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
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**SPECIAL
REPORT**

1



**Department of the
Solicitor General**

**DESIGN OF
FEDERAL
MAXIMUM
SECURITY
INSTITUTIONS**

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/REPORT

of the

**WORKING GROUP ON FEDERAL
MAXIMUM SECURITY
INSTITUTIONS DESIGN,**


appointed by

*The Honourable Jean-Pierre Goyer
Solicitor General of Canada*

*Canada, Working Group on Federal Maximum
Security Institutions Design.*

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Ottawa, November 30, 1971.


The Honourable Jean-Pierre Goyer,
Solicitor General of Canada,
Sir Wilfrid Laurier Building,
340 Laurier Avenue West,
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Sir:


The Working Group on Federal Maximum Security Institutions Design wishes to submit its report with the following observations. In the time available to us, we have focussed on the development of basic principles concerning definitions, program, staffing and the design of facilities. Our deliberations have been mainly influenced by and gained direction from an extensive process of consultation and dialogue with individuals and groups, and we have interpreted "ideal" as the optimum possible under present conditions of knowledge and sentiment. It is superfluous to spell out to you, but we would like to state, nevertheless, that in this area absolute ideal solutions are neither possible, nor should findings be presumed to be of long term value, since changing conditions in society will change assumptions as well as needs. Changing conditions do not only apply historically, but also geographically, and we have been impressed that beyond general principles which should apply across the country, specific solutions have to be found on a regional basis. The primary need, therefore, is for flexibility and continuous learning and development.

To us, the submission of this report is neither the high point nor the final outcome of our work. It is simply a necessary stage giving direction to the detailed work needed for implementation. The important points of our study were in the discussions with staff, inmates and community groups, a sharing which can only be inadequately expressed in a report, but which can be considered to be even more important for laying a groundwork for further developments than the report itself. We strongly believe that the recommendations given in this report have widespread support among the members of the public who have been sufficiently concerned to make representations to us.


Respectfully yours,




J.W. Mohr, Chairman



L. Béliveau




W.T. McGrath, Secretary




J. W. Braithwaite




C. Genest, Associate Secretary



A.M. Kirkpatrick



M.J.M. LeCorre




H.F. Smith



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CONSULTATION It was recognized that consultation with people from a wide range of backgrounds and experience was needed. It was also recognized that while certain general principles related to the care of maximum security inmates could be laid down on a national basis, adjustments would be required to meet the peculiar needs and circumstances of the different regions. That necessitated consultation from all sections of the country.

To provide this, each of the provincial and regional criminology/corrections associations was asked to appoint a person to serve as liaison and assist the Working Group in canvassing suggestions and advice from his area. These associations, along with the name of the person who served as liaison, are set out in Appendix A.

Visits were paid by the Working Group to Vancouver, Matsqui, Edmonton, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec, Moncton and Dorchester. In each area discussions were held with a number of individuals or groups, not only from the city where the discussions were held, but from other areas of the respective provinces. In the case of the meetings at Moncton, this involved groups from all four Atlantic Provinces.

Among the groups consulted were:

- (a) Headquarters staff members, Department of the Solicitor General;
- (b) Penitentiary administrative, classification, treatment and security staffs and inmates;
- (c) Representatives of the Solicitor General Component of the Public Service Alliance of Canada;
- (d) National Parole Board members and National Parole Service staff;
- (e) Senior staff of the provincial correctional services;
- (f) Representatives of citizen groups brought together by the provincial or regional criminology/corrections association. Included were ex-offender groups, groups representing Indian and Métis communities, the churches, aftercare agencies, groups working with alcoholics and drug users, and groups active within the penitentiaries. A list of the citizen groups and individual citizens consulted appears as Appendix B.

A special meeting with representatives of the correctional services of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba and the criminology/corrections associations from those provinces was held during the Canadian Congress of Criminology and Corrections in June at Ottawa. During the same period a meeting was held with the directors of federal maximum security institutions.

In addition, a number of individuals were invited at various times to consult with the Working Group. A list of these individuals is set out in Appendix C.

A list of organizations and individuals who made written submissions to the Working Group appears as Appendix D.

METHODS OF WORK The Working Group began its assignment with no precommitment as to the kind of institutional facilities required. It sought answers to the following questions in sequence:

What are the proper criteria to be used in determining which penitentiary inmates require maximum security?

How many such inmates are there among the present penitentiary population? Would the number be reduced if different programs and facilities were available?

What are the characteristics of these inmates and what program is required for them?

What kind and number of staff is required to implement such a program?

What institutional facilities, including location, are required for such a program, at the same time providing adaptability to accommodate the new program as further knowledge is gained?

It was assumed that alternative facilities would be made available for all those inmates now in maximum security who would not be so classified under our suggested new criteria. This would include psychiatric facilities, and medium and minimum security institutions to hold certain kinds of inmates not suited to the institutions in these security classifications now available. Separate classification facilities are also needed.

Plans are already under way within the Penitentiary Service to provide some of these facilities.

THE CONCEPT OF MAXIMUM SECURITY

Despite a great deal of dissatisfaction, the classification scheme of maximum, medium and minimum security has shown remarkable resilience, not only in Canada, but also in other jurisdictions. This is not surprising, since the primary purpose of prisons has been to carry out the sentence of the court which demanded that the offender be kept in safe custody until his sentence was satisfied. The diversification of sentencing practices through such devices as suspended sentence and probation and the introduction of such administrative processes as parole, mandatory supervision and work release have brought a variety of considerations into the concept of security. The Canadian Committee on Corrections, therefore, in its report came to the following conclusions:

“A prison must not be viewed as a separate, and self-sufficient institution. Instead, each prison should be seen as an integral part of a broader system of services within an overall correctional program. Each prison must, therefore, be planned not only to serve its peculiar and specific function but also to complement the work of the other services so that the common aim may be accomplished.”

The Committee goes on to say that: “The prison should also be considered part of the community it serves, not as something apart leading an existence of its own”. The Working Group has given a great deal of thought to the problem of classification and received a number of submissions on it. It recognized that the concept of security has been modified by the concept of self-responsibility seen as a progression through maximum to medium to minimum security and then to the community. It also recognized that classification of offenders should be an ongoing process but found it impossible within the context of this report to do justice to this important problem. Although some of our thinking is reflected in the chapters on process and program, there is an urgent need for further study of classification.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that at present the federal maximum security institutions house many different kinds of inmates, only a portion of whom are dangerous. Included, besides the dangerous offenders, are those who are primarily psychiatric cases (some of whom may be dangerous), those needing protection from other inmates, those not interested in reform and whose presence in the medium or minimum security institutions now available disrupts the program there, those who desire some special training available only in the maximum security institution, those performing some special service in the

maximum security institution and those who ask to be located in a particular area. The classification units where newly-sentenced inmates are received and classified are also located within the maximum security institutions.

Whatever classification system might be developed for the federal prison system as a whole, maximum security facilities should be reserved for offenders who require them for the protection of the community, the staff or other inmates. Since the satisfactory return of the offender to the community should be the final outcome, implying the ability to live with a minimum of external controls, the need for these controls has to be reduced before satisfactory release can be expected and should never be imposed after the reception and classification process unless they are found to be necessary. The Working Group has adopted the following criteria for confining inmates in maximum security institutions:

1. (a) inmates who actively try to escape and will be dangerous to the public if they do;
(b) inmates who are actually or potentially dangerous to staff, other program participants or other inmates;
2. inmates who are not primarily psychiatric cases.

In selecting these types of offenders for maximum security institutions, the Working Group recognizes that a serious problem of labelling and of interaction between persons whose behaviour is socially highly undesirable is created. On the other hand, it does make it possible for other institutions to operate on a lower level of restriction and anxiety. Institutions charged with holding people will tend to organize their life with a view to the highest potential risk, thus subjecting others to unnecessary restrictions. With reduced emphasis on static security and increased emphasis on dynamic security of responsible staff-inmate and inmate-inmate interaction, a better definition of risk and its reduction may be expected. At the present time, we feel that institutions serving high security needs are necessary, but only for a limited number of inmates.

We realize there is a view that it is dangerous to house all the volatile personalities in one institution and that some medium security inmates should be included in the population to provide a restraining influence. We feel that in principle this is a misuse of the medium security inmates who should be experiencing the correctional program best designed to aid their own growth and development. It seems also to be ineffective as the aggressive inmates will usually dominate these other inmates through the process of the prison sub-culture.

It should be stressed that very few inmates are violent or even potentially violent at all times. Violence is a function of personality characteristic in interaction with specific situations and it should be recognized that certain conditions in institutions increase the potential for violence for some persons. In fact, confinement in a maximum security institution itself may elicit behaviour responding to the expectation which "maximum security" implies.

The Working Group is of the opinion that inmates should be classified according to their program and security needs as assessed on the basis of the best available criteria and sent to maximum security only if they fit the criteria for such an institution.

Two groups of inmates require special consideration in relation to maximum security. One group are those identified as exceptionally difficult even for maximum security institutions. It is sometimes suggested that this small group of inmates be segregated in a special institution.

The Working Group is of the opinion that this group can be adequately cared for in the maximum security institutions recommended in this report and that special institutions for them are not required. The design of any maximum security institution should permit variations of degree of security within and between the various living-units. Such an arrangement will make it easier to care for this most difficult group of inmates.

The second group of inmates who require special consideration in relation to maximum security are those who request protection from other inmates by being segregated from the general inmate population and who, in themselves, may be dangerous. Included are those who are believed to have given information to the authorities either inside or outside the prison and, in some institutions, certain kinds of sex offenders. It is sometimes suggested that a separate institution should be provided for these inmates, but the Working Group found little support for this suggestion.

Every effort should be made to get these people absorbed into the general inmate population, preferably in a medium or minimum security institution. Interjurisdictional arrangements might make it possible to care for some of them in provincial institutions. The extent to which this can be done varies since the need for protection varies with the individual case. The need also changes according to the situation in which the inmate finds himself. In any case, to permit the inmate to seek protection through segregation without careful scrutiny of his case defeats the aims of any program. In institutions where the inmates are divided into small groups, and an opportunity is provided to interpret to them what is involved in the case of each particular inmate, absorption of some of these protection cases may be easier.

One of the difficulties that arise when all the protection cases are segregated in one institution is that they may still need protection from each other.

There should be separate workshop facilities available in each maximum security institution where those inmates, who, for whatever reason, cannot be absorbed in the general population, can be employed. One of the difficulties in most of the present institutions is that those inmates who are segregated for their own protection are without work since they cannot be put in the shops with other inmates and separate shops are not available.

Special security should also be available within those institutions classified as medium security to give temporary care when violence and possible suicide is anticipated without transferring them to maximum security.

SURVEY OF INMATE POPULATION The Working Group asked the classification and security personnel in each of the federal maximum security correctional institutions to undertake a study of the inmates now held in that institution, based on given categories. They were asked to assume the existence of needed alternative facilities and to indicate how many of those presently in the maximum security institution could, in their opinion, be moved out. The following table summarizes the results.

Estimates were also obtained from and discussed with inmate and community groups and after the clarification of criteria, variations in estimates between the groups usually diminished. Although a good deal of further research concerning dangerous behaviour is needed, definitions and their interpretation will invariably be related to current conditions and their influence on behaviour. The future cannot be predicted with any degree of reliability or adequacy and institutions should therefore be designed with a view to flexibility and even obsolescence. The Working Group has endeavored to maintain an appropriate balance between current needs, definitions, attitudes and experiences of the correctional community on the one hand and ideals and future goals on the other to arrive at a process for building bridges rather than final solutions.

TABLE 1

Estimates by classification and security personnel within each federal maximum security institution of the number of inmates now in these institutions who would ideally be cared for in various types of facility.

Ideally would be cared for in:	B.C. Penitentiary	Saskatchewan Penitentiary	Kingston Penitentiary	Millhaven Institution	St. V. de P. Penitentiary	Archambault Institution	S.C.U.	Dorchester Penitentiary
Separate reception unit	—	8	74	—	101	—	—	22
Maximum security unit - violent	125	55	17	110	20	216	56	80
Maximum security unit — protection	15	23	43	25	2	8	—	7
Medium security	185	35	—	—	130	88	1	115
Minimum security — forestry	95	17	—	20	2	4	1	15
Minimum security — urban	45	17	—	15	26	8	—	35
Community release centre	—	3	—	10	3	—	—	—
Psychiatric unit	20	25	57	70	72	76	5	11
Other disposition	15	60	—	20	17	—	—	17
TOTAL by Institution	500	243	191	378	272	400	63	302

**PART OF A
PROCESS**

Prisons are not isolated entities. They constitute one step in a process. The Working Group recognizes the inter-relationship of the process but our terms of reference restrict our responsibilities to planning prison programs.

The first steps in the process are the laws under which our system of justice operates. If those laws are not in keeping with modern attitudes toward deviant behaviour and modern concepts of justice they may result in the committal to prison of individuals who should not be there. The recently appointed Commission on Law Reform should perform a most useful function in reviewing our laws and the principles that underlie them.

The sentencing practices of the courts are another crucial consideration. The Working Group supports the comments and recommendations related to sentencing appearing in the Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections. Particularly, it believes that the court should set out concisely the aim — retribution, incapacitation, deterrence or rehabilitation — that guided the court in its sentence. At present, many inmates come to prison with no indication to the prison administration of the court's intention.

On his arrival at the institution, the inmate has behind him a series of experiences related to the criminal justice process. Those experiences will influence his readiness to participate positively in the prison program.

Classification is at the heart of the distribution of inmates in any prison system and hence determines the type of institutions required to house them. Classification has two main functions, that concerned with initial distribution of inmates among the available institutions and that concerned with continuous program planning with individual inmates within each institution.

Initial classification is primarily concerned with legal responsibility for custody of the inmates and hence gives basic consideration to the security problem presented by each inmate, although program needs and individual personality are also taken into account. It is anticipated that initial classification will be done in separate reception centres for each area where the inmate will be admitted after sentencing for a sufficient period to permit full assessment.

On transfer to a specific institution, there will be further classification and orientation so that staff may continuously study the individual inmate and consider the recommendations of the area classification board. The opportunities within the institution can be discussed with the inmate and a program agreed upon. The inmate should play an active role in all decisions affecting his program.

When the inmate's progress and needs indicate, his program within the institution should be changed. Within the maximum security institution, the aim should be to transfer every inmate to reduced security institutions when his progress warrants it. The maximum security institutions should not be seen as institutions of terminal disposition but as a temporary step in the process.

Coordination of the efforts of the staff of the institutions and of the National Parole Service is necessary to facilitate the inmate's progress from maximum to medium to minimum and then to the community. Such coordination should extend from the initial stages in planning the inmate's program throughout his institutional career. This will ensure orderly progress to parole at the appropriate time. The participation of the parole staff will increase the consideration given to community factors in planning and program.

The inmates in the maximum security phase of the process should not expect many community opportunities. It is unlikely that many inmates in such an institution will be granted day release or parole. These opportunities they can anticipate once they are transferred to reduced security. If the maximum

security institution fulfills the expectations regarding its function as a transition unit successfully, most inmates will go to reduced security. It must be recognized, however, that some will not progress to the stage where transfer to medium is possible and the program staff should give special consideration to the general adjustment of such inmates.

The inmate in maximum security needs the greatest possible motivation to work toward transfer to medium, and high on the list of motivations is the availability of release to the community on parole when he is ready, rather than when some arbitrary time period has been served. If he knows that parole is not available to him for a period of several years, he may see no point in readying himself for transfer.

For the hopefully small group of maximum security inmates who will fail to be transferred to medium, the time will come when release to the community direct from the maximum security institution becomes an issue. The principle of gradual release through community centres, either public or private, for these inmates is supported. Where numbers warrant it, consideration might be given to a discharge home to serve the needs of one institution.

Throughout the process from initial arrest to final discharge, an informed and interested public is the best guarantee of the development and maintenance of good services and programs.

The interdependence of the whole system, and the necessity for public support, emphasizes the need for a good system of communication. Such a system should communicate general information about the issues involved; it should also help in coordinated planning for the individual offender.

**PROPOSED
PROGRAM**

To be classified as maximum security implies that the person is unable to function in another setting and is perceived as being dangerous to the community, staff or other inmates. It also implies that the person in this category has serious problems in interpersonal relationships and in coping with situations which demand self-control and the acceptance of limits. Unfortunately, a paradox develops since the imposition of maximum external controls tends to diminish the development of internal ones on the part of the inmate. Almost every consideration of program and design has to be tested in terms of this polarity. A heavy reliance on external, impersonal controls may make the institution relatively secure, but it makes the development of internal controls difficult and unlikely. To err in the opposite direction may have serious results for inmates and staff as well as the community. To say that one should make maximum provision for external controls but make minimum use of them may be only a pious statement. There is no overall answer to this polarity; design should permit adjustments based on staff-program-inmate interaction.

Since an institution of this kind necessarily represents an accumulation of negative behaviour traits it must be organized on a system in which it is possible for all members to observe and learn about individual behaviour in interaction with others. The institution has to provide a milieu in which problems become open and obvious and must be faced by the participants. The Working Group is of the opinion that basic to such organization is a living-unit which permits a maximum of interaction but is small enough to remain personal. In terms of group dynamics, the most intensive interaction is often seen in groups of six to nine members. For groups, however, which have other serious constraints, such as institutional living entails, and are restricted in terms of other contacts, this intensity is seen as being too high.

Living-unit groups of from 10 to 15 would represent the limits acceptable in an institution such as that envisaged in this report. A number of considerations lead to this conclusion:

- (a) A group of this size will permit the kind of interaction outlined above, at the same time avoiding the over-intensification of relationships that would result from smaller groupings.
- (b) The negative aspects of the traditional inmate sub-culture may be eliminated in groups of this size, enabling staff to work with the inmates toward positive goals.
- (c) The intimate knowledge of each inmate acquired by an involved staff identified with the living-unit groups should ensure a thorough diagnosis of his program requirements and thus offer him a good opportunity to progress toward transfer to reduced security.
- (d) Security will be enhanced because the staff's awareness of the characteristics of all inmates comprising these groups should make prediction of behaviour easier and provide an opportunity to take effective steps, with the assistance of the inmate group, to counteract undesirable behaviour.

After extensive consultation, the Working Group came to the conclusion that the optimum number of inmates in each living-unit should be 12.

For some purposes at some times, a less intensified group experience may be appropriate and the living-units should be constructed in a way which permits grouping two of them together for some aspects of program.

It is important that inmates who will likely be serving fairly long terms should participate fully with other groups in the general activities of the institution, including work and recreation. It will probably also prove necessary to have a degree of mobility among the groups for behaviour control, to transfer inmates and staff between living-units to relieve personal pressures, to upgrade their level of functioning, and to secure better group interaction.

The placement of inmates should be based on their program needs and not just to fill vacancies in the various shops and classes or to meet maintenance requirements. The emphasis in the industries should be related to the manpower needs of the region to facilitate future employment.

The industries program is important for inmates and it is suggested they should work as close to a normal working day as possible in regard to both hours and meaningful production and as compatible with the other program activities of a group or individual nature in which the individual may be involved. The problem of proper compensation of an incentive nature for inmates should be examined and, to enhance the incentive value of such compensation, no gifts of money from outside sources should be permitted. The expectations of future employers should also be carefully interpreted.

The educational program should make it possible for inmates, many of whom will be serving long sentences, to progress as far as their motivation and aptitude permit. Basic education is essential to citizenship and is an avenue to employment opportunities and so this aspect of the program should be intensified and encouraged.

Informal adult educational programs should be developed for the leisure hours with participation as the objective rather than the passive role of spectator and this should be true also of the recreational program. Every opportunity should be provided for the development of responsibility by inmates for these informal group activities so that their concept of self-worth and personal capacity may develop in their changing role in the relationship to other inmates and society. This program will call for the provision of rooms for group discussion, music appreciation, arts and crafts, and dramatic productions.

A chapel will be required to provide a setting for worship. Interviewing and group discussion rooms should also be available as needed to the representatives of the various faiths for personal interviews and for group instruction on religious matters.

Provision should also be made for individual sessions of a therapeutic nature with the institution's professional staff.

The above would provide a range of program opportunities intended to develop the necessary internal controls in each inmate so external controls can be decreased and he can progress through the correctional system and eventually move back to the normal community. The specific techniques available, according to individual needs, would include individual, group and behaviour therapy.

Experimentation with various approaches other than the living-unit discussion group led by correctional officers is indicated. Some inmates will not respond to such a program and more concentrated programs based on different professional disciplines might be tried in some living-units with some inmates.

In addition to inmates and staff, volunteers from the community and from other institutions have an important part to play in programs. Some may be hired on a contract basis to perform specified major functions, others may be involved as volunteers. Relationships between inmate and community members may sometimes provide useful assistance to the inmate after discharge.

Before being admitted into a program, inmates will need a period of orientation in which they may learn about the nature and purpose of relationships in the institution. This need may be particularly acute in those inmates who have spent time in other correctional institutions and bring with them the assumptions and attitudes of a negative prison sub-culture. This period is also necessary for staff to learn enough about the inmate to assign him to an appropriate living-unit and work out a program with him. We recommend, therefore, a separate orientation unit the same size as the other living-units.

Since the program in the institution has to be intense, problems can be anticipated at the point of transfer or discharge. Intensive programs which do not have a decompression stage often leave the participant in a vulnerable and exposed state. It is, therefore, important that inmates be removed gradually from the program in a separate transfer unit.

Programs are traditionally discussed in terms of treatment, training, rehabilitation, re-education and re-socialization. We have avoided these terms although our considerations have obviously been influenced by methods such as the therapeutic community. We have rather strove to outline a basic system which makes the application of a variety of methods possible, and allows for experimentation.

It is essential for an institution of this kind that the communication network is not fractionalized and remains responsive to situations as they develop. Many programs introduced into institutions previously have failed for this reason. A large institution cannot possibly have the kind of information-sharing which is necessary to prevent both negative inmate and staff cultures. The Working Group has come to the conclusion that an institution for about 150 inmates, represents the maximum number for a viable program and recommends ten living-units for a program capacity of 120 inmates. With room for 12 inmates in the orientation unit and 12 in the transfer unit, the total institutional capacity would be 144.

SECURITY

These are two aspects to security, usually referred to as dynamic security and static security. Both are necessary in an institution such as that foreseen in this report.

Dynamic security involves the whole institutional program. It presupposes a program based on joint staff-inmate participation extending to all aspects of prison life and an atmosphere that gives the inmates a sense of hope and accomplishment.

Another aspect of dynamic security involves simply alertness on the part of staff. If staff know the inmates and participate with them in program they should be aware when disruptive behaviour is likely in an individual inmate or a group of inmates and take steps to prevent it.

The removal of unnecessary annoyances and frustrations within the prison regime also forms part of dynamic security. Routines should be under regular review to identify needed changes before trouble with the inmates calls them to attention.

Static security involves both the physical restraints built into the institutions and the security routines in effect.

It is proposed that in this institution there be strong perimeter security; that is, the static security measures built into the institution perimeter should make escape most unlikely. Within the institution there should be as much freedom as possible, compatible with protecting staff and inmates from violence. It is recognized, however, that a program cannot be operated without risk of hostages being taken.

Strong perimeter security is necessary to give the maximum opportunity for positive program. If the perimeter is secure, program activities can be as free as possible. If perimeter security is not secure, constant obstruction of inmate movement is necessary to prevent escapes.

When inmates are aware that weaknesses in the perimeter security exist, escape plots are constant. Not only will some inmates spend their energies in planning escape rather than becoming involved in program, but they will pressure other inmates to participate in escape planning or in introducing contraband into the institution. They will pretend to participate in some program activities to cover their illegal activities or even use such activities to further their ends. When an escape plot is under way, tension exists in the inmate population, creating unnecessary difficulties. A successful escape encourages further escape attempts.

All categories of staff gain confidence and are more committed to program when they feel perimeter security is adequate. There may be a risk that some staff members will be overconfident and as a result become careless in security matters, but that risk is minimal in relation to the advantages to be gained.

Conflicting opinions were expressed to the Working Group on whether a solid wall or a chain-link fence is preferable to mark the perimeter of a maximum security institution. A wall is more secure than a link fence and it provides privacy to the inmates from passersby. Some inmates state they find it easier to spend a long period in a walled institution since the attraction of the outside is not constantly displayed to them.

Other inmates state that a view of the outside makes their imprisonment less confining and so prefer a link fence. In an urban setting, hedges can be used to provide privacy. In any case, the inmate should not be permitted to close himself away from the outside world to which he will some day return. Also, commercial experimentation with electronic devices is in progress and may eventually reduce the problems of perimeter security. A link fence will be easier to replace than a wall.

The Working Group supports the use of double chain-link fences for perimeter security in the kind of institution envisaged in this report. Various suggestions to reinforce the security of such a fence are set out in Appendix E.

Electronic and similar security devices were considered by the Working Group which might reduce the requirement to station armed guards in towers along the perimeter fence. Although some of these may be useful, none is sufficiently well developed to remove the need for supplementing static security with direct staff observation. The various devices considered are contained in Appendix F.

Effective communication arrangements should be established with outside protection forces with continuing liaison and cooperation.

In addition to individual escape risk, many other security situations must be planned for. These include mass escapes, riots and other disturbances, invasions from outside and contraband.

Except in emergencies, there should be no firearms carried within the institution, although the arsenal should be within the perimeter itself. There should also be a ready supply of tear gas and other control devices.

STAFFING

The most important factor in any prison, and particularly one dedicated to changing the inmates' social attitudes and behaviour patterns, is staff. Competent staff will work effectively in inferior facilities; incompetent staff will fail even in the midst of abundant facilities.

Since the approach to maximum security inmates suggested in this report varies from the traditional approach, staff should be selected on a different basis and will require a different kind of training. Staff at all levels should be prepared in advance of the opening of each institution. Each institution should be phased into operation gradually and each living-unit should be opened only when sufficient qualified staff are available.

Preparation of staff, as well as experimentation with the group processes involved, should start relatively soon in a separate portion of each of the existing maximum security institutions. Training for this kind of operation is best done on the job rather than in a classroom. The Director and other senior staff should be selected first and, if indicated, sent to university for further training. Visits to observe related programs now in operation in Canada or abroad should be part of senior staff training.

The importance of the Director cannot be overstressed and the Penitentiary Service should give major attention to developing potential directors for the future. This can best be accomplished by making the Service truly a career service. There should be a system of routine assessments of senior staff with the purpose of upgrading competence. There should also be career diversification, with institutional staff having an opportunity for employment or training in other situations, such as probation or parole or universities.

The salaries now available to directors seem to the Working Group to be much too low and not commensurate with the responsibilities involved. In addition to the responsibilities always carried by those in his position, the modern director has to understand the capacities of professionals from many disciplines and be able to work with them in a coordinated program. Therefore, his Public Service pay classification should be raised. One of the effects of his present classification is to depress salaries of staff in lower categories.

It is also suggested that when director vacancies occur, the best person for the job should be sought, whether or not he is already on Penitentiary Service staff. To ensure this, these positions should be advertised publicly and open to the applicant who is best qualified.

This senior staff, once their training is complete, should be involved in training the remainder of the staff for the proposed new institution.

The proposed new institution should have a training cadre to make it possible to free staff for training outside the institution. It is also suggested that six trainees be attached to the institution for on-the-job training.

Since the living-unit concept is also being developed in medium and minimum security federal correctional institutions, thought should be given to identifying some institutions, including these new maximum security units, as training institutions. Staff training facilities could then be concentrated and staff trained in a living laboratory in preparation for employment in institutions of any degree of security.

Six major functional areas are seen as coming under the Director of the proposed new institution:

- | | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Dental-Medical
Psychiatry
Psychology | 3. Group Living
(Living-Units) | 5. Work
Education |
| 2. Social
Recreation
Religion | 4. Security | 6. Administration
(Financial,
Maintenance,
Supplies) |

There is an obvious overlap between these functional areas but that is desirable since maximum cross-fertilization is essential.

It is proposed that each of the above functional areas except the first be under a supervisor who will report to the Director. The first of these functional areas is different since the psychiatrist and psychologist who compose it will have a more general responsibility throughout the institution and would normally report to the Director. This will involve a contribution to the development of an overall treatment and training philosophy, and of a milieu and a program that will be conducive to good mental health and motivation in both inmates and staff. Also, since pathology is likely to occur in a significant proportion of inmates who fall within the maximum security classification, these professionals should participate in diagnosis and, where indicated, treatment in the individual case.

In the operation of the general program, it is proposed that the correctional officers be divided into two groups — one group being primarily responsible for security, the other primarily responsible for the living-unit program and other duties of a program nature. The following assignment of responsibilities will illustrate the different roles. The correctional officers who take primary responsibility for security are referred to as Security Officers, those in the living-units as Correctional Counsellors.

Security Officers

(i) Regular posts:

Towers, mobile patrols (inside and outside, foot or motorized), fence gates, central control (main entrance of administration building, control of arms and keys, communications).

(ii) Escorts:

All outside escorts for transfers, court appearances or outside hospitals.

Correctional Counsellors

(i) Regular posts:

Living-unit areas and programs on *all* shifts. Counsellors even during the night shift may assist inmates with individual problems, and being assigned occasionally to the quieter shift will reduce the tension of working closely and continuously with inmates.

The dissociation unit and hospital (if required) are included as part of the living-unit areas and programs.

(ii) Escorts:

Outside escorts for temporary absences (except hospital).

Inside escort only if assistance is required by the Correctional Counsellors.

Inside escorts (with or without assistance of Security Officers, such assistance only on request).

(iii) Search and inspection:

Regular and special searches and inspection of all gates, locks, barriers, buildings and areas, except inside living-unit areas unless assistance requested by Correctional Counsellors. Cooperation of both groups is essential in living-unit areas and will assist in attaining overall objectives.

Body searches when required at arrival or departure from the institution.

Search of Vehicles.

Identification and search of institutional visitors.

(iii) Search and inspection:

Regular searches in living-unit area and rooms, specially involving inmates' personal effects and furniture.

Body searches in living-unit areas.

(iv) Inmate visiting area:

Identification and, under appropriate circumstances, search of visitors; general and remote supervision of visiting areas.

(iv) Inmate visiting area:

Contact with and direct supervision of inmates and visitors.

(v) Relations with police and general intelligence work in community.

(v) Discipline:

Disposition of infractions according to level of authority.


(vi) Emergencies - plans and training.

Smoothly-functioning and effective security is necessary in such an institution the program is to operate successfully. Good security frees staff and inmates alike to concentrate on projects intended to assist the inmate to understand himself and change his behaviour patterns. Such security requires specially-trained staff and this can be accomplished only where security staff is so identified. The security responsibilities set out in the Security section of this report illustrate the great degree of specialization required.

However, security remains an important responsibility of all staff. The difference is in how this responsibility is discharged. The Security Officer discharges his responsibility through distant supervision and control. The Correctional Counsellor discharges his responsibility through direct contact and human relations.

Recruitment for new correctional officers should be at the highest requirement for the two tasks in matters such as education and personality. Depending on his individual performance and preferences, the recruit would go into one stream or the other, and transfer on either a long-term or short-term basis would be possible. Responsibility for allocating the individual officer between the two streams should rest as far as possible with the Director of the institution and the necessity for flexibility in program assignment should be recognized by the Solicitor General Component of the Public Service Alliance of Canada and by the Public Service Commission.

It is proposed that a Senior Correctional Counsellor would be in charge of each living-unit of twelve inmates. Two living-units would be under the direction of a Senior Counsellor. Each Senior Counsellor would have at his disposal eight correctional Counsellors and one Trainee whom he would assign to either of the living-units under his supervision, as well as to other more general duties related to the institution's program. A Supervising Senior Counsellor would direct the whole living-unit program. This complement is required to provide for two Correctional Counsellors during the day, three during the evening and one for the morning shift in each group of two living-units on a 1095-shift (365x3) basis per year. The staffing factor used in this instance provides for a five-day training period for each Correctional Counsellor outside the institution each year in addition to adequate flexibility for in-service and on-the-job training within the institution. The following chart sets out this arrangement:



LEGEND:
 SSC -- SUPERVISING SENIOR COUNSELLOR
 SC -- SENIOR COUNSELLOR
 CC -- CORRECTIONAL COUNSELLOR
 T -- TRAINING POSITION
 I -- INMATE

The Correctional Counsellors should work on staggered and overlapping shifts so continuity in group leadership can be maintained.

At present, vacancies among the correctional officers are filled through local Manpower offices. The Manpower office selects recruits from among the unemployed. Also, the selection tends to be made from the Manpower office nearest the institution. The result is a serious limitation on the scope of recruitment. It is the opinion of the Working Group that all such positions should be advertised publicly on a national basis so that the best possible recruits will be found for all vacancies. Highly sophisticated staff is needed to deal with inmates, most of whom come from big-city backgrounds.

In addition to the above, staff will include the required number of trade and vocational instructors, teachers, chaplains and recreational specialists. Consideration should be given to bringing in many such staff members on contract.

The full staff complement recommended for the institution follows:

Administrative Staff

Director	1
Assistant Director (Group Living) called Supervising Senior Counsellor	1
Assistant Director (Occupational Development)	1
Assistant Director (Security)	1
Assistant Director (Social Development)	1
Administrative Assistant	1
Clerk/Stenographers	6
Psychiatrist	1
Psychologist	1
*Academic Teachers	3
*Librarian	1
*Industrial Instructors	6
*Maintenance	2
*Kitchen	6
*Recreation Coordinators	3
Coordinating Chaplain	1
Sick Bay	5
Financial Records	1
	42

*These positions might be filled through contractual arrangements. The Dentist and the Medical Doctor would be on contract. Power Plant staff would be hired as required.

Living-Unit Staff

Senior Counsellors	6
Correctional Counsellors	60
Training positions	6

Security Staff

Main control	
4 to 8 Towers	
Main gate	
Security supervision	
Outside patrol	
Inside patrol (night only)	
Escort and search (day only)	44 to 58

GRAND TOTAL 158 to 172

People not on staff also have an important role to play in supplementing the efforts of staff. These include members of the inmates' families and volunteer groups from the community.

OUTLINE OF FACILITIES

Carefully planned facilities will be needed to give effect to the principles and policies set out in the report. The following outline sets out the essential features. The population figures used here are seen as the maximum size for such an institution. If a smaller version will suffice in any region, this would be seen as an advantage.

The facilities required in a prison do not correspond to the requirement in any other kind of institution. For this reason, prison facilities should not be required to conform to usual requirements laid down by the Treasury Board Sub-Committee on Accommodation Standards.

Because of the importance of visitors, both from the inmate's family and from the community, to his progress, appropriate buildings should be sited with ease of visiting in mind.

Living Quarters

This area will contain:

Ten 12-inmate living-units, for a total of 120 inmates in program. Each living-unit should have equal security features, although these features may not be used in all of them at any given time. Each room should have its own outside window. Solid doors, electrically controlled and with a visibility panel, should be used instead of barred doors. Each living-unit should have a common room for discussion, some kinds of recreation, and for dining. A kitchenette will be needed as well as interviewing rooms for staff use. Two of the living-units should have a small attached workshop to be used when groups, for whatever reason, must be isolated. These shops should be so constructed that they can be closed off when not in use.

Individual rooms where the inmates sleep should also be of maximum security construction. The walls should be of solid concrete, not block construction. The opening in windows should be small enough to prevent exit. The room and its furniture should be so constructed as to eliminate hiding places; this helps facilitate room search. Each room should have its own toilet facilities to reduce traffic outside the rooms at night.

Security points are required in the living-units to be manned as dictated by the stage of progress of the inmates in the particular living-unit.

An Orientation Unit of twelve rooms. Here the newly-admitted inmate will spend a period of time getting acquainted with the program and providing staff an opportunity to decide to which living-unit he should be assigned.

A Transition Unit of twelve rooms. Here the inmate being transferred to another institution will spend a period of time readying himself for the new situation.

A Sick Bay of from four to six rooms, depending on the availability of outside hospital facilities. This would be for use in cases of minor illness. Surgery, for instance, would be carried out in a community hospital. Dental facilities are also required.

A Dissociation Unit of six rooms. This Unit would be used to give an-inmate who is out of control a period to cool off. It should be soundproof. It should also be located near enough to the Sick Bay so that the same staff can supervise both Units.

Food Service

Food should be prepared within the institution, not brought in already prepared. There should be facilities to permit each living-unit group to dine separately in their own living-unit or to permit two living-unit groups to eat together or to permit communal

dining for the whole population. This will make it possible to adjust the dining routines as desired, although it is assumed the opportunity will usually be taken for the living-unit group to eat separately in their own living-unit to further the group's socialization goals. Food would be brought to the living-units by food cart; plug-in facilities will be needed to keep the food hot.

Multi-Purpose Room

Next to the kitchen, there should be a multi-purpose room. This room should have cafeteria facilities, that can be closed off when not in use, to provide for communal dining. It should also have moveable facilities to permit its use as an auditorium. It should seat 120 for dining and 160 for auditorium.

Educational Resource Centre

Academic education should be available to the inmates in accordance with the individual's needs, interests and capacities. Some inmates may be involved in academic education almost full time. Space should be provided for 30 inmates. There should be programmed education facilities. There should be a library available in the Centre where inmates can look over the stock of books and where they can read quietly. The library should be affiliated with community library facilities. A music appreciation room might also be located in the Centre.

Cultural Resource Centre

This area should contain rooms of varying size suitable for meetings and discussions. One of these rooms should be so constructed that it can either form part of the adjoining Chapel or be closed off to form a discussion room. The Centre should also contain hobby shops. Those institutions with a large Indian and Métis population should contain an Indian Cultural Room where these inmates can maintain their own cultural interests and entertain Indian and other visitors.

Chapel

The Chapel should be separate but adjoining the Cultural Resource Centre so one discussion room can be used either as part of the Chapel or separately for general purposes. The Chapel should seat 40 by itself, 60 with the discussion room added. This would provide space for visitors. There should be two offices connected with the Chapel, one for each of the major faiths. There should be moveable chairs instead of pews, and a moveable altar.

Work Centre

Not all inmates will be involved in the work program; some will be in an academic program. Time must also be allotted for all inmates to participate in the socialization program and other activities such as recreation. The Work Centre should contain not only shops but also classroom space for technical and commercial training and for up-grading classes related to the work program. Partitions should be moveable to permit adaptation in the use of space.

The corridor in the Work Centre should be of two-tier construction. The bottom tier would be for normal traffic. The upper tier would be for security, with access from the outside. It would not be manned at all times but would be available for emergencies.

In addition to the shops in the Work Centre, shops should also be attached to two of the living-units to be used when groups, for whatever reason must be isolated.

Physical Education Centre

In addition to a standard size high school gymnasium, this area should provide smaller rooms for weight lifting and gymnastics. There should be seats for those inmates who want to watch sport events.

The Recreation Yard should be next to the Physical Education Centre so toilet and shower facilities can be shared. In addition to facilities for sports activities, there should be a garden area where inmates can sit quietly.

Administration Building This area should be inside the perimeter but near the main entrance. It should be divided so visitors and inmates use different corridors. The Director and other administrative staff who require offices should be in this building.

Visiting Visiting facilities should be basically a lounge under adequate supervision and control where inmate and visitors can be in physical contact. This will require a locker where visitors can deposit parcels and handbags. Inmates should be searched and supplied with a change of clothing for the visit. There should be lunch facilities to be shared by inmates and visitors. There should be an outdoor garden area connected with the visiting lounge. In addition, there should be security visiting booths where inmate and visitor are separated by a security device for those inmates who are shown to have abused the open visiting privilege.

Staff Facilities Separate staff facilities are needed. These would include a lounge and lockers and dining facilities for those staff not dining with the inmates in the living-units. There should also be a staff library and space where staff can gather and be given instructions and dispersed to their respective duties. The discussion rooms in the Cultural Resource Centre can be used for staff lectures and discussions.

General Other facilities are needed as well, including reception and release areas, stores, space for inmates' effects, space for institutional records, canteen and barber shop.

Sketches appear as Appendix G which are intended to constitute only a graphic portrayal of the principles and concepts contained in this outline of facilities. They are not to be interpreted as a suggested design for the institution.

LOCATION The Canadian Committee on Corrections lays down the following guides to the proper location of a prison. The Working Group supports these guides and considers them pertinent to a maximum security institution.

"... locations near major centres are desirable for these reasons:

1. Visiting by relatives of inmates is easier in the more accessible location. Many of the inmates will probably come from the city itself.
2. Community contacts, such as visiting in and out, employment interviews, sports, theatrical productions, and use of institutional facilities by the community, are facilitated.
3. Pre-release planning is easier near the large centre, because many of the inmates will probably come from that city and because after-care placement and employment agencies are more accessible.
4. It is easier to attract and hold competent staff in this setting. Few senior people, or those with professional training, will choose to live in isolated locations.
5. The urban setting prevents the staff from becoming ingrown. There are opportunities for staff to get the stimulation of discussion with other experts in their own and related fields. Extension and similar courses can be arranged easily, through the university if there is one or through the use of specialist staffs available in the urban setting.
6. Part-time professional staff from the community can be utilized to supplement the work of the institutional staff.

7. Community facilities, such as clinics, hospitals, technical schools, universities and churches, may be used for the inmates. Such facilities are becoming increasingly available in most urban areas.
8. The prison can be used for field placement of university students. Included would be students in medicine, psychiatry, pedagogy, social work, psychology, law, sociology, theology, architecture and dietary science.
9. The institution and the university, if there is one, can work together conveniently in research.
10. Although land costs may be higher, operating costs are likely to be less. For example, cost of transportation of prisoners is less, since many of them will probably come from the city. Supply and repair services are also more readily available."

Whenever a site for a new correctional institution is selected, an organized plan should be implemented to inform the citizens of the community what will be involved and to seek their cooperation and support. This support goes beyond a passive acceptance of the institution in the community ; it involves the use of community facilities, citizen activities within the institution, and the acceptance of inmates into the community on visits and work release.

REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS Each region of Canada has its unique requirements for prison accommodation. Some of the considerations involved are set out below.

The Working Group understands that a study of the total penitentiary program is being carried out in each region and welcomes the further needed information this study will provide.

British Columbia The need for new maximum security accommodation is acute and more pressing in British Columbia than in any other region. Interim arrangements are required to provide appropriate accommodation in all security categories. For that reason its requirements for federal institution accommodation are set out in more detail than is the case with the other regions.

The institutions now existing in British Columbia, with population and capacity, are these:

	Population as of Nov. 9, 1971	Capacity
British Columbia Penitentiary	515	531
Matsqui Institution (Male Unit)	314	312
William Head Institution	124	153
Mountain Prison	177	180
Agassiz Correctional Camp	82	80
The West Georgia Centre	15	16
TOTALS	1,227	1,272

From October 1970 to October 1971 there was an increase of 17.3 per cent in the inmate population in the federal institutions in the British Columbia region. This contrasts with a national increase of 4 per cent.

There is, in addition, the Female Unit at Matsqui Institution with a capacity of 128 that is, at present, empty. It is suggested that this Unit be utilized at least on a temporary basis to house the proposed new psychiatric unit while a decision as to its final location is made. The need to get this type of inmate out of British Columbia Penitentiary is urgent and transfer should not be delayed until final plans for the psychiatric unit are complete.

A decision has already been made by the Government of Canada to demolish British Columbia Penitentiary. This will provide an opportunity to build a new maximum security institution along the principles set out in this report. Experience gained in the operation of that institution can then be utilized in planning further maximum security institutions. The Working Group is in agreement with the decision to demolish British Columbia Penitentiary, and is further of the opinion that Mountain Prison and Agassiz Correctional Camp should be phased out as correctional institutions. These two institutions are in unsatisfactory locations and it is difficult to maintain an adequate program. Further, changes in the inmate population have made unnecessary the function they once performed.

The abandonment of these institutions along with the increase in inmate population in the region will make it necessary to provide further accommodation, perhaps as many as eight additional units. Since a minority of those inmates now in British Columbia Penitentiary require maximum security, the major space requirements will be of medium and minimum security type, giving a wider choice in programming and security.

In order to meet the institutional requirements of this region, the following units are suggested:

		Anticipated Average Population	Total Capacity
A. Maximum Security Units -- in close proximity but independent	1. Reception Unit	60	80
	2. Psychiatric Unit	100	128 (Female Unit at Matsqui Institution)
	3. Maximum Security Unit	130	144
	SUB-TOTALS	290	532
B. Medium Security Units -- Independent Insti- tutions with three different programs to meet needs and age of population	1. Matsqui (Male Unit)	270	312
	2. Unit (Young Offenders)	130	150
	3. Unit	130	150
	4. Unit	130	150
	SUB-TOTALS	660	762
C. Minimum Security Units	1. William Head	120	153
	2. Unit (Forestry)	140	150
	3. Unit (Urban)	40	50
	4. Community Centres	45	60
	SUB-TOTALS	345	413
GRAND TOTAL		1,295	1,527

One of the three medium security units listed on previous page, would serve young offenders. The others would serve such groups as the older type of confirmed offender who is not dangerous but who will resist program intended to influence his behaviour who would, therefore, disrupt the program in the unit intended for young and more responsive offenders. One unit might offer an intensive vocational and industrial program. The forestry unit shown among the minimum security institutions would probably consist of a base camp with a number of satellite camps. The urban unit would be a setting for inmates involved in outside work or study. Three community release centres are also foreseen with an average population of 45 and capacity for 60. At present, there is only one such institution in British Columbia.

The suggested new forestry unit will require the cooperation of the Government of British Columbia if work for the inmates is to be provided in provincial forests and parks. Discussions on this question between the federal and provincial governments should be completed as soon as possible.

The Working Group is firmly of the opinion that the suggested site near Mission, B.C., does not meet the guides for location of prisons set out earlier in this report and recommends that no federal correctional institution except perhaps a forestry unit be built there. A site nearer Vancouver should be sought for the proposed new maximum security institution.

Prairies It was the unanimous opinion of the citizen groups who met with the Working Group in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba that a single federal maximum security institution cannot adequately serve the needs of the three Prairie Provinces. Instead, they advocated three small institutions, one located in each province. We are in agreement with the proposal if inmate population warrants it.

A task force is examining the requirements for medical and psychiatric services to inmates in all regions of Canada including the Prairies. The question of reception facilities for newly-sentenced inmates is also under consideration by the Penitentiary Service. The relationship between the medical and psychiatric centres, the reception centres and the maximum security institutions is obvious and geographical proximity is important. The issue as to whether there should be one or three maximum security institutions on the Prairies cannot be considered without also considering planning for these other types of institution.

The provision of medium and minimum security facilities is also pertinent since many of the inmates now in Saskatchewan Penitentiary do not require maximum security.

A detailed study of population flow of inmates within and between each of the Prairie Provinces is advocated. Also, discussions should be undertaken with the provincial authorities to learn whether, and to what extent, some kind of sharing of facilities between the two levels of government would make a sufficiently wide range of institutional services feasible in each of the provinces.

In addition to the existing and planned community release centres, consideration should be given to opening minimum security institutions near major urban centres on the Prairies to take the appropriate type of inmate out of Drumheller Institution, Saskatchewan Penitentiary and Manitoba Penitentiary, freeing those institutions to concentrate on inmates with different security classifications.

We suggest that the priorities in providing federal maximum security institution facilities on the Prairies should be Alberta and Manitoba first, and then Saskatchewan. The maximum security Saskatchewan Penitentiary could be used on a temporary basis for those inmates requiring such security who come from Saskatchewan. The urgent need is to get the Alberta and Manitoba inmates back near their home communities. This will require planning for inmates in all security categories and the provision of supplementary services.

Saskatchewan Penitentiary should be phased out and its use as a correctional institution discontinued. Its location as well as its structure makes this imperative. Long-term planning factors should also be considered in relation to further renovations to Manitoba Penitentiary. The replacement of all cell-blocks should be given urgent consideration to promote a living-unit based program.

The large number of inmates of Indian and Métis origin in the correctional institutions on the Prairies suggests a new initiative to discover the best way of dealing with them. The Working Group suggests the establishment of a group which would bring together representatives of the federal and provincial governments, private agencies and the Indian and Métis communities, with a continuing responsibility in this matter. Such a group might review the recommendations set out in the report *Indians and the Law* prepared in 1967 by the Canadian Corrections Association at the request of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

Most of the community groups with whom we met, including representatives of the Indian and Métis people, opposed the establishment of separate institutions to house Indian and Métis offenders. They supported the need for the Indian and Métis communities to take more responsibility for these offenders and to play a greater role in services designed for them. They were also of the opinion that in each correctional institution where there are major concentrations of Indian and Métis offenders special facilities to help recognize their cultural interests should be provided.

Ontario Because of the large provincial population in Ontario, the possibilities of shared federal-provincial facilities are more complicated. They are, however, as important in this province as in other parts of the country and discussions between the two jurisdictions should be opened to explore the possibilities.

Millhaven Institution now provides maximum security accommodation for federal inmates. This institution does not have adequate facilities for the type of program suggested in this report. It also has space in excess of the number of inmates in this region who require maximum security. It is suggested that special further study be given to the possibility of finding other uses for this building, either outside the corrections field or for other than maximum security. If it is to continue to be used in the corrections field, consideration should be given to structural changes to make it more suited to program. However, no major changes in the institution should be undertaken until overall plans are developed for institutional services in this region.

Quebec The situation in Quebec is similar to that in Ontario. Size of population complicates the issue of federal-provincial sharing of facilities but the possibilities should be explored. Archambault Institution is built on the same design as Millhaven Institution and the comments above apply to this institution as well.

The Working Group is of the opinion that the Special Correctional Unit in Quebec should be discontinued as a special unit to house particularly dangerous inmates from across the country. Such inmates should be kept in their own region and cared for in the maximum security institutions recommended in this report. A study of the Special Correctional Unit is being undertaken and should give some guides as to the future of this institution.

Atlantic Provinces Because of limited population, it is not feasible to develop duplicating federal institutional services in each of the Atlantic Provinces. Instead, these services should be developed on a regional basis. This implies a greater role for the

federal government in providing institutional services in this region. Discussions should be held with the four provincial governments so that, where feasible, facilities can be shared. If the federal government takes a greater responsibility for institutional services, the provincial governments' might take greater responsibility for community-based services.

The Working Group believes that Dorchester Penitentiary should be closed. This would make construction of further accommodation necessary. Since a minority of the inmates of Dorchester Penitentiary require maximum security, most of the new construction would be of medium and minimum security.

Consideration should be given to the future role of Springhill Institution with special reference to the therapeutic community program being developed there. A separate medium security institution for young offenders should be considered with Springhill Institution being used for the older and perhaps less responsive medium security inmates. Both the program and the structure of Springhill Institution would need examination if it is to serve this new use.

It was the opinion of the groups that met with the Working Group in Moncton that the proposed new maximum security institution should be built near Moncton and the institution for young offenders, if further study indicates it should be built, should be located near Halifax. These opinions should be given considerable weight.

Insufficient information is available to make specific recommendations regarding the kind of institutional facilities required in the Atlantic Provinces. It is, therefore, suggested that a study of population flow of inmates of the federal institutions in the region be carried out. Information on the effects of possible shared use by the provinces should also be sought.

Territories Offenders sentenced to two years or more in the Yukon and Northwest Territories should, if possible, be cared for in territorial institutions. This would avoid removing them to federal institutions far from home that perhaps reflect different social conditions. Discussions should be held between the federal and territorial governments in regard to these proposals.

FEMALE OFFENDERS The provision of facilities for female offenders who require maximum security presents a special problem because there are so few of them. The Working Group is of the opinion that the present arrangement whereby all women who receive a sentence of two years or more are held in one federal institution is not satisfactory since it means that many women are moved a long way from home and family.

The report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections makes these comments and recommendations:

"The most effective way [of providing institutional services for women], in the opinion of the Committee, would be for the Government of Canada to purchase service in respect to women sentenced to two years or more from the larger provinces - Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and, probably, Alberta - so that women from those provinces serving a sentence of over two years would be held in provincial institutions. In the Atlantic provinces it is suggested the Government of Canada offer to establish a prison service for all women with a sentence of over thirty days. The Atlantic provinces could then purchase service from the Government of Canada for their women serving sentences over

thirty days and under two years. This seems more feasible than the proposal that the Atlantic provinces supply prison service for all women inmates since the numbers in each province are too small.

Manitoba and Saskatchewan present a special problem. One possible solution is for the Government of Canada to provide a regional service to these two provinces for all women inmates serving more than thirty days, similar to the arrangement suggested above for the Atlantic provinces. An alternative would be for these two provinces to purchase service from one of the larger provinces with suitable facilities for those inmates requiring security, with each province operating its own prison service for the remaining inmates

It is recommended that arrangements for purchase of prison services for women be made between the Government of Canada and the various provinces so that a unified service could be provided in each area and that the Government of Canada offer to purchase service from the larger provinces and to provide regional services that could be purchased by smaller provinces."

The Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada made substantially the same recommendation.

The Working Group supports this approach to supplying accommodation for female offenders.

RESEARCH

In various sections of this report we have already indicated areas where research is needed. This involves specifically the question of classification with specific reference to defining and predicting dangerous behaviour. Also, considerable further research is obviously needed on various design features before proceeding to the construction of an institution. We would also emphasize that every new institution should be subject to observation and evaluation to yield knowledge for the design and program of subsequent institutions. We have already indicated in this report that we do not believe in one prototype applied across the country. This is contraindicated not only because there are regional differences, but because knowledge gained in one situation should be utilized to improve subsequent efforts. It is, therefore, imperative that there be a basis for operational research in the institution.

The opportunity presented by this institution should be taken for research of a more general nature, in addition to the operational research suggested above.

Research is not only important for the production of further knowledge; it is also important for the institution itself and its continued progress. It has been well demonstrated in other areas that the best institutions are those in which service is combined with teaching and research, not only because the addition of the latter functions attracts better staff and keeps them committed to the program, but because they tend to counteract the rigidity of an institutional system.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This report was developed through consultation with many people. The Working Group visited all regions of Canada and, with the help of the various provincial and regional criminology/corrections associations, met with individuals and organizations from a wide range of backgrounds and experience. Details of this consultation process are set out elsewhere in the report. All submissions and opinions received were given careful consideration. The conclusions reached in this report represent a wide consensus and are unanimously supported by the Working Group.

While we have consulted the appropriate literature and taken into account advice given us from inside and outside Canada, we believe we have reached conclusions which might provide new leads to the care of maximum security inmates.

For the sake of clarity, we summarize our report in the following statement of principles, recommendations, and expectations.

Principles Prisons are not isolated entities. They constitute one step in a process that includes the criminal law, the sentencing practices of the courts, and such other services as probation, parole and after-care.

Each institution forms part of an interdependent prison system and one part of the system cannot be changed without affecting other parts of the system. New concepts and programs related to maximum security cannot be introduced without initiating a parallel reconsideration of concepts and programs related to other security classifications.

The prison should be considered part of the community it serves. The concept of security should be seen in relation to the concept of the inmate's progression toward ultimate return to the community.

In administering the sentence of the court, the aim of the correctional process should be to prepare the inmate for return to the community as quickly as possible, while subjecting him only to that degree of restraint necessary to prevent violence and reduce the risk of escape. It is recognized, however, that maximum security is necessary for some offenders.

Members of the public, including members of the inmates' families and ex-offender groups, have a vital role to play in inmate programs. Ease of public participation should be considered when maximum security institutions are being planned.

While certain general principles related to program for maximum security inmates can be laid down on a national basis, adjustments will be required to meet the particular needs and circumstances of the different regions.

All aspects of institutional program — work, recreation, life in the living-units, staff-inmate relations - should be utilized in encouraging the inmate to take responsibility for his own program and that of other inmates.

The inmate should participate as fully as possible in the procedures leading to decisions in all matters affecting him. He should be encouraged to speak freely and his individual opinions should be given every consideration.

Recommendations It is recommended:

1. That a study of all aspects of classification related to inmates of correctional institutions be carried out under the leadership of the Department of the Solicitor General.
2. That only inmates who meet the following criteria be confined in federal maximum security correctional institutions:

- (a) (i) those who actively try to escape and will be dangerous to the public if they do;
 - (ii) those who are actually or potentially dangerous to staff, other program participants or other inmates;
 - (b) those who are not primarily psychiatric cases.
3. That no separate institution be designated or provided to house the exceptionally difficult inmates and that these inmates be housed in the maximum security institutions proposed in this report.
 4. That no separate institution be provided to house protection cases who, in themselves, may be dangerous and that these inmates be housed in the maximum security institutions proposed in this report. Every effort should be made to absorb protection cases in the general population, preferably in medium or minimum security institutions, perhaps by transfer through arrangements with the provincial services.
 5. That coordination of the efforts of institutional and parole staff from the initial stages in planning the inmate's program throughout his institutional career be developed to facilitate the inmate's progress from maximum to medium to minimum security and then to the community.
 6. That 120 inmates in program, plus 12 in orientation and 12 in transition in preparation for transfer, be accepted as the maximum capacity for the institution recommended in this report.
 7. That 12 inmates be accepted as the appropriate capacity of the living-units to facilitate the development of an intensive small-group program without minimizing concern for the individual.
 8. That in the proposed institution there be strong perimeter security; that is, the static security measures built into the institution perimeter should make escape most unlikely.
 9. That inside the institution dynamic security provided by the effort of staff be developed to the fullest possible extent.
 10. That the proposed new institution be phased into operation and that each living-unit be opened only when sufficient qualified staff are available.
 11. That recruitment of staff in all categories be on a national basis and directed to the widest possible range of potential applicants.
 12. That, since program emphasis will be on such concepts as dynamic security and human relationships, staff selection stress personality qualities, educational achievement and professional competence.
 13. That staff training prior to assignment emphasize interpersonal and group processes and be carried out in existing training institutions.
 14. That, since continuous training of both present and new staff is essential, a cadre of training positions be authorized in the institution proposed in this report to meet the training needs of the institution and to provide for the transmission of the program to other institutions.
 15. That, despite the restrictions that apply in a maximum security institution, every effort be made to involve members of the public in all aspects of program as volunteers.
 16. That more imaginative use be made of community services on a contractual basis.

17. That a communications system related to program be planned for the proposed new institution to keep staff, inmates and the public informed.
18. That, since the inmate in maximum security needs the greatest possible motivation to work toward transfer to reduced security, and since the availability of release stands high on the list of motivations, parole be available to him when he is considered ready rather than when some specified time period has been served.
19. That the guides to the siting of prisons set out in the report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections be accepted and that whenever a site for a new correctional institution is selected, an organized plan be implemented to inform the citizens of the community what will be involved and to seek their cooperation and support.
20. That in designing the proposed new institution, care be taken to incorporate the concepts and principles set out in this report.
21. That the recommendations regarding female offenders contained in the report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections and supported in this report be implemented.
22. That provision be made for both operational research and research of a more general nature in the proposed institution from the beginning of its operations.

Expectations

Many considerations led to the conclusions reached by the Working Group and set out in this report. Some of the positive results anticipated from the new institution are these:

1. By providing a separate institution for the dangerous inmates, it will make it possible for other institutions to reduce their security restrictions, thus facilitating ease of program planning involving greater involvement of the public.
2. Through its selected and limited population, small inmate groups, inmate-staff involvement, both short- and long-term program, and security features, the risk of escape and of dangerous behaviour within the institution will be reduced to a minimum, thus offering the greatest possible protection to members of the public, staff and inmates.
3. These inmates represent the greatest threat to other inmates, staff and to the public. Since the proposed institution should reduce this threat to a minimum, staff and public support is anticipated.
4. It will provide these most difficult inmates with the maximum opportunity to progress to reduced security institutions. This offers additional protection to all concerned.
5. It will provide a realistic opportunity for testing and evaluating new kinds of program intended to influence these inmates toward better social adaptation. Such experimentation may eventually change the approach of the prison system itself and introduce new staff training requirements.
6. By offering maximum protection to members of the public, it should help reduce the public's fear of prison inmates and gain public support for more progressive programs for inmates in all correctional institutions.
7. With its opportunities for wide variation of security from one living-unit to another, it will make possible segregation for those inmates who remain disruptive of the program and thus make special institutions for them unnecessary.

8. Since flexibility and provision for alternative use is anticipated in the design of the proposed new institution, it will place the minimum of restrictions on the future and permit the useful employment of these facilities in other ways.

IMPLEMENTATION This report sets forth principles applicable to program for maximum security inmates. If these principles are accepted, it will be necessary to work out a process to apply them in each region of the country. To carry this out, the following structure of advisory committees is suggested.

1. A national coordinating committee should be appointed, advisory to the Minister. This group would be responsible for initiating the study required in each region, for advising and evaluating the work of the regional committees, and for coordinating the various studies to ensure national standards and uniform interpretation of the principles set out in this report. This committee should be made up jointly of Departmental staff and people outside the Department.
2. Regional committees related to the national advisory committee should also be established, made up of local Departmental staff and people outside the Department. These committees would recommend detailed regional requirements needed to implement the principles contained in this report for submission to the Minister through the national coordinating committee.

APPENDIX A

Persons appointed to serve as liaison with the Working Group by the various Criminology/Corrections Associations

Atlantic Provinces Corrections Association
Liaison: Rev. Eric Robin

British Columbia Corrections Association
Liaison: Mr. A.K.B. Sheridan

Manitoba Criminology Association
Liaison: Mr. H. Colerman

Ontario Corrections and Criminology Association
Liaison: Mr. Harry B. Kohl

Quebec Society of Criminology
Liaison: Mr. Pierre Landreville

Saskatchewan Corrections Association
Liaison: Assistant Deputy Warden D.J. Rooney

Since there is no such association in Alberta, the Working Group invited Mr. D.C.S. Reid, Executive Director, John Howard Society of Alberta, to perform the liaison function in that province.

APPENDIX B

Organizations and individuals who met with the Working Group

BRITISH COLUMBIA

Organizations

Activator Unit
Alcohol Foundation of British Columbia
Anglican Church of Canada
British Columbia Borstal Association
British Columbia Corrections Association
British Columbia Legal Aid Society
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police
Civil Liberties Union
Correctional Workers Branch
Dismas House
Elizabeth Fry Society of British Columbia
First United Church
John Howard Society of British Columbia
John Howard Society of Vancouver Island
John Howard Wives Group
Joshua Society
Narcotic Addiction Foundation
Salvation Army
Seventh Step Foundation
Synala House
Union of British Columbia Government Employees
Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs
Unitarian Church
United Community Services of Vancouver

Individuals

Dr. A.M. Marcus

ALBERTA

Organization

Alberta Consultative Group (arranged by the John Howard Society of Alberta)

SASKATCHEWAN

Organizations

Freedom Group
John Howard Society of Saskatchewan
Saskatchewan Corrections Association

Individuals

Dr. A. Hoffer

MANITOBA

Organizations

Community Welfare Planning Council of Winnipeg
Fortune Society
Manitoba Criminology Association
Manitoba Indian Brotherhood
Manitoba Métis Liberation Association

Individuals

Mr. Kenneth M. Arenson
Mr. Patrick R. Loring
Mr. Toby Ruhm

ONTARIO

Organizations

Anglican Church of Canada
Canadian Correctional Chaplains Association
John C. Parkin (Architects)
John Howard Society of Ontario
London Committee on Corrections
Ontario Association of Corrections and Criminology
Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada
United Church of Canada
Woods, Gordon & Co.

Individuals

Mr. Allen Baldwin

QUEBEC

Organizations

Association des rencontres culturelles avec les détenus
Centre de Psycho-pédagogie
Corporation des Psychologues de la Province de Québec
McGill Clinic in Forensic Psychiatry

Individuals

Dr. Henri Ellenberger
Rév. Père Noel Maillou

ATLANTIC PROVINCES

Organizations

Atlantic Provinces Corrections Association
Group of Citizens of the Moncton Area
John Howard Society of New Brunswick
John Howard Society of Newfoundland
John Howard Society of Nova Scotia
John Howard Society of Prince Edward Island

Individuals

Mr. James L. Crane
Mr. R.G. Evans
Mr. Patrick E. Gillespie

APPENDIX C

Individuals invited to consult with the Working Group

- Dr. E.T. Barker, Psychiatrist, Oak Ridge Division,
Mental Health Centre, Penetanguishene, Ontario
- Dr. Justin Ciale, Chief, Correctional Research Centre,
Department of the Solicitor General
- Dr. Bruno Cormier, Director, McGill Clinic in Forensic Psychiatry,
McGill University, Montreal
- Dr. D. Craigen, Director of Medical Services, Canadian Penitentiary Service,
Department of the Solicitor General
- Mr. Paul Gascon, Executive Secretary-Treasurer,
Solicitor General Component of the Public Service Alliance of Canada
- Mr. T.W. Hall, Director, Western Region, Canadian Penitentiary Service,
Department of the Solicitor General
- Mr. J.C.A. LaFerrière, Director, Quebec Region, Canadian Penitentiary Service,
Department of the Solicitor General
- Mr. A.J. MacLeod, Q.C., Special Advisor, Correctional Policy,
Department of the Solicitor General
- Mr. John Maloney, Director, Ontario Region, Canadian Penitentiary Service,
Department of the Solicitor General
- Mr. John Maloney, Director, Ontario Region, Canadian Penitentiary Service,
Department of the Solicitor General
- Mr. W.M. Nagel, Executive Director, The American Foundation Inc.,
Institute of Corrections, Philadelphia, Pa., U.S.A.
- Reverend John Nickels, Chief, Social Education and Chaplaincy, Canadian Penitentiary Service,
Department of the Solicitor General
- Mr. H.E. Popp, Director of Custody, Canadian Penitentiary Service,
Department of the Solicitor General
- Mr. André Thiffault, Director of Psychology,
Institut Philippe Pinel, Montreal

APPENDIX D

Organizations and individuals who made written submissions to the Working Group

Organizations

Archdiocese of Toronto, Roman Catholic Church
Association de rencontres culturelles avec les détenus
Board of Evangelism and Social Service, United Church of Canada
Canadian Affairs Commission, Canadian Council of Churches
Canadian Correctional Chaplains Association
Centre de Psycho-pédagogie
Citizens' Committee on Corrections, Manitoba
Community Welfare Planning Council, Winnipeg
Corporation des Psychologues de la Province de Québec
Correctional Services Committee, Anglican Diocese of Toronto
First Unitarian Congregation of Toronto
Freedom Group
Group of Moncton Area Citizens
Group of Inmates, Manitoba Penitentiary
Inmate Committee, Dorchester Penitentiary
John Howard and Elizabeth Fry Society of Manitoba
John Howard Society of Alberta (Alberta Consultative Group)
John Howard Societies of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia
John Howard Society of Ontario
John Howard Society of Quebec
John Howard Society of Saskatchewan
John C. Parkin (Architects)
London Committee on Corrections
Manitoba Indian Brotherhood
National Parole Service Staff, Winnipeg
Ontario Association of Corrections and Criminology
Presbyterian Church in Canada
Saskatchewan Corrections Association
Staff Discussion Group, Manitoba Penitentiary
Synod of New Westminster, Anglican Church
Unitarian Church of Vancouver
Woods, Gordon & Co.

Individuals

Anonymous inmate of Manitoba Penitentiary	
Mr. K.M. Arenson	Dr. A. Hoffer
Mr. Allen Baldwin	Mr. Kioshi Izumi
Mr. Borg	Dr. Osher Minovitz
Mr. Vincent T. Brown	Mr. Richard A. McGee
Mr. D. Craib	Mr. Fred Moyer
Mr. James L. Crane	Mr. Wayne A. Neithercut
Mr. Justice Louis Deniset	Mr. D. Nevay
Mr. Martin Dubitski	Mrs. Paula M. Newburg

APPENDIX D – Concluded

Individuals – Concluded

Mr. Charles E. Dwyer
Mr. R. Emkeit
Mr. R.G. Evans
Mr. John P. Freedman
Chief Magistrate Harold ff. Giles
Mr. Patrick E. Gillespie
Mr. G.R. Grenon
Mr. L. Grouette
Director B.C. Hamilton

Mr. John Parker
Dr. V.N. Pillai
Mr. C. Prince
Mr. Ralph Scott
Dr. E. Preston Sharp
Mr. William H. Young Soon
Mr. Kent Stoneman
Mr. T. George Street
Mr. H. Taggart

In addition to the above, seven inmates of Saskatchewan Penitentiary who preferred to remain anonymous made individual written submissions.

APPENDIX E

Additional features supporting the security of the recommended double chain-link perimeter fence

1. Berka wire should be placed at the top of the two fences, and inside the bottom of the outside fence.
2. Armed, manned and well-protected towers at maximum intervals of 500 feet are required. They should provide a clear view inside, between and outside the fences. The security staff who man the towers should be properly trained and equipped with firearms and binoculars and have open communication with each other, central control and the mobile patrols.
3. Electronic warning systems are needed to give early warning of escape attempts. Such devices can be installed on building exits, including windows and roofs, as well as on the perimeter fence.
4. Continuous motorized armed patrols around the institution, outside the fence, are needed. These patrols should be in constant communication with central control and the towers.
5. Remote operation of truck sally ports and pedestrian entrances through the fence should be controlled from one of the towers. We suggest both entrances should be near each other to reduce the ground-level staff required to check vehicles and visitors and to avoid the dispersal of fence openings.
6. All fences should be floodlit at night and towers equipped with strong searchlights.
7. A secure source of electric power is required to meet emergencies.
8. A substantial buffer zone should exist between the buildings and recreational grounds and the inside perimeter fence. A similar buffer zone should exist between the outside perimeter fence and the community.

APPENDIX F

Various electronic and similar security devices considered by the Working Group

The various electronic and similar devices considered by the Working Group are listed below, with some indication of how they operate and an expression of opinion on their usefulness at this time.

1. Wired Fence Stress System

A wire is stretched about a quarter of an inch above the top of the fence with an alarm sounding if tension is altered. Not suitable because of temperature changes, ice and ease of avoidance.

2. Optical Beam System

A beam of light is used which sounds an alarm when obstructed. Not suitable because the equipment is complex, beam can be avoided and winter weather creates problems difficult to overcome.

3. Closed Circuit Television

An alarm is sounded when the television picture content is changed. Deemed suitable since it provides visual means to check the cause of the alarm. Also, equipment is reliable. It should not be used in private rooms or as a substitute for personal relationship.

4. Acoustic Systems

In these systems an alarm is sounded when motion is sensed. Not suitable because equipment is complex and problems arising from winter weather are hard to overcome.

5. Electromagnetic Fence

Three wires are used to set up a magnetic field with alarm sounding when the magnetic field is unbalanced. Equipment is not yet commercially available.

6. Radio Beam System

A high frequency signal is used with alarm sounding when beam is interrupted. Not suitable because equipment is complex, beam can be avoided and problems arising from winter weather are difficult to overcome.

7. Electrostatic System

This system uses a capacitor system with an alarm that sounds when the dielectric is changed. Not suitable because of limited range and installation difficulties.

8. Radar Area System

A microwave transmitter covers an area and will signal when a moving object enters its field. Not suitable because of limited range (50 feet) and because equipment is somewhat experimental.

9. Infrared Surveillance

This system is a variant of the optical beam system and works in a similar manner. Has merit because of design features such as "fail-safe", good discrimination and rugged equipment.

10. Geophone System

Geophones are used to pick up vibrations in the ground or on a fence. Not suitable since it is a wired system and can be breached. There may also be seasonal weather problems. There is no Canadian experience with this system.

APPENDIX G

**Graphic portrayal of the principles and concepts
contained in the outline of facilities**

See following pages

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN DEVELOPMENT


ÉVOLUTION DE L'ARCHITECTURE DES INSTITUTIONS

Most designs have developed through the need to house large numbers of inmates with a minimum of staff and through an absence of communication between staff and inmates.

To accommodate these large numbers of inmates, dormitories housing twenty or thirty or more inmates were provided or each inmate was provided with a cell that opened onto a circulation corridor. Twenty to one hundred or more could easily be housed under the supervision of one security staff.


La plupart des plans répondaient à la nécessité de loger de nombreux détenus avec le moins de personnel possible et à l'absence de communications entre le personnel et les détenus.

Pour loger ce grand nombre de détenus, il y avait des dortoirs pour vingt ou trente détenus, ou même davantage, ou bien chaque détenu avait une cellule qui donnait sur un corridor servant à la circulation. De vingt à cent détenus, ou même plus, pouvaient être logés sous la surveillance d'un seul garde.




It was through this principle that a variety of geometric forms were developed.


C'est ce principe qui a donné lieu à diverses figures géométriques.



The telephone plan
Modèle "poteau de téléphone"




The radial plan
Modèle "à rayons"



The pinwheel plan
Modèle "à hérissons"

HOWEVER the decision to concentrate on groups of twelve inmates provides the first opportunity to eliminate corridors in the living units without creating excessively large spaces.

CEPENDANT, la décision de se limiter à des groupes de douze détenus offre pour la première fois l'occasion d'éliminer les corridors dans les unités communautaires sans créer de trop vastes espaces.



Twelve bedrooms and a six-foot wide circulation corridor. 288 s.f. in circulation.
Douze chambres à coucher et un corridor de six pieds de large réservé à la circulation. 288 p.c. pour la circulation.

Twelve bedrooms and a 16' wide space that can be used for activities. 640 s.f.
Douze chambres à coucher et un espace de 16' de large qui peut servir aux activités. 640 p.c.

Four sets of four bedrooms around a 24' x 32' useable activity space. 768 s.f.
Quatre séries de quatre chambres à coucher, autour d'un espace de 24' x 32' qui peut servir d'espace pour les activités. 768 p.c.


Two sets of three bedrooms and one set of six bedrooms around a 24' x 40' useable activity space. 960 s.f.
Deux séries de trois ch. à coucher autour d'un espace de 24' x 40' réservé aux activités. 960 p.c.

STAFF REQUIREMENTS AND INMATE SEPARATION

BESOINS EN PERSONNEL ET SÉPARATION DES DÉTENUS

The problem is to examine ways to combine twelve units of twelve inmates in a way that optimizes staff requirements and provides adequate separation of inmate groups. Using the morning shift as a time sample six combinations can be found. In these combinations the number of staff required varies directly with inmate separation.

Il s'agit de trouver moyen de combiner douze unités de douze détenus de façon à satisfaire du mieux possible les besoins en personnel et à séparer comme il le faut les groupes de détenus. En prenant l'équipe du matin pour exemple, six combinaisons sont possibles, dans lesquelles le nombre de gardes nécessaires est en fonction directe de la séparation des détenus.




Scale / Echelle





DENSITY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION DENSITÉ ET ENRÉGIMENTATION


The density of inmates within the living units should not be so great to increase aggressive behaviour nor should it be so small to make spaces uncomfortable. Density (no. of s.f./inmate) is improved with the addition of meeting spaces and activity spaces in the living unit. As these spaces are added institutionalism is reduced through the inmate choice of a wider variety of spaces and access to more territory. Regimentation for the inmate is reduced.

La densité des détenus à l'intérieur des unités communautaires ne devrait pas contribuer à augmenter l'agressivité des détenus. D'autre part, de trop vastes espaces peuvent aussi engendrer un certain malaise. La densité (le nombre de détenus par pied carré) est améliorée en ajoutant des espaces réservés aux réunions et aux activités dans l'unité communautaire. Ces espaces contribuent à diminuer l'enrégimentation grâce au plus grand choix qu'ont les détenus et à l'accès à plus de "territoire".




Separation of units is better with this solution.
Ce modèle offre une meilleure séparation entre les unités.







Area per twelve man unit	2504 s.f.
Common space area	366 s.f.
Total area per twenty four inmates	5374 s.f.
Density within twelve man unit	205 s.f./inmate
Density within housing unit	223 s.f./inmate
No. of meeting spaces per 12 man unit	2 choices

Espace réservé à une unité de douze hommes	2504 p.c.
Espace en commun	366 p.c.
Espace total réservé à vingt-quatre détenus	5374 p.c.
Densité dans une unité de douze hommes/p.c.	205 détenu/p.c.
Densité dans une unité de logement	223 détenu/p.c.
Nombre d'espaces réservés aux réunions par unité de 12 hommes	2 options



Scale
Échelle





Area per twelve man unit <i>Espace réservé à une unité de douze hommes</i>	2136 sq.ft./p.c.
Common space area <i>Espace en commun</i>	1847 sq.ft./p.c.
Total area per twenty-four inmates <i>Espace total réservé à vingt-quatre détenus</i>	6073 sq. ft./p.c.
Density within twelve man unit s.f./man <i>Densité dans une unité de douze hommes, homme/p.c.</i>	178 s.f./inmate 178 détenu/p.c.
Density within housing unit <i>Densité dans une unité de logement</i>	252 s.f./inmate 252 détenu/p.c.
No. of meeting spaces per 12 man unit <i>Nombre d'espaces réservés aux réunions par unité de 12 hommes</i>	5 choices/options

