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## **LEADING IN COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONS**



**BILL BENTLEY, PhD**  
Canadian Forces Leadership Institute  
Canadian Defence Academy

**GRAZIA SCOPPIO, PhD**  
Canadian Forces Leadership Institute  
Canadian Defence Academy

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Cover photos source: Combat Camera available on line at [www.combatcamera.forces.gc.ca](http://www.combatcamera.forces.gc.ca)

*April 10, 2011 - Dand District, Afghanistan – Operation Mutay*

Armed forces gear up for order of march out of Shoja into Nakhonay region. For the first time, members of the Afghan National Police (ANP), the United States Army, Canadian Forces Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (CF OMLT), Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (POMLT), and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams work together during Operation Mutay in Dand District. The Operation consisted of activities ranging from securing strategic areas from insurgent activity and searching for weapons caches to providing opportunities for members from three coalition forces to synchronize their operations.

*February 22, 2010 - Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada*

A Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) high-speed catamaran and an Orca Class patrol vessel sail in Vancouver Harbour during the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games. The RCMP-led Integrated Security Unit (ISU) was responsible for all security operations during the Vancouver Olympics and was comprised of personnel from the RCMP, CF and 118 other police services from across Canada. During the Vancouver Olympics, security and public safety agencies from all levels of government worked together to provide a safe and secure environment.

*August 25, 2010 - Resolute Bay, Nunavut, Canada*

Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada, lends a hand during a dive exercise conducted by Fleet Diving Unit (Atlantic) during Operation NANOOK 10, one of three major sovereignty operations conducted annually by the CF in Canada's Arctic. Planned and directed by Joint Task Force North (JTFN), the whole of government operation highlights inter-operability, command and control, and cooperation with interdepartmental and intergovernmental partners in the North. Operation NANOOK 10 was a combined, joint and integrated operation that included a whole-of-government exercise of environmental containment and remediation resulting from a simulated fuel spill. The Operation engaged personnel and resources from the CF, Public Safety, the RCMP, the Canadian Coast Guard, Transport Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Environment Canada, Parks Canada, the Government of Nunavut, municipal communities, the US Navy, the US Coast Guard and the Royal Danish Navy.

# **LEADING IN COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONS**

**BILL BENTLEY, PhD**

and

**GRAZIA SCOPPIO, PhD**

Canadian Forces Leadership Institute  
Canadian Defence Academy

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***MWO Dale Allen***

Canadian Defence Academy

***Peter Gizewski, Defence Scientist***

Land Capability Development Operational Research

***LCol Barry Green***

Canadian Forces College

***LCol Dennis Hartnett***

Canadian Defence Academy

***Col Bernd Horn***

Canadian Defence Academy

***CWO Ralph Mercer***

Canadian Defence Academy

***Susan Nutbrown***

ADM (HR) Civ, Learning and Professional Development

***Capt(N) (Ret) Alan Okros, PhD***

Canadian Forces College

***Stéphanie Poliquin***

ADM (HR) Civ, Learning and Professional Development

***LCol (Ret) Michael Rostek, PhD***

Land Capability Development Operational Research

***LCol Jeffrey Stouffer***

Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Canadian Defence Academy

***Megan Thompson, PhD, Defence Scientist***

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## FOREWORD

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In today's complex security environment, it is important, indeed essential, for military leaders at all levels to thoroughly understand the intricacies of working in the context of comprehensive operations. These missions, where often the military is not in charge, require the use of a comprehensive approach in which a wide spectrum of players, stakeholders and resources are involved. The players and stakeholders are drawn from other government departments, military allies, non-government organizations and local communities. To effectively lead in such diverse environments, modern leaders cannot solely rely on their 'hard' military or technical skills. Rather, they need to develop through their careers the necessary 'soft skills' such as trust building, collaboration, conflict resolution, effective communication, flexibility, cultural awareness and interpersonal skills.

The present monograph, *Leading in Comprehensive Operations*, provides solid guidance for modern leaders to develop the understanding and the skill sets required to meet these new challenges. As commander of the Canadian Defence Academy, the champion of military professionalism and leadership, I strongly encourage all Canadian Forces officers and Non-Commissioned Members to become familiar with this monograph as part of their professional development. Civilians on the Defence Teams and from other government departments and various agencies will also find this publication relevant to the leadership of their organizations.

P.J. Forgues  
Major-General  
Commander Canadian Defence Academy

## INTRODUCTION

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This monograph is meant to complement the existing Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces (DND/CF) manuals published by the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI) that outline the philosophy and practices of the military profession, and define effective leadership for all officers and Non-Commissioned Members (NCMs) in the CF. By extracting lessons from recent CF experiences in the 2010 Vancouver Olympics, domestic security operations, exercises in the Canadian Arctic, and the international mission in Afghanistan, this volume will provide a framework for new leadership requirements in comprehensive operations. It will also inform leadership professional development and practices in the CF. The materials presented are drawn from an in-depth review of the scholarly literature on modern conflict, existing CF doctrine, informal meetings with subject matter experts (SMEs) from different government departments in various locations such as Yellowknife, Toronto, Ottawa and Kingston, as well as several Canadian Defence Academy and CFLI technical reports referenced throughout this monograph.<sup>1</sup> These reports involved wide-ranging consultations with more than 120 practitioners from the four-star rank through to captains, NCMs, civilian officials from Defence and Other Government Departments (OGDs) as well as researchers and academics.

While this publication is intended primarily for a military audience, many of the concepts are applicable to a broader audience of Defence civilians and partners from OGDs. The principles outlined throughout this volume apply to *all* leaders, those who are appointed as well as emergent leaders.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the challenges of today's complex global environment can equally be faced by a military commander, a junior officer, an NCM, or a civilian member in a leadership role.

Complex security challenges arise in ethnic and religious conflicts, peace-keeping missions, stabilization efforts, humanitarian assistance missions and high intensity combat. Interventions in these types of scenarios are often referred to as comprehensive operations. DND/CF defines comprehensive operations as “the deliberate use and orchestration of the full range of available capabilities and activities to realize desired effects.”<sup>3</sup> It has become increasingly obvious that the best approach with comprehensive operations cannot be solely found through the intervention of the military, nor any other single agency, nor even through the efforts of the ‘3Ds’ (Defence, Diplomacy and Development). Rather, a broader, holistic and unified approach is required that involves multiple agencies and players. This new concept to address these complex situations is the Comprehensive Approach (CA). While the initial idea of a comprehensive approach to security operations first emerged in the mid-2000s in Britain and the United States, triggered by the Iraq mission<sup>4</sup>, this term and related concepts are now used internationally and applied to a wide range of different contexts.

Descriptors of the comprehensive approach include ‘Whole of Government’ (WoG), ‘joined-up government’, ‘Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public’ (JIMP), ‘horizontal management’ and ‘interagency coordination’.<sup>5</sup> The terminology depends on the context, as well as on various national governments’ policies. For example, the



United Kingdom uses the term ‘Comprehensive Approach’, which they define as “a conceptual framework describing collaborative and coordinated processes involving political, diplomatic, military, economic, and social instruments applied jointly to execute national responses to complex situations in areas of conflict and crisis.”<sup>6</sup> The Australian government uses the term ‘Whole of Government’, which “denotes public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues”. Approaches can be formal and informal. They can focus on policy development, program management and service delivery.”<sup>7</sup>

Although at this time there is no official Government of Canada definition of the CA, there is a common understanding across the government that such an approach is required to address the many complex situations in which Canada is involved, both domestically and internationally. According to LCol Richard Roy, former Special Advisor on the Comprehensive Approach within Chief of Force Development:

There is growing acknowledgement [in the Canadian Government] that in current and future security environments, the nature of these issues is such that on its own, no single agency, government or regional organization is able to provide durable and sustainable solutions. While military forces will often be an important component of many engagements, it is evident that wider participation is necessary and these issues must be solved collectively.<sup>8</sup>

The DND/CF definition for the CA can be found in the *CF Joint Doctrine on Operations*:

[The Comprehensive Approach is] a philosophy according to which military and non-military actors collaborate to enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation. The actors may include joint or multinational military forces, Canadian government departments and agencies (whole of government), other governments (e.g., foreign, provincial and municipal), international organizations (e.g., NATO and UN), non-governmental organizations (e.g., CARE, OXFAM), private sector entities or individuals.<sup>9</sup>


Based on this definition, an important component of the CA is Whole of Government (WoG), which is defined in the *CF Joint Doctrine on Operations* as “an integrated approach to a situation that incorporates diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of national power as required.”<sup>10</sup> Similarly, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development describes the WoG approach as:

...one where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives.<sup>11</sup>

Notwithstanding the various definitions presented, the concepts are all similar in that multiple players need to work together to achieve a mutual objective whether it is a

domestic operation or exercise involving government departments and agencies from a single nation, or an international mission concerning a multitude of departments, organizations and agencies from various nations. The terms most commonly used in this monograph will be CA, comprehensive/WoG operations, or interagency coordination depending on the context and participants.

To clarify, if we take the Afghanistan mission as an example, the CA is applied to the broader mission, i.e., the comprehensive operation, which involves a range of levels of interaction and cooperation among a wide spectrum of international and national actors, including military forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), various government departments from several countries, International Organizations (IOs), Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), the local Afghan government, the Afghan National Army and an array of other stakeholders. At the same time, WoG and interagency concepts are components of the CA. WoG can describe, for example, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. Each PRT engages multiple government departments and agencies from the same nation working together to achieve the objectives of their national government; so in the case of a Canadian PRT, the objectives of the Government of Canada. Finally, interagency coordination in the Defence context denotes activities and tasks involving the coordination between elements of the Department of Defence and one or more engaged government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective.<sup>12</sup> An example would be the CF Exercise Maple Guardian, which engages CF officers and NCMs who are conducting pre-deployment training alongside members of other departments/agencies, such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) or the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and police officers from various forces. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the CA and related WoG and interagency concepts.



**Figure 1: The Comprehensive Approach and Related Whole of Government and Interagency Concepts**

Having defined the CA and related terms, it is important to avoid being rigid when describing what these concepts entail. For instance, while cooperation and coordination may be the goals of the WoG or CA, they are not the only types of interaction that can, or should, occur – nor might they be the best types of interaction in certain situations. The level of interaction among the players in comprehensive or WoG operations should be viewed as a sliding scale or a matter of degree, with different types of interaction possible depending on the nature of the challenges faced and the context of the situation. Simply put, the nature and style of the interaction has to be adapted to the circumstances.

Regardless of the lexicon adopted, based on the experience and lessons acquired through recent missions, it is apparent that comprehensive operations go beyond the scope of the military and involve other departments and agencies. This calls for greater collaboration and coordination among agencies in order to use political, military, economic and social instruments to execute governmental responses to

complex situations of conflict, emergency, crisis or national-level security. This greater collaboration and coordination applies to a variety of situations, whether it be a mission involving a wide spectrum of actors from various nations (comprehensive) or an operation/mission involving departments/agencies from the same nation (WoG) or any interaction of two or more agencies (interagency).

Through the following five chapters, this volume will outline how the complexities of the ever-changing global security environment cannot be resolved solely through military intervention. Rather, a CA to operations is required that involves the engagement and efforts of multiple players and resources, both military and civilian.

The first chapter will discuss the general system of war and conflict as a complex adaptive system and the difference between tactical, operational and strategic levels; it will also illustrate the concept of complex adaptive systems and systems thinking. Chapter Two will describe the evolution of war and conflict and modern conflicts of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, as well as irregular warfare and terrorism, which require the application of the concept of CA to operations. Culture, especially organizational culture, and its important role in comprehensive operations will be examined in Chapter Three. The fourth chapter will review key concepts of CF leadership doctrine in relation to the evolving leadership requirements in comprehensive operations. Finally, Chapter Five will address the issue of developing leaders for comprehensive operations including the identification of the 'soft skills', ranging from communication to cultural awareness and conflict resolution, required in these complex environments.

While military skills and experience remain key to achieving mission success in any conflict and security environment, modern leaders involved in comprehensive operations also need to develop a broader spectrum of 'soft skills' and competencies and, most importantly, embrace a culture change:

Adopting such a 'Comprehensive Approach' to operations begins with inculcating a culture of active collaboration and transparency among those involved in crisis management.<sup>13</sup>

# CHAPTER ONE

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
## THE GENERAL SYSTEM OF WAR AND CONFLICT

### Introduction

Comprehensive operations, from a military perspective, always take place within the context of the structure of conflict or the General System of War and Conflict. This system is comprised of several sub-systems nested within each other in ascending order from the tactical to the operational, strategic and political (policy). This chapter will explain the General System of War and Conflict and the concept of complex adaptive systems as well as systems thinking, in relation to comprehensive operations. Finally, this chapter will outline the leadership requirements necessary to operate in the context of complex adaptive systems such as comprehensive operations.

### The General System of War and Conflict

The General System of War and Conflict construct applies even if the military involvement is strictly humanitarian such as domestic flood relief and like operations. Regardless of the situation, the military operates in units and organizations hierarchically arranged into tactical, operational and strategic sub-systems, and planning and execution occurs in these systems. The entire command and control system is structured in this manner. The General System of War and Conflict is depicted in Figure 2.



**Figure 2: The General System of War and Conflict**

In comprehensive operations, other actors work in the context of their organization, each with their own distinct structure and organizational culture and identity. From the military point of view, all of these organizations must be overlaid on the structure of conflict depicted in Figure 2. This organizational diversity is further complicated by the fact that there are always different relationships and degrees of interaction among all actors at each of these levels. The General System of War and Conflict represents the military world view; however, other partners such as DFAIT and CIDA have their own world view quite distinct from that of the military. These differing perspectives pose significant challenges for commanders and military leaders at all levels. Civilian partners in comprehensive operations are familiar with the concepts of tactical activities and strategy, but are usually less familiar with the operational sub-system and its bridging function between the strategic and tactical sub-systems, usually through the medium of the campaign plan. Nonetheless, there are analogous structures that function at the operational level such as embassies accredited to countries around the world. Operational-level military commanders generally focus on regions, whereas embassies focus on individual countries.

However, Canadian ambassadors are always sensitive to regional dynamics that impact directly or indirectly on their country of primary interest. The role of ambassador, like that of an operational commander, is to integrate or link together a myriad of activities to achieve a certain unity of focus and effort. More generally,

management science has identified a parallel three-tiered system in large corporations and public institutions such as government departments. Leaders at the strategic level plan a trajectory for the institution and its processes, and have a long-term outlook. Leaders at what is called the organizational level (middle-management) plan the context surrounding work; their function is more short-term than that of strategic leaders, and is focused on a given stage of a plan at any given time. The lower level or what is termed the production level, is concerned with day-to-day output.<sup>14</sup>

Notwithstanding the parallelism illustrated above, the basic challenge in comprehensive operations remains the creation of a governance concept and structure, which is acceptable to all, which aims for unity of effort and which minimizes friction. Determining this governance concept is foremost a political challenge but regardless of how it is handled, strategists, both military and civilian, and operational artists, and their regional counterparts must find a way to make it work. This is a central leadership challenge.

## **Complex Adaptive Systems**


It is important, indeed essential, that all participants in comprehensive operations realize that the system in question must be understood as a complex adaptive system<sup>15</sup>. This has a number of critical implications for how comprehensive operations are governed, designed, planned and executed, including how the leadership function is carried out. A complex adaptive system has the following characteristics:

- It involves large numbers of interacting elements.
- The interactions are non-linear and minor actions or changes can produce disproportionately major consequences (the “strategic” corporal, local aid projects).
- The system is dynamic, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts and solutions can’t be imposed but rather arise from the circumstances. This is frequently referred to as emergence<sup>16</sup> (the enemy/opponent always has a voice).
- The system has a history and the past is integrated with the present, the elements evolve with one another and with the evolution, and the evolution is irreversible (open systems).
- Though a complex adaptive system may in retrospect appear to be ordered and predictable, hindsight does not lead to foresight because the external conditions and systems constantly change.
- Unlike in ordered, linear systems (closed systems) where the system constrains the agents, in a complex adaptive system, the agents and the system constrain one another, especially over time. This means that we cannot forecast or predict what will happen.

Whether the military and its comprehensive operations partners are dealing with a severe conflict situation such as Afghanistan or a domestic operation like the Olympics, these characteristics apply. Such operations are often referred to as ill-structured or ‘wicked’ problems. Wicked problems can be characterized by the problematic complexity of non-linear social behaviours over time, subtle relationships between cause and effect, and constant unpredictable interactions. Wicked problems are problems of organized complexity as opposed to problems of simplicity amenable to analytical solutions or disorganized complexity amenable to statistical solutions. The concept of wicked problems is further explained in chapter five.

## Systems Thinking

In the General System of War and Conflict, complexity increases as we ascend the hierarchy to the policy level. In fact, as we proceed from the tactical sub-system to the operational/strategic, we cross a cognitive boundary as shown in Figure 3.



**Figure 3: The Cognitive Boundary**

The cognitive skills exercised by all participants in comprehensive operations in the tactical sub-system, differ fundamentally from those required in the operational and strategic sub-systems. Below the boundary, familiar modes of thinking, such as linear



analytical thinking based on Newtonian constructs are adequate, as are traditional planning techniques. Those leaders operating above the boundary in the operational and strategic sub-systems, however, must employ systems thinking based on complexity theory constructs. Systems thinking is a practice of thinking that takes a holistic view of complex events or phenomena, seemingly caused by a myriad of isolated independent and usually unpredictable forces or factors. Systems thinking views all events and phenomena as ‘wholes’ whose components interact according to complex systems principles such as openness, purposefulness, multi-dimensionality and emergence. Systems methodologies such as the U.S. Army’s Design Concept and the widely used civilian approach known as Soft System Methodology<sup>17</sup> are the appropriate learning and decision-making tools when approaching a mission at the operational and strategic levels.

The full impact of complexity on leadership is addressed in Chapter Four, but all participants in comprehensive operations should be aware that leading in complexity involves:

- developing a new mental model for each new situation rather than applying the same general prescription to many situations;
- reasoning by analogy and intuition about qualitative patterns rather than by analysis and quantification;
- thinking in terms of whole interconnected systems, including the relationships in them, rather than thinking of the separate parts;
- focussing on the learning process and on the mental models governing the process rather than the outcomes; and
- becoming aware of the effects of group dynamics on thinking and learning, and minimizing the dysfunctional group dynamics.

## **Strategy, Operations and Tactics**

In the General System of War and Conflict, the all-encompassing system is that of policy; that is, the expression of the desired end-state sought by government and the accompanying guidance for the employment of the instruments of power including military force. Policy-makers rely on advisors to formulate policy and in comprehensive operations, unlike in more conventional military missions, these advisors come from a variety of departments and agencies. In fact, depending on the nature of the particular comprehensive operation, non-military advisors may be more influential than their military colleagues.

In addition, all partners in comprehensive operations must understand that, whereas policy cannot emerge save by means of politics, politics can fail to produce sound and/or clear policy. This is a ubiquitous problem for all three groups of players in the process – politicians, civilian officials and military professionals – whether they be involved with unidimensional, complicated issues or more significantly with comprehensive operations.

Often neglected, or even resisted, is the fact that the main lines along which comprehensive operations progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the campaign(s) and into the subsequent peace. The logic of the operation is supplied by policy, whereas the grammar is supplied by strategy, operational art and tactics. In this dynamic, strategy fulfils the 'translation' function between the logic and the remaining levels of the grammar. At one end of the strategic 'translation bridge', lies civil-military relations where grand strategy and its subset, military strategy, are formulated. At the other end of the bridge, lies the operational sub-system with its nested tactical sub-system, where actions are designed to produce the desired strategic effect to enable political outcomes. Thus, where the principle purpose of effective civil-military relations is the national interest and national security, its output is strategy.

The strategic sub-system is the dominant sub-system below policy. It is here that the main political goals are defined in instrumental terms useful to the military and other non-military actors in comprehensive or WoG operations. Defining these goals is a challenging process, because the criteria for politics are subjective, ambiguous and indeterminate, while those for the military tend to be objective, concrete and relatively time limited. That is to say, the military is predisposed to seek clear, early end-states. Other participants in comprehensive operations may have less difficulty with this political dimension since, in the areas of diplomacy, development and policing, longer term planning horizons and less clear end-states are often tolerated and seen as inherent in the system.

The function of grand strategy is to coordinate and integrate all instruments of national power towards a given political goal. Military strategy is a sub-set of this function and is defined in CF doctrine as the art of distributing and applying military force, or the threat of such action, to fulfil the ends of policy. A major factor contributing to the difficulty of understanding and 'doing' strategy is that it is virtual behaviour, it has no material existence. Strategy is an abstraction or, as noted by Barry Watts, an American analyst and expert in military strategy, transformation and related topics, strategies are heuristics in the sense of being guesses as opposed to solutions in any engineering sense.<sup>18</sup>


A helpful way to understand strategy is to view it as the function that delivers the theory of victory or success. All participants should take careful note that, since strategy is a uniquely difficult element of war and conflict, rare are the people who can shine in the role of strategist. The number of effective strategists can be increased through education, though not through training and not at all reliably by the experience of command and planning at the operational and tactical levels.<sup>19</sup> Analogues in other departments for military strategy would be for example, the role of United Nations Security Council resolutions in DFAIT, or Poverty Reduction Strategies in CIDA.

There are two fundamentally different kinds of strategy depending on the political objectives set. It is of the utmost importance that politicians, military officers and civilian officials understand the distinction between the two kinds of strategy since success in comprehensive operations is dependent on clarity on this issue. If the

political objectives are extreme, demanding decisive military defeat and complete political capitulation, then the appropriate strategy is the strategy of annihilation. Here the aim is to render the opponent prostrate and once completely defeated, all of the victor's demands will be imposed after the unconditional surrender of the enemy. In this strategy, the goal is decisive victory and nothing is decided until this has occurred. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, examples of this scenario would be both the First and Second World Wars.

However, if the objective is more limited, the appropriate approach would be what is known as a bi-polar strategy whereby the strategist operates sequentially or simultaneously on either the battle pole or the non-battle pole. On this latter pole, a variety of tools would be used to help induce the adversary to come to terms by negotiating a settlement agreeable to all sides. These tools include diplomacy, peacekeeping, economic sanctions, development aid, operational pauses and the genuine offer of assistance in any post-conflict phase of stability operations and training of all sorts. The military alone operates on the battle pole when required; however, the military can also operate on the non-battle pole alongside its comprehensive operations partners.

Of course, in the strategy of annihilation, all elements of national power are applied but they are employed in support of direct, continuous military operations. In a bi-polar strategy, they are employed alongside any direct military action on the battle pole; and, in fact, the military may be acting in a subsidiary or supporting role. A bi-polar strategy allows for the shaping of a conflict and continued political engagement to redefine the conflict to the government's own advantage in both domestic and international terms. The two kinds of strategy are presented in Figure 4.



**Figure 4: The Bi-Polar Strategy within the General System of War and Conflict**

As discussed in Chapter Two, the end of the Cold War has brought about a profound shift in international relations and the associated security environment. Globalization, the decline of intensely divergent political ideologies such as liberalism, fascism and communism, and the changing conception of geography and physical territory in the state's security considerations have rendered problematic contemplating political objectives requiring a strategy of annihilation for their realization. At the same time, political fragmentation, ethnic and religious tensions, and a host of demographic, ecological, and environmental factors have produced a destabilization of the international system calling for the continued use of force, from time to time; a use contained and shaped by the bi-polar strategy.

The international system is in the early stages of a tectonic shift where the controlling amplifier will be human and biological rather than organizational and technological. The emerging vision is one that shifts from the traditional linear constructs to one that involves the cyber domain, is amoebic in shape and is distributed, dispersed, non-linear and essentially formless in space and unbounded in time. The type of confrontation that arises in this new context will be 'psycho-cultural' war and conflict. Psycho-cultural conflict causes a shift in classical centres of gravity from the will of the government and armies to the perceptions of populations, both ours and theirs. Victory will depend more in terms of capturing the psycho-cultural high ground rather than the geographic high ground.

Clearly, the new security paradigm calls for the employment of the bi-polar strategy. Furthermore, the conduct of a bi-polar strategy is virtually synonymous with a comprehensive or WoG operation because much of the activity on the non-battle pole is the responsibility of politicians, diplomats, development experts, economists, legal experts and police forces. Crucial to this type of operation and strategy is a deep and mutual understanding by all actors of the contemporary nature of the General System of War and Conflict. This common conception is important throughout the system but is imperative at the political-strategic level where sustained, determined and inspired leadership is the *sine qua non* for political success.

The operational sub-system is nested within the strategic, and it is here where the coherent accomplishment of strategic objectives through the employment of tactical resources is achieved by the conduct of major operations and campaigns. Operational commanders employ operational manoeuvres consisting of mass and mobility to achieve their goals. Operational art is a creative enterprise within the operational sub-system comprising a reciprocal discourse between the National Command Authority and the operator-designer focussing on the operational concept, and another reciprocal discourse between the operator-designer and the commanders of the tactical components concentrating on the detailed planning of the manoeuvre scheme. For example, in the case of NATO's Afghanistan mission, the National Command Authority was the political-strategic interface in NATO Headquarters in Brussels (NATO Council plus Military Committee), the operator-designer was the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, and the tactical components were distributed throughout Afghanistan including all the PRTs.

Tactics are the final nested sub-system in the General System of War and Conflict. They are defined as the direct use of force in the engagement or battle if operating on the battle pole; or the direct application of personnel and materiel to accomplish designated tasks restricted in time and/or space if operating on the non-battle pole. Tactics are obviously important since they are solely responsible for the delivery of concrete success within the context set by strategy and operational art. Strategy, operational art, or tactics cannot have integrity without the others. Strategy bereft of tactics cannot be accomplished. Tactics innocent of strategy are nonsensically aimless. Furthermore, any applied military activity is inherently tactical. The fundamental concept of strategy clearly states that strategy is the wide-ranging employment of national power and force. The operational level assigns assets and tactics are the immediate employment of all assigned assets. Thus, the immediate employment of assets, military and otherwise, is tactical regardless of its name or title. While the employment is tactical, the ultimate effect is strategic.

Commanders and military leaders in comprehensive and WoG operations will rarely be in positions where they can order or direct their civilian colleagues in the conventional way that they have been trained to lead their military subordinates. This is especially true in the operational and strategic sub-systems. Military leaders in this context can, however, 'enable and motivate' in accordance with the doctrinal definition of leadership in the CF. To do this effectively in all three sub-systems in the General System of War and Conflict these leaders need different perspectives on certain aspects of leadership; perspectives that take into account the truly complex nature of such operations and the experiences and expectations of their civilian colleagues. Key leadership tasks in this paradigm differ somewhat from traditional notions as summarized in the next section.

### **Operational/Strategic Leadership Tasks**

Complex environments call for leadership attributes different from traditional notions of leadership as explained by Colonel C. R. Papparoni (Ret) U.S. Army, associate professor, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.<sup>20</sup> This is true to some extent in the tactical sub-system but is imperative in the operational and strategic sub-systems. The capacity to develop and work in complex adaptive systems (CAS) cannot occur without a conceptual shift in our understanding of effective leadership. Papparoni et al. outline eight leadership tasks necessary for the military to operate within a CAS. In this regard, as discussed earlier, a CA to operations is best viewed by all participants as representing a CAS. Traditional notions of military leadership are not abandoned, but greater emphasis must be placed on these non-traditional concepts in comprehensive operations as described in the following section.

<b>Traditional Notions of Military Leadership</b>	<b>Leadership in (Comprehensive) Complex Adaptive Systems</b>
Role defining	Relationship building
Standardization	Loose coupling
Simplifying	Complicating
Socializing	Diversifying
Decision-making	Sense-making
Knowing	Learning
Commanding and controlling	Improvising
Planning based on estimates	Emergent thinking

*Relationship Building, not Role-defining*

Hierarchical organizations such as the military and government departments tend to emphasize roles such as commander, director, manager, etc. Over-emphasizing roles tends to isolate individuals and interferes with effective communication. Focusing on roles can also often result in a focus on differences in values and operating procedures, which can be a major point of contention. Relationships must be built that transcend adherence to specific roles.

*Loose Coupling, not Standardizing*

Maintaining order by relying on tight standards and procedures reduces adaptability, innovation and emergent thinking. Drawing attention to the expertise and value systems of all the professional communities involved, coupled with allowing the self-organizing properties of complex systems to emerge, is a better way to gain coordination and unity of effort than standardization. This is the basis, in military terms, of mission command.

### *Complicating, not Simplifying*

Simplification can mask the complexity that is in the environment, leading one to miss critical clues for future action. Maintaining agility means keeping many options in play at the same time, including those proposed by interagency partners.

### *Diversifying, not Socializing*

To achieve a homogenous culture takes years of intense socialization in an organization. Such a lengthy socialization process is not practicable or even desirable in comprehensive operations. All actors must accept and respect the products of each of their partners' socialization processes. In fact, diversity in expertise, experience and values increases the potential for new insights and solutions.

### *Sense-making, not Decision-making*

While decision-making is essential to effective leadership, leaders must first make sense of the situation. Due to the complexity of comprehensive operations, sense-making is a social activity that requires interaction and development of a collective mind; it is not groupthink but a shared sense of meaning regarding the situation at hand.

### *Learning, not Knowing*

Rather than relying on the hierarchical approach of knowing what is going on and telling others in the organization what to do, leaders should seek to create a learning organization that values knowledge sharing. Even experts cannot 'know it all', therefore, all members of a team must be given the opportunity to contribute and learn.

### *Improvising, not Commanding and Controlling*

Improvising is the capacity to respond to the unanticipated circumstances that are out of our control. Improvisation requires a balance of structure and flexibility. By playing off the strengths of others and adapting those strengths to the changing situation, operational effectiveness increases. Leaders must work to develop patterns of social interaction among professionals that give them confidence in each other.

### *Emergent Thinking, not Planning Based on Estimates*

The bureaucratic approach to administration relies on formal planning, i.e., estimates, forecasting, cause-effect relationships, etc. This approach constrains emergent thinking. For example, scenario-playing exercises have always helped the military plan for combat situations and the element of surprise.

These eight leadership approaches should be developed by operational and strategic leaders in order to ensure organizational adaptation to our ever-changing, interconnected, complex environment.

### **Summary**

Notwithstanding the different roles and organizational cultures of other partners in comprehensive operations, the military perspective is profoundly shaped by the structure of conflict and its impact on leadership as discussed in this chapter. That being said, it remains important for military leaders to ensure that they also have an in-depth understanding of the world view that non-military actors bring to the operation. Leaders must have enough awareness of the skill sets, strengths and constraints of the players in comprehensive operations to facilitate understanding, planning and execution in these settings. A critical question then becomes exactly what do each of the partners in comprehensive operations need to know about the other – and at what level of leadership/seniority do they need to know it. The answer to this question comes only through education, common training and, of course, experience. With this theoretical construct of the General System of War and Conflict in mind, Chapter Two describes the real world of the security environment as it has evolved since the Cold War.



## CHAPTER TWO

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### THE 'NEW WARS' OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

#### Introduction

To better prepare to participate in or contribute to the leadership of comprehensive operations, it is necessary to understand as clearly as possible the broad security environment wherein such operations take place. This chapter analyzes the factors shaping the 21<sup>st</sup> century security environment and how these factors demonstrate the need for the CA in current and, in all likelihood, future operations.

#### Evolution of War and Conflict

As is frequently the case when considering the subject of war and conflict, the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz provides a thought provoking starting point.

We wanted to show how every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions and its own peculiar preconceptions. Each period therefore, would have held to its own theory of war. It follows that the events of every age must be judged in light of its own peculiar times.<sup>21</sup>

Clausewitz's point seems quite relevant today when large-scale state-on-state war has receded into the background and a different type of war and conflict, as yet imperfectly defined, described and explained, has emerged. No doubt, state-on-state war in today's security environment remains a distinct possibility whether it is between India and Pakistan, Israel and any number of Arab states, or the multi-nation war that would be occasioned by conflict on the Korean Peninsula, or amongst Arab states themselves to name a few examples. However, preparing for the new type of conflict described in this chapter, and likely to predominate for the time being, will require different political/diplomatic thinking, economic tools, military strategy and doctrine and, perhaps above all, in-depth socio-cultural knowledge.

Although it is possible to identify many common, underlying factors and causes that characterize this new global security environment, each conflict will be more or less unique with regard to context and protagonists. Both dimensions, the general and the specific, need to be taken into account if we are to properly prepare for these distinctive conflicts.

From 1789 to 1989, the predominant characteristics of war and conflict remained remarkably stable. It is only with the end of the Cold War that the shift in the characteristics of war, of the kind that Clausewitz was referring to, becomes apparent. Previously, inter-state war was the norm and the state was seen as possessing the only legitimate monopoly on the use of force and violence to achieve its policy goals, both

domestically and internationally. This remains the case. From the time of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), non-interference in the domestic or sovereign internal affairs of other states was a canon of the international system. Although domestic disturbances, insurrections and civil wars were ubiquitous throughout this period, they did not fit into the accepted paradigm of state-on-state war. In this latter category, ideology was usually a prime, motivating factor, whether the fight was between liberty and absolutism, democracy and fascism or the lengthy confrontation between the capitalist West and the communist Eastern Bloc. Once policy goals were set, the strategic objective was decisive military victory – the defeat of the opponent's military means and will to resist. This objective was usually pursued by adopting what Clausewitz called the strategy of annihilation. Technology played a central role in war throughout this period: from railways and the telegraph, to the internal combustion engine, machine guns, aviation, the manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum, and the development of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, Laws of Armed Conflict and other international instruments continued to evolve; for example, the prohibition against war, except for defensive war, in the Charter of the United Nations. These laws provided a fairly authoritative guide concerning when war was legitimate and how it should be conducted. This imperfect legal framework with its ancillary elements of disarmament, arms control and deterrence theory was intended to restrain the worst excesses of the total wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945.

Inter-state war in the future is not only conceivable but probable. Further, any future inter-state war will most certainly be fought using advanced technology. In this regard, cyber-power and space power will have similar impacts to those experienced with the rise of airpower in the twentieth century. Weapons of mass destruction in general and nuclear weapons in particular may also play a role in such future war.

## **New Era of Wars and Conflicts**

It appears that the first two decades of the twenty-first century will be dominated by a very different kind of war and conflict; one of protracted, complex, ambiguous armed conflict rather than shorter wars with clearly stated political aims leading to decisive outcomes. It was in the 1990s that this new kind of war and conflict first made its unambiguous appearance in the West. The relatively recent emergence of this type of conflict can largely be accounted for by the fact that it had previously either been contained within the context of the superpower confrontation or remained subject to the prevailing interpretation of the sovereign rights of all members of the international system. From South East Asia to Central America, into Southern Europe, across much of Africa, through the Middle East and Central Asia, and into South Asia protracted, low-intensity and vicious conflict raged. In many places, this new type of conflict continues unabated.

Ironically, at the end of the Cold War, and impelled by the accelerating Information Age, many in the West perceived that an entirely different change was taking place that would revolutionize war and warfare in the twenty-first century. In retrospect,

and in the opinion of many practitioners and scholars, they identified the wrong revolution for the time. The much vaunted Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) unduly favoured discontinuity, encouraged a technophile defence community to (mis)place their faith in the wonders of technology and all but invited its devotees to ignore the widely varying political origins, context and circumstances of warfare.

General Rupert Smith, in his ground-breaking book, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, describes this new era as follows:

The new situations were always a complex combination of political/cultural and military circumstances, though there appeared to be little comprehension as to how the two became intertwined. Nor, far more seriously for the military practitioner, how they constantly influenced each other as events unfolded. We are now in a new era of conflict, in fact, a new paradigm, which I define as “war amongst the people;” one in which political and military developments go hand in hand.<sup>22</sup>

The new paradigm of ‘war amongst the people’ is based on the concept of a continuous criss-crossing of confrontation and conflict, regardless of whether a state is facing another state or a non-state actor. Thus, confrontation is underpinned by the political dimension and from time to time will erupt into actual conflict with a direct military dimension. Rather than war and peace, there is no predefined sequence, nor is peace necessarily the starting point or the end point. Conflicts may be resolved; however, this is not always the case for confrontations. Unlike industrial war, in ‘war amongst the people’ no act of force will ever be decisive. According to Smith, winning the trial of strength will not deliver the will of the people, which should be the only true aim of any use of force in today’s conflicts.

‘War amongst the people’ can be summarized in five points:

- The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide a political outcome to those of establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided.
- We fight amongst the people not on the traditional battlefield.
- Confrontations tend to be timeless, while conflicts are usually protracted.
- We fight to preserve the force rather than risk all to gain the objective.<sup>23</sup>
- On each occasion, new uses are found for old weapons and organizations which are the products of industrial war.<sup>24</sup>

The British political scientist Mary Kaldor’s analysis of the key factors that help account for these paradigmatic variations on a common theme – psycho-cultural conflict and ‘war amongst the people’ – assists greatly with our whole understanding of this new era of conflict. Kaldor argues that there has been a revolution in military affairs, but it is a revolution in the social relations of warfare, not in technology, even

though the changes in social relations are influenced by and make use of the new technology.<sup>25</sup> What is new about war has to be analyzed in terms of the disintegration of states and the changes in social relations under the impact of globalization rather than in terms of technology. Globalization in this context is the intensification of global interconnectedness – political, economic, military and cultural – and the changing character of political authority.

Essentially, Kaldor's point is that the processes known as globalization are breaking up the cultural and socio-economic divisions that defined the patterns of politics which characterized the modern period. The new type of warfare has to be understood in terms of this global dislocation. The effect of globalization on political patterns and warfare is the genesis of the concept of failing and failed states.<sup>26</sup> The politics of the new wars are about the claim to power, and hence the access to resources (wealth), on the basis of seemingly traditional identities – nation, tribe, religion. Yet the upsurge of the politics of particularistic identities cannot be understood in traditional terms. This new type of politics has to be explained recognizing the growing dissonance between those who participate in trans-national networks which communicate through emails, faxes, telephones and air travel, and those who are excluded from global processes and are tied to localities, even though their lives may be profoundly shaped by those same processes. The former are becoming fewer and wealthier, while the latter become more numerous and poorer.

To be sure, today's conflicts have political goals. The aim of these conflicts is usually political mobilization on the basis of identity, which can coalesce around ethnicity, religion, geographic location or a multitude of other factors. Examples include Croat and Serb, Hutu and Tutsi, Arab and Israeli, Hamas and Fatah, Sunni and Shiite, Kurd and Turk, Tamil and Sinhalese, Arab and African, and Pashtun, Uzbek, Tajik and Hazari. The military strategy for achieving political aims based on identity, by those who seek to exploit these divisions, is population displacement and destabilization to get rid of those whose identities are different and to foment hatred and fear. The goals of the new warfare are also particularistic where the strategy is control on the basis of exclusion and the operational concept is irregular, asymmetric conflict. The tactics for achieving this goal are terror, destabilization, ethnic cleansing and even genocide. The characteristics of the new wars – the politics of identity, the decentralization of violence (defying the nation-state's claim to monopoly), and the globalized war economy – can be found to a greater or lesser degree all over the world.

### **Irregular Warfare and Terrorism**

The capacity for military strategy to control and subsume the operational and tactical application of force in the inter-state context was a necessary precondition for the systemization of war. By contrast, asymmetry in the use of force creates a situation where tactical elements can independently produce strategic effects. Small wars (irregular warfare – guerrilla warfare, insurgency, civil war and asymmetric warfare of all types)<sup>27</sup> used to be a concomitant of larger wars, providing support and relief for the operations of the regular army. After WW I, they gradually turned into a strategic option that was no longer necessarily subordinate to, or convergent with, a

war fought by regular troops. Rather, modern small wars seek political objectives regardless of the absence of regular troops. Over the past two centuries, irregular warfare has been widespread, frequent and typically bloody. However, until recently such warfare, in its several variants, has never been the dominant category of politically organized violence in the mainstream of strategic history.

The terrorist attack in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 added a profoundly new element to this phenomenon by combining the older concept of irregular warfare with what can be described as a post-modern or globalized version of terrorism. It is instructive to acknowledge that this version of terrorism had already made its appearance as early as the first attack on the World Trade Center, the embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania and the assault on the USS Cole. To be sure, terrorism is as old as war itself, but post-modern terrorism is new in its excessively ambitious goals, its global domain and its technical capacity to cause harm (including, of course, weapons of mass destruction).

With regard to religious motivation, there are many apocalyptic-type terrorist groups in the world, including Christian, Hindu, Buddhist and Jewish versions. However, Islamic fundamentalist terrorism is currently a particularly potent variety of the new form of terrorism and likely will remain pervasive as it is fuelled by the continuing Israeli-Arab conflict and by its perceived alienation from Western culture. Equally problematic is the Islamist terrorist ability to virtually fuse irregular warfare and terrorist techniques into a seamless strategy on a global scale. Tactically and operationally, this Islamist method requires a very carefully orchestrated military/police/intelligence response that transcends the traditional boundaries of state sovereignty. Politically and strategically, a well co-ordinated political/social/economic/information/military approach remains essential to combating this form of terrorism.

In military terms, irregular war remains an essentially defensive strategy, even if it is employed for revolutionary aims. The insurgents win if they don't lose and if their political will exceeds that of the technically stronger opponent. There is a crucial difference between irregular war and the strategy of terrorism that, in both political and operational terms, has an essentially offensive character. Terrorism is further distinguished from irregular warfare by the form that the violence takes and the imprecision of its ultimate objective. Terrorism seeks to bring awareness to a political grievance but rarely, if ever, results on its own in political change. Terrorism, therefore, can be characterized as a component of a strategy that aims for the spectacular communication of a certain kind of message; that is to say, any state or community is vulnerable to terrorism at all times. However, to achieve substantial lasting political change, acts of terrorism must be supplemented with the use of force systematically over time, such as any form of irregular warfare.

The character of these 'new' wars, the kind of war for our age as Clausewitz would have it, and this era of 'confrontation and conflict' is succinctly stated in a recent publication promulgated by the Chief of the Land Staff:

In the future, and given our increasingly globalized, interdependent world, each dimension of the conflict web promises to encompass more actors, more motivations and more varied strategies and means for achieving the goals of those involved. Throughout, and far more so than in the past, however, conflict and its conduct will involve less emphasis on its physical and more on its informational and moral aspects. In short, the perceptual, psychological and ideational will increasingly eclipse the physical as the chief battlegrounds of conflict. And the human dimensions of conflict will be even more salient and significant.<sup>28</sup>

The intervention by stable states in these types of conflicts will almost certainly continue, not only for political and economic self-interest, but also for humanitarian and human rights concerns. This latter motivation has led to a process of eroding the hitherto almost sacrosanct prohibition against interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Today, and in the future, it is likely that states and coalitions of states, legitimized by the United Nations, will intervene when domestic governments will not or cannot act to prevent massive humanitarian and human rights violations. Humanitarian aims are the unmistakable motivation behind the unanimous adoption of the recent ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

### **New Conflicts and the Comprehensive Approach**

As already mentioned, prevailing in these kinds of conflicts will require a different strategy to mitigate conflict: a CA to operations that encompasses all levels, starting at the politico-strategic level and extending seamlessly through the operational and tactical levels. A CA to operations goes beyond security as it addresses issues ranging from humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, the restoration (or establishment) of the capacity for good governance and long term socio-economic development. At the same time, even the most powerful nation-states will likely be unwilling to act outside of a legitimized international coalition capable of synchronizing all of the disparate elements of international power necessary to (in Smith’s model): “establish the condition in which the outcome may be decided.”<sup>29</sup> Many Western governments have now realized the necessity of a legitimately sanctioned synchronized effort and while none have mastered the technique, progress is being made.

### **Summary**

Employing a comprehensive strategy to prevail in irregular warfare has two major domestic implications. First, these conflicts are inevitably long – usually measured in decades. In the liberal democratic state, it is very difficult to sustain public support for such action, especially in the face of continuing casualties and ever rising financial demands. Second, unlike the strategy of annihilation, in these new conflicts, civil-military relations are much more closely meshed, and civil-military activities and co-operation are deep and continuous. Additionally, the political ramifications of even the most seemingly trivial tactical action are often profound and debilitating. Specifically, it is the relationship between the various government organizations, both

civilian and military, that requires a deep understanding of the principles of leadership doctrine required and how they apply within the context of comprehensive operations.

This co-operation and ability to apply leadership doctrine, regardless of the organizational structure of the operation, is essential for future missions in which a bi-polar strategy must be applied. Militaries that wait until they are faced with 'war amongst the people' before they adapt will inevitably fail. Relating the CF leadership doctrine to this new reality – coalition and comprehensive operations in a complex political, strategic and tactical environment – is crucial.

## CHAPTER THREE

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### ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES

#### Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapters, contemporary complex operations go beyond the scope of the military and require increased co-operation and collaboration with OGDs such as Foreign Affairs, International Development, Borders Services, Correctional Services, police forces, IOs, NGOs, local institutions and multinational forces. In addition, these missions may also involve interactions with social services agencies, private sector entities such as banks, as well as local communities and other stakeholders. This increased level of collaboration and interaction calls for a deeper understanding of the different cultures at the national, regional and local levels, as well as the organizational cultures of the various actors and stakeholders involved. Consequently, leaders must develop an awareness and understanding of the various cultures surrounding them and at the same time realize the potential for clashes in organizational culture. In this context, organizational culture can be simply described as the way things are done in an organization, or the way they do business. These clashes of culture can in turn hinder the successful interactions among interagency partners as illustrated by the following examples that are drawn from literature on the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, the Vancouver Olympics and the Canadian Arctic.

#### **The Canadian Mission in Afghanistan: Coordination and Organizational Culture Challenges**

Over the course of the Afghanistan mission, it became clear that the 3D approach did not function well because the three functions of defence, diplomacy and development are not distinct but rather are inter-related. The coordination among peers from different departments was also problematic. A peer can persuade and lobby but cannot easily convince other departments to change how they do business if this is against their department's culture. Thus, the system put in place was Canada's WoG approach which involved the creation of a coordination mechanism requiring departments to follow a single plan. Despite these coordination efforts at the strategic level, the reality in the field is that the military still has most of the resources and personnel. In addition, the civilian departments have different approaches to the concept of command. Additional challenges to the WoG approach in this case are that each department uses different reporting chains and different planning approaches.<sup>30</sup>

#### **The Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics: Culture Clashes and Tribalism**

The planning and execution of the Vancouver Olympics was unique due to the scope and size of the games. It involved over 300 government agencies in three levels of



government, two countries, the Olympic organizations and many sports federations. The various cultures did not fit well together and formed a series of pegs being pressed into dissimilar holes. Despite this clash of cultures, there were successes and improvements to interagency cooperation and coordination. At the end of the games there was a formal review to capture the experiences and lessons learned. However, in the vetting process, the recommendations for change that did not conform to the best interests of the organizations or its leadership, were removed or watered down in the final reports. Given the games were a success and there were no significant security issues, the changes may have been deemed necessary. The logic adopted in this case may be attributed to hubris – excessive pride and self-confidence. Therefore, the application and operational effectiveness of the CA is limited by issues of hubris and tribalism resulting from a concern over the dissipation of power that could result from structural changes in the national security infrastructures.<sup>31</sup>

### **The Canadian Arctic: Cultural and Organizational Challenges**

Security in the Canadian Arctic is a valuable example of a whole of government approach at the national level. Providing security in these vast regions is a complex problem that goes beyond the mandate of a single federal department. It is an area of responsibility involving multiple federal departments, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces (DND/CF), and Public Safety Canada (PS). Success in Arctic security requires establishing sound relationships between departments, avoiding duplication of efforts and making the best use of existing assets and strengths. While this cooperation among civilian departments and the military is essential, it poses challenges that are cultural as well as organizational.<sup>32</sup>


These three examples illustrate some of the hurdles that organizations must overcome to work effectively as an interagency team: the differences in organizational cultures being the largest hurdle. It is particularly challenging for military and para-military organizations to understand and embrace different organizational cultures and perspectives due to having a ‘closed’ organizational culture. Such organizations are often characterized by a hierarchical structure, a rigorous chain of command, a linear planning approach, rigid operating procedures and a strong military or para-military culture.<sup>33</sup> ‘Closed’ organizational cultures may result in systemic biases, groupthink and an inability to accept diverse perspectives. In the context of comprehensive operations, it is important for leaders to be aware of potential bias and barriers, and at the same time encourage openness and flexibility within their organizations.

Comprehensive operations require adopting a more open organizational culture by implementing horizontal structures, less-linear planning, and more flexible operating processes, as well as embracing diverse perspectives and holistic ways of thinking.

## Culture

In order to understand organizational culture, we need to first define and understand culture. Culture can be described as a shared system of meaning, ideas and thoughts that gives people a sense of belonging and identity, and is transmitted from generation to generation of a community or social group. More complex definitions exist in the literature. Geert Hofstede, an influential Dutch social psychologist and anthropologist, defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another... it is learned, not inherited”.<sup>34</sup>

Various models of culture have been created by scholars, including the iceberg model proposed by organizational development scientists Wendell French and Cecil Bell<sup>35</sup> (see Figure 5 for an adaptation of this model). In this model, the smaller portion of the iceberg above the water surface symbolizes the attributes of an individual culture that are visible and conscious, such as behaviour, lifestyle, functions and rituals. The larger submerged portion of the iceberg represents those cultural traits that are less visible or sub-conscious, some of which are innate, such as ethnicity, while others are learned, such as education. Based on the iceberg theory, only about 1/10<sup>th</sup> of culture is visible and the rest is invisible.



**Figure 5: Individual Cultural Iceberg**

Consciously or subconsciously, culture influences the way we do things, view life and behave in our private sphere or at work. We are come into contact with to our culture as children; therefore, it is something that we take for granted, that we consider ‘normal’. It is only when we come into contact with other cultures that we are faced with diverse perspectives and different modes of behaviour and conduct. At times, adjusting to a new culture can be relatively simple, especially if it is similar to our own. At other times, the new culture may be so different that we may experience a ‘culture shock’.<sup>36</sup>

There are cultures based on religion, and there are national cultures shared by the citizens of a country. Within a single country, there may be more than one national group or culture. Canada is a good example, with two official languages (French and English), two main national groups (Anglophones and Francophones) and its Aboriginal peoples (First Nations, Inuit and Métis). Similar examples are found in Belgium and Switzerland. Countries with a historic tradition of immigration, such as Canada, the United States and Australia, have a common national culture, but at the same time many citizens retain elements of their culture of origin. In addition to these larger cultural groups, there are subcultures made up of people who share similar experiences, interests and values, such as members of different professional groups (lawyers, doctors, academic, teachers, military personnel), gays and lesbians, and teenagers. There are also differences between people who live in the city and those who live in rural areas. Companies and organizations also have their own corporate culture or unique organizational culture.

## **Organizational Culture**

Organizational culture can be defined in multiple ways. Edgar Schein, a prominent organizational culture theorist, defines the culture of a group in an organization as:

A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.<sup>37</sup>

Organizational culture includes the aspects that are visible and explicit, such as buildings, structures, dress/uniforms, rules, and formal functions or rites. At the same time, there are many more cultural aspects that are invisible and implicit in an organization, such as the way things are planned and organized, shared values, norms and expectations, and the approach to work. For example, in the military's organizational culture, there is a well developed body of official doctrine covering such matters as operations, administration, and leadership. While some interagency partners may not have developed similar formal doctrine, they have analogous ways to 'do business' such as using 'best practices' and 'communities of practice' upon which they base their approach to the challenges they face. Military leaders must be aware of these parallel approaches to various challenges.

According to Schein, there are three levels of culture within organizations: visible processes (artifacts), espoused values and underlying assumptions.<sup>38</sup>

### ***Artifacts***

Artifacts include visible products such as the physical environment, language, technology, products, dress, manners, published lists of values, ceremonies, visible behaviours and processes. Examples of artifacts in the CF include: units, bases, equipment, uniforms, and the attributes/values of the profession of arms. Other

organizations and departments clearly have their own artifacts. For example, the headquarters of DFAIT, the Lester B. Pearson Building, not only displays various foreign flags at the entrance, but its shape evokes the shape of a sphinx due to Pearson's involvement in the resolution of the Suez Canal Crisis.

### *Espoused Value*

Espoused values include a person's sense of what ought to be, ways to solve a problem, what is right and wrong, and what will work or not work. For example, should a significant error occur during a CF mission, a leader may identify the need for increasing military training. The team would view this additional training as something valued by the leadership. If the increase in training in turn results in positive outcomes that are widely endorsed, an emphasis on training will become a shared value. An analogous situation for DFAIT would be the value officials place on the role of diplomacy and its primacy over the use of force. In CIDA, a primary espoused value is the belief that the alleviation of poverty will enhance global stability and security.

### *Basic Underlying Assumptions*

Basic underlying assumptions refer to beliefs that are taken for granted by a group. They are implicit assumptions that guide the behaviour, perceptions and feelings of the members of a team or an organization. Basic assumptions are neither confronted nor debated and thus are resistant to change. Referring to the example above, the underlying assumption is that the outcome of increased training will be an improvement in operational effectiveness. Another example would be if we assume that people will take advantage of situations when afforded the opportunity, we may perceive someone working from home as not doing their work or as being lazy.

### *Theories in Use*

Sometimes espoused values can be in conflict with 'theories in use' (i.e., the ways that values and theories are actually understood and applied in practice) due to the basic underlying assumptions and/or the taken-for-granted beliefs of the group. For example, in the CF education and training of officers and NCMs is 'officially' valued and supported by the leadership. To this end, there are specific policies in place such as allowing personnel to use work time to complete on-line leadership development programs required for promotion to the next rank. In practice, however, some supervisors deny time to study during working hours based on their assumption that work takes priority over education. In other words, the theories in use are in conflict with the espoused values due to incorrect assumptions.

A second example of espoused values being in contrast with the 'theories in use' is provided by a study of U.S. Army officers.<sup>39</sup> The study showed that future U.S. Army senior leaders perceive that the deep-seated underlying assumptions embedded in the

Army culture are focused on organizational stability and control, formal rules and policies, coordination and efficiency, goals and results, and competitiveness.<sup>40</sup> This is in contrast with the Army profession's stated ideals of professional development as "the advancement of those skills that support innovative, flexible, risk-taking, visionary, and entrepreneurial behavior".<sup>41</sup>

Basic underlying assumptions are so embedded in the organizational culture that people may not be conscious of their own assumptions. Having assumptions can lead to bias. This is one of the main reasons why comprehensive operations can pose such a challenge; leaders need to be aware that other organizations also have espoused values and potentially clashing 'theories in use' based on their own underlying assumptions. Leaders need to think about their own theories in use and question their own assumptions rather than taking for granted their way of doing things. Also, they must not dismiss other organizations way of doing things or assume that 'our way is the right way and the only way'. Jointly with their interagency partners, a leader's goal should be to identify what is the best way to work together.

### Visible and Invisible Aspects of Organizational Culture

Similar to individual culture, organizational culture can also be depicted as an iceberg with some aspects that are visible above the water surface, such as the physical environment, buildings, products, processes, and dress. In contrast, the invisible aspects of organizational culture that are submerged in the water include values, assumptions, expectations and beliefs (See Figure 6).




Figure 6: Organizational Cultural Iceberg


### Organizational Identity

Organizations, just like individuals, have identities. According to Glen Kreiner, an American professor of management, organizational identity and organizational culture are intertwined, and he considers them conceptual cousins as they both rely on

underlying values and assumptions.<sup>42</sup> Based on his theory, organizational culture is tacit, autonomous and embedded in shared practices, while organizational identity is relational and consciously self-reflexive.

As previously discussed, organizational culture is simply defined as ‘the way we do things in an organization’ based on taken-for-granted underlying assumptions and beliefs. Organizational identity answers ‘who we are’ and, conversely, ‘who we are not’. It is grounded in local meanings and symbols, thus embedded in organizational culture. Identity is about how we define ourselves as an organization, and it is influenced by the assumptions and values of the organizational culture.<sup>43</sup> An important aspect of an organization’s identity is its ‘corporate identity’, that is to say, how its unique characteristics are communicated to various audiences through marketing. Another aspect is the organization’s ‘image’: how outsiders perceive the organization.

There are multiple organizational identities and organizational sub-cultures, just like individuals have multiple identities. These identities and cultures can change and evolve over time as organizations grow, respond to external threats, or deal with change. Organizational and individual culture and identities interplay with the other layers of culture, which are inter-related, complementary or in contradiction. Figure 7 demonstrates this interplay.



**Figure 7: Relationship between Layers of Culture, Organizational Culture and Individual Culture<sup>44</sup>**

The interplay and evolution of organizational cultures and identities occurs mostly through the interaction, cooperation and collaboration between various organizations. The three examples at the outset of this chapter (Afghanistan, the Vancouver Olympics and the Canadian Arctic) illustrate contexts where the WoG or CA have been used with various degrees of success and generated, as a minimum, a shift in organizational mindset regarding the conduct of future missions. The support and input received for the production of this publication in DND/CF is evidence of this shift. Equally, the significant participation of OGDs in DND/CF activities such as programs at the CF Staff College, exercises and working groups also serves as evidence of this change. It is becoming increasingly important for military leaders to be able to shift their outlook to consider civilian partners. ‘Other organizations’ should no longer be viewed simply as resources to be used in support of a military operation; rather, there should be an appreciation that the military needs to be better integrated with other organizations in order to better support the mission’s broader objectives.

As the CA will likely become more widely implemented and institutionalized, further shifts of organizational cultures and identities will also occur. These shifts are described by Canadian CA experts Peter Gizewski and LCol Mike Rostek:

...the regularized interaction with other organizations that adoption of the CA would involve and the ‘give and take’ that this generally entails, could work to expand organizational perspectives, sensitizing organizations to new ways of viewing security and its pursuit. This could effect not only thought and planning – but action. In time, it may even work to broaden organizational identities and mandates. The result may well be the creation of a new norm governing how future security operations are conducted.<sup>45</sup>

## **Organizational Culture Differences in the Canadian Government**

Differences in organizational culture are evident among Canadian federal departments. One example is the different approaches to command. The military mostly adopts a mission command approach. This is a decentralized style of command whereby commanders communicate their intent and delegate a level of freedom of action to subordinates, who can then make decisions to achieve the mission within certain constraints. Some civilian government departments may adopt a more centralized approach, while others may delegate greater authority to their staff on the ground.<sup>46</sup> Other differences in command include approaches to planning where the military uses the Operational Planning Process (OPP)<sup>47</sup> while OGDs have their own planning methods. There are also distinct approaches to recruiting and training. Historically, military organizations recruit young candidates and have their own doctrine and training system, whereas civilian departments generally prefer candidates with the requisite education and experience, and do not have their own formalized doctrine or training system.

## **Organizations as Dynamic, Complex Systems**

Having acknowledged organizational cultural differences, one must not consider organizational culture as something that is static and never changes. According to Wheatley, an American business scholar and author, organizations are not rigid artifacts of charts and job descriptions; nor are they static entities that we should try to control through permanent structures.<sup>48</sup> Instead of attempting to maintain hands-on control, leaders should seek order, focus and clarity about the purpose and direction of the organization. Organizations are dynamic systems that should be open to input from the outside to enable them to evolve. In addition, organizations should focus on being learning organizations, rather than focusing solely on pre-established business mindsets, so they can respond quickly to new opportunities.

Our concept of organizations is moving away from the mechanistic creations that flourished in the age of bureaucracy. We have begun to speak in earnest of more fluid, organic structures, even of boundaryless organizations. We are beginning to recognize organizations as systems construing them as “learning organizations” and crediting them with some type of self-renewing capacity.<sup>49</sup>

Once we understand that organizations are evolving, dynamic systems, we not only recognize the complexity of comprehensive operations, where multiple organizations come together, but we also realize how the interplay between these ‘systems’ is never static, nor is there a single cookie-cutter solution that can be applied again and again over time.

For organizational systems to remain vibrant and move forward, it is important to seek out new information and innovation. Innovation and new information often originate from uncertainty and chaos. Because we generally fear ambiguity, we need a paradigm shift to become comfortable with complexity and non-linear thinking and be able to focus on the whole organizational system, rather than on individual parts.<sup>50</sup>

## **Cultural Intelligence**

In comprehensive operations, organizations are increasingly dependent upon one another to achieve mission success and accomplish stated goals. Developing an awareness of the strengths, constraints and biases of one’s own culture, recognizing when and how cultural orientations are influencing beliefs and behaviours, as well as recognizing our ability to interpret and understand the beliefs and behaviours of others represent major challenges in comprehensive operations. To break down cultural barriers and biases, it is important for leaders involved in these missions to develop ‘cultural intelligence’ (CQ), defined as:

...the ability to recognize the shared beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours of a group of people and, most importantly, to effectively apply this knowledge toward a specific goal or range of activities.<sup>51</sup>



The cognitive dimension of CQ highlights the importance of having knowledge of other cultures as well as knowledge of oneself and the way in which assumptions about one's own culture influences perceptions, understanding and behaviour toward others. CQ experts David Thomas and Kerr Inkson identify several basic 'rules of engagement'<sup>52</sup> essential to CF leaders in comprehensive operations:

- Build relationships.
- Expect differences in others, see different behaviour as novel, and suspend evaluation.
- Be attentive to behavioural cues, their possible interpretation, and the likely effect of your behaviour on others.
- Become knowledgeable about one's own culture and background, its biases and idiosyncrasies, and the way this is unconsciously reflected in your own perceptions and behaviour.
- Adapt behaviour in ways that are comfortable and believed to be appropriate for the situation.
- Be mindful of responses to behavioural adaptation.
- Experiment with methods of adapting intuitively to new situations and use these experiments to build a comfort level in acquiring a repertoire of new behaviour.
- Practice new behaviours that work until their production becomes automatic.

Given the significant cultural component of comprehensive operations, it is essential for leaders to develop cultural awareness and progressively master CQ, together with other key soft-skills illustrated in Chapter Five.

### **Implications for Leaders**

It is important for leaders involved in comprehensive operations to understand their organizational culture and sub-cultures as well as the culture of other organizations involved in the mission: OGDs, allies, IOs, NGOs and host nations. CQ enables leaders to understand cultural differences and to distinguish between real differences that must be taken into account when developing an interagency team, and differences that are simply *perceived* based on limited understanding of the other culture or organization. A leader who does not develop CQ and does not see beyond their own organizational culture is in fact looking through a lens of organizational ethnocentrism – the belief that one's own organizational culture is of greater value or significance than that of others.

It is equally important for leaders to be able to question their organization's underlying assumptions and lead cultural change when necessary. Cultural change is an area where management is different from leadership. According to Schein, managers live within cultures whereas leaders create and modify cultures.<sup>53</sup>

Therefore, Schein believes that leadership is intertwined with the formation, evolution, transformation and the destruction of organizational culture.<sup>54</sup> When the organizational culture becomes dysfunctional, leaders need to:

- help the group unlearn some of its cultural assumptions and learn new assumptions;
- perceive the problem and have insights into themselves and into the culture;
- ‘unfreeze’ their organization;
- have the emotional strength to absorb the anxiety brought about by change;
- remain supportive to the organization through the transition phase; and
- articulate a new vision and concepts.<sup>55</sup>

It is essential for leaders to undergo professional development that includes a wide spectrum of learning events, ranging from training and educational programs to experiential learning and self-development.<sup>56</sup> It is also important for leaders to be able to identify any additional learning they require based on self-assessment and for them to be engaged in new learning, rather than viewing it as ‘a tick in the box’. Schein believes that:

Learning and change cannot be imposed on people. Their involvement and participation are needed...If the leaders of today want to create organizational cultures that will themselves be more amenable to learning they will have to set the example by becoming learners themselves and involving others in the learning process.<sup>57</sup>

Therefore, leaders should provide purpose, direction, motivation, inspiration and professional identity by shaping the organizational culture. They should also create a vision which requires expanding the knowledge and skills of the members of the profession. Effective leaders should not solely focus on maintaining hands-on control, or on elaborate rules or structures. They should communicate the vision, values, beliefs and concepts and then allow flexibility in the implementation of this vision.

In addition, because leadership is situational, leaders should possess the capacity to adapt their leadership style to best suit the unique needs of a particular time and context. Successful leaders should also recognize that the context is “established by the relationships we value.”<sup>58</sup> In other words, leaders have to include stakeholders, evoke followership and empower others. These kinds of leaders often emerge from the group rather than by self-assertion.

In the context of comprehensive operations, there are many cultural differences and cross-cultural gaps and inconsistencies among the organizations involved. While differences should not be ignored, the focus should be on the commonalities and the strengths that each member of the interagency team offers. To achieve this, relationships need to be built over time, not ‘just in time’ while a crisis, emergency,

or operation is occurring. These relationships can be built and nurtured through a variety of interagency mechanisms such as committees, working groups, task forces and exercises, exchange and liaison positions, sharing of information, lessons learned and best practices, and integrated learning events for military and OGD partners.

Leaders must also develop the motivation and awareness to objectively see their own 'theories in use' stemming from their individual and organizational culture. This is no easy task. Significant effort is required by all members of an organization participating in a culture change initiative, to identify and articulate the basic assumptions and unstated rules of an organization's culture and sub-cultures. Leaders play a central role in bringing about culture change. They need to be assisted and coached by experts and advisors to learn how to become effective role models of the desired future culture and how to plan and implement appropriate interventions in their organizations. A multi-year, interagency organizational development strategy and implementation plan along with a cross-agency governance structure and appropriate resources would be needed to develop the required capabilities to bring about culture change across multiple systems. It is essential that the required capabilities for interagency teams are developed before the occurrence of an incident where the ability for a rapid and effective response is crucial.

## **Summary**

Ultimately, leaders involved in comprehensive operations need to understand and embrace the different organizational cultures of stakeholders, be comfortable with uncertainty and complexity, influence situations by establishing relationships, and gain the trust and respect. Successful leaders engaging in comprehensive operations require well developed cultural competency and other key 'soft skills' such as effective communication, critical thinking, interpersonal skills and the ability to build trust. While all soft skills are important, understanding the role of culture, writ large, is crucial when dealing with distinct organizational cultures, multi-national coalition partners, foreign nations' cultures and local communities' cultures.

## CHAPTER FOUR

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### CANADIAN FORCES LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE AND COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONS

#### Introduction

CF leadership doctrine is the foundation for all CF leaders; however, it is modified as required in order to take into account the need to cooperate with different cultures as previously discussed. This chapter links the major concepts developed in the *Leadership in the Canadian Forces* series of manuals to comprehensive, WoG operations, and expands upon these concepts to derive a leadership guide for interagency teams. Having said that, it is important to acknowledge that complex operations may also involve actors who are not part of integrated teams but who exist nonetheless in the area of operations. For leaders, this will involve identifying and developing the necessary means to take these actors and players into account as a mission unfolds, to ensure awareness of their roles, and to be able to interact effectively with them. Thus, the CA involves establishing categories of relations, ranging from awareness to co-operation and collaboration, depending on the context. Leaders must adapt accordingly.

#### Evolving Leadership Requirements

All CF members will at some point in their career work with members of other organizations, both military and civilian. Whether this interaction takes place through interagency exchanges, joint exercises, domestic operations or international missions, and regardless of who has been assigned the lead role, CF professionals must be prepared to effectively contribute their leadership expertise to comprehensive operations. As articulated in *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*, effective leadership in the CF means “directing, motivating and enabling others to accomplish the mission professionally and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mission success.”<sup>59</sup> This definition of leadership can be extended beyond its application to the military realm. In a comprehensive operations context, mission success hinges on the ability of an interagency team to work as a cohesive whole, enabling each other to achieve a common goal, and expanding and strengthening individual and group capabilities required to address complex multi-jurisdictional problems.


#### CF Leadership Effectiveness Framework

A vehicle to assist CF leaders develop the skills required in comprehensive operations is the CF Leadership Effectiveness Framework. This framework is a values-based, distributed model of leadership that provides guidance on decision-making based on

professional values embraced by the military ethos. The framework defines collective effectiveness in the CF using five major dimensions:

- Mission Success;
- Ethos;
- Internal Integration;
- External Adaptability; and
- Member Well-being and Commitment.

These five dimensions can at times be seen as ‘conflicting values’ and leaders must find a balance between the inevitable tensions arising from the primary and enabling outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 8. For example, the need for leaders to adapt to changing social norms and mores must sometimes be balanced against the integrative factors of team morale and cohesion. These tensions are exacerbated by the fact that the primary outcome – mission success – must always be paramount.



**Figure 8: CF Leader Effectiveness Framework**

## **Mission Success**

Mission success, referred to as ‘meeting objectives’ in civilian organizations, is of primary importance to the CF and its interagency partners. Mission success remains the dominant imperative for all parties in a comprehensive operations context. Interagency partners will have diverse capabilities, interests, constraints and ways of operating that will contribute to the achievement of this overarching aim. In overseas missions where the overarching aim is stability, as was the case in the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, the CA can be broken down into the sub-groups of security, governance and development. These sub-groups are mutually reinforcing and draw upon resources and expertise from across departments and agencies. Each organization works toward the overall aim in different ways depending on their area

of expertise or jurisdiction. However, success in each of the sub-groups translates into overall mission success.

## **Member Well-Being and Commitment**

Member well-being and commitment refers to the concern for the people who serve in the CF, their quality of life, their conditions of service, and the provision of all necessary means of force protection on operations. CF leaders must acknowledge that in comprehensive operations, the definition of ‘member’ well-being may expand to include their civilian partners, in addition to the CF members on the team. CF members may find themselves on an interagency team that coordinates the conduct of routine operations. In Afghanistan, for example, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) combined diplomats, development specialists, police officers, corrections experts and military forces to form a multidisciplinary team. Various types of PRTs existed (military-led, civilian-led, and dual-headed civilian-military co-led) that varied in structure, size and mission. Regardless of the model, however, military leaders must contribute to the well-being of their interagency partners.

At the tactical level, that is to say ‘leading people’, ensuring member well-being may involve physical requirements such as ensuring members are properly fed, sheltered and tended to medically, intellectual requirements such as skills training at the group-level that closely replicates possible and realistic operational conditions, and emotional requirements such as interpersonal conflict resolution, equitable treatment, and morale boosting.

At the operational/strategic level, that is to say ‘leading the institution’, member-well being means interacting with other agencies to ensure the purpose and focus of the activities at the tactical level are understood and that the required resources are made available to enable members to work effectively on the ground. As evident in Afghanistan, interagency coordination at the top has a direct effect on tactical interagency missions on the ground.

Member well-being is also influenced by conditions of service and force protection. The difference between military and interagency partners is the length one can go to achieve mission success in circumstances that put the individual at personal risk. Under their terms of service, military members assume *unlimited liability*, ultimately putting service before self at all costs, whereas civilian partners cannot assume this risk without voluntary consent. For example, when a civilian (voluntarily) deploys overseas to an unstable area they are often accepting the same degree of personal risk as their military partners, but without the benefit of military/combat training. Although the legal liability lies with their respective federal department, a CF member may assume responsibility (non-legal) of a civilian requiring secure transport for the purposes of diplomacy or delivering aid.

## **Internal Integration and External Adaptability**

Internal integration and external adaptability have been combined in this chapter because, in the context of comprehensive operations, these dimensions may overlap, as will be explained in this section. Internal integration refers to the internal organization and stability of military units, systems, and the CF. More specifically, internal integration refers to the co-ordination of in-house functions and processes, and the achievement of teamwork and cohesion among the people who make up a unit or organization. External adaptability refers to the requirement for the organization to be aware of and adapt to the broader environment in which it finds itself including the social, cultural, political and economic contexts.

As mentioned, in the context of comprehensive operations, the two dimensions of internal integration and external adaptability are interrelated. Internal integration in these contexts is expanded beyond the CF team or system to the interagency team or system. For example, in a PRT, a CF leader cannot separate the internal integration of his/her military team from the broader requirement to adapt and promote the integration of the overall WoG team.

The tenets of internal integration refer to the co-ordinated functioning of multiple teams within an organization and include:

- establishing stable structures and routines;
- ensuring that teams function efficiently;
- making good use of information and communications to promote a common picture of reality; and
- sharing commitment and valuing the contributions of others.

In a comprehensive operation when two or more organizations are involved in a given task, the leader must apply these tenets to achieve overall integration of the team. An interagency team in the context of comprehensive/WoG operations is created based on the idea that cohesion and teamwork are force multipliers, resulting in a collective effort that is greater than the sum of its parts.

External adaptability reflects a concern for the external operating environment and the capacity of a military unit, system or the CF to anticipate and adapt to changing conditions. In the case of external adaptability in the comprehensive/WoG context, CF leaders must work with interagency partners to understand the external environment. This type of cooperation requires the willingness to work alongside other teams and organizations in pursuit of the success of a common mission.

## **The Military Ethos**

In comprehensive operations, each organization espouses its unique set of values that guide their members' conduct, actions and the way they apply their knowledge. In the CF the core military values are:

- Duty;
- Loyalty;
- Integrity, and
- Courage.

Military values represent a powerful component of the larger set of values contained in the Canadian military ethos that include:

- fundamental Canadian values and
- beliefs and expectations of military service.<sup>60</sup>

Analogous to CF values and the military ethos, other organizations have their own sets of values and ethics. For example, the Values and Ethics Code for the Canadian Federal Public Service outlines the values and ethics that guide and support public servants in all their professional activities. These are:

- democratic values;
- professional values;
- ethical values; and
- people values.

Each organization takes justifiable pride in their values and codes of ethics. These different value and ethical systems have been shaped by their organizational history, the nature of the profession, and the context. The key for leaders in comprehensive operations is to recognize and acknowledge these realities, and work to develop mutual understanding and respect for other organizations' values.

## **Types of Leadership for Comprehensive Operations**


Leaders use a range of behaviours to communicate their intent and to influence others, which vary in content, tone, intensity and other qualities. Such influence behaviours may be deliberately selected or shaped to achieve a particular effect, or they may be subconscious and habitual forms of the way in which the leader relates to others.

CF leadership doctrine provides a broad inventory of leader influence behaviours (see Figure 9). These are roughly ordered by the amount of control employed by the leader, ranging from total control that epitomizes authoritarian leadership to the complete absence of control that typifies *laissez-faire* leadership. Leadership styles found on the left end of the spectrum are considered more transactional, while those on the right are considered more transformational.

In CF doctrine, transactional leadership styles remain necessary in some instances although the transformational style is the preferred approach. CF doctrine encourages transformational leadership styles that rely on shared core values, mutual



commitment, and trust, while emphasizing that today's leaders "must continue to strive for a common identity and teamwork within a more varied and complicated human resources landscape."<sup>61</sup> In the context of comprehensive/WoG operations, CF leaders must be transformational. This is based on the understanding that comprehensive operations require consensus-building, empowerment of followers and team enhancement.



**Figure 9: Leader Influenced Behaviours**

It is the persuasive, facilitative and participative behaviours highlighted above that must be mastered in order to contribute effectively to an interagency team.

- *Persuasive influence* is primarily intended to affect decision-making and motivation by explaining or convincing others why a certain course of action is necessary.
- *Facilitative influence* often means securing the necessary task resources so that individuals can effectively complete their tasks and missions.
- *Participative behaviours* involve sharing decision-making authority with others. The primary objective of participative methods is to improve the quality and/or acceptance of decisions. The use of participative methods depends on the availability of sufficient time to involve others, but these methods are considered essential when subordinates or others possess critical expertise or information, and when the acceptance of a decision or plan by subordinates or others might mean the difference between implementation success or failure. This style is especially appropriate for leaders who are dealing with experienced followers. It can facilitate team building and conflict resolution, especially if the leader values and appreciates the ideas and input of the followers.

## **Developing Leadership Competencies at All Levels**

As the CF increases its involvement in comprehensive operations, professional military leadership development will need to expand to incorporate new competencies requisite for effective performance in interagency contexts. The competencies and skills required for these missions include both hard and soft skills as outlined in Chapter Five. These competencies and skills must be integrated at the tactical level of *leading people* and at the operational/strategic levels of *leading the institution*. From lower to higher levels of responsibility and authority in an organization, there are obvious differences in the focus, scope, and time horizon of leaders. Generally speaking, the leadership environment becomes more ambiguous and the leadership task becomes more complex with increasing rank and responsibility.

### **Leading People: Tactical Level Requirements**

At lower to middle rank levels in the CF, officers and NCMs appointed to positions involving leadership responsibilities are typically engaged in directing, motivating, and enabling others to accomplish the day-to-day missions and tasks that have been assigned to the CF. Due to the requirement for face-to-face interaction and direct influence, this leadership function is described as *leading people*, and generally corresponds to the tactical level of command and activity.

At this level the concept of team development should be well understood and practiced. A leader at the tactical level understands that the process of team development is the necessary prerequisite for establishing an effective, efficient and cohesive team. This development process has proven to be a stumbling block in the interagency context and is, therefore, the foundational requirement for mission success.<sup>62</sup>

### **Team Development**

Teambuilding is a continuous and evolving process and teams are more cohesive when they have experience working together. The more organizational diversity a team has, the longer and more arduous the team building process can be. Consequently, it is preferable that teambuilding take place prior to a joint interagency operation.

Teams go through a developmental process before they become effective as a cohesive whole. The process can occur fairly quickly or be time-consuming, depending on whether or not there is a pre-existing relationship between the individuals involved. In comprehensive operations, where diverse organizations and agencies are involved each with their own organizational culture and value sets, it is preferable that this development take place prior to an operation to ensure the group has already established itself as a team.

The following stages of team development are natural and must occur in order to establish cohesive and effective teams:<sup>63</sup>

1. *Forming*: At this stage, communication is poorest and group members may be unclear of the group's goal.

Interagency partners must buy into the idea that their collective expertise and resources are required to accomplish the task at hand. Outlining the situation and defining the objectives in the beginning ensures that all team members understand their operating environment and agree with the overall objectives.

2. *Storming*: There can be intra-group conflict at this stage; group members may need to revise their assumptions about others in the group.

Turf protection is likely to occur when an individual from an organization does not understand the mandate(s), priorities or operations of their interagency partners, or when resources are scarce, or as a response when one feels one's contribution is not valued. This protectionist attitude ignores the reality that all interagency partners have valuable skills, resources and knowledge to add to an integrated effort.

3. *Norming*: At this stage, the group begins to function as an entity.

In a team as large and diverse as those often found in comprehensive operations, conducting professional development and exercises together is key to success. A group can work towards functioning as an entity by physically acting out their integrated roles in a mock crisis or exercise. This allows team members to better develop their 'supporting' and 'leading' roles.

4. *Performing*: At this stage, mutual accountability and trust is established in the group.

The focus is on the group task rather than the development of the team. Once individual roles and responsibilities have been established and practiced, the group can focus on improvements to the team operation. At this stage, turf protection referred to earlier will be alleviated by the creation of a strong team ethos.

5. *Adjourning*: At this stage, lessons learned are determined.

After an exercise or operation, team members can recall and reflect on successful and unsuccessful actions, and make recommendations to improve the team's operational effectiveness. To this end, the CF has established a Lessons Learned system. In other organizations, there may be a different process to identify lessons and best practices. Regardless of the system in place, the final step or 'closing of the loop' is often missed. That is to say, the lessons learned are not always exchanged among agencies nor are they always incorporated into policy, programs, or training. Ideally, a collaborative interagency lessons learned report should be generated after each comprehensive/WoG mission or exercise.

## Opportunities for Interdepartmental Team Development

Developing personal, direct relationships with interagency partners *before* a crisis occurs is the ideal way to ensure an effective integrated dynamic *during* a crisis. The following strategies represent opportunities for interdepartmental team development.

- Officer liaison/exchange/secondment programs are one of the most effective tools to build relationships between departments as well as develop individual expertise in working in the context of comprehensive/WoG missions.<sup>64</sup>
- Participation on integrated committees, working groups, or tabletop exercises, allows team members to establish relationships as they make decisions, discuss alternatives or develop contingency plans for future integrated responses.
- Community involvement will vary based on the community. For example in Canada's northern territories, involvement in regional implementation caucuses is an important forum to meet with and establish relationships with community leaders and decision-makers. Community buy-in throughout the entire planning process is essential.
- At the grass-roots level, social media can also contribute to establishing networks, informal learning, cultural change and influencing individual/group perceptions and behaviours.

## Strategic Leadership in Complex Environments

At higher rank levels, senior leaders and their staff are uniquely responsible for sustaining current military capabilities and systems, while planning and developing the strategic and professional capabilities needed to ensure that the CF remains effective into the future. This leadership function is described as *leading the institution* and generally corresponds to the military-strategic and national-strategic levels of command and activity. As CF leaders move up in rank and assume greater responsibility and authority, it is essential that they broaden their perspective, knowledge, and skills so that they are able to provide effective leadership to both people and the institution. These broader skills fall into three categories: cognitive, interpersonal and managerial.

With respect to the first category, operational/strategic leaders must distinguish between 'how-to-think' and 'what-to-think' approaches. The former embraces flexibility of mind and diverse intellectual disciplines. 'How-to-think' approaches emphasize the importance of understanding the parts of a problem in relation to each other as well as the different perspectives and needs that problem-solving partners contribute. Such approaches entail developing problem-solving methodologies that serve to reconcile competing viewpoints while remaining focussed on the goal.

In essence, the 'how-to-think' approach is based on systems thinking. As discussed earlier, comprehensive operations are most usefully viewed as an interactively

complex system. Reductionism and analytical thinking are inappropriate and largely ineffective cognitive tools in such circumstances. Coping with complex systems must be systemic, rather than reductionist, and qualitative vice quantitative. Different heuristic approaches, such as modelling-design, are needed rather than linear problem-solving. It is, therefore, extremely important to recognize the distinct difference between analytical thinking and systems thinking. Analytical thinking is a three-step process. First, it takes apart what it seeks to understand. Then, it attempts to explain the behaviour of the separate parts. Finally, it tries to aggregate understanding of the parts into an explanation of the whole. Systems thinking uses a different process. It puts the system as a whole in the context of the larger environment and studies the role it plays in that environment. The art of systems thinking lies in being able to recognize increasingly dynamic, complex and subtle structures amid the wealth of details, pressures and cross-currents that attend all real settings. In fact, the essence of mastering systems thinking as a discipline lies in seeing patterns where others see only events and forces to react to.

In the category of interpersonal styles, personal characteristics such as sociability and the preference for relationship building are necessary to perform effectively at the operational/strategic levels in comprehensive operations. Operational artists and strategic leaders must view themselves as communicators, facilitators and collaborative space-makers. As mentioned in Chapter Three, critical ingredients in this category are cultural intelligence, as well as the understanding of culture and organizational culture. In terms of managerial styles, communication is of paramount importance. This involves generating compelling ideas and conveying them effectively and continually to all stakeholders, ensuring the ideas are appropriately communicated by subordinates to institutional implementers, and reinforcing ideas through action.

The increasing requirement for interagency responses to global and national crises is indicative of an emerging environment that entails adaptation at the strategic level. *Leading the Institution* provides senior leaders with inclusive leadership concepts and through experience, senior leaders will develop insight into the characteristics of successful commanders and into the measures required to ensure future leaders possess these characteristics. Traditional notions of military leadership are hierarchical. At the strategic level, this notion has translated into a perception of the military as a professional bureaucracy that can be effectively managed through the development of more policies and standard operating procedures. This notion is problematic in a military organization where missions, tasks and concepts of war are continuously in flux. A strategic leader recognizes the complexity of the security environment and looks at the military as an adaptive system.

## **Summary**

Comprehensive operations require current leadership concepts to evolve. It is necessary for military leaders to adapt their leadership competencies to the complex security environments they will be facing. It is also essential for military leaders and their civilian partners to develop strong working relationships whenever possible,

prior to the mission or exercise, in order to build cohesive interagency teams. Different organizations will bring to the table diverse values, ethics and organizational cultures. The challenge for the military leader is to build consensus and value the strengths of each team-member. This can be achieved through effective communication, dynamic engagement and relationship building. By adopting these principles and adapting to the mission scenario, successful military leaders will be able to apply their leadership in contexts where the military is often not in charge of the mission as a whole.

## CHAPTER FIVE

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### DEVELOPING LEADERS FOR COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONS

#### Introduction

In this chapter, the key soft skills required by leaders involved in comprehensive operations are identified. These skills will then be mapped within the Leadership Development Framework (LDF), which defines the requisite elements of an effective leader.<sup>65</sup> Soft skills, such as cultural awareness, communication skills, critical and analytical thinking, interpersonal skills, leadership, and teamwork, are necessary for leaders to be successful in modern globalized and complex work environments such as those associated with comprehensive operations. Many soft skills can be linked to the competencies listed in the LDF, which outlines the requisite elements to be an effective leader in a wide spectrum of challenges including war, global issues, security threats, internal order, and member care.<sup>66</sup>

It is important that, in preparation for comprehensive operations, interagency partners conduct integrated civilian-military training and education. The following examples illustrate the challenges of comprehensive operations and highlight the requirement for soft skills and integrated civilian-military training and education in order to better prepare all partners for comprehensive/WoG missions, understand the mandates and cultures of the various agencies, and establish working relationships.

#### The Canadian Mission in Afghanistan: Training Gaps

WoG teams are comprised of diverse partners who contribute distinct yet complementary expertise, skills and resources. Interagency training and education are important tools to mitigate some of the challenges that can hinder the success of WoG missions. A successful example is Exercise Maple Guardian (EX MG) conducted by the CF prior to deployment to Afghanistan. OGD members were invited to contribute to planning and to participate in preparation for deploying in a whole-of-government team. Overall, OGD participants found EX MG to be of value, preparing them to work with the CF while deployed, allowing them to learn about the CF organizational structure, culture and planning process, and providing an opportunity to build useful relationships with CF personnel. Some OGD personnel identified gaps in their EX MG experience, including, limited interaction with Afghan role players and inadequate information on the Afghan culture, insufficient information about the roles and responsibilities of OGDs communicated to their military counterparts, and the need to engage OGDs at an earlier stage of the planning process.<sup>67</sup>

## **The Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics: Organizational Culture Differences and Information Sharing**

The CF had a supporting role in security operations at the Vancouver Olympics. Responsibility for overall management and control of Games security rested with the RCMP and inter-departmental security coordination was the role of Public Safety Canada. In addition, local police authorities and civil emergency agencies also had security support functions. The sharing of the security role among such a large number of players posed many challenges including: undefined agencies' roles and responsibilities; unclear leadership (who was in charge); problematic sharing of classified information (those with a need to know vs. those with clearance to know); and different organizational cultures' views regarding information security. Some organizations faced significant challenges due to their closed organizational culture. They did not appear to embrace change, they were perceived to have an 'us versus them' philosophy, and they tended to distance themselves from their peers. Other organizations, with a more open organizational culture, tended to be very inclusive and were very good at information-sharing, team-work and relationship building.<sup>68</sup>

## **The Canadian Arctic: Challenges Due to Different Cultures, Structures and Planning**

A number of lessons have been identified in the Canadian Arctic, an operational environment that goes beyond the jurisdiction of one government department or agency and thus requires close interagency cooperation and collaboration. The Arctic context presents challenges due to the collaboration required between different organizational cultures, structures and planning processes. In addition, there is unfamiliarity among partners with other agencies' roles, responsibilities and mandates. Joint integrated training and exercises, such as Operation NANOOK, help to develop positive working relationships between military and civilian partners. These events must be built around OGD requirements and OGDs need to be incorporated into the planning and implementation process. Good communication and trust among partners are essential for WoG success in the Arctic. These attributes are developed through working together, interpersonal relationships, and joint activities, prior to an emergency situation occurring.<sup>69</sup>

## **Wicked Problems**

As previously stated, the very nature of the new, complex security missions is similar to that of 'wicked problems', i.e., unique problems with no definable, single solution versus 'tame problems', which generally have a definable solution.

Wicked problems defy definitive formulations. Any proposed solution or intervention causes the problem to mutate, every situation is unique, and each wicked problem can be considered a symptom of another problem.<sup>70</sup>

These unique 'wicked problems' require unique approaches that include:



- a clear understanding of the policy goals;
- a unified interagency and civil-military approach;
- trust-building;
- developing relationships with all interagency partners and other stakeholders;
- mutual respect and confidence;
- innovative solutions; and
- communication, information-sharing, and consultation.

### **Leaders' Skills for Comprehensive Operations**

To better prepare military members and their civilian partners to successfully engage in comprehensive/WoG, complex missions, they need to develop the required skill sets. Specifically, they need:

...a different set of cognitive, technical and social skills as well as a broader understanding of the context and cultures involved. These skills and understanding are necessary to engage with and influence local communities, coalition partners and allies and other stakeholders involved.<sup>71</sup>

A recent RAND study identified the characteristics, education and experience required by future leaders to successfully operate in complex environments.<sup>72</sup> As illustrated in Figure 10, these characteristics fall into three categories or 'styles':

- cognitive;
- interpersonal; and
- managerial.

## Cognitive

- Emphasize ‘how-to-think’ over ‘what-to-think’ approaches, flexibility of mind and diverse intellectual disciplines.
- Understand that different problem-solving partners provide alternative perspectives and needs that can enrich an individual’s thought process when making a decision.
- Develop problem-solving methodologies that serve to reconcile competing viewpoints while remaining focused on the goal.
- Account for consequences over time, across multiple levels and lines of operation, while tolerating iterative problem-solving in the absence of perfect solutions.
- Step outside events and intellectual processes to observe in real time how they and others proceed and learn.
- Recognize a decision’s implications at each level and then harmonize tactical actions with operational objectives and strategic goals.

## Interpersonal

- Ensure sociability and relationship building, or ‘command through influence.’ A commander should be facilitative, consultative, communicative, and collaborative.
- Build bridges across institutional divides through sincere personal relationships.
- Develop and strengthen cross-cultural capabilities to ensure CF members can operate comfortably, seamlessly and empathetically with other agencies, and be open to different ideas from other organizations.

<b>Managerial</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tailor communication to different audiences for ideas requiring collaboration among diverse partners, while ensuring the message is consistent and sincere.</li> <li>• Coordinate the activities of task-oriented staffs whose members represent multiple organizational interests.</li> <li>• Understand organizational dynamics and cultures, both real and espoused.</li> <li>• Mentor through explicit instruction and exemplary conduct.</li> <li>• Call on experience at the tactical and operational level in interagency operations.</li> </ul>

**Figure 10: Table of Strategic Leader Skills and Characteristics<sup>73</sup>**

The characteristics and skills outlined above are acquired and developed through a combination of education and experience, using a career-long learning approach that enables leaders to successfully transition from the tactical to the strategic, as they progress in rank.

**Broad Educational Experiences**

Standard military educational experiences include Professional Military Education (PME) made up of interdisciplinary studies, out-of-service PME, and traditional military education. This military-focused education is just that – military-focused. In other words, schooling reinforces how-to-think in a military context only. Education at civilian institutions has proven to broaden leader experiences to include the consideration and understanding of civilian approaches to national security and the organizational dynamics that drive various civilian institutions. Where practicable, educational content and learning environments should be shared with WoG partners. This sharing has begun with significant participation of civilian officials, including staff from various OGDs, on the National Security Program at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. In addition, the Canada School of Public Service has developed some relevant leadership courses.

## **Interagency Exposure**

Experience working with other agencies is essential to strategic leadership. Interagency exposure can be achieved through educational or developmental assignments in civilian institutions and/or participation in interagency exercises and operations – both domestic and international. Specifically, experience in senior staff positions within the defence department or in international defence organizations expands the senior command perspective. All of these interagency experiences provide leaders with insight into the dynamics of various civilian organizations, better enabling them to synchronize and leverage interagency capabilities.

These educational and developmental opportunities have proven to reinforce the cognitive, interpersonal and managerial skills, previously discussed. Finally, as is the case in team development theory at the tactical and lower-operational level, exposure to the interagency environment must take place prior to deployment to best ensure that military leaders fully develop their CQ in relation to partner organizations. This ‘cross-pollination’ can be facilitated through opportunities that provide exposure to interagency processes and norms such as recurrent assignments, internships and participation on interagency committees. As well, proximity to senior civilian and military leaders would be highly beneficial. This is all a part of an effective career development plan for officers and NCMs that needs to be managed through succession planning and the careful selection of personnel for the appropriate job. In short, it is important for leaders to acquire a broad education and exposure to various job experiences.

## **Soft Skills**

This section will illustrate the inventory of soft skills required not only for success in comprehensive missions, but also in many non-military global environments. In fact, there is concurrence in the academic and private sector literature on the importance of soft skills outside of military contexts, including industry and higher education. There are several ways to describe soft skills: transferable skills, non-academic skills, employability skills, people skills, emotional intelligence. In the context of the military profession, soft skills can be defined as: “Career attributes, personal qualities, skills and attributes that set an individual apart from others with similar technical or ‘hard skills.’”<sup>74</sup>

Soft skills are critical to successful unconventional warfare. They are those abilities that fall in the range of human dynamics, interpersonal communications and personal relations.<sup>75</sup> Conversely, hard skills are those military and technical skills required by military personnel on their job and in a theatre of operations, such as: weapons handling, combat, interrogation, occupational tasks, first aid, fitness, operational planning, or personal security and survival skills needed in hazardous environments.<sup>76</sup>

Soft skills set individuals apart whether in the context of academia, business or other civilian environments. In these environments, there is evidence that employers are more concerned about soft or transferable skills and attitudes rather than technical

competency or knowledge. In addition to looking for candidates with high academic performance and work experience, employers look for soft skills. Regrettably, managers report that new employees are deficient in these skills and, although university education is suggested as the most appropriate venue to teach these skills, there is a gap between what universities offer and what businesses demand.<sup>77</sup> In the context of higher education, soft skills are referred to as non-academic skills, which are extremely important for overall university performance as well as in the pursuit of work-related career goals.<sup>78</sup>

Some soft skills can be linked to emotional intelligence (EQ), a construct within the field of psychology. EQ involves those abilities distinct from but complementary to academic intelligence, which describes the purely cognitive capacities measured by IQ. EQ is defined as: “the capacity for recognizing our own feelings and those of others, for motivating ourselves, and for managing emotions well in ourselves and in our relationships”.<sup>79</sup>

EQ includes five basic emotional and social competencies:

- self awareness;
- self regulation;
- motivation;
- empathy; and
- social skills.<sup>80</sup>

Figure 11 illustrates (in alphabetical order) the soft skills required in comprehensive operations, which were validated by several experts.<sup>81</sup>

Build/maintain trust/trustworthiness
Communication verbal/written
Conflict resolution/problem solving/persuasion
Critical thinking/analytical/agility of thinking
Cultural awareness/diversity/sensitivity
Detail orientation/attention to detail
Diplomacy/negotiation skills
Empathy
Flexibility/adaptability
Foreign language skills
Imagination/creativity/innovation
Initiative/motivation/goal oriented
Interpersonal skills/social skills
Leadership/decision-making/risk management
Professionalism/ethics
Self management/ability to work under pressure
Taking responsibility/maturity/work ethic
Team building/collaboration
Time management/organization/planning
Willingness to learn/continuous learning capacity

**Figure 11: Inventory of Soft Skills<sup>82</sup>**

While the experts consulted deemed *all* soft skills in the inventory as necessary for leaders in comprehensive operations, they identified the following skills as being of critical importance:

- building/maintaining trust;
- cultural awareness/diversity;
- team building/collaboration;
- interpersonal skills/social skills;


- flexibility/adaptability;
- conflict resolution/problem solving; and
- communication.<sup>83</sup>

The experts found some of the skills in the inventory not to be crucial, such as foreign language skills. In fact, while language and regional expertise are important when operating in a specific context, broad cultural awareness and intercultural competence enable leaders to operate successfully in any context. These cultural competencies enable leaders to understand the cultures of the various individuals, organizations, and nations involved in these complex missions.

While some soft skills, such as empathy, could be considered ‘innate’ according to the EQ paradigm, most soft skills are ‘learnable’ based on the education perspective. A third approach could involve using the ‘package model’, whereby soft skills are disaggregated into two sets of separate but interrelated skill sets:

- innate personality traits and
- learnable skills that can be developed or enhanced through formal and informal learning.

The three approaches (EQ, education and package model) are seen in Figure 12.



**Figure 12: Three Approaches to Soft Skills<sup>84</sup>**

The ‘package model’ allows for the integration of soft skills learning with personality traits development by building on existing/innate soft skills while acquiring additional skills. Once learned or enhanced, not only are all soft skills important in the context of comprehensive operations, they are also transferable to a wide range of environments.

## Mapping Soft Skills within the Leadership Development Framework

Soft skills should be developed progressively, starting from acquiring a general awareness, building on this awareness to gain specific knowledge and understanding, and finally developing advanced skills. This skills development should occur throughout one's career through formal and informal learning as well as through work experience. The acquisition of soft skills can be supported by integrating relevant learning opportunities into professional development. The CF Professional Development System (CFPDS) provides a solid 'structure' for the development of soft skills through the four pillars of education, training, self-development and experience, starting at the junior rank levels and continuing through members' careers. The CFPDS is now competency-based, in line with the LDF (previously referred to as the Professional Development Framework). The LDF (Figure 13) is composed of five leader elements.<sup>85</sup>

	Expertise	Cognitive Capacities	Social Capacities	Change Capacities	Professional Ideology
<i>Senior</i>	Strategic	Creative Abstract	Inter- Institutional	Paradigm Shifting	Stewardship
<i>Advanced</i>	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
<i>Intermediate</i>					
<i>Junior</i>	Tactical	Analytical	Inter-Personal	Open	Internalize

**Figure 13: The Leadership Development Framework<sup>86</sup>**

If we map soft skills on the LDF (see Figure 14), they fall under cognitive capacities, social capacities, change capacity and professional ideology. While soft skills do not specifically appear under the element of expertise, there is a need to develop leaders' expertise by increasing their knowledge of Comprehensive/WoG missions, as well as other agencies' missions, mandates and diverse organizational cultures.



<b>Cognitive capacities</b>	<b>Social capacities</b>	<b>Change capacities</b>	<b>Professional ideology</b>
Communication verbal/written	Build trust/ maintain trust/ trustworthiness	Flexibility/ adaptability	Leadership/ decision making/ risk management
Critical/analytical thinking/ agility of thinking	Conflict resolution/ problem solving/ persuasion	Imagination/ creativity/innovation	Professionalism/ ethics
Detail orientation/ attention to detail	Cultural awareness/ diversity/sensitivity	Initiative/ motivation/ goal-oriented	Taking responsibility/ maturity/work ethic
Foreign language skills	Diplomacy/ negotiation skills	Willingness to learn/ continuous learning capacity	
Time management/ organization/ planning	Empathy		
	Interpersonal skills/ social skills		
	Self-management/ ability to work under pressure		
	Team building/ collaboration		

**Figure 14: Mapping Soft Skills on the Leadership Development Framework**

### **Developing Soft Skills**

In developing leaders with the requisite soft skills, the following should be kept in mind:

- Most soft skills can be learned through a combination of education, training and experience, while a few are considered innate.
- The just-in-time training approach is not effective to develop soft skills. Rather, a life-long-learning sustained approach is needed.
- Some organizations use testing to recruit people who already possess required soft skills. Other organizations train and educate most of their members. Different organizational cultures and mandates may influence such decisions (e.g., armed forces historically recruit young candidates and train them). Other factors that influence the different organizational approaches used to select for

soft skills include the pool of applicants, the nature of the job, the skills required, the time and the resources available.

- There are various approaches to facilitate the acquisition of soft skills through formal and non-formal education, including advanced degrees, PME, military staff colleges, professional development programs, self-directed learning, exchanges/secondment opportunities, integrated civilian/military programs and mentoring.

## Summary

In combat operations where the primary objective is annihilation or destruction of enemy forces and capabilities, it is extremely important to develop leaders with the appropriate military experience and hard skills to effectively perform their occupational and military-specific tasks. In the context of comprehensive operations, where the objectives range from combat to security, reconstruction, governance, and development, it is critical to develop future leaders with the right combination of hard and soft skills to successfully function in a variety of environments with multiple interagency partners that have diverse backgrounds, perspectives and organizational cultures.

Soft skills are also referred to as transferable skills, employability skills, non-academic skills or emotional intelligence and are also deemed essential in other contexts such as industry and academia. Although some soft skills are considered innate traits, most skills can be learned. The inventory of soft skills constitutes a blue print that can be used for recruiting, selection and professional development purposes. The inventory, developed from a multidisciplinary body of literature and feedback from subject matter experts, reflects existing military studies in this field, such as the RAND study, which identified three leadership styles, cognitive, interpersonal and managerial, that are critical to senior leaders' abilities to plan, lead and manage complex operations.<sup>87</sup>

Cognitive skills include problem solving and specifically 'how to think' rather than 'what-to-think' skills. Interpersonal skills include relationship building, facilitation, openness to different ideas, collaboration and cross-cultural capabilities, such as foreign language skills. A final set of characteristics relates to a leader's managerial style and involves communication skills, understanding organizations, and mentorship.

The key experiences and educational opportunities necessary to better develop the required skill sets for officers and NCMs include:

- PME;
- educational programs at civilian institutions;
- joint billets and secondments to OGDs;
- exposure to senior leaders' ways of thinking and interacting;

- international experience; and
- mentorship.

Soft skills should be developed using multiple learning paths and a life-long learning approach. Education plays a crucial role in developing soft skills as does informal learning, mentoring, and broad career experience.

Leaders should also enhance their knowledge and understanding of the CA and other organizations' mandates and cultures. Much of this knowledge can be acquired through human interaction, conversations, connections and professional relationships. In fact, existing knowledge, lessons and new ideas about the CA and related concepts, are often transmitted formally and informally through various interagency networks, connecting people to people.

In addition, to develop leaders for comprehensive/WoG operations, it is necessary to develop the required organizational structures, human resources systems, information flows and processing capabilities to support the implementation of appropriate strategies and initiatives. Suitable interagency mechanisms need to be in place in order to enable collaboration, planning and decision-making across various partner organizations. In this context, clear recognition by the home organization that these interagency activities are valued is key. Clearly, leadership development for comprehensive operations needs to be part of a broader interagency strategy that extends beyond the CF. An integrated effort on behalf of all partner departments is needed to update and modernize leader development and enable organizational culture change to ultimately generate Canada's capability for future complex operations.

As illustrated in Chapter Three, the importance of the cultural aspect of leadership skills should never be underestimated. Whether in a national or international context, new comprehensive operations require leaders with the ability to work alongside different individual, organizational, and national cultures; leaders who are 'enablers of multiculturalism', which is the capacity to "work comfortably, seamlessly, and empathetically with interagency counterparts, members of other services, and NGOs in spite of differences in institutional cultures and processes."<sup>88</sup>

## CONCLUSION

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The nature of operations for the foreseeable future will, in all likelihood, resemble those discussed in Chapter Two and experienced by the CF over the past two decades. No two missions will be exactly alike, but many, or all, will require an all-government, integrated effort referred to throughout this monograph as the CA.

Leadership in these comprehensive operations does not negate or replace the principles and practices of leadership codified in CF leadership doctrine, either leading people or leading the institution (strategic leadership). However, CF leaders must take into account the different and unique nature of the leadership challenge involved in these operations with respect to their peculiar complexity and multi-dimensionality.

Viewing comprehensive operations as a complex adaptive system, as discussed in Chapter One, means that different modes of cognitive thinking such as systems thinking must be mastered. Equally, all partners need to strive to understand the organizational/structural frameworks that each brings to the operation, be it tactical/operational/strategic or frontline/middle management/departmental. As clearly described in this volume, leadership at each organizational level is slightly different. Certainly, as one ascends through to the strategic/institutional level, non-traditional notions of leadership as discussed in this volume will need to be utilized.

Central to effective leadership in comprehensive operations is the understanding of diverse organizational cultures. As discussed in Chapter Three, understanding and knowledge must go beyond artifacts to an appreciation of the espoused values that other departments and agencies bring to the mission, as well as the underlying assumptions that underpin organizational culture. Mutual respect is essential and cultural intelligence (CQ) is an indispensable tool. Beyond cultural awareness, there is a whole range of additional 'soft' skills necessary to inter-operate effectively under often difficult and dangerous conditions at the tactical level and the more nuanced, even political conditions, at the operational and strategic levels. CF leaders must be flexible, comfortable dealing with ambiguity and uncertainty, as well as able to operate smoothly with multiple and diverse partners.

This monograph provides insight into the nature of comprehensive operations and an understanding of the skills and attributes required for these complex missions. This volume enhances existing CF leadership doctrine and serves as a basis on which to expand the professional development of leaders from all levels. This includes strategic leaders, operational commanders, commanding officers, junior officers, NCMs, civilians from Defence, and interagency partners responsible for guiding, inspiring and encouraging others to work together to create unity of effort and ultimately achieve a common goal.

Leaders are being encouraged to include stakeholders, to evoke followership, to empower others...Leadership is always dependent on the context, but the context is established by the relationships we value. We cannot hope to influence any situation without the respect for the complex network of people who contribute to our organization.<sup>89</sup>

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Canadian Government, Department of National Defence, *Broadsword or Rapier? The Canadian Forces Involvement in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Coalition Operations*, CFLI TR-2008-01 (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2008); Grazia Scoppio, *The importance of culture: soft skills for inter-agency, complex operations* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2011); Jenna Alexander and Dalton Cote, *Leadership in Whole of Government Operations – A Case Study of Security in the Canadian Arctic* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2011); Grazia Scoppio, Ray Idzenga and Sharon Miklas, *Learning together: Lessons on Canadian Forces Skill Sets for Multinational, Inter-agency Operations* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Department of National Defence, 2009).

<sup>2</sup> Emergent leadership, which is in line with the principle of distributed leadership, is defined in the CF Leadership Doctrine Manuals as: “A distributed or temporarily shared role, which may be assumed according to situational demands and the capabilities and motivation of group members... Emergent leadership operates completely outside the box of organizational authority, which is simply another way of saying that it isn’t necessary to be a commander to be a leader.” Canadian Government, Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces – Conceptual Foundations* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 6-9.

<sup>3</sup> Canadian Government, Department of National Defence, Defence Terminology Bank. Retrieved on 13 August 2012 from <http://terminology.mil.ca/term-eng.asp>

<sup>4</sup> Kim Richard Nossal, “Introduction: Security Operations and the Comprehensive Approach.” in *Security Operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century – Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, eds. Mike Rostek and Peter Gizewski (Kingston, ON: Queen’s University, 2011).

<sup>5</sup> See the discussion on the various terminologies in Canadian Government, Department of National Defence, *Broadsword or Rapier? The Canadian Forces Involvement in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Coalition Operations*.

<sup>6</sup> United Kingdom Government, Ministry of Defence, *The Comprehensive Approach*, Publication No. JDN 4/05 (Shrivenham, UK: The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2006).

<sup>7</sup> Australian Government, *Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges*, Management Advisory Committee 4, Australian Public Service Commission. (Canberra, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 2004).

<sup>8</sup> Richard Roy, “All in: Developing the Comprehensive Approach,” *Vanguard*, 2006, retrieved on 13 August 2012 from: <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/ExplainingTheComprehensiveApproachRoy>

<sup>9</sup> Canadian Government, Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication CFJP 3.0 Operations* (Ottawa, ON: Joint Doctrine Branch, Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre Department of National Defence, Sep 2011), Glossary – 3, retrieved on 13 August 2012 from [http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/cfwc-cgfc/Index/JD/CFJP%20-%20PDF/CFJP%203-0/CFJP\\_3\\_0\\_Ops\\_Updated\\_EN\\_2011\\_09.pdf](http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/cfwc-cgfc/Index/JD/CFJP%20-%20PDF/CFJP%203-0/CFJP_3_0_Ops_Updated_EN_2011_09.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., GL-7.

<sup>11</sup> Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development report (2006), *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States*, page 15, quoted in Canadian Government, Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team*, Publication No. 1258-156 (CRS) (Ottawa, ON: Government of Canada, 2007), 21, retrieved on 13 August 2012 from <http://www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/pdf/2007/P0775-eng.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> United States Government, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 retrieved on 04 Sep 2012 from [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp1\\_02.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> LTC Geza Simon and MAJ Muzaffer Duzenli, “The comprehensive operations planning directive,” *Nato Rapid Deployable Corps – Italy (NRDC-ITA) Magazine*, 2009, Issue 14, retrieved on 13 Aug 2012 from <http://www.nato.int/nrdc-it/magazine/2009/0914/0914g.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> Edward Jacques, *Requisite Organization* (Arlington, VA, USA: Ceson Hall, 1989).

<sup>15</sup> This concept and its relationship to war and conflict is fully treated in Manabrata Guhu, *Reimagining War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: From Clausewitz to Network Centric Warfare* (New York, NY, USA: Routledge, 2011). See also: Linda Beckerman, “The Non-linear Dynamics of War,” Science Applications International Corps, 1999.

<sup>16</sup> Emergence is a characteristic of complex adaptive systems, whereby properties discernable at one level in the system cannot be identified at the lower level in the hierarchy of nested sub-systems. For example, the study of individuals in psychology versus the study of the different and unique dynamics at the group level studied in sociology. In the military, an example would be a tactical manoeuvre consisting of fire and movement versus an operational manoeuvre consisting of mass and mobility.

<sup>17</sup> For Design Concept see Colonel Stephan Banach, "The Art of Design: A Design Methodology," *Military Review* (March-April, 2009), 105-115. For SSM see Peter Checkland, *Systems Thinking, Systems Practice* (NY: John Wiley Ltd, 2004).

<sup>18</sup> Barry Watts, *US Combat Training, Operational Art and Strategic Competence: Problems and Opportunities* (Washington, D.C., USA: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008).

<sup>19</sup> For a full discussion, see Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2011), Chap. 2.

<sup>20</sup> Christopher R. Papparone et al., "Where Military Professionalism Meets Complexity Science," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2008.

<sup>21</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Preton, USA: Preton University Press, 1984), 20.

<sup>22</sup> General Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London, U.K.: Allan Lane, 2005), xiii.

<sup>23</sup> For example, in World War II, Commanders sought decisive victory irrespective of the impact on their forces; whereas in counter-insurgency, winning the hearts and minds of the population is more important than risking the force to secure geographic objectives.

<sup>24</sup> For example, tanks being used solely for protection rather than mobility or tactical military organizations being used for humanitarian purposes rather than combat.

<sup>25</sup> Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 4.

<sup>26</sup> See especially Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Preton, USA: Preton University Press, 2004).

<sup>27</sup> These terms/concepts are discussed in some detail in Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace, and International Relations* (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2007), 246-263.

<sup>28</sup> Canadian Government, Department of National Defence, *Land Operations 2001: Adaptive Dispersed Operations – The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow* (Ottawa, ON: Canadian Army, 2007), 6.

<sup>29</sup> Gen. Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London, U.K.: Allen Lane, 2005).

<sup>30</sup> Gavin Buchan, "Canada's Whole of Government Approach: Pursuit of Civil-Military Coherence in Afghanistan, 2005-2009," Master's Thesis (Kingston, ON: Queen's University, 2010).

<sup>31</sup> Bernard Brister, "Family Relations: A Preliminary Analysis of the Use of the Comprehensive Approach at the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics," in *Security Operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century – Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, eds. Mike Rostek and Peter Gizewski (Kingston, ON: Queen's University, 2011).

<sup>32</sup> Jenna Alexander and Dalton Cote, *Leadership in Whole of Government Operations – A Case Study of Security in the Canadian Arctic* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2011).

<sup>33</sup> However, even among military, para-military and other security organizations that have all of these similarities, there are differences in organizational culture which can also significantly affect interaction between them, even without the potential added complications of interacting with other organizations outside of the security domain.

<sup>34</sup> Geert Hofstede, "Culture and Organizations," *International Studies of Management and Organizations*, 10 (4) (1981), 15- 41.

<sup>35</sup> Wendell French and Cecil Bell, *Organizational development* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1979).

<sup>36</sup> Culture shock occurs when we find ourselves in unfamiliar environments, surrounded by things, people, behaviours, norms and customs that are very different from what we are accustomed to. Finding ourselves in an alien environment can cause stress, and even trauma. However, after the initial stages of culture shock, in order to survive one must learn to adapt to a different context, or culture, and eventually one goes through a stage of self-growth, a change in identity. For a more comprehensive discussion on culture shock see the work of the Canadian anthropologist Kalervo

Oberg, *Culture Shock and the Problem of Adjustments to New Cultural Environments* (Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, 1958).

<sup>37</sup> Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco, CA, USA: Jossey-Bass, 1992), 12.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> James Pierce, *Is the Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army Congruent with the Professional Development of its Senior Level Officer Corps?* (Carlisle, PA, USA: U.S. Army War College, 2010).

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., xiv.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 62.

<sup>42</sup> Glen Kreiner, "Organizational Identity – Culture's Conceptual Cousin," in *The Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate*, eds. Neil Ashkanasy, Celeste Wilderom, and Mark Peterson (Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage publications, 2011).

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Diagram adapted from Pierce, "The Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army," 2010, 3; and Grazia Scoppio, *The importance of culture: soft skills for inter-agency, complex operations* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2011), 34.

<sup>45</sup> Peter Gizewski, "Discovering the Comprehensive Approach," in *Security Operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, eds. M. Rostek and P. Gizewski, 2011, 22.

<sup>46</sup> For a more detailed illustration of the different approaches to the concept of command between departments see: Gavin Buchan, "Canada's Whole of Government Approach," Master's Thesis (Kingston, ON: Queen's University, 2010).

<sup>47</sup> In the context of military operations, the OPP is defined as "A decision-making process employed by a commander and staff." Defence Terminology Bank, retrieved on 13 Aug 2012 from <http://terminology.mil.ca/term-eng.asp>

<sup>48</sup> Margaret Wheatley, *Leadership and the New Science: Learning about Organizations from an Orderly Universe* (San Francisco, CA, USA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1992).

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 104-110.

<sup>51</sup> Cited in Karen Davis (ed.), *Cultural Intelligence & Leadership: An Introduction for Canadian Forces Leaders* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009).

<sup>52</sup> David C. Thomas and Kerr Inkson, *Cultural Intelligence: People Skills for Global Business* (San Francisco, CA, USA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2003), 78.

<sup>53</sup> Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 1992.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 386.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> For a discussion on leadership development see: Jeff Stouffer and Allister MacIntyre (eds.), *Strategic Leadership Development: International Perspectives* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007).

<sup>57</sup> Schein, 392.

<sup>58</sup> Wheatley, *Leadership and the New Science*, 1992, 144.

<sup>59</sup> Canadian Government, Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 5.

<sup>60</sup> Canadian Government, Department of National Defence, *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003).

<sup>61</sup> Canadian Government, Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), xv.

<sup>62</sup> Various research has identified the difficulty of coordinating military and civilian pre-deployment training and exercises necessary for the development of cohesive whole-of-government teams. See for example: Grazia Scoppio, Raymond Idzenga and Sharon Miklas, *Learning together: Lessons on Canadian Forces Skill Sets for Multinational, Inter-agency Operations* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Department of National Defence, 2009).

<sup>63</sup> Canadian Government, Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces – Leading People* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2007).



- <sup>64</sup> See Scoppio et al., *Learning together: Lessons on Canadian Forces Skill Sets for Multinational, Inter-agency Operations*, 2009.
- <sup>65</sup> See Robert Walker, *The Professional Development Framework: Generating Effectiveness in Canadian Forces Leadership* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2006).
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>67</sup> Megan Thompson, Angela Febbraro and Anne-Renée Blais, “Interagency Training for the Canadian Comprehensive Mission in Afghanistan,” in *Security Operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, eds. Mike Rostek and Peter Gizewski (Kingston, ON: Queen’s University, 2011).
- <sup>68</sup> Bernard Brister, “Family relations: a preliminary analysis of the comprehensive approach at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics,” in *Security Operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century – Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, eds. Mike Rostek and Peter Gizewski (Kingston, ON: Queen’s University, 2011).
- <sup>69</sup> Jenna Alexander and Dalton Cote, *Leadership in Whole of Government Operations – A Case Study of Security in the Canadian Arctic* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2011).
- <sup>70</sup> Michael Miklaucic, *Commanding Heights: Strategic Lessons from Complex Operations* (Washington, D.C., USA: Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, 2009), x.
- <sup>71</sup> Grazia Scoppio, Raymond Idzenga and Sharon Miklas, *Learning together: Lessons on Canadian Forces Skill Sets for Multinational, Inter-agency Operations* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Department of National Defence, 2009), 28.
- <sup>72</sup> Barak Salmoni, Jessica Hart, Renny McPherson and Aidan Kirby Winn, “Growing Strategic Leaders for Future Conflict,” *Parameters*, Spring 2010, 72-88.
- <sup>73</sup> The concepts alluded to in this table are drawn from: Salmoni et al., “Growing Strategic Leaders for Future Conflict.”
- <sup>74</sup> Victor Rosello, *Soft skills for 21<sup>st</sup> century land dominance*, 1-4. I.O.Warfare, 4<sup>th</sup> Ed. (Arlington, VA, USA: Association of the United States Army, 2009), 3.
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>76</sup> Scoppio et al., *Learning Together*, 2009.
- <sup>77</sup> See: Cathleen Stasz and Dominic J. Brewer, *Academic Skills at Work*, National Centre for Research in Vocational Education (Berkeley, CA, USA: University of California at Berkeley, 1999); G.W. Mitchell, “Essential soft skills for success in the twenty-first century workforce as perceived by business educators,” *The Delta Pi Epsilon Journal*, 2010, LII (1), 43-53; K.S. Balaji, “A Comparative Study of Soft Skills Among Engineers,” *IUP Journal of Soft Skills*, 2009, 3 (3); NACE, *Job Outlook Survey* (Bethlehem, PA: National Association for Colleges and Employers (NACE), 2009).
- <sup>78</sup> Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, “Soft Skills in higher education: importance and improvement ratings as a function of individual differences and academic performance,” *Educational Psychology*, 2010, 30 (2), 221-241.
- <sup>79</sup> Daniel Goleman, *Working with Emotional Intelligence* (New York, NY, USA: Bantam Books, 1998).
- <sup>80</sup> Ibid., 318.
- <sup>81</sup> Grazia Scoppio, *The importance of culture: soft skills for inter-agency, complex operations* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2011).
- <sup>82</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>83</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>84</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>85</sup> Walker, *The Professional Development Framework*, 2006.
- <sup>86</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>87</sup> Salmoni et al., *Growing Strategic Leaders for Future Conflict*, 2010.
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid., 74
- <sup>89</sup> Wheatley, *Leadership and the New Science*, 1992, 144-147.

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