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
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COMMUNITY BASED PREVENTIVE
POLICING: A REVIEW
1984-90

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COMMUNITY BASED PREVENTIVE
POLICING: A REVIEW
1984-90

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ABSTRACT

Some of the most recent literature on team policing in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States was reviewed. Very little rigorous evaluative data was available at the time of this review. However, team policing shows great promise as a means of providing a better level of service to the public. Improved job satisfaction for police officers, improved public attitudes towards the police, and lower costs all appear to be possible in a well-designed team policing program.

Improved service to the public has been noted where team policing has been introduced. The average time taken by the police to respond to citizen complaints or calls for assistance has been reduced. The proportion of crimes cleared by arrest has risen. The rate at which the occurrence of crime has been growing has been slowed.

Improved job satisfaction seems to have followed the introduction of team policing in at least some localities. Even veteran police officers have said that their work was made more challenging and interesting under the team policing style of operation. Boredom was reduced and reports of incidents of police abuse of citizens were less frequent.

Significant cost savings have resulted from more effective use of available manpower. Teams have applied their human resources only at those times and places needed. Other cost reductions have resulted from reduced amounts of sick leave and overtime. Lower turnover rates have resulted in

reduced recruitment and training costs.

Improved public attitudes towards the police have been reflected in increased rates at which the public volunteers information useful to the police. Reductions in the number of assaults on police officers have also been noted where team policing has been in effect. Citizen complaints have declined.

Some of the problems encountered by various police agencies in the implementation of team policing were noted. It was concluded that no police force should accept team policing as a packaged solution to all problems. The most successful implementations of team policing have occurred where the project was carefully designed to fit the requirements of the community.

The implications of the current literature for future research, policy of the Department of the Solicitor General, and the operations of the Department of the Solicitor General of the Government of Canada were discussed.

SUMMARY

The introduction of police radios and patrol cars has enabled modern police forces to serve more people and larger geographic territories and to respond to increased demands for service without substantial increases in manpower. However, this has been achieved at the cost of a significant deterioration in police-community relations. The police no longer enjoy any significant level of informal contact with the public. This prevents an adequate information exchange between the police and the public and inhibits the ability of the police to control crime. In some circumstances the relationship between the police and the public has deteriorated to mutual hostility. Recently, the rising demand for police services has made it difficult for the police to devote very much time or effort to the problem of crime prevention. Their attention is focused almost exclusively on the detection of crime and the apprehension of criminals.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

A number of major police departments have initiated community relations programs. These can be categorized into three types. First, there are image-building programs. These programs consist of a simple one-way communication of information about police activities to the public. Second, there are the two-way police community relations programs. These programs involve the exchange of information: a) from the public to the police and; b) from the police to the public. The public

is encouraged to express its concerns about the police force, and the police force is expected to respond to these problems. Finally, there are the public involvement programs. Here, the attempt is made to involve directly the public in police work by such mechanisms as police auxiliaries.

PREVENTIVE POLICING

A number of programs undertaken by various police departments in the area of crime prevention were discussed. Police officers are often taught that crime results from a combination of criminal desire and criminal opportunity.

The reduction of criminal desire requires three elements:

1. The police agency must be able to identify the potential offender before the offence occurs.
2. The police agency must understand those social and psychological processes which lead to the emergence of criminal behavior.
3. The police agency must have proven programs for successful intervention in criminal careers.

Some tools are available to assist in the identification of potential offenders. These are rarely used by police forces. The ability of society at large to understand the processes underlying criminal behavior or to intervene in criminal careers in any meaningful way is extremely limited at present.

The reduction of criminal opportunity can be achieved in two ways:

1. Sufficient surveillance can be given to the potential

offender so that he becomes convinced that he has little opportunity to commit a crime and get away with it.

2. The potential targets of crime can be identified, and the potential victims of crime can be advised on how best to protect themselves against criminal activity.

A number of programs were described which were intended to prevent crime. Some of these programs involved the use of the mass media to reach the public. Other programs involved meetings between the police and small groups of the public. Still other programs involved one-to-one relationships between police officers and citizens. Most of these programs represented a badly fragmented approach to the problem of crime control in the community.

TEAM POLICING

Team policing represents one police organization and manpower deployment strategy, which attempts to overcome the limitations of the more fragmented community relations and crime prevention programs attempted by many police forces. There is a philosophy of policing that must be understood and accepted if team policing is to be introduced successfully. That philosophy holds that the primary objective of the police force is to prevent crime and traffic accidents. The philosophy also holds that no police work can be carried out without a high level of communication and understanding between the

police and the public. Crimes cannot be prevented without information from the public, and crimes cannot be solved without information from the public.

Elements of Team Policing

The six key elements of team policing are: 1) geographic stability of assignment; 2) decentralization of authority; 3) emphasis on crime prevention; 4) emphasis on community relations; 5) mechanisms for improved internal police department communications, and; 6) reduced reliance of the police department on the use of police specialists.

A total of nineteen policing programs was reviewed in terms of these basic concepts. Mention was made of nine additional team policing programs that are under way or under consideration.

The Role of Public Opinion

Public opinion is extremely important to the development of successful team policing programs. As the level of police-community contact is increased, it is hoped that these experiences will convince the public to provide more information to the police. Initially, improved public opinion may result in higher crime rates. The public may be more inclined to report crime because they have renewed confidence that the police department will do something about it. In the long run, however, crime rates should begin to decline. Police will be receiving sufficient information from the public about potential

criminals and their activities to prevent crime.

IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST

A checklist was developed for the police executive intending to implement team policing:

1. Involve a cross-section of respected members in the planning of team policing. They will persuade other members of the department to cooperate in implementation.
2. Involve the executive of the collective bargaining unit or, at least, keep them informed about changes planned.
3. Form an internal task force to plan the team policing project.
4. Send the task force to visit areas where team policing is in effect.
5. Point out the advantages of team policing to detectives at an early stage (eg. possible reduction in routine investigative workload).
6. Identify detectives who may qualify as team commanders.
7. Involve middle and senior managers in the planning of policing, especially those who are respected by their colleagues and who have demonstrated a willingness to attempt new methods.
8. Avoid consultants offering packaged solutions which may not fit force problems.

9. Use consultants only as a resource to assist the internal planning task force. Do not allow team policing to become an "outsider's" program.
10. Ensure that members of the police teams are not dispatched outside of team boundaries. No more than 10% of calls in any team territory should be answered by outside units.
11. Establish a system of call priorities to assist in the observance of team boundaries in dispatching.
12. Train dispatchers on the importance of maintaining geographic stability and on any new call priority system.
13. Select team members at random. Team members should not be volunteers or the best available, but should be generally representative of the range of quality and attitudes within the force.
14. Select a team commander of high ability who is willing to innovate and who is respected by other commanders.
15. Give additional training in the elements of team policing, especially community relations and crime prevention.
16. Train team members in any required specialized skills when tasks formerly assigned to specialist units are to be assigned to the teams.
17. Establish guidelines which clearly define the authority of watch commanders, precinct commanders, and functional commanders, with respect to police teams.
18. Provide continuity of leadership. A chief who

implements team policing should remain in office for at least five years to ensure that all changes introduced become part of the operating style of the department. The chief should regard implementation of team policing as his prime priority. Team policing has failed when the attention of the command structure has been directed to other matters.

19. Test the type of team policing to be implemented in one part of the territory served to iron out any "bugs" prior to conversion of the entire force to team policing.
20. Keep teams as small as possible. This allows members to develop the best possible communication with the neighbourhood and with each other. Best results are likely with teams of only 7 or 8 persons.
21. Urge the decentralization of other social agencies. Intervene, where necessary, to establish links between police officers and members of other social agencies.
22. Allow sufficient time for racial, ethnic, or linguistic tensions between the police and the public to be overcome during the establishment of new patterns of communication between police teams and their neighbourhoods.
23. Provide sufficient manpower. No more than 1/3 of each officer's time should be required for service calls. The remainder of the time should be divided

equally between community relations and crime prevention activities.

24. Provide portable two-way radios. These allow team members to leave police vehicles and remain in contact with the dispatcher.
25. Do not force teams to staff their team offices on a regular basis. This is wasteful of manpower.
26. Be aware that a larger department will need more time to implement team policing than a smaller one. More levels of management will require retraining.
27. Provide training for team commanders and middle managers in personnel supervision techniques and budgeting.
28. Avoid unnecessary distinction of police team members from other members of the force. It can create needless antagonism.
29. When crises occur, examine the potential impact of the response proposed on the six key elements of team policing. Responses which violate these elements may severely impair the effectiveness of the program.

MEASUREMENT

Measurement should be undertaken to ensure that the team policing program is having the desired effects on costs, level of service, police attitudes, and public attitudes. Evaluation on a systematic basis can help identify the changes

required to enhance the probability of long-term success.

Five major types of measurement should be undertaken to evaluate a team policing program. They are: 1) crime rates; 2) victimization surveys; 3) citizen attitude surveys; 4) police attitude surveys, and; 5) reviews of policing costs. It is expected that crime rates will initially climb as more crimes are reported and will decline when preventive measures begin to take effect. Victimization rates may level off and then begin to decline. Citizen attitudes towards the police should improve. Police attitudes towards their jobs, working conditions, and the citizenry should improve.

Some immediate cost reductions may be noted (reductions in the amounts of sick leave and overtime), and in the long run the over-all cost of policing and the administration of criminal justice should decline.

RURAL AND FRONTIER AREAS

Policemen operating in rural and frontier areas of Canada will not find anything new about team policing. In fact, they probably already operate according to many of the principles found in successful team policing programs. However, it is important to ensure that all of these elements are present in rural policing activities. Attempts to reorganize or consolidate rural police forces should be reviewed in terms of the potential effect on the major concepts outlined as being of importance to successful team policing programs.

CONCLUSIONS

A number of problems that had arisen during the implementation of team policing in various cities were discussed. Strategies for dealing with these problems were outlined. It was suggested that more research was needed to establish the validity of the team policing concept in Canada. Specific research should be undertaken to evaluate the impact of team policing in Calgary. Another city should be selected for the implementation of team policing. Evaluative efforts in this city can focus on the changes in crime rates, victimization rates, citizens' attitudes, police attitudes, and costs that occur as a result of the introduction of team policing. A national victimization survey was recommended, which should focus on regional, ethnic, and income-level patterns in the reporting of crime. It might also serve as a means of identifying successful police activities.

It was suggested that if additional research establishes the validity of team policing, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police should consider the implementation of additional team policing projects in the municipalities they police under contract with the local government. The introduction of all team-policing concepts into rural and frontier areas might also be considered. Activities of the correctional service and the parole service might also be decentralized in such a way as to maximize interaction between officials of those agencies and members of the police teams.

Finally, it was suggested that special arrangements for funds might be made with the provincial governments to assist

local governments in the successful implementation of team policing programs. Included would be funds for the design of the team policing program, the training of officers in team policing concepts, the evaluation of the team policing program, continued consulting assistance, and temporary or permanent increases in manpower.

I - THE NEED FOR TEAM POLICING

PRESSURES ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Strong pressures have developed on the criminal justice system of Canada which have served to refocus attention on the problem of crime prevention. Crime rates have been increasing. Costs have been escalating. Public confidence in the system has been eroded.

Effective methods of crime prevention could reduce the workload of the courts, the investment in correctional facilities, and the caseloads of probation and parole officers.

POLICE PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS

Attempts to improve police productivity during the past thirty years have stressed increased mobility, improved telecommunications, and increased specialization. Patrol officers were withdrawn from foot beats and placed in automobiles. Automobiles were equipped with radios, and the officers were discouraged from leaving their cars on the grounds that urgent radio calls would be missed. Increasing specialization in the area of major crimes frequently meant that patrol officers would take only preliminary reports before passing the case to a specialist unit.

These changes were undertaken to increase the volume of complaints that an individual police officer could handle effectively. To some extent the role of the police officer in

crime prevention was overlooked as these changes took place.

Many of these changes served to impair the flow of communication between the public and the police. Information that might have been volunteered to the foot patrol officer, who was regarded as a personal friend, was withheld from the impersonal stranger in the passing radio-equipped car. Crime became more difficult to prevent and more difficult to solve as suspicious persons or events went unreported. More crimes went undetected until they were completed.

POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS

In the 1960's many major urban police departments became painfully aware that little police contact with the public was occurring outside the context of law enforcement. The police faced a distinct lack of cooperation in many communities. In some cities, outright hostility to the police had developed.

A number of major civil disorders in Canada and the United States were touched off by conflicts between the police and residents of black, Spanish-speaking, or youth sub-culture neighbourhoods. These incidents clearly demonstrated the extent of the deterioration in police-community relations that had taken place in the previous two decades.

Image-Building

In response, many police departments created public relations or community relations units whose sole task was to

make the public aware of police department activities in the most favorable possible light. Press releases were prepared and distributed, and speakers were made available to service clubs, community groups, and schools.

These efforts provided only for one-way communication from the police to the public. The public could not communicate their views to the police. Worse, the image being projected often did not fit the reality of day-to-day police-public contacts.

Communications

Some police departments began to build programs to encourage two-way communication between the police and the public. Police officers were separated from their regular duties and given special training which often involved the behavioural sciences. They were assigned to certain neighbourhoods and were told to build as complete an understanding of those neighbourhoods as possible. These men, known as community relations officers or community service officers, were expected to help the police department understand the public and were also to help the public understand the police department and its actions.

These programs frequently proved to be an excellent short-term solution to some of the more severe problems that had been developing. However, they also had some limitations. They tended to demean the worth of regular police officers. Community relations officers were hand-picked and specially trained. They were often the most intelligent, articulate, and open-to-change police officers that could be found. They were often able to

gain an excellent grasp of the problems found in a particular neighbourhood. However, they had difficulty in communicating their understanding to their fellow police officers.

Specialist programs encouraged the view among other police officers that the specialists alone were responsible for community relations. The behaviour of regular police officers towards the public was altered only slightly, if at all. The behaviour of the public towards the regular police officer did not change much either. Yet the specialist knew that public attitudes could be changed because they had changed towards him. Many community-relations specialists became frustrated by this limited change. They came to see themselves as devices to allow people to blow off steam. A certain amount of police-public communication was taking place, but it was not enough.

CRIME PREVENTION

As police departments were taking their first steps to improve their deteriorating relationships with the public, a strong concern was developing among police executives about escalating crime rates. Efforts were undertaken to prevent crimes and to reduce crime rates.

It has been a conventional wisdom among police officers that desire plus opportunity equals crime. This simple formula provides a useful basis for understanding the complex problem of crime prevention. The police agency can attempt to reduce criminal desire, or it can attempt to reduce criminal opportunity.

Reducing Criminal Desire

The problem of reducing criminal desire is an exceedingly complex issue. Three conditions are required:

1. The police agency must be able to identify the potential offender before offenses are committed.
2. The police agency must be able to understand the social and behavioural pressures and processes which produce delinquent behaviour.
3. The police agency must be able to call into play an array of techniques which have proven useful in intervening in social and psychological processes for the purpose of averting criminal behaviour.

Unfortunately, it is highly unrealistic to expect that even the most sophisticated police agency will possess a great degree of competence in any of these three areas.

Reducing Criminal Opportunity

The problem of reducing criminal opportunities would appear to be a more manageable one than that of reducing the desire to commit crimes. There are two basic strategies for the reduction of criminal opportunities:

1. The police agency can focus its attention on the potential offender in an attempt to prevent him from having the opportunity to commit crimes.
2. The police agency can focus its attention on the potential victim in an attempt to prevent him from

becoming the victim of criminal activity.

Youth

Most police agencies have recognized youth as a high-risk group with respect to criminal activity. Not surprisingly, a high proportion of police crime prevention programs have focused on youth. Pursuit, Gerletti, Brown and Ward (1972) have described a variety of youth-oriented crime prevention programs. School programs have been designed to increase cooperation between police and school officials and to promote better communications between students and the police. Recreational programs such as Police Athletic Leagues have also attempted to build better police-youth relationships. Both school and recreational programs were intended to provide extensive contact between the police and young people in an informal, non-law enforcement context.

Target Hardening

A variety of strategies have appeared in recent years in which the police have attempted to assist the potential victims of crime by hardening the potential targets of criminal activity to reduce opportunities for crime. Some of these programs have been general; others have focused on specific types of crime. Some programs have been presented through the mass media; others have involved contacts between the police and groups of potential victims; still others have involved police contact with potential victims. Target hardening includes

such items as security checks, advice on locks and lighting, development of steering column locks, and block-parent programs to prevent child molestation.

CONCLUSION

Many of the approaches to community relations and crime prevention discussed above were badly fragmented and did not fully recognize the importance of police-community communications to the problem of crime control. There was little evidence of long-term improvement in crime rates.

A fully integrated model of policing was needed which would emphasize the importance of communication with the public and focus attention on crime prevention as a means of restoring public confidence and reducing the over-all pressures on the criminal justice system. A fresh approach to the whole way in which police work is conducted was required. Community-based team policing seemed to be one such fresh approach which offered great promise.

II - TEAM POLICING

In the late 1960's and early 1970's, a number of police departments recognized that substantial pressures were building up which would require major changes in their method of operation. For example, the costs of policing were generally escalating faster than either population or taxation revenue. Second, police-community relations were deteriorating. Third, police morale and job satisfaction were deteriorating. Fourth, police turnover rates were growing at an unacceptable rate. Fifth, it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a high level of police service.

There was some recognition that the kinds of community relations and crime prevention efforts discussed in the previous sections of this report did not represent an integrated approach to the range of problems being faced, particularly by urban police departments. The creation of crime prevention and community relations specialists tended to increase rather than decrease the total costs of policing. While the morale of the specialist was often improved, the morale of the general police department membership was not improved. Furthermore, it was difficult to maintain momentum in some of these specialist programs. For example, an advertising program urging citizens to lock their cars could and did reduce auto theft rates for a period of time. However, after the advertising campaign stopped, auto theft rates would begin to rise again.

A number of police departments began to examine team policing as a fully integrated departmental approach to the range of problems described above. It was felt by some that

team policing offered the opportunity of increasing the quality of police service to the community at a reasonable cost. In addition, a carefully designed police team approach should result in improvements both to police-community relations and to the job satisfaction of the officers in police teams.

The term "team policing" had its origins in Aberdeen, Scotland, at the close of World War II. The program there was originated to alleviate the boredom and loneliness of police officers. It was not intended as a fully integrated approach to the range of problems that have been discussed above. In fact, several of the policing efforts that will be reported in this section were begun in response to a much smaller range of problems. Only recently have deliberate attempts been made to design team policing approaches which will deal with all the problems of cost/effectiveness, police-community relations, job satisfaction, and crime prevention.

DEFINITIONS OF TEAM POLICING

Two slightly different definitions of team policing have been offered in the literature to date. Sherman, Milton, and Kelly (1973) suggested that there were three key elements in team policing:

1. Geographic stability of patrol.
2. Maximization of interaction among team members.
3. Maximization of communication between police team members and the community.

Sherman et al further suggested that there were four organizational supports that characterized the true team policing project:

1. Unity of supervision.
2. Lower-level flexibility in policy-making.
3. Unified delivery of services.
4. Combined investigative and patrol functions.

Bloch and Specht (1973) discussed four key elements of team policing and a variety of sub-components:

1. Planning within the team.
2. Police-community relations:
 - continuous assignment to a neighbourhood;
 - dispatch continuity;
 - foot patrol;
 - police street tactics.
3. Encouragement of police professionalism:
 - treatment of team as a professional group (use of team conferences);
 - developmental style of supervision;
 - training and education;
 - supervision in absence of commander;
 - encouragement of individual contributions to policy formulation;
 - reduction of boredom;
 - improved personnel evaluation techniques.
4. Assignment of investigative responsibilities to the police team.

The present author feels that these two schemes can be combined into one set of six key elements of team policing:

1. Stable geographic assignment.
2. Decentralized authority.

3. Emphasis on community relations.
4. Emphasis on crime prevention.
5. Improvement of internal police department communications.
6. Reduction of over-all reliance on the use of police department specialists, particularly those in centralized detective units.

STABILITY OF GEOGRAPHIC ASSIGNMENT

Most of the team policing experiences to be discussed relied on a stable geographic assignment of their manpower. This meant that a team of police officers and their commander were solely responsible on a twenty-four-hour-per-day basis for the delivery of police service to a defined geographical area. The element of geographical stability of assignment required that the team itself have control over what other police units could enter the territory. For example, tactical units or narcotics units could normally enter a team area only on the invitation, or with the approval of, the police team designated for that area.

Geographical stability also required continuity in dispatching. That is, the central dispatching facility could not constantly dispatch police team units out of their designated geographical territory. Conversely, central dispatch could not constantly assign calls within the territory of a police team to police units from other territories.

The element of geographic stability of assignment allowed the working police officer to build up an intimate knowledge of the territory that he served and to build stronger personal relationships and to improve channels of communication with the citizens of the neighbourhood.

DECENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY

The concept of decentralization of authority required that the police team be given the authority to make some decisions traditionally reserved for higher departmental officials.

Shift Scheduling

Shift scheduling was frequently decentralized in team policing experiments. Based on an analysis of criminal occurrences within the territory, the team determined which shifts were to be worked and which team members were to work these shifts.

This particular decentralization of authority was important, and in some departments, could have resulted in important cost reductions. For example, a police department might have determined the size of its shifts by the requirements of the peak workload period. Manpower costs could be reduced by staffing the shifts according to actual demands for services.

Decentralization of shift scheduling was also likely to be important to police morale. It usually resulted in an increase in the number of day and evening shifts worked and a

decrease in the number of night shifts worked. This might have been beneficial to the police officer's home life and social life. In addition, if shift scheduling resulted in a better match between manpower deployment and workload, there would have been fewer shifts worked during which the police officer had little to do and became bored and frustrated. Police executives generally felt that boredom could be a cause of police misconduct and subsequent poor community relations. Theoretically, the police officer who had little to do was much more likely to conduct an illegal search or to behave in an aggressive manner towards members of ethnic minorities than was the police officer who was fully occupied.

Uniforms

Another area of decision-making that was frequently decentralized to the team level involved uniforms. The team itself determined whether it would wear police uniforms. In some cases this decision-making authority was further delegated to the individual officer. He could determine whether he reported for his shift in plain clothes or in uniform.

Planning

Planning responsibility was also delegated to the team level. This could include formulation of team objectives, the discussion of alternative programs of action to reach these objectives, the selection of programs of action that were actually

used by the team, and the preparation of a budget to support these programmed activities.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS EMPHASIS

The third element typically found in many team policing experiments was a strong emphasis on community relations.

Use of Social Resources

In some team policing experiments, the police teams were told that it was their responsibility to focus the community's entire social resources on the problem of preventing crime. They were told that they must build effective working relationships with other social agencies such as the school system, the municipal social services department, probation services, and the municipal parks and recreation department.

Community Meetings

Other police teams actually tried to set up formal meetings on a regular basis with the citizens in their community. These meetings, initiated by the police department, were designed to encourage open and honest two-way communication between the public and their police department.

Citizen Involvement

In some cases there was an attempt to improve citizen

involvement in policing through the use of advisory boards. That is, either the community or the commander of the police team might select a group of individuals to provide advice to the police team on policy and operation.

Another way of emphasizing community relations was to involve the public in real police work. A police team might form an auxiliary of either volunteer or paid para-professionals. These para-professionals assisted the police in their daily activities. On a more informal level, neighbourhood citizens could be invited to ride along with the police to observe them as they performed their duties.

Informal Contact

Another method of increasing the level of communication between the police team and the neighbourhood citizens was to insist that the police officer leave his vehicle (be it a car, motor scooter, or motorcycle) to initiate informal contact with area businessmen, youth, and the general population on an informal, non-law enforcement basis.

Referrals

Police teams also adopted policies of referring various types of problems to other social service agencies for non-criminal justice solutions.

Street Tactics

Of course, police teams were usually expected to refrain from aggressive patrol techniques, such as stop and frisk or street interrogation.

CRIME PREVENTION EMPHASIS

A fourth major element underlying many team policing practices was that of placing a very strong emphasis on crime prevention, as opposed to the more traditional activities of crime detection and offender apprehension.

Identification of Potential Offenders

The members of a police team were encouraged to attempt to identify the potential offenders within their neighbourhoods. They were to do this by close cooperation with school officials; careful observation of patterns of domestic disputes; close cooperation with other social service agencies, particularly with parole services; liaison with recreation leaders, religious leaders, and other community organizations.

Identification of Targets

Police teams also identified potential problem spots, such as bars, hotels, and parks, where trouble was known to occur frequently. The officers made a habit of being present in such areas on a regular basis before the trouble occurred. Businesses

and residences that were particularly likely to be the targets of criminal activity were identified and given close surveillance. Informal, non-law enforcement contacts were established with persons who were thought to constitute high risks in terms of their potential for becoming criminals. Stress was laid on youth and ex-offenders.

INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSES

Team policing experiments were also characterized by careful attention to the internal communication processes of the police department.

Team Conferences

Within police teams, formal team conferences were scheduled at regular intervals to provide for the exchange of information and the education of team members.

Inter-Team Communications

In addition, various mechanisms usually ensured that an adequate level of communication occurred across team boundaries. This was particularly important because of the high degree of innovation anticipated as authority was progressively decentralized. If one police team produced innovations in policing techniques generally applicable across a police department, it was important that these results be communicated as quickly as possible to the members of other teams. In some

police departments, team commanders were expected to meet on a regular basis. Newsletters were another device for ensuring communication among teams.

REDUCED USE OF SPECIALISTS

The sixth major element of team policing was that it required a reduction in the police department's over-all reliance on the services of police specialists. This was particularly true for specialists located in centralized units. In some cases, specialized traffic units were abolished. General traffic enforcement and accident investigation were delegated to the general police officer in the police team. In addition, most team policing experiments encouraged police officers to take on greater responsibility for the investigation of routine crimes. In fact, in some police departments the police teams were responsible for determining whether they required a specialist detective unit to bring a particular case to a satisfactory conclusion.

However, there was still considerable variation among team policing experiments in terms of how specialist services were actually provided. There did seem to be general agreement that at least some specialized detective units should be retained at central headquarters. These detective units were to be responsible for the observation of city-wide patterns of crime and for the investigation of crime where any lengthy training and specialized skills might be required to conclude the investigation satisfactorily. For example, commercial fraud investigations

might require lengthy training, education, and experience in the practice of accounting. Such educational and training qualifications would not be required of the general police officer. Therefore, the investigation of sophisticated and complex commercial frauds should generally rest with a specialist detective unit.

Some teams attempted to provide a range of services within their own teams' membership. However, this usually required that the police team be large enough to provide adequate coverage in all areas of specialization during all time periods. This requirement for teams of a larger size had potential adverse effects on team cohesion and productivity.

When a range of specialties did exist within a team, however, then the specialists could train each of the other members of the team in their particular areas of specialization. There were also problems with this approach because it was somewhat frustrating to acquire skills which were rarely used.

In other team policing experiments, detectives were assigned as members of the team. The detectives were to teach the other members of the police team something of their investigative skills. Problems remained in this approach as well. The detective was usually more highly paid, and had a higher status than the rest of the team members. This focused the attention of team members on the acquisition of investigative skills, primarily oriented toward the detection of crime and apprehension of offenders, and, diverted them from the crime prevention role of the police.

The next chapter will discuss a number of team policing experiments which have been conducted in cities in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. Each of these experiments will be discussed in terms of whether the team policing design employed each of the six elements outlined in this chapter.

III - TEAM POLICING EXPERIMENTS

The first team policing experiment described in the literature occurred in Aberdeen, Scotland, in 1947. The most recently available reports on team policing experiments refer to team policing undertaken in Calgary and Cincinnati in 1973. Additional team policing implementation is under way, but there are no reports of this work available in the literature.

ABERDEEN, SCOTLAND

Sherman et al (1973) mentioned briefly a project undertaken by the police department in Aberdeen, Scotland. Teams of five and ten men who worked together regularly were formed. They worked both on foot and in cars. The number of teams in service at any one point in time depended on the concentration of crime and calls for service experienced during that time period. Teams could be moved to different parts of the city as workloads demanded.

In terms of the six elements, the Aberdeen experiment should probably not be regarded as a true team policing experiment for the purposes of this paper. It did not provide geographic stability of assignment. There was no evidence to suggest that authority was decentralized. There was no evidence to suggest that greater emphasis was placed on community relations than had been the case in the past. There was no evidence to suggest that the team policing program was intended to redirect the attentions of the police from detection and apprehension to crime prevention. From the material available, it could

not be determined whether there was any great stress on internal communications. Finally, from what was reported, it was unlikely that the Aberdeen experiment called for any reduction in over-all departmental reliance upon the use of police specialists.

This scheme was ended in 1963. No literature describing the reasons for termination was available at the time of the review.

TUCSON, ARIZONA

Bristow (1969) described the fluid patrol system adopted by Tucson, Arizona, in 1963.

Program Description

This program was based directly on the program tried by Aberdeen, Scotland. The Tucson program followed the computerization of the police department records division. At that time, the city area was seventy-two square miles. The city was divided into two sectors, each commanded by a field lieutenant, and further subdivided into thirty patrol areas. A computer program was developed for the allocation of manpower according to the crime trends developing in small, one-quarter square-mile reporting districts called "grids". For example, one patrol area could have four to six men assigned to pay particular attention to specific grids. On the other hand, another patrol area might have only one officer assigned, or, one officer might be assigned to cover two or three patrol areas which had

relatively few crime problems.

Measurements Used

The crime rate was used to measure the results of this program. In 1964, cities of the same approximate size as Tucson reported that crime had increased approximately 18.6% over the previous year. Tucson, on the other hand, reported a 13% decrease. The statistics included a 9.16% drop in aggravated assaults, a 6.33% drop in burglary, and a 28.44% reduction in auto theft.

Program Modifications

Tactical squads without specific patrol areas were formed in November, 1964. In January, 1965, the city was divided into four sub-sectors. The personnel of each watch was broken into squads. The assignments within the sectors were made by the squad sergeants. The squads consisted of six or seven men, each commanded by a sergeant. The individual police officer was encouraged to act more as a generalist. He was told that he could expect to see investigations through to conclusion. The teams rotated their shifts together. That is, the sergeant and his six or seven patrol officers always worked the same shifts and had the same days off. The sergeant could authorize some of his men to work in plain clothes.

Elements of Team Policing

Clearly, the Tucson program did not fully meet the requirements of team policing as stressed in this report. Small teams of men were held accountable for specific pieces of geography. However, the geographic assignment was not stable. That is, the squad would be responsible for a particular area only during a particular shift. The squad could be assigned to different sectors of the city according to the apparent demands of changing crime statistics. There was, however, a certain amount of decentralization of authority to the squads and the squad commanders. For example, the squad commander could determine whether his men ought to work in plain clothes or in uniform. Clearly, there was to be an emphasis on crime prevention. The prime method of measuring the success or failure of the program was to be the reduction in the crime rate. However, there was no evidence to suggest that any emphasis was placed on the importance of improving community relations. There was no description available of any efforts the Tucson squads might have undertaken to improve the communications between the police and the public.

To some extent, the requirement of improving internal communications within the police department was met. The formation of small units of police officers who always worked together guaranteed that the squads would become cohesive and would share information with greater frequency than would be likely under a more generalized shift rotation system. In addition, there was strong emphasis in the program on the

computerized tabulation of statistics by small (one-quarter square mile) reporting grids. This maximized the opportunities of squad commanders and individual police officers to understand Tucson's crime trends. Also, prior to the beginning of each shift, the watch commander would conduct a briefing for the squad commanders as a group. This would encourage sharing of information among squads. Before each shift, the squad commander would brief his own squad on its assignments. He could bring to these meetings any useful information from the computerized crime reporting system or from his contacts with the other squad commanders.

Finally, there were at least some rudimentary attempts to reduce the over-all reliance of the Tucson Police Department on police specialists, particularly those in central detective units. Officers were encouraged to carry an investigation as far as they could.

On the whole, however, it is the feeling of this author that the Tucson Police Department's fluid patrol squad system cannot be regarded as a true team policing experiment. The key missing elements were the failure to incorporate complete geographic stability of assignment and the failure to emphasize the importance of community relations.

Edmonton, Alberta

The City of Edmonton Police Department used a similar system prior to a reorganization recommended in a survey conducted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police

in 1972. In the Edmonton squad system the team was composed of thirteen constables commanded by a sergeant. As in Tucson, the entire team worked on exactly the same shift-rotation schedule and had exactly the same days off. They were even scheduled for vacations as a unit. However, this author has had no access to information which would more completely describe the Edmonton program or the results achieved on the fluid patrol system prior to 1972.

In 1972, the Edmonton Police Department abandoned the fluid patrol squad system and reverted to a shift assignment manpower deployment scheme. Personal comments made by Edmonton Police Department officers and sergeants indicate a general degree of dissatisfaction on the part of both the men and the sergeants and the desire to return to the squad system of deployment. Constables enjoyed the social cohesiveness of the squad system. The sergeants felt they were able to do a better job of in-service training and performance evaluation when they were required to deal only with a small number of men on a regular basis.

ACCRINGTON, ENGLAND

The Chester Constabulary (1968) have written a brief description of the Unit Beat Policing system as instituted in Accrington. This policing program has been adopted widely throughout the United Kingdom in an essentially identical form.

Program Description

The unit was a patrol car area. The patrol car territory was to be covered on a twenty-four hour per day basis. The British Police estimated that it required five men to provide this around-the clock protection. Therefore, a team of five constables would be assigned permanently to a specific patrol car territory. Within the patrol car territory, two foot beats would be established. Each foot beat would be patrolled by a constable known as an area constable. This constable was free to select his own hours of work but was encouraged to vary his hours so that he would not work straight day shifts from Monday to Friday. The area constable was provided with a portable two-way radio for purposes of communication with a central dispatcher. The area constable was required to live in the neighbourhood that he served, and was expected to get to know his neighbourhood well. One of the methods of judging the performance of an area constable was by measuring the amount of information he generated. The police team in a Unit Beat Policing system, therefore, consisted of five men assigned to a patrol car territory, two men assigned to foot patrol within that patrol car territory, a detective, and a policewoman.

Generally speaking, these geographical Unit Beats were formed within the existing geographic territories of police subdivisions. A number of Unit Beat teams reported to the sergeant or inspector in charge of the subdivision station. Each subdivision station also contained a collator responsible

for the collection of information from every available source, including the police and the public, within the subdivision. The collator analyzed and recorded this information. Then, he was expected to disseminate it to all police officers within the subdivision, if that was appropriate, or to police officers to whom the information might be of specific concern.

Program Rationale

Unit Beat Policing was introduced primarily as a response to severe manpower pressures in the United Kingdom. Police pay scales have not generally risen as quickly as incomes in other occupations in the United Kingdom, and many U.K. police forces have found it difficult to recruit. Consequently they have suffered chronic shortages of manpower.. It was not unusual for a major British police force to be several hundred men short of authorized strength. Therefore, it was essential for these police departments to find the best way of using available manpower. It was recognized that the public's faith in the police would be shaken if a quick response to calls for service was not available. Therefore, patrol cars were deployed on a twenty-four hour per day basis. However, it was also recognized that the police work load varied from time period to time period. Therefore, the area constables who patrolled on foot were authorized to schedule their hours of work according to the demands for police services in the neighbourhood. Finally, it was recognized as being essential that the police department maintain the closest possible relationship

with the communities being policed; these relationships were essential to maintain the flow of information from the public to the police required by the police if they were to succeed in their mission. Therefore, the area constables were required to live in the territories they served. In addition, they were expected and encouraged to develop informal contacts with the public at every opportunity.

Elements of Team Policing

Unit Beat Policing as practiced in the United Kingdom appears to meet most of the requirements of the definition established for team policing for the purpose of this report. Unit Beat teams enjoyed permanent geographic stability of assignment. There was a certain amount of decentralization of authority, particularly in the shift schedules of the area constable. There was a very strong emphasis on the maintenance and improvement of community relations. The area constable's performance was measured by the amount of information that he was able to generate from his neighbourhood and his relationships with the citizens living there. However, the description of Unit Beat Policing available did not describe any strong emphasis on crime prevention. Rather, the impression given was that the information developed from improved community relations basically was to be used for the solution of crimes after they had occurred.

Internal Communications

There was a very strong emphasis on improving the flow of communications within the police department. Because the Unit Beat teams were so small, a certain amount of cohesiveness could be expected to develop. Therefore, communications within these teams could be expected to be good. In addition, a system of daily bulletins supported the exchange of information. As soon as possible after an area constable reported to duty, the patrol car driver on duty at that time would bring him a copy of the daily bulletin. The important role of the central collator of information has been noted previously.

Use of Specialists

Finally, there was at least some reduction in the reliance of the police department upon the use of specialist police officers, particularly those assigned to centralized detective units. A detective was assigned to each Unit Beat team. With the manpower shortages described, it would have been reasonable to expect that constables would be called upon to perform far more investigative duties than might previously have been the case. The presence of a detective on the Unit Beat team allowed the transfer of investigative skills when necessary and appropriate.

Measurements Used

This author has not had the opportunity to view any

material evaluating, in any real terms, the success or failure of Unit Beat Policing in the United Kingdom.

RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA

Phelps and Harmon (1973) and Sherman et al (1973) have described a team policing experiment that was introduced in Richmond, California, in June, 1968.

Program Description

The Richmond program fits the model developed in Aberdeen, Scotland, and elaborated in the United States in Tucson, Arizona. However, because of the small size of the city of Richmond, California, it is possible to regard the city itself as one neighbourhood. Patrol officers were originally divided into ten teams. Each team consisted of eight to twelve patrol officers commanded by a sergeant. As in Aberdeen and Tucson, the members of each team always worked together, worked on the same shift-rotation schedule, and always had the same days off. During periods of low demand for police services, one team might cover the whole city. During peak hours, as many as four teams might overlap. In addition, training was delivered to the teams as units. Five teams covered the basic shift rotation, two relief teams worked days when the other teams were off, and a team relieved teams taking vacations. Four years later, in March 1972, two tactical teams were added to work in those areas of the city experiencing especially high rates of crime.

Elements of Team Policing

The teams did not have geographic stability of assignment in Richmond. However, because of the small size of the city, this was probably not critical. There was a certain amount of decentralization of authority. Teams could determine whether they would work in uniform or in civilian clothes. They could determine whether there should be one, two, three or four officers working in a car together. On some occasions, team members even rode bicycles.

Crime Prevention

There did not appear to be any particularly strong emphasis on crime prevention. In fact, had crime prevention been established as an objective, the program might have been regarded as something of a failure. In 1971, according to Sherman et al (1973), the crime index rate of Richmond, California, was approximately twice the national average and twice the average of cities of the same size.

Community Relations

There was strong emphasis on community relations. In fact, community service officers were directly involved in the more routine and time-consuming tasks of the department. Community service officers, assigned to six of the teams, were paid, wore police uniforms, but did not carry weapons or make arrests.

Internal Communications

The whole team concept was intended to improve the communications within the police department, and more specifically to provide a great deal of interaction among team members.

Use of Specialists

Finally, team members were given a great deal more investigative responsibility than had previously been the case. However, the detective division remained centralized, and no detectives were assigned to the original police teams. It was regarded as highly likely that detectives and community relations officers and possibly other specialists would be assigned to the teams later.

SYRACUSE, NEW YORK

The installation of a Crime Control Team in Syracuse in July 1968 was reported by Elliott and Sardino (1971). Their work was also discussed briefly by Bloch and Specht (1973b) and in some greater detail by Sherman et al (1973).

Program Description

At the time, Syracuse was a city of approximately 200,000 residents, policed by 436 officers. The first Crime

Control Team was composed of nine persons. It was commanded by a lieutenant who was supported by a sergeant serving as deputy team commander and seven patrol officers. The team was responsible for the control of crime within a specific geographic territory which was designed on the basis of the number of people living there and the number of properties vulnerable to criminal attack. However, the Crime Control Team members did not have complete responsibility for the delivery of all police services in their geographic territory. Other police units handled routine calls for service. The Crime Control Team responded only to crimes. Members of the team were expected to spend a certain part of each of their working shifts surveying the premises of local business establishments for security. They were also expected to undertake preventive patrol which emphasized the coverage of both potential crime targets and potential criminals. Finally, the team was expected to react to criminal attacks.

Elements of Team Policing

Syracuse Crime Control Teams did have a stable geographic assignment. However, this assignment was not exclusive. That is, other police units were also involved in the delivery of police services to the area.

Decentralization of Authority

There was a certain amount of decentralization of

authority. The team was given the responsibility of scheduling tours of duty for its members. However, this scheduling had to take place within rather rigid central guidelines. No team member could be compelled to work more than eight hours in a twenty-four hour period. A team member was expected to work the same eight-hour period each day, if possible. No team member was to work more than forty hours in a seven-day period. All team members were expected to get two consecutive days off during every seven-day period. Finally, each team member was expected to get at least two weeks notice of when his days off would occur. A distinctive uniform was prescribed for Crime Control Team members which involved white shirts and distinctive badges to enable the public to distinguish immediately between Crime Control Team members and other patrol force officers.

Crime Prevention

There was considerable emphasis on the prevention of crime. Officers were held accountable for the crime rate in the geographic territory. The primary method of operation was to advise local residents and businessmen on how they could protect themselves from crime, engage in preventive patrol, and intercept criminals in the course of committing offences.

Community Relations

There was strong emphasis on community relations.

However, much of this effort was based on one-way communication from the police department to the public. The **Crime Control Team** attempted to keep community leaders informed of what was going on at all times. In addition, team members were expected to have regular contact with area businessmen in the course of their security surveys. The feedback on how the area population viewed the **Crime Control Team** developed more informally. Information in this area was volunteered by religious and political leaders in the neighbourhood.

Internal Communications

There was also a strong emphasis within the **Crime Control Team** program on improving internal communications. However, most of this effort was focused on improving crime report forms, officer activity logs, and tabulation and analysis of crime statistics.

Use of Specialists

The Syracuse experiment definitely attempted to reduce the over-all reliance of the police department on the use of specialist skills, particularly in the area of investigations. The **Crime Control Team** member responding to a crime assumed over-all responsibility for the direction of the investigation. He could determine whether he wished to employ the assistance of a specialized detective unit. He alone could determine whether the probability of solving the case was sufficiently great to

warrant the expenditure of additional time and effort. However, it might certainly be argued that the whole Crime Control Team approach involved the creation of yet another group of specialists within the Syracuse Police Department, the members of the CCT's themselves.

Measurements Used

The evaluation techniques employed involved only the use of crime statistics. However, these statistics were used in some novel ways. The basic measures used were reported crimes, the number of crimes cleared, and a performance index which compared the number of crimes reported to the number of crimes cleared. Certain types of offences were excluded from consideration. These included the so-called victimless crimes and other areas of criminal activity where the number of crimes reported could depend, to any great degree, on the level of police activity in relation to these crimes. The Crime Control Team area in terms of these crime rates, clearance rates and performance indices were compared with twenty-two other geographic territories. The conclusion drawn was that the Crime Control Team area performed in a superior manner on all indices compared with the majority of other territories.

Elliott and Sardino (1971) also suggested some methods of measurement that were not used. It was suggested that the number of people on the streets after dark could be used as a simple index of citizen fear. A similar measurement would be the number of sales in the neighbourhood stores open at night.

For example, the ratio of night-time to day-time sales might be computed to measure citizen fear of crime. A possible measure of police attitudes to the Crime Control Team might have been the number of requests for re-assignment.

Problems

Elliott and Sardino (1971) also reported that they encountered three serious difficulties in the implementation of their program:

(1) Planning

Elliott and Sardino felt that the command structure of the police department was not adequately involved in the planning and implementation of the first Crime Control Team experiment, resulting in resistance within the command structure to expansion of the program.

(2) Team Selection

Above average police officers had been deliberately selected as members of the Crime Control Team. They had also been deliberately selected as younger than average. The feeling was that the younger police officer be less resistant to the changes proposed in the Crime Control Team program.

(3) Team Distinctions

Members of the Crime Control Team were set apart from other police officers by a distinctive uniform.

These three elements produced considerable resentment and hostility to the Crime Control Team by the majority of the police officers in the Syracuse Police Department. This again made expansion of the Crime Control Team program extremely difficult.

DETROIT, MICHIGAN.

Bloch and Ulberg (1972), Bloch and Specht (1973), and Sherman et al (1973) have all discussed a team policing experiment which had begun in Detroit in March, 1970, under Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy.

Program Description

At the time of the experiment, Detroit had a population of approximately 1.5 million. The police department had an authorized strength of 5,659 uniformed officers, 527 civilians, and 150 cadets. However, the department was considerably below authorized strength, having only 4,583 uniformed officers, 448 civilians and 119 cadets. The first newly developed team was given a territory in the tenth precinct. The territory essentially covered two existing patrol car territories. The team was composed of one sergeant designated as team commander,

a second sergeant designated as assistant commander, twenty-four patrol officers, and three detectives. The territory covered approximately 12,000 residents, of whom 99% were black.

Elements of Team Policing

Although the Detroit team policing program lasted less than two years, we can still analyze its program in terms of the six elements of team policing.

Geographic Stability

Although there were definite geographic limits to the territory of the team police officers, a major dispatching problem arose. Team police officers were frequently dispatched to calls outside the team area, and police officers from other units frequently were dispatched to calls in the team area. This may have been a natural consequence of the fact that the department was seriously undermanned at the time the team police experiment was undertaken.

Decentralization of Authority

There was a great deal of decentralization of authority to the team sergeants. Shift scheduling of team members was the responsibility of the team itself. In addition, the team was free to determine whether it would patrol its area by foot, automobile, or motor scooter.

Community Relations

There was a strong emphasis on community relations. The police team personnel were urged to meet informally with citizens whenever possible. Team members were frequently assigned by the team commander to attend specific community meetings. To ensure that community contact actually took place, police officers were required to report on their daily activity report forms each contact, the nature of the contact, and the length of time that it took.

Crime Prevention

Crime prevention was an important feature of the experiment. Patrol officers were told that the reasons for developing greater contacts with the community included the ability to develop information about potential targets of criminal opportunity and about the activities of criminals within the neighbourhood.

Internal Communications

The Detroit team policing experiment also included a mechanism for improving communications within the police department. The police team was expected to meet monthly for a conference in which information about the team area could be shared.

Use of Specialists

The experiment required assigning detectives to the police team, thus reducing the reliance of the department on centralized specialist detective units. However, the detectives were not required to teach investigative skills to patrol officers as a part of the program. Improved communications between the patrol function and the investigative function were noted.

Measures Used

A variety of measures were used to evaluate the team policing effort. Reported rates of crime rose and then fell, but no conclusions could be drawn from this. It was noted that arrest records and investigation records were improved during the team policing experiment. In addition, team policemen responded more quickly to calls for assistance. The quality of arrest made by team police officers was felt to be better than those made by officers of the department in general, i.e., more of the arrests made by the team resulted in prosecutions. No formal citizen surveys were undertaken; however, the number of citizen complaints about the police decreased in the team policing area. Team police officers were subject to lower rates of absenteeism than were other members of the police department.

Problems

The experiment in Detroit encountered four serious

problems:

(1) Team Selection

The first team commander was permitted to select the best -- not the average -- men available from a group of volunteers. This engendered hostility towards the team on the part of other members of the police department.

(2) Dispatching

The dispatching problem previously mentioned was never completely solved. Team police members continued to be dispatched to calls outside of the team area, and other units continued to be dispatched to handle calls within the team area.

(3) Planning

The command structure of the police department was not involved in any meaningful way in the planning and implementation of team policing. The literature would suggest that there was much direct interaction between the team commander and the office of the police commissioner.

(4) Continuity of Command

When the police commissioner moved on to become police commissioner of the City of New York, little support

for team policing remained among the officers of the department. By 1971, the program had died a slow death. The men of the police team were gradually absorbed into the regular precinct command structure.

LOS ANGELES BASIC CAR PLAN

Bloch and Specht (1973) have described the Los Angeles Basic Car Plan that was implemented throughout that city in April, 1970, after a five month experiment in two of the city's 17 patrol divisions.

Program Description

The Basic Car Plan has several similarities to the Unit Beat Policing system in the United Kingdom described earlier. Patrol car territories were established on the basis of an estimated work-load. A team of nine police officers was permanently assigned to the territory. Each team consisted of a lead officer, five senior patrol officers, and three probationary officers. This team of nine men was responsible for manning the Basic Car, known as an "A" unit, on a twenty-four hour day basis. Additional "Y" units overlapped the "A" units during periods of peak demand for police services.

Elements of Team Policing

Although the Basic Car Team was assigned to a specific geographic territory, the stability of this assignment was not

particularly great. Basic Cars were frequently dispatched to calls outside of their patrol territories, and cars from other patrol territories were frequently assigned calls in the Basic Car District.

Decentralization of Authority

There was very little decentralization of authority. Shifts were assigned, and all officers were required to work in uniform.

Community Relations

There was some emphasis on community relations. The Basic Car Team was expected to hold regular monthly meetings with citizens of the district. There was some attempt to encourage informal contact between the police and the citizens; however, officers were neither supplied with portable radios, nor encouraged to leave their vehicles for the purpose of making citizen contacts.

Crime Prevention

There was an emphasis on the reduction of crime. It was hoped that the increased public contact created by the stable geographic assignment and by the regular monthly meetings with the community would lead to an improved flow of information and a reduction of over-all crime rates.

Internal Communications

The basic mechanism for the improvement of internal communications within the Basic Car District team was the lead officer who was responsible for **coordinating all activities.**

Use of Specialists

There was no over-all reduction of police specialists' services as a result of the Basic Car Plan. Patrol officers were not encouraged to undertake more investigative activities than had previously been the case. Unlike Unit Beat Policing in the United Kingdom, detectives were not assigned to Basic Car Districts.

Measures Used

No formal attempt was made to evaluate the Basic Car Plan. Informal information suggests that the Basic Car Plan of Los Angeles may be in serious trouble. Numerous incidents of patrol officer dissatisfaction have been related. There are persistent rumors that the plan is to be phased out, possibly in favour of a more orthodox team policing approach, which will be described in a later section of this report.

DAYTON, OHIO

Bloch and Specht (1973), Sherman et al (1973), and Koverman (1974) have all reported on a team policing experiment

conducted in Dayton, Ohio, beginning in December, 1970.

Program Description

At the time, Dayton was a city of approximately 250,000 people. The fifth police district was selected to serve as the experimental area. A lieutenant was placed in command of the district. Four units were selected, each consisting of nine patrol officers and a sergeant. The team was supported by neighbourhood assistance officers, who were essentially civilian volunteers who had received police training. The four units actually operated as one team. They were supported by one detective, a community co-ordinator, a co-ordinator for the Neighbourhood Assistance Program, and one secretary. There were five neighbourhood assistance officers assigned to the total experiment. A unique feature of the Dayton experiment was the specialist-generalist concept. In addition to having general policing skills and knowledge, each member of the police team would also be a specialist in a certain area, such as juvenile, family crisis intervention, complex investigative strategy, etc.

Elements of Team Policing

Members of the police team were assigned within a specific geographic territory; however, the unit boundaries within the fifth district were ignored. For all practical purposes, this meant that essentially the four smaller units operated as one large team. In the view of Bloch and Specht,

this suggested that the area covered and the size of the team (47 members) were so large that the team policing experiment actually represented a small precinct and not a police team. In addition, in the early stages of the experiment the geographic stability of the assignments was violated by frequent dispatch of district five cars to other territories. This problem was later corrected.

Decentralization of Authority

There was a certain amount of decentralization of authority. Teams enjoyed discretion in such areas as uniforms, vehicle use, and shift scheduling.

Community Relations

There was a very strong emphasis on community relations in the Davton program. Monthly meetings between the police teams and their respective communities were scheduled. In addition, the assignment of neighbourhood assistance officers guaranteed a certain level of public participation in police work. These neighbourhood assistance officers lived in the neighbourhoods being policed. Systems of referring police-identified problems to other social agencies were also established; however, use of the referral systems by police team members was not particularly great.

Crime Prevention

The emphasis on crime prevention was not strong. Improvement of police-community relations and the reduction of racial tension were more primary objectives.

Internal Communications

One of the weak points was that there was little provision for the improvement of internal communications within the police department. The program did not call for regularly scheduled team conferences. Most communication among team members was informal, and in writing.

Use of Specialists

One of the strong features of the experiment was the reduction of departmental reliance on police specialists. A great deal of investigative authority was decentralized to the patrol officers. In addition, detectives were assigned to the team, but the team could decide whether it wished to make use of the services of centralized detective units.

Problems

A number of new problems were encountered by the Dayton Police Department as it implemented its team policing program. A high level of racial tension characterized the community at

the time. The city was in a fiscal crisis which not only made it difficult for the department to deliver its own range of services but also made it difficult for effective referrals to be made from the police department to other municipally funded agencies. Moreover, the changes being introduced were viewed as threats by both members of the police department and certain segments of the community.

Measurements Used

No formal evaluation of the Dayton team policing effort was known at the time of this review.

HOLYOKE, MASSACHUSETTS

The Holyoke Police Department of Holyoke, Massachusetts, instituted a team policing effort in December, 1970 (Bloch & Specht, 1973; O'Malley, 1973; Sherman et al, 1973).

Program Description

Holyoke had a population of approximately 50,000. Its police department consisted of only 117 people. The team was instituted in ward one of Holyoke, an area of 5,000 people characterized by poverty. The population was composed of 40% Puerto Ricans, 10% blacks, and 50% white. The police team consisted of twelve patrol officers commanded by a captain. Puerto Rican community service officers were assigned to the

team, and later detectives were assigned.

Elements of Team Policing

Virtually complete geographic stability of assignment was achieved in Holyoke. The team members were not dispatched to radio calls outside of their territory and would not permit other police officers to enter the team area.

Decentralization of Authority

Decentralization of authority was achieved. The team determined whether it would use police uniforms or blazers and slacks. Shift scheduling was done within the team.

Community Relations

There was a strong emphasis on achieving effective community relations. Monthly meetings of the police team and members of the community were held. A board of community members was formed to advise the team. Aggressive patrol tactics were not permitted.

Crime Prevention

There was not a strong emphasis on crime prevention in the Holyoke experiment. Initially the community police team was formed to reduce racial tensions. Relationships between the Puerto Rican community and the police had been particularly poor,

and it was hoped that the team policing effort would improve the confidence of the community in their police department.

Internal Communication

Effective internal communication within the police department was guaranteed by weekly policy-setting meetings attended by the entire police team, during which major problems were identified and discussed. Committees were formed within the team to study problems and to recommend solutions.

Use of Specialists

The team policing effort resulted in a reduction of the over-all reliance of the department on the use of police specialists. The team had responsibility for investigations, except in the case of homicides. After team policing had become city-wide, detectives were assigned to the teams.

Problems

A number of problems were encountered during the implementation programs.

Team Selection

The first police team had been made up of volunteers. Presumably, these individuals were enthusiastic about the program

and were inclined to do their best to make it successful. The rest of the force was composed of people who were not as enthusiastic about team policing. Because of the volunteer nature of the original selection for participation in the team policing program, those who opposed team policing were not exposed to direct personal participation in the program. Their attitudes remained negative. In addition, the rest of the department came to resent publicity being given to members of the experimental team.

Program Extensions

Nevertheless, the entire police department of Holyoke was converted to police teams. The second unit was instituted in August, 1972. The third unit began operations in January, 1973, and the fourth and final unit in April, 1973.

Measures Used

Evaluation, which suffered from a lack of adequate controls, consisted basically of an assessment of the changes in rates of reported crimes, arrest rates, community and police attitudes, the number of calls for service received by the police, and the number of community contacts.

NEW YORK CITY

An ambitious program of Neighbourhood Team Policing was

begun in January, 1971, by Patrick V. Murphy, then recently appointed Police Commissioner for the City of New York (Block & Specht, 1973a; Bloch & Specht, 1973b; Sherman et al, 1973).

Program Description

At the time, New York City had a population of approximately eight million. It was served by a police department of over 30,000 police officers. The first Neighbourhood Police Team was instituted in the seventy-seventh precinct, consisting of eighteen patrol officers under the command of a sergeant. Their territory was what had been one radio patrol car sector. The population of the poor and largely black neighbourhood was approximately 10,000.

Later police teams consisted of a sergeant in command of between thirty and thirty-five patrol officers who covered two former patrol car sectors. In the original team policing experiment, detectives were not assigned to the teams.

The program was expanded rapidly so that by August, 1971, there were twenty-nine teams of approximately one thousand men. Five entire precincts (twenty-fourth, thirty-fourth, fiftieth, seventy-seventh, one-hundred-tenth) had been converted to team operation. Thirty-two additional precincts had one or more teams in part of their precincts. In March, 1973, eight detectives were assigned to teams in five precincts on an experimental basis. The program eventually grew to include over sixty-five teams comprising 10% of the patrol force.

Elements of Team Policing

Geographic stability of assignment was never completely realized in New York City. Members of the police teams were consistently dispatched to calls outside of their territories. In addition, frequently the sergeant in charge of a police team did not enjoy sole command of his team. During the hours when he was off duty, his team could be subjected to the directions of sergeants and senior officers at the precinct level.

Community Relations

It was intended that there be strong emphasis on community relations in the neighbourhood police teams. The evidence suggested that cooperative relationships were improved between the police teams and business establishments. However, aggressive patrol tactics with youth and minority groups were frequently noted. Police teams did not initiate meetings with the public but did attend meetings initiated by members of the community. The Neighbourhood Police Teams were required to establish close working relationships with social service agencies. However, effective referral systems did not develop, in part because police officers frequently experienced great difficulty in getting other social service agencies to accept referrals at the times when these referrals were needed. Civilian police auxiliaries were used on a regular basis. They were permitted to patrol independently or with regular police

officers. One of the prime objectives of the New York City Neighbourhood Police Teams was to improve crime control.

Crime Prevention

There seemed to have been little effort in crime prevention. Some team commanders did take the initiative in undertaking crime prevention activities. For example, one team commander used community meetings to talk about criminals believed to be active in the neighbourhood. He also attempted to get information about criminal activity from the citizens who attended these meetings.

Internal Communications

Internal communications were supposed to be guaranteed by frequent team meetings. However, few team commanders held these conferences on a regular basis. With such large teams, it was difficult to schedule times when all of the policemen could attend. In addition, there was antagonism toward schedule changes.

Use of Specialists

Little progress was made in reduction of the use of police specialists. Detectives were not assigned to Neighbourhood Police Teams until 1973, and then only on a limited basis. Patrol officers in the neighbourhood teams were expected to

undertake investigative work; however, few did. It must be noted that detectives in New York City belong to a different police union than do the regular patrol officers. In addition, the detective force has traditionally been politically powerful in the New York City Police Department. Both factors made any meaningful integration of the patrol and investigative functions extremely difficult.

Problems

Five important problems came to light during the New York City experiment:

(1) Overlapping Command Structures

There was the problem of overlapping command structures. Police teams were frequently called upon to function in parallel with an existing precinct command structure. This made it difficult for the team commander to exercise twenty-four hour per day command responsibility. When he was off duty, there was a tendency for the on-duty sergeants and lieutenants to usurp his authority over the team.

(2) Planning

A second major problem was that the command structure of the police department was not adequately involved in the

planning and implementation of the Neighbourhood Team Policing. There tended to be direct lines of communication between team commanders and the very top of the management hierarchy. This annoyed, irritated, and **threatened the middle** management of the police department, particularly the lieutenants and precinct commanders.

(3) Team Size

It would appear that most of the police teams fielded in New York were too large. The large size of the teams made it difficult for the team commanders to retain control on a twenty-four hour per day basis. It was too easy for conflicting instructions to be issued from one shift to another. The large size of the teams also prevented the development of effective mechanisms of internal communication; it was simply too difficult to schedule regular team conferences. Too many conflicting interests had to be reconciled.

(4) Hasty Implementation

Community reaction to the police teams was favourable resulting in a demand from other segments of the community to receive the services of Neighbourhood Police Teams. A hasty pattern of police team implementation developed, making adequate planning and training difficult to achieve.

(5) Detective Persistence

The detective division was not adequately involved in the planning and implementation of Neighbourhood Team Policing. It became highly resistant to the whole concept and apparently resisted the idea that there should be greater integration of patrol and investigative functions.

Measures Used

External evaluation was an important part of New York City's team experiments. Evaluation was made of crime, arrests, job satisfaction, and police and community attitudes, but this was made difficult by the rapid expansion of the police team program. The statistics collected before the introduction of the Neighbourhood Police Teams and at some period after the introduction of the program were compared on a neighbourhood basis. In addition, neighbourhoods where team policing had been introduced were compared with similar neighbourhoods where the program had not been introduced.

During the experimental period, crime rates generally declined in New York City. Those areas of New York City policed by neighbourhood teams reported a somewhat larger reduction in crime than the rest of the department. Neighbourhood Police Teams reported a 13% average reduction. The entire New York City Police Department reported a 10% reduction in crime. It was concluded that the difference could have been a chance occurrence.

There was little evidence that the Neighbourhood Police Teams were effective in developing greater community cooperation in the area of crime control. In terms of community attitudes, there was no measurable reduction in fear of crime, nor was there any improvement in the public's general attitude toward the police that could be attributed to the Neighbourhood Police Team Program. No major improvements in police job satisfaction or basic job attitudes were recorded among officers assigned to teams. There was somewhat less dissatisfaction with pay and hours of work than with others on the police force. Rates of absenteeism among team police officers were only half those of other officers in the police department. Unfortunately, 80% of the members of the Neighbourhood Police Teams believed that their job was getting worse rather than better.

OXNARD, CALIFORNIA

Bloch and Specht (1973b) reported that Oxnard, California, introduced a form of team policing in January, 1971.

Program Description

At the time, Oxnard had a population of approximately 82,000. The section of the city in which the Neighbourhood Car Plan was instituted contained approximately 13,000 residents, of which 90% were of Mexican descent. The team

consisted of one lieutenant as team commander, one sergeant as deputy team commander, and thirteen patrol officers.

Elements of Team Policing

Geographic stability of assignment was achieved. The lieutenant in charge had complete responsibility for the team on a twenty-four hour per day basis.

A certain amount of decentralization of authority did take place. The police team adopted a deployment schedule of four ten-hour days per week.

There was a strong emphasis on community relations, and aggressive patrol techniques were prohibited. An advisory board of community residents was formed and met monthly with the police team to discuss problems in planning for the area. Monthly team meetings were provided as a mechanism of internal communication.

The Oxnard program was not intended to reduce the over-all reliance of the police department on the use of specialists. The patrolmen had not been encouraged to take on additional investigative responsibilities. No detectives had been assigned to the police team.

Measures Used

Evaluation consisted of measurement of police attitudes, analysis of crime and arrest statistics, and analysis of sick leave, injuries, and accidents. The International

Association of Chiefs of Police attitude scale was administered at intervals of one and two years. Police team members were compared with the entire patrol force, a matched group of police officers, and the national IACP baseline data. The survey results published to date indicate that the police team members were more positive about: crime prevention, the value of social sciences, support for law enforcement from the public, and the value of a sense of humor in police work.

ROCHESTER, NEW YORK

Bloch and Ulberg (1974) discussed the team policing program in Rochester, New York.

Program Description

This program was introduced in March, 1971. At the time, the City of Rochester had a population of approximately 300,000, policed by 620 officers. The police team of thirty patrol officers and four detectives was responsible for a defined area with traditional neighbourhood boundaries. Responsibility for all investigations, with the exception of homicide, was vested in the team.

Elements of Team Policing

The Rochester experiment appeared to have achieved geographic stability of assignment. Data regarding the

decentralization of authority and the degree of emphasis on community relations were not published. It would appear that there was a strong emphasis on crime prevention. No data was presented with regard to the mechanisms of internal communication established within the police team. There was some attempt to reduce the over-all reliance of the police department upon specialists, especially those concentrated in centralized detective units. The police teams were given responsibility for the investigation of all crimes, with the exception of homicide. Detectives were assigned directly to the police team.

Program Extension

The program was expanded to include a second team in January, 1972.

Measurements Used

The techniques of evaluation used with respect to the Rochester experiment were an examination of clearance rates for burglary and robbery. In terms of actual incident rates, robbery increased about the same amount in team areas as it did in the rest of the city. However, burglary declined in the team areas while it increased in the rest of the cities. Larceny decreased in both the team areas and the rest of the city. The team areas, however, achieved a far larger decrease in larceny. Criminal trespass declined at approximately the same rate in both the team areas and the rest of the city.

ALBANY, NEW YORK

Bloch and Specht (1973b) described the Neighbourhood Team Policing Program undertaken in Albany, New York, beginning in July, 1971.

Program Description

At the time, Albany had a population of approximately 150,000, policed by approximately 400 officers. The first Neighbourhood Police Unit was deployed in an area of 10,000 population, of whom approximately half were black. The neighbourhood suffered from poverty, substandard housing, unemployment, and a high rate of street crimes. The first team consisted of a lieutenant, who was the team commander, four sergeants and thirty-one patrol officers. The sergeants worked permanent tours of duty, as did the men working for them. Therefore, sergeants were required to become familiar with only the small group of men working directly for them.

A second team was deployed in October, 1972. It consisted of a lieutenant as team commander, four sergeants, forty-one patrol officers, and four detectives. In the case of both teams it should be noted that essentially all members of the Neighbourhood Police Units were selected or hand-picked from among a group of volunteers and thus were not representational of the over-all police department in terms of quality of personnel.

Elements of Team Policing

The Albany Neighbourhood Police Units did achieve complete geographic stability of assignment. In fact, members of other police units were expected to be accompanied by members of the Neighbourhood Police Unit if they were to contact residents of the team area.

Decentralization of Authority

Team commanders were virtually regarded as autonomous chiefs of police for their particular areas. They made manpower deployment decisions and, were responsible for maintaining cooperation with the community and other social service units. Both team units were responsible for investigations, and members of the teams could determine when a case should be closed, subject to the approval of the team commander.

Community Relations

There was considerable emphasis on the improvement of community relations. Representatives of social service agencies outlined the social resources available in the community. Referrals were made from the police department to other social service agencies. Members of the police teams were urged to make personal contact with the public as often as possible. The team commander was expected to be active in community groups. Storefront operation posts were

maintained by both of the police teams, and these posts were manned **around** the clock. A distinctive feature of the Albany police team experiment was the use of the Neighbourhood Police Teams to expedite citizen complaints about other city services, with the police team acting as the complainant. A special referral form was filled out and forwarded to the Chief of Police. The Chief of Police would refer the complaint to the Mayor. The Mayor would pass the complaint on to the agency involved. The city agency would be expected to inform the Chief of Police of the action it took on the complaint. On one of the two police teams, a citizen advisory board was formed to advise the police team. It consisted of fifteen representatives of various agencies and interest groups within the neighbourhood.

Crime Prevention

The teams were also involved in crime prevention activities. However, the available report did not contain a very thorough description of the crime prevention activities undertaken.

Internal Communications

The police teams internal communications were reported to be excellent. It was felt that the teams were very cohesive. Peer pressure was used to keep performance at high levels. In fact, officers in the Albany program

were permitted to vote off the team 'fellow' officers who were not performing up to standard. However, no specific mechanisms used to ensure an adequate level of internal communications were reported.

Use of Specialists

There was a definite attempt to reduce the overall reliance of the Albany Police Department on police specialists, particularly those located in centralized detective units. In the case of the first unit, all investigative functions were handled by the patrol officers. The patrol officers could request assistance from detectives or identification personnel. In the second unit, a different investigative model was used. Four detective positions were created within the unit.

Problems

No major problems were reported during the implementation of the Albany experiment.

Measures Used

Evaluation of the work in Albany concentrated on the monitoring of attitude changes within the community and within the police teams. As of 1973, an evaluation of the first unit had been completed but not released.

NORTH VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA

In 1971, the first team policing work was reported in a Canadian urban area.

Program Description

Robert N. Heywood (1975), Officer-in-Charge of the North Vancouver detachment of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, converted his entire operation to what he called "zone" policing. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police were acting as the municipal police force in the City of North Vancouver under the terms of a contract between the municipal government and the federal government of Canada. At the time of the experiment, the City of North Vancouver had a population of 100,000, policed by 112 members of the RCMP. The seventy-nine square miles of territory was divided into six zones, which followed natural neighbourhood boundaries. For example, major highways, railway tracks, or rivers formed some of the zone dividing lines. Each zone team, of 6 to 12 patrol officers, was commanded by a sergeant. The zone team was responsible for the area on a twenty-four hour per day basis. The men were encouraged to leave their cars to initiate informal contacts with members of the community. The team was responsible for scheduling hours of work. Team conferences were scheduled at regular intervals. Any mistakes made by a team member were discussed by all team members rather than simply between the officer and his immediate superior.

Elements of Team Policing

In North Vancouver, geographic stability of assignment was achieved. Men were assigned to a specific territory and were not normally dispatched beyond the boundaries of that zone territory.

Decentralization of Authority

There was a strong emphasis on the decentralization of authority to the teams. The teams were responsible for scheduling their own hours of work, and individual team members were encouraged to use their own discretion in leaving their cars and initiating informal contacts with the community.

Community Relations

There was a very strong emphasis on community relations. It was pointed out to all team members that they were responsible for focusing the community's total resources on the problem of crime prevention. To this end, police officers were expected to initiate contacts with other social agencies such as the school system, parole services, the parks and recreation department, and the welfare authorities.

Crime Prevention

In North Vancouver, crime prevention was strongly

emphasized. It was recognized at an early point that youths there were responsible for a high proportion of the crime. Therefore, a special effort was made to reach youths and to divert them from criminal activities. Moreover, each police officer was expected to build informal working relationships with the schools in his zone. This resulted in the development of more positive attitudes towards the police on the part of both school officials and students.

Internal Communication

The major mechanisms for internal communication involved zone team meetings and meetings of team commanders, scheduled at regular intervals. As noted earlier, these meetings served not only to exchange information, but also to assist officers in their self development by exposing them to peer criticism of mistakes made in policing practice.

Use of Specialists

There was a specific effort within the North Vancouver experiment to reduce the over-all reliance of the detachment on the use of police specialists. The basic theory advanced by the Officer-in-Charge of the Detachment, Inspector Heywood, was that the zone team patrol officers should deal with amateur criminals and youths in their zones. However, where it was felt that a professional criminal was at work, a centralized detective unit would be employed.

Measures Used

There was no formal evaluation of the team policing program in North Vancouver. Some attention was given to changes in crime statistics as the program was implemented. Certain encouraging trends in crime reduction were noted. There was an informal feeling that patrol officers' attitudes had improved and that the community's attitude towards the police had become more cooperative. This was felt to be especially true in the case of juveniles. In addition, it was thought that the change to zone team policing permitted substantial growth of North Vancouver's population without a corresponding growth in the number of men assigned to the North Vancouver Detachment.

Problems

No significant problems were encountered in the course of the program.

LOS ANGELES: VENICE DIVISION

Both Block and Specht (1973b) and Sherman et al (1973) have described a team policing experiment instituted in April, 1972, in the Los Angeles Police Department, Venice Division.

Program Description

At the time of the experiment, the City of Los Angeles

had approximately 2,800,000 residents, policed by 6,500 officers. The area selected for team policing covered three square miles within the Venice Division of the Los Angeles Police Department. The population of that territory was approximately 35,000 people, 89 percent of whom were white and fell into middle or low income groups. There was a mixture of business, industrial, and residential areas, felt to be representative of the City of Los Angeles. The Los Angeles experiment was unique because it focused on prevention of a specific crime, burglary.

The team area was originally a Basic Car Reporting District staffed by nine men. Under the Basic Car Plan, additional cars were assigned to the territory during peak hours of demand for police services. Narcotics personnel were not assigned to the team. The new team concept incorporated a lieutenant as team commander, four sergeants, two patrol officers, three traffic officers, two accident investigators, one administrative assistant, two typists, and six detectives. This represented about one-seventh of Venice Division's total police manpower and the team territory represented one-sixth of Venice Division's total workload. Team members were selected from among volunteers; however, care was taken to ensure that they were representative of the general quality of police officers found in the Venice Division. This was done by an examination of performance ratings.

Elements of Team Policing

Geographic stability of assignment was maintained.

Police team cars were rarely dispatched outside of their territory.

Decentralization of Authority

There was considerable decentralization of authority. The team commander, a lieutenant, exercised responsibilities normally restricted to captains in charge of patrol or to the detective office at the divisional level. The team commander had authority to deploy his men and equipment according to the team territory's needs.

Community Relations

There was a strong emphasis on community relations. A system of block captains was established. Block captains were selected by the residents of each of the three hundred twenty-five city blocks in the team area. The block captains relayed information about crime and criminals from the police to the residents of the team territory. In addition, the block captains relayed information about suspicious persons and events from the residents to the police. Regular meetings were scheduled between the block captains and the police at two month intervals. Discussion of what information was to be circulated among residents of the territory took place at these meetings. In addition, yearly meetings were scheduled between all residents of a block and members of the police team at the home of the block captain.

Crime Prevention

As indicated, there was strong emphasis on the prevention of burglary. The police team was to develop information from the neighbourhood on the activities of burglars. At the same time, the police team and the block captain were expected to help residents mark their property for identification. Residents of the community were also advised on measures they might take to protect their premises from criminal attack.

Internal Communications

Strong mechanisms were provided to improve internal communications within the team. Each watch was scheduled to last for eight hours and forty-five minutes. The overlap period of forty-five minutes was used for team meetings, information exchange and in-service training. In addition, the entire team was withdrawn from the territory for a three day seminar held to review the experiment. Other police officers from the Venice Division provided coverage of the territory during this period.

Use of Specialists

The Los Angeles team policing experiment also called for a limited reduction of the use of specialists. Patrol officer duties were expanded to include the handling of

traffic accidents. In addition, patrol officers worked closely with the detectives in the team in the course of investigations. Daily contact with team detectives provided patrol officers with informal training in investigation, resulting in the delegation of greater investigative responsibility to the patrol officers as their skills improved.

Problems

No significant problems were encountered in the implementation of the team.

Measures Used

Evaluation efforts included measuring of crime statistics, the extent to which team objectives were reached, traffic accident statistics, and police and community attitudes. Changes within the team area were compared with changes in a control area. In California, approximately seven in one thousand crimes were solved by using citizen information. In contrast, the team achieved an average of between fifty and seventy solutions per thousand crimes through the use of citizen information. In the control area, crime statistics remained relatively steady, while in the team policing area crime statistics were reduced dramatically. Burglary was reduced by 53%.

Program Extensions

The Los Angeles Police Department was reported to be seeking funds for expansion of its team policing program. One possible expansion would be to include one team policing area in each of the department's seventeen divisions. Another possible expansion would convert the entire Venice Division to team policing.

ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA

In April, 1972, the City of St. Petersburg, Florida, fielded its first police team (Bloch & Specht, 1973b).

Program Description

At the time, St. Petersburg had a population of 270,000, with a police force of 15 lieutenants, 40 sergeants, and 310 officers, of which 134 were assigned to patrol duties. The neighbourhood selected for the first team policing experiment had approximately 26,000 residents, 99 per cent of whom were black. The area was characterized by high unemployment, sub-standard housing and poverty. The average annual income in the team territory was \$5,000.

The first police team consisted of a lieutenant, three sergeants, 21 patrol officers, three detectives, and one secretary. The police officers were selected in such a manner as to be representative of the over-all quality of

personnel available within the police department. A unique feature of the experiment was the use of "Management by Objectives" in conjunction with team policing. In effect, the team was required to agree on general goals and specific objectives and to plan programs to meet those objectives. There was a strong emphasis on measurement of performance. Budgetary authority was delegated to the teams.

Elements of Team Policing

Geographic stability of assignment was achieved with the first police team. Only the narcotics unit could operate within the team area without receiving a request for assistance from the team. Occasions when team members were dispatched to calls outside of the team area were relatively rare.

Decentralization of Authority

Considerable decentralization of authority took place. The team scheduled its own hours of work, set its own objectives, designed its own programs to meet these objectives, and established a budget to support the proposed programs.

Community Relations

There was strong emphasis on the building of better relationships with the community. The team commander was

expected to hold regular monthly or bi-monthly meetings with community businessmen; however, it was difficult to maintain community interest in these meetings. Initially, there were to be monthly meetings of the police and the general community membership. These meetings were not held on a regular basis because of the difficulty of finding a suitable place to meet. Aggressive patrol tactics were prohibited within the team area. Members of the police teams tried to introduce themselves to the community and to get to know the citizens. The team commander attempted to seek out both supportive and antagonistic members of the community. An effort to form a volunteer auxiliary was not successful.

Crime Prevention

There was a certain amount of emphasis on crime prevention within the St. Petersburg experiment; however, specific programs for crime prevention were not described in the team policing design.

Internal Communication

In terms of internal communication mechanisms, the team policing program in St. Petersburg required monthly team meetings to discuss project problems. Other informal meetings were scheduled irregularly either by the team commander or his sergeants. In addition, a daily bulletin containing a detailed list of crimes reported during the previous day was circulated to each officer as he reported for duty.

Use of Specialists

One of the objectives of the St. Petersburg experiment was to reduce the reliance of the police department on specialists. Detectives were assigned to the first team, but there were no rank differences between detectives and patrol officers in the St. Petersburg Police Department. Therefore, it was the intention of this assignment to provide the opportunity for the patrol officers to receive training from the detectives in investigative functions.

Program Extensions

In March, 1973, four additional teams were fielded to complete the conversion of the city police to team policing.

Measures Used

There was a fairly strong evaluation effort carried out. Changes within the first team area were compared to changes within a control group. Measurements included community attitudes, police attitudes, clearance rates, crime rates, calls for service, and the extent to which "Management by Objectives" goals were met. The results of the evaluation were not available in 1973.

Problems

Although no severe problems were encountered during the police team program implementation, severe political friction developed between the city manager and two successive chiefs of police. The second resignation of a chief of police in less than twelve months brought the termination of the team policing program.

CINCINNATI, OHIO

Perhaps the most thoroughly documented program of team policing began in March, 1973, in Cincinnati (Bloch & Specht 1973b; Schwartz & Clarren, 1974; Schwartz, Clarren, Fischgrund, Hollins & Nalley (1975)).

Program Description

Cincinnati had approximately 500,000 residents, covering an area of approximately 78 square miles and policed by approximately 1,000 officers. Team policing was implemented in district one. District one, which covered a territory of 3.1 square miles, had a resident population of approximately 35,000. Because district one included the downtown business and shopping area, a daily total of 225,000 shoppers, tourists, and non-resident workers were present in the area. The area also accounted for approximately 25% of the reported crime in Cincinnati.

District one was further sub-divided into six

areas, each of which was a distinctive neighbourhood. Each team consisted of a lieutenant, a commander, three or four sergeants as assistant commanders, one to five detectives, and 11 to 47 patrol officers. Personnel were selected for the teams to be representative of the over-all quality of personnel available within the Cincinnati Police Division.

Elements of Team Policing

Geographic stability of assignment was planned in the program design, and officers were to be assigned to the teams for a relatively long term. Team officers were to be dispatched outside of their territory only when absolutely necessary. Dispatching was handled by a special dispatching unit set up specifically to handle district one.

Decentralization of Authority

A high degree of decentralization of authority was planned. Each team within district one was to be free to deploy its manpower according to the needs of the community being served.

Community Relations

A variety of techniques were used to improve police-community relations. All team members were held accountable for the establishment of good working relationships with the

community. In addition, area youths, hired to serve as community service assistants, were expected to take over many routine, time-consuming tasks. Regular community-police team meetings were scheduled. Systems were established for the referral of police problems to other social agencies. Police officers were encouraged to park their vehicles and to engage in informal contacts with citizens. They were also encouraged to find alternatives to arrest.

Crime Prevention

There was strong emphasis on crime prevention in the duties of all team members. Security checks were made on targets of criminal activities. Information was exchanged with the community at every possible opportunity.

Internal Communications

A number of internal communication mechanisms were established, including the establishment of six collator positions at the district level. As in the Unit Beat Policing schemes in the United Kingdom, the task of the collator was to review, coordinate, and disseminate information to the police teams. Team meetings were scheduled on a regular basis for the sharing of information among team members. Meetings of team leaders and assistant team leaders were also scheduled on a regular basis under the auspices of the district captain.

Use of Specialists

There was a definite tendency to reduce the reliance of the Cincinnati Police Division on police specialists. Each team was held responsible for all investigations except homicide. Patrol officers were responsible for all preliminary investigations. Each officer could decide to close an investigation; however, on-going investigations were handled by detectives assigned to teams. Detectives were also permitted to re-open cases closed by patrol officers.

Measures Used

A major feature of the Cincinnati team policing experiment was the emphasis placed on rigorous evaluation.. A thorough external evaluation of police, resident, business, and victim attitudes was to be conducted. Crime rates, clearance rates, and closure rates were also to be evaluated. Internal evaluations of the effectiveness of investigating and training and the extent to which the teams were successful in meeting their objectives were also included as part of the program design.

However, the unique feature of the Cincinnati team policing experiment was the victimization survey that was included in the evaluation program. Ennis (1967) demonstrated that crime was significantly under-reported in the United States. The previous team policing experiments which were intended to reduce crime actually found that crime rates

increased. Yet, a suspicion arose that more crime was being reported than had previously been the case. If that was true, then the team policing experiment could have been having a positive effect which was being hidden by the existing methods of collecting crime statistics. For example, it would have been possible for actual victimization to be declining while reported crime rates were increasing.

Cincinnati evaluation techniques were designed to observe the relationships that would occur between rates of crime reported in victimization surveys and reported rates of crime as the police teams attempted to improve their working relationships with their neighbourhoods.

Problems

A number of problems were identified as the team policing program was implemented. First, team policing was regarded as so successful by the community at large, that there was a danger that adequate comparison areas could not be maintained. Pressure on the comparison areas was coming from two sources. Citizens of other neighbourhoods wanted to receive the same level of police service that they saw being given to district one. Police commanders in other districts, noting the success of the techniques that were in use in district one, appeared to wish to implement those techniques within their own commands. Second, a number of incidents occurred, but not in the team policing areas, which brought a strong desire for increased centralization of control within the management hierarchy.

of the department. Some of these centralized controls were applied to the team areas as well as to the other areas. Therefore, some of the team policing concepts were diluted. This occurred almost by accident, and steps were immediately taken to prevent a recurrence.

CALGARY, ALBERTA

Sawyer (1975) reported on the conversion of the entire Calgary, Alberta, Police Department to a form of team policing in 1973 and 1974.

Program Description

At that time, the City of Calgary covered 170 square miles and had a population of 450,000. There were approximately 800 police officers. In addition, there was a civilian complement of approximately 100 persons. The city is now divided into five geographic districts, but at that time there were four districts divided into 28 zones. Each of these zones was to be manned by a team of between 12 and 20 constables commanded by a sergeant. The first team was fielded in June, 1973. Strong community support for the program developed immediately and implementation proceeded rapidly so that by February, 1974, the department was totally under the zone team policing concept. The zone teams were held accountable for crime prevention within their neighbourhoods. In addition, they were held responsible for routine traffic enforcement and accident investigation.

Elements of Team Policing

In Calgary an excellent level of geographic stability of assignment was achieved. Team cars were rarely dispatched outside their areas.

Decentralization of Authority

There was considerable decentralization of authority to the zone teams and their commanders. Each zone team was responsible for determining its own hours of work, within overall policing requirements.

Community Relations

There was considerable emphasis on the improvement of police-community relations within the Calgary team policing effort. Team officers were told that it was their responsibility to focus all of the available resources of the community on the problem of crime prevention. The teams were expected to develop close working relationships with the schools, the city social services department, and the parks and recreation department operations in the zones. It was particularly fortunate that the activities of both the city's social services department and the parks and recreation department were being decentralized at approximately the same time. In fact, the geographic service territories developed for those departments were similar to those developed for the police department. It was, therefore,

possible to develop good working relationships between members of the police department and members of other city agencies which were not encumbered by the bureaucratic structures of other organizations. A very important development was that the police recruit training program was expanded from three months to six months and began to include brief internship periods during which the rookie received work experience with various public service agencies. All members of the police teams were encouraged to get out of their automobiles to spend time in casual contact with the citizens of the zone. They were provided with two-way radios to allow continued contact with the central dispatcher.

Crime Prevention

The whole focus of the conversion of the Calgary Police Department from a temporal assignment of manpower to a geographic assignment of manpower was centered on the element of crime prevention. Team police officers were told that the reason for their increased contact with the public was to generate an improved flow of information which would allow the police department to identify active criminals and potential offenders. For this reason, the relationship between the police department and the school authorities was considered to be exceptionally important.

Internal Communications

The mechanisms for internal communication in the Calgary Police Department included regularly scheduled team conferences and conferences of team commanders and sector commanders.

Use of Specialists

There was considerable reduction of the department's over-all reliance on the use of police specialists. The previous traffic division was reduced when the zone teams assumed all responsibility for routine traffic enforcement and accident investigation. However, some specialized investigation work remained centralized, such as hit-and-run investigation. At the same time, the more routine investigations conducted by the detective division became the responsibility of the zone teams. The over-all strength of the detective division, however, was maintained. Some detectives requested and were granted assignment as zone commanders or sector commanders. In this way, they could coach the members of their zone teams to improve their investigative techniques. At the same time, it was intended that the work load facing the remaining detectives would be more satisfying. They were to receive only those non-routine cases which would really challenge their investigative skills.

Measures Used

No formal evaluation of the Calgary team policing program was undertaken, although citizen attitudes were surveyed before implementation and after one year.

Problems

No major obstacles were encountered in the course of implementing the program. However, there was and continues to be a certain amount of resistance from members of the command structure.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

Funk (1973) reported on a team policing program implemented in San Francisco in July, 1973.

Program Description

The City of San Francisco had closed two police stations during 1972. Community pressure forced the department to re-open them within less than a year. Two new police companies, each of approximately 100 men, would have to be formed. It was decided that when the Park District station reopened, team policing would be introduced and that the results would be compared with those for the Southeast District where the standard San Francisco police deployment techniques were used.

In the team policing program, all members of each eight-hour shift would work together as a team, or squad. The sergeants and their patrol officers were all to work the same days, the same watches, and would have the same days off. Each sergeant would be assigned a specific group of patrolmen who would work with him. Patrolmen worked with regular partners. Patrol officers were usually detailed to the same patrol sector or area each day. The total manpower of the Park District consisted of one captain, four lieutenants, 15 sergeants and 80 patrolmen. This manpower was allocated among six watches. The Park District was further subdivided into four patrol car sectors and 46 reporting plots. Each reporting plot would consist of eight to ten city blocks. Two foot beats were instituted in major commercial areas. Two specialist units were formed to fight burglary and robbery.

The Park District was an area of 4.5 square miles with a population of 68,590, fifty-seven per cent of whom were white, 35% black, 3% Chinese, 2% Japanese, and the remaining 1% were Hawaiians, Koreans, and others.

The San Francisco team system appeared to have a strong relationship to the flued patrol systems tried in Richmond, California, Tucson, Arizona, and Aberdeen, Scotland.

In the Southeast District, used for comparison, the watches were not organized into squads. The men did not have the same days off and did not normally work together in the same unit. They were not permanently assigned to specific partners or areas of patrol. The comparison district had one captain, four lieutenants, fifteen sergeants, and 88 patrol

officers. There were five patrol car sectors and three foot beats established in the territory. Four specialized units were formed: an anti-burglary unit, an anti-robbery unit, a unit to deal with abandoned autos and the towing of illegally parked vehicles, and a unit to operate the patrol cars.

The Southeast District had an area of seven square miles, and 71,813 residents. Fifty per cent of the residents were white, 40 per cent were black, four per cent were Phillipino, three per cent were Chinese, and the remaining three percent were Indian, Japanese, Korean and other.

Elements of Team Policing

There was little decentralization of authority. Geographic stability of assignment was not as certain in San Francisco as it was in other experiments described. Officers were not always assigned to the same geographic territory, and the team did not have the authority to determine shift scheduling or deployment. Shifts were scheduled somewhat differently in the team policing area than they were in the comparison district.

There was no evidence of any particularly strong emphasis on community relations, nor were members of the police team expected to engage in any unusual or different crime prevention activities.

The sole major difference between the team policing area and the comparison district was that in the team policing area the assignment of small groups of men to work together

on a regular basis was likely to lead to a greater cohesiveness and to greater exchange of information within the group.

There was no particular attempt to reduce the reliance of the San Francisco Police Department on police specialists.

Problems

No particular problems were experienced with the implementation of the system.

Measures Used

Evaluation was centred on the comparison of crime rates between the two districts. Average monthly crime rates were established for both districts prior to the re-opening of the two stations. The crime rates were virtually identical. After four months, the crime rates in both of these districts had declined. However, the decline in the team policing area was significantly greater than the decline in the comparison area.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Within the past 12 months, two additional team policing implementations have been undertaken in Ontario. Team policing was implemented in district three of the Halton Regional Police Force (Burlington). It was to be supported by a substantial evaluation program including surveys of police attitudes, citizen attitudes, and victimization levels.

Preliminary results indicate that reductions in sick leave and overtime have been achieved in the team area in Burlington. In March, 1975, team policing was implemented in Barrie, Ontario.

Dallas, Texas, has had a proposal for city-wide implementation of team policing under consideration since 1972. At this writing (April, 1975), a proposal was being made to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Department of Justice for implementation of team policing in six cities at once. The areas being considered included Hartford, Connecticut; Multnomah County, Oregon; Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Elizabeth, New Jersey; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Pueblo, Colorado. This multi-city team policing program is intended to generate evaluation data which can be compared from one city to another.

COMPARISONS

Table 1, opposite, compares each of the 19 team policing programs on each of the six key elements of team policing. This table summarizes remarks made in the preceding sections of this chapter.

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF 19 TEAM POLICING PROGRAMS

	Geographic Stability	Authority Decentralization	Emphasis on Community Relations	Emphasis on Crime Prevention	Improved Internal Communications	Reduced Use of Specialists
Aberdeen	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Tucson	NP	P	P	NP	P	P
Accrington	P	P	P	NP	P	P
Richmond, CA	NPA	P	P	NP	P	P
Syracuse	P	P	P	P	P	P
Detroit	PNA	P	P	P	P	P
L.A. Basic Car	PNA	NP	P	P	P	NP
Dayton	PNA	P	P	NP	NP	P
Holyoke	P	P	P	NP	P	P
New York City	PNA	PNA	PNA	NP	PNA	NP
Oxnard	P	P	P	UK	P	NP
Rochester	P	UK	UK	P	UK	P
Albany	P	P	P	P	P	P
N. Vancouver	P	P	P	P	P	P
L.A. Venice	P	P	P	P	P	P
St. Petersburg	P	P	P	P	P	P
Cincinnati	P	P	P	P	P	P
Calgary	P	P	P	P	P	P
San Francisco	NP	NP	NP	NP	P	NP

NP - Not Planned, Not Achieved
P - Planned, Achieved
NPA - Not Planned, but Achieved
PNA - Planned, but not Achieved
UK - Unknown

IV - EVALUATING TEAM POLICING

It is important to evaluate the results achieved through team policing. The police executive must know that the program is doing what it is supposed to do. If the desired results are not being achieved, then modifications may be introduced to ensure the long term success of team policing.

Team policing cannot be applied as a packaged solution to policing problems. The exact team policing design that will work best for any given police force probably cannot be determined wholly in advance of implementation. The first team policing design produced by a department represents only an educated guess as to what is likely to work best. Only fairly rigorous evaluation can identify the faults in the first attempt which can result in intelligent modifications of the program.

In any program of change in a large organization which requires training or re-orientation of individual behaviour, there is a certain amount of unevenness in the extent to which change occurs in the organization. An effective evaluation system allows trouble spots to be highlighted for corrective action.

Without effective evaluation, the police manager cannot be certain of the impact that team policing is having on operating costs, crime rates, the level of service to the public, public attitudes towards the police, and police attitudes towards their jobs and towards the public.

Five major measures of effectiveness have been used in the team policing studies cited above. These included: crime statistics, victimization surveys, community attitude surveys,

police attitude surveys, and policing costs.

CRIME STATISTICS

Crime Statistics have frequently been used to assess the effectiveness of team policing programs. Many team policing experiments have been started for the express purpose of preventing crime. That is, one of the specific objectives of the team policing program was to reduce the rate of crime. In a number of cases, however, reported crime actually increased after the implementation of team policing.

Reported Crime Rates

Reported crime rates have long suffered from several deficiencies as methods by which to evaluate the performance of the police. There has long been a suspicion that reported rates of crime have seriously understated actual rates of crime.

As part of the work of the President's Task Force on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, a major victimization study was undertaken on a nation-wide basis in the United States (Ennis, 1967). A national full multi-stage probability sample of 10,000 households in all parts of the continental United States was drawn. Personal interviews were conducted. The interview consisted of three major parts. A twenty minute screening interview was conducted with any adult of more than eighteen years to see if anyone in the household had been the victim of a criminal act in the previous twelve

months. If a victim was identified, a further thirty minute interview was conducted with the person who had been victimized. Questions on this part of the interview were intended to establish the nature of the crime, where the crime had taken place, and how the crime had taken place. An attempt was made to determine the extent and nature of the loss, injuries, or damage suffered by the victim. It was determined whether the victim had notified the police. If the victim had failed to notify the police, further questions explored the reasons for not reporting the crime. If the crime was reported, questions were asked concerning the outcome of the judicial process and as full a description as possible of the offender. A third thirty minute segment of the interview covered the victim's attitudes to the police. Attitudes towards the victim's own personal security, towards neighbourhood security, and, finally, towards crime were explored. A random sample of non-victims was also given this attitude questionnaire for the purposes of comparison.

In addition, a questionnaire was left with those interviewed. The questionnaire repeated the list of crimes contained in the screening interview, and was intended to be completed by the other adults in the household. Its purpose was to check the accuracy of the information reported by the person interviewed.

The victimization survey recognized that some crimes could not be measured by a personal interview survey. For example, people are likely to be unwilling to admit to engaging in such activities as gambling, liquor violations, the use of narcotics, the procurement of an abortion, or fraudulent acts against corporations or other large institutions. Therefore, there was no attempt to measure the rate of victimization in such cases.

Under-reporting

The findings of this national survey were startling. It was suggested that at least twice as much major crime occurred than was reported. Substantial variations occurred in patterns of crime from one region to another, as well as substantial variation in the amounts of crime reported from one region to another. Furthermore, the patterns of crime were different depending on the size of the community. Large metropolitan areas tended to have violent crime rates five times higher than those of smaller cities and rural areas, while crimes against property occurred only twice as often in large metropolitan areas as in the smaller city or rural area.

The study also found that a substantial amount of violence was not of a stranger-to-stranger type, most commonly thought of in relationship to acts of criminal violence. It was found that 40% of all aggravated assaults and rapes occurred in the home of the victim. Approximately 45% of all crimes against the person were committed by someone known to the victim.

Race Effects on Reporting

Race was important as to whether crimes were reported. There was evidence of considerable under-reporting on the part of blacks. The study results indicated that the lower income black is subject to more violence than the lower income white. The study also indicated that the high income black is subject to more property loss than the high income white.

Seriousness and Reporting Rates

It was found that serious crimes were more likely to be reported. Insurance played an important role in determining whether the victim reported the crime. If the crime was substantial and the victim was entitled to recover from his insurance company, the crime was likely to be reported. Most insurance companies would not accept a claim in a case where a police report had not been filed. However, in the cases in which the victim felt that the reporting of a crime was likely to result in a rise in insurance premiums or possible cancellation of his policy, the victim was likely to absorb the loss and let the crime go unreported. Crimes which were attempted but not completed were much less likely to be reported than crimes which were committed. For example, a store owner who unlocked his premises in the morning and found evidence of an attempted forced entry but found that nothing had been stolen, would be unlikely to report the attempt. Alternatively, if something had been stolen, he would be much more likely to report the crime.

Reasons for Failure to Report

The national survey developed a number of reasons why police might not be notified of criminal acts. In many instances, the victim believed that the incident was not a police matter. Either the victim did not want the offender to come to any harm, or he thought the incident was not criminal. Fear of reprisal

was another important reason for failing to notify the police. The victim might fear reprisal from the offender's friends. He often was in even greater fear of cancellation of his insurance policy or an increase in his premium costs. Other reasons for not reporting crimes included: fear of involvement with the police; not knowing if the police should be called; and a level of confusion which prevented the victim from calling the police. Finally, many victims had negative attitudes towards police effectiveness. They felt that it would not do any good to report the crime because the police would not be able to solve it.

Causes of Public Skepticism

The survey identified some of the reasons why people were skeptical about the potential police response to a criminal victimization. In the past, the police may have failed to respond to a call. There might have been a rejection of the incident reported as not being criminal. Low arrest rates and low trial rates were also given as reasons for skepticism about police involvement.

Attitudes to Courts

The attitudes of the victims towards the court system were also explored. One-half of the victims felt that the offender was treated too leniently in the courts. The other half were satisfied with the conviction and the level of punishment

imposed. Furthermore, it became apparent that the ordinary citizen felt that justice was done only when there was punishment over and above the monetary loss suffered by the victim.

Attitudes to Police

Attitudes towards the police were covered in the survey. Generally, respondents felt that the police were honest and generally respectful of citizens. Yet, they felt that the police were failing to meet the challenge of crime, possibly because of circumstances beyond their control. Negroes tended to be more critical than whites. Among whites, there was a correlation between high income and favourable attitudes. Among blacks, however, those with high incomes tended to have more unfavourable attitudes than those with lower incomes. Blacks generally felt that the police showed little respect for them.

Conclusions

It would appear that reported rates of crime depended on the seriousness of the crime, the likely response of the police, the possibility of reprisal, the race of the victim, and the region of the country in which the offence was committed.

Implications for Team Policing

If community team policing efforts succeeded in

improving public attitudes about police effectiveness, then the citizen could reasonably be expected to begin to report crimes that might have gone unreported in the past. Therefore, it would appear to be unwise to rely solely upon crime statistics when evaluating a team policing program.

Clearance Rates

The second major type of crime statistic that was used to measure the performance of team policing programs was the clearance rate. In a number of team policing programs, it was noted that the clearance rate began to improve almost immediately upon the implementation of team policing. Here again, care must be exercised in the interpretation of such data. It is entirely possible that some higher clearance rates resulted from a smaller number of reported crimes due to diversion from the criminal justice system to other social service agencies. Moreover, it is also possible that improved clearance rates resulted from improved communications with the public, leading to a greater flow of information about criminals and their activities. More interception of criminals in the act of committing their crimes could be expected. More information, leading to the apprehension of criminals after crimes had been committed, could be expected. Greater cooperation from witnesses within the community could be expected, which could have led to more prosecutions.

Use of Crime and Clearance Rates

Finally, all other results indicated that reported rates of crime and clearance rates must be treated with great caution. The standards by which crime reports are accepted and are cleared should be clearly established prior to the implementation of a team policing experiment. Great care should be taken in the design of the team police experiment that no unintentional changes to crime reporting standards or clearance standards take place.

VICTIMIZATION SURVEYS

It appears that victimization surveys should be conducted for each team policing experiment. All available evidence suggested that there were important differences between cities of different sizes and between geographic regions of the United States in terms of the pattern of under-reporting that occurred. There is no reason to believe that similar differences between regions of Canada and between cities of Canada may not also exist.

Evaluations of team policing using victimization studies were under way in Cincinnati, Ohio, and Burlington, Ontario. Unfortunately, in neither city were final results available for study.

The general conclusion that can be drawn is that each city attempting a team policing program should undertake its own victimization study. It would be unwise to rely on

relationships between reported crime and unreported crime that might exist in other jurisdictions. Furthermore, the theory of team policing holds that important changes in the relationship of unreported crime to reported crime are likely to result from the implementation of a team policing program. In the case of Cincinnati, a comprehensive victimization survey was designed by the Institute for Metropolitan Studies at the University of Cincinnati. A similar victimization study has been developed by the United States Bureau of the Census. The Bureau of the Census took over the responsibility of collecting victimization data in the Cincinnati experiment. In addition, victimization study data from several U.S. cities is also being gathered. The annual cost of this program is estimated at \$12,000,000.

CITIZENS' ATTITUDES

In the New York, Cincinnati and Calgary police team experiments considerable emphasis was placed on collecting information to determine how the police were regarded by the communities, both before and after the implementation of team policing. It was felt that more favourable attitudes towards the police would result with the introduction of team policing. In Cincinnati, attitudes were measured from the general public, from citizens who had recently requested services from the police department, from businessmen, and from persons who had recently been arrested.

It was also felt that team policing techniques would result in greater police-community contact. Therefore, it was felt that citizens policed by teams would be more likely to know their police officers than citizens not policed by teams.

POLICE ATTITUDES

A number of methods of measuring police attitudes towards their job, towards the citizens they policed, towards the court system, towards correctional systems, and towards other city service agencies have been used. The theory of team policing holds that there should be important improvements of police attitudes about their jobs. In most team policing experiments it was possible to improve the working conditions of the average police officer and provide him with a more stimulating and challenging job. Furthermore, he could be held fully accountable and would know exactly where he stood in terms of his performance at any time. All of these factors would lead to improved job satisfaction on the part of the working police officer.

The theory of team policing also holds that improvements in police perception of the public could be achieved through the use of community team policing. A policeman's attitude towards the public would be less hostile, he would see less public hostility towards the police, and he would see the public as being more cooperative with the police than under a different scheme of deployment.

COSTS

A number of cost measures have been used in evaluating the effectiveness of team policing. Costs of overtime, turnover, and sick leave have been noted to drop with the introduction of team policing. The per capita cost of team policing can be compared with the per capita cost of other styles of policing.

Generally speaking, the introduction of team policing should allow the police force to offer any given level of service at a lower level of cost than that available under other manpower deployment schemes. However, cost increases may be necessary if a department is so understaffed that it cannot provide an adequate level of service under any manpower deployment system. Temporary cost increases may be necessary to maintain an adequate level of service while training and adjustment of team police officers takes place.

V - THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

From the previous sections it is apparent that public opinion plays a critical role in the success of team policing. In New York, Cincinnati, and Calgary the implementation of the First police teams led to demands from other parts of the community for teams to be used in their neighbourhoods.

INCREASED CONTACT WITH PUBLIC

The importance of public opinion is central to the theory of team policing. Most team policing designs require the police officer to operate according to a model of service and helpfulness to the public. The police officer is expected to initiate contact with the public in non-law enforcement situations. Police teams are expected to engage in open and honest two-way communication with the public they serve. Police are to encourage citizens to come forward with information about criminals and their activities. In addition, the police attempt to inform the public of persons or events that should be regarded as suspicious.

PUBLIC ATTITUDE CHANGE

As the public begins to have this new, closer relationship with the police, a set of experiences develop, convincing individual citizens that the police are really there to help:

(a) IMPROVED INFORMATION FLOW

When the public becomes convinced that the police are serious about the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals, then the information begins to flow in larger quantities from the public to the police. Crimes that had previously gone unreported become the subject of police reports. Therefore, the reported rate of crime actually increases, at least in the first few months of the team policing experiment. At the same time, citizens come forward with information that they would not have volunteered in the past. They are also more willing to serve as witnesses in judicial proceedings, thus improving clearance rates and conviction rates. There is no evidence that they deteriorated.

(b) CRIME PREVENTION FEASIBILITY

As the information from the public to the police begins to flow in larger quantity, the police are able to identify potential offenders and keep them under close surveillance. In addition, programs of acquainting residents of the team area with the potential hazards to themselves and their property could begin to be implemented. Target hardening could occur, in order to make the perpetration of criminal acts substantially more difficult. Ultimately, reported crime rates should begin to decline.

It is probably unrealistic to expect any drop in reported crime within the first year of operation of a team

policing experiment. However, the second year should indicate a levelling of reported crime, and third and subsequent years should indicate declines. The victimization rate, as opposed to the rate of reported crime, may actually begin to show decline in the second year of a team policing program. At very best, the victimization rate is likely to remain stable during the first year of the team policing program.

(c) IMPACT ON CRIME REPORTING

Another effect of public opinion that should not be overlooked is that the victimization rate and the reported rate of crime should begin to approximate each other. As citizen attitudes towards police effectiveness improve, the citizens will report more crimes than they have in the past. Therefore, discrepancy between reported crime and actual crime should be reduced. In addition, the average size or seriousness of a reported crime may decline as less serious crimes are reported, pulling down the average. For example, the average dollar value of thefts may decline while the total number of thefts reported actually increases.

CONCLUSIONS

Therefore, considering these three factors, it is extremely important for the success of team policing experiments that public attitudes be monitored at all times. Citizen attitude surveys can be used to pinpoint areas of dissatisfaction

with the police, and these can be taken into account in the design of a team policing experiment. During the course of a team policing experiment, citizen attitude surveys can be used to identify and isolate problems to be dealt with by the team. If no improvement in citizen attitudes takes place, then it is unlikely that any major improvements in clearance rates, crime rates, or victimization rates can be achieved. Where a team policing program does fail, a survey of citizen attitudes may assist the department in isolating the reason for failure.

VI - IMPLICATIONS FOR RURAL AND FRONTIER AREAS

Most police officers who have operated for any length of time in a rural or frontier area will find little new in the concepts of team policing.

GEOGRAPHIC STABILITY

Most rural or frontier policemen already enjoy geographic stability of assignment. The detachment of a rural police force essentially consists of a police team which is responsible, on a twenty-four hour per day basis, for the policing of their assigned territory.

DECENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY

There has traditionally been considerable decentralization of authority to detachment commanders. They are responsible for determining the hours of work of the people under their command. They may, in fact, be responsible for drawing up the detachment budget.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

There has always been a strong emphasis on community relations within detachment policing. Members of the detachment must usually live in the territories that they police. Because there are relatively few other policemen around, the

police officer forms a circle of friends within the community which is not exclusively restricted to other police officers. He is frequently in contact with members of the public in situations which are not at all related to his law enforcement role. The police officer frequently takes part in community activities as a regular member of the community. He has little difficulty in getting the information that he needs to do his job.

CRIME PREVENTION

There is not a particularly clear emphasis on crime prevention. But crime prevention may occur almost automatically in the everyday course of the relationship established between the rural or frontier police officer and his community. Because the community is small, the police officer tends to become aware of those individuals who are likely to become criminals. He can then make it his business to be aware of their activities. *what about police management?* The rural police officer or frontier police officer will not find it particularly difficult to identify those businesses or residences which are most likely to become the targets of crime. He can take it upon himself to advise the owners of measures that may be taken to improve security.

INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

The rural or frontier police officer has no trouble communicating with his peers. He usually sees his fellow police officers on a regular basis, even when they are not working

the same shifts, eliminating major problems of internal communications within a detachment.

USE OF SPECIALISTS

The rural policeman rarely has the luxury of having specialists available to assist him. Yet, like the team police officers in some urban areas, he may be free to call upon specialists from detective units located in a sub-division or division headquarters when he feels that the skills of those individuals are required.

CURRENT TRENDS IN RURAL POLICING

There has been economic pressure to extend the geographic territory covered by one policeman. In addition, there has been pressure to close isolated police posts in favour of consolidated facilities located in larger communities. The so-called "hub" concept adopted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police is the result of such economic pressure. The regionalization of police forces in rural parts of Ontario has resulted from similar pressure.

Care should be exercised in consolidating police operations that the basic team policing elements already present in rural police operations not be lost. Such moves could result in loss of geographic stability of assignment and the subsequent loss of local knowledge on the part of the individual police officer. In addition, consolidation could result in an unacceptable level of centralization of authority. The current

emphasis on community relations might be lost in the face of a new emphasis on economy of operation. There is a danger that the manpower deployment schemes of larger operations might be based strictly on the demands for service now present in the territory. Manpower might be allocated in such a way as to cover adequately the calls for service; however, little time might be left for adequate emphasis on the crime prevention role of the police. As the individual police unit gets larger, internal communication difficulties can be expected to grow. The larger unit would not be as cohesive as the smaller detachment. In addition, there would be a great temptation to create specialist positions, possibly in emulation of larger police operations. In fact, one of the justifications of consolidating police facilities might be the creation of specialist detective units to handle crime problems which are not yet sufficiently severe to warrant the creation of such units. This could result in the lack of sufficient interesting work for the specialist (who had received expensive training), and a reduction in the responsibility of the general police officer.

CURRENT TRENDS IN FRONTIER POLICING

Traditionally, the police officer has been one of the few representatives of any social service agency present in the frontier areas of Canada. This often required that the frontier police officer assume many roles in addition to law enforcement. Frontier policemen delivered personal counselling, social welfare, financial advisory, legal advisory, and medical services.

However, the services of other social agencies are rapidly being introduced into our frontier areas, increasingly restricting the frontier policeman to his basic law enforcement role, thus diminishing his insight into the total range of problems faced by the frontier communities that he serves. The loss of insight is particularly acute where the culture of the community differs in any material way from the culture of the police officer.

Therefore, Indian, Eskimo, and Metis communities may frequently find themselves in conflict with police officers who have not had the opportunity to experience the total range of social problems faced by these communities. Contacts between such communities and the police tend to occur only in the context of the law enforcement role, allowing little opportunity for the people to see the frontier policeman in a non-threatening, supportive role.

Additionally, the personnel of other social agencies delivering services in the frontier areas of Canada often see their objectives and activities being in opposition to the objectives and activities of the police agency. Therefore, relatively little communication or understanding flows between the members of the police agency and members of the other social agencies serving the frontier area. As with the urban team policeman, the frontier policeman should recognize that he is responsible for focusing the total social resources of the communities he serves on the problem of preventing crime. This means that he must initiate meaningful contacts with the representatives of the other social agencies. In this way, he can begin to restore some of the free flow of information between the police agency and the community that existed in the past.

VII - IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

A number of problems arose during the implementation of the various team policing experiments described in the previous sections of this report. Some of these problems will be discussed in the sections that follow, and suggestions are offered on how these problems might be resolved.

PLANNING

In almost all cases, initiative for the implementation of a team policing program came from the very top of the police department concerned. The police commissioner or the chief of police involved sometimes hired external consultants to assist him as team policing was introduced. In a number of instances, the chief of police and his consultants planned most aspects of the team policing program with little reference to other members of the department. Not surprisingly, these programs ran into stiff resistance from other members of the police department.

Resistance from Middle Management

In other cases, working police officers were directly involved in the planning of the team policing program; however, in such cases, there was a tendency for direct channels of communication to be opened between the individuals responsible for the planning of the team policing project and the chief of police or police commissioner. The entire command structure

of a police department might be bypassed in this way. Again, not surprisingly, where the middle management group of a police department had not been involved in the planning of team policing programs, that middle management group tended to resist both the implementation of team policing, in experimental forms, and later expansion of team policing programs.

Team policing programs often called for a substantial reduction in the authority, or the apparent authority, of middle managers within the police departments involved. At the very least, a team policing program usually called for substantial changes in the management style of a police department. Team policing programs usually required movement from a military model of management to one placing greater emphasis on the use of human resources management skills. Many police department middle managers found these changes highly threatening, particularly when they were not involved in the planning of these changes.

Resistance from Detectives

A number of team policing approaches included potentially negative implications for the detective divisions of the police departments involved. In the first place, a team policing program usually required that crime prevention be given at least equal weight, in terms of departmental activities, with the detection of criminal acts and the apprehension of the offenders. This meant that the high status accorded to those with investigative skills by most police departments would be somewhat reduced. To make matters worse, most team policing

experiments required the delegation of investigative responsibilities from the detective divisions to the police teams. This took place either by having the regular patrol officers assume greater responsibility in the area of investigation or by the assignment of detectives from the detective division to the neighbourhood team. All of these moves were potentially threatening to the detective division. The members of some detective divisions and their commanders reacted accordingly. There has been strong resistance from detectives -- particularly where they are members of separate collective bargaining units -- to the concept of team policing.

Recommendations

The following paragraphs will outline some of the mechanisms available to the police executive to help him cope with these planning problems.

Involve Patrol Officers in Planning

All of the evidence indicated that the implementation of a team policing program proceeded most successfully where the patrol officers, whose jobs were being changed, were directly involved in planning the nature and the process of change. The executive of the police collective bargaining unit should be involved in the planning of a team policing program from the very beginning. This does not mean that the police executive should seek the permission of his police union before instituting team policing, but it does recognize that the police union has the right to be informed, in advance, and with some degree of

accuracy, of any major changes that are proposed for the working conditions or job structure of its membership. In no case where the police union was involved from an early point did management encounter severe resistance from the union executive. In fact, on at least one occasion there was enthusiastic support and cooperation provided by the executive of the police association for the implementation of team policing. In addition to involvement of the police association, some steps should be taken to form a planning task force composed of regular working police officers. These police officers should be permitted the opportunity to visit other jurisdictions where team policing is in effect. They can speak as police officer to police officer to those involved with existing team policing projects. A full and frank exchange of views on the advantages and disadvantages of team policing can take place. This exchange will take place on the terms that the police officer member of the planning task force can communicate effectively to his fellow police officer in his home department. Effectiveness of a planning task force will be enhanced if it includes at least some police officers who are respected by their fellow police officers. When a team policing program is recommended by working police officers who have the respect of their colleagues, there is likely to be much less resistance than might be the case where such a program is imposed by external consultants or by the chief of police.

Involve Detectives in Planning

There are a number of advantages in the team policing

approach that should be pointed out to detectives early in the implementation of the program. First, the operating procedures of many police departments have often saddled the detective with unwanted routine tasks. Team policing allows many of these routine tasks to be delegated from the detective division to the police teams. For example, it makes no sense for a highly trained fraud detective to track down individuals who insist on writing bad cheques in local supermarkets. Detectives probably should be assigned to a team policing planning task force. They should have specific responsibilities within the task force for identifying the alternative methods of dividing investigative workload between the police teams and centralized detective units. However, they should probably not have final authority over which alternative is to be selected for implementation. Although it may be necessary for the police executive to live with a certain amount of resistance on the part of the detective division, by involving members of the detective division and planning various alternatives, such resistance might be minimized. Such resistance will be further minimized if those detectives assigned to the planning task force are highly respected members of the detective division. In some situations it will be necessary to reduce the over-all size and scope of operations of the detective division. This may require the transfer of detectives to police teams. Resistance to the transfer of detectives to police teams might be minimized if at least some of those detectives transferred found that they had become team commanders. Finally, it should be pointed out to detectives that their solution rate should improve with team

policing. Team policing should result in a far greater flow of information from the public to the police teams, who can feed their information to detectives who require it.

Involve Command Structure in Planning

The command structure, too, should be involved in planning and implementing team policing. Members of middle management and senior management should form part of the team policing planning task force. They should be given specific responsibilities for formulating role descriptions for the middle and senior level of the force, following the implementation of team policing. They should also be asked to identify the training and management development required if the present members of the command structure are to function effectively in these new roles. Again, care should be taken to ensure that those members of middle and senior management who are on the team policing task force include at least some individuals who have the respect of the remainder of the officer corps. In addition, the police executive forming the task force should take care to ensure that those members of his officer group who are named to the task force are not totally opposed to change. Middle and senior level managers selected for participation in the planning task force should be receptive to new ideas and should have expressed in the past a willingness to attempt new methods of policing.

Use of external consultants

The police executive must choose carefully his external consultants and their terms of reference. As yet, the team policing approach has not been sufficiently well developed to justify the promotion of it as a packaged solution to all policing problems. The major concepts of team policing must be fine-tuned to the specific circumstances of any given police department. Therefore, at this time, the police executive would do well to avoid those consultants offering package solutions. There is a danger that such consultants will attempt to bend the police agency's problems to fit the available solutions. In addition, the police executive should take care to prevent the team policing program from becoming the consultant's program. The consultant must not be in a position of authority. He should serve only as a resource to department personnel. It is the departmental command structure that will be responsible for operating the team policing program long after the consultant has gone. The police agency should use the consultant to learn of other police agencies' experiences in implementing team policing. His advice can be very useful in preventing the department from making serious errors. However, over-all responsibility for the planning and implementation of team policing should rest on the members of the department. These individuals should be free to reject the advice of the consultant if they feel that he is wrong.

DISPATCHING

One of the most important aspects of team policing is the concept of geographic stability of assignment. Geographic stability of assignment can be destroyed by inadequate dispatching techniques. If the units of a police team are frequently dispatched to calls outside of their territory, they no longer enjoy a stable geographic assignment. Similarly, if other police units are frequently dispatched to calls within the boundaries of a team territory, the team no longer enjoys complete control over the quality of police-community relations within its area.

Workload Problems

Workload problems of two types may occur:

(1) Under Strength

In the first case, the police department as a whole may be undermanned with respect to the volume of calls for police services. In such circumstances there will be frequent violation of team boundaries and the dispatching of police units to handle calls for service. Dispatching problems are inevitable where a department is seriously undermanned. There is no solution to this problem apart from providing an increase in manpower sufficient to adequately service the calls received by the department.

(2) Team Mis-deployment

The second type of workload problem may occur where a police team is undermanned or where a police team has not deployed its manpower in line with the calls for service received from its territory. This will result in frequent dispatching of units from other territories into the team area. A method of avoiding this problem is to set standards. For example, a standard could be set that no police team should have more than 10% of the calls in its territory serviced by units from other territories in any given time period. Failure to follow that standard of performance would result in a review of the team deployment pattern or team manpower needs on the part of higher management.

Call Priorities

A system of call priorities can be useful in assuring the team boundaries are observed in the dispatching of police officers to calls for service. Three priority categories are probably sufficient. The highest priority would be those emergencies where a police car must be dispatched immediately, even if it means violation of team boundaries. The second highest level of priority calls should be those which are urgent but which are not emergencies. Here, the dispatcher should be prepared to wait a few minutes if a unit serving the territory is not immediately available. If a unit does become available within a five to ten minute time period, it is assigned to the call. If, however, five or ten minutes goes by and no neigh-

bourhood unit becomes available, then an outside unit must be assigned. Finally, there are the lowest level priority calls which can wait for fifteen minutes or more before a unit from another neighbourhood must be assigned. If a police team has deployed its manpower adequately with respect to the calls for service received from within its territory, then a simple priority system should ensure that the team itself services most of the calls within its area.

Dispatcher Training

It may be necessary to instruct the dispatchers on the need for maintaining complete geographic stability of assignment within the team policing experiment. Training might include the use of any new call priority systems. The dispatchers should be told in some detail why geographic stability of assignment is so important in developing the team police officers' knowledge of the territory that they are serving.

TEAM SELECTION

The methods by which the first police teams are selected can have a significant impact on the amount of resistance to the team policing program developed within the police department. Two issues are of critical importance here; volunteering and quality of personnel selected. In those circumstances where volunteers are used, the police commander is taking the risk of polarizing his department. Those individuals who hold favourable attitudes towards team policing will volunteer for

the first teams. Those individuals who hold unfavourable attitudes towards team policing will not volunteer. Therefore, it will be much more difficult to field later teams than it was to field experimental teams. Those who volunteered for the team policing assignments will tend to select evidence which is supportive of the program. Those individuals who decided not to volunteer for the team policing program will tend to select negative evidence about the program. After a period of experimental operation, attitudes are likely to harden on both sides.

The police executive who attempts to ensure that a police team program works by selecting the best possible police officers to serve on the first police team to be fielded is also running the risk of seriously dividing his department. Detractors of the team policing program will point out that it was run with "hand-picked" men. Those police officers who were not selected for participation in the initial test of team policing will know that they are not highly regarded by the department hierarchy. If only the best men are picked for the initial team experiment, some feeling may develop among other members of the department that they may experience difficulties when team policing is introduced for them. Naturally, they will tend to resist introduction of team policing. These problems will become magnified if it is apparent that the hand-picked group consists of the younger, better educated members of the force. In such circumstances, resentment and hostility towards the team are likely among officers who were not selected for the initial experiment.

Selection of the Team Commander

In selecting the team commander for an initial test of the team policing techniques, the police executive must run the risk of antagonizing other potential team commanders by selecting the very best available. This individual need not be a volunteer, but he must be an individual who is highly respected by the working police officers and who has the respect of his colleagues. He must be an individual who is open to change. He must possess a good array of human resources management techniques. In short, he must be a model of all that is expected of a team commander. If the first team commander fails, the first team fails also. After that, implementation of team policing throughout a police department becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Selection of Team Members

The selection of team members should occur almost on a random basis for the initial team experiment. The use of volunteers is to be discouraged for the reasons discussed above. The only circumstance in which volunteers should be used in the selection of an initial team would be when the police association has registered violent objections to the team policing program. This is extremely unlikely to occur; police associations involved in team policing experiments to date have, at the very worst, maintained a neutral attitude towards the concept. Team members should be representative of the police department at large in

terms of age, departmental seniority, educational level, ability, and performance ratings. This method of team selection is likely to maximize the opportunities for success and to reduce the resentment of this experimental team among other members of the department.

TEAM TRAINING

A certain amount of training will be necessary if the team policing program is to be effective. Frequently, this will have to be the type of training that actively involves the learner in the learning situation. The preparation of written guidelines and the presentation of new rules and regulations governing the operation of a police team by the lecture method will not usually suffice. It may be necessary to depart completely from established practices and procedures. In other cases, individual police officers will be required to unlearn old habits of policing.

Community Relations

Constables should be exposed to a training experience which emphasizes the importance of good community relations to the development of a fruitful flow of information from the public to the police. Where previous departmental policy might have prohibited the police officer from entering a bar or beverage room while on duty, except in the course of response to a call for service, he might now be expected to call on bars and

beverage rooms regularly. Where previous departmental policy had forbidden the police officer to leave his vehicle for any extended period of time, team policing policy might require the individual to get out of his vehicle and to contact the public informally at every possible opportunity. Naturally, individual police officers would have to be provided with a portable two-way radio to permit them to maintain communication with the central dispatcher. Previous departmental policy might have required police officers not to enter schools while in uniform. Team policing policy might demand that police officers take their coffee breaks in high school cafeterias while in uniform.

Crime Prevention

Team constables should also be given some basic instruction in the theory and practice of crime prevention. They should be taught profiles for the recognition of potential offenders at an early age. They should be told of the importance of building effective working relationships with the schools and other social service agencies. They should be taught the ways and means in which commercial and residential properties can be hardened against criminal attacks. Previous departmental policy might have made crime prevention the responsibility of a specific unit within the department. For example, in the case of a commercial burglary, the patrol officer might simply take the initial report which would be followed up with a visit by an identification technician, who would search for fingerprints and other evidence. A detective might interview the victim to

clarify the nature of the goods that were damaged or stolen. Finally, the victim might be visited by a crime prevention specialist who would advise him on the lock hardware, lighting facilities, or burglar alarm systems that might be installed to make criminal attacks more difficult.

Specialist Skills

There will usually be a requirement to train the members of a police team in certain specialist skills. For example, if police team officers are to assume responsibility for routine traffic investigation, then a refresher course in the measurement of skid marks and other aspects of accident investigation may be required. If members of police teams are to assume major responsibility for routine investigation of crimes, then it may be necessary to offer more advanced training in techniques of interrogation than they have previously received. Such training may include the use of role-playing or demonstrations to supplement the lecture material.

OVERLAPPING LINES OF AUTHORITY

Some team policing experiments have run into difficulty because of overlapping lines of authority. These problems have arisen only where police teams have been required to co-exist with more traditional forms of manpower deployment. Trouble has come from three major sources: watch commanders, precinct commanders, and functional commanders.

(1) Watch Commanders

When a watch commander has responsibility for the city during his tour of duty, he is extremely likely to interfere with members of a police team. This is particularly likely to happen when the team commander is not on duty. The watch commander may also issue instructions to members of a police team during his shift which conflict with the general instructions of the team commander. The only way to avoid this problem is to establish clear guidelines which limit the authority of a watch commander over a team policing area. In general, the watch commander should be free to re-assign men from a team policing area to another area in the event of a severe emergency, but he should not be free to re-assign men from a team area to another area simply to provide better over-all coverage of the city during a particular watch. Neither should the watch commander be able to re-assign regularly men from a team area to other areas of the city. The watch commander should not be able to issue orders to members of a police team which conflict with standing orders of the team commander. Of course, the ultimate solution to this problem occurs when conversion of the police department to team policing is complete. Then, the position of the watch commander is either eliminated or its importance is severely reduced.

(2) Precinct Commanders

A second set of problems occurs when a police team is

located within a specific geographically defined precinct. Conflicts may arise between the desire of the officer in charge of the precinct to achieve the best over-all policing of the precinct and the desire of the team commander to achieve the best over-all policing of the team area. These problems can be especially severe if there are philosophical differences between the team commander and the precinct commander in terms of methods of policing. Again, when the team commander is not on duty or is away on vacation, the pressures on the members of the police team can become severe. Again, the best method of solving this problem is to establish clear guidelines which spell out the relationship expected between the precinct commander and the team operating within his precinct. Again, the precinct commander should be permitted to make emergency manpower re-deployments. However, he should not be permitted to interfere in any significant way in the methods of policing used by the police team. The other method of dealing with this problem is to convert the entire precinct to team policing at once. In this case, the precinct commander becomes an important part of the team policing program. Conflicts between himself and the police team are much less likely where the style of management is uniform throughout the precinct.

(3) Functional Commanders

Other difficulties can occur when a functional commander such as the head of the traffic or detective division, issues orders or instructions to detectives or traffic officers

who are members of police teams which conflict with the general philosophy of team policing, or which conflict with the specific orders of the team commander. For example, the commander of the detective division might require the use of aggressive interrogation techniques on the part of all detectives throughout the police force. The detective assigned to a police team might find it difficult to use such techniques without upsetting the community-police relations established by the teams. One method of dealing with this sort of problem might be to remove functional specialists from any accountability to functional commanders at high levels within the department. That is, the detective assigned to the police team would be responsible only to the team commander, not to the head of the detective division. A second method of dealing with the problem would be to establish guidelines which clearly spell out a functional commander's limits of authority over members of a police team.

CONTINUITY OF COMMAND

One of the major causes for abandoning team policing programs appears to have been a lack of continuity in the top management of the departments concerned. Detroit abandoned its team policing program shortly after the departure of Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy. Mr. Murphy had been the Detroit Police Commissioner for only a few months. The program of team policing in St. Petersburg, Florida, was abandoned after the departure of two successive chiefs of police within a year. It would appear that a substantial length of time is required to institutionalize

the changes embodied in team policing. If the chief of police or police commissioner who supports the team policing program leaves before the program is completed, then that program is jeopardized.

Continuity of command also requires that the team policing program have continuous attention from the top management of the police department. Major distractions which divert the attention of the top executives from the team policing program can have important negative effects on quality and longevity of the program. For example, the attention of Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy of the City of New York was diverted from his Neighbourhood Team Policing Program by a major commission of inquiry into corrupt practices within his department. It is highly likely that several of the planning and implementation problems that occurred with the neighbourhood police teams in New York City might have been avoided had the police commissioner been able to give the program more of his attention than the circumstances permitted.

Almost all of the team policing programs reviewed were initiated by the top police executive. Almost as many of these team policing programs were distinct threats to middle and senior levels of management within the police department involved. Before a senior police executive leaves the police department in which he has initiated team policing, he must ensure that the top command structure of the department is organized in a fashion compatible with the continuation of team policing. In addition, he must assure himself that the executives and middle managers who occupy positions in this command structure

are comfortable and secure in roles which may have undergone considerable change as team policing was introduced. Finally, he must assure himself that there are at least two or three competent senior managers who are committed to the team policing philosophy and program who can succeed him upon his departure. If this level of institutionalization of team policing has not occurred within the department, then the departing police executive can be sure that his pet program will be in trouble as soon as he leaves.

SCALE OF IMPLEMENTATION

There has been considerable debate over whether team policing ought to be introduced on an experimental basis or whether it ought to be implemented city-wide immediately.

Experimental Implementation

A number of problems have surfaced about the experimental implementation of team policing within single police agencies. The experimental team may come to be resented by other police officers, which may effectively prevent the deployment of additional police teams in the future. Then it is highly likely that there will be a negative reaction on the part of the community selected for the experiment. Politicians and community leaders may be upset and may wonder why their neighbourhood has been selected for special police attention. Ethnic minorities may regard the selection of their neighbourhood

as yet another example of a lack of police respect. On the other hand, after team policing has been implemented, and if it has been successful, an outcry may arise from those communities who were not selected for the initial experiment. They will be displeased because one neighbourhood has received a better form of policing than their neighbourhoods. They will demand immediate, and possibly unplanned, implementation of team policing in additional areas.

Instant Implementation

Smaller communities may choose to implement team policing across the entire community at one time. Provided that the total manpower of the police department concerned does not exceed 200 persons, this can probably be achieved without major disruptions in the delivery of police service. In larger departments, however, it is rarely possible to provide sufficient training facilities to train a large number of police officers in the concepts of team policing all at once. Therefore, an instant implementation of team policing city-wide in a large urban area is not likely to be practical. If instant implementation is attempted in a large urban area, it is likely to be of poor quality, and serious problems, possibly fatal to the team policing program, are likely to appear.

Test Implementation

The most successful method of implementation is likely

to be a test implementation to try the major concepts of team policing followed by an immediate program of phasing additional police teams into operation. The test phase of the program can be used to iron out any operational wrinkles and to fine-tune the concepts of team policing to the needs of the particular area in which it is being implemented. Necessary changes should be made to the team policing design and to the pre-implementation training program. Then, additional teams should be deployed as rapidly as training facilities permit. A period of perhaps no more than three months should elapse between the introduction of the first police team and the beginning of deployment of the remainder of the teams. This rapid introduction of team policing throughout a city prevents the polarization of attitudes within the police department and capitalizes on the favourable public reaction usually brought about as a consequence of the introduction of the first team.

TEAM SIZE

Some team policing programs have run into difficulties simply because they have tried to establish teams which were too large. Team policing concepts require a very close working relationship between the working police officer and his immediate superior. The immediate superior is expected to coach his subordinates, and in order to do this he must meet with his subordinates frequently and observe the character and quality of their work. Therefore, the span of control of any one supervisor must be relatively small. No more than twelve constables should report to any one sergeant. The best results will

probably be achieved where only six or seven constables report to a sergeant. Spans of control of up to twenty may be possible where the team commander is exceptionally well qualified and where the team members understand their duties and require little coaching.

Where teams of much larger than twenty are contemplated, serious consideration must be given to the establishment of additional levels of authority within the team. Ideally, a team should have only two levels of authority: their team commander (a sergeant) and his men (constables). Where additional levels of supervision must be introduced, both the quality of the supervisory relationship and the cohesiveness of the team may suffer.

In addition, when a team is large, it must serve a larger geographic territory and/or a larger number of residents. This may make it difficult for the individual team members to develop adequate levels of personal knowledge of the total team territory and its residents. Such knowledge would be developed much more quickly if the team territory was smaller or if the number of residents served was not so large.

Finally, larger teams have more difficulty establishing effective mechanisms of internal communication. It is more difficult to schedule team conferences, and it is more difficult for the team members to keep themselves informally in contact with all other members of the team which is necessary to guarantee an adequate sharing of information about everything that is going on within the team territory. It must be recognized that in some circumstances large teams may be absolutely

essential. Very dense, high-rise neighbourhoods of mixed residential and commercial establishments may require a large police team because of the high volume of requests for police services that emanate from a relatively small geographic territory. Further reductions in the size of the patrol territory might not be sensible.

SOCIAL SERVICE DECENTRALIZATION

One of the requirements of team policing is that the members of each team establish close working relationships with other social service agencies serving their territories. In some cities, in which social services are highly centralized, members of the police teams will probably experience frustration in attempting to establish such contacts. Wherever possible, team boundaries should approximate the service areas of other social service agencies. Where this is not possible, direct intervention by top management of the police department may be necessary to establish mechanisms by which individual team police officers can establish communication with individual social workers and parks and recreation officials. Wherever possible, the chief of police should take the lead in urging the decentralization of other municipally controlled social services.

The bureaucratic requirements of other social services may make it difficult for the individual police team officer to make a referral. There is no point in providing the individual constable with a list of social agencies available within the community if these agencies are not prepared to act when their services are required. Formal interaction at top management

level may be necessary to establish mechanisms of referral that will work when the constable needs to use them. Otherwise, the constable in the field may abandon his attempts to make referrals. A refusal to accept referrals and a general unwillingness to engage in joint problem-solving with the police by other community service agencies which are not decentralized could result in important negative attitudes towards these agencies developing among team members.

RACIAL TENSIONS

The existence of any high level of racial, ethnic or linguistic tension may make the implementation of team policing more difficult than usual. There may be a temptation, on the part of those planning a team policing program, to ensure that the members of minority groups are included in the police teams responsible for territories with significant populations of those particular minorities. This practice may be unwise because it places strain on the minority police officer. Initially, neither he will not be accepted by the community of which he is a member, nor will he be certain of his acceptance by the other members of the police team. If these conditions prevail, then the presence of a minority police officer on the police team does nothing to improve communication between the police department and the minority community.

It is important for the police team to understand the sources of minority hostility towards the police. The transmission of such an understanding should be the objective of an important element of pre-implementation training for the police team

being assigned to a minority neighbourhood. Important parts of such training can be role-playing and discussions with members of the minority group in question.

It is also important to exclude from team membership any police officer whose attitude towards the minority in the team territory is hostile. Such an individual's hostility is likely to be sensed immediately by the minority residents of the neighbourhood and his presence is likely to do nothing to enhance police-community relations.

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

Team policing programs can run into problems when they are undermanned. If a strong relationship is to be built between the police team and its community, it must have the time to do this. Those involved with a number of team policing programs have suggested that no more than one-third of the working police officer's time should be spent responding to calls for service. Fully one-third of the police officer's time should be committed to community relations activities. These should include attendance at community meetings, the initiation of informal contacts with individual citizens, and the establishment of working relationships with other social service agencies.

In addition, the police officer involved in a team policing program should have approximately one-third of his time available for crime prevention activities. He should be able to undertake security surveys of local businesses and residences in order to advise area citizens how to protect their lives and

property. He should also have time to identify and contact potential offenders. None of this can be done effectively if the police officer is always rushing to respond to a radio call.

Because community team policing requires substantially less reliance on centralized specialist units, the personnel of these units may become available for transfer to police teams when the department implements team policing. There may be political resistance to the idea of trying a new concept of policing while at the same time substantially increasing manpower requirements. It may be argued that any scheme of policing would work better given such high levels of police manpower. The counter argument is that existing levels of police manpower may not be providing an adequate level of service at all. Team policing provides the opportunity for increasing police service to acceptable levels at minimal cost.

EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

Team policing programs usually require additional expenditures on equipment.

Portable Radios

Portable two-way radios are an essential feature of team policing programs. They permit the individual constable to leave the car to initiate informal contact with citizens while maintaining communication with a central dispatcher.

Automobiles

Team policing may require the purchase of additional automobiles on the part of the department. Neighbourhood boundaries may not fit previous patrol car boundaries.

Radar

If police teams are to be delegated responsibility for routine traffic law enforcement, there may be a requirement to purchase additional radar sets. Smooth mechanisms for the sharing of radar sets among teams may be difficult to establish. Practically speaking, this means that one or more teams may overlook their traffic management responsibilities for substantial lengths of time. This can result in an unacceptably high level of traffic fatalities and accidents. The department may find that it is necessary to purchase one radar unit for every police team in order to ensure an adequate level of traffic enforcement.

Motor Scooters

The department may find it advisable to purchase motor scooters for the police teams. These motor scooters can be used to facilitate informal contact between the police and the citizens. The scooters can be used to patrol parks, bicycle paths, and laneways which would be difficult to patrol by automobile and too time-consuming to patrol by foot.

Dictating Equipment

In many police departments a substantial amount of police man-hours are taken up writing reports. Man-hour savings of up to two or three hours per assigned shift might be realized if the police department were to provide every constable with a high quality portable dictating unit. This dictating unit should be easy to operate, should provide a high quality of voice reproduction, and should be sufficiently durable to survive the rough physical handling it is likely to receive in police service. If the machine is not easy to operate, constables will continue to write or type their own reports. If there is not a high level of quality and voice reproduction, the typist will find it difficult to prepare reports accurately. This may frustrate the constables to revert to handwriting or typing their own reports again. If the machine is not durable, it will be frequently out of service. If the machine breaks down in the field, the constable has no choice but to write or type his own reports.

Armaments

Team policing has some major implications for armaments. In order not to appear threatening to the residents of the community, police officers are usually asked to restrict themselves to a standard side arm. The carrying of nightsticks, mace, shotguns, high-powered rifles, and automatic weapons is to be discouraged. This does not mean that the police team should not be versed in the use of such weapons and should not have them im-

mediately available if required, in a police vehicle. It does mean that police officers should refrain from displaying these weapons, especially in a neighbourhood which is hostile to the police. There are a number of unresolved philosophical issues surrounding the use of special weapons and tactics. Emergency situations, such as barricaded snipers, require special weapons and tactics units which operate on a paramilitary model of discipline and authority. It is doubtful if the average police team can successfully alter its style of operation when this is appropriate. Therefore, it is probably necessary to support neighbourhood police teams with a centralized special weapons and tactics unit which can respond appropriately to these emergencies. To put it bluntly, the type of police officer who is likely to succeed in a police team is not the type of police officer that is likely to succeed in a special weapons and tactics unit. If that is the case, then there is no good reason for members of police teams to even have special weaponry available to them in their automobiles.

PHYSICAL PLANT REQUIREMENTS

The introduction of team policing has certain implications for the type of physical plant that a police department should be operating.

Field Offices

If only one police team is to be fielded as an experiment or as a test, then it is probably wise to establish office

facilities for the team away from any existing police headquarters or precinct station. This will force members of the team to associate more with each other rather than with members of other police units, as might occur if the team officers were located in a precinct station or headquarters. The unit will begin to operate as a team more quickly if their offices are separate from existing police facilities.

Storefront Offices

In at least one team policing experiment, storefront team offices were used with some success. The claim was made that the flow of information from the public to the police was improved because of the existence of a storefront office which was manned twenty-four hours per day. The existence of the storefront allowed the public to initiate casual and informal contacts with their police officers by simply dropping in. There was some evidence to suggest that the usefulness of storefront operations depended entirely upon the characteristics of the neighbourhood. In some neighbourhoods a storefront operation might be highly desirable because of the high rate of informal contact with the public that might result. It has been suggested that such results can most readily be achieved in low-income areas or neighbourhoods populated by ethnic minorities. In other neighbourhoods, a storefront office would probably not generate any meaningful level of informal contact with the public. Such results are likely to occur in upper-income or middle-income neighbourhoods whose residents are largely white Anglo-Saxons. However, even in such neighbourhoods, it is possible

that a significant level of informal contact may be generated between the police and the youth of the neighbourhood. Such circumstances may justify the additional expense of a storefront operation. An even more useful variant of the storefront office scheme may be to locate the police team offices in temporary classrooms placed on the site of major school facilities within the team's territory.

Mobile Home Offices

A second major variant of the storefront office is the use of a mobile home. This allows the police team to experiment with different locations within their territory. If the location of the team office at a neighbourhood high school was not having the desired effect, it might be relocated to a shopping mall or to a recreation centre or to a park. Different locations might be used at different times of the year. For example, the mobile home might be located on the campus of a high school during the school year. During the summer it might be located next to a community recreational centre or a swimming pool.

Central Offices

There are also some advantages, however, in terms of internal communications within the police department, in having two or more team offices located in the same building. For example, in smaller cities, all of the teams might work out of the police headquarters building. In larger cities seven or

eight teams all operating in the same geographic sector of the city might have their offices located in a sector headquarters. Contact between the teams would guarantee a high level of accurate and timely communication, at least within the sector. A sector commander, secretarial support services, telephone answering services, and collators - such as those maintained in the Unit Beat Policing systems in the United Kingdom or the Community Sector Team Policing Program of Cincinnati - might all be located at such a sector headquarters.

Office Layout

No matter where the team office is located it should consist of an office for the team commander, an interrogation room, a file storage area open to all members of the team, and a general work area. This general work area should be equipped to serve as the site for team conferences or meetings. It should also be equipped in such a manner as to facilitate in-service training of team members. If teams are located in a sector headquarters or in a headquarters building, interrogation facilities for the sector or for the police department as a whole should probably be consolidated in some area of the building remote from the team work areas.

Political Pressures

In some communities, there may be strong feelings on the part of elected officials that all team offices be located in the neighbourhoods which they are to serve. However, the

police executive should be careful to point out the cost implications of the major alternatives. It may cost more to build and maintain a group of smaller neighbourhood police offices than it would to build one larger facility at some central location. On the other hand, it might cost more in terms of wasted man-hours for police officers to travel from a central office to the team territory than it would to have them assemble at a team office located in the territory served. This is particularly likely to be true in densely populated areas characterized by heavy traffic conditions.

Elected officials may also feel that team offices should not only be located in the neighbourhoods but that they should be staffed around the clock. They will suggest that neighbourhood residents are likely to drop in to such offices and that this will increase the informal contact between the police and the public. The police executive should be quick to point out that such a style of operations is not likely to be cost effective. It takes approximately six or seven staff man-years to provide one police officer on a twenty-four hour per day basis to staff an office. The level of informal contact between the police and the public will probably be far greater if these six or seven men are on the street where they can initiate contact with the public, as opposed to the situation where they must spend all of their time in an office waiting for the public to come to them.

The staffing of team offices must be regarded as an alternative to the deployment of small teams. As noted earlier, the individual member will find it impossible to develop the

same in-depth knowledge of a large team territory that would be possible in a smaller territory. Where smaller teams are fielded, there should be less need to staff an office around the clock.

POLICE AGENCY SCALE

The very size of a police department will have an important effect on the implementation of team policing. Smaller departments should experience little difficulty in making the conversion. However, where police departments are larger than 1,000 members, certain difficulties of scale must be dealt with. The process of re-training police officers for police-team duties may alone require a considerable period of time. Many more variables must be considered in the planning and design of team policing programs in a large department than must be considered in a smaller operation.

The number of levels of management existing within a police department may also prove to be an obstacle to the smooth implementation of team policing. Some police departments may simply find that they have too many levels of management to be accommodated within a team policing structure. Those who may stand to lose their rank distinctions in any reorganization of the upper and middle levels of management because of a team policing program are not likely to be particularly pleased. In addition, even where the number of ranks does not require reduction, the re-drafting of role descriptions and the outlining of new job duties and responsibilities may prove to be formidable tasks.

MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

The introduction of team policing throughout a police department will almost certainly require a substantial investment in management development for first-line supervisors, middle managers, and senior executives.

Personnel Supervision

Many first-line supervisors and many senior managers may require substantial exposure to principles of effective supervision. They must learn to be sensitive to the individual differences in motivation and ability of team members. They must have available to them a range of supervisory techniques which will enable them to use their knowledge of individual differences to get the best possible work performance from their total work groups. In addition, team policing requires that a first-line supervisor become a coach to his men. He must assist them in getting the experience and training that they need in order to develop professionally into more effective police officers. Finally, team policing requires that effective methods of performance evaluation be introduced. First-line supervisors must be trained in the use of these performance evaluation techniques.

Budgeting

Many police departments at the municipal level

still operate on a highly centralized line-item budgeting process. That is, the chief of police or his financial officer may draw up a budget reflecting expenditures for such items as salaries, maintenance of physical facilities, equipment repairs and maintenance, etc. Such a budgeting process does not relate the expenditures of the department to the activities undertaken or to the results expected. The most appropriate form of budgeting for a police department anticipating a move to team policing is program budgeting. The Los Angeles Police Department and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have introduced this technique of budgeting with considerable success. Essentially, program budgeting requires the police department to set objectives, to establish programs of activities which are intended to allow the department to achieve these objectives, and to estimate the cost of carrying out these activities. Such a budgeting process would allow each police team to be designated as a program. Responsibility for preparation of the team budget should be delegated to the team commander. This will require a substantial effort to educate team commanders and each level of management above them in the process of program budgeting.

TEAM DISTINCTIONS

The police executive may be tempted to distinguish members of an experimental or test team from the other members of the police force by means of such devices as distinctive uniforms or distinctive automobiles. In one case, members of the first police team were issued with white shirts instead of the usual blue shirts. In other cases, members of the police teams

have been allowed to wear blazers and slacks rather than the traditional police uniform. In still other cases, automobiles assigned to police teams have been distinctively identified as belonging to the teams.

It would appear that the use of special uniforms is risky. The evidence suggests that the use of special uniforms will increase the level of hostility and resentment directed at the first police team by other members of the department. The use of distinctly marked patrol vehicles does not appear to engender such hostility.

The only real justification for using a distinctive uniform for team police officers would be a high level of hostility towards the police on the part of the community where the first team is to be fielded. In such circumstances, it may be necessary to distinguish team police officers to set them apart, symbolically, from other police officers who may have been in open conflict with the community in question. Unless such conditions prevail, it is not recommended that team police officers either be forced or permitted to wear distinctive uniforms. Such distinctions might be tolerated in a small department where team policing can be implemented rapidly. However, such uniform distinctions will almost certainly have a negative effect on the process of implementing team policing in a larger department where the time period required for conversion to team policing is more substantial.

MILITARY RESPONSE TO CRISIS

A number of police departments experimenting with team policing programs have experienced problems of police corruption or police misconduct surfacing during the implementation of police teams. One of the fears of experienced police managers about team policing is that the high level of autonomy delegated to team commanders and the close contacts that are expected to develop between the police and the communities that they are serving may encourage the development of corrupt police practices. The police team is assigned to a neighbourhood for a relatively long period of time. Each member of the team has the opportunity to become aware of vice operations within the community. In addition, the decentralization of investigative responsibilities to the police team may make it relatively easy for the members of the team to protect vice operations within their territory.

Misconduct

In at least one case, a serious police misconduct situation arose in part of a police department where team policing was not in effect. New departmental orders were written to prevent the recurrence of the problem in question. These orders were also applied to the police teams, where no such problem had yet been identified. The new orders had the effect of removing a certain amount of autonomy from the team. The effect on the morale of the members of the team was immediate and negative.

They knew that they no longer had complete responsibility for the territory that they were policing.

Vice

To date, none of the evidence from the police team programs in progress would suggest that the neighbourhood police teams are particularly soft in dealing with vice operations. In fact, the experience of at least one department would suggest that the contrary is true. In point of fact, introduction of the team policing concept may make life quite difficult for organized crime which operates across a city. Because the police teams have decentralized responsibilities for vice investigation, the vice operator may find that he has to pay off far more police officers than was the case when a relatively small number of detectives in a centralized unit were responsible for the investigation of the type of operation that he is trying to run. Theoretically, the team policing concept requires that every member of the police department be corrupted in order to protect any large-scale vice operation. The members of a police team must work together very closely. If one member of a police team engages in corrupt practices, the improved flow of information from the public to the police is likely to make at least one or more, if not all, of the other members of the team aware of the problem. This means that the vice operator in any given team territory must be able to corrupt all members of the team. If he intends to operate in more than one neighbourhood, then, eventually,

he must be able to corrupt all of the members of every team in whose territory he operates. This will prove to be not only difficult, but perhaps impossible.

It is not suggested here that the introduction of team policing be regarded as a weapon which the police executive may use to fight corruption within his department. However, it is suggested that the fears of senior police executives about the possibility of corruption within the team policing concept may be overstated.

Problems in Non-Team Areas

In cases where incidents of police misconduct or police corruption occur in parts of the police department not yet operating under the police team concept, members of the police team program ought to be exempted from any general orders intended to correct the problem. At the very least, these orders should be reviewed very carefully for their potential effect on the team policing program. Orders likely to have a negative effect on the team policing program should not be extended to include police teams.

Problems in Team Areas

In those cases where problems do occur within the police teams, it should be determined whether the problem resulted from a fault in the design of the team policing program. If this was the case, then the proper corrective measures should be taken. However, if the problem did not result from

a design fault, then any general orders to the department prepared as a result of the incident should be reviewed very carefully to determine their possible impact on the effectiveness of the team policing program. Again, orders likely to have a negative effect on team policing should be amended or dropped.

IMPACT ON ELEMENTS OF TEAM POLICING

Each of the problem areas discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter has a possible impact on the key elements of team policing. These impacts are summarized in Table 2 opposite.

Planning

Failure to involve a good cross-section of a police department's members in the planning of a team policing program could produce resistance to the implementation of team policing which would have an impact on all six key elements. If the command structure resists the implementation of team policing, geographic stability or decentralization of authority will be exceedingly difficult to achieve. If patrol officers feel that they were not adequately involved in planning, they may not conform to the new emphasis on community relations and crime prevention. Planned improvements in internal communications will not occur if middle management is not adequately involved in team policing planning. Failure to involve detectives in planning could lead to resistance to any reduction in the use of police specialists.

TABLE 2

POSSIBLE IMPACT OF PROBLEMS ON ELEMENTS OF TEAM POLICING

	Geographic Stability	Decentralization of Authority	Emphasis On Community Relations	Emphasis On Crime Prevention	Improved Internal Communications	Reduced Use of Specialists
Planning	x	x	x	x	x	x
Dispatching	x	x	x	x		
Team Selection	x	x	x	x	x	
Team Training						x
Overlapping Authority	x	x				x
Continuity of Command	x	x	x	x	x	x
Scale of Implementation					x	
Team Size					x	
Special Service						
Decentralization			x	x		
Special Tensions			x	x		
Manpower Requirements			x	x		
Physical Plant Requirements	x	x	x	x	x	x
Police Agency Scale						x
Management Development	x	x	x	x	x	x
Team Distinctions	x	x	x	x	x	x
Response to Crisis	x	x	x	x	x	x

Dispatching

Dispatching problems affect directly only the ability to maintain geographic stability of assignment. Excessive dispatching of team members outside team boundaries or excessive dispatching of other police officers to calls within team boundaries blurs those boundaries, producing an indirect effect on community relations. The team police officer cannot know his area well if he is constantly dispatched to calls outside of it. His knowledge is also reduced when other police officers handle calls within the team area. A further indirect effect may be noted in the area of crime prevention. Frequent dispatch to calls outside of the team area is likely to mean that the team police officer knows less about area criminals and area targets than he might otherwise know. Finally, it will be more difficult to decentralize authority when team boundaries are frequently violated in the dispatching of calls because it will be impossible to hold the team accountable for authority exercised in the team territory if other police officers are frequently active in that territory.

Team Selection

An inappropriate method of team selection could lead to a level of resentment of team policing on the part of the remainder of the force, which would produce an impact on all six key elements. It would occur in much the same way as resistance generated by failure to adequately involve members

of the force in the planning of a team policing program.

Team Training

Failure to provide adequate training for team members in community relations, crime prevention, and needed specialist skills would reduce the emphasis on community relations and crime prevention and force a continued high reliance on the use of specialists from centralized detective units.

Overlapping Authority

Failure to isolate a team policing program from watch commanders, precinct commanders, or functional commanders could produce severe violations of team boundaries and pressures to re-centralize authority and autonomy.

Continuity of Command

If the police leader responsible for the introduction of team policing leaves office and is replaced by an individual who does not support team policing, then all six essential elements will eventually feel the impact. Team boundaries will be violated with increasing frequency. Authority will again be concentrated at high levels. Emphasis will be removed from community relations and crime prevention in favour of detection and apprehension. Team meetings and conferences will become less frequent. The delegation of

investigative responsibilities to the police teams will be withdrawn.

Scale of Implementation

The larger the scale of the team policing programs, the more difficult it will be to maintain adequate levels of communication among the teams.

Team Size

Larger teams will find it more difficult to maintain an adequate level of communications within the team.

Social Service Decentralization

Where social services are not decentralized, it will be more difficult for police teams to establish effective working relations with social agencies, and more difficult to obtain information that might be useful in crime prevention also.

Racial Tensions

Racial tensions will make it more difficult and more time-consuming to establish effective communication between the police and the public. Tension also makes it more difficult to get information useful to the police in crime prevention activities.

Manpower Requirements

A team which is undermanned may be overwhelmed by calls for service which must be handled. This will make it difficult to spend time on community relations or crime prevention.

Physical Plant Requirements

Failure to provide an adequate communications and dispatching system could result in difficulties in maintaining stable geographic assignments. The design of the physical facilities could produce difficulties in terms of decentralization of authority. For example, when teams work in offices close to a watch commander, conflicts might arise over shift scheduling. If team offices are poorly located, the amount of time available for crime prevention and community relations might be reduced. If team offices are poorly designed, a reduction in the flow of internal communications could result. If teams are not provided with needed equipment or space, certain specialist activities must remain decentralized.

Police Agency Scale

In larger police agencies there will be entrenched groups of police specialists anxious to protect their own interests. Larger forces will face more acute problems in reducing their reliance on specialists.

Management Development

Police managers will be required to coach police teams on their operations. They must learn the importance of all six key elements in order to ensure that these principles are followed by the teams being managed.

Team Distinctions

The use of certain team distinctions such as uniforms can result in resistance to team policing on the part of other police officers. This resistance can cause problems on all six elements in the same way as failure to involve members adequately in planning or failure to select team members appropriately.

Response to Crisis

In responding to any police misconduct or corruption crisis, a police executive can violate the elements of team policing. Suspicion of long-term assignments to territories where temptations may exist may result in a weakening of the geographic stability of assignment in a team through frequent transfers. An inspection function might be established which would weaken the responsibility of the team for policing its territory. Fear of excessive fraternization with criminals might bring about orders which would impair team ability to emphasize community relations and crime prevention.

A misconduct or corruption crisis could produce strong pressures for internal investigations which would severely impair internal communications within and among teams. A police force in crisis may also be tempted to rely more on specialists, especially those in centralized detective units, to help solve the problem.

IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST

To avoid the kinds of problems discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, a police executive should consider taking certain steps in the implementation of team policing. A checklist of these problems is suggested below:

1. Involve a cross-section of respected members in the planning of team policing. They will persuade other members of the department to cooperate in implementation.
2. Involve the executive of the collective bargaining unit or, at least, keep them informed of the nature of the changes planned.
3. Form an internal task force to plan the team policing project.
4. Send the task force to visit other localities where team policing is in effect.
5. Point out the advantages of team policing to detectives at an early stage (eg., possible reduction in routine investigative workload).
6. Identify detectives who may qualify as team commanders.

7. Involve middle and senior managers in the planning of policing, especially those who are respected by their colleagues and who have demonstrated a willingness to attempt new methods in the past.
8. Avoid consultants offering packaged solutions which may not fit force problems.
9. Use consultants only as a resource to assist the internal planning task force. Do not allow team policing to become an "outsider's" program.
10. Ensure that members of the police teams are not dispatched outside of team boundaries. No more than 10% of calls within any team territory should be answered by units from outside the territory.
11. Establish a system of call priorities to assist in the observance of team boundaries in dispatching.
12. Train dispatchers on the importance of maintaining geographic stability and on any new call priority system.
13. Select team members at random. Team members should not be volunteers or the best available. They should be generally representative of the range of quality and attitudes within the force.
14. Select a team commander of high ability who is willing to innovate and who is respected by other commanders.
15. Give additional training in the elements of team policing, especially community relations and crime prevention.
16. Train team members in any required specialist skills where tasks formerly assigned to specialist units are to be assigned to the teams.

17. Establish guidelines which clearly define the authority of watch commanders, precinct commanders, and functional commanders with respect to police teams.
18. Provide for continuity of leadership. A chief who implements team policing should remain in office for at least five years to ensure that all changes introduced become part of the operating style of the department. The chief should regard implementation of team policing as his prime priority. Team policing has failed where the attention of the command structure has been directed to other matters.
19. Test the type of team policing to be implemented in one part of the territory served to iron out any "bugs" prior to conversion of the entire force to team policing.
20. Keep teams as small as possible. This allows members to develop the best possible communication with the neighbourhood and with each other. Best results are likely with teams of only seven or eight persons.
21. Urge the decentralization of other social agencies. Intervene where necessary to establish links between police officers and members of other social agencies.
22. Allow sufficient time for existing racial, ethnic, or linguistic tensions between the police and the public to be overcome in the establishment of new patterns of communication between police teams and their neighbourhoods.
23. Provide sufficient manpower. No more than one-third of each officer's time should be required by calls for service. The remainder of the time should be divided equally between community relations and crime prevention activities.

24. Provide portable two-way radios. They allow team members to leave police vehicles while remaining in contact with the dispatcher.
25. Do not force teams to staff their team offices on a regular basis. This is wasteful of manpower.
26. Be aware that a larger department will need more time to implement team policing than a smaller one. More levels of management will require retraining.
27. Provide training for team commanders and middle managers in personnel supervision techniques and budgeting.
28. Avoid unnecessary distinction of police team members from other members of the force. It can create needless antagonism.
29. When crises occur, examine the proposed response to determine the potential impact on the six key elements of team policing. Responses which violate these elements may severely impair the effectiveness of the team policing program.

VIII - IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Several research projects might prove to be useful in further evaluating team policing concepts within Canada.

CALGARY EVALUATION PROJECT

The City of Calgary is the largest example available in North America of the complete conversion of a municipal police department to team policing. Very little effort has been made to evaluate the impact of this project on crime rates, police attitudes, the cost of police services, or the over-all costs of the administration of justice. However, citizen attitude studies were carried out both before implementation and one year later.

The opportunity for evaluation of the Calgary experience in other areas has already passed. For example, police attitudes that exist today cannot be compared with police attitudes that existed prior to the implementation of team policing. There was no measurement of these attitudes at that time. Moreover, victimization rates today cannot be compared with victimization rates in the past. No victimization survey was taken at the time the team policing program was implemented in Calgary. Crime rates can be compared; however, as the extent of under-reporting of crime in Calgary prior to the implementation of team policing is not known and can not be known, the comparison of crime rates prior to the implementation of team policing to the crime rates which now exist is not entirely trustworthy. The introduction of team policing may have had an effect

on the extent crime was reported. The costs of policing Calgary prior to the implementation of team policing can probably be compared meaningfully with the cost of policing since the implementation of team policing. In addition, the costs of the over-all administration of justice for the Calgary area prior to the implementation of team policing can probably be meaningfully compared with costs today.

Edmonton Comparisons

We are particularly fortunate in the case of Calgary, in that comparisons with Edmonton are likely to be meaningful. The two cities are of approximately the same size and have police forces of approximately the same size. Calgary operates with team policing. Edmonton abandoned a rudimentary form of team policing in 1972. A study could be conducted to compare police attitudes, citizen attitudes, crime rates, costs of policing and the administration of justice in Calgary and Edmonton.

Crime and Clearance Rates

Reported rates of crime could be compared from one city to the other. Clearance rates should also be compared. Victimization studies should be conducted in both cities. The relationship between actual rates of crime and reported rates of crime should be noted for both cities. It would be interesting if the relationship between reported crime and actual

crime were to be substantially different in the two cities.

Job Attitudes

Police attitudes towards their job duties should be compared from one city to the other. The attitudes of members of Calgary's police teams should be compared with the attitudes of the members of the patrol division in Edmonton. The attitudes of the detectives in both departments ought to be compared. The attitudes of the members of the command structures of both departments ought to be compared.

Working Conditions

In each city, police attitudes towards their working conditions ought to be compared. Particular attention should be focused on hours of work, two-man cars and, pay and fringe benefits.

Police Attitudes to Public

The police attitudes in each city toward the communities they serve should be compared. Ratings of the extent to which the police feel the community is hostile towards them should be obtained in both cities, and the extent to which police officers feel that the citizens are prepared to help them should be measured.

Public Attitudes

Community attitudes towards the police might be compared. Attitudes should probably be broken down to samples representative of the general public, the business community, those recently requesting services from the police department, and those recently arrested by the two police departments. Measures of public willingness to assist the police, public willingness to report crime, and public willingness to report suspicious events or persons should be measured.

Costs

The size of the police budgets in Edmonton and Calgary should be compared. The total cost of processing offenders in Calgary and Edmonton through the courts and correctional systems should be measured and compared. Some estimate of the impact of the implementation of team policing on the total per capita costs of policing and the administration of justice might be made. The specific costs of police overtime and sick leave might be compared.

NEW TEAM POLICING PROJECT

The Department of the Solicitor General or the provinces may wish to fund development of a new team-policing project which would involve adequate measures of the results of introducing team policing. All of the measures of police attitudes, citizen

attitudes, crime rates, victimization rates and costs could be measured both before and after the implementation of team policing.

Municipal or regional police forces may require some federal encouragement to move towards team policing. This could be provided in the form of funds for the design of the team policing program, for any special training required prior to the implementation and for the evaluation of the program. In return for such funding, the administrator of the police department should permit representatives of other police departments to study the program in detail upon request.

NATIONAL VICTIMIZATION SURVEY

Canada should undertake a national victimization survey in the near future.

Crime Reporting Patterns

This victimization survey ought to explore the differences between rates of crime and the rates of crime reported to the police. Such a survey should be conducted with the cooperation of Statistics Canada and should be based on either personal or telephone interviews with a very large sample chosen to represent major variables in the Canadian population.

Geographic Region

A similar study in the United States found that there

were major differences in crime reporting patterns from one geographic area of the country to another. It would be interesting to determine whether similar regional differences and reporting patterns occur between the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairie provinces, British Columbia, and the Yukon and North West Territories.

City Size

In the United States the cities of different sizes had different patterns of crime reporting or under-reporting. Therefore, it would be important to compare major Canadian cities such as Montreal and Toronto with smaller centres and rural and frontier areas.

Ethnicity

Important ethnic differences may occur in terms of crime reporting. Comparisons of rates estimated by victimization surveys and rates of reported crime in police statistics may prove interesting. In addition, the study should provide the capability for identifying the crime reporting patterns of such major ethnic groups as Germans, Ukrainians, Italians, Jews, Blacks, East Indians, and Native peoples of Canada.

Income Level

Income differences are also likely to be of interest.

Generally speaking, it was found in the United States that there was significant under-reporting of crime among the lower income groups. Similar patterns of under-reporting may exist in Canada, but this will not be certain until a victimization study has been done.

Identification of Effective Policing Programs

The victimization study may also prove useful from another point of view. If the assumption is accepted that more effective policing results in a closer correlation between reported crime rates and crime rates as estimated by victimization surveys, then the victimization study may allow us to identify police departments whose programs appear to be particularly effective. For example, if two police departments of similar size, policing cities of similar size whose ethnic composition and income contribution is similar, come up with different relationships between rates of reported crime and rates of actual crime, then it may be assumed that one police department is more effective than the other. Comparisons of the approaches used by the two police departments might be made to determine what program elements appear to be producing the differences in public confidence. The successful policing techniques can then be communicated to other police executives for possible adaptation or adoption.

IX - POLICY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

If the results of the research suggested in the previous chapter are positive, then the Ministry of the Solicitor General may wish to cooperate with the provinces in encouraging the implementation of team policing throughout Canada. This would have several possible implications for departmental policies.

In all of the discussion that follows, it is recognized that the ten provincial governments, not the federal government, bear primary responsibility for the administration of justice. Suggested policies refer only to initiatives that the Ministry might take in offering financing to the provincial governments for specific types of programming at the municipal or regional level, which would be administered by the provinces.

FUNDING OF DESIGN

It may be found that many municipal or regional police departments lack the resources to design a team-policing program adequately. Joint federal and provincial funds may be required to provide the required resources.

One of the most important elements of an adequate team-policing design is records management. A municipal police force must be able to determine the calls for service that it receives from the various neighbourhoods proposed as team territories. Only then can adequate levels of manpower be assigned to the proposed teams. Additional records that would be useful are the

numbers of people and the numbers of businesses located in each of the team neighbourhoods.

Adequate standards of crime reporting should also be established prior to the implementation of team policing. Team policing may involve an increased emphasis on diversion of offenders from the criminal justice system to other social agencies. Rules must be established prior to the implementation of team policing to make sure the data obtained prior to implementation is comparable to data obtained after implementation.

The implementation of the team policing program will usually require the establishment of a planning task force which will draw police officers from a cross-section of the police force. The man-hours and time that these police officers devote to the planning of the team-policing program must be paid for. In addition, members of the planning task force should have the opportunity of travelling to other jurisdictions to discover first-hand the advantages and disadvantages of team policing. The resources that the municipality is able to provide may not fully cover the expenditures involved in the creation of a team policing planning task force.

FUNDING OF TRAINING

The Ministry of the Solicitor General, in cooperation with the provinces, may also wish to finance some of the training necessary to implement team policing successfully. This will include not only the additional cost of trainers and training facilities (which would not otherwise be required) but also

the cost of the productive man-hours that were lost to the police agency while such training was in progress.

Significant investments must be made in the training of the police team members. As noted earlier, old habits must be broken and replaced with new habits. Team police members are asked to disregard their previous orientation towards the detection and apprehension of criminals. They are now expected to place primary emphasis on crime prevention, and must be taught techniques for crime prevention. In addition, where previous departmental policy may have frowned upon frivolous contact between the police and the public, team policing philosophy requires extensive informal contact between the police and the public. Techniques of community relations and the philosophy of community relations must be taught to members of police teams. In addition, where any specialist traffic or investigative duties are delegated to the police teams, these skills must be taught to the members of those teams.

The team policing philosophy requires changing substantially typical police patterns of supervision. First line supervisors will have to be taught a greater array of human resources management skills than they now possess.

Middle level and senior level police managers and executives may be required to acquire greater scope in terms of their management techniques. These can include both human resources management techniques and financial management techniques. In some cases, extensive management development programs will need to be set up, which may even require full-time attendance of members of police forces at Canadian or foreign universities.

FUNDING OF EVALUATION

The Ministry of the Solicitor General, in cooperation with the provinces, may want to fund independent evaluation of the results achieved by police departments converting to team policing. The police departments are unlikely to have the necessary array of skills for a full-scale evaluation among their own personnel. External evaluation should probably be purchased from such suppliers as universities and consulting firms.

Crime statistics kept by the police force should be audited by outsiders. Any changes in reporting requirements and the important influences of these changes on comparisons can be noted. Victimization studies should be conducted independently of the police department. The use of at least the name, if not the staff, of Statistics Canada is suggested in this regard. Finally, citizen attitude surveys and police attitude surveys should be conducted by external evaluators. It is unrealistic to expect that honest answers will be given either by the police officers or by citizens in attitude surveys conducted directly by the police agency involved.

External evaluators could be expected to provide for survey design, survey implementation, survey analysis, survey interpretation, and survey reporting. The skills required for these activities are unlikely to be found within the typical police department.

FUNDING OF CONSULTING ASSISTANCE

The Ministry of the Solicitor General, in cooperation

with the provinces, may also wish to finance on-going consulting assistance to police departments engaged in the implementation of team policing programs. Such consultants could be drawn from the staff of the department, from the universities, or from private consulting firms.

The intent of such consulting assistance would be to provide guidance to the police executives and to the planning task force as the program was implemented. The consultant could review proposals and point out potential problems. He might be able to point out areas which had not been adequately covered and suggest sources of additional data. During the operation of police teams, he might assist the police department in coping with various problems that arise by pointing out the solutions, used by other departments facing similar problems. He might also review major changes to general departmental orders and indicate what the potential implications of such changes would be for the team policing program. In no case would the department concerned be obliged to accept the advice of the consultant. However, the department would always be obliged to listen to the consultant.

FUNDING OF MANPOWER INCREASES

The Ministry of the Solicitor General, in cooperation with the provinces, may find it advisable to provide funds for certain manpower increases in order to guarantee the success of the team policing program.

The payment of manpower expenses at the local level

by senior levels of government is certain to be controversial. Municipalities and regional governments will be competing for funds. It will be difficult to decide that one locality should get funds and that another should be turned down. It should be made very clear that such financial support is temporary.

Certain boosts in manpower may be required as the team policing program is introduced. Extra manpower will be required to provide adequate police coverage for the city while a number of police officers are being trained in their new roles as team police officers. In addition, there will be certain operational inefficiencies while police officers are adjusting to their new roles within the police teams. This may cause a further requirement for additional manpower in the short term.

Another type of manpower increase will be required in those departments which have traditionally staffed only to meet the work loads generated by the calls for service received from the public. Under such levels of staffing, team police officers could not give proper attention to their new roles of crime prevention and community relations. However, federal and provincial funds to provide such manpower increases should probably be available only in the short term. Once the community has had an opportunity to recognize the value of crime prevention and community relations activities, it should be prepared to assume the costs of these activities.

NEW WORKING RELATIONSHIPS

It may be to the advantage of the Ministry of the Solicitor General to establish, in cooperation with the

provinces, policies regarding the working relationships that should exist between local police authorities using team policing concepts and the various operational areas of the Ministry. Close working relationships should be fostered between police teams and employees of the correctional service and the parole service. In the case of corrections, officials should be encouraged to establish direct contact with police teams. Police teams should be advised when a prisoner is being placed on day release to accept a job in the team territory. Team members should also be advised when an offender is to receive a weekend pass to visit family or friends in the team territory. Members of the police team should have access to information regarding the evaluation of the prisoner by correctional facility officers.

Team policing also provides the opportunity of establishing close working relationships between officials of the parole and probation services and members of police teams. Some thought might be given to the assignment of caseloads on a geographic basis. The parole or probation official can then form a close working relationship with a relatively small number of police teams. Police teams could be useful to the parole or probation officer in terms of providing supervision. In turn, the parole or probation officer could be useful to the members of the police team by providing assessments of offenders most likely to commit further offences and who therefore require close surveillance.

X - OPERATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

If the research suggested in a previous chapter should demonstrate the validity of team policing, there would be major implications for the operations of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the correctional service, and the parole service.

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

The implications of team policing are important to the municipal contracts, provincial policing contracts, and to federal policing.

Municipal Contracts

The original team policing installation in Canada occurred in the North Vancouver detachment of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Other municipalities are policed under contract between the local government and the federal government. If research results are favourable, it should be possible to introduce team policing into these areas. Detachment operations at Burnaby, British Columbia; Richmond, British Columbia; Surrey, British Columbia; and Red Deer, Alberta; should be prime candidates for team policing projects. The reorganization of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in the entire lower mainland of British Columbia may include the present detachments at Burnaby, Richmond, and North Vancouver. The entire area might be considered a prime target for the implementation of team policing.

Provincial Policing Contracts

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police are responsible for policing rural areas of British Columbia, the Prairie provinces, and the Maritime provinces. If research results are positive, some attention might be focused on these rural detachments and sub-divisions in order to ensure that their operations conform to the basic principles of team policing. If rural detachments are to be consolidated, care might be taken to ensure that the territory to be served and the number of residents to be involved is not so great as to preclude an adequate level of communications between the police and the public. Care might also be taken to ensure that responsibility for shift scheduling remains decentralized at a fairly low level of authority. It might be a mistake to establish shifts of equal size in most rural areas because, for example, there could be a great deal of work during day and evening shifts but very little work during midnight shifts. The importance of crime prevention might be stressed to rural police officers. They could be given training in activities they might undertake to prevent crime in their territory. Rural police officers might also be encouraged to maintain a high level of effective police-community relations. Informal contacts with the general public and close working relationships with other social service agencies and the school systems could be developed. Rural detachments could be encouraged to hold regular meetings, during which crime problems are discussed and in-service training could take place. Finally, where detachments are consolidated, the temptation to create specialist positions could be resisted.

Federal Policing

In Quebec and Ontario, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police deploy functional specialist units in major metropolitan areas. These functional specialists are normally concerned with such matters as commercial frauds, narcotics control, and criminal intelligence. In all of these areas, the authority of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police overlaps to at least some degree that of the municipal police authority. Perhaps, if the research results on team policing are positive, these functional specialists could be encouraged to decentralize their activities on a geographic basis. For example, the narcotics specialist at "O" Division in Toronto might be encouraged to build close personal working relationships with the police teams being fielded in Burlington. They could provide him with useful sources of information about the narcotics traffic within their team territories. Alone, the narcotics specialist could never expect to achieve either the volume or the quality of information that is likely to be achieved within an effective neighbourhood police team. However, this data is not likely to be shared by the municipal police authority and the federal police authority unless a close personal working relationship is established between the individual narcotics investigators within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the municipal policemen who are members of the police team.

CORRECTIONS

Again, if research results are positive and lead to

any significant implementations of team policing on a national basis, some consideration could be given to the decentralization of the activities of the correctional service. Correctional officials could be assigned to work with criminals drawn from the neighbourhoods policed by teams. Close working relationships could then be established between the police team and the correctional institute. Members of the police team might be able to provide information concerning the background of a prisoner to correctional officials which will be useful in their attempts to rehabilitate him. On the other hand, correctional officials might be able to give members of the police teams information about prisoners being released which could be useful to the police in their efforts to prevent crime in their territories.

PAROLE SERVICE

If research results are positive and lend to the introduction of team policing, some consideration might be given to a parallel decentralization of parole services. A parole officer might be assigned to work with an individual police team or with a group of police teams. His caseload might consist of all those offenders released to the territory being policed by the teams with which he works. The police team could provide the parole officer with information that might be useful to him in his efforts to assist the offender in the process of re-integrating into society. On the other hand, the parole officer might be able to give the police teams information that would be useful to them in their efforts to control crime in their territories.

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