

OVERCOMING LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES:

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES



Edited by

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Douglas Lindsay, PhD &
Commander Dave Woycheshin, PhD

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EDITED BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL (RETIRED) DOUGLAS LINDSAY, PhD
& COMMANDER DAVE WOYCHESHIN, PhD**



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Overcoming Leadership Challenges is the tenth publication by the International Military Leadership Association. For the past ten years, this group has consistently produced high-quality publications on a wide range of relevant topics in military leadership. This volume identifies many key challenges faced by military leaders and offers suggestions for overcoming these problems.

It is important to recognize the ongoing support of Military Personnel Generation (MILPERSGEN) and the Canadian Defence Academy Press for this series of publications. In particular, our gratitude and thanks go to Melanie Denis of MILPERSGEN for her long term help and support in producing these volumes. Our thanks also go to Marie-Josée Landry, who has taken over Melanie's duties. We must also express our gratitude to the 17 Wing Publishing Office in Winnipeg, Manitoba, for consistently producing a high-quality, professional product.

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FOREWORD

I am pleased to introduce *Overcoming Leadership Challenges*, the tenth volume of the International Military Leadership Association (IMLA) series published by the Canadian Defence Academy Press. Established in 2005, the IMLA has provided a forum for military leadership researchers, academics, and members of military leadership institutes to collaborate on a wide variety of military leadership projects. The IMLA has recently been formally recognized as a permanent Working Group of the International Military Testing Association. This publication is one of the tangible outcomes of this fruitful and vital collaboration.

Overcoming Leadership Challenges addresses both perennial leadership challenges and challenges that come from today's operational environment. Despite efforts to recruit, select, train, and develop the best leaders for our militaries, there have always been good leaders and bad leaders. This volume includes a number of chapters that help explain and understand bad leaders and evil leaders. A chapter on pseudoscientific thinking offers a means to understand and deal with bad leaders. The volume also includes positive approaches to overcoming leadership challenges, including surmounting obstacles to enabling transformational leadership and facilitating the development of military leaders as professionals.

Overcoming Leadership Challenges also addresses the challenges faced by leaders today. One example is the shift in the use of social media by different generations of leaders. Leaders must understand how and when to use the convenient, but indirect, forms of communication that social media provide, and when to use "old-fashioned" face-to-face communication. Social media can also be used to a military organization's advantage, as demonstrated in the case study of Australia's response to the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. Finally, the volume includes a chapter on overcoming a perennial problem that seems particularly prevalent today: how leaders can prepare their subordinates to deal with organizational change.

FOREWORD

The IMLA continues to demonstrate its relevance to furthering the understanding of the many facets of military leadership. I commend the efforts of the authors, editors, and publishing staff in producing this volume and I unequivocally support the continued publication of the IMLA series by the Canadian Defence Academy Press.

J.G.E. Tremblay
Major-General
Commander
Military Personnel Generation

CHAPTER 1

LEADERSHIP: SIMPLIFYING THE COMPLEX

*Commander Mark Meehan**

INTRODUCTION

In 2011, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) recognized the advantage that improved leadership development could provide, both at the individual and the organizational level. However, like many other organizations, despite having discrete, isolated, touch points of leadership development throughout its organization, a comprehensive system of leadership development across the full spectrum of the organization did not exist. The first, and in practice the most straightforward, exercise was to establish a leadership development framework. Semi-structured interviews and leadership behaviour card sorts were conducted at every level of the organization. This information was analyzed and compared against international benchmarks to provide a clear and coherent picture of what leadership success looked like, behaviourally, at every leadership level in the NZDF. From this, the NZDF Leadership Development Framework (LDF) was created. While the identification of what leadership success looked like for the NZDF was relatively simple, the true challenge remained: how to support the understanding and development of leadership from both a theoretical and practical perspective within the organization.

In order to support leadership development, the NZDF implemented its Leadership Development System (LDS). For the LDS to be effective, a clear understanding of what leadership is and how it is developed was required. Whilst the NZDF was advanced in its thinking, regarding establishing the LDF and providing a very clear picture of the behaviours of a successful leader, an understanding of how these would be developed in its members was still in a nascent stage. While it was understood that certain intangible qualities existed in a successful leader, (i.e., they had “soft” skills that supported their engagement with those they led), how could they articulate these skills and place them alongside the “hard” skills required to be an effective leader

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect those of the New Zealand Defence Force or the New Zealand Defence Force Institute for Leader Development.

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in the military? Attempting to provide this clarity exposed a “leadership industry” that imparts a myriad of theories, each with supporting models. While all of these theories are presented with the aim of unravelling the complexity of leadership, and despite the efforts of a leadership industry, a lack of clarity regarding leadership still exists. This paper has been generated for two primary reasons: to support the establishment of the LDS and, perhaps more importantly, to provide wider clarity and some points to support the wider understanding of leadership and leadership development.

In 1959, Bennis wrote, “of all the hazy and confounding areas in social psychology, leadership theory undoubtedly contends for top nomination. And, ironically, probably more has been written and less is known about leadership than about any other topic in the behavioural sciences.”¹ It can be argued that more than half a century later, Bennis’ statement, for the most part, remains applicable. The neoteric nature of the leadership industry is actually undermining the understanding of leadership and leadership development. It is not suggested that this is a reflection of any attempt to disguise the issue, nor is the issue isolated to the work of any individual, but the issue is reflective of the industry itself. An industry has developed comprising commercial entities,² bringing their promises of unravelling the conundrum of the “art and science of leadership.”³ In an attempt to bring their points of difference to the leadership milieu, most theorists have in fact added complexity, not elucidated the challenges.

The current state of the understanding of leadership is defined by Kellerman, in her 2012 work *The End of Leadership*.⁴ Kellerman delivers a coherent dialogue describing an industry that has developed around leadership as a construct. An argument is put forward regarding the impact that changes in societal norms and advances in technology have had on leadership. According to Kellerman, the requirements of leadership are now different due to the new complex environment. Kellerman is not alone in her thinking: notable theorists, such as Hazy, Lichtenstein, Uhl-Bien, Marion, Gardner, Pearce and Conger,⁵ all identify with the new and complex leadership milieu. Furthermore, these theorists also consider that the current leadership environment requires new perspectives through which to view and resolve the potential new challenges. While the irony of the self-fulfilling prophesy is not missed by some, on the whole, this perspective in turn supports and feeds the leadership industry.⁶

THE GOALS OF THIS CHAPTER

At its core, leadership is about “simplifying the complex.”⁷ This chapter will do this by exploring the fundamental core of leadership. The industry that has evolved around understanding and developing leadership argues that today’s leadership environment is different, new, and complex. It will be argued that this is not the case; the environment within which leaders operate has always been constantly changing. Furthermore, the challenge of leadership is not any different now than it has ever been. Leaders have always had to respond to new and complex environments, and will continue to have to respond to these environments. It is proposed that ensuring successful relationships between leaders, followers, and all actors involved in the achievement of the success of a leadership event is the heart of leadership. This chapter will highlight that despite the efforts of the leadership industry, an unnecessary lack of clarity or understanding still exists in the field of leadership. This chapter will explore the current understanding of leadership, and its development, by addressing three questions:

Question 1: *Does confusion still exist around what leadership is?*

Despite the plethora of studies on the subject, it is posited that confusion still exists around what exactly leadership is. Significant research has been conducted, and continues to be conducted, on the subject without any significant consensus being achieved. However, this chapter will show that clarity can be established.

Question 2: *Is the 21st century leadership environment more complex?*

It will be argued that the current lens through which leadership is viewed is in fact adding complexity, making the role of leading more challenging. As each new leadership era commences, new lenses through which to view the issue comes to the fore. In answering this question, some fundamental flaws that have occurred in trying to elucidate leadership challenges will be exposed. Consideration of this question will build on the foundations laid exploring question one and support simplifying the complex.

Question 3: *How can the understanding of leadership, and its development, be simplified?*

The challenge will be considered from a humanistic approach. It will explore what is at the heart of leadership: human interaction. While the continued exploration of theory brings greater understanding, this exploration needs to be based on solid foundations. The discussion provided to answer

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this question will support individual and organizational development of leadership capacity.

Through the exploration of these questions, it will become clear that the industry that has risen to support the understanding of leadership has, to an extent, proved counterproductive. The apparent unabated desire of theorists to bring something new to leadership research and add to the leadership lexicon has not, on the whole, supported leadership development. Practitioners of leadership are sufficiently challenged just by leading, without being required to come to terms with a seemingly never-ending supply of new leadership models and constructs. This chapter will argue that paring the understanding of leadership back to its most basic premise of human interaction should be the basis to build upon. While this approach is not radical, it is counter to the many new layers and lenses through which to view the challenge of understanding leadership. It will be argued that this approach to supporting the understanding of leadership and to developing leadership capacity will better serve leadership as a whole.

QUESTION 1: DOES CONFUSION STILL EXIST AROUND WHAT LEADERSHIP IS?

FIRST WE MUST DEFINE LEADERSHIP. OR MUST WE?

Leadership understanding, and its associated definitions, has moved through many epochs and we are now moving through yet another. Notable leadership theorists, such as Stogdill, Rost, Bass and Northouse, have all explored the different lenses through which leadership has historically been viewed.⁸ Each has provided similar chronologies of how the characterization of leadership has altered since its exploration commenced at the turn of the 20th century. Distinct leadership taxonomies have been identified in each decade from the 1920s through to the 1990s.⁹ The advent of the new millennium brought with it a new lens of complexity through which to attempt to unravel the leadership conundrum. The lens through which leadership is explored keeps changing, attempting to bring a new perception of clarity to the issue. However, despite significant robust research efforts into the subject, the elucidation and clarity of defining leadership does not appear to have been gained.¹⁰

To understand leadership and expand the knowledge of leadership, first it is necessary to define it. Or is it? Whetten's work,¹¹ "What Constitutes a Theoretical Contribution," is recognized as a model of how to explore theory.¹²

Whetten identifies four key elements required in a body of research: the first three of these are the what, the how, the why; the fourth component is actually made up of a group of three elements: the who, where and when. Unsurprisingly, Whetten identifies that establishing what is being explored is an underpinning requirement of research, with the what being the “variables, constructs [or] concepts” to be tested or expanded upon. Recognizing the importance of the theoretical underpinning of defining what leadership is has not been missed by some within the academic community.¹³ However, establishing what leadership is, to be able to explore it against Whetten’s theoretical model, has proved challenging.

In 1974, Stogdill published his review of the definition of leadership from the 1920s through to the 1970s.¹⁴ This review of 221 definitions failed to draw consensus on a singular definition of leadership. This is a failing in the theoretical exploration of leadership, looking for a black or white, or binary, answer to a challenge in human nature. It should be accepted that sometimes the perfect answer just does not exist. If one were to explore the definition of any word, selected at random, across multiple dictionaries, would the definition be exactly the same? However, the essence of the definition would be the same, allowing for individual personalization. This more pragmatic approach to developing the understanding of leadership has been missed by some theorists.

The challenge of the plethora of leadership definitions was recognized by Bass, who acknowledged a “surfeit of definitions of leadership.”¹⁵ The pragmatic approach to defining leadership is captured by Bass, who states that there are as many definitions of leadership as there are people considering what leadership means to them. Bass’s point is that leadership is a very personal thing. It could be argued that, as the understanding of leadership developed, finessing of its definition occurred. Under different circumstances this could be considered appropriate and a natural progression. However, if one considers this in conjunction with the significant changes that have occurred in the understanding of the leadership construct, the argument is invalid.

Analysis of leadership as a field of study to support its understanding and development did not truly commence until the early 20th century.¹⁶ As the field of study developed, the predominant focus was placed on individuals and their roles as leaders. It was during this phase that leadership was explored almost exclusively through the “heroic conceptualization”¹⁷ lens of the leader.¹⁸ This lens spurred the associated “great man” theory which evolved into the more general concept of trait theory. These theories were popularized in an attempt to help leaders recognize what they should “look like” if they were to be

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successful.¹⁹ The popularity of trait theory waned, largely as a result of the 1948 work of Stogdill.²⁰ Not dissimilarly to his later work reviewing the definition of leadership, Stogdill called into question the trait construct, due to the inability of experts to reach universally accepted traits linked to effective leadership.

The reductionist approach to study is not applicable to understanding leadership. While total agreement on defining leadership may not have been achieved, advances in understanding leadership have occurred. This can be recognized through how leadership has historically been explored, initially being considered solely through the lens of the leader to a more holistic approach, considering all of the actors involved in the leadership event. Despite the lack of agreement on a definition of leadership, a greater understanding of the factors impacting leadership has clearly been developed. The challenge for theorists is to look at the bigger picture, rather than becoming consumed with theoretical perfection. Stogdill's review of trait theory undermined this approach's academic credibility, but the role human traits play in leadership and understanding human interaction still remains valid.²¹

THE LEADERSHIP CONSTRUCT: LEADING VERSUS LEADERSHIP

Further complicating issues in defining leadership arise due to the variability in how the leadership construct is considered. At the most basic level, leadership is very personal when looked at through the leader-follower relationship. At the other end of the conceptualization spectrum, leadership can be looked at through the organizational context. Bass identifies 20 different constructs under which leadership could be considered, from the simplistic construct of a "leader as a symbol," "leadership as a process," through to more abstract constructs, such as "leadership as the initiation of structure" and "leadership as the making of meaning."²² This attempt to capture what leadership is should not be confused with defining leadership; it is an additional level of complexity. In his review of Bass's earlier work, Washbush comments that due to the nature of leadership, the crux of leadership is what it is to those (i.e., each individual) who are considering it.²³ Much as is the case with the variations in defining leadership considered previously, Washbush considers it appropriate that "we are all free to define the term to suit our own needs."²⁴ Bass recognizes the situational nature of leadership and that "the definition of leadership should depend on the purposes to be served."²⁵

In order to elucidate the complex leadership challenge purportedly faced by the 21st century leader, it is necessary to unravel the role and requirements of

a leader, and to distinguish this from the task of leadership. Bass's 20 domains of leadership provide a robust explanation of leadership context, but more simple models can be applied. Friedrich *et al.*²⁶ reference the work of Yukl²⁷ in linking leadership to three archetypes: leadership can be considered from the perspective of a person, through the lens of a role, or as required by a process. However, this can be reduced even further to two archetypes, that of the person (the leader), and the process (leadership).

The simple construct of two leadership archetypes, that of the person (the leader) and that of the process (leadership), can provide the clarity to leaders that is currently missing in the leadership industry. Schruijer and Vansina²⁸ argue for the uncomplicated construct, and their work is not incongruous with that of Yukl. If it is considered that Yukl's role of the leader has to be filled by a person, this model is valid. Friedrich and colleagues highlight the work of Gronn²⁹ when identifying that "leadership is a complex process in which the behavioural roles that often fall under the leadership umbrella may be taken up by different individuals."³⁰ The work of Schruijer and Vansina further supports the argument that the function of leadership does not have to be fulfilled by a singular person, and that the function can be shared.³¹ This concept is reinforced by the shared leadership models, most recently put forward by Pearce and Conger³² (this is not a new construct, a point that will be expanded further in this chapter).

IS LEADERSHIP SO HARD TO DEFINE?

In 2004, the GLOBE Project³³ provided a definition of leadership that acts as a solid foundation for building the understanding of leadership. At the 2004 Calgary GLOBE Project symposium, an international body of social scientists, led by House, considered the definition of leadership. They included the definitions of leadership from Stogdill, Bass, and Yukl, referenced previously. They considered the roles associated with those affected by acts of leadership, including leaders, followers, and groups or organizations, and how leadership is manifested, through its impact and influence. Furthermore, the symposium considered the impact of a leader's ability in motivating individuals, and the effect of this on the required outcome. The GLOBE symposium ultimately defined leadership as "the ability to influence, motivate, and enable others to contribute to the effectiveness and success of the organizations of which they are members."³⁴ With this simple definition, Whetten's first component of theoretical research can be considered established.³⁵ Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, this definition provides a foundation upon which to develop a greater understanding of leadership.

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LEADERSHIP IS MUCH MORE THAN JUST A DEFINITION

While the lens through which leadership is viewed has changed, the underpinning components of leadership, or what leadership intrinsically is, have not. Each definition of leadership recognizes the role of the leader, for it is the leader that is ultimately responsible for the success of the leadership event.³⁶ It should not be assumed that the role of the leader is fixed or even pre-determined; the role can be contingent on the circumstances. The construct of leadership is not a result of leaders or theorists viewing and now understanding leadership through the lens of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). If a leader exists by the very nature of a leadership relationship then so must followers, or those impacted by the actions and decisions of the leader.

The various leadership constructs recognize that the leader's role is to elicit outcomes from an interaction. For this to occur, the leader has to have some form of effect or influence on the event and on those involved in the event. However, the leader does not operate in isolation; they interact with all those involved in the event.³⁷ The leader's influence is not just a one-way flow. All those involved in the event influence the outcome; the leader influences followers and in turn followers influence the leader. Similarly, all other players involved in the outcome play their part and impact outcomes. The only absolute in the leadership construct is the reliance on influence; the ability to influence is impacted by the leaders, followers, and others involved in the leadership event.

SHOULD CONFUSION STILL EXIST AROUND WHAT LEADERSHIP IS?

Regardless of the construct through which leadership is considered, the GLOBE definition provides a solid basis on how to consider leadership. The constant rehashing of the definition of leadership, in an attempt to get agreement between theorists, adds no value to leadership development. Irrespective of whether leadership is examined through each of Bass's 20 leadership constructs, Yukl's three archetypes, or through more contemporary constructs, such as "Shared Leadership,"³⁸ "Authentic Leadership,"³⁹ or "Complexity Leadership Theory,"⁴⁰ leadership is, and will remain, "the ability to influence, motivate, and enable others to contribute to the effectiveness and success of the organizations of which they are members." Clarity regarding what leadership is could and should exist. Why then does a lack of consensus exist in the leadership industry? The argument of theorists is that today's

leadership environment is unlike any other. However, this is the argument that has been provided in each leadership epoch.

QUESTION 2: IS THE 21ST CENTURY LEADERSHIP ENVIRONMENT MORE COMPLEX?

THE CONTEMPORARY LEADERSHIP ENVIRONMENT IS NEW, DIFFERENT AND UNLIKE ANYTHING BEFORE. OR IS IT?

The new millennium brought with it fresh challenges for leadership, and the leadership industry responded to the need with new models. Events such as the global financial crisis, 9/11, and other “chilling examples of corporate and government malfeasance,”⁴¹ shattered the trust that had previously been placed in organizations and, more specifically, in their leaders.⁴² Theorists and students of leadership argue that the 21st century leader’s role is more complex than ever before.⁴³ They posit that leaders today have to deal with new complexities that did not burden their predecessors. These complexities include living in the new knowledge era,⁴⁴ which in turn is supported by advances in technology;⁴⁵ all of this is exacerbated by the impact of globalization.⁴⁶ These theorists argue that historic leadership models can no longer support the necessary development of today’s leaders, and has become obsolete.⁴⁷ Some consider that the contemporary leadership challenge is so significant that new “special leaders are required.”⁴⁸ Kellerman goes so far as to suggest that today’s era has ushered in the end of leadership as we know it.⁴⁹ In response to this perceived new leadership complexity, neoteric models of leadership have been, and continue to be, identified to respond to the supposed modern demands.

In response to this, Greenleaf identified what he considered to be “the crisis of leadership.”⁵⁰ This crisis of leadership is centred on two themes. First, although people recognized the requirement to lead, due to their perception of the complexity of the issues of the day, they saw the challenge as too great. Those required to lead were being blinded by what they saw (and this was being reinforced by the leadership experts) as insurmountable challenges. Second, Greenleaf proposed what he saw as the rise of “anti-leaders.” Greenleaf described anti-leaders as those so perplexed by the complexities and challenges of modern society that they sought its demise. Greenleaf’s anti-leaders’ answer to dealing with these new complexities was a new “leaderless” society.

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LEADERSHIP TO THE RESCUE

Effective leadership can support wider organizational and societal success, but it is not the panacea. Richard Barker suggests that “leadership has been advocated as a solution to particular personal, social and organizational problems.”⁵¹ While the exploration of leadership has brought with it advances in wider societal understanding, exploring wider societal impact purely through the leadership lens is flawed. Barker proposes that this is an error in the social science approach to the exploration of leadership; failings in individuals or society are identified and the manner in which to fix the failing is offered, in this instance through more effective leadership.

Barker identifies that many theorists and those involved in the leadership industry consider the applicability of leadership from a perspective that is no longer applicable, if in fact it ever was.⁵² This argument is credible when considered from the perspective of theorists analyzing leadership through the great man construct. However, it suggests that leadership theorists are not adding to the wider body of knowledge, which is not the case. The understanding of leadership research, its impact, and how it can positively impact the wider community is adding value, but this value needs to be distilled. There is clear evidence associating the behaviours of leaders and the impact on those they lead,⁵³ however, leadership is not the cure-all. The industry that supports its understanding must concentrate on adding value, where it can, to the leaders it is attempting to support.

THE ROLE OF THE LEADERSHIP INDUSTRY

In 2000, Day recorded his view that “leadership development appears to be at its zenith.”⁵⁴ Since then, the field of study has burgeoned to such a size that it is in itself now viewed by some as an industry⁵⁵ that has “generated a complex web of theories and frameworks.”⁵⁶ As with many industries, there are tools aimed to support its understanding and growth, both at an individual and organizational levels. These tools are supposed to offer the actors in the industry greater ease in achieving their required end-state, or success. A gratuitous propensity to reinvent itself appears to exist in the leadership industry. It continuously looks for new, arguably unnecessary, lenses through which to explore the leadership construct. The most recent topic, or justification for new analysis of leadership requirements, is what is considered to be the current complex environment. It has resulted in adding greater complexity through an ever expanding leadership lexicon, models of comparison, and the increasing multitude of lenses through

which leadership is viewed. The current view of leadership complexity has in fact detracted from the development of leadership capacity.

Social science as a whole could be seen to be the problem in attempting to understand leadership. Attempts to simplify a problem have actually resulted in its overcomplication. Rather than using a systems approach of looking at the underlying issues of leadership, the leadership industry appears to generate and discredit theories as a matter of course. Continued efforts are made to deconstruct leadership in an attempt to break down its inherent complexity.⁵⁷ However, this approach is fundamentally flawed; in order to be able to measure or test a concept or theory, it must be sufficiently finite.⁵⁸ The current complexity challenges being dealt with by today's leaders provide further opportunity for confusion, or a lack of clarity of the real problem. Stogdill's attempts at discrediting of trait theory due to his inability to identify commonality or agreement on the traits of leadership is an example of a theory being considered moot due to a lack of irrefutable evidence.⁵⁹

QUESTION 3: HOW CAN THE UNDERSTANDING OF LEADERSHIP, AND ITS DEVELOPMENT, BE SIMPLIFIED?

The understanding of leadership developing as a situational and relational construct is fundamental when considering leadership. Van Vugt and Ahuja,⁶⁰ amongst others, offer a compelling image of leadership developing as a situational occurrence in the semi-nomadic hunter gatherer groups of the savannah, some 13,000 years ago.⁶¹ They support the theory that specific members of groups played leadership roles, depending upon the situation. These groups would generally number in the region of 100-150,⁶² where each member of the tribe played their role and added their value to the group. While there was the propensity for the "big man" to play an alpha role or dominate the group, they would step down if skills more appropriate to the situation were held by others in their group.⁶³ Leadership was situational rather than hierarchical or structural, with the role being taken or given to someone with skills required at the time, such as the ability to lead the group to water, or to track to the place the group was most likely to find food. The transfer of leadership was "consensual, democratic, and transitory," and lasted only as long as the situation required. For this to occur, there needed to be a number of prerequisites; these will be dealt further in this chapter.

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WHAT ARE THE SKILLS REQUIRED OF A CONTEMPORARY LEADER?

Hogan and Warrenfeltz suggest that successful leadership relies on four key domains: intrapersonal skills, interpersonal skills, leadership skills (the skills required for building and maintaining effective teams), and business or technical skills.⁶⁴ It is worth considering these domains through both an ancient and modern lens, to test how they would support survival on the savannah or leadership in the modern global corporate boardroom. Prior to this examination, a benchmark of understanding is required. The Hogan and Warrenfeltz domains comprise:

- *Intrapersonal Skills:* The ability of an individual to manage their own challenges; an individual's resilience in dealing with the challenges they encounter on a daily basis; how they cope with the circumstances that befall them and their responses to their challenges, both from an emotional perspective and also from a control perspective, i.e. impulse control, when interacting with others.
- *Interpersonal Skills:* How successfully individuals can interact with others; how they can communicate and influence those around them. This is directly linked to an individual's intrapersonal skills; if they are challenged with managing themselves when under pressure, this will have a direct impact on their communication and interaction with others.
- *Leadership Skills:* This centres on an individual's ability to develop and maintain a team. While it could be seen as a role that requires the leader to step forward and lead, it also requires the ability to identify what is required by the team at any specific time. Furthermore, it requires the leader to have the requisite competencies to satisfy the needs of those they lead. On the whole, it is within this domain that most leadership development programs focus, on the tools of leadership; however, without intrapersonal and interpersonal skills, the leader will not succeed.
- *Business or Technical Skills:* The leader is required to be technically competent. They are required to possess the cognitive ability to resolve challenges in their area of expertise.

There are strong linkages between each of Hogan and Warrenfeltz's four domains. They identify that for a leader to be successful he or she must possess the prerequisite level of skill in each of the domains; no amount of strength in any one individual domain can make up for a gap in another. It is of little

use if a leader has significant intrapersonal and interpersonal skills if they do not have the knowledge of leadership skills to harness the team's ability, nor the technical ability to add value to overcoming the team's challenges. The leader must be able to self-manage, while effectively interacting with those he or she leads (and all stakeholders involved in the leadership challenge) and understand how he or she can support the requirements of the team in achieving what the leader identifies to be the desired end-state. Hogan and Warrenfeltz are not radical in their thinking, but much like most organizations the predominance of training and development in the NZDF had been weighted toward the hard professional or business skills, rather than the softer intrapersonal and interpersonal skill development.

The NZDF recognized the imbalance that had previously occurred with developing its members' leadership capacity across all four of the Hogan and Warrenfeltz domains. When tested in the NZDF, much like many other militaries, if one were to analyze the length of time and focus placed on the development of trade skills, this far outweighed any "soft" skill development. For junior ranked sailors, soldiers, or airmen, hard skill training or development would at the minimum be measured in months. If one were to look at the trade-specific development investment that had occurred for senior members of the NZDF, this could often be measured in years. However, when the same analysis was conducted on what investment was made in developing the softer skills associated with the domains of intra and interpersonal skills, historically, little emphasis had been placed on supporting the development of these attributes. For a leader to be successful, he or she needs to be skilled in all four of the Hogan and Warrenfeltz domains; the LDS was the rebalance for addressing this shortfall. The question of how much these skills are innate in an individual, and/or can be developed, is a separate issue and will be discussed further later in this chapter.

Other theorists support the construct that leadership capacity, or capability, is underpinned by soft, less definable skills based on personality, rather than the harder, more tangible skills. Senge identifies the requirement for successful leaders to develop both "business skills and reflective and interpersonal skills."⁶⁵ Senge's "business skills" can be aligned with Hogan and Warrenfeltz's leadership and technical skills, and his "reflective and interpersonal skills" are synonymous with the personal domains of Hogan and Warrenfeltz. Modern leadership theories also link to the intrapersonal and interpersonal skills underpinning leadership success, as defined by Hogan and Warrenfeltz. Gardner and Schermerhorn identify the self-awareness element of the Authentic Leadership construct as requiring a successful leader to know their strengths

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and weaknesses.⁶⁶ Avolio and Gardner identify that self-regulation and self-awareness requirements are not limited to just the leader and their role; the requirements equally apply to the follower for leadership relationship success to occur.⁶⁷ This is further supported by Northouse, who recognizes the work of Luthans and Avolio (2009) and Gardner *et al.* (2005) in identifying the importance of self-awareness, relational transparency, internalized moral perspective and balanced processing.⁶⁸ However, to enable this, other factors also apply; Popper and Mayseless identify self-efficacy as an underpinning building block for successful leadership.⁶⁹ They consider there are “essential and particular psychological capacities required for leadership.”⁷⁰

Dragoni, In-Sue, Vankatwyk, and Tesluk identify the impact of a leader’s personality and weave in the role that general cognitive ability plays in leadership capacity.⁷¹ There is significant evidence supporting the importance that a leader’s cognitive ability plays in their effectiveness as a leader.⁷² Some research goes so far as to suggest that the link between the cognitive ability and successful leadership is stronger than that of any other personality traits.⁷³ While there is evidence that supports intelligence not being the only precursor for leadership success and other studies have suggested that the link between cognitive ability and leadership is not as strong as previously concluded,⁷⁴ there is strong evidence that supports that General Mental Ability (GMA) is a precursor for success. Schmidt and Hunter tie together the links between GMA and an individual’s conscientiousness (from the Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality)⁷⁵ as the most reliable predictor of work place performance, including leadership.⁷⁶

LEADERS ARE DIFFERENT

Kirkpatrick and Locke identify that “leaders are different.”⁷⁷ This was the case of Van Vugt and Ahuja’s situational dependent “savannah man” leader, who had different competencies from the rest of the tribe.⁷⁸ Leaders possess skills and/or traits that make them different from those they lead. The importance of this differentiating characteristic is equally applicable to the leader 13,000 years ago as it is to that of the modern day, whether it is the difference that the primary hunter or tracker had from the other members of their tribe or the difference that a senior leader providing strategic direction to an organization in the 21st century corporation. As discussed previously, while it has proven challenging to arrive analytically at a consensus of what leadership traits are required of a successful leader,⁷⁹ it is difficult not to acknowledge that there is something different in an effective leader. “People intuitively accept the idea that there is a definite cluster of personal

characteristics associated with effective leadership.”⁸⁰ However, Stogdill’s challenge to gain consensus may be a result of looking for the perfect specific traits of the leader, when these traits are in fact situationally contingent.⁸¹

Leaders and leadership do not operate in isolation. The role of the leader and the task of leadership are inextricably linked to those being led. Gibb identifies that “leadership is best conceived as a group quality, as a set of functions that must be carried out by the group. This concept of “distributed leadership” is an important one,” as it recognizes that neither leaders nor followers operate in isolation.⁸² While Gibb may have identified the concept of distributed leadership some 60 years ago, the fixation with isolating leadership and attempting to scrutinize it persisted and grew.⁸³ In recent years, the concept has again grown in popularity, as if it is a revelation, and it has also spawned many more constructs, such as “shared leadership,” “leader-member exchange,” “complex systems leadership theory,” etc. The key point was highlighted by Dansereau and colleagues; they recognized that leadership was not an isolated or distinct thing, but existed on a spectrum.⁸⁴

LEADERSHIP RELIES ON RELATIONSHIPS

Schruijer and Vansina identify that “the essence of leadership lies in the relationship between ‘leader(s)’ and ‘follower(s)’.”⁸⁵ It is clear that the leadership relationship has to involve more than one person; a leader cannot be a leader without at least one other person fulfilling the role of follower.⁸⁶ The quote attributed to Benjamin Hooks, the African-American civil rights leader, “if you think you are leading and turn around to see no one is following, then you are just taking a walk,” is a superb analogy for Seers and colleagues’ leadership construct. Schyns and Day, along with Sherony and Green,⁸⁷ identify the importance of relationships when exploring leadership through the “Leader Member Exchange” construct of leadership. This is consistent with the previous discussion regarding intrapersonal and interpersonal skills, and the impact they have on relationships. It could be argued that a military leader holds lawful Command over those they lead and therefore why do they need to have a “relationship” with those they can command to act. However, these would be the thoughts of someone who has never served, or at least never served in the NZDF. They are the thoughts of someone that does not understand the relationship of trust that must exist between a military leader and their subordinate. The relationship of a successful leader, with those they lead, is one that generates unquestionable trust, and this trust is mutual.

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A leader must recognize that leadership relationships are omnidirectional. Fletcher and Käufer distilled the work of Fletcher *et al.* (1997), Hosking *et al.* (1995), Jordan *et al.* (1997), and McNamee and Gergen (1999),⁸⁸ to determine that “leadership is seen as something that occurs in and through relationships.”⁸⁹ Fletcher and Käufer recognize the multiple versus singular nature of the leadership relationship. Leadership is rarely simple and dyadic; it is more often realized in a complex social system, versus the simple social system that is the basis of a leader and follower construct.⁹⁰ Fletcher and Käufer recognize that much like the way any individual could add value and support the tribe on the savannah, the relationship and role of leader was not static. The roles and relationships between the leader and follower were interchangeable; the relationship was dynamic in nature and contingent on what was situationally required.⁹¹ While there might be an overall “big man” leader in a tribe, for them to be successful they must recognize that there is often a time and a place to defer to those in the team with more appropriate knowledge and skills.

A leader cannot develop and maintain a relationship through power alone; the leader must rely on influence. This occurs through trust and relational transparency, where the followers believe in the outcome sought by the leader.⁹² Successful leaders “exert...influence on follower performance through open communication and mutual exchange,”⁹³ rather than dangling a carrot or wielding a stick. It is worth noting that the influence a successful leader applies is not only over those they interact with, it is also over themselves. Danserau and colleagues recognize this when they identify the influence that needs to be applied to everyone involved in the leadership event, including the leader being self-aware and having the ability to influence their own behaviour.⁹⁴

WHAT IS THE ANSWER TO SUPPORTING LEADERS IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT?

The leadership industry is overflowing with options to develop leaders.⁹⁵ The industry has cultivated a belief that all organizations need to develop their leaders is have them participate in leadership programs.⁹⁶ Many of these programs have a fad-like existence,⁹⁷ with the arrogance of suggesting that if an individual follows their “secret formulas for achieving [leadership] saviourhood,”⁹⁸ they too can become a successful new leader. However, leadership development is not a simple process.

In 2004, Peterson identified that psychology was moving toward competency-based models, and the parallels and overlap with leadership development are notable.⁹⁹ Peterson's main focus was based on the assessment of competency rather than the role it plays in development. His focus was to test whether individuals held "mastery according to set criteria deemed to constitute evidence of proficiency."¹⁰⁰ This approach is similar to that taken by some organizations when considering individuals as leaders. They attempt to assess whether individuals are demonstrating leadership, without truly articulating what successful leadership looks like or supporting its development. While the demonstration of mastery of a skill is an important element of the competency model, it is not the only element. According to Rubin and colleagues, it is only the last piece of the competency paradigm; "psychology is moving toward competency-based models with attention to competency-based education, training, and credentialing,"¹⁰¹ and it is in education and training where the focus should be placed.

Much like leadership, competency cannot be distilled to a simple held or not held algorithm. As noted by Hogan and Warrenfeltz, the interrelationship between multiple factors is critical to overall competence.¹⁰² Epstein and Hundert recognize that "professional competence is the habitual and judicious use of communication, knowledge, technical skills, clinical reasoning, emotions, values, and reflection in daily practice, for the benefit of the individual and community being served."¹⁰³ As with the leadership construct, "competence is context-dependent. [It is a] relationship between an ability (in the person), a task (in the world) and...[the] context in which those tasks occur."¹⁰⁴ Epstein and Hundert also recognize that "professional competence is developmental, impermanent, and context-dependent."¹⁰⁵ Effort must be devoted to developing the leadership competence, and when it is developed, it does not remain without deliberate maintenance.

As with other competencies, Nahavandi argues that leadership is a learnable skill.¹⁰⁶ While this is a reasonable premise, to what extent leadership is learnable is another question. Diddams and Chang identify that there are challenges with developing self-awareness.¹⁰⁷ However, they identify that self-awareness is not a binary function, that is, an individual either is or is not self-aware. They identify that the individual's level of self-awareness exists on a spectrum, and that this level can be affected. Other theorists support Nahavandi's view regarding leadership development. They consider that the leadership competencies of intrapersonal and interpersonal skills, that support the ability of a leader to be able to influence, can be developed.¹⁰⁸

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Mezirow's transformative learning theory identifies that:

in order to properly prepare a productive and responsible worker [or equally applicable to leader] for the twenty-first century it is imperative that the individual be empowered to think as an autonomous agent in a collaborative context, rather than to uncritically act on the received ideas and judgement of others.¹⁰⁹

Leaders must be sufficiently self-aware, or made self-aware, to be able to recognize their potential shortfalls and leadership deficiencies. The generation of this self-awareness can be supported by self-leadership.¹¹⁰ This is aligned with the thinking of O'Connell, who recognizes the overlap between the fields of leadership development and social and biological sciences.¹¹¹ If leaders have insufficient self-awareness, their development can be supported through programs where they are exposed to tools such as psychometric surveys and/or multi-rater feedback.¹¹² As well as increasing self-awareness, development programs can aid in developing strategies to offset counterproductive responses and to develop positive appropriate responses to leadership challenges.

CONCLUSION

For a leader to be successful and to develop their leadership capacity, they must understand what leadership is. Within both the academic and business environment, confusion still remains regarding what leadership is, and how it is developed. This confusion is unnecessary. In order to not only support leadership development in the NZDF, but also bring greater clarity regarding what leadership is to the wider leadership community, this chapter has attempted to pare back leadership to its core. It has been highlighted that despite all of the efforts of the leadership industry, a lack of consensus remains in defining leadership. This has been counterproductive for leaders. This could be resolved by more emphasis being placed on supporting the fundamental understanding of what leadership is.

A basic premise of theoretical exploration has been missed by not clearly establishing what leadership is prior to attempting to expand the theoretical understanding. The advantage of the work of the GLOBE Project in defining leadership has not been leveraged. A pragmatic approach to theory needs to be taken. It is not suggested that all of the answers to the leadership conundrum have been answered, nor is it suggested that there is no role for the leadership industry. However, the leadership industry must recognize its

customer, namely, those leaders attempting to enact leadership. Greater clarity and agreement on defining leadership would support this.

While the challenges before the modern leader are undoubtedly new and complex, the challenge of leading in a changing environment remains the same. There are, without doubt, modern challenges for the modern leader, but are the leadership challenges faced today really any different to those faced previously? What impact, if any, has Greenleaf's "knowledge explosion"¹¹³ had on leaders? Has it made the role of leading in today's "more complex, volatile, and unpredictable"¹¹⁴ era more challenging? Leadership is challenging, and it is as challenging today as it has been in the past, but the leaders' role is to rise to the challenge and lead.

Leadership is about relationships and a leader cannot manage a relationship through force or authority, but through influence. The role that influence plays in leadership has been recognized by many theorists, including those involved in the GLOBE project. However, this reliance on influence is not a 21st century phenomena.¹¹⁵ As discussed, leaders have relied on relationships and influence since early *Homo sapiens* roamed the savannah some 13,000 years ago.¹¹⁶ Just as the reliance on influence to achieve an end-state is not a new paradigm, neither is the desire of man to achieve success. What has changed during the last 13,000 years is the view of what success looks like. In the case of our ancestors, success was seen as the "simple" task of securing food, water, or shelter. Leadership responded to contingent requirements, and the role of leader was transferred as the situation required. For the modern leader, their image of success is seen as far more complicated. But is this really any different from our past? Leaders throughout history have always had to respond to changing environments, but what is required of them remains the same.

Leadership capacity can be developed. For this development to occur, leaders must understand that they do not practice leadership, they engage in leadership. To engage and interact with those they lead, a leader must leverage relationships, relationships that must be nurtured and developed. Historically, within the NZDF, career development centred on acquiring the hard technical skills required to be effective in a role, with months or years dedicated to the acquisition of these skills. However, the NZDF recognized the importance that the development of the "softer," less tangible, intrapersonal and interpersonal skills play in the leadership skill set. The NZDF understood the development of an understanding of human interaction was critical to the success of relationships. To be able to interact with others effectively, leaders must first understand themselves and their

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impact on those others engaged in the leadership relationship. This challenge was recognized by the NZDF, and was fundamental in how it applied its LDS. Underpinning the LDS is the understanding that for leaders to be effective they must understand more than just themselves, as they are only one piece of the leadership puzzle. Leaders do not operate in isolation when working toward a successful leadership outcome. They must understand themselves and those they interact with, and also recognize the situational context of leadership.

While this chapter could be read as calling into question the value of the exploration of leadership as a field of study, this is not the case. By its very nature, scholarly research aims to expand the understanding of the subject under consideration¹¹⁷ and this is the case with leadership development. For this to occur, the fundamental underpinning and understanding of leadership must be clarified before it can be expanded upon. Through the attempts to bring greater understanding to the discipline, the opposite has occurred. This has been a result of the ever-expanding leadership industry, an industry that has lost sight of its objective. This chapter has sought to provide clarity regarding what leadership is and it has reinforced that the fundamentals of leadership are the same today as they have always been. This is counter to what some theorists suggest, that today's leadership era is different. However, this has always been the case; tomorrow will always be different and new.

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CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF MILITARY LEADERS' DEVELOPMENT AS PROFESSIONALS

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INTRODUCTION

Military leaders have to continually improve their practice of leadership in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment. In order to do that, military leaders need to constantly learn and develop their professional identity, knowledge and practice in becoming better leaders. This requires overcoming the challenges of leadership development. This chapter will review the relevant literature to provide an in-depth understanding of the current state and substantive theory¹ of leadership development and professional learning in the areas of professional identity (being), knowledge (knowing), and practice (doing). It will argue that leadership development needs to focus on actual development and not merely on leadership theories. It will link how leaders develop as part of adult development and highlight the importance of professional learning in order to understand how leaders develop as professionals within their organizations.

This chapter will also argue that traditional understanding of professional learning focuses on professional development (i.e., leadership development) primarily on the epistemological dimension (i.e., imparting knowledge and skills) and less on the ontological (i.e., leader identity) and praxiological (i.e., leadership practice) dimensions. It will suggest that military leaders approach being professional from a more holistic perspective of professional being, knowing, and doing.

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Singapore Armed Forces.

BEING A LEADER

Myths and legends of great leaders have been around since the dawn of civilization. However, the systematic and scientific leadership research only began in the early 20th century.² Leadership has become one of social science's most examined phenomena and the amount of literature is "enormous and expanding apace,"³ especially recently.⁴ There are literally thousands of definitions, ideas, views, and approaches to leadership that are being used in research studies.⁵ Although Gary Yukl listed 10 definitions and Bernard Bass and Ruth Bass listed a dozen different definitions for leadership respectively, Joseph Rost listed 221 scholarly definitions for leadership that he found in 587 books, book chapters, and journal articles.⁶ Francis Yammarino simply highlights one of the attempts to summarize the thousands of them which define:

Leadership is a multi-level (person, dyad, group, collective) leader-follower interaction process that occurs in a particular situation (context) where a leader (e.g., superior, supervisor) and followers (e.g., subordinates, direct reports) share a purpose (vision, mission) and jointly accomplish things (e.g., goals, objectives, tasks) willingly (e.g., without coercion).⁷

Nevertheless, the two notions that underlie most of the definitions are process and influence.⁸ The notion of leadership as the person (leader) and as the process of leading (leadership) has also been widely accepted within the leadership research community, especially when thinking in terms of leadership development.⁹

Traditionally, leadership has been conceptualized as an individual-level skill of the leader.¹⁰ David Day argues that a complimentary perspective approaches leadership as a social process based on research that shows leadership as "a complex interaction between the designated leader and the social and organizational environment."¹¹ However, in their overview of approaches examining leadership, Bruce Avolio and Adrian Chan note that the "historical trend of leadership research has swung from a leader-centric to a leadership-centric perspective and back again."¹² Most recent leadership studies agree with Day that organizations need to focus on both the individual leader and collective leadership in their leadership development efforts.¹³

THE INDIVIDUAL LEADER PERSPECTIVE

The discussion of leaders and the process of leadership is so intertwined that it is almost impossible to separate the two perspective of leadership. However,

looking from the leader perspective will provide the lens in understanding the historical context of leadership theory. Historically, the study of leadership has been approached from the individual traits of the leader, followed by the behavioural aspect, and eventually to how they operated within different kinds of situational contingency.

The trait-based approach was the first school of leadership. It focused on the “great man”¹⁴ as a leader having certain traits and attributes that distinguish them from non-leaders. These traits (e.g., intelligence, masculinity, adjustment, dominance, extraversion, conservatism) and attributes (e.g., cognitive abilities, personality, motivation, social appraisal and interpersonal skill, expertise, tacit knowledge) were viewed as relatively stable and innate characteristics of leaders.¹⁵ The approach was nearly abandoned between the 1960s and 1970s because of the pessimistic interpretation of findings trying to replicate and isolate a reasonable set of universal leadership traits.¹⁶ Stephen Zaccaro, Cary Kemp and Paige Bader highlighted research showing that the diversity of attributes associated with leadership could not be consistently sustained across different leadership situations and with problematic data that were limited and confounded by possible errors and biases such as halo effects and variable misspecifications.¹⁷ Although it has undergone a revival at the turn of the millennium, debate on whether leaders are born or made has indicated that most of “what leaders have that enabled them to lead is learned”¹⁸ and not entirely inherited.¹⁹ Avolio and Chan suggest that the revival was because research into leadership emergence has identified several contributing “stable traits such as extraversion and conscientiousness, self-monitoring, intelligence, and generalized self-efficacy.”²⁰

Instead of leaders’ personality traits, the behavioural approach focused on their behaviours, actions and styles. Similar to the trait-based perspective, the behavioural approach assumed that there were universal characteristics of leaders.²¹ Scott Derue *et al.* suggest, based on prior leadership experiences and their own literature review, that the leaders’ behaviours, actions, and style can be classified into (1) task-oriented (e.g., directive, initiating, boundary spanning), (2) relational-oriented (e.g., participative, empowering, developing), and (3) change-oriented (e.g., transformational, inspirational, charismatic) categories.²² Though the interest in classical behavioural theory was low by the turn of the millennium, many ideas from the movement have been incorporated into other perspectives of leadership theories and operationalized into the more recent transformational and charismatic leadership theories.²³ Bruce Avolio and Francis Yammarino state that the transformational and charismatic leadership theories and

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models largely represent “a set of approaches to understating leadership that can help us understand how certain leaders foster performance beyond expected standards by developing an emotional attachment with followers and other leaders, which is tied to a common cause.”²⁴ However, the many contradictory findings relating to the behavioural movement led leadership research towards the situational contingency approach.²⁵ Some of these contradictory findings include situations in which one behaviour may be more effective than another, or behaviours that contributed to men’s emergence as leaders not having the same effect for women.²⁶

The contingency perspective introduced the interaction of the leader with followers and the situation, and represented the beginning of examining leadership from a multi-level view.²⁷ The contingency theory assumes that leadership can vary across situations.²⁸ Roya Ayman characterized these theories as being based on their focus on the leader’s traits, the leader’s perceived behaviours, or on situational leadership.²⁹ As an example, under the leader’s traits theory, the contingency model for leadership effectiveness predicted the leader’s or group’s success from the interaction of the leader’s “Least Preferred Coworker” score with the leader’s situation.³⁰ Under the leader behavioural contingency models, one model is the normative model of leadership decision-making that focuses on the interaction between a leader’s choice of decision-making strategies and the decision situation, which predicts the quality of the decision and subordinate commitment to the decision.³¹ The situational leadership theory proposes that the effectiveness of four leadership behaviours (telling, selling, participating, and delegating) depends on whether they complement the subordinates’ task and their psychological maturity.³² These contingency approaches to leadership demonstrate that the relationship between a leader’s characteristics (be it trait or behaviour) and effectiveness is moderated or influenced by other factors known as “contingencies.”³³

Together, the trait approaches of the 1930s, the behavioural approaches of the 1950s, and the contingency approaches of the 1970s have been categorized as traditional leadership theories.³⁴ Although these approaches have spawned a broader understanding of leadership and have been incorporated into many newer leadership theories, most of these early theories viewed leadership as “a concrete phenomenon that could be measured as if it were a natural physical phenomenon”³⁵ and leaders had “innate characteristics”³⁶ that could be replicated. James Hunt also pointed out that this traditional conception of leadership reflects the “deterministic, machine metaphor position on the continuum”³⁷ of the philosophy of science.³⁸ Day argued that it is within this

tradition that leadership development is thought to occur primarily through training the individual's intrapersonal skills and abilities.³⁹

After the 1980s, theories that included charismatic, inspirational, transformational, and visionary leadership were categorized as newer leadership theories.⁴⁰ This signaled the shift of leadership research focus from predominantly examining transactional models that were based on how leaders and followers exchanged with each other to models that could augment transactional leadership.⁴¹ Unlike the traditional leadership models, which are based on “economic cost-benefit assumptions,”⁴² the new leadership models emphasized “symbolic leader behaviour; visionary, inspirational messages; emotional feelings; ideological and moral values; individualized attention; and intellectual stimulation.”⁴³

Prior to these newer leadership theories, there were other theories that included the cognitive/information-processing, self-leadership, and authentic leadership approaches.⁴⁴ The cognitive science leadership literature is an area of research and theory containing a wide range of approaches that are united by their focus on explaining the way leaders and followers think and process information.⁴⁵ The authentic leadership approaches' main purpose was to examine what constituted genuine leadership development, as well as to highlight the recent work in positive psychology as a foundation for examining how one might accelerate development.⁴⁶ With transformational and charismatic leadership theories emerging to be the most frequently researched theories over the past 20 years, the historical trend of leadership research has indeed swung from a leader-centric to a leadership-centric perspective and back again.⁴⁷ Leadership development should therefore pay attention to both the leaders as individual and the leadership process beyond the individual. Similarly, the military would have to go beyond leaders' development and also focus on the process of leadership development within their organizations.

LEADERSHIP BEYOND THE LEADER

Fred Fiedler looked beyond leadership from the perspective of the individual leader. He states that leadership of groups and organizations is “a highly complex interaction” and “an ongoing transaction” between a person in a position and the social and task environment.⁴⁸ Patricia O'Connor and David Day agree that by focusing on the social aspects of leadership, the “limitation of treating individuals and the organizations they work within as distinct from each other”⁴⁹ can be overcome. They assert that developing collective forms

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of leadership involve people participating throughout the organization, sharing in the creation of a unified leadership. They argue that employees must move from seeing themselves as “independent actors (‘me’) to seeing themselves as an interdependent collective (‘all of us’)” so as to produce what they refer to as “collective leadership identities” when and where the organization requires it.⁵⁰ This perspective of collective leadership beyond the leader sees leadership as a socially constructed phenomenon.⁵¹

From a relational approach, Mary Uhl-Bien describes the perspectives of relational leadership from the perspective of an entity (the more traditional orientation) and from a relational (multiple realities) perspective.⁵² She sees that the entity perspective as adopting a cognitivist, constructivist approach, based on realist ontology that focuses on identifying attributes of individuals as they engage in interpersonal relationships. According to Uhl-Bien, the main relationship-based approaches under the entity perspective include the Leader-Member Exchange theory,⁵³ Hollander’s relational theory,⁵⁴ social identity theory,⁵⁵ social network theory,⁵⁶ and post-industrial leadership.⁵⁷ Uhl-Bien surmises that these entity perspectives approach relational leadership from the standpoint of relationships lying in individual perceptions, cognition (e.g., self-concept), attributes, behaviours (e.g., social influence, social exchange), and relational processes considered as relative to individual characteristics that leaders and followers bring to their interpersonal exchanges.⁵⁸

Uhl-Bien sees the relational perspective as adopting a constructionist, relational ontology that views leadership as a process of social construction through which certain understandings of leadership come about.⁵⁹ Instead of seeking to identify the attributes or behaviours of individual leaders, Uhl-Bien states that relational perspectives focus on the communication processes through which multiple relational realities are being constructed.⁶⁰ Citing Dian Marie Hosking, she states that relational constructionism switches attention from leaders, as persons, to leadership as process, thus making relationships the basic unit of analysis, not individuals.⁶¹ In both lateral⁶² and distributed⁶³ leadership, the emphasis is on a “wider range of relationships emphasizing contacts or relations with others outside a leader’s hierarchical line of authority.”⁶⁴ According to Wilfred Drath, relational leadership⁶⁵ is “not personal dominance nor interpersonal influence but rather a process of relational dialogue in which organizational members engage and interact to construct knowledge systems together.”⁶⁶ Citing Kenneth Murrell, Uhl-Bien suggests that a completely new way of seeing leadership could happen by closely studying the relational dynamics (such as the social interactions, social constructions of leadership) of organizations.⁶⁷

Instead of taking the “extreme” end of the philosophy of science continuum of the social constructionist leadership perspectives, Hunt argues for a middle path by adopting a moderate scientific realist perspectives.⁶⁸ He adds that this position can be “operationalized through complexity theory and [is] closely related to dynamic systems perspective.”⁶⁹ The Leaderplex model⁷⁰ and the Complexity Leadership Theory⁷¹ are two such examples. Using the concept of Complex Adaptive Systems, Mary Uhl-Bien, Russ Marion and Bill McKelvey propose that leadership should not be seen only as position and authority but also as “an emergent, interactive dynamic”⁷² system according to the tenets of complexity theory,⁷³ whereby the unit of analysis becomes the CAS. However, Avolio, *et al.* suspect that, as a result of the difficulties in assessing this type of emergent construct within a dynamically changing context, the complexity leadership field lacks substantive research.⁷⁴

Organizations are inherently complex. By focusing on the meaning-making behaviour of leaders, Storey asserts that leaders help interpret the complexities within the organizational environment on behalf of the followers.⁷⁵ He adds that another variant of meaning-making is to pay more attention to the part played by the followers. He states that recent research and theory has paid much more attention to non-essentialist forms of analysis, seeing leadership as a “meaning-making activity.”⁷⁶ Cautioning against the shift in focus for the past 50 years to the significance of leadership for economic performance, Joel Podolny, Rakesh Khurana and Marya Hill-Popper also suggest that leadership be defined as a process of meaning-making among organizational members.⁷⁷ Enric Bernal defends the need for return to meaning-making by nurturing value-based leadership theories.⁷⁸ It is therefore important for leaders within a profession to make an “ethical turn”⁷⁹ and to be clear of what it means to be a professional. And seeing military as a value-based profession, we would then require military leaders to being professional as well.

BEING PROFESSIONAL

To be a professional leader means that the leader embodies his or her professional identity, knowledge, and practice. Leaders, as professionals, develop commitment and perform consistently in their professions.⁸⁰ Being professional connects leaders to what they care about, which is central to non-routine responses to problems of practice.⁸¹ Being professional is a state that is constantly evolving and is constituted socially. This is more so for leaders’ professional identity as new leadership studies argue that leadership is a vehicle for social identity-based collective agency in which leaders and followers are partners.⁸² Stephen Reicher, Alexander Haslam and Nick Hopkins

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argue that a shared sense of identity makes leadership possible and leaders act as entrepreneurs of identity in order to make particular forms of identity and their own leadership viable.⁸³ As the context for leadership and professionalism changes rapidly, how military leaders establish their professional identity, knowledge, and practice will be increasingly important.⁸⁴

PROFESSIONAL KNOWING

The epistemological dimension of “being professional” covers the body of knowledge and the delivery of service with specialized skill. It is this professional knowledge that differentiates professions from other occupations. Professional knowing is the embodiment of the body of knowledge that gives status and authority to the professional.⁸⁵ It highlights the “knowing body” rather than “body of knowledge,”⁸⁶ paying attention to the way in which knowledge is embodied and enacted in practice.⁸⁷

Professional knowing is different from traditional professional knowledge that regards knowledge as being absolute and foundational. Traditional professional knowledge is still “seen to be specialized, requiring specific and lengthy periods of education, controlled by universities, professional associations [,] and governments.”⁸⁸ This knowledge, which includes theoretical, practical, and attitudinal components, is still guarded and delineated by professional boundaries.⁸⁹ Functionalists, for example, regard modern professions as an “occupationally specialized group”⁹⁰ that have grown from traditional European culture, with medicine, law, and theology as the “traditional trinity of ideal”⁹¹ professions. Eliot Freidson offered an ideal model of a professional as “having a body of knowledge based on abstract concepts and theories and requiring the exercise of considerable discretion.”⁹² It is still widely accepted that research was conducted to build up the body of knowledge so that the theory could be taught to the next generation of professionals.⁹³

Professional knowing is seen as being situated within particular settings and is in flux, changing across contexts and over time through a process of social construction.⁹⁴ Randee Lawrence contests the Cartesian dualistic belief of the mind being separate from the body and espouses embodied learning as a way of knowing.⁹⁵ Similarly, Dall’Alba and Robyn Barnacle’s critique of Cartesianism situates their argument with the notion of what they call “embodied knowing,” grounded on phenomenological/hermeneutic tradition.⁹⁶ They suggest that epistemology itself needs to be transformed by thinking through the body, not merely re-thinking the body of knowledge. This embodied nature of knowing is a prominent theme of phenomenologists

(e.g., Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty) and pragmatists (e.g., John Dewey and George Herbert Mead) who stress that knowledge cannot be split from the knower.⁹⁷

Embodiment, according to Dall’Alba, is a condition for knowing, which is made possible and occurs through the lived body.⁹⁸ Thus, based on the lived body and embodied research, being professional is constituted of professional knowing that moves from a decontextualized “body of knowledge” to the embodied knowing of professionals.⁹⁹ Increasingly, research supports the notion that professional knowledge (professional knowing) is embodied through practice.¹⁰⁰ Wendelin Küpers suggests putting into practice an embodied inter-practice of leadership.¹⁰¹ This, he thinks, will open up important possibilities for future practices and studies about embodied “hows” of leading and following.¹⁰²

PROFESSIONAL DOING

Professional doing is the second constituent of being professional. It encapsulates the traditional practice of professionals and the embodiment of the professional knowing that was discussed in the previous section. Matthew Ronfeldt and Pam Grossman suggest that the concept of practice recognizes the acquisition of knowledge or skill as part of the construction of an identity.¹⁰³ Yam San Chee also states that engaging in professional practice sets the context for the development of professional identity and being professional.¹⁰⁴ David Beckett claims that “our professional identities are shaped by what we do.”¹⁰⁵

Dall’Alba identifies practice as “a dynamic flow produced and reproduced by professionals,” neither fixed nor static.¹⁰⁶ David Boud and Brew Angela even re-conceptualize academic work as professional practice, highlighting the importance of professional practice.¹⁰⁷ The growing demand for a “broad-based” professional doctorate, differentiated from the traditional discipline-based PhD program, also allows the development of professional practice within the real-world context of ambiguities and complexities.¹⁰⁸ In the same way, leadership can be conceptualized as the professional practice of leaders within an organization.¹⁰⁹

The idea that practitioners applied theory to practice continues to be widely accepted.¹¹⁰ Dall’Alba highlights that literature on expertise maintains that it is possible to identify the knowledge and skills that make up expert performance by contrasting the performance of experts with that of novices.¹¹¹

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She argues that a “container metaphor for knowledge transmission”¹¹² separates knowledge acquisition from its subsequent application and artificially splits theory from practice.¹¹³ Similarly, in debunking scientific rationality as a framework for theorizing organizational and management practice, Jörgen Sandberg and Haridimos Tsoukas highlight three particular problems with the theory/practice divide:

1. it underestimates the meaningful totality into which practitioners are immersed;
2. it ignores the situational uniqueness that is characteristic of the tasks practitioners do; and
3. it abstracts away from time as experienced by practitioners.¹¹⁴

Instead, they see the concept of the phenomenological life-world,¹¹⁵ grounding our entwinement with the world as a means of overcoming the separation of mind (i.e., theory), body and world (i.e., practice). Professional practice through the life-world perspective is consistent with the focus on practice evident in some recent practice-based approaches, such as communities of practice, activity theory, actor-network theory, and cultural perspectives on organizational learning.¹¹⁶

Similar to professional knowing, professional doing is the enactment and embodiment of individual or collective practice that is spatially and temporally located in specific contexts.¹¹⁷ Extending Dall’Alba’s theorizing, professional doing is the “practices of human beings and what we (as human) do”¹¹⁸ that “evolves and becomes renewed over time through its temporal character, incorporates continuity and transformation, for both individuals and collectives, in and through their entwinement with the world.”¹¹⁹ It is turning the attention away from propositional knowledge and beliefs to praxis¹²⁰ through the “acting and doing” of the “perceiving body.”¹²¹ Professional doing is the praxiological dimension of being professional and leads us to answer ontological questions relating to what is and who we are as human beings.¹²²

PROFESSIONAL BEING

Professional being is the third dimension of being professional. It is the ontological dimension of being professional and it is also socially constructed. Yam San Chee, Swee Kin Loke, and Ek Ming Tan indicate that “being” is central to the construction of personal identity.¹²³ Beckett simply states that “it is in our doing that we find our being.”¹²⁴ Being is relational as in

“being-in-the-world,” the mode of our being as espoused by Heidegger.¹²⁵ Professional being is being with other professionals, being amidst the world we share with others and things, a world in which we dwell, perform our practice, and make our home.¹²⁶ Ann Webster-Wright simply states that “considerations of *being* is an important move away from a strongly epistemological focus in professional education, research into the professions[,] and professional practice.”¹²⁷

Based on Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, Vu and Dall’Alba suggest that we negotiate “possible selves” through our involvement in the world where we can “hear and respond to the call to become authentic.”¹²⁸ Hazel Markus and Paula Nurius define possible selves as the ideal selves that we would very much like to become, could become or are afraid of becoming.¹²⁹ Matthew Ronfeldt and Pam Grossman take Markus and Nurius’ framing of possible selves as future self-concepts in examining novices’ determination of “which possible and provisional selves are helpful in adapting to new roles.”¹³⁰ They define provisional selves¹³¹ as those possible selves that are actually tried out during role transitions or in professional education. Citing Heidegger, Dall’Alba *notes* that being human, we understand ourselves in terms of possibilities (or possible ways to be) and are “continually in a process of becoming that is open-ended, never complete,” oriented to what we are “not yet.”¹³² These professional selves (either provisional or possible) are made authentic through our professional being that is always “being and becoming.”

Professional being is our professional selves constructed socially. Building on Mead’s conceptualization of the self as a social object whose meaning emerges through successive role-taking experiences in interactions, Chee argues that the self is a social entity that is not a structure or a core attribute of an individual, but it is continuously evolving through social interaction.¹³³ This echoes Markus and Nurius’s suggestion that these possible selves are “individualized or personalized, but are also distinctly social.”¹³⁴ Professional being includes not only individual and collective identity situated in specific professional practices, but also provisional identity, a “kind of rehearsal for professional selves.”¹³⁵ This rehearsal takes place within the social context of the professionals, be it in their practice (i.e., professional doing) or professional education. Kara Vloet and Jacqueline van Swet suggest that the construction of professional identity takes place in “several, more or less separated, socially and culturally constructed worlds.”¹³⁶ The search for this professional self, similar to searching for individual self, is a social activity that echoes George Herbert Mead’s theory of self.¹³⁷

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Professional being is asking who we are in the context of our profession and our professional practice (i.e., professional doing). Ian Burkitt suggests that we are social selves, as we can only attain the state of “individual self-identity in relations and activities with others.”¹³⁸ For Mead, the construction of self as a “generalized other” realizes the notion of the mind as an internalized conversation between two people, the actor and the observer, referred to as the “I” and the “Me.”¹³⁹ Burkitt suggests (citing William James) that another way to conceptualize the self in “material, practical and temporal ways”¹⁴⁰ is to see “I” as the knower and the “Me” as the known, similar to the “I” as the subject and “Me” as the object.¹⁴¹ To have a sense of selfhood is to have a reflexive internal dialogue between the two parts.¹⁴² But, Burkitt concludes (citing Lev Vygotsky and Mikhail Bakhtin) that fundamentally, “there are always moments of passivity and activity in life in that we find ourselves in the midst of being part of a world not made by us as individuals, yet it is a world we also actively participate in and therefore partially remake.”¹⁴³ Thus, professional being is to understand ourselves, which begins with having the dialogic space “within” and “without” ourselves. And, according to the pragmatists’ understanding of self, through conscious reflection on our own activity within a group, we gain self-awareness and make choices in shaping ourselves and our social world.¹⁴⁴

David Day, Michelle Harrison, and Stanley Halpin add that lessons derived from experience, either on the job or during professional learning, drive development.¹⁴⁵ They conclude that arriving at such lessons requires “a certain degree of self-reflection and it seems likely that those individuals at higher levels of personal development would be likely to find greater numbers and more sophisticated lessons than those at lower developmental levels.”¹⁴⁶

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT

After discussing what it means to be a leader and being professional, I turn next to the term “development.” The term development has biological connotations of “growth, evolution, gradual unfolding and fuller working out.”¹⁴⁷ Paul Hager and Phil Hodkinson state that the biological development metaphor suggests that development arises both from within and outside, and professionals continuously develop their own capacities, but always in response to going on in their own particular environment.¹⁴⁸

Advancing the notion of leader development as adult development,¹⁴⁹ Day, Harrison, and Halpin note that although biological maturation plays a predominant role in child development, in adult development the role of

experience is much more instrumental.¹⁵⁰ Day and Patricia O'Connor suggest that adult development theories hold the greatest promise for advancing a science of leadership development because they “focus on how people make sense of their experiences in increasingly complex ways.”¹⁵¹ On the other hand, Avolio and Chan view development as a superordinate category of learning, an increase or change in knowledge or skill as a result of experiencing something.¹⁵²

With so many diverse theories for leadership, is there a grand theory for leadership development? In their examination of the last 80 years of research focusing on leadership development, Avolio and Chan conclude that no theory of leadership development has been “comprehensively validated empirically.”¹⁵³ Similar to the theories of leadership, they note that many leadership development theories make a conceptual distinction between “leader development” and “leadership development.” Day and Halpin state that “despite the voluminous amount of leadership literature, relatively little is known about exactly what gets developed in leader development.”¹⁵⁴ In fact, Day and Stephen Zaccaro argue that there are more leader development practices than their scientific understanding, and that the science of leader development is only at a nascent stage.¹⁵⁵

Day and colleagues state that “the nascent fields of leader and leadership development tend to focus less on leadership theory and more on developmental science”¹⁵⁶ because of the complex and ill-defined problems facing contemporary leaders. They argue that understanding and enhancing the developmental processes, instead of leadership research studies, should become the focus associated with studies of leadership development since the effective development of individual leaders and leadership processes does not simply depend on which leadership theory is used. Also, the importance of learning becomes obvious when we start to look at military leadership development from the developmental perspective.¹⁵⁷

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT AS ADULT DEVELOPMENT

Michael Mumford and Gregory Manley suggest that the theories of adult development provide a plausible and potentially useful framework for understanding leadership development.¹⁵⁸ As development is about growth, change, and learning, they argue that adult development models are a “promising framework for efforts to build a more comprehensive and sophisticated approach to the development of leaders across the life span.”¹⁵⁹

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In summarizing what the literature says about how people's development as adults is related to various leadership phenomena, Cynthia McCauley and colleagues focus on the constructive-developmental theory most frequently used in the management and leadership literature.¹⁶⁰ Day and O'Connor also agree that adult developmental theories are likely to be most helpful to the scientific study of leadership development process since these theories "focus on more holistic cognitive development and the changes that occur in adult thinking."¹⁶¹

Implicit within the constructive and developmental terms of constructive-developmental theory is a social-constructivist assumption that underscores a focus on the evolution of sense-making and psychosocial growth of individuals within a social context.¹⁶² Robert Kegan first suggested the term "constructive-developmental"¹⁶³ for psychological studies that focus on the development of "meaning and meaning-making processes across the lifespan."¹⁶⁴ McCauley and colleagues explain that the constructive-developmental theory builds on the seminal work of Jean Piaget's "genetic epistemology"¹⁶⁵ and extends his ideas in several important aspects:

- a. constructive-developmental theory takes the view that the developmental growth Piaget studied affects more than the way a child constructs the physical world and includes the way adults construct and interpret their experiences;
- b. the theory moves beyond Piaget's focus on cognition and includes the emotions;
- c. although constructive-developmental theory recognizes qualitatively different "stages" of development, it also focuses on the processes of transformation – the challenges, achievements, and costs of moving from one way of meaning-making to another;
- d. the theory moves beyond Piaget's exclusive attention on the external manifestations of development to also include the inner experience of developing; and
- e. constructive-developmental theory broadens its focus beyond the individual to include a study of the social context and how it affects development.¹⁶⁶

A developmental feature of the constructive-developmental theory is the organizing principle that regulates how people make sense of themselves and the world, known as the orders of development.¹⁶⁷ Day and colleagues

explain that the successive orders of development, through the process of developmental movement, build on and transcend the previous orders, becoming more “complex and interconnected ways of sense-making.”¹⁶⁸

Various theorists (including Robert Kegan, William Torbert, and Lawrence Kohlberg) have different ways of labeling and describing the various orders of development. McCauley and colleagues organized their review of the literature into categories: dependent, independent, and inter-independent.¹⁶⁹ They summarize that leaders operating at a higher developmental order (the independent order) are more likely than those operating at a lower order (the dependent order) to enact effective organizational leadership. For example, Karl Kuhnert and Philip Lewis suggested that transactional and transformational leaders are qualitatively different in the way they view the world and construct meaning from it.¹⁷⁰ Transactional leaders enact leadership most congruent with the dependent order by relying on a relationship of mutual support, expectations, obligations, and rewards with their followers.¹⁷¹ Transformational leaders enact leadership most congruent with the independent order, relying on a personal value system that they motivate followers to adopt.¹⁷² McCauley and colleagues argue that independent leaders “can rise above personal needs and commitments to others in order to meet organizational goals.”¹⁷³ However, they note that the impact of training, development, or coaching programs on the participants’ order of development was hardly studied in any leadership research.

Day and colleagues reviewed articles published mainly in *The Leadership Quarterly* over its 25-year history to identify scholarly advances and contributions to the field of leadership development. They note that constructive-developmental theory has been used sporadically, with the assumption that leaders’ order of development influences their leadership effectiveness or managerial performance.¹⁷⁴ They surmise that by examining individual differences in developmental trajectories more thoroughly, a typology of trajectories can be devised to better understand and more accurately predict how leaders develop and change over time.¹⁷⁵

Susanne Cook-Greuter proposes that the adult developmental perspective offers a framework for “understanding and assessing the current capacity and the growth potential of individuals, teams, and whole organizations.”¹⁷⁶ However, the models reviewed above by Day and colleagues show that they focus exclusively on the individual leader’s development. Since leadership is a “multidimensional and multilevel phenomenon,”¹⁷⁷ leadership development is also a “multilevel development process.”¹⁷⁸ Avolio views leadership development as a full range comprehensive lifespan process that involves the

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“accumulation of unstructured and structured experiences and their impact on the maturation of both leaders and followers.”¹⁷⁹ In order to design and conceptualize a comprehensive model of leadership development, Avolio opines that a “safe bet is to look at least two levels up,”¹⁸⁰ i.e., beyond the individual leader-level to include the relationship level with followers, peers, and superiors, and the unit and organizational culture and climate level. Likewise, the military has to be cognizant of the multidimensional and multilevel aspects of leadership development.

MULTIDIMENSIONAL AND MULTILEVEL LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

More comprehensive leadership development process models are needed. Leadership development is a dynamic, longitudinal process that involves multiple interactions throughout the entire lifespan.¹⁸¹ Studies that focus only on the individual leader’s level would not be sufficiently comprehensive. Even though studies on multilevel perspectives of leadership theory have gained momentum since the two-part special issue on 13 multiple-level approaches to leadership was published, Day and Harrison lament that multilevel understanding of leadership development remains limited. Day and colleagues continue to seek greater contributions to understanding how leaders and leadership processes develop and change from relevant theory and research that reflect both the multilevel and the longitudinal nature of development.¹⁸²

To understand the process of leadership development from a multilevel perspective, Day and O’Connor present a multidimensional approach. They propose the following dimensions: (1) development target of the individual, dyad, group, or organization; (2) development resources of human, social or systems capital; and (3) leadership constructs of personal, interpersonal or relational.¹⁸³ They argue that understanding the developmental resources that can be found in social and systems capital, and building more complex leadership constructs to include interpersonal and relational ways of thinking about leadership, are critical concerns in enhancing an understanding of the leadership development process.¹⁸⁴

It is becoming evident that leadership is a property of groups and organizations as opposed to just individuals. Day and O’Connor argue that by adopting such a multidimensional approach, the nature of the leadership phenomenon as experienced in organizations and societies can be better understood.¹⁸⁵ They conclude that leader development efforts that focus mainly

on developing human capital (i.e., at the individual level) “rarely acknowledge the role the broader organizational context plays in developing leadership.”¹⁸⁶ Although admitting that a comprehensive science of leadership development must also address social processes and organizational systems, Day and O’Connor acknowledge that there had been no empirical work then that has focused on “an explicit relationship between networks and leadership development”¹⁸⁷ nor “explicitly investigated the role of systems in leadership and development.”¹⁸⁸

To develop a more comprehensive theory of leadership development that reflects the multilevel nature of organizations, Avolio and Chan reviewed the body of work on Authentic Leadership Development theory.¹⁸⁹ They state that authentic leadership development, as defined originally by William Gardner, Bruce Avolio, and Fred Walumbwa, is “a process that draws from both positive psychological capacities and a highly developed organizational context to foster greater self-awareness and self-regulated positive behaviours on the part of leaders and associates, producing positive self-development in each.”¹⁹⁰ Subsequently, to more fully reflect the underlying dimensions of the construct posited by Gardner, Avolio, and Walumbwa and by Remus Ilies, Frederick Morgeson, and Jennifer Nahrgang¹⁹¹, Walumbwa and colleagues refined the definition of authentic leadership as

a pattern of leader behaviour that draws upon and promotes both positive psychological capacities and a positive ethical climate, to foster greater self-awareness, an internalized moral perspective, balanced processing of information, and relational transparency on the part of leaders working with followers, fostering positive self-development.¹⁹²

Noting that leader development and leadership development are rarely integrated, Day and Harrison believe that identity can be leveraged to better bridge these development levels.¹⁹³ They argue that “incorporating an identity lens in development efforts can serve to go beyond the necessary (but insufficient) emphasis on individual leader development to also include the kinds of relational and collective identities that can facilitate the development of social capital in organizations.”¹⁹⁴ Citing Marilynn Brewer and Wendi Gardner, Robert Lord and Rosalie Hall briefly define relational identities as defining “the self in terms of specific roles or relations, often including others in the definition of one’s own self-identity,” and collective identities as “defining the self in terms of specific collectives such as groups or organizations, creating a desire to develop in oneself the qualities that are prototypical of these collectives.”¹⁹⁵

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As proposed by Lord and Hall, taking on these relational and collective identities could shift the development focus from self-development to other development, and from a leader development focus to leadership development.¹⁹⁶ Day and Harrison argue that when leaders identify themselves as a leader, it helps to build their leadership self-efficacy through seeking self-developmental opportunities.¹⁹⁷ On the other hand, leaders at a higher organizational position will then need more highly developed leadership skills to operate at varying levels (i.e., individual, relational, or collective level) of thought and action. They conclude that since the exercise of leadership is a complex human endeavour, “incorporating an identity lens into leader and leadership development efforts is probably long overdue.”¹⁹⁸

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING

Elena Antonacopoulou and Regina Bento suggest that “leadership is learning,”¹⁹⁹ since both leadership and learning are processes of being and becoming. They argue that learning could be another lens for exploring leadership as a relational process. Van Velsor, McCauley, and Ruderman also pay special attention to leaders’ ability to learn in the efforts to develop leaders because of its central role in leader development.²⁰⁰ Avolio and Chan state that since learning is integral to leadership development, the adult learning approach to be utilized for leadership development has to be clearly specified.²⁰¹ As an example, they illustrate that the learning approach of Lord and Hall’s model²⁰² of leadership skill acquisition was adapted from how novices become experts. They further explain that other learning approaches adopted by some leadership development studies were from a moral development approach or used life stories.²⁰³

There are concerns that most leadership intervention studies do not clearly articulate what, if indeed any, learning has occurred.²⁰⁴ The learning taxonomy of deep and surface learning corresponds with the leadership development conceptualization of learning adopted by Maurer.²⁰⁵ Avolio and Chan find that most leadership training may have focused on a “surface learning” approach.²⁰⁶ They were not surprised that the two main meta-analytic evaluations of managerial training conducted in the past 20 years²⁰⁷ found that Kirkpatrick’s level 2 (i.e., knowledge transfer²⁰⁸) outcomes of learning remain the primary focus of many leadership development programs. Unlike surface learning that focuses on the overt signs of the behaviours and skills to be mastered, they argue that deep learning goes “beyond these overt signs to what is being signified (i.e., meanings, context, assumptions) to achieve a better understanding of what is to be learned.”²⁰⁹ In the context of leadership

development; they suggest that deep learning must therefore have an “impact on one’s implicit understanding of leadership, one’s self-concept, and one’s role as a leader.”²¹⁰

Avolio and Chan, citing London and Maurer’s leader development approach, point out that situating leadership development within the context of organizational settings is another way to “link organization’s learning and development culture with the leader’s involvement in learning activities.”²¹¹ London and Maurer’s model is centred on learning and intended for assessing the continuous learning needs of the leader, with the assumption that there can be “congruence between the development goals of the organization and the leader.”²¹² They maintain that the appropriate leadership theory can be applied to design leadership development interventions, once the developmental goals of the leader are identified and framed within the needs of the organization. Avolio and Chan agree that these interventions can then be operationalized through various developmental methods such as the use of “mentoring, assessment centers, and formal training.”²¹³

The leadership development interface model, developed by Byron Hanson, provides an interconnected perspective of leadership development and explores a “whole system”²¹⁴ view. In this approach, both leaders and organizations can engage, plan, and evaluate their development effort in an aligned and supported way. Hanson argues that the model tests the assumption that an aligned systemic view of the leadership development interface will lead to more effective and measurable leadership development outcomes.²¹⁵ The interface is the intersection between the individual and the organization, and between leader and leadership development, forming four key elements (or quadrants) which allow “learning conversations between leaders and their stakeholders around all of the elements of leader and leadership development and who is accountable for what.”²¹⁶

The leadership development interface model shows that leadership development (i.e., learning) interventions should match the learning orientation of the leaders. Bruce Avolio, Fred Walumbwa, and Todd Weber argue that when leaders are more motivated to learn and have higher motivation to lead, they will more likely embrace trigger events (i.e., intervention) that “stimulate their thinking about their own development as an opportunity to improve their leadership effectiveness.”²¹⁷ These conclusions are similar to Todd Maurer and Michael Lippstreu finding that “people with a learning orientation should respond very favourably to a learning-oriented context that matches their own developmental nature.”²¹⁸ Maurer and Lippstreu, however, caution that for some employees, support for learning and development by an

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organization will not be associated with greater commitment.²¹⁹ They explain that those with a low learning orientation might be negatively associated with commitment. Therefore, leadership development programs are far more likely to have “an enduring impact if they offer new learning and opportunities for growth in self-awareness, reflection, multisource feedback, goal setting, and guided practice of new behaviours combined with follow-on assistance from coaches”²²⁰ for leaders with higher learning orientation.

Gareth Edwards and colleagues champion the focus toward alternative and critical approaches to leadership development and learning. These approaches are intended to counter the criticism of leadership development approaches (including activities such as 360-degree feedback, coaching, mentoring, networking, job assignments, and action learning) as being too individually focused.²²¹ They echo Day and Doris Collins’ call for more socially orientated and systemic approaches to leadership development.²²² They also state the need for leadership development and learning literature to appreciate “the aspects of emotion, in particular anxiety and desire in the process of ‘becoming’ a leader and in ‘being’ a leader.”²²³ Edwards and colleagues believe that alternative approaches of leadership learning and development suggest a further elaboration on the themes of social, experiential, contextual, systemic, and community, “ultimately furthering knowledge, theory, research and practice through an appreciation of different and innovative approaches.”²²⁴ Among these alternative and critical approaches to leadership development and learning, there is a move toward aesthetic and artistic methods,²²⁵ and the recognition of work identity, gender and power issues.²²⁶

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF LEADERS AS A PROCESS OF “BECOMING”

Organizational leaders are “practitioners of leadership.”²²⁷ Ronald Riggio suggests that although practitioners might be experts, they remain students of their profession.²²⁸ He argues that the practice of leadership is a continual learning process, no different from the practice of medicine, law, or any other profession. He states that leaders can always find ways to improve and learn how to lead better, since leadership as a practice is as complex as any of these professions. This echoes the increasing call from policy makers and stakeholders to ensure that educational leadership programs (as part of professional development) must be relevant to the practice and its local needs.²²⁹

But what is entailed in the professional development of leaders? Webster-Wright was not able to determine the origin of the term professional

development in her study to understand professional learning as a living experience.²³⁰ In an earlier study, she was able to state that most professional development aims to “improve practice towards competent or even accomplished practice.”²³¹ Nevertheless, she also acknowledges that there is little valuable research literature on professional development from professions other than teaching. Drawing from relevant professional development research findings from the fields of community education, workplace learning, and professional education, Webster-Wright finds that most professional development literature implicitly assumes an “objectivist epistemology that views knowledge as a transferable object” and a “dualist ontology that implies professionals can be studied in a meaningful way separate from their professional practice.”²³²

Webster-Wright argues that despite significant research into professional learning that generated interest in innovative ways to support professionals, professional development in most professions continues to be a “traditional didactic nature of delivery by an expert, in a transient event with a predetermined beginning and end.”²³³ This extends Cyril Houle’s earlier research finding that many of the activities constituting “traditional” professional development (e.g., lectures, journals, conferences) failed to result in changes in practice.²³⁴ This echoes Yip and Wilson’s findings that only 2%-5% of the executives cited experiences in course work and training (i.e., professional development) as developmental for leadership learning across their studies in China, Singapore, India and the United States.²³⁵

There are an increasing number of studies showing that effective professional development needs to be self-directed, with a focus on transformation of identity.²³⁶ To create capacity for supporting self-directed learning (as espoused by Cyril Houle) and transformative practice, Aileen Kennedy outlines a framework that classifies nine professional development models (training, award-bearing, deficit, cascade, standards-based, coaching/mentoring, community of practice, action research, and transformative) into three broad categories of “transmission,” “transitional,” and “transformative.”²³⁷ This could help channel research into the professional development practice to focus more on the transformative models.

Webster-Wright states that the philosophical assumptions about professional development need to be challenged and re-conceptualized. Implementing innovative strategies such as mentoring, communities of practices, and action learning is simply not enough. Hager and Hodgkinson conclude, after their critical analysis of the various metaphors for learning, that “becoming” has major advantages over alternatives as “acquisition”

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and “transfer,” “participation” and “construction.”²³⁸ Through concrete examples of professional learning drawn from their empirical research, they show that the learning as becoming metaphor helps overcome the problematic dichotomies of mind and body, individual and social, and between structure and agency. They also think that the “becoming” metaphor provides useful insights that can help guide the provision of and support for professional learning in practice through: (1) enhancing learning cultures, (2) supporting individual learners, and (3) enhancing learning associated with boundary crossings.²³⁹ Enhancing professional learning will be important to Yip and Wilson’s suggestion of boundary crossing assignments to enrich experience-based development for leaders needing to lead in a VUCA environment.

Chee also agrees that learning conceived as a trajectory of becoming oriented toward professional participation entails the development of *habitus*²⁴⁰ for professional practice.²⁴¹ Dall’Alba states that in becoming professionals, knowing, acting, and being are integrated into professional ways of being that unfold over time, not simply just coming to know through doing.²⁴² She argues that for professional education programs to enhance the process of becoming, the interrelation of epistemology and ontology has to be nurtured.²⁴³ Citing Heidegger, she also cautions against treating human beings instrumentally as resources to be exploited, when we value learners only for what they achieve (via their development of knowledge and skills).

A focus on narrowly defined skills or competencies overlooks and undervalues the ontological dimension of professional practice and of learning to be professionals.²⁴⁴ Instead, professional learning must be open and integrate possibilities for being professionals. Dall’Alba suggests that an approach to an integrated curriculum is to emphasize inquiry directed to practice, that conceives professional education program as a process of becoming.²⁴⁵ She argues that allowing learners to engage deep questions about the purposes of professional education and how those purposes can be realized is necessary to thoughtfully and responsively enhance the process of becoming professional. She suggests “letting learn”²⁴⁶ with a curriculum that is not overloaded or closed to inquiry, but allows and encourages professionals to pursue the questions they bring, including those about the profession to which they aspire and who they are becoming. This echoes Dewey’s view that “we never educate directly, but indirectly by means of the environment.”²⁴⁷ Similarly, citing research within the adult developmental field, Day, Harrison, and Halpin use the term “letting go to develop,”²⁴⁸ to illustrate the point that leaders promoted to a higher level position may have to let go of certain day-to-day

technical responsibilities and focus on new responsibilities. Specifically, they highlight that at each crossroad, leaders must:

- a. let go of those activities, habits, and tendencies that they are comfortable with but are no longer functional;
- b. preserve certain familiar tasks, activities, and functions that will likely continue to be practical and useful; and
- c. add on in terms of learning new ways and methods of leading.²⁴⁹

Through learning to be professionals in this way, “integration of knowing, doing and being is promoted so that learning professional ways of being is foregrounded.”²⁵⁰ Therefore, when professional learning is conceptualized as becoming, professional becoming goes beyond knowledge and skills acquisition. The process of becoming then goes beyond being the professional that “denotes the notion of arriving at a static point of expertise.”²⁵¹ Lesley Scanlon argues that conceptualizing being professional as becoming goes beyond the typical lineal professional development that proceeds in a stepwise manner through a fixed sequence of stages.²⁵² Even within the feminist research, Rebecca Coleman sees becoming as transformation, not of “forms transforming into another or different form but of constantly processural, constantly transforming relations”²⁵³ and “professional self.”²⁵⁴ Hence, the military needs to link leadership development to “deep learning” and conceptualize military professional development as a process of “becoming.”

CONCLUSION

The literature reviewed in this chapter suggests that no substantive theory of leadership development process has been validated comprehensively and empirically as understanding of what gets developed in the process is not entirely clear.²⁵⁵ What is apparent is that effective development of individual leaders and leadership processes does not depend solely on which leadership theory is used.²⁵⁶ Understanding and enhancing the developmental processes should then be the focus of leadership development in the military. The chapter also reviewed how military leaders develop as part of adult development and highlighted the importance of professional learning in order to understand how military leaders develop as professionals within their organizations.

This chapter started out by presenting the need to go beyond the leader as individual to seeing leadership as the process of influencing. In the context of

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a military profession, the military leader is always in the process of being and becoming a professional. In fact, central to the United States Army's leadership doctrine is the Army leadership framework of BE, KNOW, DO.²⁵⁷ The framework outlines:

[W]hat a leader must be in terms of values, attributes, and character; what a leader must know in terms of leadership competence; and what a leader must do in exercising leadership with regard to influencing, operating, and improving.²⁵⁸

Day and colleagues suggest that combining the BE, KNOW, DO framework with the United States Army's three leader development "pillars" of institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development, provides a "powerful heuristics for orchestrating a potentially effective leader development process."²⁵⁹

Similarly, for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), there is a leader development roadmap that frames the development of SAF officers throughout the four stages of their career. The roadmap charts the development of individual leaders based on the four themes of "lead self," "lead teams," "lead leaders," and "lead organization" for the various levels of "direct," "organizational," and "strategic" leaderships. The NZDF has also developed a LDF that provides six key elements (ethos and values, think smart, influence others, develop teams, develop positive culture, and mission focus) of behavioural expectations in the NZDF.²⁶⁰ From the behavioural expectations, detailed behaviour statements provide a clear picture of successful leadership at each level of the organization.²⁶¹

However, most of the leadership frameworks focus on individual leader development and not quite on leadership development as discussed above. Although leader development and leadership development are rarely integrated, using the identity lens in development efforts bridges these two developmental levels.²⁶² Taking on relational and collective identities could shift the development focus from self-development to other development and from a leader development focus to leadership development.²⁶³ It has been suggested that deep learning in the context of leadership development must impact the leaders' self-identity, besides their implicit understanding of leadership and their role as a leader.²⁶⁴ For professional military organizations that see institutional training as professional development for their personnel, professional learning then becomes critical. Nevertheless, professional development continues to focus on narrowly defined skills or competencies that overlook and undervalue the ontological dimension of professional

practice and of learning to be professional.²⁶⁵ Therefore, understanding the process of military leaders' development as professionals remains a leadership challenge to be overcome.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER 3

THE PSEUDOSCIENTIFIC LEADER: DO BAD LEADERS ENDURE BY USING PSEUDOSCIENTIFIC THINKING?

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The human ability to self-deceive creates possibly the greatest leadership challenge of all. In theory, leaders learn from their mistakes and improve their leadership abilities. In reality, many leaders simply cannot or will not recognize their own leadership weaknesses. Leaders receive information about their respective leadership abilities from several sources. This “evidence” includes, but is not limited to, indicators of mission success, informal feedback, formal feedback, employee turnover, and measures of organizational health. When this evidence is positive, typically supporting the leader’s belief in his or her effectiveness, it is easy for the leader to consider. When this evidence is uncomplimentary, leaders can engage in several psychological processes to distort this information into alignment with their positive beliefs about their own leadership abilities. These distortions might be benign. For example, a moderately effective leader might not recognize that he or she would benefit from listening more actively. In other cases, leaders can be overwhelmingly delusional about their actual leadership styles. There are chronically destructive leaders who believe that they are above-average, maybe even outstanding, leaders. How can some leaders be so bad, but still think they are so good?

We propose that pseudoscience provides a framework that can integrate a variety of psychological and leadership-related phenomena to clarify how ineffective leaders can continue to believe that they are effective. In the present chapter, we will (a) outline the major tenets of pseudoscientific thinking, (b) conceptualize a leader’s self-assessment as a personal theory, (c) describe how violations of this personal theory can be dismissed through a personal version of pseudoscientific thinking, and (d) use this framework to make recommendations for addressing this type of leader self-delusion.

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Air Force Academy or the United States Department of Defense.

SCIENCE VERSUS PSEUDOSCIENCE

Science, in its broadest form, can be defined as the development of knowledge about natural behaviour, people, or societies.¹ Science progresses by conducting carefully controlled research intended to further this knowledge. The results of these various research endeavours are then shared with a broader scientific community and made available to the general public. The communication of research procedures and corresponding results is vital. It allows the scientific community to support or refute scientific theories. This process allows theories that are logically developed and supported by careful observation to be applied in novel ways, whereas theories that lack similar levels of support are amended or discarded.

Pseudoscience, in contrast, is just what the name implies: fake science. It involves promoting a belief or set of beliefs with unsound principles that look scientific but fail to generate support at a truly scientific level. The distinction between science and pseudoscience is not always clear, but we agree with many scholars who believe that this distinction is legitimate and important.² Pseudoscience can create considerable harm. It can reinforce poor ways of thinking. It can also cause individuals to waste financial resources (e.g., on consultation with psychics) or make poor interpersonal decisions (e.g., based on astrology). This state of affairs has motivated scholars to more clearly understand the demarcation between science and pseudoscience.

Understanding this demarcation begins with a useful definition of pseudoscience. According to Hansson:

A statement is pseudoscientific if and only if it satisfies the following three criteria: 1. It pertains to an issue within the domains of science in the broad sense (the criterion of scientific domain); 2. It suffers from such a severe lack of reliability that it cannot at all be trusted (the criterion of unreliability); 3. It is part of a doctrine whose major proponents try to create the impression that it represents the most reliable knowledge on its subject matter (the criterion of deviant doctrine).³

Put differently, to qualify as a pseudoscience, an idea must be within the domain of science, must fail to meet the standard of science, and must have proponents who promote the idea as being scientific.

It is really the last criterion, the criterion of deviant doctrine, which interests us in terms of leadership. How do pseudoscientists convince themselves and

others that a belief is true, even while carefully obtained results strongly discredit it? To this point, scholars offer a variety of lists intended to describe common characteristics of pseudoscience.⁴ These characteristics of pseudoscience can be considered as sufficient but not necessary; a pseudoscience could use a subset of these characteristics or could use a different characteristic that has not been identified formally. Also, there are many characteristics that have been attributed to pseudoscience. Different scholars identify different characteristics that they believe are particularly common. Some scholars identify similar characteristics of pseudoscience but define these features in different ways.

The extensive debate about the characteristics of pseudoscience is beyond the scope of this chapter.⁵ We felt it was most effective to make the reader aware of this debate through the use of one framework for understanding pseudoscience as it relates to leadership. In addition, we did not want to tailor the concept of pseudoscience unfairly to the domain of leadership by hand-picking characteristics from a variety of lists. Accordingly, we decided to use a list of seven characteristics provided by Hansson⁶ and we added one item that we thought was particularly important to pseudoscience and leadership (i.e., exaggerated beliefs in unfair group treatment). We used Hansson's list because we believe that his work on the subject was particularly insightful⁷ and because his writing is current and can therefore draw from more recent forms of pseudoscience.

1. *Belief in Authority.* Pseudoscience adherents put an augmented emphasis on a person or group of people having a special ability to determine whether something is true or false. In his book *Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science*, Gardner argues that pseudoscientific practices are often headed by “cranks” who can be tremendously persuasive.⁸ Gardner's review of L. Ron Hubbard's wide-reaching authority in the area of Scientology (then called Dianetics) provides one nice example.

2. *Unrepeatable Experiments.* Pseudoscience sometimes emphasizes successful experiments that cannot be replicated, even conceptually, by others. This can be seen in the concept of dowsing – detecting an underground substance (often water) with a handheld instrument (e.g., a forked stick). Adherents of dowsing can point to individuals who were known to use dowsing effectively. Skeptics are likely to question whether these success rates were remembered accurately or whether the seemingly successful results could be explained through other factors like human intuition or chance. Indeed, in controlled experimental examinations, even self-proclaimed dowsers are unable to detect underground substances at a rate greater than chance.⁹

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3. *Handpicked examples.* Pseudoscience often uses handpicked examples to support its theory, but the handpicked examples are not representative of the practice as a whole. In other words, pseudoscience will point to supportive pieces of evidence (often anecdotal) while ignoring disconfirming evidence.¹⁰ Those who believe in “The Bermuda Triangle” can recall stories, some of which are distorted substantially, where individuals traveling through this area experienced strange phenomena or simply disappeared. Adherents clearly do not pay similar attention to the vast number of people who have traveled through the Bermuda Triangle uneventfully. Adherents might also fail to note that similar incidents occur in many other parts of the ocean.¹¹

4. *Disregard of Refuting Information.* Pseudoscience places too much emphasis on ignoring or refuting evidence that does not support its central beliefs. This phenomenon is clearly related to general idea of confirmation bias: the tendency to interpret information in a manner that is consistent with one’s pre-existing beliefs.¹² The original study that launched the belief in vaccinations as a cause of autism was based on a single study with only 12 participants.¹³ Many individuals still believe that immunizations are a substantial contributor to autism development despite several extensive investigations that have failed to find any supporting evidence¹⁴ and a thorough investigation revealing the original study to be fraudulent.¹⁵

5. *Exaggerated Beliefs in Unfair Group Treatment.* Pseudoscience adherents frequently exhibit an exaggerated belief that they are the victims of unfair treatment. This ostensibly unfair treatment can include conspiracy theories suggesting a greater power is inhibiting the public release of evidence that would support the pseudoscience (e.g., the United States Government is hiding evidence of alien visitation).¹⁶ More benign forms of this unfair treatment involve complaints that mainstream science is just unwilling to entertain the ideas put forth by a pseudoscience.¹⁷ This tactic helps render an entire pseudoscience non-falsifiable. Adherents can argue that their theory would have support if only mainstream science or some powerful clandestine agenda would allow it.

6. *Unwillingness to Test Pseudoscientific Theories.* Pseudoscience can be unwilling to test its respective theories carefully even when it is possible to do so. Psychic ability can be examined experimentally. A researcher could place an object or person randomly in one of several designated locations. The psychic’s ability to correctly identify the location could then be compared to chance. Former magician and paranormal investigator James Randi has exposed the reluctance among many psychics to be subjugated to careful scientific investigation by offering a million dollar prize to anybody who can demonstrate paranormal abilities.¹⁸

7. *Theories Are Arranged so They Can only Be Confirmed.* When pseudoscientific theorists do allow testing of their beliefs, they tend to adopt belief systems that only allow confirmation. Grove provides a nice example in the context of extra-sensory perception (ESP).¹⁹ When people fail to demonstrate ESP in a scientifically controlled setting, they can attribute that failure to the disrupting negative attitude of the experimenter or to just having a bad day. Likewise, Bigfoot believers can perpetually search for Bigfoot. The absence of convincing evidence only means that Bigfoot has not yet been found.

8. *Explanations Are Replaced with Less Tenable Explanations.* A pseudoscientific theory often has a reasonable explanation according to traditional science but pseudoscience discards this explanation for an alternative theory that provides less explanation than the scientific one. For example, traditional science can argue that seemingly paranormal experiences are caused by a combination of hypnagogic hallucinations, hypnopompic hallucinations, and fraud.²⁰ Believers in paranormal activity argue that at least some of these experiences are truly paranormal. Yet, their resulting theory that human energy can exist intelligently and without organic matter seems, at least from a physical standpoint, less tenable. In a similar vein, Thagard *notes* that pseudoscientific theory lacks clear mechanisms; for example, astrologists believe that planet alignment influences human interactions but do not explain how this works.²¹ Thagard also argues that pseudoscience often requires extra hypotheses to explain existing evidence; for example, creation science can explain any outcome by adding a hypothesis that God was responsible for it.²²

In addition to the aforementioned characteristics, we could also characterize pseudoscience psychologically. Pseudoscience begins with a person or persons who are motivated to believe in an idea. The idea might have seemed plausible at one point but was later discredited (e.g., phrenology). The idea might explain something important that happened in a person's life (e.g., a child's development of autism). The idea might be practically beneficial (e.g., belief in cryogenic freezing might alleviate death anxiety). The etiology of the motivation seems relatively unimportant. The critical issue is that the motivation to believe disrupts the sensible processing of discrediting information. Adherents achieve this by putting an undue emphasis on a set of explanations which could conceivably be true, but most likely are not. This process is almost certainly bolstered by intra-group communication which is supportive of the respective pseudoscience.²³ The fake science aspect of pseudoscience is probably an outgrowth of and contributor to this inordinately biased form of information processing. Pseudoscience can dismiss critical scientific investigations with poor science or scientific-sounding principles to promote its own ideas.

PSEUDOSCIENTIFIC THINKING AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INFLATED LEADERSHIP BELIEFS

Leaders, military leaders in particular, might experience a process analogous to pseudoscience when they receive critical information about their respective leadership abilities. The primary difference is that leaders can experience defensiveness and resultant pseudoscientific thinking on an individual level rather than on a group level. Indeed, fundamental processes related to the self-concept suggest that some leaders respond to negative feedback with a form of pseudoscientific thinking.

Beliefs about the self-concept can function similarly to beliefs or theories that individuals possess about the external world. Epstein suggested that the self-concept is a dynamic yet stable collection of experiences and information about the self. This theory of self helps the individual maintain the balance of pleasure and pain, maintain self-esteem, and cope with new experiences and information.²⁴ When developing a self-concept, individuals employ self-evaluation processes. These can include the objective processing about self-relevant information (self-assessment), a focus on information that supports the individual's current self-concept (self-verification), and the positive colouring of self-relevant information (self-enhancement). Although some research suggests that individuals prefer situations that diagnose positive and negative self-referent information that would lead to accurate self-assessment,²⁵ Sedikides provided substantial evidence that individuals are primarily motivated to process self-relevant information in self-enhancing ways.²⁶ One important method for maintaining self-enhancement involves a self-serving attributional bias, by which individuals will attribute successes to internal factors (such as ability) and failure to external factors (such as uncooperative others).²⁷ This self-serving bias is magnified in situations in which individuals' self-concepts are threatened by negative information.²⁸ It is important to understand these general human characteristics as they relate to the processes that leaders might follow as they use pseudoscientific thinking to ward off threat.

The nature of the self-concept as a theory and the accompanying desire to self-enhance lays the foundation for two assumptions related to our model of pseudoscientific leadership.

Assumption 1: The response that leaders have to negative personal information about their leadership will function similarly to the

response that pseudoscience adherents experience when receiving negative information about their pseudoscientific theory.

In both cases, the critical information is likely to generate ego defensiveness.²⁹ Pseudoscience adherents have often devoted considerable time and resources to their idiosyncratic practices and therefore do not take kindly to critical information. Similarly, leaders often become defensive about critical leader feedback because leadership is important to their respective self-concepts. Moreover, evidence suggests that individuals tend to overestimate their leadership ability³⁰ and this overestimation might be especially robust in a military population.³¹ Considering that 50% of leaders are below average by definition, this suggests that many leaders will resist critical but accurate feedback because it is inconsistent with their inflated leadership-based beliefs.

Assumption 2: Some leaders will respond to negative information with more pseudoscientific thinking than others.

The primary moderating variable is likely to be ego defensiveness. Leaders who believe they have poor leadership skills (presumably a minority) will be less defensive about critical information because such information will not conflict with their self-concepts. Likewise, even individuals with inflated beliefs about their respective leadership abilities might process negative information accurately if they can avoid being overly defensive.³² Another potential moderator of the pseudoscientific thinking effect involves the threatened leader's belief about the nature of leadership. Leaders who believe that leadership ability is fixed (i.e., unchangeable, unable to be improved) will likely feel more threatened by negative feedback than will leaders who believe that their leadership ability is malleable (i.e., changeable, can be improved) and may be more likely to engage in pseudoscientific thinking to defend themselves rather than facing the negative feedback and working on self-improvement.³³

We now return to our list of eight characterizations of pseudoscience to examine whether it can elucidate how poor leaders can continue to believe that they are good leaders.

1. *Belief in Authority.* Threatened leaders can affirm their leadership-related self-beliefs by believing (a) that they possess a heightened ability to judge effective leadership and (b) that effective leadership corresponds closely to their own leadership. This strategy is particularly operative when another person suggests that the threatened leader consider modifying his or her leadership style. Criticized leaders can argue, even privately, that they know

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what it takes to be a leader and that critical perspectives are naïve or inaccurate. Researchers have not examined clearly whether leaders overestimate their ability to identify effective leadership. Yet, individuals clearly tend to overestimate their intelligence in similar interpersonal domains. Individuals, on average, appear to overestimate their interpersonal intelligence³⁴ and their emotional intelligence.³⁵ Individuals might be particularly prone to overestimating their emotional intelligence when they are unskilled in that domain.³⁶ There is evidence that individuals distort their perceptions of effective leadership to meet their own needs. Individuals tend to distort “ideal leadership” to match how they see themselves.³⁷ Narcissistic leaders tend to view leadership in a way that justifies their own destructive behaviour.³⁸ It has even been suggested that one major factor in poor hiring decisions is a “just like me” bias.³⁹

2. *Unrepeatable Experiments.* An experiment generally refers to a set of observations that took place in a laboratory or a field setting. Leaders rarely, if ever, participate repeatedly in a systematically controlled leadership study. Rather, leaders typically progress through a variety of real-world leadership experiences that are usually difficult to compare precisely. Accordingly, leaders accumulate evidence about their leadership abilities in something more like a series of case studies and could not point to a specific “experiment” where they had been successful. Yet, the fact that assessments of leadership ability are typically based on recollections of a variety of case studies provides the ambiguity that enables other forms of pseudoscientific thinking.

3 and 4. *Handpicked Examples and Disregard of Refuting Information.* Because leaders do not work in carefully controlled settings, they have ample opportunity to focus on evidence that indicates positive leadership ability while simultaneously refuting unresponsive evidence. In fact, these two processes are so intertwined at the personal level, we reviewed them together. Research demonstrates that individuals use self-deception to maintain a positive self-image; some people will repress the negative information, spending less time to process and encode it, and if the feedback is given publicly and cannot be ignored, they pay more attention to negative feedback in order to develop refutations of the criticism.⁴⁰ Sedikides and Green, in their work on self-protective measures in the face of negative feedback, found evidence that negative self-referent information is actually neglected; it receives fewer cognitive processing resources than does positive self-referent information.⁴¹ This effect was specific to processing information about the self; participants exhibited no trouble recalling negative feedback about another person. Similarly, Stone and Stone found that individuals who receive inconsistent

feedback from two raters of equal status and knowledge (one positive rating and one average rating) tend to view the positive rating as more accurate.⁴² Their research demonstrated additionally that recipients of consistent feedback (positive feedback from both raters) used this information to bolster their feelings about their own task competence, but recipients of inconsistent feedback (at least one positive and one average rating) reported similar bolstering of task competence. This indicates that, in the presence of at least one piece of positive feedback, negative feedback is often discounted. Leaders are not exempt from these self-protective techniques. Baumeister extensively reviewed the ability of evildoers, many of whom were leaders, to minimize their attention to their nefarious transgressions.⁴³ Smither, Brett, and Atwater found that, after receiving multisource feedback, leaders from both an elementary school district and a retail organization recalled positive feedback information about themselves significantly better than they did negative feedback information.⁴⁴

5. *Exaggerated Beliefs in Unfair Group Treatment.* Hogan and Hogan identified several “dark-side” traits associated with managerial derailment.⁴⁵ One such trait is argumentativeness. Leaders with this trait are “keenly alert for signs of mistreatment” and they “specialize in conspiracy theories.” They avidly defend themselves by bolstering their personally-held theories about how the world operates and by attacking countering viewpoints.⁴⁶ As Kramer and Gavrieli attest, paranoia may be a way that even normal people make sense of and cope with threatening situations and leaders in particular may be hypervigilant to signs of threat, especially to their power or credibility.⁴⁷ Narcissists may seek out leadership positions to satisfy their need for power,⁴⁸ and the paranoia that can be associated with narcissism may induce such leaders to perceive subordinates’ mistakes as intentional attempts at undermining their leadership.⁴⁹

6. *Unwillingness to Test Pseudoscientific Theories.* Pseudoscientific thinkers exhibit an unwillingness to test their theories, seemingly out of fear that the resulting evidence would disrupt their central belief systems. Leaders can mimic this defensive behaviour by avoiding feedback situations altogether. Argyris pointed out that this kind of defensive thinking is a “closed loop” that ignores other points of view in order to defend against the threat of discrediting information.⁵⁰ Managers with low managerial self-efficacy demonstrate less willingness to seek employee feedback and a greater likelihood of denigrating those employees who offer improvement-oriented feedback.⁵¹ In four experimental studies, See and others demonstrated that individuals with more power were significantly less likely to seek or heed the advice of

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others, and that this negative relationship was driven by their confidence in the accuracy of their own judgments, even though their judgments were less accurate than the judgments of less powerful individuals.⁵² When asked to rate the harmfulness of a variety of leadership behaviours, participants in a study by Pelletier rated behaviours related to the leader's unwillingness to listen to feedback as especially harmful.⁵³ For example, 90% of participants rated failure to respond to employees' concerns as harmful and 82% rated ignoring employee comments as harmful.

7. *Theories are Arranged So They Can Only Be Confirmed.* Recall that pseudo-scientific theory can be structured so that evidence can confirm the theory but disconfirming evidence can be easily dismissed. The evidence surrounding leadership ability can be arranged similarly. Effective leadership is typically framed as a product of leaders, followers, and the situation.⁵⁴ These general factors provide leaders with built-in explanation for indicators of leadership failure. Leaders can blame failure on followers or on situational factors that were beyond their control. In a review, Pelletier *notes* that blaming others for the leader's mistakes is evident in five of six harmful leadership styles.⁵⁵ In an applied linguistic analysis of the apologies of four Chief Executive Officers (CEO) of British banks giving testimony to the United Kingdom House of Commons at the Banking Crisis Inquiry in 2009, analysts determined that all four former bank leaders used language that directed blame for the crisis away from themselves. They expressed shock and outrage at "the turn of events" and other situational factors. The CEOs avoided taking any personal responsibility and indeed aligned themselves verbally with taxpayers as victims of the situation.⁵⁶ Obviously, leaders could attribute positive evidence to external sources, but the robust influence of self-enhancement and the self-serving bias suggests that this is less likely, particularly when leaders are characteristically narcissistic.⁵⁷ This general dismissal of evidence that disconfirms personal leadership theories is further enabled by the ambiguity associated with defining leadership and the corresponding challenges in assessing leadership effectiveness precisely.⁵⁸ It is easier for individuals to self-enhance on ambiguous criteria.⁵⁹ Leaders can always deflect negative information because no single piece of information demonstrates convincingly that one's leadership ability per se was inadequate. This is in contrast to other criteria that are far more definitive (e.g., the time it takes to run 1600 meters).

8. *Scientific Explanations Are Replaced with Less Tenable Explanations.* This final characteristic allows a broader integration of the previous points. Imagine a situation where all the available information points to failed leadership: performance metrics are down, formal and informal feedback

consistently highlight problems with the leader's behaviour, and high-quality employees are leaving the organization. The straightforward explanation is that the leader is not leading effectively. Yet, leaders can invoke a series of inelegant defensive explanations. Common among these might be a tendency to blame followers or situational factors that were beyond the leader's control. Each of these explanations could conceivably be true, which is why the leader believes them, but these explanations collectively can appear more convoluted and less likely than the simpler explanation of leader failure. It is not surprising that scientific research has not examined this specific phenomenon systematically. Doing so would entail finding situations where the leader has failed definitively and verifying that the leader has privately denied this failure by pointing to untenable explanations involving coworkers or situational factors. Nevertheless, research on excuse-making suggests that this type of reasoning exists.⁶⁰ Narrative reviews integrating a variety of leadership anecdotes describe how leaders can respond to negative information by unfairly blaming others or blaming situational factors.⁶¹

Based on this review, we believe that the concept of pseudoscience provides a useful metaphor for understanding how leaders can view themselves as effective, often to the bewilderment of others, in the face of discrediting evidence. Several well-established psychological and leadership principles, the majority of which have been supported empirically, reveal that leaders can use a variety of self-enhancement strategies to protect their positive beliefs about their leadership in a manner similar to pseudoscience adherents protecting their core pseudoscience-based beliefs. Moreover, research indicates that abusive or destructive forms of leadership occur frequently. We speculate that very few of these leaders would identify themselves as abusive or destructive. We speculate further that many of these leaders would identify themselves as above average.⁶²

As a result, we believe that it is useful to classify some leaders as *pseudoscientific leaders*. Pseudoscientific leaders excessively employ one or more cognitive strategies to process interpersonal and performance-based information in a manner that allows an unusually delusional positive assessment of their respective leadership abilities.⁶³ This process is akin to the pseudoscientist who employs overly biased forms of information processing to promote an otherwise unjustifiable view. The concept of pseudoscientific leaders differs from other classifications of leadership style (e.g., transformational leadership, toxic leadership) because the focus is not on how the leader treats subordinates but rather how the leader processes information about his or her leadership effectiveness.

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The support for our concept of pseudoscientific leadership was based on Hansson's recent characterization of pseudoscience.⁶⁴ We added one item to Hansson's list to avoid handpicking items from a lengthy list of pseudoscience characterizations. Nonetheless, pseudoscience and leadership seem connected in two additional important ways. One such connection involves the ambiguity associated with characterizing effective leadership. As noted earlier, this ambiguity allows individuals the luxury of self-deceit in evaluating their own leadership effectiveness. Interestingly, one old characterization of pseudoscience involves its proposed effects operating near the limit of detectability, meaning that the evidence for the effect is difficult to observe (e.g., paranormal activity). The subtlety involved in observing the effect provides pseudoscientists the ability to fool themselves.⁶⁵ Another leadership-pseudoscience connection involves leaders' ability to associate primarily with those who provide positive feedback about their leadership ability. When leaders seek the company of supportive subordinates, it can contribute falsely to feelings of leadership effectiveness.⁶⁶ The characterization of pseudoscience working in isolation from the scientific community works similarly.⁶⁷ Pseudoscience adherents will often associate with other believers, which might make the pseudoscience seem more believable.⁶⁸ In sum, the power of self-enhancement appears to work in many interconnected ways, some of which do not map cleanly onto a particular list of pseudoscience characteristics.

It is important to note that cultural context will surely influence the prevalence and quality of pseudoscientific leaders. There is no way to review all the cultural factors that could influence this process, but one obvious concern is whether self-enhancement is a pan-cultural human tendency. One viewpoint is that self-enhancement is pan-cultural but is modified by context. Another viewpoint is that self-enhancement occurs more in Western cultures which tend to be more individualistic.⁶⁹ The pan-cultural view of self-enhancement suggests that leaders might be similarly defensive about their respective leadership abilities universally, although the nature of that defence could change. For example, individuals from collectivist cultures, rather than individualist cultures, might be more defensive about teamwork-related issues. In contrast, the self-enhancement as a primarily Western perspective suggests that leaders from non-Western cultures might be less defensive, and therefore less pseudoscientific, in responding to threatening leadership information. We therefore encourage a cautious application of our model to other cultural settings.

A final and related issue involves pseudoscientific leadership in the military specifically. The military provides its own cultural context within a broader

cultural context. These cultural factors could enhance or inhibit pseudoscientific leadership. In theory, the emphasis that military organizations often place on leader development could create less defensive responses to negative leader feedback. This could occur because individuals are motivated to develop their leadership abilities and therefore place a greater emphasis on attending to critical information. It is also possible that the military attracts more service-oriented people who are correspondingly less defensive.⁷⁰ On the other hand, it might be difficult for military professionals to believe that they are below-average leaders because of the contextual importance of leading effectively. It is also possible that aspects of the military, such as power, attract narcissistic individuals.⁷¹ Furthermore, the structure of military organizations might allow greater levels of leader delusion. Formal appraisals are often controlled exclusively by superiors. This can enable a military professional to use a “kiss up, kick down” strategy where behaviour towards superiors is supportive but behaviour toward subordinates is negative. This process is possibly enabled further by the formal and normative restrictions on subordinate disobedience, and by the ability for the negative leader to move on to a different assignment every few years.⁷² It is interesting to note that examinations into negative forms of leadership have often occurred in military contexts.⁷³ These examinations suggest that military organizations have destructive leaders who presumably are unaware of their destructive leadership styles.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WORKING WITH THE PSEUDOSCIENTIFIC LEADER

Understanding pseudoscientific leaders sets the stage for working with them. Unfortunately, our overarching recommendation involves having realistic perceptions about how resistant pseudoscientific leaders can be to change. A feature of many pseudoscience adherents involves their inability to consider alternatives to their beliefs despite all logical arguments to the contrary. Gardner provides an illustrative description in the preface of his book, where he *notes* that supporters of a pseudoscience can have answers to every logical counterargument.⁷⁴ Similarly, Storr *notes* that pseudoscience believers are generally unpersuadable.⁷⁵ Thus, one option for coping with pseudoscientific leaders is simply to remove them from their respective positions or limit their leadership responsibilities. This option might not be feasible for a variety of reasons. Furthermore, we believe that pseudoscientific leaders can improve over time, even if they are unlikely to recognize immediately their leadership-based delusion.

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When dealing with a pseudoscientific leader, our first recommendation is to listen respectfully to the threatened leader. It is always possible that the explanations offered by seemingly destructive leaders will be correct or partially correct. Subordinates might be partially to blame for problems, but not at the level suggested by leaders. Even *The Committee for Skeptical Inquiry* acknowledges that pseudoscientific beliefs *could* be proven correct.⁷⁶ Besides, when pseudoscientific leaders seem to be misguided in their perceptions, listening respectfully will make them feel better about the feedback process and hopefully provide feedback givers additional credibility.⁷⁷

Our second recommendation is to promote the notion of leadership being a malleable skill. An extensive literature suggests that individuals respond more adaptively to critical feedback when they believe that the skill in question can be improved and is therefore under their control.⁷⁸ Yet, individuals often promote the idea that leadership is a fixed skill. In the United States, it is not uncommon to hear someone praised as a “natural born leader” which suggests, of course, that leadership ability is determined by genetics. Military organizations should take care to avoid this type of language both in formal training programs and in informal discussions. The notion of leadership being a developable skill would ideally be introduced early in professional military education as part of a commitment to lifelong development.

Our third recommendation is to focus on specific skills rather than on the totality of leadership.⁷⁹ Individuals who receive negative feedback about their leadership ability might become defensive or despondent about this broad attribute. In contrast, the domain of leadership includes many specific skills that appear to be developable. For example, military professionals might respond more effectively to feedback indicating that they need to work on being assertive as opposed to needing to work on their leadership generally. Obviously, even some of these specific skills might appear to be difficult to develop. Leaders who are generally anti-social, for example, are unlikely to embrace being more compassionate and caring. That said, even these leaders might learn to make fewer abrasive specific comments in the workplace.

Our fourth recommendation is to focus on the evidence. Pseudoscience adherents can be adept at turning discussions away from the primary issue.⁸⁰ The pseudoscientific leader will be likewise tempted to steer a conversation away from the evidence at hand. To illustrate, a pseudoscientific leader might steer a conversation toward whether leadership can be assessed at all rather than discussing behaviours that could improve his or her leadership abilities. Pseudoscientific leaders will have numerous explanations, many of which could be partially true, about why problems were beyond their control. These

discussions can be useful for building trust with pseudoscientific leaders by seriously considering their perspectives. Nevertheless, pseudoscientific leaders must consider whether there are ways that they could be more effective in their current environments. Pseudoscientific leaders in particular need exceptionally clear performance goals and personal goals. There is a “burden of proof” argument about pseudoscience that might be useful when reviewing indicators of leadership success.⁸¹ Pseudoscience will sometimes imply that because an idea has not been disproven, the idea is legitimate (e.g., the inability to disprove alien visitation becomes support for alien visitation). The scientific response is that theories must have evidence supporting their utility. Likewise, pseudoscientific leaders will put an undue emphasis on refuting evidence suggesting that they are leading ineffectively. Pseudoscientific leaders can be challenged to provide evidence that they are leading effectively. This discussion might be less threatening and more effective.

Our fifth and final recommendation is to consider lowering the stakes regarding leadership. We believe that leadership can be overly romanticized in the United States. When organizations and societies promote leadership excessively, it presumably becomes difficult for individuals to admit being substandard in this domain. This is particularly evident in the United States Armed Forces which emphasizes repeatedly the importance of leadership. Obviously, leadership is a critical skill and it is often a requirement for success. Nevertheless, we are simply suggesting that leadership could be elevated to a point where many individuals cannot admit, even privately, that they are mediocre or poor at this seemingly life-encompassing variable. There are certainly deplorable personality characteristics that can make one a poor leader, like being abusive. Yet, some other leaders struggle for reasons that have little to do with their qualities as human beings, like having trouble with public speaking.

CONCLUSION

In closing, our conception of the pseudoscientific leader should facilitate leader development in two primary ways. The first involves understanding and working with pseudoscientific leaders. We believe that organization members are often puzzled as to how individuals with destructive forms of leadership can be so ignorant of their own destructive behaviour. We believe that the classification of pseudoscientific leaders can help clarify how such leaders can be so obtuse. We also hope that properly understanding this type of leader can make individuals more patient and more effective in dealing with them. Understanding the pseudoscientific leader can also help explain

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why leader development efforts can produce marginal, non-existent, or even negative results.⁸² Organizational members who work with pseudoscientific leaders must consider how they frame attempts at leader development.

The other issue involves recognizing and addressing oneself as a pseudoscientific leader. When individuals are properly aware of these pseudoscientific leadership practices (or tendencies), this awareness should diminish their personal ability to create this type of denial. It might be tougher to blame subordinates for mission failure when one is also cognizant that this is a common tactic employed by pseudoscientific leaders. This process of admitting personal leadership failure can be painful. Recognizing that one is distorting leadership-related evidence substantially can lead to admitting personal weaknesses that people do not care to admit. However, many leader attributes can be developed. Because the military continues to serve a critically important function in society, military members should feel a sense of responsibility to examine their respective leadership abilities objectively and to commit to improving those abilities.

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CHAPTER 4

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL LEADERSHIP: CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS AND VISUALIZED NARRATIVES

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INTRODUCTION

Even though evil has haunted mankind for a long time, what is traditionally understood by the epithet “the problem of evil” has only been an object of research for theology and metaphysically informed ethics. The concept sometimes appeared in public discourses and private conversations, but there it was usually synonymous with being “very bad” in a moral sense. In recent years, however, the concept of evil has also found application in social psychology and interdisciplinary studies of organizational behaviour.¹ This scientific usage is new, as it has apparently become necessary in order to describe a specific set of phenomena that is deeply problematic and, at the same time, a possible object for scientific enquiry. Of course, leadership studies in general and military leadership studies in particular cannot afford to ignore the concept of evil. The questions are: what actually is the concept and what role should it play in leadership studies?

The concept of evil can be approached from two different angles: bottom-up and top-down. With the bottom-up approach, one would begin with clear cases of evil leadership and evil administrative structures and then go on to investigate what their characteristics are and why people go along with it. This will not be the topic of this chapter, but rather the topic of the fifth chapter, by Reed and Dobbs. What will be discussed here is a top-down approach. First we offer a philosophical analysis of the concept of evil leadership which distinguishes it from morally bad leadership. We shall argue that while morally bad leadership still achieves its goals, evil leadership defeats the very purposes of leadership in the long term (and is, in that sense, perverse). In the second step, we articulate in general terms what it means to defeat the purposes of military leadership and thereby offer an account of evil

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Military Academy or the Swiss Armed Forces.

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leadership in the military context. In order to illustrate the concept of evil leadership, and of evil military leadership in particular, we will present and analyze visualized narratives from movies in order to render the conceptual framework more accessible.

Having thus analyzed the concept of evil military leadership, we will present further analyses and examples from films to come up with conditions for a solution to the problem of evil leadership. The basic idea here is that we want to spell out how the purposes of military leadership can be secured in the long term. Solving issues of evil military leadership therefore requires specific measures to secure the purposes of military leadership.

FROM THE PROBLEM OF EVIL TO THE PROBLEM OF EVIL LEADERSHIP

In Western culture, evil has often been conceived of as something that has no being or that corrupts being. The *kakon* of Anaximander, Plato and Plotin has this metaphysical aspect and the *malum* of Augustine and Aquinas, for whom all things created by God are fundamentally good, continues this line of thought by construing the *malum* as a *privatio boni*, a privation of good. If seen from this perspective, evil cannot be said to exist, it only exists insofar as it drives to corrupt what is good. From its roots in ancient Greek thought up to Leibniz, there has usually been a question about metaphysical compatibility at the centre of the problem of evil. How and to what extent is the rational order of nature, the perfect order of God's creation or God's own goodness compatible with the fact that there is evil in the world? Obviously, suffering, sickness, war, unethical behaviour, natural disasters and anything else that did not correspond to the higher order was a challenge for the fundamentally optimistic outlook of these thinkers. What does that tell us about a perfectly rational world order or an omnipotent, benevolent God?

Leibniz argued rationalistically that the present world was the best of all possible worlds and this shows that God, who can be seen as the ideal leader, is indeed all-good, all-knowing and all-powerful at the same time. The fact that there are individual events we humans do not find good does not show that we do not live in the best possible world, if we consider the world as a whole. True, an all-powerful God could change individual evil events, but that means asking for an alteration of a natural order that might, all things considered, already have been perfect.² So, Leibniz argues, there is no reason that individual evil events provide evidence for giving up the optimistic view

that we live in a world that is the best, all things considered, of all possible worlds.

This and related problems have always had their place in narrative cinema and are a main ingredient of much good storytelling in movies. This is especially the case in disaster movies where volcanic eruptions, impact events, tsunamis or firestorms all serve as a basis for narratives. The movies often depict natural disasters which result from human intervention in the form of misguided “evil” science or bad policies that provoke a reaction from nature. The moral explanation of natural evil in visualized narratives puts man back in the centre of attention as he causes a reaction to his crimes against nature and will thus be punished for his malice. But sometimes there is no explanation at all why nature is out of control. Natural evil in film has proven to be relatively impotent to religious solutions or implications. Science, politics, and the military are often represented as secular counterparts to religion which can control a natural evil to some degree, but remain partially responsible themselves for nature’s retaliation in the first place.³

Generations after Leibniz have sometimes tended to question the *prima facie* optimism that Leibniz built on. More often, however, they started to reject the metaphysical perspective which framed the initial question and its possible answers for Leibniz. For them, evil in the world was worrying not so much if it threatened trust in a good natural or divine order; they found those evils which are caused by humans more disconcerting. The problem of evil slowly turned into a question about how human free will, and the newly emerging rights of liberty, can be compatible with evil human deeds if free will is to be good in and of itself. How should we understand and deal with evil human deeds which were freely willed? How are they possible, what does it mean for the value of freedom and what does that entail for ethics in general?

The narration of D.W. Griffith’s classic movie *Intolerance* (1916)⁴ illustrates how man acts inhumanly to others and how we deal with the problem that despite man’s free will being basically good, men do evil. The movie is notable as a very ambitious and colossal project for its time, running almost three hours and blending four different plot-lines into one bigger narration about intolerance and injustice in human history. Regarded by many as an anti-war or pacifist movie at the time of its release,⁵ the movie itself has no direct connection to the Great War in any of the four stories. The epic storytelling centres around religious and social intolerance through the ages, with depictions of the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, the life and death of Jesus Christ, the conquest of Babylon by the Persians and a modern day story of two lovers, with all stories sharing a common theme where the ones in power

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oppress the powerless. The historical melodrama shows how the phenomenon of intolerance (or injustice) was omnipresent in the history of mankind. With the movie's subtitle *Love's Struggle Throughout the Ages*, Griffith made it clear where he sees the solution to how to not lose hope in humanity. Being one of the first monumental movies in the history of early narrative cinema, it also shows how the issue of moral evil has always been present and in need of storytelling, even a hundred years ago when movies just started to develop from pure spectacle⁶ to a respectable form of art. With its clear distinction between good and evil and a biblical *mise-en-scène*,⁷ *Intolerance* is a good starting point to see how movies illustrate conceptions of evil in an experimental form of storytelling. *Intolerance* is interesting not only from a historical point of view but also because of its ageless themes.

The two most important root strategies for dealing with the more modern version of the problem of evil are commonly associated with Marx and Engels on one side and Freud on the other. The first approach (and its numerous successors) seeks to identify repressive structures in society to explain why there are evil deeds despite individual freedom. The main idea here is that people do evil things because they want to restrict other people's natural freedom or because their natural freedom is restricted by other people. For Marx and Engels, repressive structures alienate human beings from who they are naturally, and they consider overthrowing such structures a categorical imperative.⁸ Freud (and most of his successors) identified subconscious drives and dispositions that manifest as evil deeds. Those drives and dispositions override what we consciously will and thus bypass the domain of individual freedom. Freud himself posits a death drive, which explains the aggressive behaviour of individuals, which may also be the very basis for guilt, anxiety and discontent in the entire civilized society.⁹

While contemporary work in the social sciences on the notion of evil tends to focus on identifying repressive structures in societies, organizations or groups, Freud's conception often informs explanations of an individual's evil deeds, especially when it seems unlikely that the individual was merely the victim of repressive structures. Concerning the notion of evil leadership, these two approaches suggest straightforward ways for defining it. Evil leadership can thus either refer to establishing and maintaining repressive structures or it can simply refer to a leader who is not capable of sublimating destructive drives. These are two candidates for the cause of evil leadership.

To illustrate how evil manifests through repressive structures, a fine example of an approach along the lines of Marx and Engels is Soviet filmmaker Sergei M. Eisenstein's revolutionary propaganda epic *Battleship Potemkin*

from 1925.¹⁰ The movie deals with the historical uprising of Russian marines against the Tsarist regime in 1905 and features a heavily socialist narrative which is an iconic example of “Soviet Montage,” a manipulative filming technique that Eisenstein invented.¹¹ With suggestive film editing and psychologically intriguing patterns of images, the director visualized a clear enemy of man in the repressive Tsarist regime, represented in various agents of political and religious authority like brutal military officers or orthodox patriarchs. Eisenstein was deeply rooted in Marxist ideology while creating his revolutionary movies, following the dictum of not trying to understand history but to change it. He was convinced that art should not establish political structures but question them and transform the viewer.¹² Ironically, during the filming of his later epic movie about *Ivan the Terrible*¹³ Eisenstein fell out of favour with Stalin and left the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a victim of the same repressive structure he helped establish.¹⁴

On the other hand, if we regard evil as a dark subconscious drive in the sense of Freud, a good example is Fritz Lang’s movie *M* (1931).¹⁵ The movie was inspired by various real cases of child murderers and serial killers like Fritz Haarmann and Peter Kürten that haunted the Weimar Republic of Germany between the two World Wars.¹⁶ The production was embedded in a context of political instability and economic poverty which led to a general increase in criminality. This overall dark setting and socio-political context was present in many Weimar Republic movies that featured evil individuals or archetypical villains like the manipulative hypnotist in *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* (1920), the vampyric Count Orlok in *Nosferatu* (1922) or the power-hungry Dr. Mabuse (most notably in *The Testament of Dr. Mabuse* from 1933).¹⁷ In *M*, the main character Beckert (played by Peter Lorre) is a child molester who is fully aware of his malign needs but who also suffers from them. The thought of someone attacking or killing the innocent is something that a normal person feels deeply repulsed by and such acts are regarded as evil because they are beyond rational understanding. During the movie, the killer gets caught by a mob of underworld gangsters that put him onto an improvised trial without any legal legitimacy and the spectator is confronted with how bad men judge evil deeds.

Although Beckert seems to retain his freedom of will, he is a victim of his own lust (unlike the thugs judging him who are driven by greed). The spectator feels relieved when the evil killer is finally in the hands of the police and not in those of the underworld anymore¹⁸ because the moral order of good and evil finally gets its due. The film yields itself to a Freudian interpretation; the movie can be seen as the psyche itself, structured in “*Film-Ich, Film-Es und Film-Über-Ich*” (film-ego, film-id and film-super-ego).¹⁹ This allows

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interpreting the whole movie as an implementation of a Freudian psychoanalysis, where the psyche of the killer is identical with the psyche of the film. The Freudian definition of “the uncanny” (*das Unheimliche*)²⁰ aptly applies to the overall stylistic tone of the movie (and many other examples of German Expressionism) due to its use of nightmarish symbolism and the heavy focus on the psychological profile of a lust murderer hauntingly performed by Peter Lorre in self-reflective speeches.

Philip Zimbardo offers an alternative to these two basic perspectives, the Marxist and the Freudian, by arguing that certain situational factors lead to evil behaviour and, as he argues regarding the Abu Ghraib abuses and other cases, to evil leadership. For him, repression is not necessarily the result of a conscious plan to establish certain structures to restrict other people’s freedom and to violate their psychological and physical integrity. Repression can be expected to emerge if certain situational factors are present. For him, neither repressive structures nor subconscious drives and dispositions explain the entire phenomenon. Factors like the possibility to defer responsibility, inattentiveness, irresponsibility, low self-esteem, a willingness to tolerate unjust systems, deeds or persons, are actually decisive for him. Evil leaders succumb to these factors and good leaders prove resilient despite their presence and, hence, work to minimize these factors.²¹

The approach of Zimbardo is well depicted in the German movie *The Experiment* (2001),²² which features a dramatized version of Zimbardo’s own Stanford Prison Experiment. In his Prison Experiment, ordinary students were turned into prisoners and guards as part of an experiment, with disastrous results. Another example would be *The Wave* which was adapted twice for the movie screen (1981 and 2008).²³ *The Wave* delivers a fictionalized version of a social experiment from 1967 which demonstrated drastically how sensitive students are to fascist ideas and how easy they fall prey to such authoritarian structures. Zimbardo himself discusses *Lord of the Flies*²⁴ as an adequate representation of his approach. The dystopian novel from 1954 was adapted cinematically twice, in 1963 and 1990. The first film is more faithful to the novel; the second is the more successful and overall more popular version.

Both follow a group of boys stranded on a remote island.²⁵ After having reconciled themselves to their situation and having satisfied their basic needs, the collective starts to divide into two groups, one interested in securing order and a steady set of rules and the other group mainly interested in action and fun. Tensions begin to rise and after animals get killed, a murder happens among the boys, who have meanwhile fallen into a primitive and archaic state of some sort of warrior tribe. The narrative shows how even

completely innocent individuals like children in an idyllic paradise-like setting can shift to evil deeds if there is an opportunity or a conducive situation.

EVIL LEADERSHIP

With these three notions of evil, we get three different ways in which matters drift away from what is good. We also get three different notions of evil leadership. There is, of course, ambiguity in the term “evil.” It can refer to moral badness, disvalue and injustice, especially in severe cases. But there is also the other, more precise, usage of the term, which implies moral badness, disvalue and injustice that are so severe that they threaten a positive outlook on the world or on human nature. If we look at the three concepts of evil that are relevant candidates for a sound conception of evil leadership suggested above, we find that both the idea that there are repressive structures in human interaction and the idea that humans have an evil subconscious impulse, a death drive, do threaten a positive outlook on human nature. After all, in the first case, humans invent, install and entertain repressive structures and in the second case, humans have an innate impulse for aggressive behaviour.

Zimbardo’s approach does not yield itself easily to an analysis of the more precise concept of evil. He argues that if situations are a certain way, people are more likely to do horrible things. But does that threaten a positive outlook on the world in general or human nature in particular? His account simply provides a psychological explanation of why and when things are more likely to go wrong in a moral sense. Furthermore, Zimbardo holds that the very same conditions that produce evil deeds may also produce truly heroic deeds:

[A]ny of us could as easily become heroes as perpetrators of evil depending on how we are influenced by situational forces. The imperative becomes discovering how to limit, constrain, and prevent the situational and systemic forces that propel some of us toward social pathology.²⁶

The sort of evil Zimbardo is interested in is hard to distinguish from deep moral badness. He is most interested in the factors propelling us to social pathology and how we can prevent it. The difference between the broad and general concept of evil and the more precise concept prevalent in philosophical and theological discourses does not seem relevant for Zimbardo. However, if we want to use the concept of evil in social sciences, it should add something to our explanations that had not been available before. If evil is nothing

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more than deep moral badness, why say that things are evil instead of saying that they are very bad? If the concept of evil is not clearly distinguished from the concept of deep moral badness, there will be no explanatory benefit and, therefore, no reason for serious scientific discussion.

This does not mean that Zimbardo's work is useless. It means that he sometimes speaks about evil when he might be talking about moral badness, especially moral badness related to social pathology. If we focus on Zimbardo, the conception of evil leadership we come up with will probably be indistinguishable from the different conceptions of morally bad leadership that we find in standard treatments of leadership responsibility.²⁷ Zimbardo's conception of evil does, at least for leadership studies, offer nothing on the conceptual level that a sound account of leadership responsibility does not already provide. The present chapter, however, is interested in an analysis of the concept of evil that does explain more than the concept of moral badness does.

Should we explain evil leadership in terms of repressive structures that people willfully design and entertain or should we explain it in terms of dark subconscious drives? Such a general question may seem too hard to answer. Consider that different sorts of leaders have different possibilities to influence the structures with which and within which they lead. Political leaders have other possibilities to influence structures than, for example, managers of change processes in private economy. Military leaders have the freedom to influence structures that are very different from political or private domains.

If we remain on a very abstract philosophical level, there is actually a straightforward way of handling the issue. A leader stands for the structures which are within his or her sphere of influence. The leader is thus responsible for an organization or part of an organization and that responsibility extends as far as their sphere of influence. Whatever happens within a leader's sphere of influence, no matter whether the leader has caused it or failed to prevent it, it is something he or she is personally responsible for. If this were not the case, if there was something the leader is responsible for without being able to influence it, the leader would not be in control and therefore cannot be said to actually lead. The opposite is also true: if there was something the leader cannot influence without being responsible for it, the leader cannot be said to actually lead; the effects of his or her leadership do not concern him or her and therefore he or she is not concerned with something within their sphere of influence. Therefore, a leader's sphere of influence and the extent to which he or she is responsible are completely congruent. If this is not so, the leader does not fully exercise leadership.

If leaders are personally responsible for everything within their sphere of influence, they are responsible for designing, endorsing and not changing repressive structures within their sphere of influence – just as much as they are responsible for changing and overcoming such repressive structures if they do. Because leaders represent organizations or parts of organizations, they are personally responsible for anything evil that happens in their sphere of influence. And if they design, endorse or decide against changing anything evil within their sphere of influence, that fact will count against their moral integrity. It is hence completely natural to explain the evil that leaders cause or allow in terms of their character. But is this not unfair? Are there not cases in which evil happens within a leader's sphere of influence due to factors completely outside the leader's sphere of influence? If evil happens and the leader cannot do anything, evil will not have happened within his or her sphere of influence. If factors outside the control of a leader cause an evil, the evil will either not happen within the leader's sphere of influence or the leader will be able to do something.

So far, all of this is compatible with what one might want to say about ethical leadership. But where is the explanatory benefit of a concept of evil leadership? Traditionally, problems of evil are problems about how evil is compatible with the basic goodness of God or human free will. In the case of leadership, the problem is about how evil events within the leader's sphere of influence are compatible with the basic trust people have in the leader's authority and in the organization he or she stands for. The concept of evil leadership serves to name cases where such specific questions about compatibility arise. The explanatory benefit hence lies in the possibility to name and, hopefully, explain whether and how evils within a leader's sphere of influence can possibly be compatible with the basic trust on which leadership builds. For present purposes, we assume it to be natural to believe that, in order to lead people, a leader must have their trust. After all, a tyrant who rules through fear and intimidation does not lead people, but forces them – people act out of fear and due to a commitment or conviction. This is true for politics as much as it is for private businesses. But it is especially true in the military domain, where leadership must work under extreme circumstances. Anything evil within the leader's sphere of influence should not influence subordinates' trust too much if the goals at hand are to be achieved. Under extreme situations, a tyrant who has to depend on his or her followers tends to have a hard time.

An interesting approach to visualize evil leadership is the B-movie *The Prophecy* (1999).²⁸ Following an uprising of certain angels against God, their

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leader, Gabriel, searches for the most evil soul he can find to destroy the cosmic order of Heaven. During his quest, he gets chased by the first angel ever to revolt against God, Lucifer. Lucifer stops Gabriel in his rebellion as he cannot tolerate a second front against Heaven and does not want the eternal order of good and evil to be disturbed. The premise of Gabriel's rebellion is that he has lost his faith in God; deeply aggrieved and disappointed by God's love for humanity, Gabriel no longer sees God as a trustful leader of the angelic armies of heaven and is hurt in his pride because he feels removed from God's sight ("he doesn't speak to me anymore"). In his arrogance, he refers to humans as "monkeys" and considers their existence ended the time when God loved the angels most. For Gabriel, God has been corrupted by humanity, as he sees humanity as the source of all evil. This allegedly evil leadership of God thus must be destroyed and an order must be restored where humans have no place and angels (led by the archangel Gabriel) regain their rightful place next to God. The movie represents angels as beings who can lose trust in their leader, God, in exactly the way same way that humans can if they do not understand what their leaders tell them or what their leaders' plans are.

EVIL LEADERSHIP IN GENERAL AND IN A MILITARY CONTEXT

Based on classic accounts of the problem of evil, we argued that evil is about corruption, the *privatio boni* of Augustine and Aquinas, and threatens such ideas as the basic rationality of nature, the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing and benevolent God or the basic goodness of human freedom. Focusing on evil leadership, there is an analogous problem: how are evil events within a leader's sphere of influence compatible with the basic trust in a leader (and the organization he or she stands for) that forms the very basis of leadership? In order to understand this more clearly, we must refine the notion of trust.²⁹ Trust in a leader is a positive presumption that the leader makes good decisions and is in control of the situation. From a transactional point of view, a trustworthy leader is someone who is a reliable partner in a transaction. More precisely, he or she is a reliable partner in the contract that binds leaders and those they lead. From a transformational point of view, a trustworthy leader is a reliable partner in the sense just mentioned, but the leader also stands for and puts into action good and meaningful values and perspectives.

The problem of evil leadership thus turns into a question of how evil events within a leader's sphere of influence are to be squared with the requirements that, first, a leader must be a reliable partner with their subordinates and that,

second, a leader should stand for and put into action good and meaningful values and perspectives. Several movies have shown this distinction and exemplify the effective use of transactional and transformational leadership in a military context. Two notable examples are the World War II movie *Twelve O'Clock High* (1949)³⁰ and the army prison film *The Last Castle* (2001).³¹ The second movie especially shows the difference between the two leadership styles in a direct and exciting manner. The plot is basically that of a classic prison uprising movie with all ingredients typical of the genre,³² but enriches the narrative with questions about good military leadership. *The Last Castle* tells the story of the prisoner General Irwin (Robert Redford) who is serving ten years for refusing an order to stop a war criminal. Colonel Winter (James Gandolfini), the prison commander, is initially very impressed by this former three-star general, but reacts with hurt pride when he accidentally hears Irwin remark that he has no respect for someone who has never served in actual combat. Irwin gains the trust of the other prisoners, who see his incarceration as an opportunity to challenge the increasingly inhumane methods of Colonel Winter. Winter has all the characteristics of an ineffective transactional leader; he is corrupt, manipulative, using prisoners as spies in exchange for merely promissory prison time reductions. He sabotages every attempt of Irwin to “get the best out of the men” with collective punishment, while always focusing on the crimes the former soldiers have committed instead of considering more positive traits they might have. Irwin successfully uses his tactical combat experience and strategic leadership skills not only to transform and inspire the inmates, but to take control of the prison itself and to eventually undermine Colonel Winter. In the end, Irwin gets shot in the back by Winter (who is not able to accept his defeat), who in turn gets arrested by his own Captain, as he has lost his trust in him.

Irwin is a truly transformational leader, who builds trust in his men by leading through inspiration. Irwin was also a prisoner of war in Vietnam and knows how to persist despite extreme stress or unexpected situations. This is something that Colonel Winter has never experienced and which is summed up by Irwin's verdict: “he may be prepared, but he is not ready.” Winter lacks authenticity when acting as a battle commander and is in the end rightfully defeated and degraded by Irwin, first verbally during a dialog (“you are a disgrace to this uniform”) and then in an actual combat situation where even Winter's closest officers turn their backs on him and refuse to arrest Irwin.

The problem of trust is particularly acute in the military domain. During missions, there are moments of stress, there may be injuries and there may be deaths. Such things can happen due to the leader's decisions and

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sometimes subordinates might ask themselves whether they can continue to see the leader as someone who embodies good values. If the leader makes grave mistakes, subordinates might even question whether he or she still qualifies as a reliable partner in the legal arrangement regulating their respective status as leader and subordinate.

There are three reasons why military leadership is so interesting in studying the problem of evil leadership:

Stress: Military leadership prepares for and is exercised in extreme situations, where individuals and their interactions have to function reliably despite higher levels of physical or psychological stress.

Defined spheres of influence: In the military domain, the sphere of influence (i.e., what a leader is responsible for) is usually defined in a precise way.

Representation: Military leaders represent the armed forces (and their respective subdivisions) due to a hierarchical structure.

If compared to leadership in the private sector or to political leadership, stress levels in the military domain are generally higher in a deployed environment (although they are not when in garrison). In the private sector, the spheres of influence might be defined less precisely (and usually they are not defined as formally as in the military context). Furthermore, outsiders tend to distinguish more clearly between a leader and the organization that they work for in the private or the political domain. Military leaders wear uniforms and are expected to behave in a way that clearly manifests military values, values which are, at least in democratic nation states, not openly propagated and put into action by leaders outside the military domain.

CRITERIA FOR SOLUTIONS: SECURING GOOD LEADERSHIP

Every conception of evil comes with a story about corruption. Traditionally, these stories of corruption have been metaphysical or moral. But when it comes to evil leadership, corruption takes on a different form. We have already developed a two-tiered account of the sort of corruption we find in evil leadership. On the upper tier, corruption manifests as a lack of faith in the leader as someone who stands for and puts into action good and meaningful values and perspectives. On the lower tier, corruption manifests as a serious

doubt whether the leader in question qualifies as a reliable partner in contracts binding leaders and those led.

It is natural to define sustainability as the direct opposite of corruption. And because the sort of corruption we are dealing with here also has a moral connotation (we are speaking about evil after all), we may define sustainable and good leadership as the opposite of evil leadership. The two-tiered account of corruption thus translates into a two-tiered account of what “sustainable and good” should mean here. First, sustainable and good leadership makes subordinates have faith in the leader as someone who stands for and puts into action good and meaningful values and perspectives. Second, sustainable and good leadership requires minimally that a leader completely qualifies as a reliable partner in contracts binding leaders and those led. These are, then, the criteria with which we can identify the sort of leadership that fully overcomes the challenge posed by the problem of evil leadership.

Even though the account presented here is more on the abstract side, there are nevertheless concrete suggestions that military leaders can take away from this for their daily work. The challenge of evil leadership is most efficiently tackled if leaders are able to identify corruption, stick to legal requirements and, optimally, stand for and put into action good and meaningful values and perspectives:

Identify Corruption: when leaders learn about subordinates who doubt whether their leader qualifies as someone who merits faith and trust or as someone who is a reliable partner in the contract binding him/her to subordinates, investigation is indicated.

Stick to Legal Requirements: if leaders prove to their subordinates that they stick to the legal requirements that bind them both and that the subordinates can demand compliance, more dangerous cases of corruption can be prevented or rectified.

Good Values and Perspectives: evil thwarts optimism, motivation and meaning; because of that, good values and perspectives (and reliable leaders who stand for them and put them into action) are the most efficient antidote to counter corruption.

The core message of the paper therefore is that where evil leadership is an issue, lawful and reliable leaders with values are needed. And where such good leaders are the norm, corruption leading to evil leadership will probably not become a challenge.

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ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER 5

MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATIVE EVIL

*George E. Reed, PhD, and Lieutenant Colonel James M. Dobbs, PhD**

In the 1998 publication of *Unmasking Administrative Evil*, Guy Adams and Danny Balfour wrestled with the question of how otherwise good and well-intentioned public administrators could perpetrate significant and sometimes outrageous harm to others as part of a larger system or process. The characteristic example used in their book was the systematic murder of millions of citizens by the German Nazi regime, which we know as the Holocaust. German civil servants who often did not willingly or knowingly sanction intentional harm to others went about their daily work of providing public services that were also an essential part of mechanisms that facilitated Adolph Hitler's final solution.

Public administration, in the form of ordinary civil servants carrying out legally sanctioned and routine bureaucratic processes, played a key role in all parts of the Holocaust, including the composition and management of the civil service, the compiling of lists and management of files, defining the legal status of victims and their property, the organization of ghetto communities, transportation management, the administration of death/slave labor camps, and the coordination of these and other activities.¹

Adams and Balfour used the term “administrative evil” to distinguish their construct from abject or pure evil, a descriptor more applicable to those who contrived, directed, and with full knowledge, orchestrated unjustified harm to others. Malevolence and ill intention are the handmaidens of abject evil. Evil is a harsh word that is sometimes overused in political rhetoric, but its use in an ethical sense is associated with unjust outcomes that involve pain, suffering, and even destruction of innocent people. Evil exists on a spectrum of unethical behaviour extending from an innocuous white lie on one end to mass murder and genocide on the other.

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Air Force Academy or the United States Department of Defense.

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Adams and Balfour do not specify exactly where an outcome or behaviour moves from bad to evil, but the unjust infliction of suffering that insults the fundamental dignity of mankind is at the heart of it. The subjectivity and lack of precision of such a determination is an admitted issue, but that is also the case with most socially constructed normative constructs. Administrative evil is more distant, nuanced, and easy to overlook because it tends to remain masked, at least until the harm becomes widely known. Those operating in bureaucratic systems where labour is divided into specialized functions can easily lose sight of the ultimate long-term cumulative negative impact of their effort. Certain types of leadership behaviours and organizational climates can also serve to dull moral sensibilities.

Perhaps organizational members would recognize harm if they looked for it, but there is not much incentive in modern organizations to look much farther than the boundary of a cubicle. “Don’t ask me, I just work here” is a refrain that would be expected from someone with such a limited moral perspective. A few examples might be illustrative. Consider the administrative assistant for an unscrupulous financial manager. She is a professional who is competent and effective in her work, highly regarded for her helpfulness and work ethic. Assume that she is unaware of the fact that her boss is bilking others of their life savings. She would not necessarily be considered culpable for something she is unaware of. At this point the harm is masked. Once it becomes known that her boss is a thief, the level of accountability for her actions takes on a different character. Once the evil is unmasked she is called to a higher level of accountability for her facilitating role. She can continue in an unethical and harmful organization, she can choose to end her affiliation with the criminal enterprise, or even work against it by cooperating with investigators.

For an example more in keeping with the military theme of this book, consider the actions of medical personnel who treated detainees at Abu Ghraib Central Prison.² Systematic abuse of detainees at the prison came to the attention of the public after a *60 Minutes II* report depicted military police enthusiastically punching, kicking, and subjecting detainees to humiliating abuse. The transgressions were documented in a series of reports of investigations and criminal trials. A number of junior enlisted soldiers and non-commissioned officers were held accountable for their actions despite claims that they were acting under the direction of military intelligence officials who wanted the detainees softened up for interrogation purposes. Those who engaged in the degrading treatment knowingly produced harm so their actions are properly classified as abject evil, but for administrative evil we need to look at the periphery.

Medical personnel treated wounds that were indicative of abuse, dutifully annotating them in health records and applying healing arts, but they did not sound an alarm. There were no procedures, rules, or written requirements that specifically required them to report the presence of abuse. It was instead a junior enlisted military policeman who slid a package of photographs under the door of a United States Army Criminal Investigation Command Agent that launched the now famous inquiry. Only after the misbehaviour of military police on the night shift became public knowledge did the actions of health providers come into question. Only in retrospect after the abuse was unmasked did their actions appear questionable as possible acts of omission.

The process of unmasking evil is of particular importance. Mechanisms that identify harm that would otherwise go unnoticed are valuable. A free and active press, complaint processes, access to investigators who are not beholden to the local command such as military criminal investigative organizations and inspectors general all provide an important service. Detecting and exposing otherwise masked evil serves the military well as a correcting mechanism. Whistleblowers that unmask evil are frequently not appreciated in a culture that values loyalty, but a more enlightened view recognizes that those who speak truth to power provide a good and vital service. An uninformed public that gives excessive deference to military personnel and moribund elected officials who do not provide vigorous oversight are not particularly helpful in preventing administrative evil.

Adams and Balfour lament the diminution of ethics that seems to be associated with contemporary mindsets and organizational life. When evil is unmasked it can be recognized and resisted, but those who are insensitive to ethical considerations can be slow to recognize moral dilemmas. Those who are less attuned to moral issues rarely suffer the angst that comes with a dilemma because they do not see the problem. Two recent discussions illustrate an apparent distance in moral sensibilities between military personnel and citizens they serve. The first discussion took place at a community event at a public museum featuring a display of medieval instruments of torture. Most of the attendees were members of the local community. One panelist posed a hypothetical scenario that involved a terrorist group placing a weapon of mass destruction in a populous city. The scenario offers that a member of the group is captured and knows where the device is placed. As the deadline for detonation approaches, the question is posed to the group. Would they permit the use of torture to extract information that might save the city? In the museum group, an overwhelming majority indicated that they would not condone torture under any circumstances. They saw torture as an

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action prohibited by law and convention, wrong and unjustifiable under any circumstances. They tended to focus on the unreliability of information obtained via torture.

The same question was later posed to a military audience consisting largely of senior non-commissioned officers. Their response was much more accepting of torture, despite its statutory prohibition, if it would result in any chance of disrupting the attack and saving lives. It was easier for the military audience to justify breaking the rules. Their “ends justify the means” instrumental approach seemed characteristic of military populations charged with the duty to protect. When told of the reaction of the public group, the military audience reacted with a sense of incredulity and accused their fellow citizens of naiveté and lack of understanding of the dangerous nature of the world. The relative merits of their arguments are for the purpose of this chapter; less important is the observation that military and non-military groups had very different moral set points.

This chapter offers that the notion of administrative evil has application beyond the confines of public administration and should be worthy of consideration by military leaders. If divisions of labour and specialized work functions are an issue for almost all modern organizations, and an over-familiarity with the application of violence on behalf of the state, the concomitant moral corrosion associated with protracted conflict, and certain leadership styles common in military settings might be expected to exacerbate the problem of moral desensitization or ethical numbness. If the organizational dynamics suggested by Adams and Balfour combine with the morally hazardous environment of military operations and cultural aspects present in military organizations, then military leaders who are charged with controlling their formations and maintaining faith with the democratic societies they serve could have their work cut out for them.

QUESTIONING THE ETHICAL HEALTH OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY

There is evidence that concern about the moral status of the United States military is warranted. In 2012, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta directed a review of ethical standards focused on senior military officers in the wake of a spate of sexual misconduct and other scandals.³ In 2014, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel raised the possibility of a “systemic” ethics crisis inside the military.⁴ A cheating scandal involving Air Force officers responsible for ballistic missiles, a YouTube video that allegedly depicted United States Marines

urinating on the dead bodies of Taliban members, and an unprecedented number of misconduct removals of senior officers and non-commissioned officers provided impetus for an examination of ethics in the military. Secretary Hagel appointed Rear Admiral Margaret “Peg” Klein to serve in a new position as senior advisor for military professionalism, an unprecedented move designed to underscore the importance of a strong professional ethic. The United States Army established the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic at West Point, “to reinforce trust within the profession and with the American people: the foundation for successful accomplishment of the Army Mission, consistent with the Army Ethic.”⁵ Additionally, the United States Air Force recently stood up the Profession of Arms Center of Excellence to ensure the concept and culture of the profession of arms is taught at every level of leadership and supervision. Such initiatives are expensive, yet signal a concern about and interest in the moral health of the armed forces.

MILITARY FACTORS FACILITATING ADMINISTRATIVE EVIL

The notion that protracted conflict has a corrosive effect on the moral status of soldiers and society is hardly a new idea. Outraged at the continued German rocket bombardment of British territory in 1944, Prime Minister Winston Churchill asked his Chiefs of Staff to consider drenching German cities in poison gas. As to the morality of the action, Churchill wrote:

It is absurd to consider the morality of the topic when everybody used it in the last war without a word of complaint from the moralists and the Church. On the other hand, in the last war, the bombing of open cities was regarded as forbidden. Now everybody does it as a matter of course. It is simply a question of fashion changing as she does between long and short skirts for women.⁶

Eisenhower and the service chiefs argued against the initiative largely out of concerns over the likelihood of retaliation, especially on allied prisoners in German custody, and also on the feasibility of concentrating enough gas in one spot to be effective. In the end, Churchill reluctantly acquiesced but it was a close call. Had the war extended beyond 1945 and the fortunes of the allies turned for the worse, they could have thought more favourably of the use of gas or biological weapons in a way that would not have been conscionable in 1939. In capitulating to the concerns of his advisors, Churchill left open the possibility of future use.

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I am not at all convinced by this negative report. But clearly I cannot make head against the parsons and the warriors at the same time. The matter should be kept under review and brought up again when things get worse.⁷

Two United States Army War College professors recently published a study that pointed to an uncomfortable level of lying by military personnel, driven by an environment where requirements and expectations exceed available resources. The resulting “ethical fading and rationalizing allow individuals to convince themselves that their honour and integrity are intact despite ethical compromise.”⁸ Ethical fading and numbness can facilitate administrative evil since they lead to less likelihood that harm will be recognized and unmasked. This is especially so when organizational members are able to maintain the delusion that they hold moral high ground even while engaging in unethical activity. Words like integrity and character abound in military culture, yet as the Army War College study confirmed, high standards, insufficient resources, and an unwillingness to recognize inherent limitations can be a formula for significant moral hazard. One of the most morally hazardous statements from a person in authority has to be, “I don’t care how you do it, just get it done.” Pleasing the boss becomes an imperative, and moral inversions where bad activities become perceived as good are a predictable outcome.

The flawed logic of moral inversion goes something like this: It is good to accomplish missions assigned by, and important to, my supervisor, therefore any action that leads to mission accomplishment is also good. Lying, stealing, and contracting violations that would otherwise be considered as unfortunate actions to be avoided are embraced in service to the overriding necessity to accomplish the mission. The preeminence of mission accomplishment sometimes puts moral concerns into the background, leading to disheartening statements heard by military officers when discussing ethics such as, “If I need some ethics I will just call the chaplain or a staff judge advocate,” or as another senior service college student once quipped, “Ethics, I don’t need no stinking ethics.”

Organizations frequently espouse values that do not coincide with the lived experience of their members. On the one hand, shared value systems characterized by homogeneity of values can lead to a number of positive organizational outcomes, including a common vision, retention and social cohesion.⁹ On the other hand, too much distance between espoused and enacted values can be problematic. Talking the talk without walking the walk can lead to perceptions of hypocrisy, cynicism and quite possibly a sense of betrayal. A litmus test for dissonance between espoused and enacted values can be

observed when values statements are turned into sarcastic jibes and jokes that spread through the organization. Values statements that are meant to inspire and motivate can become the brunt of cynical forms of humour if they are not part of the lived experience of organizational members. In a Dilbert cartoon by Scott Adams published in 2003, the boss points to an image of an apple and says, “This apple will remind us of our core values: respect, customer service and teamwork.” Dilbert responds with, “The apple’s core is the part you throw away.” “Not always. Sometimes I accidentally eat it,” counters the boss. Dilbert concludes the strip with the observation, “Maybe the stem can represent our loyalty to the company.”

LEADERSHIP AND ADMINISTRATIVE EVIL

A 2013 study by Hannah and colleagues noted that leader behaviour has both positive and negative impact on the prosocial and antisocial behaviour of followers.¹⁰ Their study included a sample of 2,572 soldiers serving in Iraq in 2009. It found that those who experienced abusive supervision identified less with the organization’s core values and demonstrated lower levels of moral courage. Abusive supervision was found to undermine moral agency and negatively impacted ethical behaviour. Furthermore, those in organizations with higher levels of abusive supervision were less likely to report ethical transgressions of others. This study was of particular interest because it is one of the few that examined military personnel in a combat zone and it focused on the mistreatment of non-combatants as a measure of unethical conduct. Applying findings from this study to the notion of administrative evil suggests that abusive leadership serves a role in establishing an ethical environment where outbreaks of evil are more likely to occur and when they do occur they are less likely to be unmasked. It is a military maxim that leadership matters, but we are still learning the myriad ways leadership style impacts the behaviour of followers as well as the culture and ethical climate of military organizations.

A recent dissertation by James Dobbs (one of the authors of this chapter) focused on cadets at the United States Air Force Academy. It found evidence that a relationship exists between perceived toxic leadership and increased levels of organizational cynicism. It also found that followers of toxic leaders are likely to have more negative attitudes toward their organizations as a whole.¹¹ Organizational cynicism is generally defined as a negative attitude toward one’s employing organization with three dimensions: (1) a belief that the organization lacks integrity; (2) negative effect toward the organization; and (3) tendencies to disparaging and critical behaviours toward the

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organization that are consistent with these beliefs and effect.¹² A study by Burris, Detert, and Chiaburu found that negative feelings toward the supervisor carried over to negative feelings towards the organization.¹³ This could be due not only to the toxic leader being perceived as representative of the organization, but also due to the perception that the organization does not intervene to protect its personnel.

A lack of faith in the leadership of the unit seems to translate to a lack of attachment to the larger organization with a number of ethical implications. These include feelings of frustration, hopelessness, disillusionment, and even contempt of individuals or an entire organization. Organizational cynicism is related to unmet expectations and pessimistic predictions about how the leader of the organization will act in the future. Cynicism predicts a lack of organizational citizenship, which is defined as activity that extends beyond that which is required: behaviour that tends to serve organizations well. Organizational citizenship behaviour takes place when unit members are committed rather than merely compliant. Furthermore, those who report high levels of cynicism are more hesitant to take prudent risks.

Perhaps the leadership at Abu Ghraib contributed to an environment that bred cynicism resulting (at least partially) in a climate that fostered ethical numbness and moral desensitization. There is some evidence to support this as research has shown that low levels of perceived psychological support led to higher levels of cynicism.¹⁴

While conditions at Abu Ghraib were as bad for the officers as for lower-ranking soldiers, the officers were clearly (very harshly, in many cases) judged by other Army officers to have fallen short of expectations. Every official report on Abu Ghraib indicts the leadership and supervision at the facility as having failed to establish an appropriate command climate, one in which these abuses might easily have been prevented. It is quite possible that had leadership and supervision been better, these abuses might not have occurred.¹⁵

Given that moral courage requires the confrontation of threat, organizational cynicism can have a negative impact on an individual's willingness to take moral action, creating an environment for administrative evil to take root. One can only imagine whether things might have turned out differently at Abu Ghraib, if in the early days of the war, members of the medical team, who had contact with the Iraqi detainees, had spoken out about the nature of the injuries the detainees were suffering at the hands of prison guards. The fact that the medical personnel at Abu Ghraib continued to treat prisoners

whose wounds were indicative of abuse reveals how the ethical framework within a culture of poor leadership leaves little room for moral choice or for the resistance to administrative evil. The medical workers fulfilled their role in the process, silently accepting their part in the administrative evil that occurred at Abu Ghraib, as did any number of other intelligence and military police personnel.

BUREAUCRACY, PROFESSIONALISM AND ADMINISTRATIVE EVIL

In his seminal work, *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington wrote: “The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer is a professional man.”¹⁶ Huntington asserted that the military had joined the ranks of the classic professions, including medicine and law, because the military had developed the “distinguishing characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation – expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.”¹⁷ Professionalism is generally viewed as a good thing. To be a professional is to master a body of knowledge and apply it in good service to a client. Classical professions include relatively high status groups such as medicine, law, and the clergy. Professionals are valued and trusted practitioners of important and frequently arcane skills. Members of the armed services want to be seen as professionals since it connotes a vocational calling with greater gravitas and prestige than a mere job. Citizens want a professional military because it suggests a level of competence and dedication that can be trusted.

Members of the military profession have a special duty to act ethically because they are given the awesome authority and responsibility of applying force on behalf of society. *The Armed Forces Officer* states it succinctly: “The most basic task of the profession of arms is the armed defence of society, its territory, population, and vital interests.”¹⁸ To some degree, a sense of professionalism that requires a focus on a client that is to be well served stands as protection against inappropriate use of military power, a perennial concern of the founding fathers of the United States. We tend to take for granted standing armies and professionalized armed forces that were once viewed by the designers of the American republic with suspicion as feared instruments of oppression.

Don Snider has provided good service to the American military by asking a salient question: Is the United States military a profession or is it merely an obedient bureaucracy?¹⁹ He observed that the armed services operate as part

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of a massive bureaucratic structure with all of its attendant dysfunctions. Key among the problematic aspects of bureaucratic structures is a diffusion of information and a mindset that ensures disciplined conformity to established processes and procedures. It is a description that aligns closely with Adams and Balfour's portrayal of modern organizations:

Modern organizations, as noted, are characterized by the diffusion of information and the fragmentation of responsibility. With diffuse and scattered information, literally no one in the organization may have a complete enough picture to adequately comprehend the destructive activity or actively try to reverse course. Those who might have enough of a picture to perceive that something is wrong may well assume that higher management is aware of the problem and has chosen to do nothing about it.²⁰

In bureaucracies, adherence to rules, initially constructed as means to an end, become an end in themselves.²¹ Those who mindlessly follow rules and procedures fit the description of "petty bureaucrats" who lord over their limited power and jurisdiction. Sometimes rules, processes, and procedures do not serve the ultimate aims of the organization, but they become reified and immune to influence.

An example might serve to illustrate the point. The commanding general of an infantry division was known to question his soldiers in the performance of their daily tasks. One day he approached a soldier on post guard duty securing a warehouse that contained sensitive items. The general asked the soldier about his assigned tasks and quizzed him on his duties. "What would you do, if you saw something suspicious?" the general asked. "I would contact my sergeant by radio" the soldier quickly responded. "Do it," commanded the general. "I can't" said the soldier, "my radio doesn't work." Bemused, the general continued the interrogation to find out that not only was the radio inoperative, but the soldier's supervisor was aware of that fact and issued it to him anyway. After tracking down the sergeant of the guard, he was met with a rational explanation. While the regulations for the post guard did require every soldier have a radio, the rules did not specify that the radio actually had to work. It was a case where the rules were followed to the letter, but also to the detriment of the purpose for which the rules were created in the first place. Blind obedience to rules and procedures can serve to dull moral sensitivities. Just because an activity falls within the parameters of a rule does not make it right, or beneficial in accomplishing the goals and objectives of the organization.

Sociologist James Q. Wilson described peacetime militaries as “procedural organizations.”²² The real test of whether a military is effective or not is determined on the battlefield. The desired outcome of battlefield success cannot be readily determined during war. Between periods of conflict, however, without the ultimate test of combat, military organizations rely on adherence to rules, procedures, and application of doctrine as a substitute. Standard operating procedures (SOP) and checklists abound and compliance is ensured by virtue of close and layered supervision that includes inspections, training drills and exercises. Wilson also notes that during periods of war, doctrine and SOPs are frequently discarded. “Staying alive, taking real estate and killing the enemy are such important outcomes that the only SOPs which continue to have much force are those that contribute directly to producing those outcomes.”²³ During peacetime, doctrine tends to flow from higher headquarters to units, but during times of war, doctrine struggles to adequately and expeditiously capture and distribute lessons learned from units operating in the field.

Professionals are less susceptible to bureaucratic dysfunctions because they maintain a central focus on serving the client well even if doing so is detrimental to members of the profession. Bureaucratic boundaries tend to stay fixed and the prerogatives of bureaucrats are assiduously defended, while professions expand and contract as necessary to best serve their clients. Professionals are expected to adhere to a code of conduct that calls for the independent application of professional knowledge to the highest degree possible. At the heart of such codes are principles that combine to create an ethos that drives behaviour when rules and procedures are inadequate or absent. Such intrinsically driven behaviour is frequently beyond the reach of bureaucratic organizations that rely primarily on tightly constructed job descriptions, rules, guidelines and procedures. Professional ethics involves the practice and study of “should” and “ought to” statements for those who are entrusted with important tasks.

It is analogous to medical ethics or legal ethics in the sense that its core function is to assist those professions to think through the moral challenges and dilemmas inherent in their professional activity and, by helping members of the profession better understand the ethical demands upon them, to enable and motivate them to act appropriately in the discharge of their professional obligations.²⁴

Professionalism in general and professional ethics in specific can be helpful in offsetting bureaucratic tendencies that foster outbreaks of administrative evil. It is precisely because the practice of military professional ethics

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recognizes moral challenges and dilemmas inherent in activities of the armed forces that they serve as a potential means for preventing or mitigating the impact of administrative evil. Military practice is laden with moral dilemmas, and assertions that the profession of arms is somehow inherently more moral than the society it serves is delusional at best and downright dangerous at its worst. The military is a microcosm of American society from which it draws its membership. It is comprised of a younger and more physically fit sample, but every flaw and predilection present in the larger population will be manifest to some degree in military formations. Delusions of moral superiority become dangerous when warriors come to the conclusion that the society they serve is somehow debased, that it is a lesser entity that is unworthy of their sacrifice.

For Adams and Balfour, anything that serves to separate organizational members from the consequences of their actions is problematic. Actions or processes that dim, fade, or numb moral sensitivity can be viewed as a contributor to the perpetration of harm and are to be minimized. Destructive leadership styles that contribute to high levels of cynicism and disassociation from espoused organizational values should be corrected. Military personnel have a legal obligation to refuse unlawful orders, a provision that encourages a degree of moral agency not appreciated by many outside of the armed services. Following the orders of a superior is not an acceptable defense against accusations of war crimes as evidenced by the trials of Nazis at Nuremberg at the end of World War II. When accountability for individual actions becomes diffused, evil is more likely to blossom without obstruction.

When Adams and Balfour contributed the notion of administrative evil, they were focused on the role of civil servants and public administrators, but they did not intend to limit application of the concept to that field. This exploration has demonstrated that the concept need not be isolated to the field of public administration alone. The mindsets, organizational dynamics, and narrowly defined roles that contribute to a lack of moral sensitivity and ethical numbness are not hard to find in the military and might even be more prevalent than in other sectors. Because the military operates within a decidedly bureaucratic structure, we can anticipate a continuing battle between the dysfunctions of bureaucracy and a better nature that stems from a professional identity. It seems as though to some degree contemporary organizational life is naturally inclined to produce outbreaks of administrative evil.

Effective leadership, an ethos driven by a strong sense of professionalism, and mechanisms that continually look for and unmask administrative evil could serve as mechanisms to counter the slide. Under the press of a strong drive

for mission accomplishment, military leaders should be equally attuned to not only getting the job done, but also to how the job gets done and whether the means used are in concert with organizational values. It would be a shame if otherwise honourable service to the nation were tainted by a sense of moral regret. Those in positions of authority should be sensitive to the unintentional consequences of systems and processes that contribute to an unethical environment such as resource-mission mismatch and excessive competition. Ethical climate surveys can be valuable tools in assessing the state of an organization and sensitizing leaders to ethical issues. It is disappointing, if not dangerous, to hear some in positions of authority defer ethical issues to the chaplain or staff judge advocate. While clergy and legal advisors can be useful sources of information and advice, responsibility for organizational climate is an essential element of leadership. Entities that serve to unmask evil are not a threat to the organization; they serve a critical function. Just as a free press is an indispensable element to the functioning of a democracy, access to elected officials, inspectors general, and even whistleblowing activity serves a necessary and valuable function. Those avenues should be reinforced rather than lamented. When a service member conscientiously accesses an open door or one of the avenues for grievance outside of the chain of command, they are not necessarily engaged in an act of disloyalty. They might be unmasking administrative evil.

CONCLUSION

This exploration has made the case for inclusion of administrative evil in the lexicon of military ethics. An ethically desensitized military can become an unwitting tool in outbreaks of administrative evil such as genocide. It is an especially appropriate time to consider the topic and assess the ethical status of the military. The period immediately after military conflict can be a time of useful reflection and rebuilding as the military profession makes collective sense of the past and prepares for an uncertain and dangerous future. The post conflict period is also a time when hard questions about the ethical foundations and overall state of the profession are most appropriately asked. A healthy profession of arms is self-monitoring and open to the need to evolve and change for the sake of the society it serves. If the concerns of Adams and Balfour are taken to heart, an agenda item for professional renewal could include a focus on recognizing the factors that contribute to administrative evil and adoption of means to prevent or minimize its occurrence. In order to be useful for military leaders, the notion of administrative evil needs to be more than something that is recognized only in hindsight after the damage is done. It is also necessary to develop sophisticated

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professionals who are attuned to the long-term impact of their actions and willing to engage in sophisticated moral reasoning.

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CHAPTER 6

SITUATIONAL OBSTACLES TO ENACTING TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

Bass and Avolio's Transformational Leadership model and Sosik and Jung's more comprehensive Full Range Leadership Development (FRLD) model offer a leadership framework that is well suited for use by the armed services.¹ Despite strong evidence for its effectiveness, militaries may find it difficult to adopt and apply transformational leadership. It may be that military organizations, with their hierarchical bureaucracies and unique contexts, pose some obstacles for leaders who wish to internalize, apply and realize the benefits of transformational leadership.

In this chapter, we use Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy's Interactional Framework to explore how characteristics of military organizations can influence the behaviours of leaders and followers, and inadvertently interfere with the adoption and successful application of transformational leadership.² We will then provide recommendations as to how leaders can overcome or mitigate these obstacles. Before we begin our analysis, it is instructive to summarize the essential components of the transformational leadership and FRLD models.

TRANSFORMATIONAL AND FULL RANGE LEADERSHIP

James MacGregor Burns, a political sociologist, is generally recognized as the first to distinguish between transactional and transformational forms of leadership.³ In *Leadership*, Burns suggested that the transactional form of leadership is based on an exchange relationship between leaders and

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Air Force Academy or the United States Department of Defense.

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their followers, such that each party's needs are met via workplace transactions (e.g., followers help to achieve the leader's objectives; leaders reward followers with a salary, bonuses, or other benefits). In contrast, he indicated that the transformational form of leadership involves a process by which a leader appeals to followers' values, needs and aspirations to elevate their morality and motivation to achieve their fullest potential. The transformational form of leadership is superior to the transactional form as it has been shown to be positively related to followers' satisfaction with their leader, overall job satisfaction, organizational commitment, work motivation, and supervisory ratings of leader effectiveness.⁴ Bass and colleagues later incorporated this distinction in a Model of Transformational and Transactional Leadership, which is now referred to as either the model of Full Range Leadership or FRLD.⁵

Sosik and Jung provide the most detailed and comprehensive explanation of the FRLD model to include its three forms of leadership encompassing eight leadership styles, the specific leader behaviours that comprise those styles, and the resulting effects of these behaviours on followers and the organization.⁶ According to the authors, the three forms and eight styles of leadership can be arrayed along two dimensions as depicted in Figure 6.1. The x-axis differentiates between passive and active forms of leadership, while the y-axis distinguishes ineffective from effective forms of leadership. Thus, Sosik and Jung assert transformational leadership is the most active and effective form of leadership, inactive leadership is the most passive and ineffective form of leadership, and transactional leadership is somewhat active and effective. In the remainder of this section, we will summarize Sosik and Jung's ideas to provide the background required to continue our analysis.




Figure 6.1: The Full Range Leadership Development Model.⁷

INACTIVE LEADERSHIP

Inactive leadership is the least active and effective form of leadership, and it consists of two leadership styles: laissez-faire and passive management by exception (PMBE). The two styles are classified as inactive due to the low to negligible involvement of leaders with their followers. This level of inactivity is associated with poor performance as followers notice and mirror the passivity and minimal effort of their leaders.

Leaders who use laissez-faire are not really leading at all, as they are essentially uninvolved with their followers and their work. Such leaders avoid making decisions, solving problems, emphasizing results, and are generally unavailable due to absences or failures to follow up. As a result, followers become detached from their leader, can become confused about their roles, and may fight with peers when issues related to responsibilities and resources go unresolved. Ultimately, followers respond to laissez-faire behaviours with the lowest levels of performance and satisfaction, and may even leave the organization.

Sosik and Jung describe leaders employing PMBE as involved with their followers, but only when they happen to notice a corrective action is required.⁸ Such leaders react to problems reluctantly, intervening to force followers' compliance with policies and procedures only once an infraction, problem

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or failure has occurred. While this style demonstrates a leader's willingness to enforce standards when presented with a problem, and followers do respond with compliance, followers also demonstrate little trust in the leader, little commitment to the organization, and exert little effort overall.

TRANSACTIONAL LEADERSHIP

The transactional forms of leadership consist of the active management by exception (AMBE) and contingent reward leadership styles. With these styles of leadership, the leader is moderately active, creating and executing exchanges with their followers, and therefore producing better performance from followers as compared to the inactive forms of leadership. The difference between the AMBE and contingent reward styles reflects the nature and focus of their associated leader behaviours and resulting effects on followers.

Unlike PMBE, leaders employing the AMBE style actively monitor followers' work for infractions or failures. They often arrange to know if failures have occurred, or are about to occur, and will micromanage followers' work in order to recover from recent failures or prevent future failures. Unfortunately, the leader's continuous focus on complaints, mistakes, deviations and failures tends to produce a punitive and demotivating work environment. While such behaviours are clearly warranted to ensure compliance with important rules, policies, or procedures in critical (e.g., life or death) situations, the excessive use of this style can increase follower anxiety, stifle innovation, and reduce commitment and engagement at the expense of performance.

Leaders who engage the contingent reward style have crossed the neutral point of the FRLD model as depicted in Figure 6.1, and are generally both active and effective in their leader behaviours. At its core, contingent reward leadership is based on a constructive transaction or contract in which the leader sets expectations and goals and suggests ways and means for followers to achieve those goals. These goals orient and motivate followers to perform in a manner that is mutually beneficial to the leader, follower, and organization. As the follower works toward those goals, the leader monitors their progress, providing support, feedback, and agreed upon rewards when those goals are achieved. According to Sosik and Jung, this builds trust in followers as they see their leaders supporting their work and following through on the contract by delivering earned rewards.⁹

TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

The transformational form of leadership is firmly entrenched in the active-effective quadrant of Figure 6.1, and encompasses four styles of leadership, collectively referred to as the “4Is” of transformational leadership: idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration. Rather than leading by corrections or transactions, the 4Is work in concert to inspire followers to perform beyond expectations and create meaningful change in themselves, their coworkers, and the organization.

The idealized influence component of the 4Is involves the leader serving as a positive role model by displaying high moral and ethical standards, raising performance expectations, and placing follower, team, or organizational interests above personal interests. Leaders supplement their followers’ passive process of observational learning by actively discussing their most important values and beliefs, and the importance of having a strong sense of purpose, trusting one another, and working as a team. As a role model to followers, it is also important for leaders to consider the moral and ethical implications of their actions and decisions, and to advocate for exciting new possibilities that can be accomplished via teamwork. When leaders engage these behaviours, followers attribute idealized influence to them. Specifically, followers identify with the leader, develop admiration and respect for the leader, demonstrate trust and commitment toward that leader, and show greater levels of effort and motivation on the job.¹⁰

The inspirational motivation component involves the leader expressing the vision, initiative, energy, and persistence required to motivate followers to exceed performance expectations as they work toward that vision. Leaders do this by articulating an exciting, optimistic, and compelling vision of the future, while talking enthusiastically and confidently about what needs to be done to realize that vision. Through these actions, leaders create positive psychological states in their followers, which in turn intrinsically motivate followers to exert extra effort toward a meaningful vision, and persist in these efforts when confronted with obstacles to success.

When leaders employ the intellectual stimulation component, they leverage rational thought and creativity to help followers generate new solutions to problems and overcome obstacles that stand in the way of progress. This can be accomplished by questioning assumptions and methods, seeking divergent perspectives, examining problems from different perspectives, and encouraging non-traditional thinking. By promoting these behaviours, followers learn to think critically about problems and situations, and to use

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logic and creativity to come up with new ideas and solutions that exceed expectations.

The last of the 4Is, individualized consideration, encourages leaders to treat each follower as an individual rather than solely as a member of a group. The leader can fashion a developmental plan that provides the right opportunity, degree of challenge, and level of support to facilitate each follower's leadership development. Leaders do this by listening carefully to followers to understand their needs, abilities, concerns, and aspirations, and by supporting followers' self-development by spending time teaching, mentoring, and coaching them on their strengths and weaknesses. In response, followers respect the leader for their willingness to invest time and effort in their development, feel valued as they make meaningful contributions to the organization based on their unique talents, grow confident in their developing abilities, and show more willingness to learn and develop.¹¹

Although the 4Is are often introduced as four distinct leadership styles, they are intended to work together to produce transformational effects. For example, when leaders demonstrate idealized influence, followers develop trust and respect for them and wish to emulate them. In essence, idealized influence "attaches" followers to their leaders. When leaders demonstrate inspirational motivation, followers are motivated to act to achieve their leader's vision; inspirational motivation attaches followers to the vision and the work required to achieve it. Leaders can capitalize on these attachments to motivate followers to work toward that vision while developing themselves. First, they can use intellectual stimulation to provide the psychological safety net that allows followers to question assumptions and established methods as well as encourage critical thinking and creativity to seek better solutions to new and old problems. Then, leaders can use individualized consideration to develop followers by assessing their strengths, weaknesses, and aspirations, challenging them with difficult but achievable tasks, and supporting them via coaching, mentoring, and praise. In turn, this investment in follower development reinforces the trust, respect, and idealized influence attributed to their leaders and the commitment to the organization and mission. Collectively, this is how the 4Is of transformational leadership produce unit performance that exceeds expectations and simultaneously develops leaders.

It is also important to point out that FRLD does not suggest that transformational leadership is good, and transactional leadership is bad, or that inactive leadership has no place in a leader's toolbox. In fact, Sosik and Jung assert that transactional leadership could be effective in motivating followers' performance, and the use of expectations, rewards, and punishments are

foundational to a leader-follower relationship.¹² They also indicate that AMBE leadership, even with its micromanagement connotation, is recommended in critical situations involving life and death, absolute regulatory compliance, or other “failure is not an option” situations. What FRLD does suggest is that leaders should spend a majority of their time engaged in transformational leadership, a minority of their time engaged in transactional leadership, and rarely engage in inactive leadership. By doing so, leaders can reap the benefits of superior performance, while minimizing the risk of lesser performance or the stymied development associated with less effective forms of leadership.

Transformational leadership enjoys tremendous research support for its effective application in a wide variety of environments and contexts. Militaries should leverage it to realize the twin outcomes of leader effectiveness (and therefore unit performance) and follower development.¹³ The former is essential due the value nations place on achieving national security objectives, making the most of scarce national resources, and preserving the lives of its soldiers, sailors, and airmen. The latter is essential due to the nature of military life and operations; militaries must continually develop effective non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and company grade officers into effective senior-NCOs and field grade officers despite the disruptive influences of attrition, redeployment, casualties, and relatively early retirement as compared to civilian counterparts.

Despite these benefits, there is evidence that military organizations are not widely employing transformational leadership. For example, the United States Army is currently struggling with a self-admitted “toxic leadership” problem; abusive and self-serving behaviours are the antithesis of transformational leadership.¹⁴ While ignorance of FRLD and transformational leadership is a plausible explanation, it does not fully explain this observation. For example, United States Air Force Academy cadets and the officers who oversee their leadership development are taught the FRLD model and the value of transformational leadership, yet annual leadership climate data indicate the cadets and officers are still employing transactional leadership at the expense of the more effective and active transformational leadership.

Could it be that the unique nature of military organizations and contexts hinders or prevents a broader implementation of transformational leadership? Up to this point, we have been concerned with leader behaviours and their effects on followers. We will now turn our attention to a broader leadership framework that includes the situation and contexts in which leaders interact with followers.

INTERACTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

Fiedler may have been the first to acknowledge the importance of the leader, follower, and situation in the leadership process, but it was Hollander who incorporated these elements into what Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy call the Interactional Framework (Figure 6.2).¹⁵ This framework presents leadership as a function of the leader, follower, and situation. The leader element encompasses what the leader brings to a leadership scenario. This can include their personality, interests, beliefs, values, knowledge, skills, and experiences. The follower element is similar to that of the leader, in that each follower also has a personality, motivations, and abilities. Finally, the situation element describes the context in which leadership takes place and can include a range of factors spanning the team (e.g., the nature of the task at hand, resource availability) and the organization (e.g., structure, design, culture).




Figure 6.2: The Interactional Framework.¹⁶

While any leadership scenario can be analyzed with respect to each element, it may be more enlightening to examine the interactions among the three elements. More recently, Tett and Burnett proposed a model of job performance that links the personality of people (i.e., leaders and followers) to situational constraints, suggesting that optimal outcomes are the result of person-situation fit.¹⁷ Our analysis extends this idea in an attempt to describe the impact situational factors related to typical military organizational structures can have on leaders and followers.

THE MODERN MILITARY ORGANIZATION

The modern military owes much of its current organization, culture, and processes to Frederick the Great, who ruled Prussia as the Industrial Revolution was taking root in Europe. Frederick was as fascinated by mechanical toy soldiers as he was dismayed by the unruly mob of criminals, paupers, and mercenaries that populated his own army.¹⁸ Applying the industrial *zeitgeist* to bring discipline and order to his army, he introduced such modern military conventions as standardized uniforms, ranks, regulations, equipment, and training. Through task specialization, systematic training, and repetitive drill, he created a living army of “automatons” such that soldiers lost to combat or attrition were easily replaced, thus mitigating the disruption to military operations. Frederick the Great similarly modernized the Prussian civil service with bureaucratic reforms, ultimately elevating his state’s economic and political strength.

Today, many of Frederick the Great’s ideas are resident in most modern organizations. For example, one need only glance at an organizational chart to see that Classic Management Theory is alive and well. Such structures reflect the now timeless principles of unity of command, span of control, division of labour, centralization of authority, differentiation between staff and line, and lines of authority and responsibility within the organization. It is this marriage of organization and bureaucracy that is problematic for militaries that wish to practice transformational leadership.

The word organization derives from the Greek *organon* which means “tool” or “instrument.” Indeed, organizations are the means by which leaders can harness the talents and efforts of many to accomplish complex and difficult tasks to achieve significant and valuable ends. Morgan’s *Images of Organization* uses metaphor to explain the complexities of modern organizations.¹⁹ One metaphor, “organizations as machines,” describes the many ways in which organizations can be perceived to function as machines, especially in terms of the heartless manner in which it treats its workers.

Consider, for example, the mechanical precision with which many of our institutions are expected to operate. Organizational life is often routinized with the precision demanded of clockwork. People are frequently expected to arrive at work at a given time, perform a predetermined set of activities, rest at appointed hours, and then resume their tasks until work is over. In many organizations, one shift of workers replaces another in methodical fashion so that work can continue uninterrupted twenty-four hours a day every day of the year. Often work

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is very mechanical and repetitive. Anyone who has observed work in the mass-production factory or in any of the large “office factories” processing paper forms such as insurance claims, tax returns, or bank checks will have noticed the machinelike way in which such organizations operate. They are designed like machines, and their employees are in essence expected to behave as if they were parts of machines.²⁰

BUREAUCRACY

Organizations that are designed to function as machines are typically referred to as bureaucracies. As military organizations possess many bureaucratic features such as hierarchical structures and lines of authority, it is this situational factor that is of primary interest to an analysis of obstacles to implementing transformational leadership.

The word bureaucracy has a decidedly negative connotation that prompts images of stacks of forms and miles of red tape. While its characteristic web of rules and regulations are intended to impose the order Frederick the Great so passionately craved, the benefits of bureaucracy may no longer be worth the costs, as the world of the 21st century is far more VUCA than the 18th century. Adding rules and regulations to deal with the VUCA environment may no longer be creating order; instead, it may be adding complexity and confusion. Unfortunately, many military organizations possess strong bureaucratic characteristics.

In an environment characterized by rules, regulations, policies and procedures, leaders may be compelled to focus on rule following in order to accomplish their assigned tasks. In addition to following the rules, leaders must also enforce the rules. Taken together, a rule-bound environment may serve to drive the leader toward transactional, rather than transformational, forms of leadership. Specifically, leaders may engage in AMBE-style leadership as they seek out and punish rule violators or, use contingent reward-style leadership to set expectations for rule following and to reward compliance and punish noncompliance. As a result, followers are likely to comply with the bureaucracy to earn rewards or avoid punishment. Thus, transformational leadership is unlikely to flourish in a machine bureaucracy with tightly controlled, hierarchical communication and reporting structures, functional specialization, and formalized policies and procedures.²¹

Bureaucracy may be the situational factor that contributes most to the organizational context and culture that inhibits transformational leadership in military organizations. However, there are other contextual factors present

in bureaucracies and military organizations in general that can exacerbate the problem. We will now explore these factors and their effect on the 4Is of transformational leadership.

SCARCITY

If bureaucracy serves to push leaders toward transactional leadership in general, scarcity is the situational factor that compromises the individualized consideration component of transformational leadership. Resource scarcity is rooted in task overload as a result of insufficient resources (e.g., time, budget, materials, or skilled personnel). In any case, people in organizations experiencing scarcity are having difficulty “doing more with less.”

When overwhelmed with work, leaders may resort to reactive strategies to accomplish tasks at the expense of proactive strategies that build developmental relationships with followers. In other words, leaders may focus more on meeting the demands of the present and less on investing in the future. Consequently, followers may feel “used and abused” as their needs and aspirations are neglected. Such contexts suggest that time intensive leader-follower relationship building, developmental coaching, and mentoring activities will grow rare. In response, followers may notice developmental interactions are dominated by instances involving corrections in response to error or failure. Ultimately, scarcity has driven the leader away from transformational leadership and toward a less effective form of leadership. This can be especially problematic in military organizations since leaders are “grown” (i.e., developed from within). When junior leaders accept these corrective interactions as the “right way” to lead, then this style can be adopted and transmitted as the junior leaders rise through the ranks.²²

COMPETITION

At first glance, military organizations appear to be cohesive entities in which members are unified in pursuit of a common mission. However, this view ignores the fact that members maintain their individuality in the form of personal needs, interests, and aspirations. Scarcity of opportunities and rewards sets the stage for competition and self-interest rather than cooperation for the benefit of the organization. This desire to compete can be inadvertently exacerbated by a bureaucratic system that promotes self-interest. For example, in his examination of poorly conceived reward systems, Kerr noted that most coaches preferred to talk about teamwork and *esprit de corps*, yet distributed rewards based on individual performance:

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The college basketball player who passes the ball to teammates instead of shooting will not compile impressive scoring statistics and is less likely to be drafted by the pros. The ballplayer who hits to right field to advance the runners will win neither the batting nor home run titles, and will be offered smaller raises. It therefore is rational for players to think of themselves first, and the team second.²³

Thus, military organizations that rank order or stratify individuals based on individual performance may be encouraging competition and self-interest, especially when high visibility job opportunities, additional responsibility, increased power, salary increases, or promotions are at stake.

When competition is present, leaders and followers may engage in fewer activities that involve the risk or appearance of failure. In other words, competition hinders the intellectual stimulation-related behaviours that transformational leadership leverages to generate new solutions (e.g., questioning assumptions, employing critical thinking, encouraging creativity) so the organization can exceed expectations and develop followers. Instead, leaders may encourage taking the safer, more predictable path to task accomplishment to avoid failure. When failures do occur, the leader may punish or fail to reward those followers who are responsible in order to prevent further risk taking and damage to the leader's personal interests. This emphasis on correcting failure and avoiding punishment pushes the leader toward the transactional styles of contingent reward and AMBE.

STASIS

Some military organizations are sheltered from VUCA environments. For example, staff, administrative, training, and research and development organizations are often located in rear areas (i.e., in garrison), far away from the dynamic nature of a capable opponent and combat operations. While maintaining "reachback" support reduces the logistical footprint of forward operating bases, the static and routinized nature of daily operations in these organizations can promote complacency as leaders and followers become accustomed to the status quo.

When work is routine, leaders can become too focused on a comfortable present rather than future success or survival. Without the threat of a dynamic opponent or sudden, external shocks to the system to motivate organizations to adapt and overcome, leaders have little need to consider the future, and may fail to articulate a compelling vision. Followers can become bored or numb to their work, and see little need to excel or develop themselves. Without the

leader to stimulate intrinsic motivation, followers may fall prey to extrinsic motivation. Thus, leaders may neglect inspirational motivation and turn to contingent reward leadership to ensure follower compliance with expectations. Alternately, they too could succumb to boredom and self-interest and rely on PMBE to initiate their corrective interactions with followers.

MORAL IMMATURITY

When an organization is led by an immoral or unethical leader, peers and followers are unlikely to trust, respect, or attribute idealized influence to that leader. While such leaders do exist in military (and non-military) organizations, a more common problem is the moral immaturity of leaders and the members of an organization in general.²⁴ Moral reasoning is the process by which people make ethical (or unethical) decisions, and the quality of moral reasoning reflects the state of an individual's moral development.²⁵ Kohlberg theorized that people progress through three levels of moral development: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional. Each successive level is characterized by increasingly complex ways of analyzing moral situations. People operating at the pre-conventional level (predominately children) make moral decisions based primarily on self-interest. Therefore, their decisions often reflect obedience to authority in order to obtain rewards and avoid punishment. Those operating at the conventional level (primarily late adolescents and adults) make moral decisions to obtain the approval of others. As a result, they follow rules or laws and do their duty consistent with their acquired values and beliefs. Finally, few adults reach the post-conventional level where moral decisions are based on abstract, universal principles that transcend societal or national boundaries.

Most militaries prefer to recruit young males and females because they are healthy enough to withstand the rigours of military training and combat, are ready to enter the workforce generally unencumbered by spouses and children, and wish to establish an adult identity.²⁶ Thus, most military organizations are populated by young people who typically reason at the pre-conventional and conventional levels. This should benefit military organizations that are aligned with members predisposed to seek rewards, avoid punishment, and obey authority. However, these levels of reasoning are more compatible with transactional, rather than transformational, systems and environments.

When young officers and NCOs are reasoning below the post-conventional level, they may be role modeling self-interested behaviours and applying

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contingent reward and management by exception styles of leadership. Lacking an external focus on the rights of others, social contracts, and universal principles of justice, such leaders may be unable to shift perspective from “me” to “we” and therefore engage in less inspirational motivation and individualized consideration, while demonstrating fewer behaviours that generate trust, respect, and idealized influence.²⁷ Furthermore, leaders may be “trained” to use transactional styles by self-focused followers who are not developmentally ready for the 4Is, and only seem to respond to the carrot and stick approach.²⁸

MITIGATING SITUATIONAL OBSTACLES TO FOSTER TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

If bureaucracy, scarcity, competition, stasis, and moral immaturity are situational factors that prevent military organizations from fostering transformational leadership and they are a fact of life or necessary evil to the functioning of modern military organizations, what are leaders to do? We offer three possible solutions in order of decreasing complexity and difficulty.

1. CHANGE THE ORGANIZATION

Leaders who fail to recognize the effect of bureaucracy on their choice of leadership style may find themselves engaging in transactional rather than transformational behaviours. Rather than alerting leaders to this danger and training them to enact appropriate transformational responses, an alternative option is to change the organization so that it cues the desired transformational behaviours.

As previously discussed, Morgan has likened the bureaucratic organization to a machine that seeks efficiency, precision, and predictability, with little regard for the needs, interests, and aspirations of its replaceable parts (i.e., the workers).²⁹ Such organizations create a dehumanizing and demotivating environment that excels in stable and predictable environments in which well-trained workers can perform their well-practiced tasks. However, today’s VUCA world coupled with a diligent enemy on the battlefield is anything but static. To succeed in turbulent and uncertain environments, Morgan offers an alternative metaphor: organizations as organisms. When we think of organizations as organisms, we can think of individuals as cells, teams as organs, and organizations as whole organisms. Each level has needs that must be satisfied in order to survive, and when they work in concert with one another, the organism may go beyond mere survival to thrive. In the

language of organizations, the individual, team, or organization may surpass minimum requirements for success in order to exceed expectations and develop additional capabilities.

While the machine metaphor is alive and well in many conventional military organizations, some unconventional organizations are demonstrating results by following a more organic model. Consider the distinction between conventional and special operations forces. The former operates in a standard hierarchical command and control environment and well established tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) consistent with the machine metaphor. However, the latter receives highly specialized training to operate independently and thrive in specific dynamic and high threat environments to accomplish particular missions.³⁰ If leaders can change their organizations to operate as organisms rather than machines, they may be able to focus attention on satisfying and aligning the needs of followers and the organization rather than merely rewarding compliance with rules and regulations.

While the theory and methods for organizational change are well established, its record of success is poor, with some failure rates estimated as high as 70%.³¹ The fact is that organizational change is difficult to achieve because most individuals, teams, and organizations are resistant to change unless faced with the prospect of catastrophe. According to Kotter, to produce a lasting change, leaders must create a sense of urgency, build a guiding coalition, develop a vision and strategy, communicate that vision, empower action across the breadth and depth of the organization, generate short term wins to sustain motivation, consolidate gains and produce more change, and then anchor the change and new ways of doing business in the culture.³² This is an exceptional amount of work, and success is not assured even if all leaders are involved in the change effort. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine how a generic, large organization might change to better reflect an organic metaphor. An organic model suggests the change be driven bottom-up by members and teams rather than top-down by a central planner. In light of these difficulties, it may be easier to attempt our second solution: leverage the existing bureaucracy to reorient policies and procedures to encourage transformational leader behaviours.

2. CHANGE ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

The fields of industrial-organizational (or work) psychology, human resources management, and organizational behaviour have identified a host

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of personnel processes designed to promote organizational effectiveness. These processes include recruiting, selection, placement, training, assessment, appraisal, and compensation. At the corporate or organizational levels, each process is codified in the form of policies, regulations and rules that help create the bureaucracy. Ironically, by changing these policies and rules, leaders can harness the power of bureaucracy to encourage less-bureaucratic behaviours, such as transformational leadership. How can policy changes counter the transactional effects of scarcity, competition, stasis, and moral immaturity?

The related processes of recruiting, selection, and placement are designed to identify a pool of interested and minimally qualified job candidates and then select the most qualified candidate for a vacant position. These processes can be co-opted to cue transformational leadership by mitigating the effects of situational factors that cue transactional leadership. For example, to the extent moral immaturity is lacking in a youthful military population, young leaders may model self-interest to followers to include leading via contingent reward or management by exception styles. To promote transformational leadership, corporate leaders can choose to recruit with an emphasis on intrinsic benefits of military life such as patriotism, national service, and defending others, rather than the extrinsic benefits like competitive pay, potential for promotion, and extraordinary opportunities. Thus, the service may begin to fill with members who are less self-interested and more inclined to lead in a more transformational manner.

The other situational obstacles can also be addressed via modifications to selection processes. As previously discussed, scarcity-induced task overload can deny leaders the time to engage transformational leadership behaviours associated with individualized consideration. One way to deal with task overload is to improve the capabilities of those who are charged with accomplishing those tasks. If leaders are selected based on their social, coaching, or mentoring skills, they may be able to engage in individualized consideration behaviours in spite of task overload. When competition is present in an organization, leaders may revert to self-interested behaviours to secure promotions and benefits. This could decrease the intellectual stimulation-related behaviours that have the potential to increase the organization's effectiveness. To mitigate this, senior leaders could select leaders based on critical thinking, creativity, and willingness to take calculated risks. Finally, when stasis contributes to complacency and satisfaction with the status quo in an organization, leaders can be selected based on their ability to envision new and exciting futures, communicate a vision, or inspire others to action.

When selecting leaders with the appropriate transformational skills is not possible, senior leaders also have the option of developing these skills in leaders. By harnessing the assessment, training, and appraisal processes, senior leaders can identify those leaders who lack the desired skills, provide them with skills training, and reward those who demonstrate skill proficiency with high visibility leadership or critical responsibilities. Ultimately, the objective is to restructure the organization or its processes to encourage leaders to engage in transformational rather than transactional leadership behaviours. However, if organizational policy changes are not possible, it may be up to individual leaders to exercise and support transformational leadership. This could be facilitated by a unit's changing contexts.

3. ADAPT TO CHANGING CONTEXTS

Thus far, our discussion of military organizations has been generic. If we consider the environment in which a military organization must operate, then we can introduce factors that might exacerbate or counter any transactional leadership-inducing influences. To explore this idea further, we will consider a generic military organization that operates across three different contexts: an initial training or education context, a home station or in-garrison context, and a forward deployed or combat context. In each context, research suggests leaders should strive to lead in a transformational way, but it is important to recognize some contexts pose more obstacles than others.

Of the three contexts, a military organization with a technical training or educational mission is likely to offer more obstacles to transformational leadership. First of all, a training mission is likely to be located safely behind national borders, far from the complexity and threat of a dynamic enemy, so that trainees can focus on basic knowledge and skill acquisition. Thus, the mission is fairly static and routine, often repeating the same curriculum on a regular schedule. Second, the locations for these activities are likely to foster stronger bureaucracies. Specifically, the organization may have a larger proportion of senior administrators who know the bureaucracy well and are heavily invested in perpetuating it for the power and benefits it offers. Third, most training programs have rigid time and resource constraints, as corporate leaders push to graduate trainees, fill operational vacancies, and maintain combat capability. Finally, training organizations tend to be very assessment-oriented to ensure trainees have met minimum standards. Leaders use these assessments to stratify graduates for special opportunities during and after training (e.g., class leader, distinguished graduate award, merit-based assignment processes), thus contributing to a competitive environment.

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One positive characteristic of training organizations is they may be populated with experienced officers or senior NCOs who can demonstrate idealized influence by role modeling ethical behaviour, institutional values, and discussing the value of purpose, trust, and teamwork. In such contexts, leaders should take the time to introduce transformational leadership and FRLD to trainees in the classroom, encouraging trainees to observe different styles of leadership around them, and practice transformational behaviours when provided the opportunity to lead.

Given the diversity of military organizations and their missions, the obstacles to transformational leadership of in-garrison organizations will vary widely in kind and degree. While a bureaucracy will be present, it may rise and decline as members cycle in and out of the unit. Resources may be scarce, but often not to the degree found in training contexts. Competition among members may still be present, but appraisal and award cycles will be longer and less conspicuous. As the organization focuses on maintaining combat readiness, it responds to a distal enemy and projected threats which provide just enough novelty and impetus for adaptation to prevent stasis and complacency. Finally, some leaders are free to engage in transformational or transactional leadership consistent with their personality, motivation, knowledge, skill, and experience. When in-garrison, leaders should take the time to engage the 4Is of transformational leadership to the maximum extent possible, to reap the benefits of effective performance while developing the next generation of leaders. When followers develop trust, respect, and admiration for their leader, while simultaneously developing their own knowledge, skills and abilities commensurate with their interests and aspirations, the unit is better positioned to excel in the VUCA environment that characterizes modern conventional and counterinsurgency warfare.

In forward deployed contexts, under threat of contact with a dynamic enemy, the obstacles to transformational leaders are least likely to be present. Bureaucracy is discouraged and often ignored as members focus on the essential activities required to defeat the enemy and survive on the battlefield. Bureaucracy may be confined to “pockets of paperwork” such as headquarters’ staffs or support functions. Scarcity is less of a problem when nations support their soldiers on the field of battle, leaders prioritize resources, and NCOs apply ingenuity to accommodate shortfalls. Competition also falls by the wayside as comrades in arms unite against a common enemy. Unlike the static routines of training or garrison life, soldiers are forced to out think or adapt to a dynamic enemy.

Successful combat leaders are perhaps the best examples of those who are adept at idealized influence. In his study of *in extremis* leaders, Kolditz noted that such leaders embrace continuous learning, share risk and a common lifestyle with followers, and inspire trust and loyalty; these characteristics are consistent with the transformational components of individualized consideration and idealized influence.³³ For many combat leaders, this is the opportune time to engage in transformational leadership as well as reap the benefits of its effective practice while in training or in-garrison. On the battlefield, transformational leadership could translate into victory and survival. In contrast, mistrust and lack of respect for leaders, combined with lack of motivation and commitment to the unit and mission could produce less desirable results such as casualties, failed objectives, and poor morale.

CONCLUSION

Military organizations tend to be structured in accordance with timeless principles of Classic Management Theory. Unfortunately, this creates a bureaucracy that can encourage predominately transactional forms of leadership rather than the more effective transformational forms of leadership. When bureaucracy is coupled with the situational factors of scarcity, competition, stasis, and moral immaturity, the pressure on leaders to use transactional leadership may be more pronounced. By recognizing this dynamic, leaders have the opportunity to change their organizations, revise personnel policies or procedures to cue transformational behaviours, or choose to engage in transformational behaviours in spite of situational obstacles. As transformational leaders and followers produce superior results and develop greater capabilities, other work units may seek to emulate their best practices to achieve the same results. A visible record of success may be the best way to spur bottom-up, and ultimately, top-down organizational change.

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CHAPTER 7

GETTING READY TO CHANGE: WHAT LEADERS CAN DO TO FOSTER CHANGE READINESS

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INTRODUCTION

Change readiness has become one of the most popular topics in the change management literature. In less than 10 years, dozens of studies have been published on the ways to better prepare employees facing organizational transformations.¹ However, questions remain regarding the best way to prepare employees facing organizational changes or transformations. In more precise terms, the question is: *what are the key levers that organizational leaders can use to foster readiness to change in their workforce?*

Major transformations in organizations can create considerable stress for members of the organization and for the leaders who are responsible for overseeing those initiatives. Changes faced by today's organizations are not only more complex than in the past, but tend to be more frequent, and sometimes involve multiple simultaneous transformations.² This trend forces leaders and employees to deal with the pressure and the increased workload that comes from multiple roles and tasks, performance requirements, and the need to exceed expectations.³ According to the majority of respondents in a recent study that surveyed more than 3,000 public and private sector managers and executives, only one in three organizational changes could be regarded as successful.⁴ Resistance to change among employees, at every level of the organization, was found to be one of the most important causes of this low success rate.⁵

Over the years, the Canadian federal public service, and in particular the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the Department of National Defence, has undergone numerous changes and transformations, including workforce reduction, realignment of departmental priorities, and the implementation

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Canadian Armed Forces or the Department of National Defence.

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of new organizational structures. Change management in the CAF is unique for many reasons. For example, the size of the organization and its multiplicity of constituencies, some of which have their own cultures, represent a challenge for military leaders when the time comes to implement change initiatives. As a result, fostering change readiness in team members requires a lot of effort from military leaders. The challenges posed by a transformation in an institution like the CAF cannot be underestimated; it must be carefully planned, developed, and articulated. As discussed in *Leadership in the Canadian Armed Forces: Leading People*⁶, CAF leaders are encouraged to develop their management skills and to gain a better understanding of change management principles, i.e., openness to creativity, diversity, and innovation that will bring about the opportunities for change. At the same time, the CAF members need to be receptive and ready to fully engage in the proposed change in order for it to be a success. Hence, training and supporting military leaders in the management and implementation of change initiatives is of paramount importance and represents one of the most important skills required by today's military leaders.

Nonetheless, transformations impact all personnel, and multiple reactions to these situations have been identified in the literature.⁷ A few of the most well-known responses toward these organizational changes are resistance to change, cynicism, and reduced organizational commitment. Traditionally, resistance to change has been recognized as one of the major causes behind the failure of change initiatives.⁸ This phenomenon is not unknown in military organizations. When participating in or implementing change initiatives, military leaders usually devote a lot of their time and effort to counter change resistance. Their emphasis on reducing resistance to change by members of the organization often detracts from (and competes with) the time they invest in other important tasks related to the introduction of the change: formulating a strategic vision, developing a plan for change, and implementing the change.⁹ Recent work on the subject have led us to believe that successful transformation within organizations often depends on leaders' skills (at all level of the organization) to better prepare members for the change, rather than leaders' attempts to reduce members' resistance.¹⁰ Hence, we believe that creating awareness among military leaders of their role as agents of change and helping them get a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying change readiness will prove useful when the time comes to promote, initiate and implement changes in the CAF and in any other military organization.

FROM RESISTING TO BEING READY TO CHANGE: DEFINING CHANGE READINESS

Identifying the factors that positively affect employees' readiness to change is a relatively new area of study.¹¹ This approach involves uncovering the beliefs (or attitudes) conducive to change among members of the organization so that these beliefs can be fostered. Armenakis, Harris, and Mossholder define readiness as "the cognitive precursor to the behaviors of either resistance to, or support for, a change effort."¹² Resistance to, or support for, a change effort can be observed in personnel's beliefs, attitudes, and intentions toward the organization's need to transform, and these beliefs and attitudes will determine the capacity of organizational members (individually and collectively) to fully invest themselves in the proposed change.

According to most researchers, change readiness and resistance to change represent distinct yet related phenomena. Conceptually distinguishing the two constructs offers the possibility to approach change management from a different perspective. For example, leaders who are hesitant to face resistance from their members toward organizational change may behave apprehensively. In response, members might interpret their leaders' reluctance to engage with them as an indication that the leader would rather impose the change without necessarily asking for their involvement. In contrast, a leader who is committed to change and who exhibits openness will most likely be seen as a proactive leader who strives to create excitement about change in his or her work unit and cohesion among his or her personnel to implement the organizational change in a collaborative ways. However, leaders and employees do not always welcome change within an organization. That is why leaders need to be well-equipped when it comes time to manage a change.

This chapter presents a conceptual framework for change readiness, using the CAF as an example, which supports leaders and personnel in promoting, initiating and implementing transformation within their organizations.¹³ To this end, we present Armenakis and Harris's model for change readiness¹⁴ and discuss results of a recent literature review of research that has studied the influence of the change readiness levers. The chapter also presents strategies that leaders can use to foster readiness to change among the organization's workforce. Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief discussion on the practical applications of this model and its limitations in the military context.

READINESS TO CHANGE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

According to Armenakis and Harris, five key beliefs explain the degree to which an employee will engage in a change (Figure 7.1).¹⁵ Armenakis and Harris identified these beliefs from their work with numerous organizations, through their research on the impact of key beliefs, and through a seminal literature review of organizations that either failed or succeeded in the implementation of major organizational changes. These key beliefs, which could be seen as strategic levers from a management point of view, are *discrepancy*, *appropriateness*, *efficacy*, *principal support*, and *valence*. This section defines each of the levers and discusses the effects they have on members of the organization when facing changes.




Figure 7.1: Change readiness key levers.¹⁶

1. *Discrepancy*. This belief or lever refers to the perceived gap between the current state of the organization and the desired one.¹⁷ Leaders and employees have to believe that change is required for it to be introduced and implemented properly; both parties have to acknowledge the existence of a significant gap between the organization's current state and what it needs to become. The greater the perceived gap between the ideal situation and reality, the more likely employees will engage in the transformation. However, if the gap between the current situation and the desired one is perceived to

be trivial or small, chances are that employees will not support the proposed change, and might perceive it as a whim of the organization's leaders. In such cases, resistance to change can develop.¹⁸

Lauzier, Atangana, and Annabi's systematic literature review lends support to Armenakis and Harris's model.¹⁹ These authors found that employees' perception of a gap between the current state of their organization and where they thought it should be is positively linked to employees' acceptance of changes proposed by the organization's leaders.²⁰ Moreover, employees tended to be more involved in the transformation process when they perceived it to be fair. It seems that when the discrepancy was fostered among employees facing an organizational change, they tended to more easily accept the reasons for change, they perceived a higher level of procedural justice (i.e., employees believed that procedures are designed to collect accurate information necessary for making decisions), and they were more likely to get involved in the organizational transformation at the implementation stage.

In the CAF, the strategic-development process is the key process used to evaluate the discrepancy between the real and the desired state.²¹ In fact, the aim of this recurring process (a five-year cycle) is to assess the organization's effectiveness in a variety of areas. It also leads to the identification of the organization's strengths and weaknesses, i.e., where the CAF needs to improve. The strategic-development process involves four major activities, which contain the conduct of external and internal analyses, the formulation of a strategic vision and plan, the implementation of the change, and the control, evaluation or reassessment of the newly implemented strategy that are applicable to significant elements and component systems of the CAF.²² The crucial measure of the strategic-development process is the internal and external analyses, which attempt to position the organization to effectively carry out its mandate as expected by Canadians. This phase provides a picture of the CAF at a specific point in time and identifies its strength and weaknesses from an internal and external point of view in order to better plan the future necessary changes.²³ At this point, senior leaders are in a better position to develop a vision that will need to be endorsed by subordinates to improve the organization's effectiveness.²⁴

2. *Appropriateness.* This lever can be defined as the adequacy of the proposed solution to the problem.²⁵ Organization members need to believe that the proposed transformation is the right solution under the circumstances. In order to satisfy "appropriateness," leaders must ensure that those who will be impacted by the change have relevant information. First, leaders must provide members with information that demonstrates the discrepancy between

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the current situation and the desired situation; second, leaders must demonstrate the suitability of the proposed change; and, third, they must demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed solution (or procedure). Demonstrating the positive effects of a transformation on the organization's operations and performance will contribute to employees' responsiveness to change.²⁶

In their review, Lauzier, Atangana, and Annabi²⁷ found that when employees perceived the proposed transformation to be an appropriate response to the discrepancy and agreed that the transformation would benefit the organization and its personnel, employees not only accepted the proposed organizational change, but they also had a positive effect on it.²⁸ In addition, when a solution was perceived by employees to correctly address a discrepancy in their organization, they were less pessimistic toward the change.

Through diverse initiatives such as education and training activities as well as Chief Defence Staff Guidance to Commanding Officers, senior leaders in the CAF are trained to become change enablers and, more precisely, are seen as individuals who come up with solutions to problems identified by the internal or external analyses in the strategic-development process.²⁹ Senior leaders need to fully understand the environment in which they operate to prepare the CAF for the near, mid-, and long-term future, and need to share this information with their subordinates. CAF leadership doctrine, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*,³⁰ addresses change strategy. This includes the need for leaders to formulate an appropriate vision, i.e., a vision that is an adequate reflection of the discrepancy between the current situation and the desired one, as determined by the strategic-development process.³¹ They need to elaborate relevant plans that employees perceive as appropriate to overcoming the organization's identified difficulties or weaknesses and that continue to meet the organization's responsibilities to society and satisfy the expectations of Canadians.³²

Also, as articulated in *Leading the Institution*, once the vision and plans have been established, the next step is to identify and generate the strategic options that will lead to the best way to solve the identified organizational issue(s). Once a consensus has been established between senior leaders concerning the best options, these options can then be tested against comparable scenarios, at a smaller level, to find the most satisfactory path. When the most appropriate solution is found, senior leaders can develop a communication plan to inform members.³³ Finally, demonstrating the relevance of the solution is part of CAF member's duty (one of the four principles of *Duty with Honour*³⁴). Members of the CAF need to pursue their responsibilities to society and satisfy the expectations of Canadians, even in times of change, while

maintaining the health of the profession of arms and the organizational culture. To attain this goal, change solutions must be demonstrably well-suited to the organization.

3. *Efficacy*. This lever refers to employees' beliefs about their resources and abilities to successfully face the proposed change. More precisely, Armenakis and Harris argue that efficacy is related to the belief that employees, either individually or collectively, have what is needed to successfully implement the required transformation.³⁵

Lauzier, Atangana, and Annabi³⁶ found that when a sense of efficacy existed in an organization, i.e., when employees felt they were able to achieve the transformation, they were able to continue doing their jobs even while a change was being implemented. Moreover, these employees showed a greater level of wellness and satisfaction with their work and behaved according to the organization's values. Further, employees who demonstrated strong self-efficacy encountered fewer difficulties associated with the transformation process. This finding suggests that leaders would be well advised to implement organizational change in a way and at a pace that does not reduce their employees' feelings of competence.

Numerous examples can illustrate how the CAF demonstrated its awareness concerning the efficacy lever. For example, the CAF established the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre (CFAWC) in 2005 to identify and consider ideas and future technologies for military applications. CFAWC conducts experiments to test or validate new technologies, policies, and practices. When a trial of a selected option is successful, the positive results are communicated throughout the organization, and other CAF members are invited to implement the suggested change or transformation.

Some say that success breeds success.³⁷ When a member sees colleagues succeeding in using the new technology and improving their effectiveness, this may positively influence others and provide them with some reassurance that they too possess the required skills, abilities, and competencies to apply the required change. Because the CAF, like other public sector organizations, undergoes a significant number of changes, its leaders are well advised to implement organizational change in a way and, ideally, at a pace that supports their employees' perception that they have the competencies to apply the required transformation while continuing to perform their work.³⁸

4. *Principal Support*. This lever can be defined as the certainty among employees that the organization's leaders are fully committed to the success of

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an organizational change.³⁹ In other words, employees are dedicated to the transformation because they feel supported by the leaders of the organization.

Lauzier, Atangana, and Annabi⁴⁰ found that employees demonstrated a higher level of motivation toward their work environment and the proposed change when the organization's leaders demonstrated principal support toward the change process. Employees also had to perceive the fairness of the procedures for implementing the change.⁴¹ When employees believed that senior leaders were fully engaged in the transformation process and were working in the direction the organization needed to go, they became confident that the organization would successfully achieve the change.

Similarly, Rousseau and Tijoriwala found that a high level of confidence in the management team may result in higher levels of approval for a complex organizational transformation.⁴² As a result, they propose that "high trust creates a broad zone of acceptance to the exigencies of complex organizational change."⁴³ Larkin and Larkin also showed that immediate supervisors are the most important influence on employees' acceptance of organizational transformation, because workforce personnel generally turn to their closest management level to understand the reasons for the change.⁴⁴ Thus, the positive influence that comes from a committed co-worker one level above, i.e., the immediate supervisor, can facilitate organizational change because it shows consistency between organizational leaders' words and deeds. However, employees' readiness to change will be negatively impacted if employees perceive insufficient support for organizational change among leaders.⁴⁵

Collerette, Lauzier, and Schneider note that horizontal influence is sometimes needed.⁴⁶ As an example, employees who occupy the same level in the same company can influence other members of the organization to accept or resist a change initiative. At the same time, these unrecognized agents of change, e.g., employees or member at the same level who share their opinions and step out as leaders of the group, can provide a great help to management by sharing the positive aspects of the transformations with their colleagues and subordinates.

In the CAF, leaders at all levels are encouraged to demonstrate awareness of the weight of the principal support lever in the implementation of change. They need to be mindful of their responsibilities concerning the endorsement, reinforcement, and support of the implementation of suggested organizational transformations.⁴⁷ The senior leadership team is committed to the change and leads the way by guiding the transformation. Through the strategic vision and through an effective communication plan distributed as

broadly and deeply in the organization as possible, senior leaders encourage and support attitudinal and behavioural change as well as the alignment of organizational culture in the direction of the required transformation.⁴⁸ Effective networking through key people in the chain of command is encouraged to help gain acceptance of the selected transformation. Objective performance measurement and feedback data from CAF leaders that recognizes successes can encourage members in the implementation of change and reassure them that they do have the capacities to achieve expected change goals. Finally, one must not underestimate the potency of the CAF members' military legal and professional norms in facilitating change, especially when the change is clearly endorsed and reinforced by CAF leaders, since one of the objectives of the Canadian Forces Professional Development System is to ensure that CAF members are capable of and committed to managing change.⁴⁹

5. *Valence*. This lever refers to employees' belief that the organizational transformation will benefit them, whether intrinsically or extrinsically, i.e., "What's in it for me?"⁵⁰ Examples of intrinsic benefits are the increases in flexibility and autonomy in the performance of their jobs (e.g., employees will get more freedom of choice). Extrinsic benefits are generally conceptualized as better working conditions (e.g., a better schedule or a raise) or the perception that employees will gain something (e.g., honour or respect) from their peers once the change has taken place.⁵¹ Finally, the more employees perceive that the change will benefit them, the more likely they will support and adhere to the organizational change.

In their review, Lauzier, Atangana, and Annabi found that when employees perceived an organizational change to be beneficial to them, they generally demonstrated more positive feelings (i.e., affect) toward the proposed change. They showed a higher level of motivation and a higher level of satisfaction toward their work.⁵² Further, employees who better perceived the benefits of the change also seem to experience less frustration or develop less pessimistic feelings regarding the change, and were less likely to leave the organization.

In the CAF, as in other organizations, clarification concerning how transformation will directly benefit members is sometimes lacking. Many changes are well-prepared, well-managed, and suitably implemented; however, many leaders neglect to explain to their subordinates the intrinsic and extrinsic gains for them (personally and professionally) with this change. This omission slows down or reduces the successful implementation of change. As suggested by Armenakis and Harris, when employees clearly understand how they can benefit from the implementation of the proposed change, they tend

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to be more committed toward it, which can ease acceptance and, thus, implementation of the change. For these reasons, good communications by leaders with their subordinates appear to be of crucial importance.⁵³

PRACTICES AND ACTIONS THAT COULD HELP LEADERS TO FOSTER CHANGE READINESS

As shown by Lauzier, Atangana, and Annabi, the five key change levers proposed by Armenakis and Harris have positive effects on employees' attitudes, motivations, and behaviour related to readiness to change.⁵⁴ Good planning on the part of leaders is paramount in easing the change process and achieving positive psychological and behavioural outcomes throughout the organization. Some practices have been identified that seem to ease the process of introducing and implementing a change initiative by helping leaders positively influence the five key beliefs of employee readiness to change.⁵⁵ Several factors have been shown to positively influence employees' readiness to change, including work environment, organizational procedures and policies, and organizational climate.⁵⁶ Management should therefore look carefully at creating a positive work environment, ensuring organizational policies are equitable, and establishing a favourable work environment to prepare the way for transformation.

With respect to discrepancy, constant communications seem paramount. Military leaders could remind employees about the objectives of the change and the observed gap that necessitated the organizational transformation.⁵⁷ It is important to remember, however, that leaders must first establish a trusting relationship between themselves and their employees before presenting the required change and trying to achieve the organizational transformation.⁵⁸ Leaders could also allow their employees to be involved in the decision-making process, provide support to their personnel in mastering the new conditions and procedures, send their employees on training to learn new skills required, deliver regular reports to employees showing the progress that has been achieved in implementing the change (and what is left to do), keep an open mind toward employees' ideas about increasing and easing the transformation process, and develop a mentoring program that allows peer-pairing of junior and senior employees within the organization.

With regard to valence, two determinants might positively impact employees' perception of the benefits they will receive as a result of the organizational change.⁵⁹ First, military leaders could ask employees to participate in the decision-making process concerning change. For instance, leaders could

invite certain members of the organization to be part of a committee responsible for the implementation of the change. By giving employees autonomy and opportunity to share their point of view, leaders may create a perception of importance among subordinates toward their organization. In addition, leaders could also provide employees with clear information about the way in which the changes will affect their work and the organization as a whole.⁶⁰ When employees obtain clear information about the transformation, they feel more competent and more equipped to face the change within the organization.⁶¹ Military leaders could also act as role models by adopting the suggested behaviours. This could be done by providing training on how they can influence employees' readiness to change, and how they can positively impact and motivate their personnel to participate in and implement the transformation process.⁶²

LIMITATION OF THE CHANGE READINESS MODEL

Notwithstanding the novelty and the advantages of the model that Armenakis and Harris present, it must be recognized that the change readiness model discussed in this chapter has certain limits. The principal limitation of the model is the assumption that employees who receive information showing the benefit of a change for them will look at the proposed change favourably and be motivated to participate in it.⁶³ This assumption overlooks the fact that individuals generally express complex patterns of needs and that they prioritize these needs in accordance with their personal values. If an organizational change runs counter to some individual's prioritization of values, the individual may not be motivated to support the transformation, even though the transformation can be shown to benefit them.

Secondly, the change readiness model posits that employee involvement should be enough to keep a high level of motivation toward the transformation at stake, regardless of the nature of the proposed change.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, it should be recognized that most organizational transformations are strategic in nature and require complex competencies that go well beyond the reach of certain employees, i.e., beyond the competencies required for their work. As a result, these personnel cannot be involved in the transformation process beyond applying the change requested by their leaders. Finally, the model suggests that military leaders who use the five key levers in their message to motivate their subordinates toward the change process will have a positive impact on all personnel facing the transformation.⁶⁵ In the real world, however, it is hard for leaders to personalize the message for all

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employees, given the variety of positions and the hierarchical structure of most organizations. This is even more applicable in a diverse organization like the CAF. Hence, the context in which the transformation takes place will have an important influence on how leaders can foster change readiness.

CONCLUSION

Although it is not always possible for an organization to perfectly apply each of the levers of the change readiness model, it is possible for military leaders to provide support to their subordinates in order to help them master new skills and, hopefully help them better face the transformations at stake. Given the many changes that military organizations have undergone in the recent years and the new ones to come, it is apparent that the levers presented in this chapter could be useful in helping military leaders attain organizational priorities. The model reveals that those levers have an effect on the way organization members apprehend (or react to) change and can represent points of leverage when the time comes for military leaders to lead change initiatives. Notably, examining previous studies' results, insights were provided concerning the kinds of actions military leaders put forward in order to foster a change readiness attitude with members of their organization. As observed by many, however, further research is required to enhance our understanding and knowledge of the conditions under which the change readiness model produces its best effect.

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CHAPTER 8

OPERATING IN THE AGE OF 24/7 MEDIA COVERAGE: CHALLENGES FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS

*Brian Agnew**

INTRODUCTION

Despite being in the Information Age for decades, most operations by defence forces consider dealing with the media as a supporting component. Information is released mainly in reaction to an event or enquiry from the media. It is rare for an operation to integrate engagement with the public, and with national and international media, as an indispensable element of the campaign. An exception was the 2014 search for missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370, in which communicating with the media was an integral part of the operation. The Australian Defence Force supported a national task to locate the missing Malaysian Airlines aircraft that disappeared in March 2014. The operation was conducted under intense media scrutiny as the story captured the world's attention. This propelled the strategic communications and public affairs component to become a central effort of the operation.

While a non-combat operation, the Malaysia Airlines aircraft search involved an integrated military-civilian response to a government tasking. The operation indicated how strategic leadership and future operations could reasonably be conducted when under high levels of media scrutiny. A particular feature of this operation was the adoption of social media tools to support the mission.

SEARCH RESPONSE

At a time when there is more travel by air than ever before, the disappearance of an aircraft without trace is a tragedy that is certain to generate intense

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Australian Defence Force or the Australian Department of Defence.

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media coverage worldwide.¹ Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 disappeared on 8 March 2014 with 239 passengers and crew on board. The aircraft was carrying 15 different nationalities, from Malaysia to China. Initial official responses lacked credible information; a mystery surrounding a change in flight direction, and conspiracy theories all contributed to the incident becoming the most discussed news story of 2014.²

The transmission of information followed three phases. The first covered the initial loss of the aircraft announced by Malaysian Airlines Systems and the Malaysian Government. They reported that contact was lost with flight MH370 at 0120 on 8 March 2014.³ The last known location of the flight as it disappeared off the radar was provided. In the next phase, the Malaysian Prime Minister provided likely crash corridors, either over Central Asia or in the Indian Ocean. But by 24 March, in the third phase, the Malaysian Prime Minister admitted that the plane had likely been lost in the Southern Indian Ocean.⁴ These differing announcements resulted in responses and search assets being dispatched to separate areas.

The initial search, which was credibly co-ordinated by Vietnam, proved futile as it was based on faulty information. China, having lost 154 of its nationals, reportedly deployed 10 ships and 10 airplanes, and dispatched about 10 satellites to support this fruitless search.⁵ Australia, with six passengers lost, sent two AP-3 Orion aircraft to search west of Malaysia, and then the Indian Ocean, north and west of the Cocos Islands.⁶

By 17 March, the search had switched to the Southern Indian Ocean, which was under Australia's search jurisdiction. Four Orion AP-3 maritime surveillance aircraft commenced operations over an estimated 600,000 square kilometre search area. Eventually, eight nations joined the search and Australia established a Joint Agency Coordination Centre to "coordinate the Australian Government's support for the search into missing flight MH370."⁷ The eight countries provided a total of 22 aircraft and 19 ships to cover a search area of 4.6 million square kilometres in the six weeks from 17 March to 28 April. With nothing found, the search still continues focusing on the sea floor for the final resting place of flight MH370.

MEDIA COVERAGE

The loss of MH370 quickly became the top news story worldwide. The main media organizations releasing news stories were CNN, Reuters and China's CCTV.⁸ For CNN, this story doubled its ratings and placed its evening news as the most watched program for three days in a row, dislodging Fox News as

the lead for the first time. The missing aircraft remained a top 20 news story in the United Kingdom for the first three weeks of the search. Social media sites were also inundated. For example, in the first few days there were 1.1 million tweets on MH370, rising to four million in the first two weeks. On the BBC's online site, 17 of the 20 most popular articles related to the search, making the issue the most read news story since the 2011 Japanese tsunami.⁹

The near total saturation by the media was fed by the seemingly unsolvable mystery the missing plane created. In the United States, the 24/7 coverage was fuelled by a battle for ratings. In China, similar coverage was reportedly due partly to pride in this being the first time China had joined a multinational military search and rescue in foreign waters.¹⁰ The missing flight generated 102,000 news articles and over 300 million unique posts across Facebook and Twitter. Only the FIFA World Cup in Brazil generated a greater coverage.¹¹

ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Initially, Australian support was provided directly by the agencies involved. This continued for three weeks before a Joint Agency Coordination Centre was established by the Prime Minister on 30 March 2014. The Centre was led by Air Chief Marshal (Retired) Sir Angus Houston, a former Chief of the Defence Force and an eminent Australian held in high regard by the public. The Centre became the coordination point for whole-of-Australian Government information, messaging and stakeholder engagement.¹² A significant planning factor in creating the Centre was the concern held by the Australian Government to ensure care and appropriate access were provided to the relatives once the search was complete.

In addition to the foreign aircraft and ships supporting the search in the Southern Indian Ocean, the Joint Agency Coordination Centre also oversaw Australian assets. These included assets provided by Defence through Joint Task Force 658, and those of two Department of Infrastructure agencies: the Australian Maritime Safety Authority for search and rescue and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau for air crash investigation.

As the search off Perth continued, the media contingent grew to about 80 to 100 people outside of Royal Australian Air Force Base Pearce, where the aircraft were based. This was the largest media group that Australia had seen in recent times. The media generated approximately 50 inquiries per hour. Eventually, media contacts grew to over 400 and there were 40 000 downloads on YouTube for media conferences and for video news stories. The use of Twitter enabled the large-scale distribution of operational information.

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For example, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority Twitter account expanded from 1,800 to 18,000 followers.¹³

SOCIAL MEDIA

This operation illustrated the shift to drawing news coverage from social media as compared to relying on more traditional media such as newspapers and television. Traditional media methods, as provided by media conferences and media releases, still continued to feature prominently. But, notably, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority in particular managed to supply timely information using Twitter throughout the daily media cycle. Tweets relieved the pressure from a media hungry for stories.

Although a relatively small agency, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority displayed agility and responded admirably when confronted with the pressure of the world's media. The three-person media team supported a routine of a twice-daily media briefings, at the beginning of the day to respond to media inquiries mainly for radio and television, and then in the evening for newspapers. Social media was used to augment this and to respond to near constant 24-hour per day demands for information. While some media releases were used, up to 13 tweets daily provided Twitter followers with the detailed storyline of operations. Search aircraft arrivals and possible sightings were notified through tweets. Media conferences were also recorded onto YouTube. For example, the media conference that discussed two possible sightings on 20 March had 49,021 downloads on YouTube.¹⁴

This model of adopting social media to enable a steady flow of information to an unlimited number of outlets, in conjunction with more detailed messaging being delivered through media releases and conferences, was largely maintained during the entire search. The advent of social media has compressed the normal crisis response cycle. Issues flare, are quickly addressed, and then are supplanted by other issues. Australian strategic leaders displayed agility and acute political awareness by adapting quickly to this mechanism. In an era of democratized information, social media platforms can respond by easily transferring information in a timely manner. High quality information can be uploaded quickly to capture attention and direct the media and public to fresh information.

STATUS OF SOCIAL MEDIA

The new media technology is rapidly replacing news sources for younger generations. This epic transformation of the media has been underway for the last fifteen years, with smart mobile phones accelerating this trend. News is available online and more Americans cite the internet as a main source for national and international news (50%) than from newspapers and radio, but still below television (69%). For the younger generations, the change has already occurred, with 71% recording the internet as a main news source. Social networking sites such as Facebook have also grown as a source for news (34% for 18-24 year olds).¹⁵

One of the reviews, conducted by the Australian Department of Defence in the *Pathway to Change* cultural program, examined social media. This review observed that there is no single recognized definition of social media, but for most, the “well-known network sites such as Facebook and Twitter typify social media.”¹⁶ The review briefly studied the cultural challenge provided by social media as it involves communication as well as providing a vehicle to discuss “ideas, basic assumptions, values and beliefs held by a society.”¹⁷ This cultural and social dimension of social media, where issues are debated, examined and critiqued, should not deter agencies from providing information as an initial source of discussion. Any follow-on debate is a reflection of the society from which the defence forces are formed. The manner in which information is made available adds to the credibility of the organization.

Building trust and confidence in the information supplied is no different than that garnered through traditional forms. For the Australian Defence Force, disciplined by the findings of the various inquiries into the 2001 “Children Overboard” affair, a centralized process to clear information prior to release is ingrained. Policy frames the circumstances available to commanders to engage with the media. This policy could easily be expanded to encompass social media. A separate policy to address social media is superfluous. Many Australian Defence Force units and ships currently operate Facebook sites that professionally reflect their day-to-day activities. Judgment is appropriately applied to security and sensitive matters. This emerging practice needs to be sanctioned within a broader framework for media engagement. The Vice Chief of the Defence Force has become an avid user of Twitter. He generated considerable media debate on Navy issues when he was Chief of the Navy. Encouraging wider use of social media within the defence forces is needed.

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The use of social media during the operation to search for MH370 to extend the reach of communications and to deliver immediacy was a largely unintended and unforeseen activity. However, the positive results have been replicated on a subsequent operation. During the Australian Defence Force humanitarian assistance mission to Vanuatu in April 2015, audience reach from online news was 40 million from 300 articles versus 25 million from 1,500 articles on television.¹⁸ The relative ease in delivering an online message is startlingly rewarded by the massive coverage available through this medium when compared to traditional media.

The British Army initially responded to this media transformation through an organizational solution. In September 2014, the disparate elements of media operations, psychological operations, security capacity building and military stabilization support have been swept up into a new brigade-sized entity called the Security Assistance Group. The Group is to deliver integrated effects “from persistent engagement, future media, commercial, stabilisation, cyber and financial” domains.¹⁹ As with all innovations, the path ahead is never completely clear. But what is clear is that, to be more effective in communicating across generations and to both internal and external audiences, strategic leaders need to engage and develop experience in this new media environment. Many of the techniques are not new, but the tools are.

CONCLUSION

Operating in a busy media environment is the norm for defence forces. Using social media tools such as Facebook and Twitter offers greater reach and timeliness. The practices adopted when using traditional media can be easily transferred to using new media. These include using specialist communicators, developing clear policy frameworks, ensuring oversight and direction by strategic leaders, monitoring and having the confidence that trained operators can deliver within the endorsed boundaries. Protecting democracy also includes encouraging open access to accurate and timely information.

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CHAPTER 9

CROSS-GENERATIONAL LEADERSHIP: CHALLENGES IN LEADING THE INDONESIAN ARMY AS A MODERN ORGANIZATION

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INTRODUCTION

During the last two decades, militaries all over the world have transformed into modern organizations, including the Indonesian National Army (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat*). This transformation is interpreted to be a feature of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). In addition to procuring sophisticated weapon systems and armaments, modern armies are also making progressive development in other essential sectors. This includes building capacity through efficient and effective human capital management. Human resources are considered as one of the most important factors in RMA. As a consequence, the criteria for soldiers, NCOs, and officers who serve with the Indonesian military have also changed over time, which has been reflected in numerous revisions of recruitment standards.

In the past, intellectual capability was not seen as a top priority for recruiting new military personnel, especially at the soldier level. Instead, loyalty and physical fitness were set above other priorities. Today, most of the tests for selecting new recruits incorporate more weight for intelligence in the overall process. With the procurement of modern weaponry, technological advancement means smarter soldiers are needed to man weapon systems. These adjustments to the selection process eventually changed the standards of military personnel, producing a different generation of recruits within the institution.

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Indonesian National Defence Force.

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Although there have been numerous modifications of recruitment criteria, many military organizations, including the Indonesian Army, still apply the same standard in dealing with the issue of “cross-generational leadership.” Military organizations have not yet considered incorporating generational differences into the leadership context. Dwyer defines four groups in the generational divide, which he identifies as “veterans” or “traditionalists,” “Baby Boomers,” “Gen X,” and “Gen Y,” also known as “Millennials.”¹ Differences between these generations can affect the working environment, and can even create conflict between the generations in the same organization. Therefore, this reality is critical in how leadership in a modern Army organization should deal with cross-generational issues. Each generation has a different character that may need special attention.

The new environment has also been shaped by the rapid rise of the internet. This has influenced the characteristics of new recruits. More young people who joined the Indonesian Army in the last decade were born in a period where the spread of information and ideas through information and communication technologies (ICT) was quicker and better than in the past. In fact, a World Bank report in 2006 indicated that youth accounted for 70% of all internet users aged 15 and older in Indonesia.² Thus, the new recruits who have joined the Indonesian Army are more familiar with the internet and have incorporated the latest developments of ICTs into their lifestyle.

Within the last decade, text-messaging services have been introduced widely. Indirect communication has dominated interactions between personnel, even between superiors and subordinates. This growing use of social media has created another challenge. The younger generations are familiar with this new kind of communication, but the older generations are not necessarily as familiar. Without any evaluation of the urgency of accommodating cross-generational leadership issues, the institution may have to deal with internal conflict that may impede it from moving toward a better operational posture.

At the Battalion level, this phenomenon has become an important issue. There are two dominating generations found in most Battalions in the Indonesian Army: Gen X and Gen Y. Current battalion commanders are typically identified as Gen Xers, and they are the ones who must better comprehend the issue of how to exercise effective and efficient cross-generational leadership. Meanwhile, company commanders, staff officers, platoon commanders and squad leaders are mostly acknowledged as Gen Yers. In order to organize and lead the unit in a better way, the battalion commander needs to know about the characteristics of the newer generations who are their direct subordinates in the unit.

In order to have a better perspective on cross-generational leadership issues, this chapter examines the relations between different generational cohorts in the leadership of the Indonesian Army at the battalion level. Lessons learned from this case study may be used for further development of modern leadership principles or doctrines that may be adopted by other units in the Indonesian Army, or by military units in other countries facing similar challenges. It is hoped that this chapter will inspire further research on cross-generational leadership issues within the military.

MANAGING HUMAN CAPITAL

RMA has become a leading trend within the last few decades. The concept was first introduced by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, who was a Soviet Chief of Staff. Ogarkov termed the concept as “military technical revolution,” which was intended to improve both the lethality and capabilities of conventional weapons.³ This initiative was developed to deal with the strategic environment of the Cold War era, when the Soviet Union was still in a close rivalry with the United States.

The RMA initiative was later developed more comprehensively in the United States. In 1991, the United States military used the First Gulf War to showcase its remarkable progress in RMA. The war was even viewed as a demonstration of new weaponry and military equipment to other nations.⁴ Since then, many militaries have decided to follow the successful United States military initiative. In fact, high technology weaponry, high precision munitions, integrated command and control systems, as well as communications and various other sophisticated military equipment, have dominated recent improvements. According to Teodor Frunzetti, there are three factors that drive the RMA. He identifies them as the dynamics of the strategic environment, the technological processes, and the increasing complexity of both conflict and military actions.⁵ However, dealing with these factors alone will not guarantee the transition to a modern organization. Human capital management should also be incorporated into the RMA agenda.

Bontis argues that human capital represents not only the human factor in the organization, but also the combined intelligence, skills, as well as proficiency that give the organization its distinct character.⁶ He proposes that the human element of the organization should have the capability for learning, changing, innovating and providing the creative thrust, which may help ensure the survival of the organization in the long run. Thus, effective and efficient human capital management assists in managing the competent and capable

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personnel who are required to man modern weapon systems and other modern military equipment.

Apart from applying appropriate human capital management, military organizations have to implement effective leadership at all levels. Most modern armies combine both transactional and transformational leadership.⁷ Certainly, different leadership styles are required in diverse situations, missions, and organizations. In fact, to succeed in the present contemporary operating environment as a leader of a small unit or even as a more senior officer, it is important to be able to adapt leadership styles. Typically, when referring to core competencies in leadership, a leader in a modern army organization is expected to be able to lead, develop, and achieve.⁸ “Lead” means that an army leader is able to lead others, lead by example, extend influence beyond the chain of command, and communicate. “Develop” refers to the ability to create a positive environment, prepare oneself and, of course, develop others. “Achieve” is interpreted as an ability to get results. A modern army leader must be able to apply these competencies to the different generations among his or her subordinates.

To deal with generational differences within the organization, army leaders should be able to communicate with diverse groups of subordinates. This means that leaders should understand how each generation differs. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find any educational and training curriculum which touches upon cross-generational leadership in any military. In most references, the materials taught focus on the implementation of leadership in general without accommodating cross-generational issues. Therefore, it is essential to start including cross-generational leadership as part of the syllabus delivered to army leaders. Without sufficient understanding in exercising cross-generational leadership, it will be hard for any army to transform into a modern organization.

THE CHANGING OPERATIONAL LANDSCAPE: NEW CHALLENGES

In recent decades, there have been numerous changes in security and defence dynamics. The fall of the Berlin Wall in the late 1980s preceded the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and this event marked the end of the Cold War era.⁹ Since then, the United States has played a dominant role in the global arena. The Al-Qaeda attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 shocked the world.¹⁰ The United States, which had become a sole superpower after the end of the Cold War, could not take any counter measure to deal

with the threat. This attack signified the emergence of asymmetric warfare, involving non-state actors.

The presence of non-state actors in war-like operations marked the development of a new type of war, known as the Fifth Generation War. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Stanton S. Coerr, an officer from the United States Marine Corps, Fifth Generation War is viewed as a war against non-state actors.¹¹ Since non-state actors have no official boundaries, they are free to move across countries. This condition provides them with some operational advantages. With more flexibility, non-state actors have the initiative in taking action, which makes their actions more difficult to predict. This situation creates a more complex dynamic globally, especially in the Southeast Asia region. A current example, which is also a global phenomenon, is the development of the transnational extremist group the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Approximately 514 Indonesian ISIS supporters are known to have left for Syria and Iraq.¹² In addition, 16 Indonesian tourists have travelled to Turkey and disappeared with the intention of joining ISIS in Syria.

Technological processes, which were identified as the second factor of RMA, will play an important role in dealing with these challenges.¹³ Technological advancement may help the Indonesian Army to perform its duties in safeguarding its borders with neighboring countries and dealing with transnational issues. For example, the use of drones and other modern equipment will be pivotal in driving the success of its performance, as drones can assist in monitoring and observing the borders. Additionally, integrated command and control systems may also help coordinate and synchronize joint efforts between units that operate in the surrounding areas. However, to manage these modern technological developments, the Indonesian Army needs to recruit personnel who are familiar with high technologies or at least recruit those who have the ability to learn and adapt to these technologies. Consequently, the soldier's understanding of technology is critical. With different generations among its members, the Indonesian Army needs to ensure that all generations can master these technologies.

THE NATURE OF CROSS-GENERATIONAL LEADERSHIP: PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND IMPLICATIONS

The multi-generational workplace is a reality of today's organizations. Currently, social scientists have emphasized that workforce diversity not only means cultural diversity, but also generational differences. This is happening

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in military organizations all over the world, including within the Indonesian Army. The current workforce consists of several generations in one organization. Kopperschmidt defines a generation as “a group of people or cohort who share birth years and experiences as they move through time together.”¹⁴ Each generation is imprinted by the collective experiences of its youth and tends to share common views, values, and attitudes.¹⁵ In turn, the shared experiences and the environment can have an impact on the process of socialization in a way that influences the development of various characteristics of the members of each generation, such as personalities, values, beliefs and expectations.¹⁶ Consequently, historical events can create powerful emotional memories that impact upon the perceptions and feelings about authority, institutions, and family.¹⁷ Thus, generations are influenced by various socio-cultural shifts, which could include wars and their results, new technologies that can significantly alter work and life-styles, plus political, social and economic transitions.¹⁸

To better understand the cross-generational workforce within an organization, Hornbostel, Kumar, and Smith suggested that it would be more appropriate to refer to the different characteristics of two different concepts: “Life-stage” and “Generation.”¹⁹ The “Life-stage” characteristics refers to similar behaviours that one likely shares during one’s life span development, no matter when the birth year is, while “Generation” refers to similar behaviours that one shares due to the impact of sociocultural-technological changes on one’s life style during a certain period. Based on this understanding, Hornbostel and colleagues classified four generations that exist in our society, although only the last three can still be found actively working at the current workplace. Hornbostel and colleagues define the four different generations as follows:²⁰

Veterans (or Traditionalists or Matures; people born approximately between 1922 and 1943). The Veterans were children of the Great Depression and World War II. They lived through the Korean War and are recognized for their strong traditional views related to religion, family, and country. Their core values include respect for authority, loyalty, hard work, and dedication.

Baby Boomers (people born between 1943 and 1960). The Baby Boomers did not experience the same difficulties as their parents. They grew up during a time of great economic growth and prosperity. Their lives were influenced by the civil rights movement, women’s liberation, the space program, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War. They put high value on youth, health, personal gratification, and material wealth.

Baby Boomers are optimistic and believe their generation changed the world.

Generation X (people born between 1960 and 1980). Gen Xers sometimes are referred to as the misunderstood generation. They are the product of self-centred, work-driven Baby Boomer parents. Watergate, the advent of MTV, single-parent homes, and latchkey experiences played influential roles in their development. They were the first generation to embrace the personal computer and the internet. They welcome diversity, are motivated by money, believe in balance in their lives, are self-reliant, and value free time and having fun.

Generation Y (or Millennials, Nexters, Generation Next; people born between 1980 and 2000). Gen Yers have no recollection of the Cold War, and have known only one Germany. Their world has always had AIDS, answering machines, microwave ovens, and videocassette recorders. Gen Y tends to be well-organized, confident, and resilient and achievement oriented. They are excellent team players, like collaboration and use sophisticated technology with ease.

Unfortunately, there are limited resources in exploring cross-generational leadership issues, especially in the military context. In observing the present condition in the Indonesian Army, it is important to identify the most dominant generation groups within the leadership of the organization. The populations of Gen X and Gen Y are commonly found in any active army unit, in particular at the battalion level. Murray has identified the differences between Gen X and Gen Y in response to emerging technologies. Gen Y was found to be more familiar with new technologies compared to Gen X. Technology utilization has become an important issue since technology has developed significantly within the last few years. In fact, familiarity with technology can also be expected to create tension between the two generations.²¹

The Indonesian Army has been known as an organization that is very loyal to its history and traditions. The Indonesian Army was born during Indonesia's War of Independence, which took place between Indonesia's declaration of independence on 17 August 1945 and the transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia from the Netherlands on 27 December 1949. The War of Independence involved bloody armed conflicts between the newly formed Indonesian Defence Force and the more technologically advanced Dutch forces. It was during this period that the so-called "1945 values" were established and formed the core identity of the Indonesian Army.²² These values are passed down from past generations of officers to the current generations

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and all army leaders, from the top commanders down to the squad leaders, are expected to base their leadership styles on these values. In fact, the Indonesian Army has what it calls the 11 principles of leadership, in which three of the principles require army leaders to interact closely with their subordinates. For example, principle number two demands army leaders to lead from the front by providing the right example, principle number three asks army leaders to be in the middle building motivation and volition, and principle number four states that an army leader must be willing to encourage initiative from behind.²³

SURVEY OF THE USE OF MODERN COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES BY DIFFERENT GENERATIONS IN THE INDONESIAN ARMY

Considering that modern communication technologies have created leaders who are more comfortable in communicating indirectly with their subordinates through modern communication devices, a survey was recently conducted at one of the Airborne Infantry Battalion of the Strategic Reserve Command of the Indonesian Army. The purpose of the survey was to identify the impact of technologies on the style of interaction between leaders and their subordinates. As an elite unit, the airborne Battalion has the priority to recruit personnel. The priority includes not only superior physical fitness but also intellectual capabilities. However, cross-generational issues have not been adequately discussed in any of the airborne units, or in fact anywhere in the Army.

The survey explored the question of how the leaders in the unit use modern communication modes when they interact with their subordinates. Using a purposive sampling method, 64 personnel who currently hold leadership positions in the battalion were requested to participate in the survey. These personnel represented the two dominant groups in the unit, Gen X and Gen Y. Each group consisted of 32 members, with both officers and NCOs (sergeants).


SURVEY RESULTS

Figure 9.1: How often do you give instruction to your subordinates by using indirect communication methods (SMS, Blackberry, Whatsapp, Telegram, internet chatting or similar means)?

As can be seen from Figure 9.1, when being asked how frequently they use modern communication options in giving instruction to their subordinates, the responses between the two groups were different. In the Gen X group, the majority of the group indicated that they seldom utilized this option, while only two respondents indicated that they used this option frequently or actively in giving instruction to subordinates. In contrast, the Gen Y group, answered differently: 11 personnel (34.4%) identified themselves as frequent users and eight of them (25.0%) stated that they sometimes used them in giving instruction.




Figure 9.2: How often do you check your subordinates’ condition by using indirect communication method (SMS, Blackberry, Whatsapp, Telegram, internet chatting or similar means)?

The responses to how frequently the leaders use modern communication modes for checking their subordinates’ condition showed a slightly different pattern. In the Gen X group, half the leaders answered that they seldom utilized the option, while nine (28.1%) were frequent users and another claimed that he is an active user. On the other hand, 14 leaders (43.8%) from the Gen Y group stated that they frequently chose the option in checking their subordinates, and eight personel (25.0%) said that sometimes they favoured the option. The results showed that majority (71.9%) of the Gen Y group consisted of leaders that used the modern communication option to monitor their subordinates.




Figure 9.3: How often do your subordinates report to you by using indirect communication method (SMS, Blackberry, Whatsapp, Telegram, internet chatting or similar means)?

The results for the question of how frequently leaders use modern communication options for receiving reports from their subordinates showed a similar pattern to the question about giving instruction. The majority of the Gen X group seldom used the option of indirect communication through modern communication modes. Again, the majority of the Gen Y group have subordinates who chose the modern option (76.7%).

SURVEY DISCUSSION

Analyzing the responses from the two generational groups, it can be concluded that Gen Y leaders use more modern approaches in interacting with their subordinates. At least two-thirds of the respondents in the Gen Y group have confirmed that they sometimes or frequently use the option in either giving instruction, checking their subordinates, or receiving reports. In contrast, leaders who seldom used the modern communication options to do similar things tend to dominate the Gen X group. Consequently, the survey indicated that most of the Gen X leaders tend not to use the modern communication option and presumably, this communication style influenced their subordinates as well. On the other hand, most of the Gen Y leaders are conversant with the option and apparently their subordinates are responding in kind.

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The results of the survey can lead to another conclusion. Most of the modern communication options mentioned in the survey are classified as indirect means of communication. Based on the survey, it is fair to state that the Gen Y leaders are conversant with indirect communication means, while the Gen X leaders chose to avoid indirect communication means. This may indicate that the Gen X leaders in the unit favour face-to-face interaction. While indirect communication certainly can be used as a tool in leadership, this option has limitations as well.²⁴ Since there is minimal direct contact, leaders may not be able to observe the actual conditions on the ground. While they can rely on this mode if they have already established close relationships with their subordinates, reports or interactions through indirect communication can be faked. Hence, the Gen Y leaders' preference in using indirect communication option in the unit may pose a challenge to effective leadership in a modern army units.

The Gen X leaders who favour direct interaction will have limitations by not accessing modern communication options. A modern organization in which the majority of leaders cannot utilize these communication options will be at a disadvantage. As an airborne unit, which can be deployed anywhere and at anytime, speed and accuracy of reporting and communication are important. Connections between leaders at both higher and lower levels that can be managed through sophisticated communication devices are vital, and without sufficient understanding of the convenience of using modern technologies, operations may be vulnerable. Thus, leaders in an airborne unit are required to master technologies even though their previous exposure may have been limited. Sophisticated and new military equipments in the future will undoubtedly adopt high end technology not too dissimilar with the newer versions of mobile phones and other computer devices. If current army leaders at the battalion level are not comfortable in utilizing modern technology like mobile phones and the internet, surely it will be even more difficult for them to adapt to the latest battlefield developments which may arrive sooner than later.

The result of the survey confirms a similar research finding by Avolio, Kahai and Dodge, who examined how advanced information technology influences and is being influenced by leadership.²⁵ They concluded that the outcomes of leadership styles mediated through technology can be different from the outcomes in a face-to-face context employing the same leadership styles. Consequently leadership styles may need to be changed or simply will change through the use of electronic media, and this is a part of an emerging phenomena known as e-leadership, which is defined as social influence processes

mediated by advanced information technology to produce a change in attitudes, emotions, thinking, behaviour, and/or performance within individuals, groups, and/or organizations. Short Message Service, Blackberry Messenger, Whatsapp, Telegram or internet chatting usage investigated on this survey are examples of features or applications related to handheld communication gadgets. In fact, more people are conducting distance communication through the internet, video conferences, chat rooms, desktop netmeetings, and groupware systems. Avolio and Kahai found that rapid advances in technology systems are clearly ahead of the impact on the social systems within various organizations, including the military.²⁶

CHALLENGES FOR BATTALION COMMANDERS

With a mixture of Gen X and Gen Y leaders in the unit, and future “Gen Z” (born after 2000) soldiers, battalion commanders who are predominantly from the Gen X cohort, need to develop themselves so that they can lead these groups more effectively.²⁷ If the issue is not properly handled, it may create tension between the different groups of generations.²⁸ The challenge for a battalion commander is how to develop cross-generational leadership styles and capabilities. Consequently, cross-generational leadership should be embraced in the leadership development curriculum, in particular at the initial session. Cross-generational issues should be taught as a foundation prior to learning about leadership concepts. In the Indonesian Army context, or in fact other armies which possess similar leadership doctrine, the survey results are relevant when a specific leadership doctrine requires that its leaders engage their subordinates in a face to face manner. The challenge is in how to adapt the leadership doctrine that has been a permanent fixture of established organizational culture to the current reality, in which technology has changed the lifestyle of an entire generation.

In relation to e-leadership implemented at the battalion level, team members are likely to communicate with each other via advance information technology, enabling asynchronous, synchronous, one-to-one, or one-to-many communication. Consequently, leaders are expected to display “tele” or “e-leadership” when they communicate with other members of a virtual team over electronic media. Therefore, rather than resting on a single individual, leadership is now being “shared” by team members, creating the opportunity for virtual collective leadership or shared leadership to emerge.²⁹ This is basically a recent conceptualization of leadership that explicitly emphasizes lateral influence among peers, in addition to upward and downward influences.³⁰ The behavioural focus of leadership development should then be expanded

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to include the development of directive and empowering leadership, rather than focusing solely on transactional and transformational leadership.³¹ This is due to the fact that shared leadership is very much related to the ability to empower others.³²

Finally, this research illustrates that by referring to past successes, organizational culture can hold an organization hostage to its past.³³ And this is especially the case for an organization steeped in history and tradition like the military.³⁴ Therefore, despite the existing limitations, leadership doctrine should be adaptive to current changes in technological development and its impact on lifestyle. Otherwise, doctrine itself will risk becoming invalid or obsolete. Hence, consistent updating and changes are essential to keep the standard of the military organization so that it can deal with evolving trends and the dynamic nature of current and future operational environments.

CONCLUSION

The Indonesian Army has traditionally been an organization which upheld values from the generation of soldiers who fought the nation's War of Independence. These values formed the backbone of the Army's leadership doctrine, and have been handed down from one generation of soldiers to the next. Yet current changes in the strategic environment mean the Army must transform itself in order to face technological changes, which in turn will produce societal changes. Propelled by the need to acquire modern weaponry as part of its RMA, the Army must also recruit new generations of soldiers who are more comfortable with modern communication technology.

It is clear that dissimilarities between generations may possibly impact how military leaders exercise their leadership. In fact, future generations are likely to possess characteristics that are different from previous generations. This trend is likely to pose a continued challenge for the Indonesian Army, which is currently in the process of transforming to a modern military organization. The explorative survey on cross-generational leadership issues in the Airborne Infantry Battalion provides invaluable lessons learned for revising the existing leadership curriculum in the Indonesian Army, and these lessons are applicable in other military organizations.

The survey at a battalion level showed that there is a generational divide between army leaders who are part of the Gen X cohort, who tend to use less modern communication devices, and with Gen Y leaders and their subordinates who are "digital natives." Considering that the leadership styles of

both generations have strengths and weaknesses, it is clear that both groups must be willing to adapt to each other in order to be able to work effectively as a team. Gen X leaders should have more training on using the modern communication option. On the other hand, the Gen Y leaders who are more comfortable with indirect communication when interacting with their subordinates should be encouraged to use more old fashioned direct contact between them and their subordinates to facilitate the effectiveness of their leadership efforts. Each generation should be trained and coached on how best to deal with their strengths and weaknesses, and how to lead the different generations effectively. It is imperative that battalion-level commanders have the capacity to lead in a cross-generational manner and get the proper training and coaching in this area.

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CHAPTER 10

THE DYNAMICS OF RULES, LEARNING, AND ADAPTIVE LEADERSHIP: INSPIRATIONS AND INSIGHTS FROM THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

*Jerry Guo and Mie Augier, PhD**

There is no military body in our country of higher efficiency than the Marine Corps. They take great pride in their profession. They never let things slack a bit.

Rear Admiral John A. Wilslow, USN

Every Marine is, first and foremost, a rifleman. All other conditions are secondary.

General Alfred M. Gray, USMC

The problem with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience (or by your men's experience), i.e. the hard way. By reading, you learn through other's experience.

General James N. Mattis, USMC

The United States Marine Corps, with its fiercely proud tradition of excellence in combat, its hallowed rituals, and its unbending code of honor, is part of the fabric of American myth.

Thomas E. Ricks

INTRODUCTION

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has been an active component of the United States Armed Forces since 1775. Marines have served in every

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Navy or the Department of Defense.

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major conflict the United States has fought, along with dozens of minor conflicts, peacekeeping missions, humanitarian missions, and joint training missions with allied nations. Marines are stationed both afloat and ashore around the world to serve as the United States' rapid reaction force.

The issue of “what makes a Marine a Marine” has been the source of puzzlement for a long time, worked over by practitioners, academics and members of other services. General John J. Pershing of the United States Army is said to have noted, “Why in the hell can't the Army do it if the Marines can? They are the same kind of men; why can't they be like the Marines?” alluding to the special quality of Marines, as well as their organization, that makes them – seemingly – more agile, able to fight hard as well as think hard, and adaptable to rapidly changing environments.

A larger study of the USMC as an organization, the individuals in it, and what makes them particularly adaptive, would involve a large number of issues, including things such as:

What is the particular organizational culture and supporting educational and institutional structures supporting the culture that tolerates, or even encourages, creative thinking? Why do other services and organizations often weed those out?¹

Why does the USMC seem to attract broader and more curious minds² – those, in Herb Simons' terms, “cats that curiosity couldn't kill;” and what is the role of broad reading lists in building history and a broad perspective into the minds and lives of young Marines?

ARE MARINES BORN OR MADE?

How do Marines cultivate their particular mentality or philosophy (Al Gray's warfighting is a philosophy, not just a concept or doctrine,) the underlying dynamic fabric that also seems to cultivate a higher degree of what Simon called “organizational identification” and loyalty, perhaps even altruism?³ How do the institutional structures help cultivate, respect and reward those who are not just good fighters, but good out of the box thinkers as well?

What are the rules – written and otherwise – that underly their thinking; what is the “operational code” of the USMC?⁴ Are there particular traits, some innate, some by design, that constitutes “warrior routines” or “warrior capabilities?”

Being a Marine is not a job, it's a lifestyle;⁵ it is what defines the people. How does this affect identification and innovation and the organizational culture of the USMC? What is the 'precarious value' of the USMC?⁶

(How) does the Marines emphasis on history and reading – their long term perspectives for the past – contribute to their long term perspectives for the future (as indicated in March 1999), and their adaptiveness as an organization?⁷ How does such historical inclination – shared with scholars and philosophers including Jim March, Alfred Whitehead and Friederick Nitetzche – contribute to the innovativeness in thinking as well as in action?

These – and many other – dimensions are important parts of understanding the overall nature and dynamics of the USMC. Here we focus on just a small part: how the USMC educates, trains, and organizationally nurtures the talent key to adaptive and strategic leadership.

THE SIMULTANEOUS PURSUIT OF RIGIDITY AND INNOVATIVENESS

Training must be challenging. If training is a challenge, it builds competence and confidence by developing new skills. The pride and satisfaction gained by meeting training challenges instill loyalty and dedication. It inspires excellence by fostering initiative, enthusiasm, and eagerness to learn.⁸

A well-known example of part of what makes a Marine a Marine is training. Marine training is rigorous, as evidenced by the large number of academic articles in the medical and physiology literatures showing the prevalence of injury rates in combat training, and as depicted in more popular media (than academic articles) through movies, for instance the memorable Gunnery Sgt. Hartman from *Full Metal Jacket*.⁹ It is built on a philosophy and foundational principles key to Marine Corps organizational capabilities. As all organizational capabilities, USMC capabilities are more than the sum of parts, more than the resources, training, and educational structures; it is the synergy between them that creates distinctiveness.

Marine training, including most famously perhaps the “boot camp” program, like other military training, emphasizes the transmission of basic routines needed for successful military operations. An overview of the USMC recruit

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training shows instruction in military history, martial arts, swimming, use of weapons, land navigation, and marksmanship.¹⁰ The Marine Corps processes approximately 37,000 recruits a year at two facilities: Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island (on the East Coast) and Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego (on the West Coast).¹¹ Processing so many recruits and molding them into recruits able to fill vacancies in the fleet requires a great deal of standardization; training does not differ significantly between the west coast and east coast facilities, and Marines are all drilled in the same fundamentals of military life that serve as a foundation for them in follow-on schools or in their assignments in operational units. The principles of training are focused enough to provide direction, yet flexible enough to accommodate the needs to adapt to changing conditions and to commanders at all levels of the organization.¹² Another contributing factor is the personal presence of the commanders at all levels – perhaps cultivating a higher degree of organizational identification and loyalty.¹³

Hand-in-hand with its reputation for rigorous training, the Marine Corps has also developed a reputation for innovativeness, adaptiveness, and capacity for strategic thinking.¹⁴ The USMC has implemented one of the most visible and effective energy programs in the defence establishment, with the Expeditionary Energy Office (E2O) leading efforts to shift Marine Corps energy needs away from fossil fuels toward sustainable and innovative solutions.¹⁵ Marines are regularly encouraged to think outside of the box,¹⁶ and even lower-ranking Marines are expected to serve as “strategic” thinkers in their expeditionary roles.¹⁷

How can it be that an organization can simultaneously promulgate rigid hierarchy and teach its members strong standard operating procedures, while at the same time promote innovation and innovative thinking even among its lowest-ranking members?¹⁸ In this chapter, we examine part of this issue of the tension between cultures of organizational routines and cultures of innovation. We argue that these two cultures do not need to conflict; a culture of strong routines provides a foundation from which a culture of innovation can arise. We develop our thinking from theories of routines from the evolutionary economics and behavioural organizational theory literature, and we highlight some preliminary applications from the USMC.

Instead of treating routinization and innovation as antithetical to one another, we view them as mutually supportive. We examine part of the dynamics in Marine Corps doctrine to show that, routinization serves to create a highly-trained force adept at learning and adapting to new situations, and an organizational environment conducive to innovation.

ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES

The generic term ‘routines’ includes the forms, rules, procedures, conventions, strategies, and technologies around which organizations are constructed and through which they operate. It includes also the structure of beliefs, frameworks, paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge that buttress, elaborate, and contradict the formal routines.¹⁹

Organizations implement routines to help them accomplish tasks. Organizational members take part in using routines as part of their day-to-day; they “routinize” their operations so that members know how tasks will be accomplished, leading to coordination and efficiency benefits. Routines can be explicit or tacit; explicit routines are things like standard operating procedures or checklists, while tacit routines are more of a collective understanding of how things should get done that is difficult to codify or to outline.

Formally, organizational routines are repetitive patterns of interdependent organizational actions.²⁰ They represent patterned sequences of learned behaviour involving multiple actors linked by communication or by authority.²¹ In the military context, routines could be very explicit: they could be checklists for starting an aircraft, rules of engagement, or “tactics, techniques, and procedures” to deal with emerging threats. On the other hand, they could be very tacit – they could be a particular unit’s approach for negotiating with tribal elders to learn about insurgent activity in a region; if asked, unit members might respond “This is the way we do things,” but their procedure to negotiating with local leaders may not be written down or preserved or even a conscious procedure. Unit members may just know implicitly that this is how they work together and organize to execute the routine.

Routines can therefore serve as repositories of organizational memory. Their enactment is a physical manifestation of organizational knowledge. Work in this area stems from the foundational work of Cyert and March in the *Behavioral Theory of the Firm*, where routines were argued to be sources of capability.²² Nelson and Winter, in their influential book *An Evolutionary Theory of Economics*, used a biological metaphor to explain routines as mimetic devices that pass down organizational capabilities as collective memory.²³

Routines are collective, in that they involve many actors working in collaboration. They are recurrent; members enact them repeatedly to instantiate them as part of regular organizational life. They are patterned and follow a predictable (once they are recognized) sequence. They are effortful, requiring

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organizational members to actively focus on them to enact them. They are context- and path-dependent, created from the needs of the organizational environment. Finally, they may have ostensive and performative components. The ostensive component is the idea of the routine in the minds of organizational members, while the performative component is how it is really enacted. A manual for fixing a tool may be the ostensive component codified in organizational memory, but the way crew members actually fix the tool (based in part on the guide) is its performative component.²⁴

What do routines do? Routines have been linked to coordination benefits within organizations; strong routines help organizations conduct their work more efficiently as members do not need to “reinvent the wheel.” Routines may help organizations resolve struggles within the organization about the ways things get done; their instantiation serves as evidence of truce between organizational factors.²⁵ Routines reduce uncertainty in the face of a turbulent environment by providing organizational members a toolkit for how to act. They allow organizational members to economize on limited cognitive resources. They provide a repository for knowledge retention.²⁶ Finally, they serve as a source of stability; routines are a factor in leading organizations to keep doing things the way they always have, and they may be a factor associated with the difficulty around organizational change.²⁷ Routines seem to provide many performance benefits for organizations, but the question is whether those performance benefits are outweighed by the possibility of inflexibility – as routines could be a source of organizational inertia. It is not obvious how they might play a role in innovative organizations.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Part of the challenge of studying routines is in conceptual clarity. Routines seem straightforward; organizational members use routines to accomplish tasks, members understand how the routine works and it simplifies organizational activity. Members no longer need to reinvent the wheel when approaching tasks they see again and again. Yet, this surface-level simplicity belies some conceptual challenges that are useful in understanding how routines relate to innovation. Some questions regarding routines seem appropriate.

Are routines conscious or unconscious? This question is at two levels. First, are routines consciously or unconsciously chosen? Do organizational members pick routines from a menu, or do they know unconsciously which routines would be appropriate for a given problem? Second, are routines enacted consciously or unconsciously? Cohen & Bacdayan conducted a laboratory

study suggesting that routines are stored as procedural memory within organizational members, and that they are enacted in response to stimuli from the environment and from other members – suggesting that to a certain extent, the enactment of routines can be unconscious (whether or not the routine is explicit).²⁸ Winter has emphasized how routines can be formed by unconscious recognitions which they can then become routinized: “A relatively complex pattern of behaviour (or the theoretical representation of such a pattern) triggered by a relatively small number of initiating signals or choices and functioning as a recognizable unit in a relatively automatic fashion.”²⁹

To what extent are organizations routinized? Can we think of some organizations as having more routines and some organizations as having fewer routines? From our description of how routines are enacted in organizations, it is not clear what organization would have no routines. Instead, we can think about organizations as highly routinized or lowly routinized – this, like other aspects of routines, will probably depend to some extent on the organization’s environment. An organization facing new or novel tasks will likely not exhibit high routinization because routines that do get developed will become superseded by new events.

How does one measure routines? Laboratory studies can impose routines on work teams.³⁰ This is not always possible in field settings, and empirical work has struggled with the best way of measuring routines – or even identifying them. Researchers face methodological choices to make. Is any pattern of interaction a routine? Would a pattern that organizational members claim not to be a routine but fits all criteria still be considered a routine? How can one ever really observe routines that members may not consciously know they follow? The literature provides some prescriptions from field studies about finding routines, primarily with an emphasis on conducting well-grounded qualitative observation of organizations and using context-specific knowledge to identify when routines are enacted. Alternatively, if the researcher is interested in just the sense of routinization in an organization, they might pursue a survey of organizational members, but this could lead to bias and may not capture the exact construct under study.³¹

How do routines change? Routines can change at multiple levels. First, routines themselves may evolve in response to new conditions – Pentland and Reuter have argued that pieces of routines may be recombined in the face of novel tasks, so that routines can be viewed as “grammars of action.”³² Routines may also change in every enactment; routines have ostensive and performative aspects. The ostensive aspect serves as the ideal of what the routine is meant to accomplish – how it exists either in a codified form or in the

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minds of organizational members. The performative aspect is how the routine is actually enacted, and there is no reason to believe this will be close or far to the ostensive; the ostensive guides the performative, but the performative routine, the routine as enacted, will be contingent on characteristics of the context, the performers, and the task. This may serve as a source for change, as iterated repetitions of a routine with slight variations may uncover improvements in how the routine is enacted that may filter back to the ostensive ideal of the routine and change how it is then enacted in the future.

What is the relationship between routines and innovation? The tension between stability and innovation is apparent when thinking about routines; although routines assist organizations and their members in streamlining tasks and in codifying organizational knowledge, this may come at the expense of flexibility. It is conceptually challenging to think about a highly routinized organization as also being innovative.

ROUTINES AND INNOVATION

Can routines be not just the products of innovation, but serve to engender innovation in the organization? Taking a dynamic view of routines may help us understand how we sometimes see highly routinized organizations, such as the USMC, develop reputations for innovation. We identify three streams of work that support this proposition. We assume that organizations are interested in innovation as a necessity of survival; either stimuli from the environment require innovation (facing new tasks, for example), or the organization may experience competition from other players requiring innovation to compete.³³

Routines are a source of organizational memory, but when they are repeatedly enacted by organizational members, they create organizational memory as well. A history of repetitive actions and adjustments from that history can lead to routines serving as generative systems.³⁴ Routines are therefore a font from which change can occur; they are the reason for their own change.³⁵

Routines may support innovation by freeing up resources. We have indicated how routines make it easier for organizational members to deal with routine problems, and routines aid members in economizing on cognitive resources. These resources may be diverted to other endeavours. Resources available above and beyond those needed for conduct of standard operations are analogous to the concept of organizational slack from the behavioural theory of the firm tradition.³⁶ Slack is a buffer that allows an organization to absorb

environmental variation or deal with dramatic shifts.³⁷ The theory suggests that slack – resources that are otherwise unutilized – can be diverted to innovation, either by stimuli from the environment that require a change, or from proactive activity on the part of organizational members. Research and Development divisions conducting basic research can be thought of as consuming slack. Their deliverables may not support immediate operational needs, but their findings are important for building a solid technical base from which a knowledge-intensive organization can remain competitive and innovative.

Finally, *routines may reduce search costs*. When organizations need to innovate in response to new problems or innovate to develop new competencies, they must conduct a search for new knowledge. This search for new knowledge may take place within the organization through recombination of existing information, or it may come from outside of the organization – with information coming from the outside environment and interpreted by organizational members to generate new knowledge.³⁸ Search has its tradeoffs; although it can lead to optimal solutions, there is the risk of failure and it is difficult to know where to start. Routines can help organizations better organize search. Routines are a store of organizational memory, and they provide a means for organizations to both have a place to start when approaching a new problem, but also a means to easily interpret information from the environment and convert it to useful knowledge. In this sense, routines could be a foundation for an organization's absorptive capacity.³⁹ They aid organizations in both search and transfer of information.

On the whole, these related streams of research suggest routines have a role to play in supporting innovation and adaptive leadership. When taken as dynamic and capable of influencing the organization over time, there is theory to suggest that organizations could benefit from high routinization not just on all the factors to which routines typically contribute (efficiency, memory, etc.), but also on innovation. Routines are themselves sources of mimetic variation; through repetition, organization members change their routines and stand the possibility of uncovering genuine innovations by recombining prior knowledge. Routines free up resources that could be allocated to innovation, by increasing organizational slack. Finally, routines reduce search costs and increase an organization's absorptive capacity – this makes it easier for organizations to search for information needed for innovation and interpret that knowledge in the context of the organization's new problems.

Yet, it is not clear that organizations with high routinization will necessarily be innovative. It may take a special mix of routines, an organizational culture around innovation, and context-specific factors to yield an innovative

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organization with strong routines; routines provide the conditions necessary for innovation, but may not be sufficient to guarantee innovation. To understand how and why organizations use routines in the pursuit of innovation, we examine the dynamics of rules in the USMC. The Marine Corps exhibits very strong routines, like many military organizations, but it prizes innovation as well.⁴⁰ We hope to show that routines in the Marine Corps help to lay the foundation for innovation through many mechanisms, including by emphasizing the cultivation of broader minds (e.g., through reading), providing unit members with a place to start in the pursuit of solutions to new problems, and free up resources for Marines to devote time and attention to larger problems than their standard operations.

ROUTINES AND INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

We look at one example of Marine Corps routines to show the importance of both routines and innovation in Marine Corps culture.⁴¹ Specifically, we examine written rules as manifestations of Marine Corps routines. Written rules have been demonstrated to be important in demonstrating organizational culture, and the degree of routinization in an organization can be viewed as a facet of culture.⁴²

THE MARINE CORPS ISSUES DOCTRINE

Marine Corps generals and officials release publically-available statements of Marine Corps doctrine – how the Marine Corps organizes and executes military operations. These are public statements of ostensive routines that are inculcated into the organizational culture. Marine Corps leaders and unit members follow doctrine in organizing their work, so for the purposes of identifying routines and how they support innovation, assessing published doctrinal works would be a good source of evidence.

The foremost such doctrinal work is Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: *Warfighting*. Updated and integrated with joint forces doctrine, the manual on warfighting has “had a significant impact both inside and outside the Marine Corps. That manual has changed the way Marines think about warfare.”⁴³ *Warfighting* is the Marine Corps statement of how to conduct manoeuvre warfare and to teach officers and enlisted men and women the basics of how to conduct operations. We focus on chapters 3 and 4 of *Warfighting*, which deal with how to prepare for war and how to wage war, as we view these as the clearest depictions of high-level routines common to Marines irrespective of

unit or rank; all Marines are engaged in the business of warfighting and this manual serves as the foundation for their profession.

RULES AND EXPERIMENTATION

Routines allow for experimentation because they allow for organizational members to tweak existing routines by repetition; a result from repetition of existing routines may be new solutions that aid in innovation and creating solutions to new problems.

The Marine Corps identifies two types of training:

Collective training consists of drills and exercises. Drills are a form of small-unit training which stress proficiency by progressive repetition of tasks. Drills are an effective method for developing standardized techniques and procedures that must be performed repeatedly without variation to ensure speed and coordination. Examples are gun drills, preflight preparations, or immediate actions. In contrast, exercises are designed to train units and individuals in tactics under simulated combat conditions. Exercises should approximate the conditions of war as much as possible; that is, they should introduce friction in the form of uncertainty, stress, disorder, and opposing wills.⁴⁴

It is the emphasis on exercises, rather than “dictated or ‘canned’ scenarios”⁴⁵ that distinguishes this type of training. It explicitly incorporates experimentation into the performance of routines. At the same time, an emphasis on “drill” provides a foundation from which experimentation can occur. The types of behaviours incorporated in drill are repeated in exercises (preflight checks are a component of operations tested in exercises), creating bundles of routines whose combinations may serve as a source of innovation.⁴⁶

But it is the emphasis on friction, in the Clausewitzian tradition,⁴⁷ which shows how routines really impact innovation. It is not that the Marines have instantiated a routine for innovation,⁴⁸ it is that the Marines have instantiated a way of utilizing existing routines in a flexible and repetitive system out of which innovations can flow. They have created, in their training environment, a way for Marine leaders to observe how their routines work and how they may serve in a constrained environment. In the absence of strong routines, such exercises would not be successful in spurring innovation.

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RULES AND SEARCH

As war is fluid, commanders will regularly be in situations where they must acquire information about a problem they face. Whether this problem is about how to conduct an assault of a fortified position, collecting intelligence on an unknown force or about the best way to conduct patrols in a newly-secured area, commanders will regularly face these problems with a paucity of available information. This requires them to search in their environment for information to solve these problems and to make effective command decisions. This is not formulaic, however, “A military decision is not merely a mathematical computation. Decision-making requires both the situational awareness to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. These abilities are the products of experience, education, and intelligence.”⁴⁹ This emphasis is close to the conception of decision-making in March, Simon and Cyert’s work.

This experience comes from training, which is informed by doctrine. *Warfighting* prescribes that leaders must receive “a foundation in theory and concepts that will serve them throughout their careers” and they must “focus on understanding the requirements and learning and applying the procedures and techniques associated with a particular field.”⁵⁰ But at a high level of mastery, officers are expected to be experts in combining knowledge from different fields together while understanding how to incorporate new information. The doctrinal focus on mastering routines in a given area therefore supports the development of innovation by allowing officers and leaders to incorporate new information to support the development of solutions.

RULES AND RESOURCES

The Marine Corps case is relevant for a discussion of routines and resources. *Warfighting* explicitly acknowledges that there will be a need for search, as warfare is conducted in “an uncertain, chaotic, and fluid environment.”⁵¹ Key to this type of warfare is an understanding of intent. Innovation in combat comes from the necessity for junior leaders to make on-the-spot decisions; they make command decisions based on knowledge of their commander’s intent:

Subordinate commanders must make decisions on their own initiative, based on their understanding of their senior’s intent, rather than passing information up the chain of command and waiting for the decision to be passed down. Further, a competent subordinate

commander who is at the point of decision will naturally better appreciate the true situation than a senior commander some distance removed.⁵²

What allows junior commanders to be so innovative? It is routines like regular check-ins about intent, briefings before combat, and communication routines. Further in *Warfighting*, the authors describe that philosophy of command is based on human elements and shared understandings:

We believe that implicit communication – to communicate through mutual understanding, using a minimum of key, well-understood phrases or even anticipating each other’s thoughts – is a faster, more effective way to communicate than through the use of detailed, explicit instructions. We develop this ability through familiarity and trust, which are based on a shared philosophy and shared experience.⁵³

Therefore, doctrine provides slack; it simplifies the communication process. Marine leaders who have been inculcated in this culture of tacit communication are better able to conduct innovation and to develop solutions for command problems, because they have an organization-wide shared understanding of communication routines. This frees up resources that would otherwise be used on communication and allows Marines opportunities to develop adaptive plans and to innovate, based on a foundation of routines.

Discussion of slack is an important component of *Warfighting*. Marines are encouraged to maximize their use of resources, as “time is a critical factor in effect decision-making – often the more important factor... In general, whoever can make and implement decisions consistently faster gains a tremendous, often decisive advantage.”⁵⁴ Marines, by necessity, need to maximize slack, and they use routines to do so. The example we provide of communication is one example of how they do so at a high level – at an operational level, things such as mission tactics, procedures for manoeuvring, and other TTPs may be just as effective.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF (ADAPTIVE) LEADERS

Our goal is to develop [an organization] that acts in uncertainty and thrives in chaos through a common understanding of the essence and nature of the problem and the purpose of the operation. In practice, this means that leaders must ensure their vision and intent are understood and their subordinates act decisively in concern with that vision and intent.⁵⁵

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In this chapter we have argued that routines can serve as foundation for innovation in organizations. Innovation, in turn, is key to an organization's adaptiveness. Adaptive leadership is at least partly a function of the organizational routines in the past (including who rise to become leaders), as it is about shaping the organization in the future.

Routines are repetitive patterns of interdependent organizational actions. They are enacted by multiple members of organizations and serve as ways for the organization to simplify how things are done, to make the "routine" easier to accomplish. Routines have coordination and performance benefits for organizations, but we argue that they may also serve as a source of flexibility and innovation under the right conditions. We suggest that routines can also support innovation through multiple pathways. First, routines may serve as a source of experimentation; as routines are repeated again and again, their repetition may serve as a means for organizational members to experiment with existing practices, which can inform solutions for future problems. Second, routines may reduce search costs by giving organizational members capacity to understand and to interpret new information coming in from the environment – and indeed, to interpret new problems. Third, routines may support innovation by freeing up resources and creating organizational slack. Routinized activities require less cognitive effort to perform, as well as fewer physical resources, and this makes it easier for organizational members to divert time and attention to new problems. We highlight some examples from a central piece of Marine Corps doctrine – *Warfighting* – to show how strong routinization may make the Marine Corps highly innovative in spite of an outward appearance of inflexibility.

We believe this initial observation of Marine Corps routines provides fruitful ground for future study. We have looked at only the highest level of routines – doctrine – and many of the processes we describe would apply at lower levels of tactics or operations. We believe an investigation of Marine Corps rules and training would provide evidence to suggest that innovation in routines can stem from the three pathways we have identified from organizational theory, and that this work would be important for resolving the tension between routinization and innovation.

What does this mean for leaders? Leaders can rest assured that not all of the bureaucratic procedures they follow are useless; there can, in fact, be very real benefits to some degree of routinization. We offer the following (initial) suggestions to military leaders to reap the maximum benefit of routinization for innovation:

Embrace routines that improve efficiency – greater efficiency frees up resources to devote to innovation, whether those resources are time, money, political capital, or others.

When searching for information about a new problem, use your existing routines as a starting point. This may reduce the time it takes to find new information and make what information you do acquire more interpretable.

Do not punish subordinates for minor deviations from routines, and encourage them among your teams. Innovation will come from minor deviations; follow the ostensive spirit of routines and accept that the performative outcomes may differ from time to time.

Routinization is a powerful management tool that brings efficiency and quality. However, it may also bring innovation. Military leaders should see the routines they practice as tools in their arsenal that support innovative activity, rather than as impediments to progress.

ENDNOTES

1. Not just other services, but most organizations become victims of their own success, breeding competency traps, intellectually and otherwise, reinforcing what they do well in the short run at the expense of adaptiveness in the longer run. See James G. March, “Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning,” *Organization Science* 2, no. 1 (1991): 71-87.
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3. Herbert A. Simon, “Organizations and Markets,” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5, no. 2 (1991): 25-44.
4. Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1951).
5. James G. March, “A scholar’s quest,” *Journal of Management Inquiry* 12, no. 3 (2003): 205-207.
6. The term ‘precarious value’ comes from Philip Selznick, another organization scholar. Dr. Susan Marquis uses the concept to study the special organizational culture of the special operations forces. Since there is not yet a comprehensive organizational analysis along those lines of the USMC, a fruitful starting point could be a comparison between the USMC and the SOF’s values and organizational cultures, using the framework laid out in Marquis book. (Susan Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces*. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press)).

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7. For the argument on long term perspectives for the past and future, see J.G. March (1999): "Research on Organizations: Hopes for the past and lessons from the Future." *Nordiske Organisationsstudier* 1, no. 1: 69-83. The USMC emphasizes history and learning from history; as evidence for instance through their reading lists. Re the USMC's long term perspectives, for example, James Forrestal said at Iwo Jima: "The raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years."
8. United States Marine Corps, *Unit Training Management Guide* (Washington, DC: USMC, 1996).
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10. Drawn from the official USMC website located here: <<http://www.mcrdpi.marines.mil/RecruitTraining/TrainingSummary%28ByWeek%29.aspx>>.
11. "Where REAL Marines are made: East or West," last modified 28 December 2010, <<http://marines.dodlive.mil/2010/12/28/where-real-marines-are-made/>>.
12. *Unit Training Management Guide*, 2.
13. Herbert A. Simon, "Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning," *Organization Science* 2, no. 1 (1991): 125-134; Herbert A. Simon, "Altruism and Economics," *American Economics Review* 83, no. 2: 156-161.
14. See, for example, Rosen's discussion of how the Marine Corps developed an amphibious assault doctrine before the Second World War, Stephen P. Rosen, "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation," *International Security* 13, no. 1 (1988): 135-168.
15. "Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office," <<http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/e2o/E2OHome.aspx>>.
16. Chris Wood, "About Face: A Return to Marine Corps Innovation," April 2015, <<http://blog.usni.org/2015/04/14/about-face-a-return-to-marine-corps-innovation>>.
17. Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines Magazine* (January 1999).
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45. *Warfighting*, 61.
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51. *Warfighting*, 71.
52. *Warfighting*, 78.
53. *Warfighting*, 79.
54. *Warfighting*, 85.
55. Mattis, "USJFCOM Commander's Guidance for Effects-based operations," 24.

CHAPTER 11

WHEN MILITARY LEADERS DIFFER FROM THEIR POLITICAL LEADERS: OVERCOMING LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES

*Colonel Piet C. Bester, D Phil, and Major Anita G. du Plessis**

INTRODUCTION

Prior to 1994, the political environment in the Republic of South Africa (RSA) was characterized by white minority rule that used the armed forces to ensure the security of the state against resistance from the black majority. With the democratization of the RSA, a new political leadership, mainly from the former black resistance, was elected, creating a situation where the 1994 political and military leadership¹ represented groups that were previously in conflict with one another.² The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was formed on 27 April 1994. This force was a result of the integration of several opposing military forces, including the South African Defence Force, the Defence Forces of the former independent states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, Umkhonto We Sizwe (the military arm of the African National Congress) and the Azanian People's Liberation Army.

Post-Apartheid South Africa was restructured by the new regime, the African National Congress, which came to power in 1994. Great initiatives were taken to improve the lives of all South Africans in this newly founded democracy. However, since 2000, a number of behavioural and legislative problems have come to the fore.³ In many instances politicians and security officials reacted to justified enquiries and protests in ways similar to those of their predecessors. The result of new anti-terrorist legislation, the controversial proposed Act on the Protection of State Information, and the militarization of the police was that these measures curbed rightful public protest and limited the transparency relating to the functioning of government.

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the South African National Defence Force.

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The citizens of South Africa, including military personnel, were shocked by a number of activities and scandals in which Jacob Zuma, the president, head of state, head of the executive and Commander-in-Chief of the SANDF, was implicated. Max du Preez, a well-known South African journalist, refers to President Zuma as a “one-man wrecking ball,” who is busy with the demolition of the democracy.⁴ Allegations are made that the President outmanoeuvred those who stood up to him, richly rewarded those loyal to him through a vast system of patronage, and massively enriched his own family and clan in the tradition of Mobutu Sese Seko (former president of Zaire, now known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Robert Mugabe from Zimbabwe.

Some authors are of the opinion that “politicians, diplomats, and military establishments have their own identities and interests that are not always shared by those for whom they supposedly speak.”⁵ It is clear that there is a risk that the South African government lacks the bonds of strong political consensus. Consequently, political authority will be uncertain. In this regard, Ambler⁶ states that when a state’s authority is uncertain, the relation of the military establishment to politics may take one of two forms or may be a mixture of the two. First, if dissension is chronic, the military itself may suffer the same lack of authority and unity that characterizes the society around it. Second, if the military establishment is relatively cohesive, there is a tendency for officers to conceive of the military as an island of health, unity, and courage in a sea of corruption, conflict and decay. Some military leaders might concur and show support to what is happening in the faint hope of being rewarded for blind loyalty, some may remain “under the radar” so as not to cause any ructions and silently protest, and some might want to do something in the interest of a democratic South Africa or what is viewed as “the right thing to do” from a military professionalism perspective.

In view of the foregoing, it would be safe to say that the events occurring in South Africa might raise a red flag; members in some state departments, in general and the military specifically, might experience interference from their political masters. Consequently, the military leader may be placed in a situation where he or she is presented with moral dilemmas, as Milburn⁷ states: “decisions wherein the needs of the institution appear to weigh on both sides of the equation.” Although the military has not been directly drawn into the alleged interference yet, one cannot view the military as part of the state machinery that is immune to such interference.

THE CHALLENGE

Political challenges at the highest level may possibly create a challenge for military leaders should they be confronted with carrying out instructions from political masters with whom they disagree. These challenges are in particular applicable to military leaders functioning on the military strategic level of the organization, especially when dealing with policy-related issues. Ambler illustrates that it has an effect on the operational and tactical level as well, highlighting that when dissension is chronic, the military establishment may suffer the same lack of authority and unity that characterizes the society around it, as mentioned previously.⁸ Thus, it does not mitigate the military leader against orders that appear to be unconstitutional, immoral, or otherwise detrimental to the military as an institution to protect democracy. This leads to a challenge where the military leader's watershed moment is in terms of his or her customary obligation to obey and a possible moral obligation to dissent. The question that arises is how should military leaders deal with this challenge from a leadership perspective?

In addressing this question, it is first and foremost important to note that this is not the first time that military personnel in South Africa have been faced with such a challenge. In 1914, some military personnel chose to act in a certain way that caused a divide in South Africa and specifically the Afrikaner community for many years after. In addition to the 1914 rebellion, there was another incident in 1961 in Algeria, with a direct effect in Europe, referred to as the "The Generals' Putsch."⁹ It is important first to refer to these incidents as examples of circumstances in which military leaders were in conflicting situations before discussing how this challenge should be addressed in the current context. It is important to note that both these incidents covered extensive periods, but only the significant information about the events is reported here for the purposes of this discussion.

HISTORIC EXAMPLES

THE 1914 AFRIKANER REBELLION

In 1910, eight years after the end of the Anglo-Boer War, South Africa became a union under British rule. About four years later, on 4 August 1914, Britain declared war on Germany. This was followed by 35 days of intense debate, wondering and waiting on whether the Union would choose neutrality or declare war itself. On 8 September, the South African Prime Minister, General Louis Botha (a Boer war hero), finally gave his answer that South

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Africa was going to war on the side of Britain.¹⁰ This was a decision mainly driven by being morally bound to Britain after the Union was given its freedom in 1910.¹¹

Despite South Africans celebrating this decision on a wave of patriotism and propaganda, there was still bitterness among a small group in the aftermath of the Anglo Boer War. Some felt that a German victory in the war would enable the Afrikaner to shake off the British yoke and reverse the outcome of the Anglo-Boer War.¹² Consequently, a group of Afrikaner nationalists, supported by remnants of the army and an assortment of western Transvaal and Free State “poor whites,” started preparing for a dramatic bid to seize the country.¹³ An initial attempt at a rebellion was averted after Botha summoned General Koos de la Rey, another Boer war hero, to his office and managed to talk him out of such a plan, thus temporarily averting a rebellion.

Botha then called in his top Transvaal officers, including General Christiaan Beyers, General Hendrik Muller, Major Jan Kemp, Lieutenant Colonel Manie Maritz and Major J.J. Pienaar, to discuss their wartime commitments. Although all of them were openly hostile to the idea of war with Germany, Botha left them in charge of their garrisons. Within a few days of their meeting with Botha, the officers began piecing together plans for a mid-September takeover of the government.¹⁴ When Botha’s government acceded to a British request to invade German South West Africa (today known as Namibia), 12 000 Boer War veterans in the Union Defence Force and two of its own commanders, General Christiaan Beyers in the Transvaal and General Christiaan de Wet in the Orange Free State (both Boer War heroes), resigned their commissions, crossed into South West Africa and raised the standard for a rebellion against the Union.¹⁵

As a result, General Jan Smuts, the Minister of Defence, took over command of the Union Defence Force and declared martial law, while General Louis Botha concurrently moved successfully against the rebels. Most of the captured rebels were let off lightly, but Major Jopie Fourie, a member of the Active Citizens’ Force, was court-martialed because he joined the rebels without resigning his commission from the Union Defence Force (when captured he was in full uniform of the Union Defence Force) and because there was an incident where he fired at government troops during a brief truce.¹⁶ In a unanimous decision, Fourie was found guilty by the court and sentenced to die in front of a firing squad. General Smuts refused to reprieve Fourie, who faced the firing squad with great courage and became a Boer folk-hero and martyr, while Smuts was labelled by his Afrikaner foes as “murderer of Fourie” and, in his own words, “became the best-hated man in South Africa.”¹⁷

THE GENERALS' PUTSCH IN ALGERIA

Almost 50 years later, in April 1961, an event took place that caused the French to wonder whether Paris had been transformed into a Latin American capital. The rumbling of tanks in the early morning appeared to become a substitute for popular or parliamentary vote as the normal procedure for changing governmental leadership.¹⁸ In the run-up, a number of events occurred that led to this fateful situation where serving military officers and former generals of the French Army attempted a *coup d'état* in Algeria and France.¹⁹

France was involved in Africa for a very long time. Algeria was conquered by the French in 1830 and became an integral part of France in 1848, until it was granted independence in 1962.²⁰ Toward the end of the 1950s, pressure was building up. The French Army, which had fought for more or less seven years in Algeria, was convinced that Algerian nationalism was directly or obscurely linked to the expansion of the worldwide Communist movement, which was also one of the fundamental tenets of the doctrine of *la guerre révolutionnaire*.²¹ Furthermore, many officers held the view that the national spirit was failing under the onslaught of the Left, and that the army had become the nation's only guardian. Lack of guidance from Paris concerning policies and objectives frustrated military leaders in Algeria, and France withdrew from Tunisia and Morocco in 1954. Moreover, French forces that were set ashore with British forces in 1956 at the north end of the Suez Canal to restore order in the Canal and Sinai region following Israel's precautionary attack on Egypt, had to abandon the operation after an enormous strategic success due to pressure from the United States and the United Nations. This shocked the regime and made the army deeply suspicious of its Anglo-Saxon allies, who had denied them an opportunity of possibly striking at the heart of the Algerian rebellion's major supply base. Shortly before that event, France had lost its influence in Indochina (1954) and the army obsessively believed that it had been betrayed in Paris by weak-willed politicians. This caused the French Army to come to the conclusion that in all conceivable circumstances its power had to be maintained in the Maghreb.

According to Olson, a climate of inherent military revolt began to become a reality when President de Gaulle of France announced on 16 September 1959 that the Algerian population was to be allowed to choose independence from France, or association or integration with France.²² This was contrary to the belief that de Gaulle would stand unwaveringly behind the cause of *Algérie-France*²³ and some interpreted it as surrendering in Algeria.²⁴ Ambler's observation in this regard is worth mentioning: "in the eyes of most army officers,

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the Algerian war became the final, the decisive battleground on which the military status, self-esteem and honor had to be redeemed.²⁵

Consequently, military leaders of the French Army intended to seize control of Algeria and also topple the democratically elected president, General de Gaulle, and his policies.²⁶

For the first time a purely military conspiracy was bred and implemented by the colonels – Argoud, Gardes, Broizat, Lacheroy, Godard – and four [retired] generals whom they succeeded in recruiting to lead the coup – Zeller, Jouhaud, Salan, and Challe.²⁷

Their common denominator was that they were all favourably disposed to a military crusade to prevent Algerian independence.²⁸ The irony of this was that they were not driven by ideology, but by what Joesten refers to as misguided patriotism to keep Algeria French forever.²⁹ Ambler observes that after 1946 the French Army had been engaged in a new orthodox style of war in which military and political questions were inextricably intertwined.³⁰

The effort to topple the de Gaulle regime was unsuccessful, although a brief fear of invasion swept Paris. However, with the cooperation of the Air force and the Army, the revolt collapsed in four days.³¹ The obstruction of the conscripts, with their attitude of passive disobedience, hastened the demise of the putsch.³² As a result, officers who encouraged the insurrection or attempted to profit from it were removed from their posts. Initially, Generals Salan, Jouhaud and Gardy and Colonels Argoud, Broizat, Gardes, Godard, Lacheroy and Commandant Vailly were sentenced to death in absentia.³³ Challe and forty-five other officers who surrendered were convicted. Challe and Zeller were convicted to fifteen years in prison; however, they were granted amnesty and had their military positions restored five years later.

THE CHALLENGE FACED BY MILITARY LEADERS

It is clear that situations can arise where military leaders are confronted with dissonance with respect to what they are tasked to do. It may be a potential situation, as currently in South Africa, with parallels that can be drawn to two events in history, the 1914 Afrikaner Rebellion and the Generals' Putsch in Algeria in 1961. Addressing this issue is complex and it defies clear-cut black-and-white specificity, but it is a fundamental issue that will impact the relationship between military leaders and their political masters.

The question arises as to what can be done to deal with this challenge when military leaders have to face similar situations. In order to develop a process or model to follow as a guideline for military leaders, one has to gain understanding of those aspects that regulate or direct the functioning of a military leader. The case of South Africa will be used to illustrate these aspects. The first of these is to understand the constitutional powers of the President, which ultimately also guides the standing of the military in the broader society. Thereafter, a closer look at military leaders themselves is discussed in terms of military professionalism. This is followed by a brief reference to the commission bestowed on an officer when appointed by the President of the country and the code of conduct for uniformed members of the SANDF. Lastly, the issue of lawful and unlawful commands and orders is addressed.

CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

The SANDF is governed by military law as part of the country's public law governing the relationship between the state and the individual. Military law represents an authoritative relationship, which is characteristic of an administrative relationship. It is also specifically designed to fulfil the needs of a certain group of individuals, namely soldiers. Thereafter, it expresses the norms as these relate to other forms of law, including law of evidence, criminal law and criminal as well as civil procedures, thus fulfilling the requirements of administrative law.³⁴

The President of the RSA has powers over the SANDF conferred in the Constitution.³⁵ Section 202(1) of the Constitution affirms the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the SANDF and stipulates that he or she must appoint the Military Command of the Defence Force. Section 202(2) of the Constitution states that only the President may authorize the employment of the Defence Force under the following conditions: (a) in co-operation with the South African Police Service, (b) in defense of the Republic, and (c) in fulfilment of an international obligation. Section 201(3) of the Constitution compels the President to inform Parliament when the SANDF is thus employed, promptly and in an appropriate amount of detail, including the reasons for the employment, the places where the employment will take place, the number of people involved and the time period the force will be employed.

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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The term civil-military relations (CMR) refers to the relationship between the armed forces and the broader civilian society. The reason for the introduction of democratic CMR in South Africa is partly that during the Apartheid era, the government used the SANDF as a tool to enforce its political beliefs in the population. This created an almost military state in which the public had little to no recourse to legal or humanitarian rights. Ngoma proposes that the praetorian civil-military relations used by the Apartheid government were evident in the military's seemingly relative ease to obtain resources from the government to execute its mandate. The military became the most powerful group among the participants in the political system.³⁶

Since the promulgation of the Constitution in 1994, the rights of all citizens have been respected. The SANDF (formed post-1994) is governed by the Constitution and it aims at providing a defence force whose actions are transparent, open to scrutiny and subject to accountability and responsibility to the people and society at large. In the Constitution, the Chief of the SANDF (who is appointed by the President) has executive military command. This command is exercised under the direction of the Minister of Defence in times of peace and under the direction of the President during a state of national defence. The Minister is, in turn, accountable to Parliament and Cabinet for the SANDF.³⁷ The White Paper on Defence states that Parliament has a range of significant powers regarding military affairs in order to enforce democratic control over the armed forces and defence policy. It has legislative powers, it approves the defence budget, and it reviews the President's decisions to employ the SANDF in critical defence functions.³⁸

Civil-military relations can be comprehensively defined as:

the web of relations between the military and the society within which it operates, and of which it is necessarily a part. Such relations encompass all aspects of the role of the military (as a professional, political, social and economic institution) in the entire gambit of national life. Civil-military relations involve issues of the attitude of the military towards the civilian society, the civilian society's perception of, and attitudes to the military, and the role of the armed forces in relation to the state.³⁹

The principles of democratic civil relations are couched in the reference to accountability, adherence to the rule of law, transparency, respect for human rights, political control, consultation with civil society, professionalism and

collaborative peace and security.⁴⁰ Williams augments these principles by also including constitutional provisions controlling the military, parliamentary defence committees, and the creation of a military ombud system.⁴¹ All this suggests dynamic interaction and cooperation between the military and civilian leadership to facilitate democracy.

According to Heineken, CMR theory suggests that a purposeful and effective military requires a unique culture, separate from its parent society.

This is based on the assumption that a ‘gap’ between the military and society is inevitable as the military’s function, the lawful application of military force in accordance with government direction, is fundamentally different from civilian business. The correct balance needs to be obtained to ensure that the military remains strong enough to defend the state (protected by the military) and subservient enough not to threaten the state (protected from the military).⁴²

This aspect is emphasized by Ambler, who points out that causality in CMR is multiple and complex and that all patterns of CMR can be understood only in the context of the entire political system in which they exists.⁴³

In the case of South Africa, it is important to note that various historical aspects place emphasis on CMR in the SANDF. This includes Apartheid and the misuse of the military for political purposes by the previous government. Therefore, it is important to refer to the importance that the SANDF gave to CMR in the recent South African Defence Review 2014. It states that in terms of military education, training and development imperatives: “Military professionalism, based upon core military values, ethics and a robust professional ethos, are the foundations for the future leader.”⁴⁴ This is linked to both the officer corps and the non-commissioned officers and warrant officers. Their various training institutions, such as the Defence Academy, must at all times be symbols of military professionalism, leadership excellence, and a reflection of CMR.

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

The concept of military professionalism has been understood differently in different countries and during different eras. This reflects the interaction of factors such as political culture, military traditions, and the level of complexity of the state bureaucracy.⁴⁵ The general view is that modern military professionalism in democratic states includes the broad features of any profession and the recognition of its legitimacy in the wider society.⁴⁶ Hence, being a

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profession and an occupation different from other occupational groups, military professionalism consists of two aspects. Both Huntington and Janowitz⁴⁷ define a profession in a fairly conventional manner as an occupation that has highly specialized characteristics in the areas of expertise, responsibility and corporateness. Both authors restrict the membership of the society of military professionals to those who belong to the officers' corps.

The following are "enduring characteristics"⁴⁸ that distinguish a profession from other occupation groups.

1. A profession maintains monopolistic control over a body of defined theoretical knowledge and the practical abilities that accompany such knowledge.⁴⁹
2. Aspirants to the profession must undertake intensive, lengthy, formal and practical education and training, on completion of which their performance, learned competencies and skills are assessed by qualified practitioners through formal examinations, which lead to the award of a professionally, societally recognized qualification. This is also referred to as "specialization," which means that the professional combines the knowledge of a body of scientific theory with the practical ability to perform a given set of tasks. In the case of the armed forces it is the theory and practice of warfare, or "the managed application of violence."⁵⁰
3. The activities of the profession are in areas of vital concern for humankind:⁵¹ the state and society rely on military expertise to deal with threats to their security.⁵²
4. The relationship between the profession and society, between practitioner and client, is based upon altruistic service by the former to the latter.⁵³
5. The profession retains a considerable degree of autonomy over matters such as recruitment and training practices, the behaviour expected of its members, and the maintenance of professional standards.⁵⁴
6. The profession is organized into a form of community, with an occupational consciousness (corporate identity) and a sense of collective responsibility expressed often through a professional association.⁵⁵
7. The profession is seen as a full-time permanent career-oriented form of occupation.⁵⁶

8. Society sanctions the activities of the profession as morally praiseworthy and accords to the professions a status of high esteem, respect, confidence, prestige and, not infrequently, privilege.⁵⁷ Similarly Honwana⁵⁸ refers to this characteristic as “community sanction” that postulates some element of autonomy, rights and the monopoly to practice their profession. Swain⁵⁹ states that characteristically, they seek to have some control over education and certification to practice, though formal licensure normally remains a function of government. This furthermore contributes to the development of legitimacy,⁶⁰ which is a particular component of military professionalism. The military leadership is expected to be responsible both individually and collectively to the government and the community.
9. There is usually a code of ethics⁶¹ that regulates the professional’s relationship with his or her peers. It is essential that military leaders remain faithful to the Constitution.⁶² The South African soldiers’ Code of Conduct is an example of such an ethical code that demands that service personnel be unconditionally committed to the defense of society and be permanently ready to carry out orders from a higher authority.
10. All the above attributes are reflected in a professional culture that incorporates adherence to a set of values and norms, and includes symbols such as uniforms and insignia, as well as the use of a distinctive professional language.⁶³

It is furthermore of the utmost importance to note that the military leader, as a professional within a profession, needs to understand that there is a distinction between the state (ongoing) and the regime (temporary).⁶⁴ The military is in service of the state and in this way the values and the interests of the state, including the military, claim precedence over any other temporarily powerful group or leader. There is thus a clear distinction between loyalty to the state and loyalty to the regime.

It is clear that being an officer means that the person is in an occupation different from other occupations. The person serves the state and a great deal of trust is placed in the person to render a service to society. He or she is highly skilled and dedicated to execute the orders of higher authority. This person functions according to a code of conduct and displays a specific culture with particular values and norms. What further distinguishes an officer from any other profession is that the officer is commissioned by the State President.

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COMMISSION AS AN OFFICER

The South African Defence Act⁶⁵ makes provision that the President may confer a permanent commission on any member of the Defence force. The act further states that in order to qualify for a permanent commissioned appointment, a person must *inter alia* swear or declare allegiance to the RSA, be a South African citizen, relinquish any other citizenship he or she may have, and must have a trustworthy and exemplary character. This allegiance is to the state (RSA) and not the regime (the particular political party that is ruling the country) and it consequently does not imply blind obedience to political masters.

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNIFORMED MEMBERS IN THE SANDF

The SANDF adopted a “Code of Conduct for Uniformed Members” as a guide for soldiers’ ethical behaviour and conduct. During the development process, the SANDF’s key stakeholders, civil society interest groups, and members of the Department of Defence were consulted. The Code was presented to the Parliamentary Defence Committee and the Council for Defence for final approval.⁶⁶ See Figure 11.1 for the Code of Conduct for Uniformed Members of the SANDF.

- I pledge to serve and defend my country and its people in accordance with the Constitution and law and with honour, dignity courage and integrity.
- I serve in the SANDF with Loyalty and pride, as a citizen and a volunteer.
- I respect the democratic political process and civil control of the SANDF.
- I will not advance or harm the interests of any political party or organization.
- I accept personal responsibility for my actions.
- I will obey all lawful commands and respect all superiors.
- I will refuse to obey an obviously order.
- I will carry out my mission with courage and assist my comrades-in-arms, even at the risk of my own life.
- I will treat all people fairly and respect their rights and dignity at all times, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, culture, language or sexual orientation.
- I will respect and support subordinates and treat them fairly.
- I will not abuse my authority, position or public funds for personal gain, political motive or any other reason.
- I will report criminal activity, corruption and misconduct to the appropriate authority.
- I will strive to improve the capabilities of the SANDF by maintaining discipline, safeguarding property, developing skills and knowledge, and performing my duties diligently and professionally.

Figure 11.1: Code of Conduct for Uniformed Members of the SANDF.

The code of conduct is a visible public statement of the SANDF's ostensible organizational values, duties and obligations. Standards and guidelines are laid down for the interaction of members of an organization with each other and with the stakeholders of the organization, hence directing *inter alia* the military leader's relationship with his or her political leaders. This is confirmed by the pledge by the then-Secretary for Defence, the late Mr. January Masilela:

We accept the Code as a guideline to what is expected of us from an ethical point of view, both in our individual conduct and in our relationship with others. This includes our relationship with the legislature, political and executive office-bearers, other employees and the public.⁶⁷

Similarly, the then Chief of the SANDF, General Siphwe Nyanda, stated:

We accept the Code as a distillation of the Constitution, the White Paper on Defence and international law. We also regard it as a reflection of the core values of the South African National Defence Force, a vision of military professionalism in a democratic South Africa and a normative basis for unity, morale and discipline.⁶⁸

It is clear that a code of conduct is salient for military leaders as an instrument that upholds norms of professional behaviour. Appiah⁶⁹ summarizes the role of a code of conduct when he states that there are at least three reasons why professionals should be interested in adhering to a code of conduct: it protects them from being associated with the poor performance or behaviour of others in the same profession, it helps create a working environment in which it is easier to resist pressure to do what members of the profession would rather not do, and supporting a publicized code helps protect a profession against the negative public image of members of that profession. It is in particular the second reason, to make it easier to resist pressure to do what members of the profession would rather not do, that this chapter deals with. Those parts in the SANDF Code of Conduct dealing with not advancing a political party's interests, obeying lawful commands and refusing to obey an obviously illegal order, are clearly relevant to this discussion. The next section deals with military leaders' response to illegal orders.

DEALING WITH SUPERIOR ORDERS

It is often stated that soldiers (including military leaders) must execute commands and orders given by superiors. Consequently, soldiers often state that they acted within their duties as soldiers when they executed commands and orders given by superiors. They also often claim that, as soldiers, they are

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not to question authority, but rather to obey. However, the question arises as to whether a soldier has a duty to execute and obey all orders, irrespective of their content. To address this question, this section will clarify the international trends regarding this issue, the South African perspective and the moral implications of this question.

The term “superior orders” was coined to describe an order given by a superior to a subordinate in a military context. These orders were used as defence by soldiers claiming that they could not be held culpable for actions that were ordered by a superior officer. The German Military Trials in 1921 allowed the defence of superior orders by a German U-Boat captain Lieutenant Karl Neumann. The captain admitted responsibility for sinking a hospital ship, but in his defense stated that he did this in response to orders given to him by the German Admiralty. The Supreme Court of Germany acquitted him and accepted his defense of superior orders to elude criminal liability. The court even stated “all civilized nations recognize the principle that a subordinate is covered by the orders of his superiors.” Thereafter, many war criminals were acquitted using this defense. However, because of the Allies’ dissatisfaction with the acquittal of war criminals, the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal removed superior orders as a defense in 8 August 1945.

The best known and publicized court cases in which soldiers claimed that they were only acting on orders and were not responsible for their actions, were the Nuremberg trials. These trials were part of legal proceedings that tried war criminals before the International Military Tribunal in 1945 and 1946. The trials were conducted by the Allied forces after World War II with the aim to prosecute Nazi Germany political, military and economic leaders for their actions during the war. The Germans claimed that “*Befehl ist Befehl*” (orders are orders). Orders must be executed without question from the subordinate and that commanders are responsible for their orders (command responsibility). Their attempted defense was unsuccessful and it was concluded that superior orders were no longer considered sufficient to escape punishment, although such orders could serve as a mitigating factor to lessen punishment.⁷⁰

In the South African context, the Constitution clearly indicates that no member of a security service may obey a manifestly illegal order.⁷¹ The Military Disciplinary Code (MDC)⁷² of the SANDF is a codification of the rules of law governing the conduct of soldiers. The MDC Section 19 deals with disobedience of lawful commands or orders. A soldier who willfully defies or disobeys authority is guilty of an offense under the MDC. In the precedent created by the case of *Queen vs Smith* in 1900, the courts determined that

the order given in that situation was lawful, as it was given during a time of war. In that case, a soldier acting on the orders of an officer shot and killed a servant during a time of war. The servant delayed producing a bridle that was requisitioned on a farm in a district that was under martial law. The soldier was tried criminally for murder. The court took the middle road and applied the following rule: a soldier is compelled to obey an order only if the order is manifestly lawful. If it is manifestly unlawful, he or she may not obey it; if the individual does, he or she acts unlawfully.

The manual for the Law of Armed Conflict⁷³ also states:

Every soldier has a duty to obey lawful orders of superiors. Failure to do so is a serious offence. However, an order to commit a war crime is an unlawful order. A person who commits a war crime pursuant to an order is guilty of a war crime if that person knew or should have known that the order was unlawful.

It is important to note that these sections deal with lawful commands, and this is also emphasized in the code of conduct. There appears to be no legal ground to disobey a legal order under any circumstances. But what if a command is illegal or unlawful? The availability of case law appears to be limited, and future legal debates will guide these decisions. Currently though, the code of conduct indicates that a soldier will accept personal responsibility for his or her actions, as well as refusal to obey an obviously illegal order.⁷⁴

The above serves as a guide for the military leader when making a decision. The contrasting legal conclusions between World War I and World War II raise the question of the role of the individual in executing orders. It becomes apparent that one country (in this case Germany) had seen both the legal recourses of executing superior orders. If legal precedents can change, the answer in addressing this challenge for the individual may lie in the concept of morality, and not legality. The next section looks at the morality of decisions and the effect it has on a military leader.

To illustrate the influence of morality, it is worth referring to a survey⁷⁵ conducted among military professionals at the United States' Marine Corps War College in January 2010. Respondents agreed without exception that there were circumstances under which they would disobey a lawful order, such as:

If the officer cannot live with obeying the order, he must disobey and accept the consequences; When I cannot look at myself in the mirror afterwards..."; "When I deem the order to be immoral..."; "When it is

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going to lead to mission failure...”; “When it will get someone injured or killed needlessly...”; “When it will cause military or institutional disaster...”.

Thus the morality of decision-making becomes important when leaders are making decisions. For this reason, Andrew Milburn states that any member of the military has a commonly understood obligation to disobey an illegal order. There are circumstances under which a military officer is not only justified, but also obligated, to disobey a legal order.⁷⁶ Likewise, Bedein states that soldiers have a moral imperative to refuse an immoral or illegal military order.⁷⁷

Huntington, however, has argued that a military professional is on thin ice if he dissents on any grounds other than purely military or legal ones.⁷⁸ The General’s Putsch in Algeria confirmed that military disobedience is to be considered a crime, despite the grandeur of its motives. Contrary to traditionalists like Huntington, Milburn⁷⁹ however argues that dissent is not only justified under the most exceptional circumstances and should not only be confined to the purely military aspect of a decision, but that members of the military profession should exercise moral autonomy beyond its commonly accepted responsibilities. He further states that the fact that one’s individual interpretation of what is moral and what is not also does not let the officer off the hook for making moral decisions. Such an argument will deny the existence of a military profession by relegating its role to the bureaucratic function of executing instructions. Moral autonomy can also not be denied to a profession with a clearly defined code of ethics and an oath of allegiance not to any one person, but to the Constitution.

To conclude, the forgoing implies that in dealing with superior orders it is in the interest of the military leader to look at all aspects relating to his or her decision. The leader does not function in isolation, nor does the military. A military leader has to consider international and national laws and legislation, as well as use his or her moral compass when evaluating and executing superior orders in order to determine both their legality and morality.

A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR DEALING WITH THE CHALLENGE

If a military leader is of the opinion that an order or instruction that he or she receives is rendered unconscionable by its probable consequences, he or she has a moral obligation to dispute the order. In coming to a decision on what

to do, the military leader will have to go through a decision-making process. The model for making an appropriate decision should also fit into a typical military decision-making model. An overview of the literature on military decision-making usually mentions a number of steps or phases.⁸⁰ Figure 11.2 depicts a typical military decision-making model.

- Step 1 : Define the problem
- Step 2 : Identify the object of the decision
- Step 3 : Analyze the situation
- Step 4 : Identify and assess the alternatives
- Step 5 : Decide on the best course of action
- Step 6 : Implement the plan and evaluate the results

Figure 11.2: Typical Military Decision-making Model.

In order to deal with the challenges faced by the SANDF, an adjusted decision-making model can be adopted (Figure 11.3). The adjusted model may have the following framework and will be applicable whether the issuer of the order is a superior officer or a civilian leader.

- Step 1: Become aware of the conflicting situation
- Step 2: Identify the facts related to the situation
- Step 3: Identify possible actions
- Step 4: Evaluate the possible action from various perspectives:
 - Civil-Military Relations
 - Military Professionalism
 - Commission as Officer
 - Code of Conduct
 - Legal vs Illegal Command
- Step 5: Make decision and test it against:
 - What is the best to do?
 - Contact a peer or mentor and ask what they would say?
- Step 6: Take action
- Step 7: Reflect on decision and determine which lesson can be learned from the process

Figure 11.3: Adjusted Military Model for Decision-making in Conflicting Situations.

In step one the military leader becomes aware of the conflicting situation. Military leaders should, however, always function on the principle that they would never take any action that constitutes a complete lack of discipline

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and respect for the legitimate government or command structure. This is followed by step two, where it is important that the military leader identifies the core of the issue at hand and separates it from the symptoms to prevent him or her from focusing on the symptoms and not the problem itself.

Step three refers to possible actions that the military leader can take. He or she can take either a direct or an indirect approach. A direct approach would, for example, be to refer to the code of conduct or request an audience with a senior person (Chief of the SANDF or even the President as Commander-in-Chief). It is worth mentioning that if there is disharmony between civilian and military values, the code of conduct can be used as guideline to ensure, for example, that military leaders maintain strict political neutrality in their behaviour. Alternatively, an indirect approach can be followed, such as addressing higher authority, leaking the story to a trusted journalist or politician, and lastly dragging one's feet in executing this order. The last-mentioned tactic is also referred to as "slow rolling" in military jargon.⁸¹ Another way of taking action is first to ask that any verbal instruction be given in writing and then start from step one again.

If at any time the military leader really feels that he or she is pushed beyond the limits of his or her endurance, he or she can write a letter of resignation. After resignation, the military leader may decide to go public by speaking to the media.⁸² Although resignation may be the ultimate option, it is recommended that he or she first take other steps prior to resignation. On the one hand, these steps may persuade the issuer of the order to reconsider it or it may draw the attention of the legislature to the issue. On the other, the action may be only symbolic, having no effect on the decision.⁸³

Step four is evaluating the possible actions that the military leader can consider against the standards of: military professionalism, CMR, the implied "oath" taken when commissioned as an officer, the code of conduct and whether it is a lawful or unlawful command or instruction. In this step, military leaders can consider how their decisions could affect the morale of their subordinates if they, for example, opt for public defiance. It might have a negative effect on their morale or cause subordinates to lose confidence during a critical time without really changing the course of events. Even if the leader resigns, he or she must consider the effect. He or she must consider whether resignation will cause a stir sufficient to avert the feared consequences, or whether it is more likely that he or she would be replaced by someone who would carry out the order, possibly in a manner that could cause even greater harm.⁸⁴ Furthermore, in the profession of an officer, which values integrity and moral courage, it is difficult to justify some of these deceptive approaches

to dissent. Milburn⁸⁵ views open dissent as an act of professionalism, carrying with it acceptance of personal responsibility, while slow-rolling reflects vanity without moral courage. These actions can cloud rather than clarify questions about the issues at hand and can discredit the military profession.

In step five the military leader decides on the action to take. They must consider that by taking an open stand, he or she displays the courage of his or her convictions, but also implicitly accepts personal consequences for his or her decision, whether right or wrong. It is thus important for the military leader to consider what would be the best thing to do. As a control mechanism, it is suggested that if the military leader is still uncertain or wants to get another perspective, he or she should first consult a peer or mentor to find out what they would suggest. It is important to note that, ultimately, taking the decision lies with the military leader personally. In the last step of the proposed decision-making model, after the action has been taken, the military leader will have an opportunity to reflect on it based on the outcome. They can learn from this so that they can act more swiftly in the future or can act as mentors to younger leaders as they mature as military leaders.

From the proposed model it is clear that in order to make a decision on the appropriate action to take, the military leader will go through a process in which he or she is provided with a number of choices or alternatives. Although this is an untested model and process, it is postulated that such a model will at least provide the military leader with a framework for addressing issues of obeying or dissenting with which he or she may be confronted.

THE STATE'S RESPONSIBILITY

The state has an important role to play in positively affecting CMR. In South Africa, the state should ensure that the relationship between the state, the military and the society is exercised as embedded and mandated in the South African Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The RSA Constitution clearly outlines the hierarchy in military matters.⁸⁶ The nature of the relation between the armed forces and civilian authority is thus determined by the nature of the state.

Furthermore, government should implement what is clearly stated in the South African Defence Review 2014 and, through comprehensive ministerial instructions, guidelines, and initiatives, develop a culture of military professionalism at all levels in the SANDEF.⁸⁷ In this way, care can be taken to ensure that the military does not get involved in the internal affairs of the country, as this will likely lead to undermining its image and losing its credibility. It

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is also likely to lead to the “politicizing” of the military if it is used against its own people or to drive party-political (i.e., regime) agendas.⁸⁸ This would cause dissonance in the heart of the professional soldier (especially the career officer as military leader), who opted for the military in order to serve the state and not the regime or individuals with their own agendas.

Furthermore, the state needs to create a sense of stability in government. Olsen observes that the increased instability of the various governments of the Third and Fourth French Republics and their subsequent lack of civilian control over the military contributed to the General’s Putsch.⁸⁹ The subsequent behaviour of the military in France since 1958 tends to support the theory that a firm, well-rooted governmental authority, buttressed by a general belief within the civilian population in the legitimacy of the existing government, is the strongest single deterrent to military disobedience and revolt.⁹⁰ This emphasizes that government has to ensure there is no reason for military leaders to doubt it and its leaders’ legitimacy.

Proper delegation of power to military leaders should be based on an alignment between government policy and the military. This prevents indecisiveness from civilian governmental authority and a clash between military interests and government policies. Ambler refers to the General’s Putsch, where there was a combination of the faltering of the civilian governmental authority and military interests clashing with government policies.⁹¹ If this is not addressed, delegating authority might have dangerous consequences for civilian control.⁹² Lack of clarity on this matter can cause military leaders to create an ideology to guide and justify their cause, as in the case in Algiers where “they determined to save France despite herself.”⁹³

CONCLUSION

From the current situation in South Africa and the two case studies presented, it is clear that military leaders can find themselves in difficult situations should they differ from their political leader. This is especially true if the leader is required to do something that does not seem ethically or morally correct. Military leaders can revert to a number of references to give them guidance on their conduct. These include the Constitution, aspects of CMR, military professionalism, and the code of conduct. It can also be concluded that a military leader has grounds for dissent when faced with a moral dilemma. They also have an ethical code of conduct, the perspective of military professionalism, and military law that give them the duty to disobey. The challenge for the leader is that these situations are not always clear-cut.

ENDNOTES

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GLOSSARY

4 Is	Idealized influence, Inspirational motivation, Intellectual stimulation, Individualized consideration
AMBE	Active Management by Exception
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CAS	Complex Adaptive Systems
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFAWC	Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre
CMR	Civil-military relations
COE	Contemporary Operating Environment
E20	Expeditionary Energy Office
ESP	Extra-sensory perception
FFM	Five Factor Model
FRLD	Full Range Leadership Development
GMA	General Mental Ability
ICT	Information And Communication Technology
IMLA	International Military Leadership Association
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LDF	Leadership Development Framework
LMX	Leader-Member Exchange
LDS	Leadership Development System
MDC	Military Disciplinary Code
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
PMBE	Passive Management by Exception

GLOSSARY

RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SAF	Singapore Armed Forces
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TTPs	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
VUCA	Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous

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