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The Social Service Role of Police — Domestic Crisis Intervention

by

Bruce R. Levens

with

Donald G. Dutton

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THE SOCIAL SERVICE ROLE OF POLICE

- DOMESTIC CRISIS INTERVENTION

by

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17900

This research was carried out by the United Way of Greater Vancouver under contract with the Research Division, Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada. The first four monographs have appeared in the Canadian Police College Journal in 1977 and 1978.

Published by the Communication Division, under the authority of the Honourable Bob Kaplan, Solicitor General of Canada. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Solicitor General of Canada.

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Cat. No. JS 22-55/1980E

ISBN 0-662-11018-8

Available in English and in French from the Communication Division,
Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada, Ottawa, Ont. K1A 0P8

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Acknowledgements

This study was undertaken with outstanding cooperation from the Vancouver Police Department. Much of the external research on other police departments reported in the literature refers to the problems of forging good cooperative working relationships between researchers and police personnel. We appreciate very much that because of the assistance given by the senior officers and all the line personnel such problems did not impede the progress of this project. To all those concerned the researchers extend their thanks.

Expressions of thanks are also due to the sixty police departments across the United States and Canada which responded with information on their training programs. Many inundated us with comprehensive training manuals, teaching guides, copies of forms and evaluation instruments. These provided us with an excellent opportunity to compare and assess the merits of the local training package.

Appreciation for involvement in the project by staff of the dissolved Vancouver Resources Board is also extended here. Unfortunately we did not get access to the data we required to round out our evaluative comment. However, this was in no way due to individual workers in the system from whom we received excellent cooperation and assistance. Particularly we would like to thank all the liaison workers who were attached to the Vancouver Police Department during the research period. Special acknowledgement is also due to staff of the Vancouver Resources Board Emergency Services department who met with us and advised us on the nature of the social agency referral system.

Thanks go to the study's loosely structured advisory group consisting of representatives from the police department, police academy, British

Columbia Police Commission, Simon Fraser University Criminology department, social agencies and the community at large, who reviewed the monographs of this research.

Finally, to all those authors and researchers who have over the years contributed to the literature that stimulated and guided this project, I extend the thanks of a grateful colleague.

Bruce R. Levens

Administrative Abstract

Although the principal mission of the police is frequently portrayed as reflecting a narrow emphasis upon controlling crime, police officers usually engage in a large number of social service activities that are not strictly related to law enforcement responsibilities. The statistics may vary from one community to another, but basically about half the calls police receive are for assistance with personal and interpersonal crises. While some of the problems do not involve violations of the law, many situations in which the police officer is called upon to intervene are unpredictable, potentially very dangerous and require skills which most police training settings do not impart. In particular domestic disputes require the police to manage often volatile conflict situations and assume the role of social worker, psychologist and marital counsellor.

This study reviewed the training programs that have been designed to acquaint the line officer with the techniques and resources for efficiently handling domestic disputes and has identified program components associated with successful police crisis intervention strategies. The research also describes and analyses the operation of crisis intervention training on the handling of domestic disputes by the Vancouver Police Department during the first year of the training program's development and implementation.

Introduction

The accumulation by the police over time of a broad range of "social service" functions has received considerable attention by social scientists and police commentators. A large part of the literature of late has concerned itself specifically with the intervention of police into domestic dispute situations. This involvement has been brought about by public demand for police presence and the lack of any other 24-hour immediate responsive, authoritative community service.

As the demand for, and volatile nature of, this aspect of their role has become more fully appreciated, both through the internal analyses of policing systems and the focus of attention of social scientists, domestic crisis intervention training for police personnel has developed. In the past decade this has become, in varying degrees, an acknowledged part of police training curricula in many American, and increasingly, Canadian police departments and academies.

This study was undertaken to review the training programs that have been designed to acquaint the line officer with resources and techniques for handling domestic disputes, and to identify program components associated with successful police intervention strategies. In addition the research was designed to describe and analyse the effects of crisis intervention training in British Columbia on the handling of domestic discord by the Vancouver Police Department during the first year of the local program's development and implementation.

DOMESTIC CRISIS INTERVENTION

Monograph 1 - Citizens' Requests for Service and
The Vancouver Police Department Response

Bruce R. Levens
Donald G. Dutton

The interest of social scientists in police work that has emerged in recent years has produced a body of literature replete with psychological and sociological studies of the police and the policeman's role. Frequently attention is drawn to a difference in police work between law enforcement (a function which focuses on specific law violations and involves actions which lead to arrest or summons with fairly clearly defined guidelines) and order maintenance (a more ambiguous and problematic police function involving the management of interpersonal behaviour with few specific guidelines as to what order is or how to establish it).

The distinction has been developed in the literature in various ways: Banton¹ refers to "peace officers and law officers", Bittner² writes about "peace keeping and law enforcement", Skolnick³ refers to the part played by street policemen in "law enforcement" as compared with "service and order maintenance", Wilson⁴ comments on the distinction as follows:

The difference between order maintenance and law enforcement is not simply the difference between "little stuff" and "real crime". The distinction is fundamental to the police role, for the two functions involve quite dissimilar police actions and judgments. Order maintenance arises out of a dispute among citizens who accuse each other of being at fault; law enforcement arises out of the victimization of an innocent party by a person whose guilt must be proved.... Because an arrest cannot be made in most disorderly cases, the officer is expected to handle the situation by other means and on the spot, but the law gives him no guidance on how he is to do this; indeed, the law often denies him the right to do anything at all other than make an arrest.... Alone, unsupervised, with no policies to guide him and little sympathy from onlookers to support him, the officer must "administer justice" at the curbstone.

Not only has this distinction been drawn but it has been demonstrated by many writers that, contrary to popular thought, the major part of a policeman's role (50 to 80 per cent of his time) is comprised of performing non-criminal, order maintenance or "social service" duties. Bercale⁵ reports that only 16 per cent of calls to the Detroit Police Department emergency number were crime related. The study by Cumming et al⁶ found that a half of the citizen requests were calls for assistance in non-criminal matters. Lundman⁷ cites other United States studies showing a high proportion of time dispensed in "service" work. A recent study in Britain by Punch and Naylor⁸ showed that 59 per cent of calls to the police in three Essex towns could be defined as "service" requests and the remaining 41 per cent as requests relating to law enforcement.

The Police Social Service Involvement

The accumulation by the police over time of a broad range of "welfare" or "service" functions is largely the result of citizen requests for their involvement. Black and Reiss⁹ state, "The Police far more often are initially mobilized through the action of private citizens than through police initiative." In their study of three major United States cities, some 80 per cent of all mobilizations were the result of a citizen call to the police station, and only 16 per cent were traced to police initiated intervention.

While the police themselves may regret this aspect of their work and resist the social work orientation foisted on them by their involvement, they reluctantly accept that by and large there is no other community resource capable of responding to the public's demand. The studies from the United States, Britain and Canada chiefly cited in this report all make the generalization that community social agencies provide a 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. weekday service for 5 p.m. to 2 a.m. weekend social problems. As Bard¹⁰ points out, the domain of the police is crisis, their mode is immediacy (a highly organized mobile response), and their essence is authority. (They have the power to "do something".)

Out of the many different order maintenance and "social service" functions performed by the police, this study focuses attention on citizen requests, and police response to these requests, for intervention in what have been variously described as family fights, family beefs or troubles, domestic crisis, landlord-tenant disputes, disturbance calls, neighbour troubles, etc., in short, domestic disputes.

Reports in the literature give varying proportions of all police work that is specifically domestic dispute intervention. This is mainly due to a lack of uniformity in defining what constitutes a domestic dispute. For example, Parnas¹¹ reports in terms of "Miscellaneous Non-Criminal" incidents (which comprise about 80 per cent of all calls for service from the Chicago Police Department) and states that "disturbances" -- family conflict, party noise and teen disturbances -- make up one third of these. Meyer¹² reports "Family and Neighbour Trouble" as comprising some 12 per cent of all calls of a non-criminal nature which resulted in police mobilizations in a large U.S. city. Leibman and Schwartz¹³ estimate that from 5 to 10 per cent of an urban policeman's assignments involve domestic disputes. Ephross and French¹⁴ found that 40 per cent of police calls involved family or personal disturbances and that 23 per cent of these (9 per cent of all calls criminal and non-criminal) involved family fights. The only Canadian study with which these statistics could be compared, an evaluation of family crisis training in London, Ontario estimates between 4 and 5 per cent of dispatched calls can be accounted for by family crisis¹⁵.

Perhaps more important than the precise proportion of police work which can be labelled as domestic dispute management, however, is the frequent reference in the literature to the danger inherent in this part of the policeman's role. Various United States studies have reported that more police injuries and police homicides occur in domestic disputes than in any other category of police activity. Reporting on the violence of such activities in the forward to a U.S. Department of Justice monograph the Director of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice stated:

One of the most hazardous assignments police officers face is dealing with family quarrels and disturbances. In 1972, 13 per cent of all policemen killed in the line of duty died while responding to disturbance complaints. Twenty-seven per cent of the assaults on police officers occurred in the same setting.

The risk is even greater for the participants in these quarrels. Of all murders reported in 1972, 24.3 per cent occurred between family members, 7.1 per cent during a "lover's quarrel" and 41.2 per cent as the result of other arguments. The vast majority of all aggravated assaults involve relatives, neighbours or acquaintances.¹⁰

While most of the data on violence in domestic situations come from the United States, there is reason to accept the applicability of the argument to Canada. National Canadian statistics on homicide show that between 1967 and 1971, 37.5 per cent of murder victims (675 persons) were classified as "domestic" and that of these nearly three out of every four victims were members of the immediate family of the suspect (Statistics Canada, 1973). An analysis of a list of homicides in Vancouver in 1974, compiled by the Vancouver Police Department, reveals that 15 out of 30 murders and 5 out of 17 attempted murders occurred in domestic situations.* Finally, it has been shown that 14.6 per cent of 41 Canadian policemen killed between 1961 and 1973 were killed while responding to domestic complaints.¹⁶

The professed police policy regarding what are essentially civil disputes is generally one of non-involvement. However, both the public's expectation that the police will act as a primary service agent in interpersonal crises and the reality of domestic violence coupled to the lack of an alternative agency present an overwhelming case for their involvement. However strongly the official stance is proclaimed, the police do in fact respond to many requests for their intervention, and this reality has prompted a growing number of police forces to provide a specialized training to enable their personnel to handle "domestics" in a more effective and safe manner.

*Vancouver Police Department, Planning and Research memo, 1975.

Family Crisis Intervention Training

Family crisis intervention training in general stresses the safety of the officer, teaches techniques for diffusing interpersonal violence, for mediating the problem, and, in most cases, emphasizes the referral of disputing parties to one of the helping professions where appropriate. Where police departments have adopted this kind of approach it has been claimed that:

- (a) Police injuries are reduced.
- (b) Time spent by police in domestic, i.e., non-crime related activities is reduced.
- (c) Recidivism--repeat calls for intervention in the same family--is reduced.
- (d) Family use of other community resources and contact with helping professionals increases.¹³

Soon after the creation of the British Columbia Police Commission, its chairman, Dr. John Hogarth, at a one day meeting on the future of policing in British Columbia (December, 1973), spoke in favour of such training for B.C. police departments stating that:

While it is recognized that police are not and should not become social workers, they are the major agency operating 24 hours a day and responding to crisis situations of all kinds. The police must be trained to handle family disputes, neighbourhood quarrels, social conflicts and a host of other problems for which they are inadequately prepared and insufficiently supported.

Consequently it was decided that beginning September 1975, all new recruits attending the British Columbia Police College would receive training in domestic crisis intervention. In addition, commitment has been made to a policy of providing such training to all B.C. police personnel, and in-service training is expected to begin in the near future. About 250 recruits per year will be trained, of whom 200 will be from the Vancouver force. This, plus in-service training as resources allow, will mean that over the next five years most of the B.C. police will have had exposure to the crisis intervention training programme.

The training programme can be described as conforming to a generalist-procedural model. It is generalist in that all police patrolmen will eventually receive the instruction rather than concentrating the training on a few specialists patrols. This overcomes problems of manpower deployment, allows for a more immediate response by trained personnel, and is more appropriate to a provincial training system where recruits are from large and very small police forces. The model is procedural in that the instruction stresses a set of procedures for the policeman to follow in handling domestic disputes and underplays the theoretical and psychological rationale.

The course makes extensive use of video taped demonstrations and role played behavioural simulations. A set of procedures for effective intervention in a domestic dispute is analysed into component parts: external safety procedures, internal safety procedures, defusing, brief interviewing, mediation and referral.

These are presented to recruits in the above order. Each component part is reviewed conceptually, discussed, demonstrated on video tape (both the do's and don'ts), and then recruits are required to apply what they have learned in a role-played simulated dispute. This procedure is followed for each additional component part in sequence. As later components are taught, earlier components are reviewed in the simulation exercises so that, at the end of the 30-hour training session, students must demonstrate an entire intervention procedure.

In order to monitor the effect of this training, tried for the first time in a Canadian setting, an evaluation research programme was proposed, accepted by the Vancouver Police Department and the British Columbia Police Commission, and funded jointly by the Solicitor General's Department and the United Way under whose auspices the research is conducted.

The monograph presents an analysis of citizen requests for police intervention in domestic disputes and an account of police department response to those requests prior to the appearance on the street of policemen specially trained to handle such crises. As such it presents pre-change data with which outcome measures will be compared over the next two years of crisis intervention programme development and implementation. In particular, data was sought on the frequency and timing of domestic encounters, factors influencing police decisions to respond, the patterns of police response, service time dispensed, and the outcome of police interventions.

Methods of Measurement

Two sorts of measurement of police involvement in domestic crisis were taken: an analysis of Vancouver Police Department records, and because an institution's existing recording procedures often are not directly suitable for research purposes, information was taken directly by the researchers from taped recordings of telephone requests for service.

Vancouver Police Department Records

Records provided by the Vancouver Police Department consisted of a time and contact breakdown of police activity from dispatch records for the six month period January to June 1975; access to the "Family Trouble" file of Miscellaneous and Supplementary Reports (Form 19) for the same period; and access to police injury and assault reports.

These records were consulted in an attempt to discover (a) the proportion of time expended in the management of domestic disputes, (b) characteristics of domestic disputes--prevalence of violence, use of alcohol, domestic setting and relationship of disputants, (c) the incidence of police injury and assault sustained in domestic dispute situations, and (d) the use made by the police of other social services.

Telephone Requests for Service

At the time of this research public telephone access to the Vancouver Police Department is possible via eleven telephone lines. Five lines are designated emergency and the remainder general enquiries/complaints lines. All telephone calls, incoming, internal and outgoing via the public access lines are recorded by means of a multi-track tape recorder. There are always two tapes on the recorder: one for immediate playback allowing police officers handling emergency calls to replay for clarification and information retrieval; and a master tape which is not disturbed and provides a continuous 24-hour record of calls. Tapes are changed at 6 a.m. each day and the master tape stored for 29 days after which it is recycled. There are instances when tapes may be removed from storage for investigative purposes. In these cases the next tape chronologically is used in its place.

Details of requests for service which are judged by telephone operators to warrant police presence are written on a partially pre-coded "dispatch record". Operators circle one of 47 possible event codes ranked by priority into three groups. For example, a priority one dispatch record contains events such as "shots fired, screams, man with gun/knife" and "hold-up in progress"; a priority two dispatch record contains events such as "suspicious person", "indecent exposure" and "motor vehicle accident"; among priority three events are "parking complaint", "theft from auto" and "stolen vehicle recovered". Dispatch records are then time stamped, assigned a log number and passed to the radio dispatcher. The time the message is transmitted is stamped on the record. When the police patrol responding has cleared the event he radios this to the dispatcher and a completion time is recorded.

It became quite clear from other studies of the report centre^{17, 18} from talking to telephone operators and from observing the centre in operation, that there exists a variety of interpretations of incoming calls depending

on who phones in and who receives the request, resulting in essentially similar events being classified by different event codes. Further, this variance affects the decision of whether or not to dispatch a patrol, a decision apparently often made without reference to any objective guidelines. Thus, depending on the description given by the caller and the interpretation of the operator, a family fight, for example, could be judged worthy of police presence and classified as "Aggravated Assault in Progress" (Priority 1), or "Family Trouble" (Priority 2), or "Keep the Peace" (Priority 3).

To overcome the ambiguity in recording and in order to gain information on service requests which did not receive police presence (and on which no record other than the taped recording of the call existed), a sample of incoming calls was analysed. Master tapes were sampled to give representation to each day of the week, and initially time periods were sampled to give greater representation to evening and early morning hours during which the greatest volume of calls occurs. However, the difficulty of listening and analysing sampled tapes within the time periods convenient to the Police Department proved too much to strictly adhere to this design. Consequently, a composite week of seven days with proportionate representation to time of day was sampled.

A simple recording form was designed and used to collect information on all domestic dispute calls on the following variables: time received, line used (emergency/non-emergency), person calling, complainant's address, brief description of problem, nature of request--information or police presence, mode of response, police event code assigned on dispatches, mention of children present, use of alcohol/drugs, use of threat of violence and weapons, number involved and advice given.

For the purpose of this research a domestic dispute was operationally defined as any request for service (both requests for police presence and advice/information) arising out of conflicts occurring in, broadly defined, domestic situations including arguments or fights between husband and wife, partners in common law relationship, man and woman; parent-child/teenager problems; verbal or physical disputes between relatives or unrelated persons occupying the same household or dwelling; disturbances caused by landlord-tenant disputes, neighbour arguments; interpersonal struggles over child custody; violation of separation orders; non-compliance with eviction orders; and "keep the peace" requests for police to attend and stand by in case domestic disputes arose or became violent.

Since the classification of the call as domestic dispute depended on the researcher's subjective assessment, a reliability check was conducted by means of repeat listening by a second researcher to approximately eight per cent (14 hours) of call time. Two measurements were taken: one, degree of agreement on the number of calls classified as domestic disputes, and second, agreement on the description of the call. The original tape analysis resulted in 34 calls recorded as domestic for the period chosen. Repeat analysis produced 32 domestic calls for an inter-analyst agreement of 94 per cent (subsequent discussion resulted in the inclusion of the two borderline calls not identified by the second researcher.) In all but three instances where researchers differed over the description of the dispute (fights between persons of unknown or vaguely described relationships were classified differently--i.e., as landlord-tenant rather than husband-wife, etc.), there was good agreement on all key variables when recording forms were compared. The opportunity to be able to continuously replay phone conversations to extract the data no doubt contributed greatly to the high inter-analyst reliability.

For all those calls for which a police patrol was dispatched, dispatch records were consulted and Vancouver Police Department event codes and service times were entered on the data records. At the same time comparisons were made between report centre clerks' notes on the nature of the request and the researchers' description of the call.

Finally, it should be noted that the analysis of tape recordings of incoming calls removed the possibility of a Hawthorne effect taking place. Police department personnel knew only after the event that the calls were being reviewed for research.

Vancouver Police Department "Family Trouble" File

Under the heading "Family Trouble" the Police Department keeps on file narrative reports compiled by officers who have attended domestic disturbances. For the six months January to June 1975, the file contained 95 such reports. During the same period, however, police patrols were dispatched to 554 family trouble calls. This suggests that a written report is completed in only 17 per cent of cases. The lack of a report is in part due to "unfounded calls", i.e., incidents which have calmed or for which no reason for intervention exists by the time officers arrive on the scene and officer judgments that the incident is so trivial or habitual that a report is unnecessary or will serve no purpose, among other reasons.

The reports analysed showed that children were directly involved in 48.4 per cent of the cases. In 16.8 per cent the reason for police intervention was child abuse or the abandonment of a child, and in three other instances (an additional 3.2 per cent) the abduction of a child was the reason for police involvement. The frequency with which children appear in the written report suggests that their involvement or presence is a major reason for there being a written report.

The over-representation in the reports of juvenile problems again confirms this conclusion. In 52 cases (54.7%) the disputants were husband and wife, in 28 cases (29.5%) the problems were between parent and child, and in the remaining cases the disputants were other family members, friends, and persons of unknown relationship. Compared with the analysis of incoming calls to the Vancouver Police Department reported later in this monograph, parent-child conflicts constitute only 7 per cent of all requests for service.

In 28 of the 95 reports the writer indicated that copies of his report should be sent to other internal departments or external agencies. The Vancouver Police Department liaison workers were referred to in five cases, and the Vancouver Resources Board Family and Children's Service in 14 cases. The remainder were internal referrals to such departments as Missing Persons, Youth Preventative Squad, General Assignment Section, and District Office. It was not possible to trace what action in fact was taken in these cases, or whether the officer had received or would receive feedback on the outcome of his suggested referral.

Finally, in 82 of the 95 reports no entry was made as to the time taken to handle the situation. The time at which the intervention was made, however, was reported in every case except one. Interestingly, 54.3 per cent of the calls occurred between 5 p.m. and 2 a.m.

Injury Reports

At this time Vancouver data on police injuries do not confirm the United States findings regarding the frequency of injuries incurred in domestic settings.

A review of Vancouver Police Department records was undertaken to determine the nature and extent of police injuries and the proportion occurring while attending domestic disputes. The two major sources for these data were the Investigation Reports and the Workers Compensation Reports. The researchers, with the cooperation of the Research and Planning Department of the Vancouver City Police, extracted those files of police constables who were involved in so-called "assaults on premises" from January, 1975 to August, 1975. There was a total of 29 assaults during this period; of these 29 assaults several involved assaults on two constables during a single incident.

Twenty-one of the 29 files were located; the remainder could not be located. A subsequent check was made and the files were still missing. Of these 21 reports, one clearly involved police injury during a domestic dispute and a second one was considered borderline. Injuries incurred in both cases were relatively minor.

An analysis of over 200 Workmen's Compensation Reports provided approximately the same results. One per cent of injuries reported to the Workmen's Compensation Board could possibly have occurred during a domestic intervention; however, there was not enough information to make such a statement conclusive. There were no reliable cross-references available to aid in this check. It was determined that a further review of either the Investigation Reports or the Workers Compensation Reports was unwarranted.

Dispatch Records

In order to estimate from the total number of dispatches the proportion of police work that could be categorized as "service activities", the calls to which police patrols were dispatched and the service time taken was analysed for a six-month period. January to June, 1975. The 45,957 dispatches in this period, classified by police department event code (in print-out format supplied by the Police Department) were divided into two

broad categories, "law enforcement" and "service". Insufficient information on 1903 of the calls which had been classified as "other" or "incomplete phone call" prevented their inclusion in either law enforcement or service categories.

For the purpose of this research "law enforcement" includes all reports of criminal offences--hold-ups, assaults, thefts, break-ins, molesting; reports suggesting that specific laws have been broken, such as parking regulations, impaired driving and indecent exposure; plus reports of suspicious persons and persons with weapons, etc. The "service" category is divided into six sub-groups--"domestic problems" (family trouble, drunk annoying, fight, disturbance, noisy neighbours, keep-the-peace, etc.), "health" (physical and mental illness, casualty or sick person, attempted suicide, sudden death), "people" (man/woman down drunk, missing and found persons), "property" (found, abandoned, damaged property, check premises), "highway" (motor vehicle accident, directing traffic), and "escorts" (escorting ambulance, inhalator, and fire department assistance).

The category "service" embraces all those functions which could be said to comprise the social service role component of police work. While family fights, noisy neighbours and parties should strictly come within the law enforcement category where breaches of the peace are concerned, they were more appropriately classified as "service" since they rarely result in prosecution or arrest and more often require the exercise of social skills by the police. It should be further noted that the frequencies within the "law enforcement-service" dichotomy are the result of police department event coding and subject to the vagaries and subjective judgments of individual telephone operators and dispatch clerks in interpreting the incoming requests for police assistance. Finally, the distribution between "law enforcement" and "service" reflects calls for assistance which resulted in police mobilization only and excludes citizen requests for police intervention which were handled in other ways, such as referral, giving advice or information, and denial of appropriateness for police involvement.

The process of handling requests for police assistance and the place our conceptualization of calls as law enforcement and service fits is shown in Figure 1. According to this conceptualization, 49.3 per cent of calls for assistance, amounting to 52 per cent of police patrol time, were classified as law enforcement and 46.6 per cent of calls (49.3 per cent of time) were classified as service (4.1 per cent of calls and time were not classified). A more detailed frequency breakdown of "service" activities by sub-group is given in Table 1.




Figure 1
 Telephone requests for police assistance
 and breakdown of dispatches into
 "service" and "law enforcement"

TABLE 1
 Distribution of "Service" dispatches by sub-group,
 service time taken and number of calls
 January to June, 1975

	Total calls		Total time (mins)		Average time per case (mins)
	No.	%	No.	%	
Domestic	7,396	34.5	234,811	24.3	31.8
Health	1,994	9.3	114,752	11.9	57.6
People	2,491	11.6	69,739	7.2	28.0
Property	3,838	17.9	183,211	19.0	47.9
Highways	3,573	16.7	291,790	30.2	81.7
Escorts	2,137	10.0	71,725	7.4	33.6
Total Service	21,419	100.0	966,028	100.0	45.1

Two factors require mention: Firstly, there may be an under-estimation of service activities due to police department categorization procedures, e.g., domestic fights where charges are laid would be classified as assaults -- a law enforcement activity. Estimates of the amount of time spent in "service" activities derived from other studies place the proportion much higher than 45 per cent, and estimates of up to 80 per cent have been quoted.^{5.6.7.}

Secondly, the average time per call is calculated as the difference between message transmission and clearance time radioed in by the attending officer. This therefore includes travel time and any slight delay between the actual completion of police-citizen contact and the opportunity to radio in clearance.

Telephone Requests for Service and Police Response

In order to obtain a more complete and detailed analysis of the domestic sub-category, one that would provide information on all requests for service irrespective of police response, 174 hours of telephone tapes were analysed. The statistics presented henceforth refer to this analysis.

A total of 283 domestic dispute incidents were identified from taped conversations. The calls were distributed throughout the day with a very low rate between about 2 a.m. and 12 noon. Requests for service slowly increase during the afternoon, rising to a peak during the later evening. In general the weekends, Friday, Saturday and Sunday, are busier than the rest of the week with a daily domestic dispute average of 44 calls compared with 38 per day Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. Between the hours of 4 p.m. and 2 a.m. the Police Department can expect two to three times the volume of requests received during the rest of the day. Table 2 presents the distribution of calls by duty shift, showing differences by time of day and day of the week. The figures show that by and large the domestic problems encountered are a weekend 5 p.m. to 2 a.m. phenomenon.

TABLE 2
Domestic dispute calls by day of week
and police departments duty shift
March-April, 1975*

Shift	Mon.	Tues.	Wed.	Thurs.	Fri.	Sat.	Sun.	Total
2400-0800 hrs	8	7	11	3	3	13	20	65
0800-1600 hrs	8	10	7	4	7	9	7	52
1600-2400 hrs	29	19	24	21	24	33	16	166
Total	45	36	42	28	34	55	43	283
Calls p/hr-								
Total	1.9	1.5	1.8	1.2	1.4	2.3	1.8	1.7
Calls p/hr-								
1600-2400 shift	3.6	2.4	3.0	2.6	3.0	4.1	2.0	3.0

* Note: The distribution presented in Table 2 is a composite week derived from taped conversations over a six-week period and does not represent one week of 7 consecutive days. The sampling procedure resulted in 174 hours of taped calls some 6 hours greater than a 7-day, 168-hour week. The extra 6 hours are accounted for by imprecise starting and finishing points on the tapes, i.e., not always an exact 8-hour period was recorded. Thus the total of 283 calls slightly over-represent a typical week for this time of year.

Taking our estimate of citizen initiated requests for intervention in domestic disputes (283 requests/week) in relation to the total number of citizen initiated calls (derived from internal departmental estimates), domestic dispute intervention requests account for about 5.5 to 6.5 per cent of all citizen calls.

The type of service requested and the police response for the 283 calls analysed is shown in Table 3. Service requests were divided into: (1) requests for police intervention in an ongoing dispute; (2) requests for police to "stand by" in case trouble occurred; and (3) requests for advice or information about a dispute that had taken place or was in progress -- i.e., police presence was not specifically requested.

Police responses to the requests were similarly sub-divided: (1) dispatch of a patrol car; (2) referral of the call to another agency -- e.g., nine landlord-tenant disputes were referred to the Rentalman's office, three cases involving children were referred to the Family and Children's Services department of the Vancouver Resources Board; and (3) advice or information only was given over the telephone -- e.g., the police may explain that the request does not fall within their sphere of responsibility, provide advice on the procedure for laying charges, or to advise as to the law in particular situations.

As can be seen from the table, police presence was requested in 223 calls (78.8% of all calls) and was given in 117 cases where it was requested (52.5%). Of the 60 calls requesting advice or information only concerning a domestic disturbance, the police referred the call in 21.7 per cent of cases, dispatched a patrol in 11.7 per cent and handled the enquiry over the telephone without referral in the remaining instances.

TABLE 3
Service requested and mode of police response*

Service Requested		Response mode			
		Patrol dispatched	Referral	Advice	Info. Total
Police	Intervention in outgoing dispute	102	5	72	179
Presence	Preventative Presence	15	1	28	44
Advice/Information only		7	13	40	60
Total		124	19	140	283

* Note: During the week of 20 to 26 July 1975 a log was kept of all incoming calls received at the VPD Report Centre. An estimated (i.e., excluding duplicate and erroneous entries) 7400 calls were received. A verbal estimate of 60 to 65% of citizen initiated was given. A detailed study of 24 hours of incoming calls to the Report Centre calculated that 63% were citizen initiated. (Beamish, 1974). Taking the estimate for citizen initiated calls at 60% and 65% respectively suggests that between 4440 (60% of 7400) and 4180 (65% of 7400) calls per week are received. Therefore between 5.8 and 6.4% of citizen calls are domestic (283 as percentage of 4810 and 4440).

Over-all, the police responded with police presence, irrespective of the specific nature of the service requested, in 124 cases or 43.8 per cent of the calls.

Of the 283 service requests, the police were asked to intervene directly in an ongoing dispute in 179 cases (63.3%), were asked to attend and play a peacekeeping of "preventative" role in case trouble occurred in 44 cases (15.6%), and asked for advice on the appropriate action to be taken by the caller, or information on a point of law or legal right in 60 instances (21.2%).

Most calls (185 or 65.4%) were made using the emergency number, although this by no means automatically guaranteed police presence. Of all emergency calls, 48.1 per cent were dealt with by advice and referral. Likewise, while most of the non-emergency calls were for advice only, some 28.1 per cent of calls on this line were judged appropriate to receive police presence.

In 213 calls (75.3%) the caller was a citizen personally involved in the dispute reported. (This proportion is perhaps inflated by the inclusion of neighbour disputes where the neighbour annoyed was coded as "involved citizen". Disregarding neighbour disputes, the caller was one of the disputing parties in 71.6 per cent of the remaining 204 cases.) In 50 instances (19.8%) an observer or witness to the altercation made in the call, and in the remaining cases the caller was a public service agent such as ambulance driver, crisis centre staff, etc.

An address was given for 63.3 per cent of the calls. Using this datum and both local area and proposed police district boundaries for the City of Vancouver, the calls per 10,000 population were calculated. The ratios by police districts were as follows:

Police District	Calls per 10,000 Crude Pop.
1 (N.W. Vancouver)	8.1
2 (N.E. Vancouver)	5.7
3 (S.E. Vancouver)	4.1
4 (S.W. Vancouver)	2.5

Local area analysis showed most calls coming from the West End, Strathcona, Grandview-Woodland and Killarney areas, all of which had a request to population ratio of between 7.0 and 8.5 per 10,000. For the city over-all domestic dispute calls averaged about 5.5 per 10,000 population.

Dispute Type

The 283 domestic disputes were categorized by the relationship of the disputants and grouped into eight types. The number of calls by type, the number receiving police presence and the average time taken to clear the incident are given in the following table:

TABLE 4
Requests for service, police dispatches
and completion time by dispute type
March-April 1975*

Dispute Type	Phone calls		Dispatches		Average time for completion(mins)
	No.	%	No.	%	
Husband-Wife	96	33.9	46	37.1	33.5
Neighbour	79	27.9	31	25.0	31.9
Landlord-Tenant	47	16.6	19	15.3	32.8
Parent-Child	20	7.0	4	3.2	25.8
"Friends"	15	5.7	8	6.5	38.9
Other Family	9	3.2	2	1.6	17.0
Man/Woman	6	2.1	6	4.8	13.7
Other: Unknown	10	3.5	8	6.5	33.4
Total	283	100.0	124	100.0	31.8

* Note: Mean time includes travelling time from geographic location at time of message receipt to the address of the event.

The husband-wife category includes all those calls involving a dispute between husband and wife, common law partners, boyfriend-girlfriend and man/woman fights where the relationship was unknown. As can be seen, these comprised the largest group of calls, 33.9 per cent, and received one of the highest dispatch ratios.

Considering all husband-wife disputes police were dispatched in 46 out of 96 such instances (47.9%). Taking citizen requests for police presence at husband-wife disputes (80 such requests), the dispatch ratio was 43 out of 80 or 53.8 per cent.

Direct intervention by police rather than advice or information was requested more often in husband-wife cases than most other dispute types, comprising 83 per cent of service requests (80 out of 96 calls) compared with 70 per cent for the others. In 36 of the 80 calls (45%) where police presence had been requested the police responded with advice only.

In 61.5 per cent of husband-wife disputes, compared with 73.3 per cent of all domestic disputes, the caller was personally involved in the fracas. This suggests that with husband-wife fights there is a slightly greater likelihood of the incident being reported by an observer or witness to the trouble than by a disputant. In all but three husband-wife fights where the caller was a disputant it was the wife who requested police intervention.

In 40 instances of the husband-wife dispute category the police simply told callers that the incident reported was not a police matter. In another six instances of no action by the police, the caller was informed of the law on a particular domestic issue.

The next largest group of calls was neighbour disputes. These included interpersonal neighbour fights and verbal disputes, complaints by one neighbour about the actions or behaviour of another, and complaints about noisy parties. Police presence was requested in 73.4 per cent of "neighbour" calls and information and advice requested in the remainder of the cases. Police were dispatched, however, in 39.2 per cent of cases over-all (21 out of 79 calls or in 28 of the 58 direct requests for presence 48.3%).

Violence or the threat of violence was mentioned in 25 of the 79 neighbour calls, verbal abuse was recorded in 30 calls and 19 of the neighbour troubles were noise complaints. Fifty-four per cent of the calls occurred between 8 p.m. and 2 a.m. with Saturday night being the heaviest night.

Callers were told that the incident described was not a police matter in 18 of the 79 "neighbour" requests (22.8%) and were advised to get up a neighbour petition and seek action through a Justice of the Peace in another 21 cases (26.6%).

Landlord-tenant disputes were the third largest group of calls comprising 47 incidents during the study period. Generally they consisted of disputes over evictions, the unlawful removal by tenant of landlords' property, or difficulties experienced by tenants in removing their property from rented premises.

A higher proportion of requests for service were requests for information and advice as to the law (15 requests or 31.9 per cent) in this category than was true for husband-wife disputes (12.5 per cent of requests), neighbour disputes (26.6 per cent of requests), and all categories combined (19.4 per cent of requests). Police attended in 19 cases (40.4 per cent over-all) or 56.3 per cent of direct requests for police presence (18 out of 32 requests).

In 14 requests for service in this category the callers were informed that the incidents described were not a police matter, in another nine cases of essentially similar problems the caller was referred to the Rentalman's office. Three more callers were given information concerning their rights in particular dispute situations.

The remaining dispute types identified were parent-child conflicts (in the main comprising teenage problems of unmanageability and run-aways from home), disputes between friends and acquaintances (including fights and refusals of persons to leave the caller's house), other

family disputes (between family members not comprising the primary household), man/woman disputes (calls where either a man or a woman was reported as causing a disturbance with no information as to the existence of another disputing party), and "others" where the sex, relationship and identification of victim is unknown.

In total the above group received about the same degree of attention from the police with a police presence occurring in 54.9 per cent of the cases where it was requested (granted in 28 out of 51 requests). Of note is the man/woman dispute category. The short time taken for completion in this category (13.7 minutes average) in the main is explained by the nature of the calls which reported from third party observation a man or a woman shouting or screaming. It could be that the situations had calmed down by the time the police arrived.

Police Response

In an attempt to predict the likelihood of the police attending domestic incidents, data were collected on whether four key variables were mentioned in the telephone requests for service. The variables specifically recorded were drugs or alcohol in use; personal or non-personal violence used or threatened; use or threatened use of a weapon; and, presence of children. In addition, the probability of police mobilization was calculated for time of day.

In the calculation of probabilities of police action, calls which requested only information and calls specifically concerned with neighbour noise complaints were excluded. Of the 205 calls remaining, violence or threatened use of violence was mentioned in 145 or 70.7 per cent of cases, alcohol was mentioned in 34 or 16.6 per cent of cases, the presence of children mentioned in 24 or 11.7 per cent, and weapons or the threatened use of weapons mentioned in 8 or 3.9 per cent of calls.

It should be pointed out here that non-mention of the above variables does not mean they were not present, only that they were not reported. It is further noted that the low frequency with which alcohol was mentioned does not necessarily represent a gross under-reporting. Contrary to popular belief, it has been shown elsewhere that family disputes are not usually influenced by alcohol use. In their study of 1388 family disputes, Bard and Zacker¹⁹ found that "in only one-third to one-half of all disputes did one or both disputants appear to have even used alcohol." Our finding may be an example of this low usage phenomenon although a definite statement in this regard must await the follow-up research when more accurate data gathering will be employed.

Over-all the possibility of police action for this group of 205 calls was .54. Individual probabilities for each of the variables alone and in combination are shown in Table 5.

TABLE 5
Probability of police dispatch
by circumstances of dispute

Mention of	No. of calls	No. of dispatches	Probability of dispatch
Weapons only	1	1	1.00
Violence only	98	57	.58
Alcohol only	6	1	.17
Children only	7	3	.43
Violence and weapons	6	4	.67
Alcohol and violence	24	16	.67
Violence and children	11	8	.73
Alcohol, violence and children	4	3	.75
Violence, Weapons and children	2	2	1.00

To determine whether police presence at domestic calls was a function of resource availability, the dispatch ratios were compared by shift time, and a comparison of night calls (occurring between 6 p.m. and 2 a.m.) with day calls (occurring between 2 a.m. and 6 p.m.) was made.

In choosing the times for comparison the assumption was made that during periods of peak activity for the police department generally (evenings and early morning hours) the ratio of domestic calls responded to by police presence would decrease. This was not supported by the data. There were no significant differences between day and night, or between shifts, regarding the probability of police dispatch.

A third analysis on the probability of dispatch was conducted by comparing the dispatch rates by type of caller, i.e., citizen involved in the dispute or third party observer. Again there were no significant differences in police response for the three main dispute types. That is, whether the caller was personally involved in a husband-wife dispute, landlord-tenant fight or neighbour dispute or merely an observer had no significant effect on the likelihood of the police dispatching a patrol.

TABLE 6

Probability of police dispatch by
times of requests for service

Call time period	Probability of dispatch
Midnight to 8.00 a.m.	.48
8.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m.	.42
4.00 p.m. to midnight	.44
10.00 p.m. to 2.00 a.m.	.48
Over-all (24 hour period)	.45

Another way of assessing the importance to the police department of citizen requests for service is to examine the priority rating given the call by the telephone operator receiving the requests. Table 7 shows dispute type by Vancouver Police Department priority ratings for those calls to which a car was dispatched.

TABLE 7

Domestic dispute types by Vancouver
Police Department priority rating
and patrol car dispatch

Type	VDP priority				Total dispatches No.	Total all calls No.
	1 No.	2 No.	3 No.	Not Known No.		
Husband-Wife	4	34	7	1	46	96
Neighbour	3	20	7	1	31	79
Landlord-Tenant	--	7	11	1	19	47
Other family	--	2	--	--	2	9
Parent-Child	1	3	--	--	4	20
Friends	--	6	--	2	8	16
Man/Woman	4	2	--	--	6	6
Other	2	4	2	--	8	10
Total	14	78	27	5	124	283

Where the police do respond (in 124 out of 283 calls or 43.8 per cent) it is clear that the modal assessment is a secondary priority rating. This rating is largely a function of the event code assigned to the call. For example, domestic disturbances classified by the police as family trouble, fight or drunk annoying, will receive priority two ratings. Such classification depends on the particular aspects of the calls deemed important by the receptionist. It is, however, very possible that the receptionist will classify a call with some slight distortion of description in order to increase the priority rating. Thus two family disputes were classified as "assault in progress" (a priority one rating) rather than "family trouble" (a priority two rating) to effect more urgent response. Similarly a husband forcible entering his home after being locked out by his estranged wife was, apparently because of the hysterical nature of the caller, classified as a "B and E" rather than disturbance or family trouble.

Concluding Remarks

In this study, the first baseline data gathering exercise for the evaluation of family crisis intervention, the findings have been consistent with those reported in the literature. Like other police forces, the Vancouver Police Department has a considerable amount of its time and resources devoted to requests and service calls of a strictly non-criminal nature. Like other police forces it responds in a not too consistent fashion, answering about half of the requests made of it with the dispatch of a patrol car. Here as elsewhere the low probabilities of dispatch reflect the fact that the public often perceive incidents as requiring police action while the police do not.

In domestic disputes it is often the perception of one of the disputants that the behaviour of the other has overstepped the bounds of "acceptable" abuse and violence and that precipitates the call for police intervention. It is because domestic interpersonal behaviour is regulated by what Ludman⁷ refers to as relational rules, for which there are no universal standards, as opposed to civil-legal rules, the infractions of which are clearly discerned, that no hard and fast guidelines for clearly establishing what is a police matter can be drawn.

It will be a concern of the ensuing evaluation to monitor changes over time in the police modes of response as a result of family crisis intervention training, and particularly to evaluate the degree to which the police utilize community resources in those instances where they do not recognize a need for their involvement but where nevertheless the public requires assistance and referral.

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DOMESTIC CRISIS INTERVENTION

Monograph 2 - Attitude Survey of Trained and
Untrained Police Officers

Donald G. Dutton

Bruce R. Levens

Introduction

Intervention in family and other domestic disputes has been an area of police work that most police would prefer to avoid.^{1 2*} Up to a few years ago, "training" for this aspect of the work typically involved listing three "do's" and three "don'ts" to remember on family crisis calls, and then dispatching the newly graduated recruits into the streets to receive on-the-job training -- learning by experience. British Columbia police, together with most other North American forces utilized this haphazard, trial and error approach to learning family crisis intervention, which did nothing to enhance police feelings of competence and control in such situations.

Veteran police typically express a variety of additional reasons for disliking this aspect of their work. Noteworthy among these are, first, that police departments rarely recognize exemplary service on family dispute calls and do not base promotion or advancement on such service. Secondly, police feel unsure of their legal grounds in handling such calls, and in general feel that they are "on someone else's turf" when intervening in "domestics."

A third reason for this dislike is the highly unpredictable nature of the family dispute. Family crisis intervention requires, on occasion, a tough "law enforcement" response (when, for example, a vicious assault has occurred or occurs in the officer's presence) and, on other occasions, a tactful and sensitive "order maintenance" response (for example, where no clear-cut law has been broken, yet parties disagree, are in conflict, emotionally upset and demanding police service). While these two sets of responses from police are incompatible and often antagonistic, police enter a domestic dispute without knowing which set of responses will be

* Figures refer to the references at the end of the text.

required. Part of this problem is due to incomplete and sometimes faulty transmission of information by the police communication centre,³ but nevertheless the officer attending the call has to adjust his response at a moment's notice.

A fourth reason for police reluctance to respond to family trouble calls is that citizens who strongly request police service while in crisis often reject police suggestions the next day. They refuse to fulfil a commitment to see a marital counsellor or to press legal proceedings. Hence, police feel they have wasted their time and will probably have to return to the same family to quell another disturbance in the future.

Finally, intervention in domestic disputes is dangerous work, and assaults on officers are not uncommon. For example, the F.B.I. reports that about one fifth of police deaths on the job in the United States occur during the handling of disturbance calls,⁴ and about 40 per cent of police injuries result from this aspect of their work.

Nevertheless, there appears to be a valid set of reasons for police handling of domestic disputes.

As reported in an earlier monograph,³ domestic disputes occur in all areas of Vancouver and in sufficiently high numbers to necessitate a generalized training approach, that is, one which provides intervention skills to all patrol personnel. In a peak period at night on weekends, police may have to respond to four or five calls per hour. Small squads of specially trained family crisis experts would be infeasible in the face of this demand; thus, the police constable will continue to be the only person available to handle such calls. He or she has the necessary legal authority to stop the problem and a fast enough response time to intervene prior to serious injury.

Another reason is that many people call the police, not as a last resort, but as a first choice resource. The police are well known to the public and many people are unaware of social service agencies that may help. More important, they might prefer the police to the so-called "taking help" services, or they wish to give legitimacy to their side of the argument by marshalling right on their side, or attempt to use the police to satisfy a vindictiveness toward the other disputant.⁵

Whatever the reason, citizen demand for police service is a reality to be dealt with, and the constant potential for violence places domestic disputes clearly within the domain of the law enforcement agency.

Research in other communities has shown that fighting families who come to the attention of the police, frequently do so on more than one occasion.* San Francisco and New York have demonstrated that family crisis intervention training can effectively reduce the domestic assault rate through making referrals to outside agencies and by teaching people how to mediate conflict situations.¹

Because domestic violence is a serious problem (33.4% of murders in British Columbia between 1968 and 1974 were of domestic nature) that will continue to require police presence, and because of the demonstrated advantages of having a force trained to handle this problem, it was decided that the British Columbia Police College should train recruits in crisis intervention techniques.

Description of Training

To date, three classes (approximately 180 police recruits in all, 140 of the Vancouver Police Department) have been trained using a six-day workshop that teaches a variety of family crisis intervention skills.

* Kansas City, Missouri, for example found that police had previously intervened in 90% of families subsequently committing a felonious assault and had intervened four to five times with 40% of such families (see also Boudouris, 1971).

The family crisis intervention workshop was primarily designed as a maximally effective teaching device for police training systems. As such it compacts skills in safety management, defusing (or "cooling") violent people, communications and interviewing, mediation techniques and referral techniques. Apart from these specific skills which are closely aligned with a procedural as compared with an attitudinal teaching orientation, the workshops focus on a variety of social issues, such as the propriety of police intervention into domestic situations, the effect of racial and sexual attitudes on professional interaction with the public, the job definition or perceived role expectations of police, etc. Apart from making a substantial impact on the attitudes and perceptions of police recruits with regard to their definition of their role as police officers, the workshops are designed to fit a prescriptive package for system reform. Social indicators of this reform would include a decrease in the recidivism rate for family crisis calls to the same households, a lowering of the domestic assault and domestic homicide rate (currently about 40% of all assaults and homicides in Vancouver) and greater police satisfaction with police performance.

The basic six-day workshop for police recruits utilizes lectures, video tapes, handouts, quizzes, role-played simulations and behavioural check lists to maximize behavioural as well as cognitive learning. The "training" is built around a six-step procedure for family crisis intervention beginning with external safety procedures, then internal safety, defusing, interviewing, mediation and referral. These six steps in summary are as follows:

1. Safety: This part of the course covers exterior and interior safety procedures, including approaching the scene of the dispute, obtaining information on number of disputants, weapons involved, and entering the premises. Interior safety precautions, such as separating and seating disputants, rooms to avoid, procedures for hotels and apartments, etc.

2. Defusing: This refers to restoring order and covers appropriate force, techniques for handling angry, hostile and threatening situations, plus verbal skills for distracting and confusing disputants in order to calm the situation.
3. Interviewing: The purpose of this step is to provide police with efficient techniques for arriving at a "decision point" regarding further action. Techniques cover how to determine the scope and nature of the problem, how to establish rapport, maintain control of the interview, and remain impartial. Specific interview techniques such as probing, paraphrasing and listening are also taught.
4. Decision point: With good information the officer reaches a point where he must decide on what action to take. Five possibilities are dealt with: no action, mediation, referral, convince one party to leave, and arrest.
5. Mediation: This technique is dealt with in depth and covers procedures for resolving the dispute on the spot by helping citizens to appreciate their problem and to agree upon a specific course of action.
6. Referral: This is the last step in the domestic dispute management course and covers those situations where some social agency follow-up is deemed appropriate. When to refer and how to refer are dealt with in detail. Criteria for selecting social services are provided, and the use of a directory of emergency services explained.

Each step of the above training scheme is built and based upon each prior step in a logical fashion and recruits review each prior step when learning a new one. The procedural training provides the best vehicle for introducing recruits to philosophical issues, raising questions about their racial, sexual and general social attitudes and role definitions. At the end of the six-day workshop it is expected that recruits perform to criterion in a family crisis simulation, but it is also expected that they will have been opened up to a variety of perspectives on policing, society and family relations. Knowledge and internalization of the techniques are tested by means of a written examination which demonstrates their conceptual grasp of the procedure and by a behavioural check list which is used to score their performance in handling a simulated family fight.

In addition to the procedural basis of the workshop, it also covers special topics in depth such as crisis theory, minority group relations, family structure and attitudes, and non-verbal communications, legal issues, drugs, suicide and mental health, and referral agencies. The degree of attention paid to each depends on training needs and curriculum organizational requirements.

Description of Study and Method

In order to evaluate the impact of such training on recruits, attitudes toward the handling of family crisis calls, and their general perception about this type of police work, a survey was undertaken in the spring of 1976 of 70 police officers, comprising 20 experienced officers who had not received the family crisis training package and three groups of recent B.C. Police College graduates who had received the training. All respondents were randomly chosen from Vancouver Police Department staff lists. Length of service for each group is shown on the following page.

TABLE 1
Composition of Survey Sample

	Vancouver Police Population	Sample	Length of Active Service at Time of Interview
Experienced Officers	480*	20	Average 9 years Range 3-20 yrs.
Class I Recruits	95	15	6-7 months
Class II Recruits	87	15	3-4 months
Class III Recruits	62	20	Two weeks

* This figure refers to the Patrol Division, Uniform Branch, and is the actual number of such officers at the time of this study.

One group (Class III) had just graduated two weeks prior to the survey. Class II had graduated three-four months previously, and Class I had graduated six-seven months previously. Thus by comparison of responses from the three recruit classes, the study also allowed for assessment of the longevity of any effects due to family crisis training. Prior research on police training⁶ has discussed a much-publicized discrepancy between "street training" and "academic training", whereby recruits are "re-socialized" from innovative practices during street experience with veteran officers who have not had the training and have not accepted the new techniques.

Since little in-service training had been done with the Vancouver Police Department to establish a more general acceptance of some of the more innovative procedures of family crisis intervention, it was believed that the effects of such training on recruits might be "re-socialized" and disappear with the time spent on the streets. By comparing the attitudes of B.C. Police College Classes I, II, and III some evidence bearing on this contention was obtained.

All interviewing was conducted by telephoning police officers and scheduling an interview either at the officer's home or at the police station prior to the officer going on shift. Five male interviewers identified themselves as working for the United Way on this project and divided the 70 interviews amongst them.

The interviews were structured around a 31-item questionnaire with probes inserted on specific items or at other appropriate times (in the judgment of the interviewer).

After a few "icebreaker" items, interviewers began to sound out the police officers on their attitudes and perceptions toward domestic crisis intervention.* Basically six categories of attitude were measured, each being related to a family crisis workshop training objective. These were: police procedure for family crisis calls; attitudes toward the role of the social scientist in police training; attitudes toward handling family crisis calls; attitudes toward people involved in domestic conflict; attitudes toward social agencies; and, perceptions of danger, alcohol use, and ability to control domestic crisis situations.

Findings

The results of the survey are grouped in this section according to the categories of attitudes measured in relation to family crisis training objectives.

* One is always concerned in surveys of this sort with respondents "image managing," that is, telling the interviewer what they think he wants to hear. In this study it was probably difficult for respondents to guess what a "good image" might be since many conflicting opinions exist about how one should handle family crisis calls. In any event, interviewers did not reveal a connection with the training team from the B.C. Police College: hence, one source of "reactivity" in the questionnaire was eliminated.

Category One: Police Procedure for Domestic Crisis Calls

First and foremost the workshop tries to teach recruits a basic procedure for crisis intervention. Category One tapped what respondents said they did procedurally during domestic crisis calls. An emphasis in the training, of importance to the successful handling of such disputes, is placed on mediation, and, where appropriate, referral. These particular outcomes (a) divert the disputants from the criminal justice system, and (b) reduce the chances of further calls on police for intervention and are key in expanding the officer's repertoire of responses to domestic calls for assistance.

Considering the alternatives available for clearance of domestic calls it was found that trained recruits do not differ from untrained experienced officers in terms of stated rate of arrest. Both groups estimate an arrest rate of six to seven per cent on family crisis calls.* Similarly, the response of "give a warning and leave" was estimated by both groups at about 10 to 11 per cent. Untrained experienced officers, however, were more likely to advise one party to contact a Justice of the Peace and lay a charge (28% of the time as compared with 12% by trained recruits), but less likely to negotiate settlement of problems (15% vs. 25%) or to refer to a social agency or outside worker (8% vs. 17%). Experienced officers were slightly more likely to clear a call by removing one party (21% vs. 18%). These data are shown in Table 2 which also demonstrates that there are no significant trends between trained classes for mediation and referral, the two response alternatives that trained classes use more often than untrained experienced officers. Hence there appears to be no "re-socialization" effect on what respondents say they do to clear a family crisis call.

* This finding is consistent with research in San Francisco where it was demonstrated that similar training did not seem to reduce the number of people police officers are likely to force into involvement with the criminal justice system as a result of family fights. Arrest as a police response to such calls is used infrequently and as a last resort (Redding and Olson, 1973).

TABLE 2
 Experienced Officers' and Class I, II, III
 Calls Cleared by Various Alternatives

	Experienced Officers	Class I	Class II	Class III
	n = 20	n = 15	n = 15	n = 20
	%	%	%	%
Making an arrest	7	5	6	7
Give warning and leave	12	13	8	11
Advise to contact JP	28	12	13	13
Mediate a settlement	15	22	27	26
Referral to social agency	8	20	17	16
Remove one party	21	20	15	17
Unclassified	9	8	14	11
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Three other questionnaire items (18, 22, 23) tapped attitudes toward specific procedures. All three of these items were of major importance in terms of their relationship with a prime workshop objective. Item 18 ("often with two neighbours who are battling constantly it is better to bring them together and spend some time getting agreement on the issue rather than to simply cool down the situation for that evening and leave") deals with an active preventative policing orientation as opposed to short-term crisis moderating solutions. Item 22 ("The best way to get a handle on the situation is to separate the people and let the more talkative one tell you what happened") deals with issues of neutrality and hearing both sides, covered at length in the workshops. Item 23 ("Often the best thing an officer can do for people is just to cool them down and give them a little advice on how to handle their problem") deals with citizens, and relates again to the more general issue of short-term "band-aid" crisis intervention as opposed to the use of interview, mediation and referral techniques. A combined score on these three procedural items was calculated on a five-point scale, where five was a maximally desirable score in terms of workshop objectives (strong agreement with item 18, strong disagreement with items 22 and 23), and one

was a maximally undesirable score. A statistically significant difference between untrained experienced officers and trained recruits was revealed when combined scores were tested. The trained recruits attained a mean score of 3.68 (Class I), 3.64 (Class II), and 3.88 (Class III), compared with 2.98 for experienced officers. Further, there was no significant trend between the trained recruit groups. But experienced officers differed significantly when compared with Class I, as well as when compared with Class III. This leads again to the conclusion that no "re-socialization" effect seems to have occurred on these crucial procedural items.

Two items (3 and 21) tapped attitudes toward police remaining neutral and not jumping to conclusions about who is to blame in family crises. Item 3 asked whether men or women were usually to blame. None of the recruit groups nor the experienced officers significantly tended to cast blame along sex lines. Item 21 ("Usually in family fights you can figure out who's to blame soon after you're in the door") was disagreed with by all four groups. No between group differences existed. The expectation that such prejudgments might exist among untrained police was not supported.

It would appear from this segment of the analysis that, in terms of domestic crisis intervention objectives, the training has had a beneficial effect on trained recruit response to such calls, and further, that such effects have not been lessened by time of the job and contact with untrained personnel.

Category Two: Attitude toward the Role of the Social Scientist in
Police Training

Category Two tapped attitudes toward the use of social science techniques in contributing to police training programs. Item 12 asked police how satisfied they were with the training they had received in domestic crisis intervention. The responses were scored on a 5-point scale, where a score of 1 equals "very satisfied" and a score of 5 equals "very dissatisfied." These data are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3
Satisfaction with Domestic Crisis
Intervention Training

	Score	Experienced	Class I	Class II	Class III
		Officers			
		n = 20	n = 15	n = 15	n = 20
Very Satisfied	1	0	2	0	12
Satisfied	2	6	3	9	4
Neutral	3	3	7	6	2
Dissatisfied	4	2	3	0	2
Very Dissatisfied	5	9	0	0	0
Mean score		3.7	2.8	2.4	1.7

Comparisons of Class I and Class III with experienced officers show significant differences between trained recruits and veteran officers with respect to satisfaction. Recruits trained via the present workshop are, according to this item, more satisfied with their Police College training experience than police officers who received traditional training in operation prior to the Police College course.

The other item under Category Two was item 14 ("Mental health experts, psychologists and behavioural scientists can generally teach police officers things that will be useful to them in their day-to-day police functions"). Agreement with this item was generally high in all groups. On a 5-point scale where a score of one indicates "strong agreement" and a score of five "strong disagreement", the mean scores for experienced officers equals 2.4. Class I equals 3.8, Class II equals 2.0 and Class III equals 1.7. No significant differences were, however, found among the groups.

Category Three: Attitudes toward Handling Domestic Crisis Calls

Originally this category was made up of five items: item 13: ("It takes more than just a little common sense to deal successfully with a domestic dispute case"), item 16 ("If most police had a choice, they'd just as soon not have to bother with family fights or domestic disturbances"), item 24 ("Police often shirk their responsibility by refusing to lay charges against a husband who has clearly beaten his wife"), item 25 ("There is more police can do with people in domestic calls compared to what can be accomplished in other aspects of the job"), and item 26 ("The police should only get involved in domestic disputes where there are children in danger"). Probing by the interviewers proved two of these items to be ambiguous, and differentially interpreted by recruits as compared with experienced officers. Item 13 ("Common sense...") was agreed with by experienced officers because they felt their street experience had uniquely qualified them for the job. Recruits agreed because they felt their special training was necessary for them to handle disputes. Item 24 ("laying charges...") was disagreed with by experienced officers because they felt it was the complainant's responsibility, not theirs, to lay charges in a civil suit. Recruits disagreed because they felt that the refusal to lay charges did not represent an abdication of responsibility if it meant that an officer was attempting to divert a family in conflict to outside agencies prior to resorting to the criminal justice system. Because of these different interpretations, items 13 and 24 do not lend themselves to statistical analysis. In addition, item 16 ("If police had a choice...") proved to be a relatively insensitive item with almost all scores in all groups clustered in the 2-3 (agree-neutral) range.

The remaining two items (25 and 26) were grouped and arranged in a similar direction, i.e., since "strong agreement" on item 25 and "strong disagreement" on item 26 were the desired responses, both were scored one

on the 5-point scale. On these items measuring feelings of accomplishment in domestic intervention and willingness to get involved in such calls (even when child abuse is not apparent) trained recruits scored significantly better than experienced police, and these differences do not disappear with time.

In short, the domestic crisis intervention training was successful in instilling positive feelings about the appropriateness of police involvement in domestic issues.

Category Four: Attitudes Toward People Involved in Domestic Conflict

Category Four was comprised of three items measuring police perceptions of people in domestic crisis. One workshop goal is to demonstrate to police that such crises are widespread, are not necessarily confined to any one segment of the population, and are not necessarily a sign of inferior character. Also, that attempting to advise people to live apart if they can't get along is fruitless, as it fails to recognize whatever other needs people are satisfying in their domestic relationship.

Item 27 asks respondents to rate people who get involved in domestic disputes on six 5-point semantic differential items (intelligent-dull, high income-low income, old-young, law-breaking-law abiding, white-non-white, English speaking-non-English speaking). Table 4 illustrates their responses to this item.

TABLE 4

Mean Scores of Experienced Officers and Class I, II and III Recruits of Perceptions by Police of People Who Get Involved in Domestic Disputes on a 5-point Semantic Differential

5-point Scale	Experienced Officers	Class I	Class II	Class III
		<u>Mean Scores</u>		
Intelligent - Dull	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.2
High Income - Low Income	3.8	4.1	4.1	3.7
Old - Young	3.0	3.3	3.6	3.0
Law-Breaking - Law-Abiding	3.2	3.0	3.4	3.3
White - Non-White	2.6	2.7	2.8	3.0
Non-English Speaking - English Speaking	3.4	3.3	3.1	3.7

The one strong conclusion that can be drawn from these data is that police are not using any scale extremes in their descriptions. Only two of the 24 mean scores are outside the 2 to 4 score range. Either police believe that all kinds of people get involved in domestics or else they are experiencing evaluation apprehension and are reacting by choosing only mid-scale (i.e. safe) alternatives. No significant differences were found to exist between groups on this item.

Item 15 ("People who get involved in domestics are much the same as most of us") also measures police perceptions of people in crisis, tapping into the notion that crisis is common and not indicative of inferior character. Table 5 presents responses to this item.

These data represent general agreement with this item amongst all groups, except for a curious split in Class I. We have no explanation for this split.

TABLE 5
 Degree of Agreement with the Statement
 "People who get involved in Domestic
 are much the same as most of us."
 (Item 15)

	Experienced Officers n = 20	Class I n = 15	Class II n = 15	Class III n = 20
Strongly agree	1	4	0	10
Agree	16	4	13	7
Neutral	2	0	2	2
Disagree	1	7	0	1
Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0

Item 19 ("Couples who get into a physical fight would be better off living apart") relates to the working objective of trying to get police to understand that in domestic crisis intervention they are seeing people at their worst, and that as a result they may jump to the conclusion that the couple should not be living together without really assessing that from the couple's point of view they wish to remain together because the relationship, although conflict-ridden, still satisfies some needs. Table 6 indicates responses to this item.

TABLE 6
 Degree of Agreement with the Statement "Couples
 who get into a physical fight would be better off
 living apart." (Item 19)

	Experienced Officers n = 20	Class I n = 15	Class II n = 15	Class III n = 20
Strongly agree	3	2	2	0
Agree	9	1	3	4
Neutral	5	4	3	4
Disagree	3	8	5	11
Strongly disagree	0	0	2	1

Experienced police officers differ significantly from Class III and from Class I recruits in their response to this item, indicating that the difference obtained soon after college training (i.e., Class III responses) does not disappear with time. This item is important because the attitude that couples who fight should be apart often affects the way untrained police handle domestics. Their reaction is a type of "love him or leave him" attitude that gets conveyed to the woman in terms of "if you stay here with him, you can expect the worst and don't call us because we've already warned you."

Hence, on three items measuring perceptions of people involved in domestics, experienced untrained police and trained recruits differ on only one, but that item has considerable significance for police demeanour and methods of clearing many domestic fight calls between couples.

Category Five: Attitudes toward Social Agencies

Two items assessed police attitude toward social agencies. This attitude clearly is of some importance in terms of workshop objectives, as the training encourages police to make good use of referrals to social agencies as a significant means of both increasing the patrolman's repertoire of responses in handling domestic disputes, and of reducing the possibility of repeat calls for police service. It is also important because, as reported above, trained recruits are significantly more likely to make such referrals than untrained officers.

Item 9 asked directly "What has been your experience with social agencies to whom you have made referrals?" Table 7 shows responses to this item.

TABLE 7

Favourableness of Experience with Social Agencies
as Reported by Experienced Officers
and Class I, II and III Recruits

	Experienced Officers	Class I	Class II	Class III
	n = 20	n = 15	n = 15	n = 20
Extremely favourable	0	1	2	5
Favourable	10	6	6	13
Sometimes O.K., sometimes not	6	5	7	1
Unfavourable	1	3	0	1
Extremely unfavourable	3	0	0	0

These results indicate a generally positive reaction to social agencies by all groups, which is somewhat surprising in view of the frequent negative comments made about social agencies, especially by veteran police officers. Probing by interviewers, however, revealed a diversity of opinion by police about social agencies. Many cited 52 Water Street (a Gastown Branch of the Vancouver Resources Board) and other Vancouver Resources Board services in giving examples of good experiences from social agencies. Lack of follow-up, lack of feedback and lack of availability of late night service and facilities were the main complaints. Interestingly, there is a significant trend amongst recruits to become more negative about agencies with time on the job. Class I who have had the longest street experience differ from Class III significantly and are the most negative of all groups tested about social agencies.

Item 20 ("There's little point in trying to make referrals to social agencies because they're never open when you really need them") taps a specific cause of police discontent with social agencies. Table 8 shows responses to this item.

TABLE 8

Degree of Agreement with the Statement
"There's little point in trying to make referrals
to social agencies because they're never open when
you really need them" (Item 20)

	Experienced Officers	Class I	Class II	Class III
	n = 20	n = 15	n = 15	n = 20
Strongly Agree	3	0	1	0
Agree	8	1	2	3
Neutral	5	4	5	7
Disagree	4	10	6	10
Strongly disagree	0	0	1	0

On this specific item experienced officers are significantly more negative than any recruit classes. What we are finding here is consistent with other findings on police opinions of the helping system.⁷

Much has been written about differences in philosophy between police and social workers where police adhere to a radical free-will position on crime causation (locating responsibility for a crime in its perpetrator) and social workers to a more deterministic view (locating the cause of crime in its societal antecedents). Police and social workers are also said to view themselves as being at cross purpose (the police to arrest for crime, the social worker to "help" the perpetrator "reform"). This has sometimes been described as a "punitive" versus "lenient" difference although it is far more complex than that. Police often identify with crime's victims and are first hand witnesses to the victims' distress. Their anger and frustration inevitably seeks to vent itself in retribution to the perpetrator. The social worker is often a first hand witness to the perpetrator's distress, and emphatically seeks to

discount his behaviour as the end product of numerous social forces. Each agent is acting in a human and humane way that carries an internal logic given the different information to which each has been exposed. Police discontent with social agencies will inevitably focus, however, on some concrete specific and mundane feature of social agency function (hours, bureaucracy, etc.) as a form of expression. Most police complaints in this survey referred to bureaucratic problems with agencies, most praise was reserved for actions of workers. The issue of police-social worker conflict is a complex one that has often been oversimplified and misunderstood. A police-social worker disagreement about what to do with a juvenile vandal can occur because both care about people but have simply been exposed to different information. A certain amount of conflict in the criminal justice system may be vital and healthy. If this conflict gets to the point where it is dysfunctional for the system, more drastic measures such as short term role reversal techniques may be required.

Category Six: Perceptions of Danger, Alcohol Use and Ability to Control Domestic Crises

Three items comprised this category. The first item (17) read "A patrolman is more likely to get hurt dealing with domestic disturbance or family fight than in dealing with any other kind of call." Table 9 displays responses to this item.

TABLE 9

Degree of Agreement with the Statement
"A Patrolman is more likely to get hurt dealing with
a domestic disturbance or a family fight than in dealing
with any other kind of call." (Item 17)

	Experienced Patrolmen n = 20	Class I n = 15	Class II n = 15	Class III n = 20
Strongly agree	9	3	3	3
Agree	6	8	9	17
Neutral	2	4	3	0
Disagree	3	0	0	0
Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0

In general all four groups displayed consistent agreement with the statement, although the experienced police seemed to be slightly more extreme in their agreement. Differences were not statistically significant.

The role of alcohol in domestic violence has been somewhat controversial. Bard and Zacker (1976)⁸ reported that untrained police overestimate the incidence of alcohol in family fights and that these estimates drop when family crisis intervention training is instigated.³ Some evidence to support this contention from items 4 and 5 is reported in officers' estimates of (a) incidence of alcohol involvement in domestics, and (b) incidence of cases where alcohol impaired their handling of the situation.

Experienced officers perceive a significantly higher incidence of alcohol usage and a significantly greater impairment of their handling and control of family crises than trained recruits. In this sense, another of the workshop goals, namely, to instill in recruits an awareness of and feeling for the control they have in these situations, has been accomplished.

Item 30 attempted to tap recruits' perceptions of change in handling domestics before and after the training course. Only class I and II recruits (n=30) responded to this item (experienced police had not had the training, Class III had not had the post-training experience).

TABLE 10
 Police Estimates of
 (a) Incidence of Alcohol Involvement in Domestic Disputes and
 (b) Incidence of Cases where Alcohol Usage impaired their
 Handling of the Situation.
 Expressed as a Percentage of All Domestics Attended

	Experienced Officers n = 20 %	Class I n = 15 %	Class II n = 15 %	Class III n = 20 %	Classes I II & III combined n = 50 %
(a) Incidence of alcohol involvement	82	72	69	73	71
(b) Incidence of cases where handling impaired	60	53	48	46	49

Item 30 asked "During the period following completion of domestic crisis training, have you experienced an increase, decrease or no change in each of the following as compared to before this training took place." Table 10 gives the results.

TABLE 11
Recruits' Perceptions of Pre-post Training
Change in Handling Domestic

	Increase	Decrease	Same
(a) The amount of violence directed toward you while answering a call	0	18	12
(b) The use of arrest of one or more disputants to clear a call	3	9	18
(c) The use of physical force to re-establish order in a situation	0	18	12
(d) The satisfaction with your own performance in domestic situations	27	3	0
(e) The citizens' receptiveness to your intervention	18	3	9

As the only within-subject comparison in this evaluation, this item takes on special significance. In this respect, the answers to this item appear to indicate that from the perspective of recruits who have had time to test the procedures taught in the course under real conditions, the course is meeting its objectives. These recruits report decreases in violence and the use of force, and increases in citizen receptivity and their own satisfaction with their performance. Arrest rates as previously reported (item 8) do not change. In addition, all recruits report using the skills taught in the course either "always" or "often" (item 29), and most mentioned that the basic communication skills were applicable in a wide variety of other police-citizen interactions (e.g., motor vehicle violations, checking I.D., dealing with disturbed people). Most recruits mentioned that the procedures generalized to teach them not to make snap judgments and to consider both sides of an issue before reaching a conclusion (Item 28).

Clearly, however, further research needs to be done to clarify these preliminary results. Results based on attitudinal responses, or what respondents say they do, need eventually to be compared with objective

behavioural assessments. The next step of our research is to make such assessments by means of an in-depth look at police procedures in handling domestics, coupled with interviews with recipients of police service on such calls.

Two final notes conclude this report.

First, an alternative explanation for the findings of this study is that the results are influenced primarily by time spent on the job and are unrelated to training per sé. To test this hypothesis, correlations were carried out in the experienced officer group between length of service and responses to questionnaire items. These all proved to be non-significant. That is, irrespective of length of time on the job for our experienced (non-college trained) officers, the differences found between "trained" and "experienced" groups held. Hence, it appears that length of service per sé does not account for the differences obtained. However, one could argue that police attitudes change drastically during the first three years on the job and that the crucial variable in our study was not training but comparison of officers with less than three years service to those with more than three. We can only respond that little change in those attitudes relevant to family crisis intervention occurred during the first seven months on the job (Class I and Class III comparisons), but that a definitive rejection of this alternative hypothesis must await further testing.

Secondly, interviewers reported anecdotally that new recruits seemed more "progressive" than experienced officers when interviewed at home (an observation echoed by police liaison workers). However, when interviewed at the police station, new recruits seemed more concerned about maintaining a "hard line" image. This finding is not surprising in light of the considerable literature on group influence processes, which consistently finds new members attempting to win acceptance into a group by expressing

the group's ideology more firmly and vociferously than established group members. To test this notion, recruits interviewed at home were tested against recruits interviewed at the police station on three test items: (1) percentage of domestics where alcohol affected handling of the situation (Item 4); (2) behavioural scientists can teach useful police functions (Item 14); and (3) what has been your experience with social agencies (Item 9)? On all three items, recruits interviewed in the police station took a significantly more "hard line" approach, which we can only assume they perceived to be the position of experienced officers. Since it is not a main interest of this study, and since it considerably complicates reading of the results, this finding was not explored further. However, as a rule of thumb, it means that the "true" differences (i.e., uncontaminated by perceived group influences) between trained recruits and untrained experienced officers found in this study may be even greater than reported above, and that the confounding of training and experience in this study operates against, not in support of, the experimental hypothesis.

Summary of Findings

An evaluation of procedural-generalist training techniques for family crisis intervention was performed on one group of experienced but untrained officers and three groups of trained recruits (7 months', 3 months', and recent graduates of the B.C. Police College). The following ten main results were obtained:

Trained recruits are:

- (1) more likely to negotiate settlement of problem or to make referral to outside agency;
- (2) more likely to use long-term conflict reduction strategies as opposed to short-term strategies;
- (3) more satisfied with their family crisis intervention training compared with experienced officers who received "traditional" training;

- (4) reporting greater feelings of accomplishment on family crisis calls and greater willingness to get involved in such calls;
- (5) less likely to conclude that couples in crisis should resolve their problem by living apart;
- (6) less likely to hold negative attitudes about social agencies than untrained officers;
- (7) less likely to perceive a high incidence of alcohol usage and to feel alcohol use by citizens impaired police handling of family crisis calls;
- (8) likely to report decreases in violence and the use of force after training (as compared to pre-training experience);
- (9) likely to report increases in citizen receptivity and satisfaction with their own performance after training (as compared to pre-training experience); and
- (10) none of the above findings disappeared with time: trained recruits seven months after training did not differ from trained recruits who had just completed training (both groups differed from untrained officers).

The extent to which these results endure and are supported by objective behavioural assessment and additional evaluative opinion from collaterals involved in the management of domestic conflict, will be pursued in later stages of the research.

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DOMESTIC CRISIS INTERVENTION

Monograph 3 - A Literature Review of Domestic
Dispute Intervention Training
Programs
(Part 1)

Bruce R. Levens

Introduction

This article, the third in a series of research reports comprising an evaluation of domestic crisis intervention by Vancouver Police, draws together the findings of police departments across North America and information derived from the literature on how other communities handle domestic crises which come to the attention of the police.

A study in 1972¹ revealed that prior to 1966 there were no police departments in the United States providing special training for the handling of domestic disputes. By 1972, the study reports, at least fourteen different police departments were experimenting with crisis intervention training, and many more were planning such experimentation. The survey conducted for this research (See Appendix 1) in fact reveals a quite considerable growth for this in dispute intervention training since then, embracing both Canadian and United States programs. The results of the literature review and the survey responses provide valuable information on several key issues of program planning, officer training, and day to day operation of the various intervention models. This information is presented in the hope that comparison of the Vancouver training program with similar experiences elsewhere may assist in the identification of an optimum training and operating model.

Domestic Dispute Intervention Training

Running through the literature and program reports are four main arguments used in favour of police training for domestic dispute intervention. They provide a strong justification for police involvement and their force, at the same time, helps explain the recent growth in interest and the adoption of specialized training by police. These arguments are summarized here to provide an introductory backdrop to this review. The arguments stress officer safety in handling disputes, the necessity for police involvement in domestic disturbances, crime prevention and role clarity for police personnel.

Officer Safety

It has long been recognized by police forces that the highly unpredictable, volatile, and often violent nature of domestic disturbances poses for members of the force difficult and dangerous situations which contribute more, in the United States at least, to police injury and police homicide than any other single category of police activity². The FBI³ reports that in the United States one fifth of the deaths of patrolmen while on duty fall into the "family disturbance" category and nearly 30 per cent of assaults on officers occur in these situations. Not only is the interpersonal conflict situation a difficult one to handle from the standpoint of the intensity, intimacy, and complexity of the social relationship; frequently the difficulty is compounded by the police themselves, who, through the use of traditional methods of intervention become the catalytic element which escalates a verbal battle into a physically abusive fracas, and too often redirects the intra-marital violence towards the intervening officer^{4, 5, 6, 7}. Dealing with the concept of iatrogenic* violence, Bard⁴ writes:

Indeed, there is more than ample evidence that insensitive, untrained and inept police management of human problems is a significant breeding ground for violence.

Necessity

The involvement of police in what are claimed to be essentially "civil disputes" has given rise to often heated debates over the role of the police in this regard. Like it or not, the fact remains that at present there is simply no other agency capable of responding as immediately, as appropriately, and as effectively to such disturbances. Responsibility for "keeping the peace" cannot be assigned elsewhere, not can other than law enforcement personnel be expected to handle violence just because the violence and potential for it is located in a private residence between related individuals rather than it being a criminal act in the streets between strangers (Straus, 1977).

* The term iatrogenic is borrowed from medicine and refers simply to a disorder resulting from actions of the physician during his ministrations. In other words, the very actions undertaken to relieve one disorder may in themselves create still further disorder (Bard, 1971:3).

But it is not only the fact that no other agency can respond when needed which commands police involvement. The policeman's access to the use of force, so often necessary to calm particularly violent situations, places domestic disputes firmly within the jurisdictional domain of the law enforcement agency. In his book, *The New Police*, Elliott⁸ clearly makes this point by first clarifying the police role in terms of what Bittner⁹ calls the use of "non-negotiably coercive force," and then by dividing "police" from "service" work including under the former heading, along with crime control, the response to domestic disputes.

A further point is that police involvement is at the request of the citizenry, and they have the right to expect a response in times of dangerous personal crisis. Why people ask the police for assistance rather than someone else cannot be answered adequately, Shearing¹⁰ argues, simply in terms of availability and accessibility. Considering that neighbours, doctors, and priests, for example, are also available, it is reasonable to suppose that a "major criterion for choosing someone to help one deal with a problem is what one thinks that person will be able to do to help. In other words, ... what is it that the police carry in their 'little black bag' that differentiates them from others" becomes the key question.

Shearing suggests that when a policeman is dealing with a family crisis his access to law enforcement and direct physical force plays a very important part in what he does to defuse the problem, even in those situations where neither of these two means is used. In other words, the policeman is chosen because of his ability to act. It also follows that to dichotomize the police role into social service and law enforcement activities, placing domestic disputes within the former category, is very misleading since citizen involvement of police in domestic disputes is precisely because of the policeman's capacity to enforce the law.

Prevention of Violence

To make the argument of necessity sometimes invites the inference that police interveners should become "social workers" or "therapists". This result does not necessarily follow, because effective intervention can be achieved without overtones of "treatment". Police intervention into domestic disturbance can provide mediation and referral for advice, or counselling, or other ongoing contact with helping professionals, where more than violence diffusing intervention is called for, without turning police officers into social workers. In fact, the passing of social problems to individuals often more appropriately equipped to handle them may in fact be the single most useful role police intervention in domestics can perform. Essentially this is the key to prevention. An effective relationship between a family in crisis and the social work professional may prevent repeat requests for police intervention, and the timely referral may prevent the domestic problem escalating into a more serious one resulting in severe injury, criminal charges, and possibly homicide.

The ever present possibility of domestic homicide can be seen in analyses of homicide statistics* where a consistent one third to 50 per cent of all murders and a similar percentage of non-lethal assaults take place between family members¹¹.

A further point related to the prevention argument for police involvement in domestic disturbance is that often a long history of family trouble, assault and police contact precedes the domestic murder.

* In 1974, of 499 murders committed in Canada, the suspect-victim relationship of 158 (31.6%) was stated as the immediate family or common-law family. In another 13 (2.7%) cases the relationship involved a lovers' quarrel or love triangle. Thus 171 cases (34.3%) of murder involved intimate domestic relationships. Between 1968-1974, 37.3 per cent of all murder incidents were classified as domestic. In British Columbia alone in the same period 33.4 per cent of murders were of a domestic nature (Statistics Canada. Homicide in Canada, 1974).

Commenting on the circumstances which led to the 6,389 homicides included in his study, Bourdouris¹¹ writes, "It seemed clear that the members of the family had had a long period of maladjustment and discord prior to the actual homicide." Bourdouris continues, "One wonders if an assault and battery incident may be a warning signal that if some action to change the relationship is not taken, one of the parties to the interaction may later become a homicide victim."

In a study of women who kill, it was found that in approximately one third of the 112 cases examined the women offenders had a prior criminal record for assaultive crimes.¹²

One of the most interesting studies was conducted by the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department in 1970 and 1971¹³. They found that in approximately one quarter of homicide cases and some 37 per cent of aggravated assaults, either victim or suspect had been arrested for disturbance or assault within two years of the homicide or aggravated assault. Closer analysis of police records revealed that the police had responded to at least one disturbance call at the addresses of 90 per cent of the homicide victims or suspects, and to five or more at the addresses of about 50 per cent. Similar evidence of repeat calls (85 per cent and 50 per cent) existed in the case of the addresses of aggravated assault victims or suspects. The authors caution that it is important to note that the data show a connection only between disturbance calls and addresses. However, "because of the frequency of calls, it is likely that a substantial number of these persons had had previous police contacts."

Review of police disturbance call comments

In short, the need for police intervention and referral for agency contact and help is nowhere more dramatically illustrated than in the consistent statistical reports of marital homicide and assault and the frequency of histories of previous quarrelling and family disturbance. Early involvement of police in domestic assaults may in the long term free up police time to be devoted to other components of their role.

Role Clarity

The claims of domestic crisis intervention training are that such programs reduce the risks for police, satisfy a need in the community, and in so doing perform a preventative service. The introduction of special training also has the potential of providing for line personnel a role clarity other police are without in the social service aspects of their job. The training can give greater clarity by defining the responsibilities of the police in the handling of domestics, and often will explain the responsibilities and abilities of the social work profession. Expectations of both police and social worker are brought into more realistic focus and police may come to realize that "displaying a genuine interest in being helpful to people in conflict is perfectly consistent with effective police work and can contribute to their continued growth and development as professional policemen."¹⁴

Effective Dispute Management

The experience of police departments as reflected in the literature demonstrates that the volume of requests for police involvement in domestic issues warrants the training of police.^{11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, etc.}

The point is also made very clearly that in the absence of training for domestic dispute intervention, despite the variety of approaches used in attempts to manage interpersonal conflict²¹, the true repertoire of effective responses to family trouble is somewhat confined. The options available are frequently only those which invoke the criminal justice system and which, considering the contemporary over-all philosophical framework of diversion, and bearing in mind the mediation needs of the disputants, constitute an undesirable solution from both the interests of the state and of the individual.

It is not, however, just the establishment of a domestic dispute intervention training course that will bring about the change from traditional responses to a diversionary, "helping", preventative orientation.

The successful handling of domestic dispute situations by police requires a full commitment of the police department. This means one which extends beyond internalization of the need to a mobilization of resources and the establishment of system changes. A like response from the social service network or social agency system is also imperative.

From the reading and analysis undertaken for this study, it is suggested therefore, that effective domestic dispute management is conditional upon three broad components:

1. A police officer selection and specialized training program that is designed to meet the very special demands of domestic disputes.
2. Clear procedures for responding to requests for police intervention and police policy decisions translated into methods of operation that are followed and appropriately supported by all levels of command.
3. A clear definition of the role of the police in their dealings with other community resources and a method of collaboration between police and the "helping" system, which recognizes the realities of interprofessional cooperation and expectation.

The following sections of this article deal in detail with the components outlined.

The Selection and Training of Police for
Domestic Dispute Intervention

Officer Selection

For the discussion of the selection of officers for domestic crisis intervention, a useful starting point is presented by the distinction between three models of implementation drawn by Bard²².

1. The Generalist-Specialist model is one in which only a selected group of general patrol officers are trained to process all domestic disturbance calls in a given area. When not engaged in the management of domestic conflict (specialist function), they provide normal patrol services in an assigned sector (generalist function).
2. The Generalist model which calls for all patrol personnel to be trained in domestic crisis intervention.
3. The Specialist model which assigns exclusive specialization for dispute intervention to a small group of selected officers who have no general patrol duties.

Each of the models has its proponents and certain advantages for each can be advanced. Bard, for example, suggests that the generalist-specialist model is particularly suitable for large organizations where a needed service can be delivered without sacrificing uniformed patrol coverage. The generalist model, he argues, is suitable for small organizations. The specialist model is generally thought to be unsuitable and an extravagant use of police personnel.

The response to our enquiries indicated that although the work by Bard and his associates with the New York Police Department's generalist-specialist model had pioneered domestic crisis intervention, there was a

greater acceptance of the generalist approach irrespective of organizational size. (Of 21 police departments with domestic dispute intervention training schemes who supplied information on the training model in response to our specific inquiries, 17 had opted for the generalist model, one for the specialist, and three (including New York) for the generalist-specialist approach (See Appendix 1)).

An often cited reason for the predominance of this model relates to the awareness that all officers will occasionally handle family fights even if specialists have been trained²³. It is further argued, and borne out by local statistics, that in a city the size of, for example, Vancouver, the volume of requests for service is simply too great during peak periods to allow response by "specialists" within the time frame necessary for crisis intervention. It should also be mentioned that "the tone of police/community relations is often shaped by the crucial role that police play when intervening in family fights, thereby indicating a need for all uniformed officers to be skilled in this area."²⁴

In the utilization of police for the handling of violent conflict a distinction has been drawn between "humanitarian" and "authoritarian" role styles. According to Schonborn²⁵, humanitarian police peace keepers believe that words are generally more effective than physical force during conflict regulation, and come close to the conception of police as "philosophers, guides, and friends."¹⁸ Authoritarian officers are traditionalists believing in the efficacy of force, they are quick to pass judgment and are often formal and inflexible during their conflict interventions. The traits listed below provide a summary of the two peace keeper types discussed here.²⁵

Humanitarian Peacekeepers
Are Characterized by:

Informality
Flexibility
Openness
Underreaction (non-
violence proneness)

Authoritarian Peacekeepers
Are Characterized by:

Formality
Rigidity
Closedness
Overreaction (violence
proneness)

Humanitarian Peacekeepers
Rely on:

Persuasion
Words
Normative power
Social-science expertise
Innovative procedures
Non-role behaviour

Authoritarian Peacekeepers
Rely on:

Coercion
Weapons
Physical power
Sharp-shooter expertise
Traditional procedures
Role behaviour

Raising the question, "Born or Made?", Schonborn advances the argument that both alternatives are to some extent true. Some authoritarian personalities are in evidence prior to police enrolment. The overwhelming recruitment from the working class, itself characterized by a pre-disposition to authoritarianism, practically guarantees the inclusion of the "type" in the ranks. Others, it is argued, adopt authoritarian characteristics as a result of socialization, training and autocratic modes of organization which "subtly indoctrinate recruits."

What this analysis says for the selection of police as crisis interventionists is important on three counts. First, if the abstractions of authoritarian versus humanitarian are valid, then in any generalist model one must expect a certain proportion of the officers to be extremely uncomfortable utilizing training procedures which more naturally fit the humanitarian ideal type.

Secondly, no matter how sensitive police selection procedures are in screening out "violent-prone authoritarians", a self-selection factor which makes police work appealing to authoritarians will operate to ensure some get through.

Thirdly, Schonborn²⁵ reports on the results of an analysis of 2,423 intervention case reports which show that humanitarian peacekeeping is generally more effective than authoritarian as measured by quality of conflict outcome, duration of the intervention, permanence of the outcome, and casualties resulting during the intervention. In detail,

humanitarian peacekeeping results in fewer low quality outcomes (i.e., those characterized by domination of one view in the interpersonal conflict as compared with "good" quality "compromise" or "integrative" solutions); and it results in a slightly more efficient handling of the problem in terms of duration, although this was not strongly significant. Regarding permanence of solution both humanitarian and authoritarian types experience similar rates of repeat intervention, with authoritarians slightly more effective than humanitarians in some cases. Finally, with regard to casualties, humanitarians elicited less injury than their authoritarian counterparts.

The discussion of the superiority of humanitarian peacekeeping in handling domestic disputes raises the question of whether it would be preferable to have this aspect of police work exclusively handled by policewomen. In fact, many of the early policewomen in North American forces had social work training prior to being hired as police, and as policewomen performed social work roles with children and youth.²⁶

More recently, comparisons between men and women in patrol functions have shown that women are able to perform as well as men and should be given the same kind of patrol assignment. Three small sample studies in New York State and Washington showed that although policewomen made fewer arrests, "there were no critical incidents where women were reported unable to perform the patrol function satisfactorily."²⁷

Consistency of results from these studies was pronounced in revealing that women's policing styles, however, differ significantly from men's. Data indicate they perform in a less aggressive fashion and make significantly fewer arrests. Measures of citizen satisfaction revealed that women handled their service calls and domestic quarrels better than men. Citizens perceived women as more sensitive to domestic situations and more responsive to the personal needs expressed by the disputants. Citizens indicated they felt no less safe in both service and non-service type calls when the attending officer had been female.

Unfortunately (for the research) violent situations did not show up in these studies in sufficient proportion to evaluate policewomen's handling accurately. However, there are suggestions in all three studies quoted by Sherman that women may be more effective in avoiding violence by diffusing potentially violent situations.

This is in accord with a finding of another study comparing policemen and policewomen on several measurements of performance and attitude.²⁸ These authors found very little difference between men and women in ability to perform the police role, but concluded that "a department with a substantial number of policewomen may be less aggressive than one with only men. Women act less aggressively and they believe less in aggression." Another finding of this comparative study should be noted; it is that police officials in an anonymous survey gave women lower ratings than men on ability to handle domestic fights and street violence. This finding is somewhat at variance with the result from the same study, that policewomen obtained results similar to those of men in handling angry or violent citizens, and may reflect a somewhat traditional view that because of the potential and reality of violence, "police work is really men's work." The authors, however, conclude that, "In sum, the study shows that sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification for doing police work."

It would seem, then, that a more definitive study of the respective role styles of policemen and policewomen with domestic crisis intervention training and of mixed sex police teams needs to be undertaken before recommendations can be made in this regard. It must also be kept in mind that if domestic dispute intervention is to be the exclusive province of female members of the force, then a specialist model of implementation will be imposed. If the objectives of crisis intervention are fully achieved, then the need for sex differentiation does not become an important issue, except perhaps for one special area of crisis intervention, namely, intervention and immediate crisis counselling in cases of rape.²⁹

Interestingly, not one of the 21 police departments who responded to our enquiries with training information and, in some cases, evaluative write-ups, mentioned any difference between policemen and policewomen in the handling of domestic disputes.

Training

The discussion of training police for domestic crisis intervention in this section will concentrate on four main concerns. These are, who gets trained, who does the training, what type of training is given, and which are the best methods to use. It is assumed at this point that the "why" of police training for domestic disturbances has been demonstrated in the introduction to this report and in other monographs in this series.

Who Gets Trained

The decision as to who gets trained for handling domestic crisis is of course dependent upon the implementation model chosen. The arguments presented in the preceding section have suggested that the advantages of the generalist model generally outweigh those of the other two. This means that the answer to our question here is that all police officers should receive domestic crisis intervention training.

There are two additional advantages to the generalist model and these are specifically related to training. The first is that a generalist training program can usually be adapted rather easily into the academy or college curriculum, while training a few men very intensively for "specialist" assignments may make the department dependent upon the continuing use of consultants who are expensive and hard to locate on such ad hoc bases. Apart from this the non-generalist models require the department to continually face the problem of officer selection, and the problem of "tracking" within the training institution.²⁴ The second point is that training specialists from time to time requires funding which it may not be possible to include as a perennial budgetary item. Experience shows that it is hard to institutionalize such grant funded projects. Further,

the specialist approach to domestic crisis intervention training has generally produced negative evaluation results, and the programs have been unable to continue beyond the duration of "demonstration" funds.²³

Police training can be achieved by two means: academy or police college instruction, and on-going, on-the-job training. As far as introducing a new package of skills to an existing police force is concerned, it is essential that both training methods are employed, one, to ensure that not only the new recruits (through police college intake) receive the training but that established personnel are provided with the skills, and two, to provide frequent updating and reinforcement for all concerned after the initial intensive training has been conducted.

Without in-service training for all existing personnel a number of operational problems may emerge. The probability of a re-socialization taking place, whereby new recruits trained in domestic crisis intervention abandon the practices and procedures taught in college when exposed to veteran officers who have not received the training and may be hostile to it, has been dealt with in a previous monograph. In fact, re-socialization in the Vancouver experiment had not so far occurred.³⁰ The possibility of this happening in general, however, is heightened by policies which exclude established, long-service personnel from such training.

It is not only patrol personnel who need to be trained to ensure the effective operation of the program. There needs to be support from immediate superiors and middle management echelons. The decision to adopt domestic crisis intervention training usually comes from top command. However, command personnel at the middle and lower levels need to be convinced of the usefulness of the program. Driscoll³¹ reports on two programs where indifferent and hostile attitudes from superiors in the Louisville, Kentucky, and New York projects caused serious obstacles. Particularly, the pressure from sergeants against investing time and effort in domestic cases caused most problems.

Another significant problem stems from the perceived lack of involvement of command personnel in the planning and developmental stages of domestic crisis intervention programs. In the Dayton, Ohio, program, command personnel felt that the program had been imposed on the department by federal agencies and civilian personnel who, commanders felt, were unfamiliar with the demands of police work.¹⁴ As Katz³² remarks, "There is a tendency to react to a new unit in the police system, as if it were an organ transplant. The antibodies within the system react strongly to reject the new unit." Whilst this is more true of departments who develop specialist units rather than taking a generalist approach, it is nevertheless relevant to the rejection of a new concept when involvement of all concerned is not a planning priority.

Who Does The Training

All of the training programs encountered for this review demonstrate the use of civilians at some stage in the training program. Basically two approaches are used. In the first model a teaching team consisting of civilian and police personnel conduct all the instruction with first hand recruit contact. This type of training can be achieved with both ad hoc and specialist training approaches and long term academy or police college based programs with civilians in "tenured" faculty roles.

The second model utilizes civilian personnel in a "one shot" training role whereby their training methods and course content are given to a select group of police personnel who themselves then become the trainers for ongoing instruction in domestic crisis intervention for future recruit intake and in-service officers. This method is by far the most common one encountered among the programs surveyed for this report.

Several arguments in favour of this model were advanced by our respondents. In the first place, "one shot" funding to train a cadre of police officers

means the extra cost of outside consultation does not become a persistent budget item. Often the U.S. Government Law Enforcement Administrative Agency (LEAA) provided the funding to set up the training program. In addition, the model gives police departments a self-sufficient, in-house capacity for in-service, pre-service and refresher training. In other words, a self-maintaining education system to a large degree independent of intrusion from outside. The use of "outsiders" who do not share the same experiences as police officers, it has been suggested, somewhat limits the effectiveness of the trainers in the eyes of the police trainees.^{5, 33}

The present^{ce} of psychologists in training situations, despite statements to the contrary, can also lead to the feeling among officers that they are there to "test" or "evaluate" performance or to "psych them out" for the department.³³ This feeling tends to be underscored by the inevitable weeding out process which sees the expulsion of a small proportion of recruits as unsuitable.

With large police departments the retention of outside consultants can prove to be an expensive training program. Not only do the new recruits require training, but the natural attrition and interdepartmental transfers create an ongoing in-service training need.²³

Bard³⁵ makes the point that police departments' association with social scientists is a "marriage of convenience," each participant tolerates the other for short term gain. Such marriages create problems for both police and consultant. Bard suggests that the social scientist is often isolated within the department, that this induces feelings of anxiety on the part of the civilian and apprehension among the police. The writers argue, however, that on balance the problems result largely from attempts at short-term cooperative ventures.

A more effective and productive model for these relationships is that of collaboration rather than cooperation. Collaboration suggests an active role for the social scientist, involvement in decision making

and interchangeability of some functions with police. This is contrasted to the passivity of social scientists in cooperative ventures where civilians come to the police, lecture on a particular topic, and then depart leaving police personnel to instruct officers "what to do" in given circumstances, with little integration of the two approaches.

In situations in which police instructor and civilian are in the classroom at the same time, exchanging and interchanging functions, there may result a richer discussion and a greater degree of serious acceptance of the civilian's contribution to the training.^{33, 35}

When dealing with emotionally loaded and somewhat controversial material such as that underlying much of the content of this program, perhaps the most effective role model is to use as instructors and group discussion leaders men from within the department who personally exemplify and represent the attitudes³³ and points of view that the department is desirous of imparting.

Type Of Training

The discussion of the type of training is to be given in domestic crisis intervention focuses on two key debates: the degree to which police are trained as "social workers," and the closely related question of whether the training emphasis is procedural or theoretical.

Much of the resistance to domestic crisis intervention stems from a misunderstanding of the police role in this regard. Mention of domestic crisis intervention or family crisis training too often connotes schooling in the art of social work therapy and casework techniques.³¹

Police officers rightly do not see that such social work techniques should be included in their repertoire of skills. This is not to argue that the police should not be involved, but rather, as Philips³⁴ points out in relation to counselling, the police officer should be thought of as a general practitioner and not a counselling specialist. Crisis intervention training should contain sufficient instruction to provide

basic counselling (interviewing and mediating skills) but steer clear of psycho-therapy. In fact, counselling, in the sense of in-depth interviewing, is used by some police officers in the normal course of their handling domestic and other dispute situations.

In a recent study, Bard and Zacker²¹ identified seven third-party intervention approaches used by police officers untrained in conflict management. The object of the research was to determine whether such approaches could be taught systematically. The major finding was that three selected intervention approaches (authority, negotiation, and counselling) generally led to improvement in an officer's ability to apply those approaches. But,

- (a) Repeated use of the authority approach resulted in officers viewing it less favourably, while such use of the negotiation approach resulted in officers viewing it more favourably.
- (b) Repeated use of counselling resulted in a more favourable attitude toward the approach, although the officers were originally less proficient because counselling was the approach least familiar to them.

After using the three approaches, a majority of officers viewed negotiation as the most important one for police recruits to learn. Although several offices selected counselling as the most important, none selected authority as the approach to teach recruits.

Authority was defined as the approach which arbitrarily imposed an end to the conflict through either implicit or explicit threat of arrest. Negotiation was seen as a mediating technique which dealt with the surface issue at hand, focussing upon only the content of the conflict itself. Counselling, on the other hand, penetrated the surface issues of the conflict and was designed to bring about a deeper understanding of the basic situation and the consequences of certain behaviour.

Central to this discussion is what is meant by crisis intervention, and here, perhaps, is the cause of much unclear thinking and writing on the role of police with respect to the management of domestic conflict. The lack of clear and consistent conceptualization of crisis intervention is well documented in the literature.^{29, 36, 37, 38}

In social work nomenclature "crisis intervention" refers to a form of treatment and may be contrasted with psychoanalysis and brief psychotherapy intervention methodologies appropriate for the treatment of different types of individual problems.³⁹ According to this terminology a person in crisis faces a problem he cannot readily solve using the coping mechanisms that have worked before. He is caught in great emotional turmoil and feels unable to take action on his own to solve the problem. Crisis intervention offers the immediate help necessary to re-establish personal equilibrium. It is a short-term therapy geared to solving an immediate problem. Typically, the steps in social work crisis intervention involve:³⁹

1. Assessment of the individual and his problem, the circumstances directly relating to the immediate crisis situation.
2. Planning of the therapeutic intervention based in knowledge of the nature of the crisis, the length of time since onset of crisis, and estimates of the make-up of the individual.
3. Intervention: utilization of certain social work skills aimed at restoring a level of functioning existent prior to the crisis. Assistance is given in making plans for the future and developing techniques to help cope with future crises.

Crisis in the more general sense of conflict is, we suggest, what is referred to when speaking of domestic crises as dealt with by the police, even though such conflicts may also be crises in the social work sense, or the result of such. It is an upset, an event which requires, because of its potential for law violation and the immediate severity of the

stress and conflict, an immediate response. In social work the actual period of the crisis tends to last from one to six weeks and may pass through several phases, each with its own implication for practice.⁴⁰

Crisis intervention by police, it can be argued on the other hand, refers to a law enforcement intervention in which peacekeeping is the primary objective and counselling a secondary one.² In effect, police officers can approach the domestic crisis from one of two alternatives:

1. Direct police intervention in which police officers offer crisis services after a diagnosis of family problems, or
2. Indirect police intervention in which the family is referred to an agency or counsellor.

In either case, whether the complainant's problem is mediated on the spot or a follow-up by social agencies invoked, the counselling component of police work is minimal. The police in the first model diffuse and settle conflicts by helping disputants to find solutions to their problems, and in the second case, they act as a case-finding agent for the helping professionals to decide which psychotherapeutic counselling method is most suitable to the problem.

The amount of time devoted to familiarization with social work methods may vary with the orientation of the training team and the perceived needs in the community. Situations where a well developed social agency response system is lacking, where more direct intervention by police is called for, perhaps requires a greater emphasis on improving the effectiveness of police in helping troubled persons than is necessary in large urban areas in which good cooperation between case-finders and agencies has been developed.

As Roberts²⁶ points out, police

...need training not so that they can take the place of experienced social workers, psychiatrists, and psychologists, but to be able to provide immediate crisis intervention when emergencies arise and the other professionals are not available.

Steering the training away from attempting to impart social work intervention techniques is a course of action recommended in the literature.²⁴ The emphasis on "how to intervene" to diffuse dangerous situations, the procedural model, is advanced in favour of the "theoretical" training model which includes attempts at changing the attitudes of police, sensitivity training, personal growth components, and a strong emphasis on the psychological and behavioural underpinnings of the procedures target.

The survey of police departments, however, attests to the popularity of both approaches depending upon whether the training was influenced by the writings of Bard and his associates^{16, 35} or the procedural examples of West Coast Police departments.¹ The New York project of Morton Bard shows that the "theoretical" approach has been used to good effect. It contains elements suggestive of sensitivity training and includes explicit efforts to change the police as persons paying specific attention to self-examination and awareness.³¹

As a basis of crisis intervention training, the New York model is perhaps the best known and the principal concepts the most borrowed by other departments' training schemes. In using the model elsewhere, however, the theoretical aspects are sometimes dropped. Reporting on the Louisville project, Driscoll³¹ makes the point that a release from the demands on the police to achieve personal change yielded an immediate gain in support, "When the officers saw that they were not to be tested, probed or submitted to criticism for personal attitudes, beliefs or values, they soon accepted the staff and approached training with some measure of trust and enthusiasm."

Training Methods

Training for crisis intervention, a somewhat new departure for most police forces and training academics, requires new and innovative methods. This is the consensus of the literature reviewed. 14, 16, 31, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44

The need for the innovative approach to training is most often articulated in terms of the inappropriateness of traditional classroom lecture methods for imparting the social skills necessary to intervene in interpersonal crisis situations. The classroom method which relies on a didactic, verbal approach, does not lead to a lasting change in the behaviour of the student. Bard¹⁶ states that,

...interpersonal skills, particularly those to be used in emotionally volatile family conflict situations, cannot be taught successfully by the typically intellectual and cognitive methods employed in the classroom.

The formal lecture format, because of its limited effectiveness, should be retained only for special purposes such as presentations by senior officers on departmental expectations or the giving of purely factual information by the consultants. A study³¹ of training police for their "social role" makes the point that the social skills required by police can only be acquired and retained through practice. These skills, not only specific to family crisis intervention but relevant to the social role generally, are listed by the authors as: interrogation and interviewing, public speaking, behaviour disorder recognition, arrest procedure, referral procedures involving other community services, effective interaction with minority groups and young people, and maintenance and restoration of order.

The use of innovative teaching methods is seen by one writer as the salvation for upgrading police, who traditionally have relied mainly on the apprenticeship system for their training, and for whom a return to the classroom is a "boring waste of time." Pointing to the experience

in family crisis intervention training, Baldwin⁴² comments that the success of this aspect of training demonstrates clearly that the greater the involvement in the activities of the course, the greater the potential for learning to take place.

What constitutes innovative training is generally considered to include dramatization of real life situations, active participation and role playing by the students, the use of audio-visual materials to depict specific skill behaviours, and video-tape corrective feedback, as the major components. The book Police Crisis Intervention⁴⁵ refers to this simulation training as Structured Learning Training (S.L.T.):

It is, to be sure, less "real" than learning on patrol. But learning crisis intervention procedures by having trainees respond to simulated crises in a classroom has been shown to be a rapid and safe way to teach skills which do endure and transfer to real life settings.

A number of departments surveyed included in their training real life simulations of domestic disputes. Several training manuals reviewed provide scenarios and scripts for a representative sample of disturbances. Typically the dramatizations are scripted up to the point at which police intervene to manage the conflict.^{35, 45}

Another model is for the presentation of a variety of conflict situations with right and wrong methods of dispute intervention and management dramatized on films. These are presented in such manner that discussion and student involvement take place after the film. (This is essentially the method used by the British Columbia Police Academy domestic dispute training course.)

Whichever method is used, it is stressed in the literature that the simulations utilize professional actors to enact the scenes.³⁵ One experience reported where this was not the case produced disappointing results.³³

Integrated with the dramatizations are the training benefits from active role playing by all the recruits.^{14, 24} The role playing also provides the opportunity for trainees to assess the capacity of the recruit to handle the situation for which he is being trained. Extreme reactions to the role being played served as good diagnostic predictors of future unstable police behaviour in one study reported in the literature⁴¹ (Badalamente, 1973).

The best results from the role playing and dramatized conflict situations are achieved, it appears, when those methods utilize video-taping of the officers-in-training for instant playback and self-evaluation.^{14, 31, 33} The reply of video-taped "mock" interventions in small group workshops as a vehicle for confronting patrolmen and women with an immediate transcript of their approach helps alert many police officers to blind spots and patterns of mal-adaptive behaviour. In one report¹⁴, the feedback process was enhanced by the actors who entered the group discussion to express their reactions to the different interventions made by the patrolmen.

One article⁷ reports on the establishment of a violence tape library by one California police department. By using a miniature sound recorder, actual incidents were recorded, comments added to the tape, and the result used in training sessions. Officers get the opportunity to evaluate their own performances in real life situations, to criticize themselves, and to offer the tape in a training situation for classroom discussion and feedback.

The fear expressed above in this report that external consultants and psychologists may be testing and evaluating police is not necessarily removed by the methods of involving recruits in self-examination procedures. It is with this in mind, plus the fraternal closeness of police forces, that it is also suggested that training should emphasize peer relationships and involve effective use of role models from within the force. That is, to use as instructors and discussion leaders personnel from within the department who personally exemplify and represent the attitudes and points of view that the department is desirous of imparting.³³

No training program can hope to cover the many different disturbance situations in which the officer will find himself. The practice of placing "rookie" officers under the supervision of experienced officers for an "on-the-job" training period is thus very common. We have already noted that a newly established domestic crisis intervention training package can produce problems for the program in terms of a re-socialization of the trained. It is thus imperative that very careful selection of the supervisors be made to ensure continued reinforcement in the streets of the program taught in the college or academy setting.⁴¹

It is often true that a good deal of natural talent exists in a police department in terms of training skill.³³ As these officers come to the fore in family crisis intervention, they should be identified and utilized in future training of new recruits, both as discussion leaders at the college and, as their own careers develop, as supervisors and trainers in the field.

One writer¹⁶ recommends that field training should involve the consultant trainers as well as police trainers and should occur at frequent, regular intervals for at least six months after the officer returns to the field.

Performance Evaluation

The success or failure of the domestic crisis intervention program can be judged in terms of a predetermined performance evaluation measure: the degree to which certain behavioural criteria are met by the officers responding to such calls.

Performance evaluation and feedback are thus essential components of any domestic dispute intervention program. And, such evaluation is made easier and more reliable if training objectives are stated in terms of observable behaviour, and if feedback is performed during and after the training period.⁴¹

The behavioural skills of crisis intervention may be well taught in the classroom but still fail to transfer from the college to the real world of everyday patrol. Praise (positive feedback) and other social and organizational reinforcements are crucial in facilitating such transfer.

Research in support of this position is so clear that we urge trainers to maximize positive performance feedback by meeting with command and related personnel, and actually training them in what trainee behaviour to look for and encourage, and in procedures for rewarding the trainee when the behaviour is skilled and competent. If command support does not exist, if they are indifferent or opposed to the training effort and this attitude proves to be unchangeable, we firmly recommend that you do not undertake the training effort.⁴⁵

The Total Police Response to Domestic Dispute Intervention Requests

The second major issue in the establishment of domestic crisis intervention as a legitimate police role concerns the full commitment of the force to the program. Writers^{31, 32, 35} have drawn attention to middle management resistance to such programs. Bard argues that innovative programs may often be set up outside the formal chain of command, thereby functioning to exclude members of the middle management force from the planning stages. When the program reaches the implementation stage, resistance from those initially excluded may be found. It is claimed that support and reinforcement from command personnel is essential to the success of upgrading any experimental program that potentiates change.³²

One article³¹ highlights these concerns in the literature with their report on the Louisville, Kentucky, and New York programs, where, command personnel at the level of sergeant, lieutenant and captain proved indifferent, at best, and hostile, at worst. The New York FCIU (Family Crisis Intervention Unit) officers were subject to ridicule at times from untrained officers,

which was felt as particularly harsh in the absence of active support from immediate supervisors. However, the most serious obstacle was pressure from sergeants against investing time and effort in domestic cases.

Apart from the resistance referred to by Bard and others, the need to include other than just patrol personnel in the program is particularly important in three related regards. First, the police department policy for responding to requests for domestic dispute intervention should be clarified and communicated to all departments within the force. Which calls will be treated as legitimate reasons for police involvement and which should not be known as well by civilian telephone operators and dispatchers as by officers responding in the field.

Secondly, the training of the first line of citizen contact with the police, namely the telephone operators, should be carefully considered and be an integral part of the over-all training in domestic crisis intervention. How requests will be screened, what advice, information and referral will be offered over the telephone, and what information should be requested from callers and dispatched to attending police officers must be dealt with.

Thirdly, the total department should adjust and adapt to provide the individual police officer with support and rewards for the correct application of crisis intervention procedures.

These points are dealt with in more detail below.

Departmental Policy

Most police forces who responded to our survey inquiries indicated a policy of responding to all public requests for intervention in domestics. This blanket response must be seen, however, as reflecting a desire or a "public relations" response rather than a practice, for it would appear

upon closer examination that in nearly all cases incoming requests for police presence are screened, and only the result of that screening determines whether a car is dispatched or not.

The process by which it is determined that a reported incident is a police matter involves both conscious and unconscious screening mechanisms. In the first place a department may simply respond that unless an assault or breach of the peace is taking place or clearly imminent, domestic altercations are civil matters and of no immediate concern to the police.⁴⁶ A further refinement of this is that even if an assault has occurred, the police will often only respond where the complainant agrees to lay charges of assault. The implication of such screening is that if the answer is negative, i.e., no prosecution is agreed to, then police action will be denied despite the presence of all the factors necessary to send a car in assault cases.⁴⁷

Where screening procedures are employed, there will be many situations where either ambiguously written guidelines (the need for general statements that fit many circumstances, giving rise to ambiguities), or interpretations of ambiguous verbal reports over the phone place the communications operator in a dilemma as to whether or not a given incident is a police matter.

The difficulty of interpretation of calls is highlighted by Lundman¹⁹ who distinguishes between rules of behaviour for which there are no clear definitions -- rules which are culturally or sub-culturally relative -- and those for which a clear civil-legal definition of inappropriate behaviour exists. The former he calls relational rules, and unlike more general civil-legal rules they are associated only with their networks of origin, that is, face to face relationships. For example, a wife may contact the police about relationally improper behaviour on the part of her husband, i.e., his drunkenness. However, it may not be drunkenness per se that is not accepted in the marital relationship, but rather it is the wife's perception that such an instance of this deviates from normal drunkenness, which precipitates contacting the police.

Wherever criteria are employed to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate concerns of the police, errors will occur on both sides, i.e., some illegitimate matters will receive police attention and some legitimate ones will not. It is of course very difficult to adequately understand the levels of intensity of conflict which may differentially affect tendencies to make complaints, or affect tendencies to respond.

A husband or wife may not call the police themselves in the middle of a vehement, but non-violent, shouting match -- but a neighbour or child might. Conversely, deadly but quiet threats may be made against the spouse which will induce one of them to call the police, but which are never heard by neighbour or child. Finally, individuals and neighbourhoods undoubtedly vary in their acceptance of violence or conflict; in one neighbourhood a single loud fight may lead to a call to the police, in another it may lead to a shrug of the shoulders that "the Smiths are at it again." Thus, caution should be used in making assumptions about the exact nature of, and response to, family conflicts.⁴⁷

Police perceptions of the motive for calling also affect their response to family disturbance calls. There is a multiplicity of motives for calling the police, and it cannot be predicted from the call which one is operating.⁴⁸ One example is that in many situations the reason for calling the police stems from the desire of one party to enlist "right" on their side, to have a visible authoritative ally in the body of the policeman who will be inclined to form a coalition with the injured or complaining party whose call occasioned his presence. Such experiences soon caution against willing involvement in "domestics," particularly when the established coalitions may exacerbate the violence of the situation.⁴

At the less conscious level, stereotypes of the nature of the caller as well as subtle influence of language style also affect the response to requests for service. The popular notion that domestic disputes occur predominantly among the working class is widely held. What appears to be the case, however, is that the lower socio-economic groups are more likely to use the police to settle their problems⁴⁹ and a study⁵⁰ of women who were beaten by their husbands finds that "women with less occupational prestige and lower education are likely to call the police for help. This finding is inconsistent with the popular assumption that the poor man's social worker is the police officer." Similarly, "we cannot conclude that family conflict is principally confined to the lower class, rather they are more likely to use social control agencies than are their middle class counterparts."⁴⁷

This finding may not hold for all reasons for contacting the police for help. In cases of suspected mental disorder or medical illness, family members choosing to use the police (for help and transportation to the treatment required) did not differ in social class from those using more conventional medical resources first hand. "Thus police interventions in cases of mental illness are not concentrated in the low socio-economic segments of the community, a fact which further attests to the sophisticated and intelligent use of the police when other resources fail to provide needed services."⁵¹

What makes an event a police matter in the final analysis is the fact of police intervention. The criteria for deciding on intervention rather than non-intervention include very practical considerations of the efficient use of scarce resources, the need to delimit the sphere of influence and action of the police to those matters where their specific skills and authority are required, and a complex array of social and psychological variables inherent in social relationships. Use of the correct terminology and a shared reality with the police by certain groups in society strongly influence the chances of police attention to events reported to them. Also, stereotyping of the persons most likely to contact the police and assumptions about the outcome of their intervention are very persuasive in the screening and selection behaviour of communications staff.⁵²

A citizen's decision to make a complaint, report a domestic dispute, or request assistance, is clearly beyond the control of the police, and there is most often no way to decide if the complainant's description, perceptions or allegations are honest or valid. The public will go on perceiving incidents as requiring police action while the police do not. There will be many cases where there is no real need for police intervention or cases where the police have no authorization to deal with the event. The policy implications, therefore, of these realities are, first that as much contextual information as possible should be extracted from the caller to provide the best background for the decision to respond with police presence; and secondly, in cases where practical considerations dictate no police presence, that some other assistance should be provided to those who have called the police.

Handling Requests for Intervention

In his paper "Police Discretion and Diversion of Incidents of Intra-Family Violence" Parnas⁴⁹ suggests that the dispatcher (or communications operator in the role segregated context of the Vancouver Police Department) is the receptionist for the patrolman.

Like the office receptionist, he (she) exercises extraordinary power over access to the department's services and is in a position to influence, by the questions asked and the information imparted, the immediacy and effectiveness of the services rendered. The dispatcher's significance applies to all of his (her) contacts, not just domestic disputes; but this importance, perhaps even more than the office receptionist's, has been virtually ignored.

To continue the analogy it may also be said that the receptionist is the first point of contact with the organization, and the image of that organization the public receives depends very much on how that first contact is handled. As pointed out in the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Training Key⁵³, the average citizen has little

knowledge or gives little consideration to the limits of police authority. Even though the source of the concern which has brought him in touch with the police may be outside the jurisdiction or interest of the police, he should not be embarrassed or criticized, nor, it may be added, should he be left without any assistance or advice at all.

A recent in-house appraisal⁵⁴ of the Vancouver Police Department's handling of citizen calls estimated that about 13 per cent of calls were dealt with unsatisfactorily. This means callers were given the wrong information, were refused service, or received unsympathetic or disinterested responses. Many of the calls labelled "unsatisfactorily handled" were ones requesting services the police do not perform. In the opinion of Beamish, the report clerk position "should reflect the views that the nature of the job is para-professional and that it is an important link in the chain of service to the public." It might also be added that it is a vital link in the chain of information for the police officer facing the hazards of the job, and that the training should reflect this too.

The point we wish to make here is that the disturbance call clearly is within the jurisdiction and interest sphere of the police. Elliott in his book *The New Police*,⁸ for example, sees a redefinition of the police role in which most "service" activities become the responsibility of other than law enforcement agencies. It is interesting to note that Elliott sees only crime, civil disorder, domestic disputes as clear police responsibilities. In all circumstances the police have the responsibility to restore order and preserve peace. The manner in which this task is accomplished will be instrumental in preventing such incidents from deteriorating into a criminal case. It was found that when "a complainant reports a nuisance, or a dispute, he has only one chance in two of getting more than advice -- albeit philosophical advice....It is possible that some of the calls about violence are later stages of these unanswered dispute calls."¹⁸

Contextual Information

The points made above strongly indicate a crucial role for the communications operator. As the IACP Training Key⁵³ states,

The most fundamental duty of the person receiving the complaint is to obtain as much information as possible and then to keep the assigned unit fully informed.

Four basic rules are given for the assignment of units:

1. Before assigning a police unit, answers to the following questions must be obtained from the complainant -- who, what, where when, how.
2. The complainant should be kept on the telephone as long as possible to obtain a complete narration of the events and to determine if any changes are occurring in the situation.
3. The assigned officer must be informed if the dispatcher is unable to obtain a clear or unclear description of the situation.
4. If a fight is in progress or there is any indication of violence, cover cars should be dispatched with the assigned unit.

The employment of these rules is especially important given the wide variety of domestic dispute situations, their unpredictability, and the high potential for violence. In most cases formulations of the problem are insufficient. A study⁵⁵ of Edmonton City Police provided data on just how inadequate dispatcher information really is.

Typically, dispatchers provide a patrol car's personnel with a local (often an address), a preliminary reason for the dispatch (for example: a family fight, trouble with a man, house fire, trouble with a drunk, accident) and some identification of the complainant....

While the essentials of the problem are present, they are insufficient for the officer's handling of the practical situation about to confront him. Much more must be known before the officer can take any particular effective legal and/or remedial action: Who was involved? What was the fight over? What damage was done? What are the concerned parties willing to accept as a solution? What is required legally? Will there be another fight as soon as the officer leaves? and so on.

While dispatchers generally give officers some indication of the seriousness of a complaint...they typically give little information regarding the specifics of the incident. Cars dispatched by messages mentioning "thefts," "family fights," or "trouble with a man" frequently arrive at locations where just about anything can have happened. For example, one dispatched message mentioning a "theft" turned out to be a case where a prostitute had not insisted upon payment before rendering her services and who subsequently was not paid.

In other words, descriptions of events should be elicited which provide as much social contact as possible, and that contextual information should be passed on to the officer attending the incident.⁵⁶ It is the provision of a full contextual description that will provide the best information on which to decide whether or not police involvement is warranted.

Telephone Information and Referral

The literature reviewed indicates that wherever possible the police should respond to all domestic calls, and the best way of determining the legitimacy of the calls and gaining as much information as possible for attending officer safety, is to direct and pass on full and complete descriptions of the context of the event.

There will, of course, be many situations where police presence simply will not be possible -- either because of manpower shortage or because the event described is clearly outside the jurisdiction of the police. Given this situation and the caution mentioned above that minor calls for help may be the early signs of more serious domestic issues, then it becomes imperative that some response is made other than simply telling the caller that what he described "is not a police matter."

One report¹⁵ argues that metropolitan police departments should be viewed as service agencies which are involved in dispensing a wide and diversified area of services, and points to the successful redirection to outside social agencies of about 20 per cent of calls to Detroit and St. Louis police departments.

The need for some referral action to social agencies where police presence is denied, is clearly seen in the figures showing the extent of family discord and marital maladjustment that occurs prior to serious assault and homicide.¹¹ Such referral, whilst not guaranteeing a solution to the problem of marital violence, may through counselling of the parties involved, prevent some subsequent disputes by offering the partners an alternative to violence.

An "adequate adjustment of domestic disturbances requires full and imaginative use of all relevant community resources," argues one writer, who states:

We need to make referral to family agencies more frequently, more comprehensively, more imaginatively, and more skillfully.⁵⁷

One study however, shows that referrals are not made to a significant degree, and that, "rarely was the suggestion of counselling brought forth by policemen as a possibility in the family disturbance call."⁵⁸

Not only don't the police typically utilize other community resources on such calls, but the agencies themselves may be reluctant to accept referrals from the police⁵⁹, and the persons referred are typically the ones who require the most skilled and intensive intervention to mobilize them to seek assistance. Many families calling Rhode Island police departments really needed professional help for a multitude of various family and social problems.⁵⁸

The difficulty of getting those in need of agency services to actually follow referral advice is likely to be much greater with the type of persons who take their marital problems to the police department. They are likely to expect a quick remedy from the authority figures (police officer) who can act, and are less convinced about the effectiveness of a social worker.⁵⁹ To respond effectively to telephone requests for assistance, then, implies a strong emphasis on phone referral training; probably at least as much attention should be given to the careful screening and referral functions of the communications operator as is paid to the special domestic dispute intervention training of the patrol force.

Full knowledge of the resources available in large urban communities is of course out of the question. However, such complexities should not counsel against attempting some training. One method reported in the literature utilizes presentations to police by social agency personnel, with adequate time for small group discussion.⁴³ The training was based on the assumption that benefits could be gained from police learning how other agencies approach the problems they deal with, and vice versa. The results were positive, with much improved working relationships between police and agency personnel reported. An extension of this scheme could be tried with agency staff sharing the communication operator's job in the police department, advising on the appropriateness of making referrals as the calls are received.

Given the unpredictable nature of domestic calls, the performance and safety of the police officer is very much dependent upon the information he receives from the dispatcher. The literature on crisis intervention training frequently stresses this as one of the most important ingredients of a successful program^{16, 47}, and yet only slight attention appears to be paid to this aspect of training, judging by the content of the training manuals received from our survey of police departments (See Appendix 1).

The consensus of the literature is that at least the following information should be extracted from the caller and passed to the dispatched unit:

1. Who makes the call to police -- witness, or person involved.
2. Whether assault is in progress or not.
3. Whether weapons are involved or available.
4. The number of persons involved.
5. Whether the offender is still at the scene.

In addition, where possible, information on whether the complainant or family or individual complained about is known to the police, and for what reason, should also be relayed.

The speed, attitude, and initial actions of the dispatched officers depend very much on the extent of the information relayed to them. As pointed out in another study,⁶⁰ the initial classification of a call may also be very important in determining the initial actions and awareness of the attending officers. Quite apart from the psychological set and expectations of the event created by dispatcher classification, "typing" the call has other ramifications for officer behaviour and procedure.

The classification by dispatcher may determine whether a permanent, detailed case report need be prepared or not.⁴⁹ In Chicago, a "disturbance" classification precludes such reports and therefore precludes follow-up investigation by detectives. The only record of

the disturbance then, is the dispatch record which is destroyed after one year, whereas a classification of the dispute as "assault and battery" would invoke these investigation procedures.

It is thus possible that the same domestic incident will receive vastly different investigation and attention by police as a result of initial classification. In addition, the classification "disturbance" relieves the police officer, in cases where no arrest is made, from the burden of paperwork.

In a study of the offence-reporting decisions of Minnesota patrolmen, it was found that,

To a remarkable extent, the patrolmen's decisions as to whether to report offences were determined by the terms of the calls they had received from the dispatcher. If the dispatcher named no offence in the call or dispatched the patrolmen to check a victimless or attempted offence, the chances were practically nil that the patrolmen would report an offence, even though (as detailed below) complainants' allegations to the patrolmen were sufficient to justify offence reports in a number of cases. In the vast majority of cases in which the dispatcher named an offence in the call, the patrolmen reported offences.⁶¹

In other words,

The practice of the patrolmen was to be guided in their offence-reporting decisions practically exclusively by the first information they received in the matters.



The same study reports that the departmental goal of full reporting of all calls police officers make is seen by them as senseless -- a finding probably applicable to all police departments having this rule. Police rarely witness offences being committed and have no control over citizens' decisions to make complaints, leaving the police no way in which to decide whether allegations are honest and valid. Thus, when statements are made to patrolmen, the patrolmen are placed in a dilemma. On the one hand they are accountable for failing to report offences; on the other hand, they are accountable for filing questionable reports. In this situation patrolmen develop a structure of informal rules to protect themselves from criticism:

The informal rules restrict offence reporting to matters in which another official (the dispatcher) has already decided that a report might be forthcoming. If the dispatcher's complaint card already indicates no basis for reporting an offence, responsibility for failure to report an offence is shared, which leaves the patrolmen in a position of relative safety.

Once the dispatcher has named an offence in a call, it is generally but not always safe to file a report. Another set of informal rules designates the kinds of cases in which filing reports might be hazardous. One rule states that patrolmen should not report offences without independent corroboration of the call. Therefore, if a complainant does not state an offence to the patrolmen which falls within local police jurisdiction, no report is to be filed.

Another rule suggests reticence in filing controversial reports. Looking ahead to prosecution, controversy can most readily arise from personal involvement of the complainant in the alleged offence. If the complainant might plausibly have contributed to the

commission of an alleged offence, as by leaving keys in a car, consenting to a sexual advance or provoking an assault, exercise of personal judgment as to whether to report the offence is permissible. Discretion as to whether to report a victimless crime can be deferred to others.⁶¹

Departmental Rewards

The points made above, in essence, reflect the fact that many police departments continue to evaluate and reward police performance as they have always done, despite changes in the traditional conception of the police role. Particularly where domestic dispute intervention training has taken place, and a policy of police responding to such calls has been established, the officers' correct application of the intervention procedures must be recognized and rewarded by promotion and advancement.

Traditional performance criteria for the police such as the number of citations, arrests, summonses, etc., are not appropriate yardsticks for this aspect of their role.^{8, 31, 32, 41, 62} As clearly stated by the Law Reform Commission of Canada⁶³,

...police performance indices remain primarily geared to criteria -- clearance, arrest and conviction rates -- which bear no meaningful relationship to the realities of their function. }

In short, police officers should be provided with a vested interest in doing a good job of handling domestic crisis calls.

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Appendix 1

A review of family crisis intervention literature conducted for this research monograph revealed 42 North American communities had established, experimented with, or proposed some form of domestic crisis intervention training. To the police departments identified in this literature search, a standard letter of enquiry was sent. In addition, information was solicited from a further 75 police departments in the United States and Canada in cities with populations of 200,000 and over in an attempt to discover if there were police departments engaged in planning or operating crisis intervention programs that had not received mention in the literature, and if so, to gather data on the details of the programs.

Replies to the letter were received from sixty police departments. This non-representative response provided us with the following information. Twenty-nine police departments had crisis intervention programs in progress, and 17 of these supplied copies of their training manuals. Another 12 departments, whilst not engaging in crisis intervention training per se, nevertheless provided information on social agency liaison and referral programs in which they were participating. Ten police departments replied that domestic dispute training was under review or planned for the future. Nine respondents replied that no special training had been given and that no such plans existed for the future. Fifty-seven departments failed to respond.

Information provided by our respondents, on the whole, was sketchy and not amenable to the systematic content analysis planned. While a few police departments (notably New York, Jacksonville, Louisville, Syracuse, Oakland and London (Ontario)) inundated us with research reports, lesson handouts, press clippings, training manuals and other program documents, most of these departments, and the others who responded, failed to provide specific answers to all our questions. Thus, in general, the most useful information came from descriptive and evaluative material published

in the various learned journals, law enforcement publications, and books reviewed for this monograph. These findings, together with data from survey responses where available, have been included in the main body of the review.

Judging from the material we received, the basic procedural points of conflict management do not differ widely from one program to another. Attention to detail, however, varies considerably. In general, Dayton, San Diego, Louisville, New York, Syracuse and Jacksonville all had good comprehensive programs. These departments also felt that such training was important, and their attitude showed in their communications to us. By comparison, Lansing, Knoxville, Berkley, Los Angeles, Edmonton, Winnipeg and Calgary had less well worked out programs.

It is of course difficult to draw conclusions about the quality of the actual training based on manuals, syllabi or policy statements supplied. However, the following had features worthy of mention.

Dayton, Ohio:

The Dayton Police Department policies on "domestics" seemed to be amongst the most comprehensive and well thought out. Evaluation of training techniques was not possible, but policy content suggests that the Dayton Police Department stresses all the procedural points of a good program. It was one of the few to pay attention to police neutrality and to stress in detail the importance of proper handling of calls by the dispatcher. The training included good referral information, a brief directory of essential services, and dealt with special procedures for special types of dispute, such as what to do when children, alcohol, and mentally ill people are involved.

New York City:

The New York Police Department training package is comprehensive and well planned. The "training manual" reviews some of the issues in crisis intervention for police and reveals a procedural training which is quite similar to the British Columbia program, except that New York police are

expected, it seems, to go further into the interview and solution procedures (or as they might call it, the "social work" end). New York includes case reports, scenarios, and skits, useful for role playing and active participation. In general, this is the best worked out syllabus supplied. The problem with this training program appears to be that it takes 160 hours per individual and is personal growth related. This may be too much time for all police departments to be able to afford, and it is difficult to easily assimilate into a recruit training program. The emphasis on referral may cause a problem with three quarters of all domestic calls being referred, thus placing an unmanageable strain on social agencies. However, the referral slip to be given to the referred person is a good feature.

Louisville, Kentucky:

Louisville has a sophisticated and comprehensive program including fair fight training workshops plus standard tests of family crisis intervention procedures. Training is in-service for 35 hours and includes presentation, readings, films, field trips (to social agencies), simulations and feedback sessions which include video tape replays. The program was designed, however, for six two-man specialist teams and the extra time spent in agency visits, field practice, etc., does not seem to be feasible for an entire recruit class.

Syracuse, N.Y.:

This program trains groups of 15 police officers for two weeks each, using both police and non-police trainers. It concentrates on sharpening existing skills and adding new ones, and uses a role-playing and video tape feedback model. The program spends some time on background causes such as mental health, sexuality, alcohol, etc. Of note is that it includes a familiarization with social agencies as part of a six-week field course. In all, each officer receives eight weeks training in conflict management and social agency orientation. During the last six weeks recruits are actively helping experienced officers.

Some common faults with the training manuals received from departments with apparently less well developed programs include the following. The manuals did not seem to have worked out a comprehensive step by step training procedure. Safety, defusing, mediation and how to refer to agencies still seemed to be largely a matter of learning by trial and error in the streets.

Some manuals tended to over-emphasize the legal aspects of domestic disputes at the expense of conflict management skills. In general, little attention was given to proxemics and non-verbal communication. One manual strongly recommended interviewing disputants separately. This generally wastes time, increases the probability of "recruiting" (trying to win officers over to one side of the argument) and increases anxiety over what one's fellow disputant is saying and doing.

The unwritten message that came through from at least one police department's communication was that domestic disputes should be avoided unless intervention is absolutely necessary. In this case guidelines for intervention were supplied, but they amounted to a "cool it down for the night" policy. Oversimplification in this department's "training" was misleading and tended to support the stereotype that domestic violence is something that happens regularly and is regularly forgiven by the victim.

Training manuals from the following police departments were reviewed:

Calgary, Alberta	Los Angeles, California
Edmonton, Alberta	Berkeley, California
Winnipeg, Manitoba	Lansing, Michigan
Jacksonville, Florida	Knoxville, Tennessee
Louisville, Kentucky	New York, New York
Oakland, California	Syracuse, New York
San Diego, California	Dayton, Ohio
Springfield, Missouri	Seattle, Washington
St. Paul, Minnesota	

DOMESTIC CRISIS INTERVENTION

Monograph 3 - A Literature Review of Domestic
Dispute Intervention Training
Programs

(Part 2)

Bruce R. Levens

Police and Social Service Cooperation

Traditionally, cooperation between law enforcement and social agency personnel has developed out of the experiences of police and social worker collaboration in dealing with juvenile problems. There are numerous examples of the ways in which police and social agencies have fostered good working relationships that have been effective in handling the law violations and delinquencies of youth. A particularly successful project designed to direct young people in trouble with the law to community agencies and programs is the Seattle Agency Referral project.¹

The overburden of the juvenile court within the criminal justice system has provided much of the impetus for the adoption of diversionary programs for youthful offenders, and this in itself has brought the police into greater contact with the social work professionals.² At this level of diversion the police perform a screening function "referring an incident back to family or community, or simply dropping a case rather than laying criminal charges."³

Attention has also been directed in the literature toward police diversion of persons with mental health problems, such action fostering relationships with mental health branches of the social service network.^{4, 5, 6, 7} The police have always been a behaviour mediating institution,⁸ and as such are bound to be drawn into the apprehension and management of persons whose behaviour is socially disapproved and suspicious of mental instability. Of late, programs of mental health consultation and training for police have grown and models of psychiatric professionals working closely with police abound.^{9, 10}

The effectiveness of the police to deal with crime and delinquency is seen, in many recent attempts to redefine the role of the police, as being dependent upon other resources and agencies in the community,

particularly those which cater to juveniles and the family. The new styles of policing, variously termed "community policing", "team policing", "neighbourhood policing", attest to the growing commitment of police to closer involvement with community resources.^{11, 12}

Along with the adoption of new policing styles has come a growing appreciation among the police of the legitimate role of order maintenance as a central police function. As Wilson¹³ points out, good order maintenance requires that police have available a wider range of options for handling problems than is afforded by traditional police responses of "making an arrest or doing nothing."

It is of course not all police forces who have accepted the new emphasis. Both the "peace officer" concept (relating to the order maintenance function) and "law officer" concept (focusing the police role clearly on crime) are "modern" concepts of policing,¹⁴ and both to some degree are present in Canadian police forces. What is important to note is that the closer to the peace officer concept a force gravitates, the greater the commitment to collaboration with the social agency system. And it is the peace officer concept that at present is receiving the greatest attention from police forces.

This is particularly noticeable with the degree to which domestic crisis intervention has become a component of so many police training courses. With specific regard to marital disputes and crises it has been argued that,

It is clear that our society's inadequate response to acts of marital violence is in part due to the fragmentation of existing resources. There is a manifest need for coherent policies that include and coordinate supportive work, innovative legal procedures, and a professional nucleus of persons capable of employing the techniques and insights of the social professions.¹⁵

Given that the police ability to cope can be greatly improved by collaboration with other resources, more than one writer has noted that the variety of models of such cooperation itself gives rise to a problematic situation, for what works in one situation may be totally unsuited to the next.^{16, 17, 18}

This report cannot hope to provide a prescription for the adoption of any one model in the local situation; the research upon which such recommendations should be based has not been undertaken. However, this section will attempt to describe in outline some of the main models of cooperation, to highlight the major issues in police-social worker collaboration, and to suggest the advantages of one model over another. This section, then, attempts to present the factors most often associated with the successful operation of the police-social worker collaboration and itemize the components of a referral system. It concludes by discussing some fundamental obstacles to closer collaboration and client problem solution under the sub-headings excessive expectations, social class biases, and occupational stereotypes.

Before pursuing the path described above, a note of conceptual clarity is offered in an attempt to convey what is meant by the term coordination, and also to make the reader aware of its organizational dimensions.

Service Coordination

Following Gilbert,¹⁹ coordination is a method aimed at the development of an integrated social service system. Two forms of coordination are identified: centralization, the consolidation of services under one administrative structure, and the federation, the continuing collaboration between agencies without centralized decision-making.

Essentially, coordination is advocated to minimize the strains produced by increasing specialization. What form, centralization or federation, is best suited in which circumstances is not clear from the literature, except that the nature of the local situation prescribes much of the resulting pattern. It must be borne in mind that where coordination is most often advocated in the social service arena, it is to overcome problems of fragmentation, duplication, and overlap of services. Regarding police and social agency collaboration, however, the motivation comes more from a desire to install an efficient and effective interaction and communication model rather than working to an ideal of fully integrated, i.e., centralized, services.

Another dimension of the concept of coordination centres on consideration of cooperative arrangements among agencies as a system of exchanges.^{20, 21} That is, organizational activity is seen as directed toward achieving goals. Since most agencies do not possess all the resources necessary for goal attainment, they enter into exchange relationships with one another. Reid argues that by consideration of the extensiveness of the exchange in terms of the quantity and value of resources, three main levels of coordination can be delineated. From the lowest to the highest level of coordination, these are:

1. Ad hoc case coordination: coordinated activity is generated by individual practitioners; formal inter-agency agreements are not usually involved. Specific exchanges include chiefly information, referral, and to a lesser degree, service.
2. Systematic case coordination: coordinated activity is still at the case level but with the goal of meshing services from different agencies in relation to a particular case. Special inter-agency coordinating devices, such as the case conference committees, may be set up. Exchanges at this level are systematic and extensive. Information exchange and referral is routine, the emphasis is on planned exchanges of services with clear responsibilities for the provision of specific types of service.

3. Program coordination: coordination is centred not on individual cases but on agency programs. This level includes the development of joint agency programs. Inter-agency exchanges are extensive and complex.

In terms of the above conceptualization, a federated structure with coordination at the systematic case coordination level appears to be a realistic goal for police-social agency collaboration. The preconditions and determinants of, together with the impediments to, coordination are discussed later in this section of the report. Suffice to point out here that at the level suggested as realistic, the exchange of resources between police and social agencies may taken, in very brief outline, the following form. In dealing with domestic disputes, for example, the police need the intervention and crisis management skills, plus knowledge of social and psychological support services, that social workers possess. The social agency and social worker in turn needs help from the police in the identification of individuals and families in need of social service help, and also in the management of the violence that may erupt during domestic crises. Repeated occurrences of the same problem, so often the case with domestic calls to the police, requires ongoing communication and exchange between the police and the social service network.

The means by which such inter-agency communication and exchange is achieved leads to the consideration of the models of coordination that have been identified in the literature.

Models of Police-Social Worker Coordination

From the literature review, from local experiments and from material supplied by many North American police departments, a wide variety of examples of police-social agency cooperation was found. For the purposes of

the following discussion these examples have been "pulled together" to form three main models. It must be clear that within each main category there may be variations. The variations, however, do not for the most part invalidate the general criticisms applied to each.

I. Social Worker as Member of the Police Department

This model consists of social workers working from police headquarters on a continuing basis. The social workers may be on the police department payroll or seconded under contract to the police by the social service department of the local authority (for example, Niles Wheaton Project,¹⁷ Vancouver Police Liaison Worker model,²² Multnomah County Project.²³)

The social worker is on tap to assist police officers in determining the appropriateness of social agency referral; to make contact with social agencies and mediate between social service and law enforcement systems; and in some examples, to provide direct counselling services to people who have been identified as in need of such services by police officers. In large police departments the typically few social workers employed can do little more than advise the force from a referral agent's perspective. There is little time for follow-up on cases referred and little time to facilitate difficult referrals where they have been called upon by the police officer to initiate "outreach" service.

II. Mobile Social Work Team on Call to Police

This model essentially consists of social workers available for direct service and quick intervention at the request of the police department (for example, Surrey Police Counsellor Project,²⁴ Family Consultant Service with London Police Force,^{25,26} Regina Mobile Family Services Unit,²⁷ Erie County, Pennsylvania, Project,

Haywood, California, Project,²⁸ North Vancouver Police Counselling Project, Vancouver City Mobile Team (Car 86 Project). This is achieved by one of two main methods: (a) Mobile units of social workers, mental health professionals or crisis counsellors maintaining radio contact with the police department. In this example the mobile unit would usually be called in by police at the scene, who considered that social work intervention was necessary. (b) Teams consisting of police personnel and social workers together are in radio contact with the police department. Social workers and counsellors either ride along with police on special shifts or on a round-the-clock coverage. The specialist mixed team would be summoned by the police department dispatch section and would be the first to arrive. In the first variation the assessment of the need for social worker intervention is made first hand by the attending officer; in the second variation this screening is done by the telephone operator.

Both variations of this model face the problem of uneven distributions of requests for social work services. The time taken to attend such calls often results in situations of need for which no team is available. In the first variation of the model there is the added possibility that police may indiscriminately pass on to the mobile social work team all calls for which they do not feel a responsibility to intervene. Whereas used properly the service should be consulted on a highly selective basis.

III. Ad Hoc Social Worker-Police Officer Collaboration

This model of cooperation typically takes place at the time level with officers and social workers locally establishing lines of communication, referral techniques and information sharing around individual cases as the need arises. There are varying degrees of administrative back-up for such arrangements. In good examples of this model police and social service resources

provide the mechanics for case conference, referral tracking, and information exchange. In less developed examples only very informal cooperative arrangements exist between the occupational groups.²⁹

These three appear to cover the main variants. Treger¹⁷ mentions other models including the social worker in the social agency whose job is to relate to law enforcement officers and the police officer in the social work role. No examples of these models were encountered either in the survey or our search of the literature. The types are, of course, not mutually exclusive, and often the social worker in the police department may be augmented by the ride-along teams. Such is the case in Vancouver, where examples of all three models co-exist.

Critique

A strong case is built in the literature for the model of social workers in the police department.^{17, 30} A cooperative team relationship, it is suggested, can be more easily created when the police make social services available within the department. The advocates of the model claim that communication gaps between social workers and police can be eliminated and a more positive image of each other fostered by such an arrangement.

Much of the argument for Model I is based on the specific project in Niles and Wheaton, Illinois. The results of an independent observation of the way the model was operating,³¹ however, suggest that in fact such working arrangements do little to break down the barriers between the two occupational groups. Underlying much of the hostility towards social workers is certainly the charge that by and large social workers are simply not available when needed:

An hour spent in informal discussion with a group of patrolmen who, according to the Chief, were "mixed" in their attitudes towards the social service project, was most informative. When

the Chief departed I found that the attitudes were not at all mixed -- rather unanimously skeptical and hostile towards the project. The main basis of their hostility seemed to be two-fold -- they did not like the social worker because he refused to come out when called on weekends or during the night and they considered that there was nothing that he did that they could not do, given time. "If we had as much time as he has, we could do what he does" was their argument. They did not see him as taking away a burden from the police, nor as having any special skills -- indeed, they felt that they dealt with crises better themselves. By the time the social worker appeared the crisis was always over.³¹

Throughout the literature there is an assumption that coordination is a desirable goal. The many attempts at achieving some levels of integrated police and social worker services attest to this. As Tomlinson²¹ argues, collaboration widens our knowledge of the problems, it is a means of determining when action needs to be taken, and of bringing the total resources available to bear upon the problem. However, in choosing coordination as a desirable end, there is a danger of assuming that it will resolve a number of more fundamental problems.

It is frequently assumed that coordination, cooperation and integration are the answer to problems of delivery of services. But a narrow focus on these assumed solutions tends to deflect attention from the adequacy of the services themselves. There seems to be an assumption with the commitment to coordination of common objectives among agencies. In actuality agencies do not share common objectives and goals²⁰; they have different mandates, different constituencies, and different operating philosophies -- a particularly pertinent consideration regarding the integration of police and social agency network. Further, it is often unclear as to what the coordination is specifically concerned with, and what cooperation should take place. Even when some agreement on what should be coordinated is reached, it is assumed that the implementation of these coordination efforts would be a relatively simple matter. In fact, coordination increases the possibility that agencies will intrude

on one another's domain and this creates role problems for workers, especially between police officers and social workers where serious problems of role confusion and ambiguity exist. Finally, it is often assumed that all the agencies included in such experiments come to the project with the same degree of commitment, the same desire to implement changes. Unfortunately this is not always the case. (These points were presented at a workshop entitled "Community Models of Police and Social Service Integration" at the United Way Symposium on Family Violence (March, 1977)).

In arguing for collaboration through coordination it must not be overlooked that society's experience with coordination is as yet very limited. Too few examples exist for a prescription without qualifications. Research is still needed to demonstrate the range and mix of services that can most effectively be coordinated. There is evidence that certain service functions, such as social action and direct services,³² create disharmony when joined. Not enough is known about the effects on worker morale, the clientele, or service delivery in general in a "coordinated" geographic area. Certainly there is not enough evidence specifically related to police and social agency collaboration.

This discussion of the assumptions often inherent in attempts to coordinate activities leads to consideration of impediments to cooperation and coordination that have been identified in the various attempts to achieve a good system of collaboration.

The Problems and Difficulties of Collaboration

The first point, frequently made in the literature, is that cooperation depends very largely upon personal relationships, and that any attempt to achieve exchanges between personnel from differing systems requires constant contact between the persons involved.^{9, 21, 31} One way to begin to achieve a mutual understanding and increase knowledge

of other agencies is through training programs which allow exchanges of personnel.³³ One writer, for example, suggests that a social agency internship should be incorporated in the college curriculum.³⁴ However, the quality of the relationships between police and social workers is also determined by the attitudes of the participants in these programs. It must be recognized that even where inter-agency exchanges and training occurs, there is an underlying mutual ignorance, mistrust and disrespect between police and social workers, which in the majority of cases makes a smooth collaborative relationship difficult to achieve.^{9, 31}

A second much stated problem is the issue of confidentiality of client information, and the ramifications of this for police officer and social worker alike.^{9, 21, 35, 36}

When people know another worker well and can exchange notes at an "unofficial" level they are usually willing to pass on a good deal of data. On the other hand, more caution may be necessary if a report is being submitted to a case conference which is going to be relatively public and official.²¹

This caution is especially considered where social workers may feel that the police requests for information are more for law enforcement intelligence than a desire to find solutions to the personal problems of the client. The experience of this project suggests that in those instances where information is exchanged informally it is used very effectively. However, the number of relationships which allow this kind of informal exchange are very few, and by and large an underlying suspicion as to the motives for the exchange exists.

Parkinson³⁵ makes a similar observation in his report on the Vancouver Team project. He writes,

At the line level the question of confidentiality was undoubtedly the single most disruptive issue that emerged in many contexts.

However, by the end of the demonstration year, Parkinson reports that a consensus had been reached on how to work together and the questions of "what kinds of client information are shareable with whom under what circumstances" had been worked out satisfactorily.

A related problem is the degree to which clients will reveal all the relevant information requested in counselling situations when they know that close social worker-police collaboration exists. In some instances the client may even be counselled in a social worker's office in the police department.³⁷

Some have also pointed to the dangers and moral dilemmas of close cooperation.³⁸ As Klapmuts⁴ points out, inherent in the diversionary process are a number of potential violations of social work programs, to divert from the criminal justice system, can be seen, when such enrolment is not strictly voluntary, as "subjecting a person to treatment or control without first finding him guilty of an offence." The argument is carried to the extreme by referring to the new style policeman as the "neighbourhood social service enforcement officer." He goes on to suggest that maybe the cost to individual rights of close cooperation could be too high. Posing the question, should moves toward such cooperation proceed, he answers clearly "Yes for we are already proceeding. The question then is not whether to, but how to develop appropriate police-social worker welfare services delivery systems."³⁸

Notwithstanding the dangers, Laroche et al.³⁹ make the point in their paper on collaboration between police and a psychiatric department of a Montreal General Hospital, that the "...aggressive approach or reaching out are necessary with families calling on the police because they do not call with therapy in mind." Certainly there are differences between social strata in their use of the social services just as there are social class biases in the delivery of services. But perhaps at least a part of the use of the police as a first resort is the unavailability of most social services outside the usual office hours of 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.

Discussing the preconditions for cooperative activity, Schaffer³¹ suggests three necessary courses of action. First, workers must begin to fully understand the police role and develop a maturity to accept and cope with an inevitable conflict of philosophies. Secondly, the police must gain a real understanding of the limitations of social work and not expect magical solutions. Thirdly, "The most important condition" opines Schaffer, is that "...if social workers are ever to be accepted by the police, it is absolutely imperative that they give the same service timewise as the police." The point made repeatedly in her discussion is that in cooperative projects it is the social worker who is being tested. If one can't be reached during a midnight crisis, the police will soon dismiss the project as useless and generalize their distrust and disgust to social work in general.

A particularly difficult problem, encountered most frequently in projects falling into the Model I and Model II categories of cooperation above, is a lack of clear role identity experienced by both police officer and social worker, but experienced perhaps to a greater degree by the social worker and especially in the liaison position within the police department,²² or working closely with police as in Model II projects.

One study²⁴ discusses a number of problems associated with the Model II variants of cooperation. Particularly they draw attention to the effect on counsellor neutrality of such close working relationships, both from the standpoint of the counsellor's image and maintenance of a neutral role in dispute situations.

Ivey and Hinkle⁴⁰ discuss role problems in terms of discomfort and conflict for the incumbent as stemming from several sources. Adapted to the social worker in the police setting, these role problems would be: (a) the incumbent having two role definers, police department and social agency;

(b) conflicts internal to the role such as contradictory norms (the liaison worker attempting to be therapist and relating to the treatment norms of his profession whilst being aware of the need to communicate freely with police officers); and (c) conflicts stemming from a multiplicity of organizations with diverse expectations and goals, each one representing separate interests in the complex social system in which the worker must operate.

Consideration of the problems of effecting close cooperation between diverse agencies with somewhat exclusive goals and objectives presents a pessimistic view of the possibility of good police-social worker collaboration. The isolation from social work peers that so often accompanies the "social worker in the police department" model and the role identity problems experienced by them and others who work in close proximity to the law enforcement role, suggests that such problems appear likely to occur in most dual function situations.²⁴

An interesting attempt to overcome some of these problems is one in which a worker with a family counselling centre in Washington State went through a thorough police officer training course to familiarize herself with the needs of the police.⁴¹ Such inter-agency training appears to have significantly increased the understanding of the social worker. To what degree it removes the role strains is not reported.

In drawing this review of the impediments to cooperation to a close, the model to choose, it appears, becomes the one which will most likely lessen the role strain for the incumbent whilst increasing the chances of improving the delivery of services to those in need. Despite the drawbacks so far identified as associated with some liaison worker positions, this variant of Model I would appear to be the one of best fit with the large urban situation, given the modifications suggested in the discussion below.

One such modification relates directly to number of workers. At the present time the Vancouver Police Department has two liaison workers serving some 900 police officers and a city of over 400,000 people, a situation considered very inadequate.

Liaison Worker

We have argued that the police ability to cope with their domain is improved greatly by the availability of other resources. One problem is that most communities have many more resources than is realized by police officers, thus the model of collaboration and exchange is very important.¹⁶

It would appear that no one model of cooperation will satisfy all the needs of both the individual worker participants and the target population. However, a model which suggests itself as amenable to large urban complexes, provided it is supported by elements from other collaborative service ventures, is that of the liaison worker.

It would appear from the literature that a domestic dispute intervention program in a large city must attempt to deal with the following:

1. The highly frequent but sporadic call on police time to cope with the ever present potential for violence. This suggests that the police must continue to be regarded as the first line interventionists, and it calls for a training program which emphasizes (i) police safety, (ii) effective dispute management, (iii) referral management.
2. Given that not all calls to the police are crisis situations, information and telephone assistance should be given in properly screened instances where police presence is clearly seen as unnecessary.

3. The nature of some domestic crises will be such that police intervention, mediation and referral will not be sufficient to adequately calm or otherwise manage the problem. The availability of helping professionals on call to police for this proportion of "domestics" requiring immediate trained crisis counselling, sometimes for quite long periods of time, is therefore required.

The first need identified above calls for a generalist training program. With this particular approach, however, there must be a sustained interface between police and the social service network (a) to continually update police on available resources, (b) to provide feedback to police on referral appropriateness and disposition of referrals, (c) maintain a recording of services to and contacts with habitual disputants, and (d) to foster where appropriate systematic case coordination and conferences.

The second need calls for ongoing training of police telephone operators and dispatch personnel in the screening of domestic calls, the availability and range of community resources, and the maintenance of a file of known domestic callers and their agency contacts. In this regard persistent dispute situations could be identified and outreach social work intervention effected even where the immediate problem did not seem to necessitate police presence. This preventative service may both prevent escalation of the problem and reduce the call on the police.

The third need listed above calls for a mobile service delivery system, a flying squad approach, that can, in extreme emergencies, effect an on-the-spot intervention by a social worker when deemed necessary by the police initially answering the call. In addition, other "after hours" service availability for other than on-the-spot interventions is necessary to deal with such needs as emergency shelter, and the care of children.

Given the realities of the police-social agency interface and the unlikelihood of fully integrated services, the liaison worker would be seen as the keystone in the bridge between the two systems. The specifics of the role would have to be worked out in each situation; however, the following role components seem basic to the eclectic model suggested here.

Liaison Role Components

As identified from the literature received, the liaison social worker position should include the following key roles:

1. Referral Screening

The liaison social worker should be a community resources expert providing referral and information services to both police officers and telephone operators and dispatch staff regarding range of services and referral appropriateness (Referral Screening).

2. Intake/Outreach

The liaison workers should be responsible for receiving referrals from police officers and for effecting through agency contacts and regular working relationship establishing procedures, the outreach of agency services to those in need who otherwise might not initiate contact themselves.

3. Feedback

The liaison workers should supervise the monitoring of a community feedback to police officers from community resources to which they have referred.

4. Facilitator

The liaison workers should encourage police-science workers relationships and actively promote use of the social agency system by police.

5. Linkage

The liaison worker should be the main bridge between the two systems and coordinate other police-agency activities.

6. Information

The liaison worker should handle public enquiries of a social work nature for the police.

7. Recording

The liaison worker should be responsible for establishing and updating a file of police domestic interventions to be used for preventative outreach, and supplying information on previous contacts to attending officers.

8. Orientation

The liaison workers should maintain regular, close ties with their agency and professional colleagues to continually update their knowledge and to lessen the role strain of operating mainly among police officers.

Tomlinson²¹ has noted that the most useful collaboration goes on at an informal level "since it is only in getting to know other workers and agencies that suspicion and mistrust are reduced." Thus, although the liaison role may be seen as the preferred model, this should not be to the exclusion of encouraging line to line collaborations wherever possible. In other words, the liaison role does not preclude informal individual cooperation between police officers and social agencies. Rather, in addition to formalizing the bridge between the two professions and providing systematic exchange of resources, it provides the inter-agency interaction where an individual officer or worker may be reluctant to engage in such interface.

In conclusion, we have argued that a fully collaborative police-social agency system in the integrated sense of centralized administration is unlikely to occur. However, in the terms used earlier, the level of systematic case coordination can be achieved. One method to achieve this and keep alive the police-social worker cooperation that has grown up around the recognized need for greater use of community resources, is the liaison worker.

To fixate on any one model of cooperation would be to foreclose the options on largely untested models. We therefore argue for a mix of cooperative efforts under the general coordination of a liaison worker team attached to the police department. Such a mix embraces street contacts and relationships, mobile teams, and referral as the key to problem solving.

Arrest, Referral and Community Resources

Arrest is but one method of dealing with an emergency domestic situation. Its appropriateness, it appears, depends on the attitudes of the officer, the characteristics of the situation, and the desires of the other parties involved. Domestic crisis intervention training attempts to equip police officers with a wider range of options, whilst at the same time providing the potential for a reduction in the number of domestic assaults through the intervention of the "helping professionals."

There is little disagreement in the literature over the need to develop a social service support system for police; however, there is some lack of consensus on the degree to which use of the social service system should divert cases of domestic violence from the attention of the criminal justice system.

The feminist view as expressed at two recent conferences (United Way of Greater Vancouver, Symposium on Family Violence, March 9-11, 1977, and Status of Women, Action Committee, National Conference, March 1977, Ottawa) quite emphatically recommends that wife battering be regarded as a crime and treated as such by law officers and courts, and that the responsibility for prosecution be passed from the victim, in such cases, to the police.

Writing about crisis intervention training in her book *Battered Wives*, Del Martin⁴² admits scepticism about the results of such training efforts which produce fewer arrests in domestic disturbance situations. She writes:

The danger in greatly valuing reduced arrest rates in domestic disputes is obvious, given the frustration women suffer because of non-arrest policies. The counselling function of these training programs encourages police to mediate between disputants when in fact separation may be the only solution in such cases.

Another proponent of the view that where violence is concerned the police should enforce the law equally, irrespective of the family relationship between victim and offender, is Straus,⁴³ who has pointed out that the denial of responsibility by police in family fights and the non-performance of their role when assaults occur between strangers is tantamount to a legal toleration of the violence. Straus strongly suggests that until police respond equally to all calls of complaint about interpersonal violence the perpetuation of a cultural acceptance of the "marriage licence as a hitting licence" will continue.

Others,¹⁵ too, argue that a legal system in which criminal enforcement is left entirely to the whim of the victim, which is the case where prosecution proceeds only because charges are laid and pressed, "implies official acceptance of or acquiescence to the police that violence between 'consenting' adults is a private affair."

nowever, whilst Straus stresses the equal enforcement of the law for assault, he argues in another paper that if their estimates of inter-spousal violence are correct, the likely outcome of prosecutions for assault would be a massive overloading of the criminal justice system.

...in the light of overwhelming evidence of the ineffectiveness of imprisonment as a means of rehabilitation, the prospect of adding to the total number imprisoned is not taken lightly. Even short of imprisonment, the creation of de facto new category of crime and the stigmatization of perhaps hundreds of thousands with such a label is also not taken lightly.⁴⁴

Field and Field,¹⁵ too, stress the stigma and also refer to the economic effects of arrest that may well bring additional harm to the family. Apart from this, the Fields argue, "The fact of violence itself does not obviously justify marking off the offender for unique handling, especially since, as Wolfgang has shown, the victim may have been at least equally violent." What then may need treatment, in their view; is the relationship and the conditions underlying the parties' lives.

The components of the criminal justice model--arrest, arraignment, the release on bond or recognizance, trial, jail--best fit those crimes against person or property in which "rational" or "economic" factors predominantly motivate the offenders. The justifications for the criminal process become steadily weaker as the problems with which it must deal become more personal, more emotional, and more intense. They reach their nadir in the criminal treatment of violence between husband and wife, and the efforts and practices developed to cope with the problem reflect this weakness.

The Fields conclude that the persons and institutions able to deal most effectively with violent outbreaks between spouses are those "whose responsibility is to understand and ease pathological mental processes

and the conflicts peculiar to marriage....There is manifest need for coherent policies that include and coordinate supportive police work, innovative legal procedures and a professional nucleus of persons capable of employing the techniques and insights of the social professions." Martin would probably endorse this view. She states:

The real value of (crisis intervention) programs is that a family in trouble stands a good chance of finding help before violence becomes an established pattern. To me the efficiency and thoroughness of the referral function and follow-up procedures is the measure of the usefulness of the training as a whole.⁴²

In a paper on the prevention and treatment of wife beating, another only cautiously advocates what he calls "therapeutic intervention." His emphasis in this regard is very firmly on examining the sick relationship and suggests that the potential contribution of marital counselling to prevent violence is dependent upon a relationship, rather than an individual orientation.

The importance of therapy focused on reorganizing the pattern of husband-wife relationships is stressed because, as previously noted, marriage counselling still seems to be dominated by psychoanalytic and other "insight" type therapies focused on the presumed deep psychological problems of the partners. At best such treatments are likely to be ineffective. More usually, they divert attention from the here and now issues which must be resolved. At worst, traditional therapy tends to reinforce the society's penchant for blaming the victim - the wife - rather than the husband or the relationship. This is most apparent in the

use of such concepts as "female masochism," and in a subtle and usually unintended (but nonetheless powerful) encouragement of women to follow traditional passive-accepting female roles.⁴³

Regarding other community resources, this writer opines that the most important single step a community group can take is to establish a "safe house" (emergency shelter or refuge) for the victims of conjugal violence, a point frequently made in the growing literature on wife above.^{42, 45, 46}

Whether referral is seen from a diversionary perspective as reducing the use of arrests in cases of domestic assault, or whether it is advocated as a means of effecting contact with social services in cases where such help may either prevent the escalation of violence, or remove the victims to a place of temporary refuge, one point is clearly agreed upon: the need to build a bridge to community resources is of paramount importance in the operation of a domestic dispute intervention program.

Components of a Referral System

We now turn to an identification of the factors most likely to aid in the bridge building exercise of case referral by police to social agency and from one social resource to another.

The literature, as well as the experience of the Vancouver domestic intervention project, suggests that effecting "good referral" may well be the one most difficult aspect of police involvement in domestic dispute settlement. By "good referral" is meant (a) getting police to accept and use this mode as an important part of their repertoire of responses to domestic situations; (b) ensuring appropriate use of community resources, and (c) referring in such a way that clients will follow through on the advice given. The achievement of this goal is contingent upon full cooperation from both police and social agencies. The factors found to have been associated with the components of good referral are dealt with below.

1. Directory of Services

A much publicized complaint of the police is that the complex nature and proliferation of social agency services make it extremely difficult for them to know where individuals should be referred for help. So often the constable on the beat encounters a "social problem" but is at a loss as to where that problem could receive the most appropriate attention. Intake screening and referral by liaison workers and feedback to the officer may help over time to more fully provide police with a working knowledge of the agency services, but without such a system police have to make their own referrals on what little knowledge they have.

There is no unified interconnected range of services such as the terms "social services" and "community resources" denote. Rather, the services are fragmented, overlapping, duplicatory, poorly defined, and often in short supply. Thus the police officers' often stated wish for "one telephone number" they can carry with them to accommodate most eventualities is unrealistic.

What is possible, however, is the development of a small directory of essential numbers to call, to which each police officer should be encouraged to add community resources and contacts he or she has discovered, established and used in his/her own locale.

Coffey¹⁶ and Parnas⁴⁷ both suggest that the list should include Marital and Family Counselling Services, a Mental Health resource, Child Protection services, Emergency Shelter and an Alcohol Addiction related resource.

Service descriptions should be carefully compiled in the directories, and with familiarity gained through usage, police officers should be able to choose appropriate resources, thus avoiding subsequent inter-

agency referral. The fewer the number of secondary (and tertiary) referrals, the greater the chance of sustained client contact with the service. (Good examples of agency directories were found in the training manuals of Dayton, Ohio; Charlotte, N.C.; Oakland, California; and Jacksonville, Florida.)

2. Reason for Referral

A related factor to an appropriate choice of agency is that of making clear to the individual concerned what it is they are being referred to and why. In view of the concerns about infringement of rights, and fears about confidentiality, it is important that the police officer's referral advice is seen as a support function rather than an instrument of social control.⁴⁸

As others also point out, "A further problem is the fear, ignorance, and inertia typical of the captives of poverty involved in most of the cases: they may have trouble even understanding what it is they are being referred to...."¹⁵ An essential part of the police officer's training, then, should provide the knowledge of resources which would allow for such explanations and for demonstrating that the police will not become involved in personal and family problems beyond the missions of law enforcement¹⁶ and for increasing disputants' awareness of existing support systems through mediation and referral. (Protracted police-agency relationships should take place through the liaison worker and not the individual officer.)

3. Named Contact

One of the advantages of police officers informally developing their own local community resources is that they may also develop working relationships with specific social service individuals. The chances

of referred persons following through on the referral advice are greater where agency introductions are made to a specified person. This is quite frequently advocated^{49, 50, 51} and may account for the slight improvement in successful referral, reported by these projects, over similar programs where this and some other precautions were not taken.

4. Referral Slip

A simple documentation of the referral should be made out, and a copy should accompany the person referred. In some police projects domestic disturbance report forms contain a counterfoil or copy which is given to the citizen and the outcome is traceable by means of an identification number on copies to the agency and the police department. In some other projects, a simple introduction card is used on which the name and address of the agency is written plus the words "This will introduce Mr/Mrs...who has expressed interest in learning about the services offered by your agency."⁴⁹

The key factor, however, is that the complainant is left with something more positive than a vague suggestion that they visit an agency for help. The police officer concretizes the link with a document, whilst at the same time providing for himself an effective leaving strategy from situations sometimes difficult to terminate.

The referral slip should contain information taken from the officer's directory, including the name, address, telephone number, and hours of business, plus the officer's name and number and where possible a named contact for the client. (Charlotte, N.C.; London, Ontario; New York City, and Albany, N.Y. projects all had good examples of referral documents.)

5. Immediate Attention

Much has been written in the literature about the immediacy of attention, both by police and the social agency, to the client in crisis. Police have two main advantages over other community workers in family crisis intervention. One is that they act with authority, they have the legal and symbolic power to do something. The other is their ability to intervene early in the crisis, as advocated by social work crisis theory.^{52, 53, 54}

However, the immediacy of attention advocated here applies more to the social agency response to referrals than to police response time. First, at the time of police intervention the problem is probably chronic rather than acute.⁵⁵ Secondly, it is not at all clear as to whether crisis intervention is distinguishable from planned short-term treatment, and there is confusion on the part of practitioners in their efforts to make this distinction. Immediacy, then, is required not so much to aid directly in the treatment process, as to effect and maintain client contact with the social agencies.

Given the fact that many agencies are already overburdened, it would be foolhardy to have unreasonable expectations of their ability to be of immediate service. Reported research^{16, 56, 57} shows that waiting lists are common, and that clients placed on waiting lists until time is available in a social worker's caseload have a high incidence of drop-out. An early study⁵⁷ of the Family Service Association of America (FSAA) showed that one half of the clients who waited for service nine weeks or more did not return.

There are several reasons for the short supply of counselling services, including the funding problems of voluntary agencies.¹⁶ An additional problem is that agencies generally are not organized to cope with police emergencies. It is thus important that referrals be judiciously made, with police training clearly portraying the agency system as a support system to be used carefully lest it become a dumping ground for cases the police may feel are not really "police work."

6. Information Feedback

Most of the crisis intervention projects reporting success in terms of referral to social agencies and police officer job satisfaction stressed the need for the social agency worker to communicate the results of the referral back to the referring officer.

Michaels and Treger³⁰ specifically make the point that feedback should be immediate and should include whether the referral was acted upon, attitude of the client, the worker's recommendations and disposition of the case. But perhaps the most crucial feedback for ongoing co-operation between the systems is that of the appropriateness of the referral. Only through this ongoing exchange will officers get to know the limits of agencies and the kind of help that exists in the community. Feedback generally also gives social workers the opportunity to develop individual ad hoc working relationships.

Concluding Remarks

Family crisis intervention training enlarges the police officer's skilled response to the spectrum of social problems he is expected to deal with, without, if the procedural model is adopted, committing police to a social work role.

The emphasis in this section of the review has been on methods of effectively achieving a cooperative working relationship between an institution, the police, traditionally isolated but temporarily thrust into a vast array of social pathologies, and a profession capable of offering alternatives to the criminal justice system for dealing with many of the problems.

Essential to such expansions of police response modes is the existence of a range of accessible community resources and a workable referral system. As the Law Reform Commission of Canada recently stated:

...to the extent that problems can be channelled through primary social networks or through the substitute networks made available through community resource and referral centres, they can be identified, managed and resolved in ways which discourage their intake into the formal social defence system. Problem management and conflict resolution can thus proceed through routes which avoid the labelling tendencies of the formal agencies of social control. Such routes, moreover, serve to neutralize and normalize problems; their resolution enhances the level of identification with and sense of responsibility within the community.

With specific reference to the criminal justice system, the consequence of intensifying the reliance upon informed social support systems would hopefully be a curtailment in the demand on the social service capacity of the police, and, to the extent that the police control intake into the other sectors of the criminal process, on the courts and corrections apparatus as well.³

Obstacles to Close Collaboration and Social Service Utilization

We have hinted at several points in this review that it appears that despite the urgent need for police-social worker cooperation, obstacles inherent in bringing diverse organizations together, unreal expectations and occupational biases, portend failure for such attempts. As one worker comments,¹⁶ differences between the systems are more likely to be alleviated than eliminated. What these expectations, biases and stereotypes are, and how they affect domestic dispute management, is the subject of this section.

Excessive Expectations

All too often the social worker and the law enforcement officer have unreal expectations of what each other is capable of doing. The police do not possess the power they are sometimes perceived to possess, and social workers usually cannot do as much as the police think they can.

Regarding the effects of social work intervention, outcome research in social casework tells a generally sorry tale of (1) lack of clarity in the formulation of treatment goals and objectives; (2) poor articulation of the means-end relationships; (3) questionable methodologies; (4) poorly conducted investigations, and (5) inconclusive results. Even the few studies measuring up to the basic criteria of scientific rigour, whose findings are ostensibly more trustworthy than most other studies, more often than not show as much improvement in clients who received the casework as comparison groups (controls) who did not.

In a carefully chosen review of over 70 studies from which only eleven were chosen as satisfying the minimum requirement of an experimental (i.e., control group) design, Fischer⁵⁷ poses the question, "Is casework effective" and concludes:

...this review of the available controlled research strongly suggests that at present lack of evidence of the effectiveness of professional casework is the rule rather than the exception. A technical research corollary to this conclusion, and a comment frequently appearing in the social work literature, is that "we also lack good scientific proof of ineffectiveness." This assertion, however, taken alone, would appear to be rather insubstantial grounds on which to support a profession.

A similar review of research⁵⁸ concentrated on the effects, specifically, of marital therapy. Twenty-six outcome studies undertaken between 1950 and 1972 were reviewed. The over-all improvement rate across a heterogeneous collection of patients, therapists, and treatment modalities was 66 per cent suggesting, conservatively, at least a moderately positive therapeutic effect.

Another review of studies conducted in 1975⁵⁶ included the findings on 1,919 FSAA cases with marital problems, and further comment on many of the studies covered by the other articles.^{57, 58} Speaking of the FSAA cases and the other findings, the author states,

In summary, then, some statistically significant positive gains were reported in all but one of the thirty-two controlled studies reviewed and listed...

Twenty-three of these thirty-two studies showed gains significantly above control group levels on half or more of the criterion measures tested.

...The only study with totally negative findings...was one that encountered major difficulties with the reliability and validity of the instruments used. These figures contrast sharply with the probability that on a chance basis only one study or test in twenty will show differences exceeding the .05 significance level.

Additional evidence of the positive effects of marital counselling is provided by eight additional studies without control groups and by internal evidence from the FSAA census, which showed consistent and statistically significant improvements in change score averages with increased treatment input. In combination, these studies provide strong evidence that positive changes do occur in marital counselling.

Issue was soon taken in the literature with the positive interpretation of these findings. In yet another article on the effectiveness of family services, Schuerman⁵⁹ reviewed again the findings and concluded,

We are left with little illumination on the question of whether service is effective. We cannot assert either that it is or that it is not. We should not be disappointed, however, because it is the wrong question. Obviously there can be no answer to the question "Is casework effective?" The proper question is "What kinds of counsellor activities, with what kinds of clients, with what kinds of problems, under what kind of circumstances will produce what kinds of outcomes?" The answer to that question will not come from studies like this one, even though such studies contribute much to our understanding of clients and services.

Writing about the technique which urges that disputing actors give free expression to aggressive feelings on the assumption that "levelling" and "letting it out" is a "safety valve" mechanism that can prevent major confrontations of a violent nature, Straus⁶⁰ states,

On the basis of the review of previous research and the results of the study reported in this paper, one can conclude that much of the new therapy and advice literature, and especially much current encounter group activity, is almost exactly opposite to what the scientific evidence suggests is appropriate for reducing physical aggression and bringing about satisfying interpersonal relationships. There are many factors which could account for this startling discrepancy between social science findings and clinical methods presumed to be based on social science. Nine are discussed in this paper. They range from broad historical trends in the society to simple errors in logic.

The literature, then, reveals many indecisive findings, and despite pleas^{57, 59, 61} for research into the detail of social work input, we are still in no position to say with a high degree of certainty, which form of therapy or which treatment modality is likely to produce the greatest improvement with which type of client or problem (beyond some general indications on length of treatment -- see below).

Social Class Bias

A socio-cultural factor impinging significantly on the whole question of domestic dispute management, is that of the social class origins and orientations of the actors and organizations involved. Divergent perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour, exist between the strata in society, and writers have shown how these are manifested in different values accorded to family roles, child-rearing methods, conjugal relationships, communication patterns, management of stress and use of help from within and without primary and kin groups.

In many instances the literature on family violence and crisis management points to the dominant middle class backgrounds of social work professionals, the middle class orientations of social agencies, and the predominantly working or lower class designation of the clients most likely to come to the notice of the police.^{3, 47, 62, 63}

Social agencies can represent alternative resources for families, but while most reported intra-family violence occurs in the lower classes (Parnas, 1969), social agencies tend to reflect such middle-class values as: expecting the family member(s) to recognize that a problem exists; that it is correctable without recourse to the courts; that help is to be expected if sought; that he will be able to contain disordered behaviour until the desired solution is attained; and that he will have enough faith in a successful outcome so that his commitment to work towards it will

persevere through the numerous frustrations and humiliations he will have to bear in being a "client." The paradox is that these expectations are held for the most alienated and personally disordered members of society. If these assertions seem exaggerated, how else can one explain why so many social agencies close their doors at 5 p.m., locate themselves far from their clientele and have waited (in the past, at least) for the citizen to come?³⁸

The Law Reform Commission of Canada³ drew attention to studies of the clientele of social agencies, which indicate that middle class clients, "who have the requisite verbal skills and value system to successfully use psychotherapeutic services," are more likely to get continued service than working or lower class people. The middle class are more likely to use the agencies as basic resources without resort to the police. The iceberg quality of marital violence is "certainly related to the fact that middle and upper classes tend to vent their aggressive impulses on one another through a buffer zone of separation agreements, eviction proceedings, divorce, custody battles over children."¹⁵

Sensitive to the apparent lack of cultural fit between working class needs and expectations, and middle class oriented services, some writers have suggested the need for special forms of service delivery to enrol and maintain working class clients. Three aspects of this problem are dealt with: (a) the need for outreach services; (b) indigenous worker; and (c) short-term, duration-specific treatment. We will briefly address these suggestions in turn.

Writing about collaboration between police and hospital psychiatric services, Laroche et al.³⁹ advocate outreach services or the "aggressive approach" of worker taking the service to the client as appropriate for the delivery of mental health services to lower socio-economic groups. Laroche cites studies which show the effectiveness of the approach in the case of multi-problem families or low socio-economic status families.

Bard and Zacker³⁸ too, comment on the development of the "reaching out" strategy to effectively deliver social service to "those in society who, through ignorance or lack of opportunity, do not avail themselves of the services afforded by the helping system." The authors point out, however, that there are dilemmas that serve to bar the adoption of the strategy,

In a democratic society departures from traditional methods of helping service can raise serious moral, ethical and legal questions which defy easy solution. For example, does the helper have the "right" to intervene if he feels the family's difficulties may erupt in violence? If so, how far can he go? And has not the family the right to be left alone to settle things their own way?

Similar ethical issues of diversion have been touched on elsewhere in this report. The point, however, to bear in mind in this debate is that the acceptance of social service should always be a voluntary choice for the person judged to be in need of help. The value of the outreach approach for the working class can be seen, then, not so much in terms of forcing service on reluctant clients as actively publicizing the existence of services and of educating a public that may be unaware of, or prejudiced against, the social services available.

Another innovation in the delivery of services has been the use of the non-professional social work aide recruited from the same socio-economic background as the target client population.⁶⁵ Variouslly termed "local case aide", "indigenous non-professional", "indigenous auxiliary", etc., the non-professional aide acts as a link between the professional agencies and the working class population. The worker performs what Brager⁶⁶ calls a "social-class-mediating function". There has been some success with this technique,⁶⁷ but at least three consequences of the method are self-defeating. First, the working class may get services that are "amateurish or of lesser quality" than those offered by professional workers; secondly, even when workers are competent, efforts to integrate them into the delivery structure normally meets "stiff resistance," and thirdly,

...even when non-professional workers are effective in linkage roles and are integrated into the service delivery structure, the latter will vitiate the former and their effectiveness will wane under pressure to resolve the strains between bureaucratic conformity and the free-wheeling style of local workers.¹⁹

Finally, the focus on socio-cultural differences directs our attention to a recent debate in the social work literature of somewhat wider relevance, namely, the merits of short-term, duration-limited treatment (counselling) versus long-term, indeterminate treatment.

In the book *Crisis Intervention -- Theory and Methodology*, it is argued that,

The time limiting factor of crisis intervention is a distinct advantage with those individuals in the lower socio-cultural group, who are focussed on the here and now and want relief of their symptoms as soon as possible.⁶²

Discussing "crisis intervention" as a specific treatment modality, distinguished from, although not altogether unlike, brief psychotherapy, the authors contend that it is a "logical" modality for the lower social classes. The authors cite a number of studies which have identified character traits of persons most likely to succeed in long-term therapy situations. These traits reflect many of the basic characteristics reported as descriptive of middle class culture.

Although the distinction between crisis intervention and short-term, or brief, intervention is not always clearly drawn in the literature,⁵⁵ it is generally agreed that the basic defining characteristics of both modalities, that is, immediate problem solving, short-term agency engagements, and a foreseeable time-limited, duration-specific treatment goal, suit well the needs of the lower socio-economic groups.

Baron and Feeney⁶⁸ report the results of several studies which show that (a) planned, short-term treatment yields result at least as good as, and possibly better than, open-ended treatment of longer duration; and (b) improvement associated with short-term treatment lasts just as long as that produced by long-term services. The authors from their own study of juvenile diversion through family counselling conclude that short-term casework is one of the most effective ways of dealing with problems arising out of family situations.

A review article⁶⁹ also concluded that certain short-term treatment strategies can be used effectively in situations usually seen as requiring long-term treatments. The point made effectively is that "limits can indeed be placed on potentially limitless client engagements and that these limits can be set often in advance, by a conscious structuring of time."

Typically, eight interviews or less in a period not exceeding three months⁷⁰ constitute a short-term treatment, and although the evidence is not conclusive for all client situations, the literature does suggest that a reduction in dropout with the use of short-term, duration-specific treatment can be achieved without much loss in treatment outcome, as compared with long-term, open-ended modalities.

Occupational Stereotypes

Studies of the occupational personality, behavioural style, ideology, and attitudes of police officer compared with social worker, and of the two work situations, provide quite distinct, sometimes polarized profiles of the two roles.^{30, 36, 71, 72, 73}

The degree to which such differences are entrenched will have profound implications for a cooperative working relationship. It is noteworthy that repeatedly studies confirm the differences and profile the police as adhering to rules and regulations, being conservative, aggressive, punitive and forceful, compared with social workers who are seen by police as wishy-washy, lenient, sympathetic, forgiving, etc.

A recent local study³⁵ again confirmed the differences and also suggests a sex-role differentiation between the occupations. In other words, police were found to perceive themselves in terms of male valued characteristics such as "assertive" and "competent" and social workers in terms of female valued attributes such as "helping" and "warm expressive." Referring to sex role stereotyping,

It is this feature which is as much a "barrier" between the police and social service agencies as operating ideologies. Since police forces are predominantly male and social work agencies predominantly female, the issue should not be ignored. It affects community processes, meetings and often hinders the flow of information, the sharing of ideas, and the clarification of positions.

And of the British scene,

The pity of strained relationships between the social services and the police is that they have come at a time when the police as a service have never been more concerned with their role in the social scene.⁷²

There is plenty of evidence of a willingness by the police to recognize the value of mutual cooperation.⁷² For one thing, lack of resources and manpower are problems which the police have in common with social agencies. However, the obstacles to cooperation are serious. As Schaffer³¹ observed in her evaluation of the Niles-Wheaton, Illinois, project.

At present, cooperation is limited--the police are resigned rather than enthusiastic and social workers are still filled with reforming zeal. The police obviously hope to develop a type of social worker with whom they feel they can work and social workers

hope to change police attitudes and practices. Both sides are likely to be disappointed -- if true cooperation is to come both sides will have to accept some modification of attitude and realize that each has a role to play that is vital but different.

Appreciation of each others' roles, it has been suggested, can be achieved by a system of training police and social workers together in one institution. Certainly, the number of special training schemes, such as domestic dispute intervention¹⁸ and mental health training⁹, attest to better working relationships as a result of some joint training activities.

Concluding Remarks

The literature reviewed for this monograph suggests that a domestic dispute intervention program, to be successful in reducing the risk to police officers, in preventing repeat requests for police intervention in domestic disturbances, and in effecting contact between those in need and the social service system, requires a full commitment and system change both by police departments and other community resources alike.

The picture that emerges from the books, articles, reports and manuals included in this review may be sketched as follows: Police involvement in domestic disturbance issues, if for no other reason than the potential for violence, their availability and authority, is a legitimate involvement. However, not all requests for police intervention warrant their presence -- practical considerations require that requests be screened. A consistent and thorough screening policy should be introduced, one that is fully understood at all levels of the police hierarchy. Where police officers are dispatched on such service calls, safety alone demands that they be given a complete contextual description of the event. Where police presence is judged unnecessary, the citizen's request for help should be dealt with by telephone counsel or referral. The unheeded call may be an early sign of a more severe domestic problem.

Domestic crisis intervention by police does not absolve the social services of their responsibility. The degree to which such diverse systems have successfully cooperated, however, varies greatly by community size, complexity, and the ability of such systems to come together. Underlying many of the problems of cooperation are deeper seated concerns, worker and police biases and stereotypes, as well as overworked and underfunded services and police departments.

Notwithstanding the problems, the rapid growth in domestic dispute intervention training, and the experimentation with innovative policing techniques and models of service integration are signs of a willingness to overcome the obstacles.

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DOMESTIC CRISIS INTERVENTION

Monograph 4 - Domestic Disputes, Police Response
and Social Agency Referral

Bruce R. Levens

Introduction


This article presents the findings of two follow-up stages of investigation on how the Vancouver Police Department responds to domestic crisis calls following the establishment of Domestic Dispute Intervention training. This study presented a descriptive analysis of the number and type of requests for police involvement in domestic disturbances and the pre-crisis intervention training responses of the Vancouver Police Department¹ and the results of an attitudinal study of trained recruits compared with long service officers, and a subjective evaluation of the effects of crisis intervention training on officers' perception of their own handling of disputes, the role of social agency resources, and the police officers' acceptance of domestic dispute intervention as legitimate police activity.²

Articles in the series reviewed the literature on police involvement in domestic disturbances and suggested, from a thorough analysis of other police departments' training programs and procedures, a number of prescriptions for effective dispute management. These include system changes in both police department and social agency network. The study suggests the adoption by police departments of a clear policy for responding to requests for police intervention, one that is understood and followed at all levels of police involvement. In addition, the report strongly suggests that effective dispute management is dependent upon collaboration between police and the social service system.

Ideal police and social agency involvement in domestic disputes, as suggested by the findings of the study, may be presented in simplified form as follows.

Requests for police intervention are screened as to their legitimacy for police involvement by the communications operators. Dependent upon their appraisal, either a patrol is dispatched, or advice is given over the telephone which may include referral to a social agency. Calls for assistance not seen as requiring police presence are thus given some help. The dispatched patrol receives a thorough briefing from the dispatcher based on a systematic collection of contextual information from the caller. On arrival at the scene the officer(s) appraise the situation and decide on the most appropriate response. The repertoire of responses includes simple restoration of calm with no other action, mediation of the dispute, involvement of the social service network through either indirect or direct referral, or call on emergency crisis counselling service, referral to family court, or in extreme cases of assault, arrest. The total system includes, ideally, information feedback to the police of the outcome of the social agency or court referral and the maintenance of a police file for the eventual provision of information on whether or not the disputants have a record of such interventions. This process is illustrated in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1
HANDLING REQUESTS FOR POLICE INTERVENTION
IN DOMESTIC DISPUTES



The Present Study

In essence the follow-up data gathering reported in this monograph sought answers to three main questions:

1. What effect did domestic dispute intervention training have on the screening of requests for service and on the information supplied to the attending officers? In other words, were the implications of dispute intervention fully appreciated at the level of request for service in terms of,
 - (a) the necessity for police involvement -- that is, should the police be dispatched and if not, what should be done;
 - (b) the consistency of the response;
 - (c) the collection of contextual information including data on who, where, degree of violence, existence of weapons, etc.; and
 - (d) the relay of safety relevant data to attending officers.

2. What kind of calls did police respond to and how were they being dealt with by the attending officers. What differences between trained and untrained officers can be discerned in their use of techniques of dispute management. Was the full repertoire of responses as outlined in Domestic Dispute Intervention training used by attending police?

3. What differences did the Domestic Dispute training make in the involvement of social agencies in the feedback of outcome information, and in the public's perception of the way police managed their disputes?

The first part of this article deals with question one above, the second part presents the results of a survey and observation designed to address questions two and three.

The Screening of Calls and Dispatch of Police
to Domestic Disputes

Introduction

In order to assess the impact of a domestic crisis intervention package on the Vancouver Police Department's handling of requests for intervention, a selection of telephone requests was analysed over a four-week period from mid-July to mid-August 1976.

The date of the analysis is important in two respects. First, it was some nine months after the first recruits with Domestic Dispute Intervention training had begun street duty. Secondly, the time allowed for the disruptive effects of changeover to the 911 Emergency Call System in May to have largely abated.

Sampling incoming calls at the Vancouver Police Department does not lend itself readily to the requirements of random selectivity, effecting a low profile researcher presence, nor operating with minimum disruption to the department. The policy for the recording of calls, plus complexities introduced because of the switchover to a fully automated call distribution system, made adherence to these requirements very difficult, despite full and very helpful co-operation from the Vancouver Police Department.

Consequently, since the prime concern of this phase of the research was to evaluate whether the telephone handling of calls for service had changed qualitatively, calls were selectively sampled from the peak times for the occurrence of domestic disputes, rather than using

a larger scale random sampling design. Only calls fitting the broad study definition of domestic dispute were sampled. Within that definition calls were chosen where a specific request for police presence was made. We did not attempt to fully evaluate the need for police presence but chose all calls considered to be descriptive of incidents requiring at least careful screening by the Police Department. That is, superficial complaints about neighbour noise, or unsubstantiated calls about arguments that could be overheard, were filtered out as not useful for this analysis.

Previous studies of the communications centre and a review of other police crisis intervention programs^{1,3,4}, identified the main concern with police departments as a lack of consistent domestic call screening policy. That is, seemingly similar requests for police intervention received quite different responses depending upon who answered the call, how the description was given and the interpretation of relevance to the police. Responses ranged from a non-cooperative "Not a police matter" to a priority one dispatch.

In addition, consistency is necessary due to the high potential for repeat requests from the same disputants and to research findings strongly suggestive of the notion that such calls are early warning signs of more serious interpersonal conflict.

Finally, given the predication of intervention training, for improved handling and safety to the officer, on complete baseline information from the dispatcher, the message transmitted becomes of paramount importance. We have identified, elsewhere, five key items of information minimally necessary to brief the dispute attending officer. These are:

- Who makes the call and how many persons are present;

- Where the call is made from and whether the offender is on the scene;
- Whether assault is in progress or threatened, i.e., how violent is the dispute;
- Whether a weapon is involved, available, mentioned or suspected;
- The mental status of the disputants or callers - agitated, upset, etc.

In addition to these key items, where possible, it should be determined whether the disputants are known to the police.

In sum, the research sought answers to two main questions: Were the calls consistently handled, and was the optimal information obtained and relayed to the patrol.

Findings

The researcher listened to tapes of incoming requests for service over a period of four weeks during July and August 1976 and gathered detailed information on 117 domestic calls which requested police intervention. The breakdown of calls by time and day is as follows:

36 calls between 4 p.m. Thursday and 8 a.m. Friday

19 calls between 4 p.m. Friday and 8 a.m. Saturday

62 calls between 4 p.m. Saturday and 8 a.m. Sunday

Overall, 86 calls occurred between 4 p.m. and midnight.

As in earlier measurements of requests for service and police response, the type of domestic call was broken down by the nature of the relationship between disputants. The calls listened to on this occasion were: 41 husband-wife disputes, 30 neighbour disputes, 16 altercations

between "friends", 13 landlord-tenant problems, 9 parent-child problems, and 8 "other" family member fights. In 75 per cent of the calls (88) the caller was a participant in the dispute. In the remainder, the caller was classified as observer. A study of calls to the police in Hamilton, Ontario, showed that over a six-month period 96% of the dispute calls are placed by the victim. Our selective sampling may account for the comparatively higher rate of observer placed calls. (Statistics from a Hamilton Police Home Intervention Team proposal discussed at the United Way Symposium on Family Violence, March, 1977 by J. Byles.)

Out of the 117 requests for police intervention, a car was dispatched in 92 (or 78.6 per cent) of cases. This figure should not be interpreted as a response rate, since no attempt at a random selection of all dispute calls was made. Rather, the researcher listened to peak hour and day sections of the recording tapes and recorded details of calls clearly definable as domestic problems. What follows is our assessment of the Vancouver Police Department response based on an analysis of the 117 calls.

1. Insufficient information is being collected from callers and inadequate descriptions are being relayed to attending police officers.

The analysis of the content of telephone conversations between communications operators and complainants revealed that in only few cases did the communications operator obtain a full description of the event, and further, that even where information was obtained, it was not always relayed to the dispatched patrol.

The major reason for the incompleteness of information was that questions about the presence of weapons were almost never asked, and questions about whether an assault was in progress, threatened or had occurred, were asked only rarely. Unless such information was volunteered by the caller, the communications operator did not probe these topics.

A breakdown of the calls by researcher judged information quality is given in the table below. The figures given are for the 92 cases to which a patrol was dispatched. This analysis excludes 25 calls where, despite the citizen request, the police did not attend and for which, therefore, no dispatch message exists.

TABLE 1
Information Obtained and Relayed to
Dispatched Patrol Units in 92 Calls.

Information	Information obtained and adequately relayed to patrol	Information obtained but omitted from dispatch message	Information obtained. Relay to patrol unit unknown	Information not obtained nor requested
WHO made the call, number of persons present, was caller disputant/observer.	42	25	21	4
WHERE call made from, complainant on the scene, where dispute taking place.	71	--	21	--
ASSAULT in progress, threatened, occurred, degree of violence.	45	19	21	7
WEAPON involved, in use, available, mentioned or suspected.	1	9	--	82
MENTAL STATUS of disputants/caller--calm, agitated, hysterical, etc.	4	8	2	78
OTHER, e.g. alcohol involved, children present, previously known to police	43	13	12	24

The first column in the table refers to those cases where information was either volunteered by the caller, or asked by the communications operator and relayed to the attending police officers. Column two shows those cases where information on who, assault details, weapon, and mental status of disputant was obtained (volunteered or requested) but was not passed on in the dispatch message. Column three indicates that information was obtained, but that we were unable to trace the dispatch message relating to the call and therefore could not determine whether the information was passed on or not. This was either because the message was erased from the tapes or because the quality of the recording prevented case identification.

The fourth column lists the calls where information on the details of call content were neither volunteered by the caller nor requested by the communications operators.

In interpreting this data, it should be kept in mind that the cell frequencies in the table refer to whether questions were asked, or information volunteered, about assault, weapons, etc. The frequencies do not, for example, indicate that in a given number of cases weapons were used or available, only that so many callers were questioned about this. There would appear to be an assumption on the part of communications operators that if information on weapons, for example, is not volunteered then none were involved, in use, available, etc.

As can be seen, in most cases information was obtained on details of who made the call and where the call was made from. However, in the case of who made the call, in 25 instances the identity of the caller (whether participant or observer) or their relationship to the dispute was not relayed.

By and large assault information was well handled in about half the calls monitored, but again, surprisingly, in 19 cases the information

obtained was not passed on to the patrol. Information not relayed varied but in the main referred to details about the degree of violence understood to have taken place, or to be in progress. For example, in a call where a "crazed woman" was attempting to break into an apartment screaming threats of violence and where the commotion was clearly discernable on the tapes, the dispatch message simply referred to the investigation of a noise complaint. In another example, a woman phoned to say a man was breaking into her apartment, that she knew who he was and that he had threatened to beat her. She was sure he was drunk and knew him to be violent. A car was dispatched with no more than the message "B and E in progress".

Domestic dispute intervention training focuses on the importance of police officers remaining constantly aware of the potential for violence throughout their intervention. The training teaches a cautious approach to the scene of the incident, and avoidance of officers placing themselves in possible "target" positions should firearms be involved. It cautions also, for example, to avoid interviewing disputants in the kitchen, where an arsenal of potential weapons is readily accessible to the parties concerned.

Any information that may forewarn police of the potential for weapon involvement by the disputants, then, is good preparation for the intervention. It is noteworthy that in only one case was information about weapons relayed to the patrol. In this instance the caller had told the communications operator that a "broken bottle" was being used. In nine other cases the question about weapons was asked revealing no weapon involved in four cases and an assortment of weapons--hammer, breadknife, bottle, length of wood, "fists", in the remaining instances. In none of the nine cases where the question was asked was the answer relayed to the patrol. It should be noted that all the calls selected for this analysis displayed sufficient evidence of interpersonal conflict to make the question about weapons a relevant one to ask.

As can also be seen from the table, similar gaps in information relayed appear with regard to the mental status of the disputants. In 75 per cent of cases where the caller was a participant the communications operator was in a position to judge this first hand. In other cases it would have been entirely appropriate to ask for the witnesses' opinion as to the "heat" of the fight, calmness or otherwise of the disputants. Despite the frequent mention in the researcher transcripts of the calls of descriptions such as "hysterical", "breaking things up", "shouting", "screaming", "yelling wildly", etc., little information of this kind was included in the dispatch message.

The category "other" information includes the number of times extra contextual information was collected and relayed. In most cases where such information was transmitted it referred to one or more parties being drunk, or that there were children involved, or that the disputants were previously known to the police. Such information can be interpreted as an important "rounding-out" of the context of the dispute and its collection and dispatch should be encouraged. However, too often it was the only information relayed, once again pointing to the largely passive role played by the communications operators.

2. The change to automatic call distribution (911 system), changes in the training and increases in the number of telephone operators, and an improved car dispatch system have not appreciably altered the use of the old priority system for dispatch and "event coding" the requests for service.

A criticism levelled at the report (communications) centre of the Vancouver Police Department at the beginning of the research project was that of inconsistency in the application of priority codes to domestic disputes.¹ It is of course recognized that

some inconsistency is to be expected given that a number of different operators are interpreting a range of social situations described in a variety of language styles. However, we feel that the possibility of creating a misleading perception of the event for the attending police officer is real enough to warrant an attempt at standardizing priority assignment practices.

The most recent analysis shows little change in these practices. A total of 3 different "event codes" was used to classify the disputes recorded. Nine calls received a priority one response, 64 calls were given a priority two coding, and the remainder was classified as priority three.

An analysis of the transcripts showed that there were often no clearly discernible reasons for a differentiation between priority one and two in terms of the seriousness of the complaint. There were, for example, three calls within the very similar circumstances of inebriated men attempting to gain forcible entry to their homes. Although described somewhat differently they were, nevertheless, all instances of women calling for protection. The calls received three different responses: a priority one dispatch (event code 112 -- "Assault in progress"); a priority one dispatch (event code 112 -- "Family trouble"); and a refusal to send a car on the grounds that "this is not a police matter".

An important consequence of loose descriptions of disturbance calls and the system of assigning priority ratings to the calls is that police response time is highly correlated with priority rating and type of call. Whilst it was not possible to analyse the time taken for the officer to start to a call after receiving the dispatch message in Vancouver, it is reasonable to assume that generally priority one calls will be responded to faster than priority three calls. A recent

study by the Police Foundation on response time in Kansas City, Missouri⁵, found that officers who were engaged in some specific activity at the time of receiving the call, such as performing a building check, controlling traffic, or eating, were less likely to respond quickly than officers not so engaged. It was further found that officers' starting time to a call was less in cases where they felt they had good chances of apprehending a criminal or saving a life, e.g., robbery and burglar alarm calls. If these findings hold true for the local situation, the description of the call and priority of dispatch becomes very important for the service citizens will receive from their police department.

It is hardly necessary to point out that, in Vancouver terms, family trouble calls with a low priority, which in fact may be serious domestic assaults, are unlikely to motivate immediate police response when so described.

As the Police Foundation report finds from an analysis of several surveys on public satisfaction with the police, the best predictor of general attitudes toward the police is the citizen's level of satisfaction with the responding officer and this is most significantly correlated with time taken to respond to calls for service. In other words, the people most satisfied with response time were also satisfied with the responding officer; people who were satisfied with the responding officer also had positive attitudes toward the police in general. Citizens who reported the fastest response to their calls held the most positive attitudes toward the police.

3. Requests for police intervention which clearly required police presence were often given poor attention.

In the judgement of the researcher, all the calls screened for this analysis were worthy of police presence, yet this was denied in 25 instances or 21 per cent of the calls.

A frequent request from communications operators was that complainants should commit themselves to "lay charges" before the request for a police car will be granted. In one instance the caller was asked to call again when she was prepared to do this. The response was given despite the emotional description given by a mother reporting that she and her daughter had been hit by the mother's "boyfriend".

On other occasions such assault reports received police attention without the telephone commitment from the caller that charges would be laid.

It is of course true that citizens do not always perceive police involvement in quite the same terms as the police. However, these calls were screened independently and could be considered borderline examples requiring dispatch. In fact, they could well have been early warning signs of more violent altercations, which the mediation or referral skills of a police officer could have helped.

It is recognized that police departments may need to screen calls. But a screening policy should be consistent and applied with civility. Another example of refused service was the incident of "unwanted guests" let in to the complainant's suite, in her absence, by the babysitter. The intruding couple refused to go when asked and became very abusive. When she asked for a police officer to enforce their eviction, the caller was told to "tell the babysitter to get them out". The caller then, hoping to get a better response, reported that the couple had forced themselves on the babysitter. The communications operator asked for "one story or the other -- either the babysitter let them in or they forced their way in -- which is it?" By this time the reason for the call, to get them out, seemed to have eluded the communications operator. Disgusted at getting nowhere, the complainant hung up.

On another occasion, a man called for police assistance to evict a female relative who was assaulting his wife. The man explained he did not want to use force on the relative, neither did he want the neighbours to witness him bodily removing the relative. However, something had to be done since she was causing injury to his wife. After a long conversation consisting of the communications operator repeatedly suggesting that the man take care of the incident himself, and his repeated requests for assistance and expressions of reluctance to engage in a fight with the relative, the communications operator asked the man to "hold" while she spoke to the sergeant. Comment from the sergeant in charge was "it's only a family fight". The communications operator returned to the call, advised the caller to "be a man, throw her out" and hung up. No car was dispatched.

The judgment that these calls, and others like them received poor attention from the police stems from our knowledge of the importance of early intervention and the fact that many other calls with very similar circumstances did receive attention and police officers were dispatched. We identified the following rationales for denying police presence from the calls analysed. To list these reasons is not to imply that they were universally offered as statements of police policy, or given with high frequency, but rather to show that on occasion members of the public do receive such explanations for non-involvement of the police, whilst on other occasions essentially similar circumstances received a quite different police response.

According to the communications operators' rationales, police will not attend:

1. unless the complainant agrees over the phone to lay assault charges;
2. to evict unwanted persons from a home if they have not forced their way in;

3. to evict unwanted persons from a home if they are related to the home owner or tenant;
 4. neighbour disputes involving tenants of rental property; it is the landlord's responsibility;
 5. to prevent a domestic assault by giving protection by their presence (requests for police to stand by in potentially violent situations).
4. Communications operators' length of time on the job and training did not affect the handling of domestic calls.

With the changeover to a 911 emergency call system, the Vancouver Police Department also increased the number of civilian operators. Permanent communications operators received a full two-week training session. Three hours of the training was devoted to handling "family trouble" calls and referral to social agencies.

In addition to the permanent communications operators, temporary operators were trained to fill vacant positions caused by a fairly high staff turnover. The temporary operators received two days training, of which one hour was given up to "family trouble" calls and agency referrals.

To analyse the effect of formal classroom training, and to take into consideration on the job learning, the communications operator responses were compared in terms of the permanent or temporary nature of the job, and split by those communications operators who had less than one year's experience with those who had over one year.

Unfortunately such a short training period in handling domestic calls does not provide a sufficient basis for a thorough evaluation. Not only is the training itself brief, but there is no assessment of quality of training. Further, the findings must be seen in light of the fact that if such calls are seen as less important than other aspects of the communications operators' work, then it is to be expected that this small amount of training will be relegated to secondary status among the other information received.

With these points in mind, our analysis revealed no differences with regard to (a) the refusal to dispatch a car (except that temporary and recent communications operators often consulted the sergeant in charge who made the decision); (b) the completeness of the description of the event -- all communications operators tended to rely on the caller to provide information rather than probing to obtain it; (c) the use made of social agency referral -- in only a few cases where a car was not dispatched did the communications operator suggest that the caller get help from elsewhere, and then the advice was usually to "contact a J.P."

Of the 92 calls which received police attention, there were no discernible differences between the communications operators in the degree to which obtained information was omitted from the dispatch message.

Police Response Mode, Domestic Dispute Intervention Training and Social Agency Involvement

Method

In order to obtain consistent information about police attendance at domestic disputes, a recording form was designed to provide brief but

complete descriptions in all assignments that turned out to be domestic disputes. Much of the information asked for on the form was either unavailable elsewhere or involved considerable search and tracking through police department files. In addition, we were anxious to gather information on domestic calls designated as "unfounded" for which no other documentation exists.

Given the reluctance of police officers to be burdened with yet another written report of their activities, the form was largely precoded and required only checkmarks against the appropriate descriptions of who was involved, the situation on arrival, degree of injury, action taken, and evaluation of the dispatch message received. An example of the form developed for the study is given below. Because of the importance of the form to the evaluation of police interventions, considerable care was taken with the format of the document and with ensuring that the correct terminology was used.

Full cooperation from the police department resulted in a protocol which included presentation of the research design and detailed explanation on the use of the form to the Deputy Chief and District Commanders, instruction on use of the instrument to shift commanders, and frequent visits by the researchers to NCO's in charge of each evening and night patrols who would be using the recording device. The NCO took responsibility for ensuring distribution of pads of the form. Notice of the commencement of the monitoring period was given to all officers by way of departmental bulletin and at shift briefings. Formal and informal encouragement in the use of the form was made through the ranks. After the start of the recording period, follow-up briefings with patrol personnel were held to reinforce correct and sustained use of the form.

The original design envisaged a three-stage assessment of police handling of domestic disputes as follows: first, an analysis of returned recording forms to assess the type of dispute attended and the range of responses utilised by the police; second, contact with the citizens who had requested service to assess "client satisfaction" with police and social agency service; and thirdly, contact with social agencies in cases of referral to assess the appropriateness of the police action.

Keeping in mind the difficulties of obtaining written records from police officers, the recording period was to be kept to a minimum. In calculating the length of this period there were three unknowns about which assumptions needed to be made. First, the return rate of the completed forms to domestics attended was estimated at 33 per cent. Secondly, in order to trace referral outcome it was necessary to estimate the proportion of domestic interventions that would result in a social agency referral. This was estimated at 20 per cent, or 1 in 5 of all interventions. Thirdly, we assumed a 50 per cent response rate of referred clients who would allow a follow-up interview.

Thus from an estimated 600 domestic calls attended per month, we estimated we would receive 200 dispute recording forms. If 20 per cent of the interventions resulted in referrals, that would result in some 40 referred clients. A 50 per cent response rate would produce 20 client interviews per month. Thus for a minimum 100 client interviews, the attrition predicted suggested a five-month experiment, other things being equal. As in most projects of this kind, other things did not remain equal.

VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT
DOMESTIC DISPUTE RESEARCH REPORT

DATE	ARRIVAL TIME	DEPARTURE TIME	COMPLAINANT'S FULL NAME	ADDRESS
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CALL UNFOUNDED	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPUTE NOT LOCATED <input type="checkbox"/> REQUESTED NO ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> PROBLEM MISINTERPRETED <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER PLEASE SPECIFY	CHECK ONE AND WRITE IN
----------------	--	--	------------------------

PEOPLE INVOLVED	CHECK ONE		CIRCLE ONE NO OF ADULTS INVOLVED 1 2 3 4 5 6 and over	CHECK AND WRITE IN	
	<input type="checkbox"/> HUSBAND/WIFE (incl Com Law) <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	<input type="checkbox"/> NEIGHBOURS <input type="checkbox"/> LANDLORD-TENANT		<input type="checkbox"/> PARENT-CHILD <input type="checkbox"/> BOY-GIRL FRIEND	CHILDREN PRESENT <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> YES

SITUATION ON ARRIVAL	CHECK ONE	CHECK AND WRITE IN		CHECK AND WRITE IN
	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPUTANTS <input type="checkbox"/> VIOLENT <input type="checkbox"/> AGGRAVATED <input type="checkbox"/> CALM	<input type="checkbox"/> ALCOHOL INVOLVED (COMMENT) <input type="checkbox"/> DRUGS INVOLVED (COMMENT) <input type="checkbox"/> ALCOHOL/DRUGS NOT INVOLVED		

INJURY AND ASSAULT	CHECK AND WRITE IN		TYPE OF INJURY	POLICE OFFICER(S) <input type="checkbox"/> INJURED → <input type="checkbox"/> NOT INJURED	POLICE OFFICER(S) <input type="checkbox"/> ASSAULTED (NO CHARGE) <input type="checkbox"/> ASSAULTED (CHARGED) <input type="checkbox"/> VERBALLY ABUSED
	DISPUTANT(S) <input type="checkbox"/> INJURED → <input type="checkbox"/> NOT INJURED	<input type="checkbox"/> BEFORE POLICE ARRIVED OR, <input type="checkbox"/> WHILE POLICE PRESENT			

FINAL ACTION TAKEN	RESTORED CALM CHECK ONE	MEDIATION CHECK ONE	REFERRAL CHECK ONE AND NAME AGENCY	ARREST CHECK & WRITE IN
	<input type="checkbox"/> RESTORED CALM AND LEFT <input type="checkbox"/> PARTIES WARNED/CAUTIONED <input type="checkbox"/> PARTY ASKED TO LEAVE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	<input type="checkbox"/> PARTIES AGREED TO SOME WAY OF HANDLING THEIR PROBLEM <input type="checkbox"/> PARTIES GIVEN ADVICE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	<input type="checkbox"/> REFERRED TO VPD LIAISON WORKER <input type="checkbox"/> REFERRED DIRECTLY TO SOCIAL AGENCY <input type="checkbox"/> ESCORTED TO SOCIAL AGENCY <input type="checkbox"/> ADVISED AND/OR ESCORTED TO JP <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER REFERRAL	<input type="checkbox"/> SIPP <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER CHARGE (Specify)

INFORMATION FROM DISPATCHER	CHECK YES OR NO FOR EACH ITEM		WHAT OTHER INFORMATION WOULD YOU LIKE TO HAVE HAD BEFORE ARRIVING AT THIS CALL.
	DID THE DISPATCHER TELL YOU 1 WHO MADE THE CALL TO THE POLICE? 2 WHETHER AN ASSAULT WAS IN PROGRESS OR HAD OCCURRED? 3 WHETHER WEAPONS WERE INVOLVED OR AVAILABLE? 4 THE NUMBER OF PERSONS INVOLVED?	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	

OFFICERS PRESENT	P.C. NO	ACCOMPANIED BY P.C. NO	AND COVER CAR	OFFICE USE
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VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT
DOMESTIC DISPUTE RESEARCH REPORT

DATE	ARRIVAL TIME	DEPARTURE TIME	COMPLAINANT'S FULL NAME	ADDRESS
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CALL UNFOUNDED	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPUTE NOT LOCATED <input type="checkbox"/> REQUESTED NO ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> PROBLEM MISINTERPRETED <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER PLEASE SPECIFY	CHECK ONE AND WRITE IN
----------------	--	--	------------------------

PEOPLE INVOLVED	CHECK ONE	CIRCLE ONE	CHECK AND WRITE IN
	<input type="checkbox"/> HUSBAND WIFE (incl Com Law) <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	<input type="checkbox"/> NEIGHBOURS <input type="checkbox"/> LANDLORD-TENANT <input type="checkbox"/> PARENT-CHILD <input type="checkbox"/> BOY-GIRL FRIEND	NO OF ADULTS INVOLVED 1 2 3 4 5 6 and over

SITUATION ON ARRIVAL	CHECK ONE	CHECK AND WRITE IN	CHECK AND WRITE IN
	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPUTANTS <input type="checkbox"/> VIOLENT <input type="checkbox"/> AGGRAVATED <input type="checkbox"/> CALM	<input type="checkbox"/> ALCOHOL INVOLVED (COMMENT) ... <input type="checkbox"/> DRUGS INVOLVED (COMMENT) ... <input type="checkbox"/> ALCOHOL/DRUGS NOT INVOLVED	<input type="checkbox"/> WEAPON INVOLVED → TYPE <input type="checkbox"/> WEAPON NOT INVOLVED

INJURY AND ASSAULT	CHECK AND WRITE IN	TYPE OF INJURY	POLICE OFFICER(S)	POLICE OFFICER(S)
	DISPUTANT(S) <input type="checkbox"/> INJURED → <input type="checkbox"/> NOT INJURED	<input type="checkbox"/> BEFORE POLICE ARRIVED OR <input type="checkbox"/> WHILE POLICE PRESENT	<input type="checkbox"/> INJURED → <input type="checkbox"/> NOT INJURED	<input type="checkbox"/> ASSAULTED (NO CHARGE) <input type="checkbox"/> ASSAULTED (CHARGED) <input type="checkbox"/> VERBALLY ABUSED

FINAL ACTION TAKEN	RESTORED CALM	MEDIATION	REFERRAL	ARREST
	CHECK ONE <input type="checkbox"/> RESTORED CALM AND LEFT <input type="checkbox"/> PARTIES WARNED/CAUTIONED <input type="checkbox"/> PARTY ASKED TO LEAVE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	CHECK ONE <input type="checkbox"/> PARTIES AGREED TO SOME WAY OF HANDLING THEIR PROBLEM <input type="checkbox"/> PARTIES GIVEN ADVICE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	CHECK ONE AND NAME AGENCY <input type="checkbox"/> REFERRED TO VPD LIAISON WORKER <input type="checkbox"/> REFERRED DIRECTLY TO SOCIAL AGENCY <input type="checkbox"/> ESCORTED TO SOCIAL AGENCY <input type="checkbox"/> ADVISED AND/OR ESCORTED TO JP <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER REFERRAL	CHECK & WRITE IN <input type="checkbox"/> SIPP <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER CHARGE (specify)

INFORMATION FROM DISPATCHER	CHECK YES OR NO FOR EACH ITEM	WHAT OTHER INFORMATION WOULD YOU LIKE TO HAVE HAD BEFORE ARRIVING AT THIS CALL.
	1 WHO MADE THE CALL TO THE POLICE? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> 2 WHETHER AN ASSAULT WAS IN PROGRESS OR HAD OCCURRED? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> 3 WHETHER WEAPONS WERE INVOLVED OR AVAILABLE? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> 4 THE NUMBER OF PERSONS INVOLVED? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>

OFFICERS PRESENT	P.C. NO	ACCOMPANIED BY P.C. NO	AND COVER CAR	OFFICE USE
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Despite the precautions taken and the careful instructions to police officers on use and importance of the form, an initially poor and rapidly declining rate of completed forms from the police resulted in the recording period being reduced to the ten weeks 21 March to 31 May 1976.

During this time we estimated from data collected in 1975¹ that 1,012 separate dispatches to domestic calls had occurred. A check on this figure was made by asking the staff at the Vancouver Police Department report centre to count domestic dispatches for one week between March and May. Their estimate of domestic dispatches for one week was 86, or 860 for a comparable ten week period.

The ten week period resulted in fact in only 167 domestic intervention reports. In terms of our estimated total number of domestic dispatches the return rate was 16.5 per cent. Based on the one week "spot check" conducted by the police department during which 17 domestic reports were returned, the response rate was 17 out of 86, or 19.8 per cent. In other words, police officers filed a domestic dispute record in between 16 and 20 per cent of calls attended.

It is worthy of note that a similar piece of research in San Francisco in 1973, where recording slips were used to extract dispute information resulted over a five-month period in a return rate of 11.2⁶ per cent. This low rate was achieved despite a far more elaborate persuasion including training films for patrol officers on the advantages and use of the forms.

Unfortunately, the second and third stages of the design met with similar disappointments. Several attempts were made to gain both access to agency records and effect contact with clients to assess their satisfaction with police behaviour.

Social agency follow-up was resisted strongly by the major agency involved on grounds of violation of client confidentiality. This problem appears as a common one in the other studies of like design attempted elsewhere.

The client satisfaction follow-up failed for different reasons. The intention was for a member of the research team to screen the domestic dispute reports and telephone the complainant requesting an interview, or if cooperation was difficult to achieve, gather some basic information while on the telephone. The researcher made contact from the police department and identified himself as working with the police department. Although there was a possibility of bias entering the responses given, it was felt that we would likely get a higher response if disputants were told the police department was calling than if an unknown research agency called and had also to explain how the disputant's name, and knowledge of the event, was obtained.

Several factors prevented us from pursuing the follow-up as planned. First, in many instances the name of complainant through whom contact was to be effected was not the same as the disputant, and even where it was, the name was not the same as the person under whose name the telephone number was listed. This made tracing the disputant for interview virtually impossible. In a number of cases, the address turned in on the report form was the address of the witness to the dispute and not the address of the dispute. In still other instances, the disputants were visiting relatives or friends at the time of the fight.

Even where it was possible to trace the telephone number, often reported calls failed to reach the disputant. In fact our 167 returns produced eight potential client interviews. Responses to the questions concerning what happened, what advice was given, how did the police handle the situation, etc., were so vague in the successful interviews that this stage of the research was regrettably abandoned.

The data gathered by means of the self-report dispute recording form, then, must be viewed with caution. The low response rate allows only tentative conclusions to be drawn about differences between trained and untrained officers, and in general, the findings should be taken as suggestive of changes and trends rather than being given substantiation of differences in police handling of domestic disputes.

Findings

Domestic Dispute Records

The 167 recording forms were completed by police officers acting singly and in teams of from two to four officers. In 22 cases (13.5%), the police handling the dispute were all graduates of the domestic dispute training course (all trained); in 67 instances (41.1%), none of the police attending had received domestic dispute intervention training (not-trained); and in the remaining 74 cases (45.4%) the teams consisted of trained and not-trained working together (mixed trained and not-trained). Data were missing in four cases. Eight of the police officers were female, all of whom had received Domestic Dispute Intervention training.

It was originally hoped that the analysis of the recording forms would allow speculation about the degree to which Domestic Dispute Intervention training affected the handling of domestics. Unfortunately the small number of cases prevent us from anything other than tentative indications of difference between trained and not-trained in the management of family and other domestic trouble. The data are, however, suggestive of a small change in the directions predicted from the assumptions of Domestic Dispute Intervention training.

Time Taken to Settle Dispute

The over-all average time taken to settle a domestic dispute was 29.4 minutes. There were no differences of significance between all trained teams (32.5 minutes) and not-trained teams (32.2 minutes). Unfortunately the number of disputes analysed was too small to allow a control by type of dispute. These average times compare with a previously calculated average of 31.8 minutes for dispute settlement by police officers prior to Domestic Dispute Intervention training. None of the slight differences noted here suggest any real differences in the time taken. It could be suggested that with an initial low average of about half an hour, there is little room for much time reduction even given the benefits of training.

The time taken is shown in Table 2

TABLE 2
Time Spent on Domestic Disputes

	No. of Disputes	Per Cent
Less than 20 minutes	68	41.7
21 to 40 minutes	61	37.4
41 to 60 minutes	21	12.9
Over an hour	<u>13</u>	<u>8.0</u>
	163	100.0

Higher proportions of the not-trained and mixed teams (75 per cent and 86 per cent respectively) completed their intervention in less than 40 minutes compared with the all trained teams of whom 68 per cent took less than 40 minutes. This finding, contrary to expectations of faster

handling for trained personnel, may be explained by either or both of the following reasons: (1) the trained teams were new to street experience and slow in putting the newly learned techniques of dispute settlement into practice; (2) the nature of the disputes attended by this group required a longer than average time to manage. Numbers were too small to allow this control to be used.

Type of Dispute

Husband-wife disputes constituted 76.5 per cent of the 166 calls for which information was given. Judging by previous analyses of dispatch records which showed that husband-wife calls make up about one third of all domestics, it should appear that police officers were somewhat narrowly defining domestic in these terms for the purposes of recording their actions. Reports were filed for nine neighbour disputes, 13 parent-child disputes, 12 landlord-tenant disputes, three other family problems and two "other" altercations. Most disputes involved two adults (66.7 per cent); three persons disputes accounted for 19.4 per cent of the total number.

In nearly half (49.6 per cent) of the husband-wife disputes, children were present during the police intervention. They were present over-all in 50.6 per cent of all disputes. This proportion is consistent with previous findings. The average number of children present was two, with the range from 33 disputes where only one child was present to two disputes where six children were in attendance. Thirty-eight per cent of the children were under the age of seven years.

In most of the domestic situations attended, the disputants were described as "agitated" (61.1%) as compared with 31.7 per cent of disputes where those involved were "calm" when the police arrived, and 7.2 per cent of situations which were violent when the police arrived.

One third (4 out of 12) of the violent situations ended in the arrest of one of the disputants compared with 12.9 per cent of situations which were calm or agitated on arrival.

In 42 per cent (69 cases) of domestics attended, an injury had occurred prior to the arrival of the police. In three disputes, injuries occurred while police were present. The amount of violence in the disputes is reflected in the pattern of injury which was overwhelmingly bruising, bumps and swellings. Punching, kicking and beating with an object were the most common modes of violence. Incidents of this kind were reported in 44 of 69 injuries recorded (63.8 per cent of injuries). In a further 14 instances, "cuts" and "lacerations" were reported. Among the disputes recorded there was one stabbing, several cases of unspecified "body or head injuries" and two cases of broken nose. Four victims were hospitalized as a result of the dispute.

A wide variety of weapons was reported for the 14.5 per cent of the disputes in which they were used, including kitchen and butcher knives, hammer, rolling pin, handgun, vase, fists, lawn sprinkler, rock, dishes, a table, shovel, and wooden stick. The use of weapons in assaults is fairly low and consistent with findings from Hamilton where less than 10 per cent of assaults involved their use.⁷

The use of alcohol was reported in over two thirds of the domestics attended (68.9 per cent). No one type of domestic was more characteristic of alcohol use than any other. However, the use of alcohol seems to be associated with the outcome settlement of the dispute. (See below.)

There have been many different reports on the degree to which alcohol is identified by police as an impediment to crisis intervention.

Bard and Zacker report results from patrols estimating that there was no use of alcohol by either party to the dispute in about two thirds of the interventions monitored in their research. This finding was consistent over two studies done in 1974 and 1976.⁸

Our own finding, however, is consistent with the results of a large scale study of the domestic assault incident conducted in Oklahoma in 1974 which concluded that alcohol is involved typically in almost two thirds of the assault cases surveyed.⁹ Figures provided by the Hamilton Ontario survey suggest that alcohol does play an important role in the problem with 44 per cent of the offenders identified as intoxicated or having been drinking at the time of the event. It would appear that an objective measurement of intoxication is needed before the disparities between the studies can be clarified. Until then it would seem not unfair to suggest that between one half and two thirds of domestics involve the use of alcohol to some significant degree.

The report forms returned showed there were no cases of injury to police in this period. This finding is consistent with previous research (see Monograph One) and other studies, notably those conducted in San Francisco and the later studies in Norwalk of Morton Bard and associates, which show variance with the oft quoted high rates of police injury and homicide supplied by the FBI. These research findings should not lead to any complacency or scepticism about the danger of domestic intervention. This still remains as the most compelling reason for crisis intervention training. It is the unpredictable outbursts of violence which make this police role so difficult to perform. The lack of police injury reported probably attests more to successful management of the conflict than to an absence of the potential for danger. This is substantiated by the

finding that 28 reports (17.1 per cent) mentioned that officers had been verbally abused, and four reports indicate a physical assault on the officer, which in one instance led to charges being laid. Neither assault nor verbal abuse were reported in 80.5 per cent of these domestics.

Dispute Outcome

Part of the rationale for the establishment of domestic crisis intervention is the facilitation of the diversion of domestic cases from the criminal justice system in those cases where police themselves are unable to mediate a satisfactory solution to the problem. It is possible to conceptualize the intervention mode of the police officer in terms of the outcome for the disputants. The outcomes possible can be simplified on a continuum of police involvement from a minimal intervention, the restoration of calm, through mediation, involving fairly intensive disputant interview and disputant agreement on ways of handling their problem, to referral, and finally, to arrest.

Referral is the last step in the diversionary approaches open to the police officer and invokes the use of other community resources for satisfactory resolution of domestic conflict. Depending on the specific nature of the case, the degree of violence and the legal status of the disputants, arrest may be seen as an undesirable resolution of the problem.

Thus our recording form was set up to allow the police to report what their final action was to resolve the dispute. From these reports we analyzed the degree to which training imperatives were being practiced.

Restoring Calm

Of the 167 disputes recorded, calm was restored in 14 (8.4 per cent) of instances. The action taken under this heading comprised nine cases where the simple presence of police issuing a warning or caution was sufficient to settle the problem. In two of these cases the police were requested to take no action upon arrival at the scene. In the other five cases calm was restored by asking one party to leave. Only one of the cases settled in this manner was described as violent, eight were agitated, and five were calm when the police arrived.

Mediation

Mediation was the outcome in thirty-five disputes (20.1 per cent). In 19 of the mediated cases the parties were brought to a resolution of their problem by police officers guiding the discussion such that the disputants found for themselves a way of handling their trouble. The remaining 16 cases in this category involved the police giving direct advice with a suggested course of action. Here, rather than the disputants leading themselves to a solution, the officer played a more authoritative role.

Referral

Referral to another community resource occurred in a total of 105 disputes attended. It was the only final action taken, however, in 94 instances or 56.3 per cent. That is, in 11 disputes in which one or more parties were referred to other resources, at least one of the disputants was arrested.

Seventy-five per cent of all referrals were made to agencies outside the criminal justice system. The range of referrals is shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3
Referrals of Domestic Disputants

	No. of Referrals
Car 86 -- Mobile police-social worker crisis intervention team	24
Police-social agency liaison worker	12
Direct referral to named agency	14
Vancouver Resources Board Emergency Services	12
Referred to disputant's own worker	4
Other: G.P., psychiatrist, hospital, minister, rentalsman, community care team, etc.	<u>13</u>
Sub-total -- Referrals outside Criminal Justice System	79
Family Court, legal counsel, J.P., etc.	26
Total -- All Referrals	105

It is interesting to speculate from this breakdown of referrals as to whether the police-liaison workers would have had referred to them the 24 cases actually seen by them as participants in the Car 86 mobile service. That 36 out of 79 (45.6 per cent) referrals outside the Criminal Justice System went to essentially the known police department social workers can be seen as comment on two previously reported facts about referrals. One, referrals are best effected between police officers and social workers they personally know and with whom relations of trust and understanding have been built up. Two, police officers favour a referral system in which the least amount of screening and searching for appropriate community resources is involved. Having radio contact with the Car 86 program provided an easy referral outlet for them.

As far as it is possible to estimate from our limited sample of cases, it would appear that the situation on arrival -- calm, agitated or violent -- had little effect on the outcome. Non-significant differences in the proportions of these types of situations ending up as referrals were found.

However, the presence of alcohol as a significant factor in the dispute did seem to affect the outcome. Of the 115 cases in which alcohol was reported 54 or 48.7 per cent resulted in a referral being made. This compares with 32 referrals out of 46 cases (69.6 per cent) where alcohol was not a factor.

The data revealed a tendency for trained teams to use referral more than the "not-trained" teams; 66.7 per cent compared with 58.8 per cent of their calls respectively were referred. However, again the results, whilst indicating a change in the predicted direction, are inconclusive due to small sample size. The mixed teams made a smaller proportion of referrals than both the "all trained" and "not-trained", with 50.6 per cent of their calls cleared by referral.

"All trained" teams referred predominantly outside the criminal justice system with 91.7 per cent of their 16 referrals to social agencies, compared to 65.0 per cent (26 referrals) of "not-trained" teams' referrals directed outside the criminal justice system.

Arrest

The use of arrest was made in 24 of the disputes reported. As noted above, in 11 of these situations a referral was also made. The use of arrest is high given the generally low rate in the resolution of domestic disputes and suggests that the reports received are a somewhat biased sampling of all domestics attended. (We have estimates that the 167 reports constitute between 16 and 20 per cent of all domestics attended during the research period.)

Fourteen of the arrests were made by charging Status Impaired in a Public Place, the "SIPP Strategy". There were four arrests for assault causing bodily harm, one attempted murder, two common assault, one breach of bail, one causing wilful damage and one arrest on a Canada-wide warrant for the husband. Significantly more domestics in which alcohol was involved resulted in arrest, this being the case in 21 of the arrest situations, compared to only three arrests where alcohol was not involved.

The data did not reveal any difference between trained and not-trained teams in their use of arrest, a finding probably due to the small numbers involved in this analysis.

Information Dispatched

An important feature of domestic dispute intervention is for the person receiving the complaint to obtain as much information as possible and then to fully inform the assigned unit. At least information on who makes the call, whether an assault is in progress or had occurred, whether weapons are involved or available, and the number of persons involved, should be obtained and relayed.

Police officers were requested on the recording form to indicate which of the pieces of information were relayed to them, and what other information they would like to have had before arriving at the scene. Information on who made the call to the police was reported as given by the dispatcher in 78.9 per cent of calls; whether an assault was in progress or had occurred was dispatched in 60.9 per cent of calls; information on whether weapons were involved or available was dispatched in 14.5 per cent of calls; and the number of persons involved in the dispute was relayed in 54.2 per cent of calls.

Of the four pieces of information considered minimally necessary for attending officers:

one item of information was relayed in 22.5 per cent of calls,
two items of information were relayed in 30.6 per cent of calls,
three items of information were relayed in 28.7 per cent of calls,
all four items of information were relayed in 8.8 per cent of calls,
none of the four items were relayed in 9.4 per cent of calls.

Generally, the information dispatched is inadequate as judged by the criteria suggested in most domestic dispute intervention training guides and manuals. A fair amount of dissatisfaction with the information received was shown by the requests for information although dissatisfaction was not high. This reflects that police officers were not used to receiving more than they got and did not have high expectations about the degree of detailed description of the event.

Sixty reports (35.9 per cent) indicated that the police officers would have liked more information prior to arriving at the scene than they received. Information on availability or presence of weapons was requested in 14 cases. In 10 instances officers felt that information on the cause of the dispute would have been helpful in their handling of the problem. Seven reports stated that the number of calls previously made by the same complainant would have been helpful. It is not clear, however, whether this request refers to the number of previous complaints, or number of calls made about the same complaint before the unit was dispatched.

Three reports requested information on degree of violence, three wanted to know the relationship of the complainant to the dispute, and three reports complained of inadequate screening which wasted the officer's time. A variety of other comments were made including requests for the number of people involved, the size and weight of

disputants, degree of alcohol use, complaints about inaccurate address and name of complainant, whether the suspect was still present, whether the assault was actually in progress, and on one report, the fact that the complainant was blind and had a very protective seeing-eye dog present.

Information on the number of persons involved in the dispute is especially important for the number of units that need be dispatched to handle the problem. Whilst most training guides recommend that at least a two-officer team should be dispatched to domestic calls, some minor disturbances can be adequately handled by one-officer units, whilst others require back-up units.

The number of police officers attending the disputes for which records were filed, and the number of adult persons involved in the dispute is shown in the table below.

TABLE 4
Number of Police Officers Present and Number of Persons
Involved in the Dispute

Number of Adult Persons Involved in the Dispute	<u>Number of Police Officers</u>				Total Disputes
	One	Two	Three	Four/Five	
One	2	5	2		9
Two	10	47	43	10	110
Three	7	12	12	1	32
Four-Six	2	4	8		14
All Disputes	21	68	65	11	165

As can be seen from the table, of the 21 disputes attended by one officer, 19 of them involved two or more persons. Of the 110 two-person

disputes, 53 of them were attended by three or more police officers. Appropriateness of the number of police to number of disputants cannot be judged solely from the figures presented here, although it is tempting to speculate on whether the use of police manpower would have been different given the collection of good information on number of persons involved.

The figures need to be placed in the context of the situation, and when the violence of the scene is considered, a different interpretation may emerge. For example, of the 12 situations described as violent upon arrival, only one was attended by a one-officer unit. Twenty of the twenty-one disputes attended by one officer were described as either "agitated" (10 cases) or calm (10 cases).

Summary of Findings

Data presented in this report, which was collected from a sampling of requests for police intervention, draws attention to a number of concerns about the way in which communications operators handle citizen requests for service and about the way information is dispatched to police patrol officers. Data gathered by means of the self-report dispute recording form, are of a less conclusive nature. This is due primarily to the generally poor use made of the recording form by the attending police patrols. Unfortunately, the low response rate did not allow the hoped for comparative test between trained and untrained officers to be undertaken. Consequently, only tentative conclusions can be drawn about differences between the groups with respect to time taken to settle a dispute, the use made of social agencies, and, for example, the amount of violence managed and the injuries incurred.

Specifically regarding the outcome of police intervention and social agency referral, there are no data on how often referred parties actually made contact with the agency to which they were referred, no data on client satisfaction, and no information on the appropriateness of police referral practices. There are two main reasons for these gaps in the findings. Firstly, the social agency representatives with whom the researchers were in contact showed an unwillingness to provide information on agency clients and indicated that even such information as whether a given referred individual had been to the agency was confidential and could not be shared with the researchers. Secondly, the follow-up data necessary for an assessment of outcome proved, in most cases, impossible to gather due to difficulties in establishing contact with recipients of police service and inadequate tracking and identifying controls in the research process. It is of only small solace to know that similar studies elsewhere suffered from the same lack of cooperation and control.


Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the following conclusions may be drawn from the data collected. The reader is reminded of the tentative nature of the findings from the recording form survey. They are presented as suggestive of changes and trends rather than being firm substantiation of differences in police handling of domestic disputes.

1. The establishment of Domestic Dispute Intervention training for Vancouver police department officers has not appreciably affected the way in which domestic calls are handled by other members of the department. Notably,
 - (a) there has been no change in the generally unsatisfactory way in which requests for service are screened for police presence; and,
 - (b) officers attending domestics are often dispatched with inadequate information about the dispute and lacking knowledge important to their safety.

2. In the field, trained and untrained officers appear to be able to keep their domestic interventions quite short with an average duration of about half an hour. Training does not seem to have affected this time.
3. Alcohol use by one or more parties to a domestic disturbance appears to be an impediment to the intervention in about one half to two thirds of all disputes attended.
4. Weapons, typically knives, tools and household items, are used in about 15 per cent of the disputes attended. This results in disputant injuries mainly of a minor nature involving mostly bruising, swellings and lacerations.
5. There were no reports of police injury. However, in about two per cent of cases police officers were verbally abused and/or assaulted.
6. Data indicated a tendency for trained teams to use referral to social agencies more than the not-trained teams. The concept of "diversion" was clearly adhered to with 75 per cent of all referrals being made outside the criminal justice system.
7. By and large, police officers utilized a wide range of means for dealing with domestic disputes. The use of alcohol by disputants seemed to inhibit somewhat the use of referral to social agencies.
8. The use of arrest to settle a dispute appears to have been over-reported in this sample of interventions. The fairly high rate is attributed to a possible bias in the kind of dispute for which recording forms were completed.

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DOMESTIC CRISIS INTERVENTION

Monograph 5 - Summary of Findings and Conclusions

Bruce R. Levens

Research Design

Domestic dispute intervention may be seen as having two broad goals:

- (1) improvement of police performance in handling domestic disputes;
- and (2) the longer range goal of reducing the incidence of domestic violence.

The research undertaken here was focussed almost exclusively on the first major goal. The goal of improved police performance can be defined in terms of five broad objectives:

1. To legitimize and routinize police involvement in domestic dispute intervention
2. To increase police understanding of domestic conflict.
3. To improve police control of domestic crises through more efficient handling.
4. To increase the repertoire of police responses to domestic disputes.
5. To change the relationship of the police to the external network of social services and community resources.

In the two year course of the research the original design became modified in accordance with changing circumstances in the delivery of police services in the Vancouver area, and in accord with both difficulties in adapting police department records to the data gathering needs of the project, and problems experienced with certain measures of outcome which were reliant upon social agency and individual disputant cooperation external to the police department.

Essentially, however, the research did not differ drastically from that originally proposed and the evaluation of the above objectives was undertaken by means of the following types of enquiry:

- (a) An extensive review of the literature on domestic crisis intervention by police.
- (b) A case survey analysis of training manuals, teaching guides and other materials used in the education of police officers for crisis intervention.
- (c) Pre-test data gathering by sampling citizen requests for police intervention in domestic disputes at the Vancouver Police Department to ascertain the nature and extent of demand for service and the police response.

- (d) An attitude survey of police officers to assess the degree of "internalization" of training program objectives and test for differences between trained and untrained officers.
- (e) Post-test data gathering to monitor police handling of domestic disputes as a result of crisis intervention training by means of a self-report recording by police of domestic interventions, and follow-up enquiries to social agencies.

Throughout the study draft findings were submitted to an advisory committee comprised of members of the police department, B.C. Police Commission, police academy and the Social Planning and Research Committee of the United Way. Regular meetings with the Vancouver Police Department to discuss findings and fully involve it with the techniques of each stage of the research contributed greatly to the good cooperation received from the department. Only during the final stage of the project were difficulties in data gathering encountered and these stemmed from two sources: (1) sustaining a high response rate from police officers in returning the self-report forms on domestic interventions, and (2) the failure to achieve full cooperation from the key social agencies and the release of information pertaining to the nature and extent of referred disputant-agency contact.

Limitations of the Findings

The original research was designed to provide evaluative feedback on the way in which police officers and social agencies handle citizen domestic dispute problems. This was to be achieved by a survey of citizens who had received police intervention services and a further survey of those who had followed through on referral advice of the police and had contacted a social agency. The latter enquiry was to provide information on both the appropriateness of the police referral (augmented by interviews with agency personnel) and on client satisfaction with social agency treatment of their problem.

Attempts to complete the evaluation process by recording citizen reactions to the interventions were unsuccessful. Telephone contacts to arrange interviews with citizens were almost impossible to make due mainly to their non-availability and the difficulty of tracing telephone numbers. Where contacts were made, only few instances resulted in permission to conduct an interview. Those interviews that were achieved revealed an apparent hesitance on the part of the citizens to respond openly. Answers to our questions were couched in vague, non-committal terms and lacked any meaningful appraisal of either police behaviour or of the social agency's handling of their problem.

Other attempts to gather information on client-social agency contact and referral appropriateness by direct contact with the Vancouver Resources Board, the main agency to which citizens were referred, also resulted in failure. The chief reason for lack of success was the social agency's insistence on close protection of client confidentiality. Despite attempts to negotiate safeguards in respect of confidential information, the agency administrator remained firm in his refusal to pass on data as to whether specified persons had contacted the agency and about the type of assistance given.

Regarding non-cooperation of the Vancouver Resources Board, this stage of the enquiry was unfortunately timed, coming as it did soon after considerable publicity had been given to problems of shared client information between police and social workers. During the testing of a Team Policing project in South Vancouver involving the same agency, workers were accused of not respecting client confidentiality and, understandably, the agency became particularly sensitive to the requests of this research.

It should also be noted, comparing the Vancouver project with similar

research in London, Ontario* where cooperation was excellent, that the involvement of social agencies in the two projects from the outset was very different. The research design in Vancouver was based on the assumptions that the adoption of domestic dispute intervention training by police would include notification to agencies of the changed role of the police and that arrangements for some service coordination activity would be made. In fact, with the exception of some aspects of the independent Team Policing project, no such coordination or agency involvement took place. It was the research team who became the catalysts for police-agency contact in this regard by simple reason of the need to get both bodies to agree to the data gathering procedures. In London, on the other hand, social agencies were involved in the program from the outset, i.e., the service was put into place with an evaluative research component, rather than the research process being instrumental, albeit to a minimal extent locally, in bringing about social agency-police contact.

Finally, a word about police cooperation. As we have noted elsewhere, cooperation from the Vancouver Police Department was generally excellent. Only in one respect did we experience difficulty and that was in achieving a high return of the domestic dispute recording forms. We speculate that this may be in large part due to the non-involvement of in-service police officers in the domestic dispute training resulting in skepticism about the value of such training and the value of the records of interventions that were requested.

Coupled with the reluctance of police officers to spend time on written reports per se, an increasing part of their job, this non-involvement may also have influenced their relations with the trained recruits who probably did not receive peer encouragement to cooperate with this

* Family Consultant Service with the London Police Force.

aspect of the research. Again, in comparison with the London Family Consultant Service, the establishment of the value of the training was, in Vancouver, left very much to the teaching situation in the academy with only a small number of in-service personnel enrolled. In London, by contrast, the value was well publicized through the involvement of all parties concerned in the setting up of the demonstration project.

The difficulties encountered locally in rounding out the research enquiries and the low response to a key data gathering exercise prevented us from addressing adequately some of the research questions. Particularly, we were unable to measure whether there were differences between trained and untrained officers in some aspects of their management of domestic conflict, and unable to assess the degree to which citizen satisfaction with police has been affected by the training. We also regret our inability to assess the outcome of referrals to the social agency network, a component of the entire domestic dispute intervention package so important to both the short and long range goals of the program.

Throughout the research the findings from each stage of the enquiry were published as separate monographs. This summary report attempts to draw together the major conclusions and present an over-all assessment of domestic dispute intervention. In the following pages each of the objectives is summarized, and the findings presented and referenced to the original research monograph. Readers who wish to obtain detailed information should consult these sources. In the detailed presentation of the results in the preceding monographs, cautions on the applicability of the findings have been made where appropriate. The results presented in the following pages therefore should be considered within these contexts.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Objective 1: To legitimize and routinize police involvement in domestic dispute intervention.

Analyses of the functions performed by police in other communities show that between fifty and eighty per cent of time on the job is devoted to what can be described as social service activities (domestic problems, health related activities, missing persons, found and lost property, vehicle accidents, directing traffic, escorting ambulances and fire department vehicles, etc.) as compared with the law enforcement duties usually associated with the police officer's role. Given this breakdown of the work, a two-fold objective of the domestic dispute training program specifically related to one service function but peripherally germane to many other aspects of the total police role, is to demonstrate the necessity for the police to (a) accept their involvement in service functions and (b) to routinize their response to such requests for intervention through the use of procedures and techniques that provide a departmental wide consistent and effective method of handling inter-personal conflict. The research undertaken (1) analyzed requests for service at the Vancouver Police Department to assess the degree to which crisis intervention training was a necessary component of the academy curriculum; and (2) sought to assess the degree of police department commitment to this aspect of the police role.

Findings

Through an analysis of police department records and listening to taped recordings of incoming calls over a period of 174 hours, we found:

1. That 46.6 per cent of calls and 49.3 per cent of patrol officers' time were devoted to "service" rather than "law enforcement" duties.

And further, that one third of the service calls (34.6 per cent) were domestic* calls. (Monograph 1)

2. The calls for police involvement in domestic disputes slowly increase during the afternoons reaching a peak during the later evening and night time. Friday, Saturday and Sunday were the busiest days with a daily average of 44 requests for service compared with a daily average of 38 calls for the rest of the week. Between 4 p.m. and 2 a.m. the Vancouver Police Department can expect two to three times the volume of requests received during the remainder of the 24 hour period. By and large, domestic disputes encountered, then, are a weekend evening phenomenon occurring in all parts of the City of Vancouver (Monograph 1).

3. At the time the training of recruits began, police attended in about 44 per cent of all cases of domestic dispute. Where the request specifically called for police attendance (compared with requests for advice, information, etc.) the probability that the police would attend was 54 per cent. This rate of attendance increased to 58 per cent with the mention of violence in the telephone descriptions callers gave, and to 67 per cent if weapons and violence were mentioned. The findings suggested a call screening mechanism was operating with police attending more of the calls where their unique ability to handle the problems of violence was necessary. However, the analysis also revealed that the screening was not a standardized procedure and evidence of inconsistent response was found. The research also revealed that the calls for which police presence was not considered necessary, that is in 56 cases out of 100, little else was done to assist the caller other than to provide advice of a "philosophical" nature (Monographs 1 and 4).

* For the purpose of this research a domestic dispute was operationally defined as any request for service (both requests for police presence and advice/information) arising out of conflicts occurring in, broadly defined, domestic situations including arguments or fights between husband and wife, partners in a common law relationship, man and woman; parent-child/teenager problems; verbal or physical disputes between relatives or unrelated persons occupying the same household.

4. The degree of involvement in domestic calls for service was found to be encouraging, with evidence showing that the police response probability was not affected by the time of the call. That is, given the necessity of attendance because of the violent nature of the call, there was no decrease in the number of such calls attended during otherwise peak periods of police activity and attention to law enforcement duties (Monograph I).

5. A broad range of interpersonal conflict was covered by our working definition of domestic including husband-wife, neighbour, and landlord-tenant disputes. In the case of husband-wife fights (including men and women living together), which accounted for 34 per cent of domestics, the caller was personally involved in the dispute in 61.5 per cent of cases. In such disputes, it was, overwhelmingly, the female partner to the relationship who called for help. Compared with other types of disputes, husband-wife fights were more likely to be reported by an observer than a disputant. The analysis showed that there was no apparent tendency for the police to respond to any one type of dispute more than another. The participant of action by police was more likely to be the actual occurrence or potential for violence, and the presence of children in a dangerous situation than any one type of conflict relationship. (Monograph I) However, judging by the self-reports turned in by police officers, there was a heavy concentration on husband-wife disputes which may suggest that police tend to see these domestic disputes as more important in warranting the attention of a written report (Monograph IV).

6. Although the police did not appear to apply a rigid differentiation to the type of dispute attended, there was considerable inconsistency in the response actually made to the call. That is, even though the

...or dwelling; disturbances caused by landlord-tenant disputes, neighbour arguments; interpersonal struggles over child custody; violation of separation orders; non-compliance with eviction orders; and "keep the peace" requests for police to attend and stand by in case domestic disputes arose or became violent.

violent call with children present was one of the most likely domestic situations to receive police attention, there were many instances where this combination of factors failed to elicit this response, and where the denial of police interest could not be related to anything other than the interpretative stance of the person receiving the call. Such inconsistency in telephone handling of police requests together with the absence of any telephone assistance in the form of a referral in cases where police were not dispatched further demonstrated the need for closer attention to the training objective of full police commitment to this aspect of their work (Monographs 1 and 4).

7. Unfortunately, full in-service training at the Vancouver Police Department has not taken place. The training focusses almost exclusively on inculcating new members of the force with the correct procedures for encountering domestic situations and does little, beyond intensive training of field supervisors, to involve the in-service personnel and absence of continuing upgrading courses in domestic crisis intervention increases the chances that the training imperatives will be re-socialized in the recruits as they become involved in the traditional work routines as practised and expounded by the "veteran" officers who have not received the crisis intervention training and have not been involved in its development nor in discussions of its necessity (Monographs 2 and 3).

In fact, and to the credit of the training syllabus and teaching, no resocialization took place over the period in question. Measurement of attitudes over four groups of police officers with varying street experience and one of which had not received the training showed that what the trained recruits said they did procedurally to clear domestic calls did not differ with time on the job (Monograph 2).

8. While the literature revealed the existence of middle-management resistance to innovative training programs, we did not discern this opposition in the course of our enquiries although there were, in our opinion, suggestions of lack of an enthusiastic commitment to domestic dispute intervention. We suggest, for example, that the inclusion of other than only patrol personnel in the training program is a very necessary pre-condition for a successful dispute management program. The foremost reasons for this are the need to have the police department's policy on domestic disputes clearly articulated and communicated to all departments, and especially the communications and report centres. Secondly, the evaluation and reward bestowal systems within police departments must reflect the changed emphasis in domestic dispute management from strictly law enforcement approaches to order maintenance social service orientations. Traditional performance criteria for the police, such as number of arrests, etc., are not appropriate yardsticks for crisis intervention aspects of the role. Thirdly, the concept of full commitment should include adequate training of the persons of first contact with the public requesting service, namely those occupying the telephone-operator/receptionist positions in the department (Monograph 3).

9. In sum, the findings suggest that the need for domestic dispute intervention has been established. However, within the period surveyed there was little evidence of the attention to the program components necessary to make full commitment of the police department a reality.

Specifically, this criticism is directed at the way in which the public's requests were handled by the communications operators and dispatch personnel. For example, there had been little change in the system of assigning priority ratings by brief "event code"

descriptions to the domestic situations described by callers. The danger of creating unreal expectations for the attending police officer about the nature of the call, and of leading to inconsistent response policy were particularly noted (Monographs 1 and 2).

Finally, in stressing the objective to full commitment we wish to state our awareness that domestic dispute intervention is but one of many police activities and to state that we are mindful of the danger of viewing this as if it were the most important aspect of the total operation. There is of course this danger. However, we feel that we have not overstressed the importance of full commitment, as we have defined it, if the job of domestic dispute intervention--certainly not an insignificant feature of police work--is to be handled safely, effectively and efficiently.

Objective 2: To increase the police department's understanding of domestic conflict

Closely linked to the previous training objective is the desire to have the police department fully aware of the appropriateness of police involvement in human crises, and more knowledgeable of the varied nature of domestic conflict.

The literature on domestic dispute intervention provides examples of studies which have demonstrated a reluctance of the police to get involved, including studies of hostile attitudes of police officers towards "becoming social workers". Further, the average police officer's conception of the nature of conflict is too often influenced by stereotypical images of the social background of the disputants and the circumstances of the fight, and by the attachment of prognoses of hopelessness in considering the possibility of behavioural changes of disputing families.

Findings

1. The literature suggests a clear appropriateness of police involvement in domestic disputes. This is predicated on their immediate and authoritative response ability; the proper involvement of police given the high potential for violence; and, the development of close working relationships with social service agencies who can relieve the police long-term attention to domestic disputes when the real need for their presence has been dealt with (Monograph 3).

Understanding of this appropriateness was demonstrated among the recruits who received domestic crisis intervention training. Compared with experienced officers who had not received the training, the recruits' scores on feelings of accomplishment in domestic intervention and willingness to get involved in such calls were significantly higher. Further, these differences did not disappear with the street experience of the trained, showing that the program was successful in instilling positive feelings about the appropriateness of police involvement (Monograph 2).

2. Another measure of the degree to which the "helping role" was accepted by police was tapped in the attitude survey. Attitudes towards the role of the social scientist, mental health expert and psychologist as capable of teaching police things that will be useful in their day-to-day functions were found to be generally favourable to the idea, with no differences between trained and untrained officers (Monograph 2).
3. At the level of analysis of the total police department's acceptance of police involvement in domestic issues, however, less favourable findings emerged. Specifically, the person of first contact with incoming requests for service did not appear to have

"internalized" the "helping role" orientation in dealing with the public. This was seen to be largely the result of inadequate training and lack of standardized, consistently applied policy on requests for police intervention in domestic disputes. We found that the training period was generally too short and that length of time on the job did not affect the handling of calls (Monograph 4).

4. It was found that the communications operators' responses to public requests during the period of investigation changed little and were conditioned by a lack of objective criteria for screening the calls, relied on largely unguided subjective interpretations of the legitimacy and circumstances of the request, and varied considerably as between operators dealing with basically similar conflict situations. The results were a less than desirable departmental approach to public requests for service. It was speculated that acceptance of the appropriateness of police involvement should include a mechanism for offering referral advice or other helpful information to callers who are considered, according to a standardized screening and information gathering schema, not in need of police attendance. That is, all calls to the department reporting domestic fights should be treated as serious examples of interpersonal conflict which could erupt again or escalate in severity, even though at the time police presence is not considered necessary. Strong emphasis should therefore be placed on including communications operators in aspects of domestic crisis training and with equipping them with good, updated knowledge of local community resources (Monographs 3 and 4).
5. Regarding police officer attitudes towards people involved in domestic conflict, a generally inconclusive result was achieved. Attitude tests relating to the teaching of an emphasis on the widespread nature of domestic crises, that they are not necessarily

confined to one segment of the population, and are not necessarily a sign of inferior character, showed no significant differences between groups and no extreme scores on the semantic differential. Either the police tested believe that all kinds of people get involved in domestic disputes or else they experienced evaluation apprehension and reacted by choosing fairly neutral alternative answers to the scale items.

On one scale item, however, differences between trained and untrained officers were significant. Trained officers, in contradistinction to the untrained, did not agree that couples who fight would be better living apart. The attitude that couples who fight should be apart often adversely affects the police demeanour and methods of clearing domestic disputes (Monograph 2).

Objective 3: To improve control of police officers' handling of domestic crises.

This training objective mainly refers to the actions of police officers upon arrival at the domestic situation. Evidence in the literature shows that domestic dispute situations are an all-pervasive aspect of the police officer's job, are unpredictable and dangerous, are responsible for a large proportion of injuries sustained by police, are excessively time consuming, and are often difficult to handle due to the use of alcohol by disputing parties. The research undertaken sought to establish the applicability of these claims to the British Columbia experience and assess the achievement of the training in improving police control over these factors.

Findings

1. The fact of the widespread nature of domestic conflict as fully documented in the literature led originally to the adoption of a

training and implementation model suited to the need for all patrol personnel to be trained. The generalist model chosen recognizes that all officers will occasionally find themselves in domestic dispute situations, and that the volume and geographical distribution of the requests for intervention precludes the model of a small specialist squad being able to respond effectively to the need.

Another dimension of the training model chosen was an emphasis on police procedure rather than a heavy input in the training on social-psychological and social work theory of crisis intervention. It is very likely that this focus on action skills made the program readily acceptable to police, displacing concerns that they were being turned into social workers. Steering the training away from attempting to impart social work intervention techniques and towards crisis management in the sense of diffusing interpersonal conflict without dispensing psychotherapy is one generally advocated in the literature (Monograph 3).

Local data supported the pervasiveness of domestic disputes, and the other aspects of the generalist-procedural model made it an appropriate one for adaptation to an academy curriculum serving many municipal police forces of varying size and geographical jurisdictions (Monograph 1).

2. It has been stated over and over again that one of the most hazardous assignments a police officer receives is dealing with family quarrels and other interpersonal disturbances. The number of police officers killed and injured responding to disturbance complaints is a very potent reason for attempting to improve police control of domestic dispute situations. Canadian statistics on homicide and police officers killed on duty also attest to the high risks of danger in this facet of police work (Monograph 1).

The highly unpredictable nature of the domestic dispute provides the greatest problem in controlling such situations. Family crises can require a tough "law enforcement" response (when an assault occurs in the officer's presence), or an "order maintenance" response (where the emotionally upset disputant requires sensitive counselling and assistance). While these two response patterns are often incompatible, police enter a domestic dispute in most instances without knowing which approach will be necessary. The officer attending the call has to adjust his response at a moment's notice.

When tested, trained and untrained police officers agreed that they were more likely to get hurt dealing with domestic situations. The job is clearly perceived as dangerous, but especially by those who have not received the training. One might speculate that the training was capable of instilling confidence in the officer regarding his ability to handle the danger compared with the untrained police (Monograph 2).

Our findings on the level of violence in domestic situations came from two sets of data. In the first instance, prior to the training, police department "family trouble" file reports showed that violence had taken place in 45.3 per cent of the disputes on which written reports had been made (Monograph 1). Later findings from both trained and untrained officers reporting on a wider variety of disputes described the disputants as "agitated" in 61 per cent of interventions and "violent" in 7.2 per cent when the police arrived. In 42 per cent of the domestic disputes attended, an injury had occurred prior to the arrival of the police. In 14.5 per cent of disputes, weapons, including knives, a hammer, a handgun, and sundry household items, were used to inflict injury on participants to the conflict (Monograph 4).

The presence of, or potential for, violence and the unpredictable nature of the domestic dispute remains the key factor to control as far as possible in the training program. Particularly important in this regard is the often quoted possibility of police intervention actually exacerbating the situation. Unskilled interventions creating iatrogenic violence, whilst not observed or reported in our own empirical study, is nevertheless well documented in the literature (Monograph 3). The training program is designed to lessen this possibility by dealing with non-verbal communication, proxemics, and neutral mediation. The specific effects of this training component were not measured. However, there was a general agreement among those tested that the instruction increased the trained recruits' satisfaction with their performance in domestic interventions (Monograph 2).

3. A training objective in the improvement of control over domestic situations is to limit the time police officers spend on this aspect of their work. The literature reports a wide range of times spent by untrained officers attending domestic disputes, and suggests a goal of an average of twenty minutes for a trained intervention.

Early estimates of the time spent by Vancouver Police Department officers gave an average of 31.8 minutes. In the follow-up data gathering on trained and untrained officers the average time was 29.4 minutes, showing no significant differences either between pre- and post-test or between trained and untrained in the post-test stage. There was, however, a difference in the range of times taken between the "before training" and "after training" measurements. Before the training 28.7 per cent of interventions took in excess of 40 minutes to clear compared with 20.9 per cent taking this long after training (Monographs 1 and 4).

4. Another important aspect of controlling domestic disputes concerns the degree to which alcohol use by disputants impedes the management of the conflict and affects the method of clearing the incident.

The degree to which alcohol use is a factor in domestic disputes has been subject to conflicting reports in the literature. Some early studies place the incidence of alcohol use very high, but some recent studies have shown that in only 1/3 to 1/2 of all disputes did one or both disputants appear to have used it (Monographs 1 and 3).

It has also been shown that untrained police over-estimate the incidence of alcohol use in family fights and that these estimates drop when crisis intervention training is established. Our own evidence tends to support this contention. Experienced officers who had not received the training perceived a significantly higher incidence of alcohol usage and a significantly greater impairment of their handling and control of domestic crises than did trained recruits (Monograph 2). The training objective of instilling in recruits an awareness of and feeling for the control they have in these situations appears to have been accomplished.

From our own self-report survey of domestics, the use of alcohol was reported in about two thirds of the disputes attended. No one type of dispute was more characteristic of alcohol use than any other. How "alcohol usage" is measured, of course, contributes to the disparities revealed in the research on this topic. The self-report on domestic interventions used in Vancouver merely requested a simple check mark if alcohol was detected, leaving it to the police officer to decide without guidelines as to the degree of intoxication that should be present to warrant this being recorded.

Judging by the accompanying comments on the recording form, it is not unfair to conclude that between one half and two thirds of domestic disputes involve the use of alcohol to some significant extent.

In clearing the dispute call it was found that the use of alcohol did affect the disposition made. Of 115 cases in which alcohol was reported 48.7 per cent resulted in a referral to a social agency compared to 70 per cent receiving this action where alcohol was not a factor. This was not explained by a difference between trained and untrained officers.

Whilst the training, then, has influenced officer perception of the presence of alcohol as a factor affecting their handling of domestics, it appears that when it comes to the situational decision of whether or not to refer the disputant to a social agency, the fact of alcohol usage persuades against the efficacy of this action (Monograph 4).

5. The above findings have been presented to demonstrate the degree to which police officer control over domestics has been changed by the training in crisis intervention given to patrol personnel. Another aspect of control, and one which relates directly to the need to reduce the unpredictability of such calls, concerns the content of the dispatch message.

Early data gathering for this study revealed that the modal priority assigned to a domestic dispute call was a priority two in a three dimensional rating. The system of assigning priorities and the use of "event code" numbers with shorthand event labels seemed largely responsible for a multiplicity of descriptions and different priorities for action being given to essentially similar situations (Monograph 1).

The important points made in this regard are that, firstly, police officer safety and their plans for intervention are dependent to a large extent upon the information received over the radio. That is, radio transmissions lacking full contextual descriptions of the event and couched in shorthand label terms may well create a perceptive set misleading to the attending police officer. Secondly, the public get a less than satisfactory service: some cases receiving a quick response, others of a similar nature being placed on low priority for police action.

During the course of the research project the Vancouver Police Department instituted a "911 emergency call" system. However, during the time of data collection no appreciable change occurred in the method of describing domestic disputes and dispatching patrol personnel. Content analysis of the calls often failed to reveal significant reasons for similar requests for intervention receiving quite different priority ratings.

Our observations led to the conclusion that insufficient information was being recorded and relayed to attending officers. Further, that when police officers were asked to record their satisfaction with the information received, 35.9 per cent of reports indicated that the officers would have liked more information prior to their arrival on the scene. Particularly, information on the presence or use of weapons, number of persons involved, and details of the assault were requested (Monograph 4).

6. The literature and training manuals reviewed for the study indicate a crucial role for the telephone operators and dispatch personnel. Four basic rules emerged to guide the assignment of a unit:
 - (1) Before assigning a unit, obtain as much information as possible from the caller on:
 - Who made the call, number of people involved;

- Where the call is made from and whether the offender is on the scene;
 - Whether an assault is in progress or threatened, how violent is the dispute;
 - Whether a weapon is involved, available, mentioned or suspected.
- (2) Keep the caller on the telephone as long as possible to obtain a complete narration of the events to determine if changes in the situation are occurring.
 - (3) Inform the assigned officer if the dispatcher is unable to obtain a clear or complete description of the situation.
 - (4) If a fight is in progress or there is an indication of violence, cover cars should be dispatched with the assigned unit.

The training goal of improved control was not enhanced by the handling of the collection and relay of call information. The training literature reviewed suggests that descriptions of events should provide as much contextual information as possible. This allows (a) determination of the legitimacy of the call (b) provides the basis for telephone assistance and referral where screening suggests police presence is not appropriate, and (c) gives a full preparation to the attending officer lessening to some degree the unknown and unpredictable nature of the disturbance (Monograph 3).

7. In the attention of the police department to the control of domestic situations, one additional finding is of importance. Frequently the pattern of domestic violence is one of repeat calls to the police for assistance. Often, other studies have found, the same individuals will be involved in domestic disputes requiring police intervention. An early warning status has been ascribed to some of these calls, where subsequent data has demonstrated that domestic homicides are sometimes the results of a long history of domestic assaults to which police have been called.

In order to adequately monitor this process, and to provide additional information to the attending officer in the form of whether the disputants are known to the police, an adequate recording system needs to be established. We found that the record keeping system at the Vancouver Police Department, while serving traditional policing needs, could be improved to cater to the dual function of providing information for the use of dispatchers and keeping a record for follow-up social agency action and monitoring the pattern of domestic dispute over time (Monograph 1).

Objective 4: To increase the repertoire of police responses to domestic disputes.

Traditional modes of domestic crisis management for the intervening police officer have for the most part been those of removing the offending, violent party from the dispute for sufficient time to allow a cooling off. The way in which this has been achieved varies from police officer to police officer, and from department to department. The range of ploys has included persuading the assaulting person to leave the premises, and then (when alcohol is involved) sometimes charging him/her with being intoxicated in a public place; provoking an assault on the officer so that the offender can be arrested and thus removed from the scene; and, spending inordinate amounts of time simply being on hand and attempting to calm a violent situation, only to be called back to the scene, often the same night, when the disturbance flared up again.

The domestic dispute training objective of increasing the officer's skills and recourses in the management of interpersonal conflict places an emphasis on efficient interviewing techniques so that the police officer can decide the action most suited to the particular situation.

Such action includes mediation of the problem and referral to community resources. These particular responses (a) divert the disputants from the criminal justice system, and (b) reduce the chances of further calls on police for intervention by either improving the disputants' appreciation of their problem or putting them in touch with a community resource suited to their needs.

Findings

1. Results of our attitude survey of trained and untrained police officers showed that both groups estimated the same low use of arrest as a means of handling domestic disputes. This finding was consistent with other research which demonstrated that crisis intervention training did not seem to reduce the number of people police officers are likely to force into involvement with the criminal justice system. Irrespective of the training, it seems that arrest as a police response is used infrequently and as a last resort (Monographs 2 and 3).

2. At variance with this finding was the result achieved from the self-reports on domestic interventions conducted following the attitude survey. The use of arrest was made in 24 of the 167 disputes reported. This is considerably higher than the six to seven per cent estimate of the extent to which arrest is used as stated in the attitude survey. We suspect for this and other reasons that the self-reports we received are a biased sample of all domestics attended. One datum confirmed, however, was that there was no difference between trained and untrained officers in the use of this mode as reflected by our returns (Monograph 4).

3. Some evidence of the achievement of the diversionary goal of the training and support for the use of an increased repertoire of responses, however, was obtained from the analysis of both attitude survey and self-reports on the use of referral to community resources.

The recruits who had received domestic crisis intervention training stated they were more likely to negotiate a settlement of the problem (mediation), more likely to suggest that the disputants contact a social agency or outside social worker (referral), and less likely to suggest that the disputants contact a Justice of the Peace (diversion) than were the experienced, untrained police officers (Monograph 2).

Reporting on the actual use of these modes of dispute settlement, police officers restored calm in eight per cent of the instances, mediated a solution in 20 per cent of disputes, and referred to another community resource in 46 per cent of interventions. Seventy-five per cent of all referrals were made to agencies outside the criminal justice system.

The data revealed a tendency for trained officers to use referral more than the not-trained officers. However, the results while indicating a change in the expected direction are inconclusive due to small sample size and possible unrepresentativeness of the cases reported to the total number of domestics attended (Monograph 4).

4. An interesting finding in the use of referral as a disposition is that police officers generally were found to hold negative attitudes about social agencies. Particularly, lack of feedback, lack of agency follow-up and lack of late night service availability was

responsible for the negativism. Further, there was a significant trend amongst trained recruits to become more negative about social agencies with time on the job (Monograph 2).

Further analysis of the referrals revealed that nearly half of the referrals that were made outside the criminal justice system went to the known police department liaison social workers. This supports the evidence from the literature that referrals are best effected between police and social workers personally known to each other between whom relations of trust and understanding have been built up.

In other words, we found that most police complaints referred to bureaucratic problems with agencies (procedure for contact, hours open, etc.). Most praise was reserved for actions of social workers, and this finding was supported by actual practice (Monographs 2 and 4).

5. Given the antipathy towards social agencies, the experiences of other training programs were reviewed in an attempt to identify the components of a successful case referral system. The literature, as well as the experience of the Vancouver program suggests that effecting "good referrals" may well be the one most difficult aspect of police involvement in domestic dispute settlement.

The factors found to have been associated with the components of good referral were:

- (a) The existence of a comprehensive directory of essential numbers with complete agency service descriptions.
- (b) The client must be informed of the reason for referral. Such referral advice must be seen as a support function rather than an instrument of social control.

- (c) Police should develop a cadre of contacts so that clients can be referred to a named individual.
- (d) A simple written documentation of the referral should be made out, and a copy of it should accompany the person referred. The client is thus left with something more positive than just a suggestion that he/she visits an agency for help.
- (e) Agencies should be encouraged to give immediate attention to police-referred individuals. Police-referred clients placed on waiting lists until time is available in a worker's case-load have a high incidence of dropout.
- (f) Most of the training programs reviewed which reported successful referrals stressed the need for the social agency to communicate the results of the referral back to the referring officer. This not only increases the job satisfaction of the police officer, but provides continuous information on the appropriateness of his referral actions (Monograph 3).

Objective 5: To change the relationship of the police to the external network of social services and community resources.

It is a firm notion of the training program that police ability to cope with domestic crises is greatly improved by close cooperation with social agencies. In fact, a major orientation of the instruction is concerned with fostering relationships with social workers in order to routinize the referral process as well as to approach the achievement of the long range goal of reduced domestic conflict.

The study reviewed the relationship between police and community resources and found that the degree of collaboration between the systems in Vancouver was an encouraging aspect of the crisis intervention program.

The existence of many aspects of cooperation that were identified in the literature as conducive to forging links between the systems are, to varying degrees, in evidence locally. The following highlights the aspects of cooperation reviewed during the project including the main points of concern.

Findings

1. The literature revealed a variety of different methods of police-social agency cooperation. Nowhere, however, did we find examples of what has been most often written about in the social work journals over the past decade, namely, integrated services. Following the arguments presented which outlined the components of cooperation, it would appear that the exchange of resources between police and social agencies that are necessary to increase the police response repertoire is probably best achieved by case coordination within a federated rather than an integrated structure (i.e., collaborative system without centralized decision making) (Monograph 3).

This collaborative arrangement brings the law enforcement and social agency systems regularly together at the line level and allows for communication and exchange with minimal threat to the sovereignty of either system. Such a method of cooperation is being tested in the team policing program in Vancouver.

2. One method for achieving the above involves the seconding to the police department of social workers to act in a liaison and advisory capacity between the systems as well as in a direct service role. Our review and examination of the role of liaison workers applauds the approach but suggests that an expanded concept of the job is necessary. We suggest that the liaison worker should be the key

individual in referral screening (community resources advisor to patrol and receptionist personnel in the police department); intake-outreach services (intake of police referrals in certain cases and effecting active outreach of agency services to those in need); feedback of information to police officers on outcome of referrals; facilitator role to encourage police-social worker interface; linkage of the systems through formal and informal mechanisms; handling public enquiries of a social work nature for the police; helping police record and track habitual requests for intervention; and, maintaining regular, close ties with agency and professional colleagues to update knowledge and maintain occupational orientations (Monograph 3).

3. An underlying issue in the attempt to bring social workers and police into a closer working relationship is the philosophical differences between them as reported in the literature. It has been suggested that, typically, police adhere to a different view of crime causation, to a different philosophy of social control and punishment, and to a different attitude towards victim and perpetrator in interpersonal conflict. Many studies have identified the "punitiveness" of the police compared with the "leniency" of the social worker; the police as rigid, conservative and forceful compared with the flexible, liberal and sympathetic approach of the helping professional.

The issue of police-social worker conflict and of the impact of occupational stereotypes on behaviour is a complex one that has often been oversimplified. There is, however, sufficient evidence to show real differences and the degree to which these are entrenched will have profound implications for cooperative working relationships. Some suggestions for a fuller appreciation of each other's roles and abilities, including a realistic appraisal of what social workers and social therapy can achieve, and what

police officers' authority and training will allow, through a system of exchange and joint training activities has proven effective in other communities. Such training at present is not a part of the local operation (Monograph 3).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We have argued from the literature and from our findings and observations locally that a domestic dispute intervention program will be expected to deal with a complex, multifaceted demand for service. This demand and the services to be supplied, simply put, will embrace at least the following:

1. A highly frequent call on police time to cope with the ever present potential for violence in domestic disturbances. This suggests that the police, however well developed the social service resources in a community, must continue to be regarded as the first line interventionists. A training program is called for which emphasizes (i) police safety (ii) quick police availability (iii) effective dispute management (iv) referral assessment, and (v) links to the social agency network.

We have argued that the generalist-procedural training approach satisfied in large part the needs outlined. But in order for the approach to be maximally effective there must be a sustained interface between police and the social service network (a) to continually update police on available resources (b) to provide feedback to police on referral appropriateness and disposition of cases (c) maintain a recording of services to and contacts with habitual disputants, and (d) to foster, where appropriate, systematic case coordination and case conference. The Vancouver program has, in the liaison worker role, the beginnings of this type of cooperation. An expansion of the number and of the role would enhance further the development of an ideal type of cooperation.

2. A systematic response to the many requests for police intervention is required. Not all calls to the police are crisis situations requiring immediate police attendance. However, to guard against dismissing legitimate calls as unworthy of police presence, and of leaving other callers requesting information and advice unsatisfied, there is a need for a comprehensive approach to crisis intervention. This means, in large part, the continuing training of police telephone operators and dispatch personnel to systematically screen requests for service, and advise on the existence and availability of community resources. With the maintenance of good records, in addition, the persistent dispute situations could be identified and outreach social work delivered even where the immediate problem did not seem to warrant police presence. This approach may both help prevent escalation of the domestic problem and help reduce calls on the police.

We found this aspect of the crisis intervention program lacked the total commitment of the police department and the investment in training and resources necessary to do a good job.

3. The nature of some domestic disputes is such that police intervention, mediation and referral will not be sufficient to adequately deal with the problem at hand. The immediate availability of helping professionals, on call to the police, for those requiring on the spot crisis counselling is also required. This need can be catered to by the existence of a mobile service, a flying squad approach, with social workers in constant radio contact with the police.

In Vancouver, the development of this approach began quite independently of this evaluation study. Two teams of social workers, one specifically concerned with mental health problems, now operate in radio contact with police. In addition, inter-agency

discussions on after hours service coordination is progressing in the form of an advisory committee convened by the city social planning department.

There is much still to be achieved to fulfil the objectives of the domestic dispute intervention program as outlined in these pages. Some areas of this service by police and the social service network are more developed than others. Our findings suggest, in sum, that the areas of program under-development should be made known to the responsible authorities so they then receive immediate attention.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The policy implications of domestic dispute intervention by police can be summarized, from the perspective of this research study, as falling into three main categories: implications for the law enforcement agency, for the social service system, and for the criminal justice system in general.

Implications for law enforcement

The adoption by police of domestic dispute intervention as a rationalized procedure that will be taught specifically to patrol personnel has implications for many aspects of police departmental policy.

1. It implies an expanded and changed role for law enforcement officers and the police department civilian personnel. Particularly, the social service aspect of the job will become a regularized procedure. For the efficient operation of crisis intervention this will have ramifications beyond patrol and receptionist personnel to other divisions at all levels of command.

2. The training has implications for more than the handling of purely domestic crises. Skills taught in the course are applicable in a variety of other police-citizen interactions. Emphasis on communication, safety, interviewing and affective neutrality will improve the professional skills and image of the police.
3. Recruitment of personnel and the assignment of tasks within the police department will be affected by the need to retain closer links to the social service system. There is a need for more social workers within the police department performing liaison worker roles as outlined in this project.
4. Dispute intervention training provides police officers with a broader range of responses to an aspect of their job traditionally looked upon negatively. Establishing a generalist-procedural model gives recognition to domestic dispute management as a legitimate role for the police.
5. The program establishes a new relationship between law enforcement and the social service system which could both increase the effectiveness of the police and in the long range reduce the call on police for intervention in domestic issues.
6. The increase in interaction between police and social workers will have ramifications for police department ethics and professional obligations, and bring the police further into the arena of social service development in the community.
7. Consistent response to citizen requests for service could in the short term increase demand for police attention to domestic problems. The police must create realistic expectations about their involvement, so that with the passage of time, the public becomes aware of the jurisdiction of the police and the existence of additional social service assistance in the community.

8. A continuing examination of the whole category of domestic disputes, with improved recording and social service feedback procedures, should allow police to develop a better understanding of the characteristics of violent situations and those requiring only a social service response. In addition, this increased knowledge of disturbance calls (violent and non-violent) and the effectiveness of different dispositions will allow the emergence of a clearer definition of the police role in relation to domestic disputes.

9. The social service role of the police raises questions about the value of such work, e.g., its ability to reduce the recidivism of disputes thus freeing police time for attention to other functions. The effective performance of the social service role also has implications for the reward and promotion policies within the police system.

Implications for the social service system

The growth in police-social services system interaction which will result from the establishment of the program has implications for the social service system as well as for individual workers in the social agency network.

1. A closer working relationship between law enforcement and social work may enable greater trust and mutual understanding to develop, which in turn may lead to a more positive appreciation of each other's role in the totality of community resources.

2. There will be a need for social services to modify their hours of operation to respond effectively to the needs of the law enforcement system as the first hand contact with domestic crises. Providing adequate "after hours" support services to police interventions will increase the number of persons served. The result could be an additional strain on community resources.

3. The social service system and the police will need to develop communications channels which allow case coordination activities to take place without the destruction of client expectations about confidentiality and social workers concerns about privileged information.
4. Social workers and social agency administrators will need to recognize police officers as legitimate casefinders and acknowledge their ability to initiate contact between citizens and community resources. This implies social worker realization of their duty to follow through on referrals and notify the police officer of the outcome of the contact.
5. The social service system will need to work closely with police in the training of police officers and civilian communications operators, and in the provision of up to date information on available resources.
6. The social service system must be prepared for increased costs to provide round the clock emergency services, flying squad personnel for immediate crisis counselling situations, and increased numbers of social workers to work with police in liaison roles.

Implications for the criminal justice system

The wider implications of domestic dispute intervention for the criminal justice system in general include the following:

1. Early intervention and an increased use of social agency resources to deal with domestic disputes will inaugurate a diversionary trend away from the criminal justice system.

2. The change towards a police management of domestic conflict which de-emphasizes coercive, expedient or legalistic solutions to crisis situations may have eventual ramifications for the way the courts handle domestic cases brought before them. A diversionary trend at the pre-prosecution level with referrals from the courts back into community resources with involvement of the police liaison workers and ongoing monitoring of the dispositions may ensue.

3. The role of the police in the enforcement of family court orders may be changed in light of a different approach to the management of domestic conflict by police responding to original complaints.

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