_____ **Research Report** _____

Examining the Needs and Motivations

of Canada's Federally Incarcerated

Radicalized Offenders

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2014 Nº R-344

Examining the Needs and Motivations of Canada's Federally Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders

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March 2014

Acknowledgements

Executive Summary

Key words: *terrorism, radicalized offender, counter-terrorism, risk-factors, rehabilitation*

The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) strives to contribute to the safety and security of society through identifying and addressing the criminogenic needs and criminal motivations of the federally incarcerated offender population. While much is known about the needs of the general offender population, there exists significantly less empirical evidence concerning the needs of those federally-sentenced individuals motivated by ideology: radicalized offenders. This paper seeks to examine and understand the specific motivations and needs of federally incarcerated radicalized offenders, with the ultimate goal of contributing to an evidence-based approach to effective correctional interventions for these offenders.

Using data from the Offender Management System (OMS) as well as information coded from various sources, motivations (ideological and non-ideological) and needs (criminogenic and other violent extremist) of a sample of radicalized offenders were examined.

Results indicated that 30% of radicalized offenders had purely ideological motives for their actions, 17% were purely motivated by criminal (non-ideological) drivers, and 53% held both ideological and non-ideological motivations for their crimes. The most common ideological motivations included a desire for political change, and a desire to respond to a group grievance. Non-ideological motivations were most frequently identified as the desire for material gain and the desire for friendship. Those radicalized offenders who committed the more serious acts in the definition of radicalized offender (commit or conspire to commit a violent act) as well as those who were seen as leaders of the group were more frequently identified as having purely ideological motivations.

Assessment of criminogenic needs via the Dynamic Factors Identification and Analysis (DFIA) and its revised version (DFIA-R) revealed that a high proportion of radicalized offenders were identified to have needs in the associates, attitudes, and personal/emotional domains and a low proportion were identified to have needs in the areas of substance abuse and community functioning. These differences were more pronounced when ideologically-motivated offenders were examined separately, indicating that perhaps the needs and motivations of non-ideologically motivated radicalized offenders are more similar to those found in the non-radicalized, general offender population. Similar differences were found when examining the presence of other violent extremist specific needs in the sample of radicalized offenders, where ideologically motivated radicalized offenders held many more of the violent-extremist specific needs than did non-ideologically motivated radicalized offenders.

This study allowed for a greater understanding of radicalized offenders motivations and needs, while providing CSC with further evidence that can be used in its considerations of how to intervene and case manage this population of offenders in the future.

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Introduction

The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) strives to contribute to the safety and security of society through identifying and addressing the criminogenic needs and criminal motivations of the federally sentenced offender population. The domains of risk and need have benefited from a significant amount of theoretical work (see Andrews, Bonta, & Hoge, 1990), affording CSC tools such as the Offender Intake Assessment (OIA) process with which to address the needs of the general offender population in an evidence-based manner (Motiuk, 1997, 1998). However, there exists significantly less empirical evidence concerning the needs of those federally-sentenced individuals motivated by ideology: radicalized offenders. This paper seeks to examine and understand the specific motivations and needs of federally incarcerated radicalized offenders, with the ultimate goal of contributing to an evidence-based approach to effective correctional interventions for these offenders.

CSC refers to federally incarcerated violent extremists as radicalized offenders, defined as "an ideologically motivated offender, who commits, aspires or conspires to commit, or promotes violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives" (Correctional Service Canada, 2012b)[1]. Likewise, section 83.01 of the Canadian Criminal Code (CCC) refers to ideological motivation in its definition of terrorism, outlining that terrorism includes "an act or omission, in or outside Canada, that is committed (A) in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause…" (CCC, 1985). Both definitions imply that the acts of these offenders are motivated not by traditional criminal impetuses, but by ideologically driven purposes. However, the extent to which these types of motivations differ, overlap, or exist in radicalized offenders is unknown.

Criminal motivation, in general, has historically been the focus of significant theoretical and empirical examination. The shift from the early classical criminal behaviour theories to more recent positivist criminological and psychological approaches brought about much discussion regarding the individual-level motivations behind criminal behaviour (see Weiner, 1992 and Farrington, 2005 for a review). While some feel that the infinite number of motivations for criminal behaviour can only be inferred and cannot be proven directly (Leonard,

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[1] See Stys, Gobeil, Harris, & Michel (in press) for a summary of definitional challenges related to violent extremism and radicalization.

2001), others have strived to qualitatively and quantitatively examine and categorize these motivations. In his summation of several longitudinal studies on crime and criminality, Farrington (1993) categorized criminal motivations into four main groupings: financial motive (the desire for goods or money), compliance motive (the desire to please or impress others or to give in to peer pressure), excitement motive (the desire for stimulation and excitement), and provocation motive (the desire for self-protection, control, and release of anger and hostility). Other research has outlined similar classifications, incorporating among common criminal motivations the desire for thrill and excitement (Helmus, 2009; Munton et al, 2011), the desire for social status and/or friendship (Hafez, 2006; Mullins, 2012; Munton et al, 2011), the desire for religious rewards (such as going to heaven or fulfilling a divine mandate; Gunaratna, 2005; Hegghammer, 2006), the desire for financial reward (Boyce & Cotter, 2013; Cragin et al., 2006), the desire for a sense of identity or purpose (Lloyd, 2012; Munton et al., 2011), and as a desire for release or opportunity to be violent (Munton et al., 2011).

More recently, efforts have been made to identify the specific motivations driving violent extremist behaviour, including ideological motivations. Attempting to understand more about ideological motivations, Cook and Lounsbery (2011) grouped the ideologies of 176 terrorist organizations from around the world in operation between 1990 and 1994 into one of four categories: anti-establishment, political, religious fundamentalist and single issue. They found anti-establishment and political ideologies were far more common than the other two ideologies held by the terrorist groups.

In a review of the literature on the factors leading to violent extremism, Helmus (2009) categorized motivations into four groups: desire to be party to social groups, desire for rewards, desire to respond to grievances, and passion for change. Passion for change and desire to respond to grievances are primarily comprised of ideological motivations such as a duty to defend against an attack on a collective identity, religious change, political change, and single-issue change (e.g., environmental, abortion, etc).

However, Horgan (2008) points out that asking *why* an individual became involved in violent extremist activity may reveal more about his/her organization's ideological propaganda than their actual individual-level motives for taking part in the extremist activity. Indeed, violent extremists may be motivated to participate in violent action for reasons other than, or in addition to, ideology, with several studies highlighting this propensity for multiple sources of motivation.

A rapid evidence assessment concluded that both material and non-material rewards has provided motivation in Al-Qaeda inspired violent extremism (Munton et al., 2011), while another examination of members within violent extremist organizations found it possible to group individuals as the ideologue, the basic needs (combatant), the criminal, the pragmatist, the soldier, or the follower based on motivations (Barrett, 2011). Similarly, research has found that only a subset of the offenders within the British correctional system who have been involved in terrorist activities were found to be solely ideologically motivated (Lloyd, 2012).

Regardless of the type of motivation, the underlying elements - the elements that must be addressed in order to prevent further future criminally or ideologically motivated acts - are needs (Farrington, 2003). Maslow (1954), in his hierarchy of needs, describes the significance of the desire for the satisfaction of needs and the impact that this has on motivation toward subsequent behaviour. More recent theorists have empirically assessed the relationship between needs and criminal activity specifically. In their examination of the psychology of criminal conduct, Andrews and Bonta (2010) have empirically explored needs within the offender population and found that providing interventions targeting these needs can reduce recidivism (Andrews et al., 1990). Needs assessment has been a central part of the OIA conducted by CSC for the last 20 years (Motiuk, 1997, 1998). The OIA currently assesses for seven need domains, including attitudes, associates, family/marital, education/employment, community functioning, personal/emotional, and substance abuse (Brown & Motiuk, 2005). These factors target general criminal needs, however those for individuals who engage in violent extremism may differ (Silke, 2008) as they may be more specific to extremist violence.

Examining the specific motivations and needs of federally incarcerated radicalized offenders is important for two reasons. First, it assists in theoretically conceptualizing and understanding the issue of radicalization, both in general and in a Canadian context. Second, it provides CSC with the operational tools and information it requires to consider how it intervenes with these offenders currently, and how CSC could more effectively case manage this sub-population in the future. As such, this report aims to answer the following research questions:

1. What are the individual-level motivations behind the radicalized offender's actions?
2. Which of the criminogenic needs do radicalized offenders possess?
3. What other needs do radicalized offenders possess?

Method

Participants

Study participants included all past and present federally incarcerated offenders who were identified as meeting the CSC definition of "radicalized offender". Updating and replicating an approach utilized for a previous study of this group[2], this study combined several sources of offender information (the Offender Management System, or OMS, security intelligence information, and public domain information) to identify offenders who would qualify as meeting the radicalized offender definition. Any federal offender for which an electronic or hard-copy record existed on or before December 1, 2013 was considered for inclusion in the study[3].

Procedure

Building upon an extensive review of the literature from a previous study, a comprehensive list of variables related to violent extremism, including motivation and need, was developed and integrated into a coding manual (see Appendix A). The coding manual was distributed to partner portfolio agencies with expertise in violent extremism for their review and feedback in order to ensure that the identified classifications were comprehensive, relevant, and accurate.

Information for each identified radicalized offender was then gathered from a variety of sources, including electronic OMS reports, hard-copy federal offender files, Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) records, and open source information. An intensive file review of each radicalized offender file was conducted in order to code for all variables of interest which could not be pulled directly from the OMS database. In cases where violent extremist motivations were unknown or unclear, consultations with the Preventive Security Intelligence Division, CSC and partner portfolio agencies occurred in order to inform the coding process. As criminogenic motivations and needs are routinely collected as part of the intake assessment process at CSC, these data, along with a number of other relevant variables, were extracted from the OMS and combined with the coding manual data to form a comprehensive database on

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[2] See Stys, Gobeil, Harris, & Michel (in press) for a detailed summary of how this sample was derived.
[3] For security reasons, the exact number of offenders identified as being radicalized could not be included in this report. It is possible to report that this number is less than 100.

radicalized offender motivations, needs, and interventions[4].

  Two raters read through the information collected on the offenders in the sample, and each rater coded for more than half the sample, resulting in roughly 10% overlap in cases coded to allow for an assessment of inter-rater reliability. Regular consultation occurred between the raters on those cases that did not overlap for inter-rater reliability purposes to ensure items were being rated as similarly as possible.

Measures

Degree of Involvement in Violent Extremism

  Each radicalized offender was categorized into one of four mutually exclusive groups based on their highest degree of involvement in violent extremism. The groups, derived from the CSC definition of radicalized offender, were:

a) *commit* violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives. Those who were grouped in the commit category had to deliberately carry out action or been directly involved in a plot that was carried out, and the violence must have been to advance the ideological objectives;

b) *conspire* to commit violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives. Conspiring was operationalized as secretly planning to do violent acts for an ideological objective but not getting to the point of committing violence. This included those who conspired or planned with others, as well as individuals who planned to commit violence by themselves, with no assistance from any other individual or organization;

c) *promote* violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives. Promoting violence was operationalized as helping violent action for an ideological objective to happen, develop, or increase (e.g., through funding), or to encourage others to carry out violence for ideological acts (e.g., spreading a message). Individuals within this category were not directly involved in the violent action that was intended to achieve ideological objectives, thus differentiating them from those categorized as either commit or conspire[5]; and

d) *aspire* to commit violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives. Aspiring was

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[4] Another manuscript contains information on the type of the interventions received and the needs that the interventions addressed.

[5] If an offender engaged in violence in order to facilitate the funding of the organization that carries out violence for an ideological objective, the offender would be classified as promote. If they were violent in order to spread the violent ideological message then they would be classified as commit.

operationalized as wanting to achieve an ideological objective with the use of violence, but not having any plans to do so. An association with a violent extremist individual or group, or symbols on the person (i.e. tattoos) and/or personal belongings that represented violent ideological objectives or violent ideological groups were deemed to be an indicator of aspiring to commit violence.

Criminal (Non-Ideological) Motivations

Criminal motivation types were derived from multiple sources, including a review of the violent extremist literature (Helmus, 2009), a rapid evidence assessment of prison de-radicalization and disengagement programs (Munton et al., 2011) and motivations identified in other prison systems (Lloyd, 2012). Together, these sources categorized criminal motivations as those which strive to achieve a reward or personal gain, and included thrill and excitement, social status, friendship, religious rewards, material gain, opportunity to be violent, offering an identity and meaning, and the provision of personal safety as criminal motivations. To provide clarity between the types of motivation, criminal motivations will be referred to as "non-ideological motivations" for the purposes of this report.

Violent Extremist (Ideological) Motivations

Violent extremist motivations were categorized as those which were rooted in a desire for change (political, religious, single-issue, or other moral or ideological change) or a response to a grievance or injustice (personal grievance, group grievance, or grievance with a specific event or action). These ideologically-based motivations were derived from the same sources as outlined above (Helmus, 2009; Munton et al., 2011; and Lloyd, 2012) and their accuracy was confirmed via consultation with Canadian experts in the area of violent extremism. For the purposes of this report, motivations typically associated with violent extremism will be referred to as "ideological motivations".

Needs

Criminogenic needs for the sample of offenders were obtained from the OMS database. These needs are assessed for each offender at intake to the federal correctional system through the Dynamic Factor Identification and Assessment – Revised (DFIA-R; Brown and Motiuk, 2005; CSC, 2012a), which identifies and prioritizes criminogenic needs according to seven dynamic risk areas: employment and education, marital/family, associates, substance abuse,

community functioning, personal/emotional and attitudes, and allows for targeted intervention on factors that reduce the likelihood of re-offending. Criminogenic needs for this sample were derived either from the original DFIA (1994 to mid-2009) or the DFIA-R (mid-2009 to present), depending on date of admission. DFIA domains are rated as considerable need for improvement, some need for improvement, no immediate need for improvement, and an asset while DFIA-R domains are rated as high need for improvement, moderate need for improvement, low need for improvement, no immediate need for improvement, and an asset. The two exceptions are for the substance use and personal/emotional domains, for which neither can be scored as being an asset.

Based on a review of the literature and consultation with subject-matter experts, a list of other, violent-extremist specific needs was created. The primary sources used to identify possible needs came from existing risk assessment instruments including the Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG 22+; Home Office, 2012), the Multi-Level Guidelines (MLG; Cook, Hart, & Kropp, 2013), and the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA; Pressman, 2009; Pressman & Flockton, 2012).   For ease of interpretation, these additional needs were then classified under the criminogenic need categorizations outlined above.

Results

Adequate file information was available to appropriately code the degree of involvement in violent extremism and motivation items for the entire sample. Criminogenic needs (as assessed by the DFIA or DFIA-R) were available for 66.7% of the sample, with the majority (72.9%) having DFIA scores and the remainder (27.1%) having DFIA-R scores. For violent extremist needs, missing data varied by item from as high as 13.9% to as low as 6.9% missing. Frequency tables were produced with those offenders for whom data was available.

Inter-rater reliability on ratings of motivation and non-criminogenic need were assessed using the kappa statistic and Landis and Koch's (1977) guidelines on interpreting the kappa statistic[6]. For this study, inter-rater reliability was considered to have substantial agreement on all but two of the items related to motivation (thrill and excitement: kappa = .412; friendship and affiliation: kappa = .545). For the other (non-criminogenic) needs, 17 of the coded items had at least substantial agreement, 7 had moderate agreement, and 5 had lower than moderate agreement.

Individual-level motivations

Individual-level motivations for the sample of radicalized offenders are summarized in Table 1. In general, results indicated that 62.5% of radicalized offenders were found to be motivated by a desire to respond to a grievance, 61.1% were motivated by a desire to change some aspect of society, and 68.1% possessed non-ideological (i.e. personal) motives for their criminal activity. When these categories were collapsed for later analyses, it was found that 30.0% were purely ideologically motivated, 17.1% were purely non-ideologically (criminally) motivated, and 52.9% possessed both ideological and non-ideological motives for their criminal actions.

More specifically, a desire for political change was the most commonly found motivation (55.7%), followed by a desire to respond to a group grievance (45.7%), and a desire for material gain (35.7%). Conversely, radicalized offenders were least likely to hold motivations to address a grievance from a specific event and the desire to benefit from religious rewards (2.9% and 7.1% respectively).

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[6] Landis and Koch (1977) note that kappa statistics between .41 and .60 indicate moderate agreement, .61 to .80 indicate substantial agreement, and .80 to 1.0 indicate near perfect agreement.

Table 1

Radicalized Offenders' Individual-Level Motivations: Overall

Motivation Type	Proportion (%)
Ideological – Any desire for change	61.1
Political change	55.7
Religious change	11.4
Single issue change	8.6
Other moral or ideological change	0
Ideological – Any response to grievance or injustice	62.5
Personal grievance	22.9
Group grievance	45.7
Grievance with specific event or action	2.9
Non-Ideological – Any rewards and personal gain	68.1
Thrill and excitement	24.3
Social status	12.9
Friendship	32.9
Religious rewards	7.1
Material gain	35.7
Opportunity to be violent	8.6
Offers an identity and meaning	15.7
Personal safety	12.9
Other	14.3

Note. Total proportion will be greater than 100% as offenders could hold multiple individual-level motivations.

As previously noted, CSC defines a radicalized offender as "an ideologically motivated offender, who commits, aspires or conspires to commit, or promotes violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives" (Correctional Service Canada, 2012b). Information sources for the sample of offenders indicated that the largest proportion of those that fit the definition of radicalized offender did so by "committing" violence for an ideological objective (45.8%). A quarter of the sample (26.4%) fit the definition by "conspiring" to commit violence for an ideological objective, while 16.7% were involved through "promoting" violence for an

ideological objective. The remainder of the sample (11.1%) met the definition by "aspiring" to engage in violent extremism.

Examination of motivations by the degree of involvement in radicalized behaviour indicated that those with more serious involvement in radicalized behaviour were more likely to have ideological motivations. As outlined in Table 2, the most common motivations for those who had "committed" violence for an ideological objective was a desire for political change (65.6%) followed by a desire to respond to a group grievance (53.1%), personal grievance (28.1%), and friendship (28.1%). Those who "promoted" violence were commonly motivated by material gain (83.3%), friendship (50.0%), and a desire for political change (41.7%).

Information sources for the sample of radicalized offenders also illustrated that the majority (70.8%) of these offenders were part of a violent extremist group, however only a small proportion played the role of leader (19.6%) in the group. The remainder of those who were part of a violent extremist group were members (80.4%) in their organization[7]. Just under 20% of radicalized offenders in the sample (18.1%) were considered "lone wolves", acting independently and not as part of any violent extremist organization, and the remaining 11.1% were part of a group, but not of a group that could be considered a violent extremist group (e.g., street gang, group of friends).

Table 3 summarizes individual-level motivations of radicalized offenders based on their role within their violent extremist group. Interestingly, although leaders of violent extremist groups were found to possess several types of ideological motivations, they often also possessed non-ideological motivations, most notably the desire for friendship (50.0%). Where non-members had substantially more non-ideological motivations, almost half (47.6%) also were motivated by some sort of personal grievance.

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[7] Role in violent extremist group was initially coded into categories used in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013), however due to small proportions in each category, findings were collapsed into "leader", "member", and "non-member" for ease of interpretation.

Table 2

Radicalized Offenders' Individual-Level Motivations By Degree of Involvement in Radicalized Behaviour as Outlined in CSC's Definition of "Radicalized Offender"

Motivation Type	Definitional Behaviour (%)			
	Commits	Conspires	Promotes	Aspires
Ideological – Any desire for change	69.7	78.9	41.7	12.5
Political change	65.6	66.7	41.7	12.5
Religious change	6.3	33.3	0	0
Single issue change	18.8	0	0	0
Other moral or ideological change	0	0	0	0
Ideological – Any response to grievance or injustice	72.7	73.7	33.3	37.5
Personal grievance	28.1	16.7	8.3	37.5
Group grievance	53.1	61.1	25.0	12.5
Grievance with specific event or action	6.3	0	0	0
Non-Ideological – Any rewards and personal gain	63.6	52.6	91.7	87.5
Thrill and excitement	18.8	33.3	25.0	25.0
Social status	12.5	16.7	16.7	0
Friendship	28.1	33.3	50.0	25.0
Religious rewards	9.4	11.1	0	0
Material gain	21.9	16.7	83.3	62.5
Opportunity to be violent	9.4	5.6	8.3	12.5
Offers an identity and meaning	18.8	22.2	8.3	0
Personal safety	12.5	5.6	16.7	25.0
Other	18.8	5.6	16.7	12.5

Note. Total proportion will be greater than 100% as offenders could hold multiple individual-level motivations.

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Table 3

Radicalized Offenders' Individual-Level Motivations By Role In Violent Extremist Group

Motivation Type	Role Within Group (%)		
	Leader	Member	Non-Member
Ideological – Any desire for change	80.0	75.6	23.8
Political change	70.0	71.8	19.0
Single issue change	30.0	5.1	4.8
Religious change	10.0	15.4	4.8
Other moral or ideological change	0	0	0
Ideological - Response to grievance or injustice	50.0	65.9	61.9
Group grievance	30.0	61.5	23.8
Personal grievance	20.0	10.3	47.6
Grievance with specific event or action	0	0	9.5
Non-Ideological - Rewards and personal gain	70.0	61.0	81.0
Friendship	50.0	41.0	9.5
Thrill and excitement	30.0	17.9	33.3
Offers an identity and meaning	30.0	15.4	9.5
Material gain	20.0	41.0	33.3
Personal safety	10.0	10.3	19.0
Social status	0	17.9	9.5
Other	0	10.3	28.6
Religious rewards	0	10.3	4.8
Opportunity to be violent	0	5.1	19.0

Note. Total proportion will be greater than 100% as offenders could hold multiple individual-level motivations.

Criminogenic needs

Regardless of which tool was used to assess criminogenic needs (the DFIA or the DFIA-R), the most common need areas for the sample were in the associates, attitudes, and personal/emotional domains[8]. As illustrated in Table 4, only 25.7% of the radicalized offenders assessed by the DFIA were found to have some or considerable needs in the community

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[8] Criminogenic needs are only reported for those offenders who were admitted to a federal institution in or after November 1994, as these are the only offenders with a DFIA or DFIA-R assessment of need. Of the sample of radicalized offenders, 66.7% had criminogenic needs as assessed by the DFIA or DFIA-R.

functioning domain, with this proportion dropping to 7.7% for those assessed by the DFIA-R. A similar trend appears for the marital/family domain, with 37.1% of the radicalized offenders assessed by the DFIA and 7.7% of those assessed by the DFIA-R having some/considerable (for DFIA) or moderate/high (DFIA-R) needs in this domain.

Table 4

Level of Criminogenic Need for Sample of Radicalized Offenders

Criminogenic Need	Level of Need - DFIA (%)	
	Asset/No	Some/Considerable
Associates	28.6	71.4
Attitudes	14.3	85.7
Community Functioning	74.3	25.7
Employment/Education	45.7	54.3
Marital/Family	62.9	37.1
Personal/Emotional	20.0	80.0
Substance Abuse	62.9	37.1
	Level of Need – DFIA-R (%)	
	Asset/No/Low	Moderate/High
Associates	7.7	92.3
Attitudes	7.7	92.3
Community Functioning	92.3	7.7
Employment/Education	46.2	53.8
Marital/Family	92.3	7.7
Personal/Emotional	23.1	76.9
Substance Abuse	84.6	15.4

Note. Total proportion will be greater than 100% as offenders could have multiple criminogenic needs.

Interesting patterns of results also emerged when examining those radicalized offenders with some/considerable or moderate/high criminogenic needs based on the type of motivation they possess (purely ideological, purely non-ideological, or a combination of the two; see Table 5). Regardless of assessment tool, ideologically motivated offenders had high needs in

associates, attitudes, and personal/emotional need domains. Those offenders with DFIA scores and purely ideological objectives least frequently had needs in the substance abuse (11.1%), community functioning (22.2%), and marital/family (22.2%) domains. This is even more pronounced in those assessed by the DFIA-R, with none of the purely ideologically motivated offenders scoring moderate or high on substance abuse, community functioning, and marital/family criminogenic needs. While both purely ideologically motivated and non-ideologically motivated offenders had high needs in the attitudes domain, it is notable that of those radicalized offenders that had both ideological and non-ideological motivations, almost all had high needs in the attitudes domain (DFIA: 92.9%; DFIA-R: 100%).

Table 5

Some/Considerable or Moderate/High Criminogenic Needs: Ideologically Motivated vs. Non-Ideologically Motivated Radicalized Offenders

Criminogenic Need	Motivation Type (%)		
	Ideological	Non-Ideological	Both
DFIA – Some/Considerable Need			
Associates	77.8	90.9	50.0
Attitudes	66.7	90.9	92.9
Community Functioning	22.2	36.4	21.4
Employment/Education	44.4	81.8	42.9
Marital/Family	22.2	36.4	50.0
Personal/Emotional	66.7	100.0	78.6
Substance Abuse	11.1	54.5	42.9
DFIA-R – Moderate/High Need			
Associates	100.0	100.0	88.9
Attitudes	100.0	0	100.0
Community Functioning	0	0	11.1
Employment/Education	66.7	100.0	44.4
Marital/Family	0	0	11.1
Personal/Emotional	100.0	0	77.8
Substance Abuse	0	100.0	11.1

Note. Total proportion will be greater than 100% as offenders could have multiple criminogenic needs.

Other violent extremist specific needs

Almost all of the other needs specific to violent extremists that were identified in the review of the literature were observed in the sample of radicalized offenders. When examined under the categorical groupings globally, patterns were similar to those found in criminogenic need assessments. That is, a high proportion of radicalized offenders were identified to have violent extremist specific needs in the areas of attitudes (88.9%), associates (84.7%), personal/emotional (86.1%), and employment/education (79.2%) and a low proportion were identified to have needs in the family/marital domain (30.6%)[9].

Examination of the individual violent extremist need items for ideologically motivated, non-ideologically motivated, and dually-motivated offenders are outlined in Table 6. Most notable among those with purely ideological motivations were needs in the areas of attitudes, specifically justifying offending and the identification of targets in response to a perceived injustice. All offenders who were purely criminally motivated were found to have a lack of prosocial integration with friends, and most were found to have a lack of prosocial integration in the employment/education domain. Interestingly, those with both ideological and non-ideological motivations tended to have higher violent extremist specific needs than the other two groups, and distinctly had attitude needs in glorification of the past and dehumanization of the enemy that were not found at all in purely ideologically and criminally motivated radicalized offenders. Also notable were the items related to mental health and their impact on behaviour and thought processes, in that non-ideologically motivated offenders were found to have more indications of mental health needs than ideologically motivated offenders.

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[9] Radicalized offenders were deemed to have a need in the overall domain if they possessed at least one of the non-criminogenic need items falling under that domain.

Table 6

Other Violent Extremist Needs: Ideologically Motivated vs. Non-Ideologically Motivated Radicalized Offenders

Other Violent Extremist Needs	Motivation Type (%)		
	Ideological	Non-Ideological	Both
Associates			
Associates support extremist offending – Friends	78.9	41.7	76.5
Lack of pro-social integration (associates aspect) - Friends	77.8	100.0	85.3
Personal contact with violent extremists – Friends	73.7	41.7	75.0
Associates involved in violent action - Friends	73.7	41.7	65.7
Violent role or status in group	22.2	8.3	30.3
Attitudes			
Identification of target in response to perceived injustice	100.0	8.3	87.9
Attitudes justifying offending	94.4	75.0	91.2
Commitment to using violence to achieve objectives	83.3	25.0	82.4
Negative attitudes toward outgroup	66.7	16.7	50.0
Commitment to group	61.1	16.7	65.6
Perception that conventional activity does not work	61.1	16.7	61.8
Them vs. us thinking	42.1	8.3	25.0
Victim of injustice and grievances	38.9	8.3	36.4
Over-identification with group	15.8	0	27.3
Catastrophizing	5.3	0	0
Dehumanization of the enemy	0	0	6.1
Glorification of the past	0	0	6.1
Employment/Education			
Lack of pro-social integration (employment/education aspect)	38.9	83.3	64.7
Marital/Family			
Associates support extremist offending – Family	15.8	8.3	35.3
Lack of pro-social integration (associates aspect) - Family	11.1	25.0	29.4
Associates involved in violent action – Family	5.3	0	20.0
Personal contact with violent extremists – Family	0	0	13.9
Personal/Emotional			
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, or alienation	66.7	16.7	84.8
Lack of empathy	55.6	58.3	63.6
Problems resulting from victimization	22.2	33.3	29.4
Susceptible to influence or authority	21.1	41.7	45.5
Mental health problems leading to problems with behaviour [a]	5.6	16.7	9.1
Mental health problems leading to thought processes [a]	5.6	0	9.1
Mental health problems leading to problems with mood [a]	0	0	9.1

Note. Total proportion will be greater than 100% as offenders could have multiple other violent extremist needs.
[a] Mental health problems were identified in the file review and were issues (not necessarily formal diagnoses) that were identified by mental health professionals.

Discussion

One of the primary goals of this study was to determine if Canada's federally incarcerated radicalized offenders were ideologically motivated. The results in the present study corroborate the current literature on motivation of violent extremists, with both ideological and non-ideological motivations being identified for approximately half of the sample, and the top four motivations identified being a mix of ideological and personal motivations (desire for political change, desire for material gain, desire to respond to group grievance, and desire for friendship). As previously outlined, other research has found a mix of ideologies within various violent extremist groups, including an armed Nigerian group of extremists (Barrett, 2011), jihadist terrorists in Western Europe (Nesser, 2005), and those participating in Al-Qaeda violent extremism (Munton et al., 2011).

The results pertaining to the criminogenic and violent extremist needs of the radicalized offenders provide some very interesting findings, and generally fit with the current findings in the literature. The evidence for the importance of friendship and affiliation with other violent extremists is fairly clear relative to other possible needs (Monahan, 2012). As Monahan points out, the results from Sageman's (2008) analysis of jihadi terrorists found that approximately 70% of members joined Al-Qaeda with friends. Similarly, a review of the evidence suggests social networks have been found to be a factor for participating in Al-Qaeda inspired violence or right-wing racist groups (Munton et al., 2011). The results found in this study corroborated this finding, with a large proportion of offenders having high needs in the associates domain (as assessed by the DFIA or DFIA-R). Furthermore, a large proportion of those offenders who had ideological motivations (either ideological only, or both ideological and non-ideological) had associations with those who supported or were involved in violent extremism. There were also a large proportion of offenders with only non-ideological motivations who had needs in the associates need domain as identified by the DFIA or DFIA-R, although it is important to keep in mind that this domain is assessing criminal associates, and not specifically violent extremist associates.

A large proportion of offenders, regardless of their motivation, were identified by the DFIA or DFIA-R as having needs in the attitudes domain, and results indicated that few non-ideologically motivated offenders were assessed as having other violent extremist needs in the

area of attitudes. Coupled with the evidence illustrating that attitudes towards crime have consistently been found to be a strong predictor of future criminal offending (Andrews & Bonta, 2010), these findings suggests that having attitudes that support involvement in violent extremism are an important factor to consider and target for intervention. In a qualitative analysis of militant-extremists' patterns in thinking, attitudes and beliefs (Saucier, Akers, Shen-Miller, Knežević, & Stankov, 2009), catastrophizing of events, dehumanization of opposed groups or individuals, and failing to see how conventional activity could address their issues were identified violent extremist attitudes. While little evidence was found to suggest the current sample held catastrophizing and dehumanizing beliefs, information was identified for more than half of ideologically motivated radicalized offenders to suggest that these offenders did not believe that conventional activity would address their issues.

Results of this study are also consistent with earlier findings regarding the education, employment, substance abuse, and community functioning needs of violent extremists. Munton and colleagues (2011) found those involved in Al-Qaeda inspired violent extremism typically have similar education attainment to those in their community, while those involved in gangs and violent youth crime typically have lower educational attainment than non-involved individuals in their community. This study also found that ideologically motivated offenders had lower needs in the education/employment domain than did non-ideologically motivated offenders. The very low prevalence of substance abuse and community functioning needs within the ideologically motivated sample is consistent with current understanding of violent extremists. Monahan (2012) concludes from the literature that the common factors associated with common violence including an irresponsible lifestyle and substance abuse do not appear to be relevant to those who engage in violent extremism.

Some literature exists discussing the conceptual and actual overlaps between criminal organizations and violent extremists (Flanigan, 2012; Mullins, S., 2009; Oehme III, 2008; Picarelli, 2006). Recent evidence published on the needs of offenders convicted of criminal organization offences in Canada appear to be very similar to the needs identified in the present sample of radicalized offenders (Stys & Ruddell, 2013). Attitude, associate, and personal emotional needs are the most common needs identified in both groups and the least commonly identified needs are marital/family and community functioning needs. Further understanding on how these offenders compare may result in the possibility of using criminal organization

offenders as a proxy group for radicalized offenders. This would allow for more research on the risk factors and processes involved in engaging in violent, group-based behaviour that would not otherwise be possible with violent extremists alone, considering the low base rate of these offenders within Canada.

From a theoretical perspective, this report offers evidence to suggest which factors may contribute to an individual becoming engaged in violent extremism. While identifying individual factors can assist in isolating intervention targets, further steps should be taken to investigate how these factors interact and the mechanisms and circumstances involved in radicalization to violent extremism. This is in line with calls to shift the focus of research from individual factors to understanding the processes. A number of models currently exist to offer an interpretation of these processes, however due to the lack of evidence available and issues with access to such uncommon populations, these models have not been empirically tested. Nonetheless they provide a starting point from which research can begin to investigate. Further, evidence from social psychology can contribute to our understanding, and some have already begun to integrate this information to our understanding of violent extremism (e.g., Borum, 2011; King & Taylor, 2011).

When examined through an operational Canadian federal corrections lens, the results of this study have several interesting operational and policy-related implications. As previously stated, CSC defines a radicalized offender as "an ideologically motivated offender, who commits, aspires or conspires to commit, or promotes violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives" (Correctional Service Canada, 2012b). However, the results of this study suggest that perhaps being a "radicalized offender" may not be so clear cut. Of those that were identified as being radicalized, only 70% were found to fit the former part of the definition: being ideologically motivated, although all of the offenders in the sample met one or more of the behavioural components of the definition (i.e., commits, aspires or conspires to commit, or promotes violent acts).

This distinction may not necessarily be important from a correctional programs or case management perspective, as offenders are managed and referred to programs on an individual basis, not based on whether or not they belong to a particular offender sub-population or group. Nevertheless, there could possibly be unintended impacts related to being labelled as a radicalized offender which could negatively impact rehabilitation and reintegration efforts. For

instance, research with gang members has found several negative implications of being labelled a "gang member" on rehabilitative efforts, including resistance to engaging in interventions (Harris, Turner, Garrett, & Atkinson, 2011). While it is possible that all of the necessary information that would allow for the identification of ideological motivations for the outstanding 30% of non-ideologically motivated offenders may not have been available, it remains a consideration that CSC strive to assess the true motivations of its offenders before labelling them as "radicalized".

In many respects, results pertaining to criminological need were consistent with prior work examining differences between radicalized and non-radicalized offenders. Radicalized offenders overall were found to have different patterns of needs than the general population of Canadian federal offenders, who often have significant needs in the substance abuse, employment, and community functioning domains (CSC, 2007; Mullins, P. & MacDonald, 2012; Stys, et al., in press). Indeed, examinations of criminological need across sources of motivation (ideological, non-ideological, or both) revealed that non-ideologically motivated offenders had patterns of need more similar to the general offender population than to radicalized offenders, a finding that lends more support to the proposition that the assessment and identification of motivation would be beneficial in future consideration of case management planning for radicalized offenders.

Adding to the complexity of meeting radicalized offenders needs is the finding that many of the needs identified in the literature as being unique to radicalized offenders were distinguished in the current sample. CSC's current model of addressing needs, based on the risk-need-responsivity principle (Andrews and Bonta, 2010), aims to address those needs deemed to be significant in contributing to criminally (non-ideologically) motivated criminal behaviour. As such, the DFIA and DFIA-R were developed to measure the level of need in these domains in federally incarcerated offenders. However, the OIA does not routinely measure the items that comprise the radicalized offender needs. Further consideration should be given to examining whether or not the most frequently identified violent extremist specific needs (i.e., lack of prosocial integration, identification of target in response to perceived injustice, and attitudes justifying offending) could be measured using a current DFIA-R variable as a proxy, if a new subscale should be added to the OIA with items specific to radicalized offender needs, or if the current DFIA-R is exhaustively assessing both criminogenic and violent extremist needs.

The findings pertaining to criminological and other violent extremist needs leads logically to a discussion of correctional planning, and a possibility of a revised or alternate approach for radicalized offenders in terms of population management and programming. The overwhelmingly high need among ideologically motivated radicalized offenders in the areas of criminal attitudes would imply that these offenders would benefit from programming or interventions to address these needs, as well as other highly-assessed needs (or identified, in the case of the violent extremist specific needs) in the associates and personal/emotional domains. Further research is required to determine if federally sentenced radicalized offenders are receiving the programming required to address their needs, if the current cadre of correctional programming is sufficient to address these needs, and if the development or adaptation of programming specific to radicalized offenders would be beneficial to the safe rehabilitation and reintegration of radicalized offenders. Work is currently underway to investigate the interventions received by the radicalized offender sample and the needs (both criminogenic and violent extremist specific) that are addressed by these interventions.

Conclusions

This study aimed to examine, more closely, the motivations of federally incarcerated radicalized offenders in order to identify if they were truly ideologically motivated, and to determine which criminological and other violent extremist needs could be identified for these offenders. Results highlighted the inherent difficulty in fitting individual offenders into a generalized definition of "radicalized offender". The study also illustrated that those radicalized offenders who are purely ideologically motivated truly appear to have quite different needs than those radicalized offenders who appear to be purely motivated by more traditional, criminal factors.

While this study aimed to be exhaustive in its approach, certain limitations should be noted. Certain files were not made available to the research team, impacting the availability of information sources from which to complete the coding. This was especially true for any files that were held in the Quebec region. Also, due to the number of radicalized offenders in the sample, results were presented at the aggregate level. However, the sample of radicalized offenders is, in itself, quite heterogeneous, and therefore important group distinctions may have been missed. Presenting criminogenic and violent extremist needs for the group of radicalized offenders, rather than individually, could mask the importance of certain needs for individual

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offenders. As CSC addresses needs on an individual rather than group basis, future research should consider examining the needs individually to understand how they contribute to the risk of future engagement with violent extremism.

As a next step, future research should examine the programming and interventions in which the federally incarcerated radicalized offender sample participated in order to determine the level of congruence between the needs assessed in this paper and program participation. Future work could also consider the assessment of violent extremist needs and if this can be effectively done within the current structure of the OIA and DFIA-R. Coupled with the results of this study, these efforts would contribute significantly to the ultimate goal of informing an evidence-based approach to effective assessment, management, and correctional interventions for radicalized offenders.

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Appendix A: Coding Manual

Explanation/Label	Variable Content	Coding Notes
Radicalized Behaviour		
Committed violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives	0 = No 1 = Yes 77 = Not applicable 88 = Unknown (lack of evidence) 99 = Missing	Commit: to carry into action deliberately
Conspires to commit violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives	0 = No 1 = Yes 77 = Not applicable 88 = Unknown (lack of evidence) 99 = Missing	Conspire: to secretly plan with someone to do something that is harmful or illegal
Promote violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives	0 = No 1 = Yes 77 = Not applicable 88 = Unknown (lack of evidence) 99 = Missing	Promote: to help (something) happen, develop, or increase; to contribute to the growth or prosperity of
Aspires to commit violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives	0 = No 1 = Yes 77 = Not applicable 88 = Unknown (lack of evidence) 99 = Missing	Aspire: to want to have or achieve something (such as a particular career or level of success)
Role in violent extremist group	1 = Leader 2 = Member 3 = Non-member (sympathizer or not part of a violent extremist group) 88 = Unknown (lack of evidence) 99 = Missing	
Motivations		
Desire for political change	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present	
Desire for religious change	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present	
Desire for single issue change	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present	

	2 = information indicates the motivation was present
Other moral or ideological desire for change	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present
Desire to respond to perceived personal grievance	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present
Desire to respond to perceived group grievance	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present
Desire to respond to grievance with specific event/action	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present
Thrill and excitement	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present
Social status	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present
Friendship	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present
Religious rewards	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present
Material gain	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present
Opportunity to be violent	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present
Offers an identity and meaning	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present
Personal safety	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present
Other rewards and personal gain motivations	0 = No information indicates the motivation was present 1 = Information indicates the motivation was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the motivation was present
Possible Violent Extremist Needs	
Associates	
Lack of pro-social integration (associates aspect) - Friends	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present

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Associates support extremist offending – Friends	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Personal contact with violent extremists – Friends	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Associates involved in violent action - Friends	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Violent role or status in group	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present

Attitudes

Attitudes justifying offending	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Identification of target in response to perceived injustice	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Commitment to using violent to achieve objectives	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Negative attitudes toward outgroup	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Commitment to group	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Perception that conventional activity does not work	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Them vs. us thinking	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Victim of injustice and grievances	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Over-identification with group	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Catastrophizing	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Dehumanization of the enemy	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present

Glorification of the past	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Employment/Education	
Lack of pro-social integration (employment/education aspect)	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Marital/Family	
Associates support extremist offending – Family	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Lack of pro-social integration (associates aspect) - Family	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Associates involved in violent action – Family	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Personal contact with violent extremists – Family	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Personal/Emotional	
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, or alienation	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Lack of empathy	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Susceptible to influence or authority	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Problems resulting from victimization	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Mental health problems leading to problems with behaviour	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Mental health problems leading to thought processes	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present
Mental health problems leading to problems with mood	0 = No information indicates the factor was present 1 = Information indicates the factor was possibly or partially present 2 = information indicates the factor was present