministry of the Solicitor General  
J.L. Erskine, Ontario Provincial Police  
C.R. Eves, National Research Council

The discussion of this topic reviewed the development of national police information systems, from their origins with the creation of the Central Fingerprint Bureau in Ottawa in 1908, to the establishment of the Canadian Police Information Centre in 1972. The major co-ordinative and creative mechanisms behind these innovations were identified as Federal Provincial Conferences, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Canadian Police Services of the R.C.M.P.

It was agreed that there were not sufficient evaluative controls built into the design of new information systems. There appears to be a real need to determine if existing systems are fulfilling the expectations of the users, so that in the event they are not, adjustments can be made. New information systems should be designed to account for a continuing post-implementation evaluation to address the concern for maximum productivity.

The technology explosion has put the computer within reach of all but the smallest Canadian police forces. The emphasis is currently on serving their internal needs in the spheres of administration, with several systems incorporating computer assisted dispatch. An area ripe for development is the regional information system. This would be most useful in concentrated urban areas such as Ottawa and the lower mainland of British Columbia where a number of police forces are adjacent to one another. Criminal incidents and the people responsible for them are extremely difficult to correlate when municipal boundaries are so close together. The establishment of a properly designed regional information system has the potential to improve the efficiency of the departments involved, thereby increasing their productivity. Currently, the criminal profits knowingly from the lack of police awareness between jurisdictions.

The need for a national central information exchange service dealing with the results of research on such topics as police equipment, training and information systems was identified. Such a system would encourage the submission of the fruits of all types of research in the police field, and respond to specific enquiries from individual police agencies. It was recognized that the solutions to many police problems already exist, but the difficulty in identifying where to seek such information often leads to an agency re-inventing the wheel at great expense, and perhaps not as effectively as it might have. The potential to contribute to a higher level of productivity on the part of the Canadian police community, and at the same time to save incalculable time and money exists in the formation of a central information exchange service.

It was observed that many police agencies are seeking information on crimes and criminals directly from their counterparts in other countries. The major reason for this action is to obtain a quick reply to their

queries. Working via the Interpol apparatus evidently is frequently time consuming, leading agencies to seek a faster turnaround. An improvement in response time to queries funnelled through the Interpol system would not eliminate the occasional need for a department to directly contact a police agency in another country. It would, however, re-establish the original commitment to provide a comprehensive and timely service to the Canadian police community.

The education of serving policemen in the awareness of existing services to assist in the solution of crime and crime prevention techniques was judged to have a potential for increasing productivity. A full appreciation of the capabilities of information systems at the municipal, provincial and federal levels by the individual policeman can, and has allowed him to function at a much higher level of efficiency and effectiveness. If all police officers were more knowledgeable of the pools of data and their likely assistance to the job he is performing, a significant rise in productivity could be expected.

The exposure to, and practice of preventive policing techniques is also recognized as an area requiring a training effort. Individual officers, for the most part, are aware of the traditional work with youth and service organizations which make up the bulk of preventive policing programs. New approaches to the prevention strategy have been tested to good effect recently, and should be passed on to the street level. Although this activity does not relate to the increase of productivity in the sense that clearance rates improve, if effective, these programs release badly needed manpower to concentrate on other criminal activities.

Productivity increases are both desirable and possible in the information systems, research, and crime prevention spheres, and at a cost level which can be achieved at relatively low cost considering the size of the potential payoff.

The Discussion Group suggests a further study into these areas be pursued.

*The Future of Policing in Canada*

*Discussion Group 12(a)*

Leader: D. Koenig, Ministry of the Solicitor General  
Assistant: R. F. Lunney, Edmonton P.D.  
Participants: A. Grant, Osgoode Hall Law School  
R. Clarke, Home Office, U.K.  
I. Waller, Ministry of the Solicitor General

A brief paper, included as an appendix to this report, was prepared by Dan Koenig and circulated to the participants in advance of the meeting.

It was agreed that the issues raised in the appendix may be applicable to Canada as a whole, but they require local adjustments to be applicable for any specific police department because variables such as city size, population, age structure, concentrations of ethnic minorities, etc. will differ from one community to another.

Two major concerns expressed about forecasting the future were that:

- 1) such an exercise provides no assistance to the police practitioner who wants and needs information on productivity, as well as other problems, now, and
- 2) while the exercise of forecasting has some intrinsic appeal, the resulting information may not be useful if the officials responsible for dealing with problems confronting the police are not involved in the forecasting and are not encouraged to make the transition from identification of anticipated changes to a program of implementation for responding to such changes.

It was generally agreed that policing is a business and should be managed as any other business. This implies a marketing approach, including a specification of what services are to be provided, and a plan for staffing, promotion, recruitment, training, equipment, etc. which will be required to provide those services in an efficient and cost effective manner. It also implies short-term, intermediate, and long-range program forecasts, each of which should be annually reviewed and revised as necessary.

An observation also was made that discussions of potential future concerns are useful if they serve to stimulate critical seminal thinking on possible alternative courses of action. Such discussions will assist police managers to be better prepared, even if only subliminally, to take a proactive stance as problems arise rather than to take a reactive crisis-oriented response in responding to brush fires that break out from one day to another.

Other concerns discussed included: a reorientation of police efforts through the development of alternative reward structures, particularly non-monetary rewards providing intrinsic gratifications such as prestige and autonomy; an increased flexibility in responding to changing staffing needs that may be made possible by utilizing a hiring strategy involving term contracts, such as those used by universities for untenured faculty or a variant of the military model including the possibility of re-enlistment; lateral transfers; the possible development of the police as an umbrella service to include increased numbers of specialized civilians, such as social workers, under police management to recover the eroded police responsibility for involvement with certain categories of people such as drunks and vagrants; the possibility of an increased provincial role in policing, with a commensurate decline of federal involvement;

and questions concerning the definition of national security, as well as a subsequent reorientation of the policing role in relationship to national security.

Finally, the suggestion was made that resources of money and personnel are available both for research in response to current needs and for proactive research oriented toward being prepared for future contingencies, but that too few police executives are receptive to permitting their stewardship to be exposed to the potentially critical scrutiny of an evaluation by an independent outsider. At the same time, it was also suggested that police are far more receptive to such evaluations than are professions such as medicine, teaching, law, the judiciary, or the public service.

APPENDIX

THE FUTURE OF POLICING IN CANADA

(Dan Koenig)

There are several factors that are likely to effect the future of policing in Canada. These are fiscal austerity, sophisticated technological innovations, and a continuation of existing social trends.

Under the heading of fiscal austerity, it is unlikely that the public sector -- including police -- will continue its growth pattern of the last two decades. Indeed, rapid growth has already ceased and it may well be that we will even see a future reduction in the absolute number of public sector employees, including police. Strategies such as zero base budgeting and management by objectives are likely to be imposed upon police administrators and it is highly probable that even routine police practices increasingly are going to be subjected to potential criticisms on grounds of program efficiency and cost effectiveness. In addition, assuming continued "stagflation" and concentrated pockets of high levels of unemployment, Canadian police departments increasingly may be called upon to be prepared for new types of crowd control, as well as increased terrorism.

In regard to technological innovation, increasingly police will have at their disposal more and more sophisticated security and surveillance systems including voice detection, odor detection (for the identification of either persons or contraband), the use of space satellites for surveillance of people, space, goods, and conversations, and increased patrol, criminal investigation, and management informational use of new generations of computer technology. Against this, will be public and political demands to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the individual and to refrain from the use of technological

innovations if they unwarrantedly invade the privacy of the public or abridge the rights and freedoms of the general public or, particularly, opinion leaders. Further, the problem of white collar crime can be expected to take on an entirely new magnitude as we move toward a computerized and cashless society. This in turn suggests either a growth of civilians in police work or that the police recruit of the future may increasingly be an experienced lawyer, accountant, or university trained computer scientist rather than a younger person hired primarily to perform on the street.

Finally, we are likely to see a continuation of many social trends already in existence. These would include changes in the control of drug use, the changing age structure of the population, the continuing growth of private policing, a transfer of selected functions from police to social service or health care agencies, increased diversion from the CJS, increased decriminalization of offences, and demands for increased equity in the provision of police services, as well as for increased equal employment of minorities and women. These trends can be expected to impact on such things as traditional crime rates, the size of the police establishment, promotional opportunities, police morale and police performance.

*The Future of Policing in Canada*  
*Discussion Group 12(b)*

Leader: R.M. Lajoie, Quebec Department of Justice

Assistant: L. Hall, Hickling-Johnston Ltd.

Participants: A. Oosthoek, R.C.M.P.  
M. Lambert, Quebec Police Force  
T. Elton, Law Reform Commission of Canada  
A.C. Evelyn, Metro Toronto Police Association  
D. Demers, Ministry of the Solicitor General

For the sake of productivity and good performance, we spent an hour and a half in discussion, five minutes of which were devoted to preparing a report for the plenary session. Did we succeed in the task entrusted to us? We will let you be the judge.

Retrospective

We first made a brief retrospective study of factors which seem to have had a decisive effect on the development of policing in Canada during the last decade.

According to the adage that the past determines the future, we could not ignore certain events which had taken place in policing during the period between 1968 and 1978, for the last ten years have given rise to rapid development in this sector on the federal, provincial and municipal levels. Greater attention has been given to policing, especially the role of the police, the cost of its services, its effectiveness and its ethics.

The federal government established various police services in the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada. Moreover, in order to begin an investigation of public complaints, as well as of grievance procedures and discipline within the RCMP, it set up the Marin Commission which was to submit its report in 1976. The recently-formed Macdonald Commission was given the task of investigating various activities and operations of the RCMP.

The same concerns were evident on the provincial level. Although the Province of Ontario had already established a police commission, it organized the Hale Task Force on Policing in Ontario, which was to present its report in 1974.

Six other provinces - Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia - formed police commissions. In Alberta, a Law Enforcement Appeal Board was created.

On January 24, 1967, Quebec legislators appointed the Prévost Commission to investigate the administration of justice in criminal and penal matters in Quebec, and the Quebec Police Commission began its activities on August 1, 1968. In 1970 Mr. Jérôme Choquette, then Minister of Justice, published his white paper on the police and public security in which he defined certain objectives to be reached in view of the changing role of policing in Quebec.

On January 26, 1978, the Saulnier study group on the organization and functions of the Quebec police submitted its report to the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Mr. Marc-André Bédard, who had also appointed the Keable Commission to investigate certain activities and operations of the RCMP in Quebec.

It can therefore be stated beyond any shadow of a doubt that policing in Canada has been called into question several times during the last decade.

Impact

What has been the effect of this questioning, this re-examination?

- it seems that the various studies of these specialists have at least partially destroyed certain myths about the police;
- the legislators and the public are now better informed about policing and are more demanding in regard to its role in society;
- under examination, the police has been obliged to make rapid changes in its role, its duties and the quality of its services in relation to the cost of its operations;
- in certain spheres, police administrators and officers have recognized the need for professionalization;
- police associations and unions have given increased emphasis to the hardships and responsibilities of policing and demanded better working conditions, as well as certain privileges concerning consultation and joint responsibility in police administration and operations;
- the view of the police as a para-military force responding to crime and using as a basis for its activities and operations only criminal statistics, the many public calls it must answer and the workload of its investigators, seems to have been called into question;
- the leadership, administrative capacity and managerial ability of police authorities are considered prerequisites for humane, efficient and productive policing;
- the role of the police in Canadian society is now better defined and will have to be carried out with all due respect for the law, individual and collective rights, and community needs;
- the police will have to analyse and evaluate its activities in order to adapt to these needs;

- several public bodies have been given such duties and responsibilities as advising the police in regard to its activity, initiating procedures for gauging the quality and quantity of its services and assessing its ethics, as well as making all pertinent recommendations to the legislators;
- laws and regulations affecting the police and its role have been or are about to be passed;
- there has been a delegation of certain functions traditionally assumed by police forces - traffic regulation, special investigations, and so forth - to other services and agencies;
- police authorities must now face budget, personnel and material cutbacks;
- some municipal police forces have simply been disbanded; and so on.

#### Looking Ahead

For some police forces, the future has already arrived. Within a short time, they have had to make major internal changes with regard to interpretation of their role and use of human and material resources.

There has been evidence of a deep-seated concern and firm intention to achieve better results with less expenditures, at all levels of government.

Taxpayers can apparently no longer absorb the constantly increasing costs of police services, and the use of the human and material resources made available to police authorities is being re-examined.

The future of policing in Canada will be determined by the ability of the individuals and governments concerned to adapt quickly to the needs of Canada's democratic, liberal society and to the social changes brought about by urbanization, the drug problem, changing relationships between the sexes, the declining birth rate, economic recession, technological progress, automation and the advent of the computer, to mention only a few factors.

### Conclusion

In the question at hand, the present seems to be determining the future. The police will always be needed in our society. Gone are the days, however, when the police operated according to the personal idea which the director or chief of police had of his role, regardless of whether he advocated prevention, detection or repression. Police authorities will have to define their mission in terms of the needs of the community, using an appropriate combination of the above three approaches. They will have to place increasing emphasis on analysing their activity and operations in order to be able to evaluate their effectiveness and quality of performance, and, while facing budget and personnel cutbacks, learn to make greater use of the techniques and technological devices which science has made available.

Lastly, all policemen will have to perfect their knowledge in the humanities and social sciences so as to be able to meet the needs of society. If policemen fail to adapt rapidly to social changes, they will probably see their force fragmented and reduced to carrying out a single mission: law enforcement.

The members of our group apparently agreed that the next five years would bring major challenges to the directors and members of the Canadian police forces.

Researchers in the social sciences and humanities, and the study groups and commissions established by the various governments are forced for change, and their recommendations and suggestions concerning the mission and operations of the police seem to indicate that they will undoubtedly change during the next twenty years.

Such, in brief, were the important points made during the discussion held by our group at this Workshop.

A P P E N D I X A

BACKGROUND ARTICLES FOR THE WORKSHOP ON POLICE  
PRODUCTIVITY AND PERFORMANCE

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BACKGROUND ARTICLES FOR THE WORKSHOP ON POLICE  
PRODUCTIVITY AND PERFORMANCE \*

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1. THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT - G.L. Kelling, T. Pate, D. Dieckman, and C.E. Brown
2. THE POLICY IMPACT OF POLICY EVALUATION: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE KANSAS CITY PATROL EXPERIMENT - J. Henig, R.L. Lineberry, and N.A. Milner
3. WHAT HAPPENED TO PATROL OPERATIONS IN KANSAS CITY? A REVIEW OF THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT - R.C. Larson
4. A RESPONSE TO "WHAT HAPPENED TO PATROL OPERATIONS IN KANSAS CITY?" - T. Pate, G.L. Kelling, and C.E. Brown
5. IACP POSITION PAPER ON THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT
6. ON THE MEANING AND MEASUREMENT OF OUTPUT AND EFFICIENCY IN THE PROVISION OF URBAN POLICE SERVICES - E. Ostrom
7. THE MEASUREMENT OF POLICE OUTPUT: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES - R.C. Lind and J.P. Lipsky
8. INCREASING PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT - S.S. Souryal
9. POLICE DEPARTMENTS UNDER SOCIAL SCIENCE SCRUTINY - D. Guyot
10. THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS VOLUME I: SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS - P.W. Greenwood and J. Petersilia
11. AIDS TO DECISION-MAKING IN POLICE PATROL - J.S. Kakalik and S. Wildhorn
12. MEASURING AND IMPROVING THE PRODUCTIVITY OF POLICE PATROL - G.B. Hirsch and L.J. Riccio

\*all these articles were sent in advance of the workshop to the participants.

13. POLICE PRODUCTIVITY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR MEASUREMENT AND IMPROVEMENT - M. Holzer
14. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH IN POLICE PATROL: THE WILMINGTON SPLIT-FORCE EXPERIMENT - J.T. Nolan and L. Solomon
15. PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME, FEAR OF VICTIMIZATION, AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS - C.W. Thomas and J.M. Hyman
16. IMPROVING POLICE PRODUCTIVITY - A Special Report from the Police Foundation
17. PATROL STAFFING IN SAN DIEGO: ONE- OR TWO-OFFICER UNITS - J.E. Boydston, M.E. Sherry and N.P. Moelter
18. PATROL OPERATIONS: PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND IMPROVEMENT - W.J. Brown and D.B. Butler
19. POLICE RESEARCH: AN OVERVIEW - D.J. Farmer, K.J. Monte, W.E. Saulsbury, and W.P. Travers
20. AN EVALUATION OF THE RAND CORPORATION'S ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION - Daryl F. Gates and Lyle Knowles

BIBLIOGRAPHIES ON  
POLICE PRODUCTIVITY

Three bibliographies prepared by the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NILECJ - U.S. Department of Justice) were distributed to all participants after the workshop.

- Police productivity (88)
- Police performance evaluation (213)
- Police effectiveness measures

A P P E N D I X B

WORKSHOP PROGRAM

WORKSHOP PROGRAM

THURSDAY, MAY 25, 1978

8:30 - 9:00 Registration

9:00 - 11:00 Plenary Session

Welcome Address: *C/Supt. R.G. Moffatt  
Canadian Police College*

Opening Address: *Mr. B.C. Hosley  
Ministry of the Solicitor General*

Presentations:

I - The Problems of Definition and Measurement  
of Police Productivity

*Chief R.F. Lunney  
Edmonton Police Department*

II - Some General Considerations Affecting  
Productivity Improvement in Public  
Sector Organizations

*Prof. V.N. Macdonald  
Queen's University*

III - Police Program Performance Measurement:  
A Scheme for Gauging Effectiveness and  
Productivity

*Mr. J.A. Needle  
American Justice Institute*

11:00 - 11:15 Coffee

11:15 - 12:00 Plenary Session

Presentations:

IV - Police Effectiveness in Dealing with  
Crime: Some Current British Research

*Mr. R.V.G. Clarke  
Home Office, U.K.*

V - The Police Scientific Development Branch  
Role and Approach to Police Productivity

*Mr. A. Burrows  
Home Office, U.K.*

VI - Research and Police Productivity:  
The United States Experience

*Mr. D. Farmer*  
*LEAA, Washington*

12:00 - 1:00 Question Period

1:00 - 2:00 Lunch

2:00 - 3:30 Small Group Discussions:

1(a) - Pressure to Reduce Costs

Leader: *Mr. J. Jessup*  
*City of Vancouver*

Assistant: *A/Dep. Chief A.R. Rice*  
*Ottawa Police Department*

1(b) - Patrol

Leader: *Dr. G.L. Kelling*  
*Police Foundation*

Assistant: *Supt. R.N. Heywood*  
*R.C.M. Police*

1(c) - Criminal Investigation

Leader: *Mr. P.W. Greenwood*  
*Rand Corporation*

Assistant: *Mr. W.J. Brown*  
*Edmonton Police Department*

1(d) - Two-Man vs One-Man Patrol

Leader: *Insp. K. Fortier*  
*San Diego Police Department*

Assistant: *Dep./Chief R.J. Stewart*  
*Vancouver Police Department*

1(e) - Responsibility for Crime Prevention

Leader: *Dr. J. Hogarth*  
*University of British Columbia*

Assistant: *Chief B. Sawyer*  
*Calgary City Police*

- 1(f) - Crime Prevention Programs in Canada  
Leader: *Insp. W. Snowdon*  
*Ministry of the Solicitor General*  
Assistant: *S/Sgt. V. Rawlins*  
*Ministry of the Solicitor General*
- 2 - Productivity and Standards for the  
Delivery of Police Services  
Leader: *Insp. A. Oosthoek*  
*R.C.M. Police*  
Assistant: *Dr. C.R. Eves*  
*National Research Council*
- 3 - Decision-Making by Senior Police Administrators  
Leader: *Chief W. Johnson*  
*London Police Department*  
Assistant: *Dr. F. Lipsett*  
*National Research Council*
- 4 - The Productivity Issue in the Context of  
Management Training  
Leader: *Mr. M. Martin*  
*Canadian Police College*  
Assistant: *Insp. G.R. Wallace*  
*B.C. Police Commission*
- 5(a) - Technical Aspects of Research Aiming at  
the Development of Measures/Indicators  
of Productivity and Program Evaluation  
Leader: *Dr. M. Lioy*  
*Ministry of the Solicitor General*  
Assistant: *Mr. A.M. Pate*  
*Police Foundation*

3:30 - 5:00 Plenary Session

Small Group Reports and Discussion

5:30 - 6:30 Reception

6:30 Banquet

Guest Speakers: *Mr. A. Bissonnette*  
*Deputy Solicitor General of Canada*  
*Chief B. Sawyer*  
*Calgary City Police*

FRIDAY, MAY 26, 1978

8:30 - 9:00 Informal Discussion

9:00 - 10:05 Plenary Session

Presentations:

IV - Traditional and Innovative Policing

*Supt. R.N. Heywood*  
*R.C.M. Police*

V - Obstacles in Maximizing Productivity

*Prof. A. Grant*  
*Osgoode Hall Law School*

10:05 - 10:45 Question Period

10:45 - 11:00 Coffee

11:00 - 11:15 Plenary Session

Presentation:

VI - The Role of Research in Maximizing  
Productivity

*Dr. G.L. Kelling*  
*Police Foundation*

11:15 - 12:00 Question Period

12:00 - 1:30 Luncheon

Guest Speaker: *D/Comm'r. J.R.R. Quintal*  
*R.C.M. Police*

1:30 - 3:30 Small Group Discussions:

5(b) - Use of Research by Police Departments  
to Maximize Productivity

Leader: *Insp. L. Scherlowski*  
*R.C.M. Police*

Assistant: *Dr. G.L. Kelling*  
*Police Foundation*

- 6 - Resistance to Change  
Leader: *D/Chief R.J. Stewart*  
*Vancouver Police Department*  
Assistant: *Supt. R.N. Heywood*  
*R.C.M. Police*
- 7 - Internal Indicators/Measures of Productivity  
Leader: *Mr. W.J. Brown*  
*Edmonton Police Department*  
Assistant: *Insp. R.W. Gertzen*  
*R.C.M. Police*
- 8 - Police Associations and Productivity  
Leader: *Mr. J.C. Rondou*  
*Montreal Urban Community Police Force*  
Assistant: *Prof. D. Forcese*  
*Carleton University*
- 9 - External Indicators/Measures of Productivity  
Leader: *Mr. A.M. Pate*  
*Police Foundation*  
Assistant: *Chief B. Sawyer*  
*Calgary City Police*
- 10 - Steps Involved in Preparing the Reorganization of a Police Agency  
Leader: *Dr. T. Zaharchuk*  
*Decision Dynamics Corporation*  
Assistant: *Mr. J.R. Dufort*  
*Quebec Police Commission*
- 11 - Need for Interaction and Information Sharing Between Police Forces  
Leader: *Supt. B. Anderson*  
*R.C.M. Police*  
Assistant: *Insp. V. Rawlins*  
*Ministry of the Solicitor General*
- 12(a) - The Future of Policing in Canada  
Leader: *Dr. D.J. Koenig*  
*Ministry of the Solicitor General*  
Assistant: *Chief R.F. Lunney*  
*Edmonton Police Department*

12(b) - The Future of Policing in Canada

Leader: *Mr. R.M. Lajoie*  
*Quebec Department of Justice*

Assistant: *Mr. L. Hall*  
*Hickling-Johnston Ltd.*

3:30 - 5:00 Plenary Session

Small Group Reports and Discussion

5:00 Closing Address: *Mr. P. Engstad*  
*Workshop Chairperson*

A P P E N D I X C

WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

Insp. B. Adam  
Planning Branch  
R.C.M. Police  
1200 Alta Vista Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0R2

Supt. B. Anderson  
Canadian Police Information Centre  
R.C.M. Police  
1200 Alta Vista Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0R2

Mr. A. Bissonnette  
Deputy Solicitor General  
Ministry of the Solicitor General  
340 Laurier Ave. West  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0P8

Mr. W.J. Brown  
i/c Operations Analyses Section  
Edmonton Police Department  
4 Sir Winston Churchill Square  
Edmonton, Alberta  
T5J 2C2

Mr. A. Burrows  
Director  
Police Scientific Development Branch  
Home Office  
Horseferry House  
Dean Ryle Street  
London SW1P 2AW  
England

A/Dep. Chief A. Bussière  
Vanier Police Department  
Vanier, Ontario

Mr. R. Clarke  
Research Unit  
Home Office  
Queen Anne's Gate  
London SW1H 9AT  
England

Insp. K. Deevy  
R.C.M. Police  
1200 Alta Vista Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0R2

Dr. D. Demers  
Research Division  
Research & Systems Development Branch  
Ministry of the Solicitor General  
340 Laurier Ave. West  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0P8

M. J. Dufort  
Directeur  
Service de Conseillers en Matière  
Policrière  
Commission de Police du Québec  
2050 ouest, Boul. St-Cyrille  
Ste-Foy (Québec)  
G1V 2K8

Chief K. Duncan  
Gloucester Police Department  
Gloucester, Ontario

\*Mr. T. Elton  
Director, Policy Unit  
Policy Planning & Program Evaluation Branch  
Ministry of the Solicitor General  
340 Laurier Ave. West  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0P8

\*Mr. Elton was previously a member of the Law Reform Commission  
and has just recently become employed by the Ministry of the  
Solicitor General.

Mr. P. Engstad  
Research Division  
Research & Systems Development Branch  
Ministry of the Solicitor General  
340 Laurier Ave. West  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0P8

D/Comm'r. J.L. Erskine  
Ontario Provincial Police  
90 Harbor Street  
Toronto, Ontario  
M7A 2S1

Dr. J. Evans  
Research Division  
Research & Systems Development Branch  
Ministry of the Solicitor General  
340 Laurier Ave. West  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0P8

Mr. A. Evelyn  
Metro Toronto Police Association  
180 Yorkland Boulevard  
Willowdale, Ontario  
M2J 1R5

Dr. C.R. Eves  
Head, Protection & Forensic  
Science/N.A.E.  
Building M-55, Room 317-A  
National Research Council  
Montreal Road  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0R6

Mr. S. Fairweather  
Advisor on Administrative Technology  
Ontario Police Commission  
George Drew Building  
25 Grosvenor Street  
Toronto, Ontario  
M7A 2H3

Mr. D. Farmer  
Director  
Police Division  
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration  
633 Indiana Ave. N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20530  
U.S.A.

Prof. D. Forcese  
Department of Sociology  
Carleton University  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1S 5D6

Insp. K. Fortier  
San Diego Police Department  
801 W. Market, Room 140  
San Diego, Calif. 92101  
U.S.A.

Mr. L. Fytche  
Program Analyst  
General Government Services  
Treasury Board  
160 Elgin Street  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0R5

M. R. Gendron  
Service de la recherche et  
de la statistique  
Commission de Police du Québec  
2050 ouest Boul. St-Cyrille  
Ste-Foy (Québec)  
G1V 2K8

Insp. D. Gertzen  
Monitoring & Analysis Branch  
R.C.M. Police  
1200 Alta Vista Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0R2

Insp. D.M. Giljam  
A/Director of Training  
Saskatchewan Police College  
210 College West  
University of Regina  
Regina, Saskatchewan  
S4S 0A2

Mr. E. Glinfort  
Consultation Branch  
Ministry of the Solicitor General  
340 Laurier Ave. West  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0P8

Mr. J. Graham  
Macdonald Commission on the R.C.M.P.  
P.O. Box 1982, Station "B"  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1P 5R5

Prof. A. Grant  
Osgoode Hall Law School  
4700 Keele Street  
Downsview, Ontario  
M3J 2R5

Mr. P.W. Greenwood  
Criminal Justice Program Director  
Rand Corporation  
1700 Main Street  
Santa Monica, Calif. 90406  
U.S.A.

Mr. L. Hall  
Hickling-Johnston Limited  
415 Yonge Street  
Toronto, Ontario  
M5B 2E7

\*Supt. R.N. Heywood  
272 Avenue Road  
Kingston, Ontario

\*Supt. Heywood is attached to the Surrey Detachment of the R.C.M. Police,  
17695 - 56th Ave., Surrey, B.C. V3S 1E1 ( 574-4122), but will be at the  
above address until August 1, 1979.

\* Mr. B.C. Hofley  
Registrar  
Supreme Court of Canada  
Wellington Street  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0J1

Dr. J. Hogarth  
Faculty of Law  
University of British Columbia  
2075 Wesbrook Mall  
Vancouver, B.C.  
V6T 1W5

Mr. J. Jessup  
Social Planning Department  
City of Vancouver  
453 West 12 Avenue  
Vancouver, B.C.  
V5Y 1V4

Chief W. Johnson  
City of London Police Force  
P.O. Box 3415  
London, Ontario  
N6A 4K9

Mr. P. Kaskey  
Group Chief  
General Government Services  
Treasury Board  
160 Elgin Street  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0R5

Dr. G.L. Kelling  
Police Foundation  
1909 K Street N.W., Suite 400  
Washington, D.C.  
U.S.A.

\* Mr. B.C. Hofley was Assistant Deputy Minister, Research and Systems Development Branch, Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0P8.

Mr. C. Kilburn  
Commissioner and A/Chairman  
New Brunswick Police Commission  
County Court House  
Box 6000  
Fredericton, N.B.

Dr. D. Koenig  
Department of Sociology  
University of Victoria  
P.O. Box 1700  
Victoria, B.C.  
V8W 2Y2

M. R. Lajoie  
Attaché d'administration  
Direction générale de la Sécurité  
publique  
Ministère de la Justice  
Gouvernement du Québec  
1, Notre-Dame est  
Montréal (Québec)  
H2Y 1B6

M. M. Lambert  
Directeur général adjoint  
Direction de la planification  
Sûreté du Québec  
1701 rue Parthenais  
Montréal (Québec)  
H2L 4K7

Dr. M. Lioy  
Research Division  
Research & Systems Development Branch  
Ministry of the Solicitor General  
340 Laurier Ave. West  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0P8

Dr. F. Lipsett  
National Research Council  
Building M-50  
Montreal Road  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0R8

Chief R.F. Lunney  
Edmonton Police Department  
4 Sir Winston Churchill Square  
Edmonton, Alberta  
T5J 2C2

Prof. V.N. Macdonald  
School of Business  
Queen's University  
Kingston, Ontario

Dr. P.K. Manning  
Department of Sociology  
Berkley Hall  
Michigan State University  
East Lansing, Mich. 48824  
U.S.A.

Mr. M. Martin  
Manager  
Research & Program Development  
Canadian Police College  
P.O. Box 8900  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1G 3J2

Chief R.L. Miles  
Central Saanich Police Department  
7B56 E. Saanich Road  
Saanichton, B.C.  
V0S 1M0

C/Supt. R.G. Moffatt  
Director  
Canadian Police College  
P.O. Box 8900  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1G 3J2

Chief R. Morin  
Dept. de Police de Hull  
Hull (Québec)

Mr. F. Musten  
Canadian Police College  
P.O. Box 8900  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1G 3J2

Mr. J.A. Needle  
Director, National Project to Develop  
Police Program Performance Measures  
American Justice Institute  
1007 - 7th Street  
Sacramento, Calif. 95814  
U.S.A.

Mr. C. Nuttall  
Research Division  
Research & Systems Development Branch  
Ministry of the Solicitor General  
340 Laurier Ave. West  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0P8

Insp. A. Oosthoek  
o/c Policy & Planning Unit  
R.C.M. Police  
1200 West 73rd Street  
Vancouver, B.C.  
V6P 6G6

M. J.P. Parent  
Section de la planification  
Communauté Urbaine de Montréal  
750 Bonsecours  
Montréal (Québec)  
H2Y 3C7

Mr. A.M. Pate  
New Jersey Field Evaluation Office  
Police Foundation  
20 Park Place, Suite 901  
Newark, N.J. 07102  
U.S.A.

Mr. F.J. Prévost  
National Task Force on the  
Administration of Justice  
1190 Melville Street, Ste. 500  
Vancouver, B.C.

D/Comm'r. J.R.R. Quintal  
Canadian Police Services  
R.C.M. Police  
1200 Alta Vista Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0R2

S/Sgt. V. Rawlins  
Consultation Branch  
Ministry of the Solicitor General  
340 Laurier Ave. West  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0P8

D/Chief A.R. Rice  
Ottawa Police Force  
60 Waller Street  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1N 7G5

Dr. S. Rizkalla  
C.I.C.C.  
Université de Montréal  
C.P. 6120  
Montréal (Québec)

A/Dep. Chief J. Roche  
Newfoundland Constabulary  
Government of Newfoundland  
and Labrador  
St. John's, Nfld.  
A1C 5Y2

M. J.C. Rondou  
Directeur, District 3  
Communauté Urbaine de Montréal  
750 Bonsecours  
Montréal (Québec)  
H2Y 3C7

Chief/Const. B. Sawyer  
Calgary City Police  
316 - 7th Avenue S.E.  
Calgary, Alberta  
T2G 0J2

Insp. L. Scherlowski  
R & D Coordinator  
Science & Technology Advisory Group  
R.C.M. Police  
1200 Alta Vista Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0R2

Chief W.J. Shrubbs  
Peterborough Police  
500 Water Street  
Peterborough, Ontario  
K9H 3M4

Insp. W. Snowdon  
Consultation Branch  
Ministry of the Solicitor General  
340 Laurier Ave. West  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0P8

D/Chief R.J. Stewart  
Vancouver Police Department  
312 Main Street  
Vancouver, B.C.  
V6A 2T2

D/Chief J. Tronrud  
Winnipeg Police Department  
P.O. Box 1680  
Winnipeg, Manitoba  
R3C 2Z7

Insp. G.R. Wallace  
B.C. Police Commission  
1550 - 409 Granville Street  
Vancouver, B.C.  
V6C 1T2

Dr. I. Waller  
Director General, Research Division  
Research & Systems Development Branch  
Ministry of the Solicitor General  
340 Laurier Ave. West  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0P8

Mr. E.J. Webdale  
Police Services Consultant  
Manitoba Police Commission  
5th Floor, Woodsworth Building  
405 Broadway Avenue  
Winnipeg, Manitoba  
R3C 3L6

Chief G. Wersch  
Nepean Police Department  
Nepean, Ontario

Mr. L. Wevrick  
Information Systems & Statistics  
Division  
Research & Systems Development Branch  
Ministry of the Solicitor General  
340 Laurier Ave. West  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0P8

Mr. B. Whetstone  
Program Development Officer  
Alberta Solicitor General  
7th Floor, Melton Building  
10310 Jasper Avenue  
Edmonton, Alberta  
T5J 1Y8

Dr. T. Zaharchuk  
Decision Dynamics Corporation  
Suite 800, 42 Charles St. East  
Toronto, Ontario  
M4Y 1T4

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GENERAL OF CANADA

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OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
CANADA K1A 0P6



