Ethical Decision-Making in the New Security Environment is proudly released by the Canadian Defence Academy Press and represents an important contribution to the fields of leadership and ethics. This book is the second volume of proceedings from the 7th Canadian Conference on Ethical Leadership held at the Royal Military College of Canada on 28-29 November 2006. Ethical Decision-Making in the New Security Environment is an excellent counterpart to the first volume in the series, The War on Terror: Ethical Considerations. Each book underscores the importance of ethical considerations while on operations. Specifically, this volume focuses on ethical decision-making processes, considerations that are increasingly intricate and important given today’s new and complex security environment.
Ethical Decision-Making in the New Security Environment
PROCEEDINGS FROM THE 7TH CANADIAN CONFERENCE ON ETHICAL LEADERSHIP

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ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

VOLUME 2

Edited by: Dr. Emily J. Spencer and Dr. Daniel Lagacé-Roy

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FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure to introduce Ethical Decision-Making in the New Security Environment. This publication is another book released through the Canadian Defence Academy Press and represents an important contribution to the fields of leadership and ethics. This book is the second volume of proceedings from the 7th Canadian Conference on Ethical Leadership held at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) on November 28-29, 2006. The first volume is entitled The War on Terror: Ethical Considerations. Specifically, this volume focuses on ethical decision-making processes, considerations that are more than ever intricate in today’s new security environment.

In recent years, the Canadian Forces (CF) has recognized that the need to discuss ethical issues is fundamental to mission effectiveness. With this in mind, no topic could be more germane than that of military ethics, especially in today’s ambiguous, chaotic and complex defence environment. In these situations, military members sometimes remain uncertain about the “right” thing to do. However, one thing is certain: these complex and chaotic operational environments demand the highest order of discipline and ethical standards from military personnel.

Ethical Decision-Making in the New Security Environment provides an excellent discourse concerning ethical dilemmas to assist individuals in ensuring that they are, and remain, ethical soldiers, sailors and airmen and airwomen. This publication is a must read, as it will engage you in pursuing the debate on ethical leadership and ethical decision-making. It can also serve as an educational tool for preparing military members to recognize and understand the complexity of ethical situations on operations.

In closing, I wish to reiterate the importance of this book, as well as all others in the Strategic Leadership Writing Project series. These books are designed to assist you in being prepared to lead and command in today’s complex defence environment. At the Canadian Defence Academy, we hope that our efforts at providing well-researched and relevant books on key operational topics both enlighten and empower those who serve in, and those who interact with, the profession of arms in Canada.

Major-General J.P.Y.D. Gosselin
Commander, Canadian Defence Academy
INTRODUCTION

Throughout time there have always been cataclysmic events that have changed history. The tragic occurrences of 11 September 2001 (9/11), when terrorists hijacked fully fuelled commercial airliners and used them as munitions to attack the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, as well as the Pentagon in Washington D.C., was, arguably, such an event. In fact, the influential *Economist* magazine called 9/11 the day the world changed.

This dramatic description is not undeserved. Beyond the approximate 3,000 deaths and the billions of dollars in damages, 9/11 set off a chain of events that has transformed the face of the global security environment. New threats emerged and the West responded to both the real and perceived perils that nations, particularly those in North America and Europe, faced. Although terrorist acts were not previously unknown, the sheer savagery and magnitude of the attack of 9/11 and its complex planning indicated that terrorists were prepared to utilize new and innovative weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the suicide bomber now provided the ultimate smart munitions – capable of deciding how, when and particularly who to strike.

Undeniably, 9/11 created dramatic change for Western military organizations and their allies. Already reeling from major paradigm shifts that resulted with the “fall of the wall” in 1989, western militaries already faced a major challenge departing from the relatively stable and secure template of the Cold War. This model was based on large, symmetrical mechanized forces, within the context of high intensity warfare. In retrospect, the Cold War model, in existence for almost 50 years, was a very comfortable environment for everyone. The world was clearly delineated – the enemy was easily identified and understood and the anticipated battlefield was fully comprehensible to the point where exercises, particularly in Europe, were considered dress rehearsals for the potential conflict.

With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in December 1989, which represented the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the rigidly controlled bi-polar world tumbled into a free fall. An economic and political power vacuum was created as the superpowers disengaged from many areas around the world. Very quickly failed and failing states
mushroomed around the globe. Exacerbating the situations were other significant problems such as ethnic violence, narco-trafficking, transnational crime and conflict over resources.

In the 1990s, things went from bad to worse. With only a single global superpower, the United States, the West began a series of selective interventions that would have been inconceivable in the Cold War. Often without the necessary mandates, international agreements, participant sanction, political will or resources. Moreover, on several occasions, an intervention was launched before the conflict or belligerents were clearly ready for such interference.

In this context, the landscape for militaries also dramatically changed. The belligerents were no longer clearly identified or well understood. Indeed, operations in the 1990s contained a monumental leap in complexity. Antagonists ranged from military, to para-military forces, to warlords, to criminal organizations and gangs, to armed mobs. In addition, military forces now had to deal with other governmental departments and organizations, as well as non-governmental agencies and an ever present press. By 1993, United States Marine Corps commandant, General Charles Krulak, articulated the new security environment within the context of the “three block war.” Quite simply, he described an operational concept, or contingency in fact, in which soldiers conducted operations spanning humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping and/or mid-intensity combat all in the same day and all within three city blocks.

Western militaries scrambled to meet the requirements of new environment, one that required both warfighting and diplomatic skills. More emphasis was placed on lower levels of leadership. The old mass army concept that relied only on senior leadership to make decisions and deal with the public or press was no longer relevant or effective. The concept of the “strategic corporal,” where the tactical decisions made by junior members on the ground in the glare of media cameras can become strategic issues as they are beamed across the globe by the media in real time and influence or incite negative and often violent reactions, required a more de-centralized leadership approach.

The new security environment is characterized by an enemy that is an amalgam of opponents that span the realm of criminals, warlords, host nations belligerents, radical religious extremists, ideologues, jihadists,
mercenaries and foreign state sponsored combatants. As opposed to the symmetrical enemy of the Cold War, the new opposition relies on asymmetric means. They follow no standard organizational framework; abide by no international rules; and follow no standard doctrine. Moreover, their non-linear and asymmetric approach, in stark contrast to the symmetrical mind-set of the Cold War opponents, makes no distinction between civilian and military. As such, operations are conducted both among and against civilians and societies at large.

Not surprisingly, today’s complex security environment demands that soldiers be warriors and technicians as well as scholars and diplomats. Kinetic solutions are no longer the panacea of warfare. As such, military members need to be armed with a good moral and ethical compass.

*Decision-Making in the New Security Environment* underscores some of the ethical concerns that arise during operations. Specifically, this volume focuses on ethical decision-making processes, considerations that are increasingly intricate and important given today's new and complex security environment.

In chapter one, David Last addresses the positive and negative aspects of private sector collaboration during military operations. He describes that military members and leaders should advance with great caution when deciding how military interventions for stabilization and reconstruction should work with local private sectors. He highlights the role that ethics plays in making the “right” decisions. With the use of historical and contemporary examples, Last underscores the importance of ethical considerations when making even seemingly small decisions concerning host nation private sector collaboration; even small decisions can have a big impact on the local economy and power structure.

In chapter two, Rachel Lea Heide emphasises the importance of ethical conduct among serving military personnel. She promotes the need for pre-deployment cultural awareness training for Canadian Forces members to facilitate this goal. Heide uses the disgrace and disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia to illustrate her point, providing a thorough account of the events of March 1993 and the future inquest into the Somalia incident. Throughout, she also stresses the role of the home front in insuring and demanding ethical conduct from Canadian Forces members.
In “Ethics and Developments in Military Technology,” David Whethem addresses the ethical implications posed by the use of emerging weapon systems. He argues that the decision to adopt a new weapon system in the conduct of hostilities requires moral and ethical consideration. He also disputes the idea that some new weapon systems do not fit into existing moral and ethical debates. Additionally, Whethem points out that the use of Precision Guided Munitions and Stand-Off weaponry, for example, has indeed changed the face of war and has modified the reasons for going to war.

Next, Lew Diggs’ paper addresses the economic and business implications of peace operations from an ethical perspective. He provides an engaging account of the economic role that military members play in low-income countries while on peace operations. Diggs argues that the impact on the local economy demands that the military clearly define its terms of economic engagement in these local communities. He provides two fictional case studies to illustrate this point. Diggs suggests that a utilitarian approach that emphasizes the greatest good for the greatest number of people would assist in resolving ethical dilemmas that deal with the economic and business implications of peace operations.

In “Competing Values: Loyalty to the Chain of Command and Personal Integrity,” Greg Maddison shows how one can be both loyal to the chain of command and still possess personal integrity. Using personal accounts to illustrate his points, Maddison highlights the need for strong values associated with the profession of arms, a sense of duty, loyalty to what that profession stands for and the importance of service before self. Maddison concludes that there is no better code of behaviour than that of the Royal Military College of Canada: truth, duty and valour.

Janis Karpinski’s paper “Ethical Behaviour and the Military/Ethical Challenges in the Complex Security Environment” is a personal account on leadership and ethical conduct. Her paper addresses the difficulties of ethical leadership, particularly when leaders at all levels do not practice or enforce ethical behaviour. Karpinski suggests that ethical leadership will improve when senior leaders become accountable for their actions and thus serve as mentors for junior military personnel. She uses the war in Iraq as an example and also relies on her experience as a commander in the US army to illustrate this point.
In chapter seven, Damian O’Keefe asks if leadership makes a difference in the ethical climate of an organization, specifically the Canadian Forces. He also explores the relationships between ethical and unethical behaviour in the workplace and the efficiency of the organization or, in military terms, the operational effectiveness of the unit. O’Keefe specifically examines the ethical culture of the Canadian Forces and its ethical climate, relying on both qualitative and quantitative research to support his claims.

In “Impetus to Action: Moral and Ethical Decision-Making in Canadian Forces Operations,” Michael Thomson and his colleagues present and analyse accounts of moral and ethical dilemmas that Canadian Forces personnel have faced in operations. This study evaluates the factors that comprise ethical situations as well as the processes of decision-making. Such factors as self-identity, moral intensity and organizational culture are taken into account. Their findings confirm that moral and ethical decision-making is not a linear and rational process, but rather a complex and multi-dimensional one.
CHAPTER 1

Private Sector Collaboration in Operations: Promise and Pitfall

David Last

Faced with chaos, conflict, and human suffering, how should military interventions for stabilization and reconstruction work with the private sector? The answer is: with great caution, some suspicion, and attention to the regulation of the economy. Unregulated markets are not safe for fragile states, and if military occupation imposes free-market imperialism by design or by accident, it may be a vector of chronic affliction for a recovering society. Ignorance of economic effects is no excuse.

Ethics are about choices between good and bad, these choices are shaped by historical circumstances and the practical goal-driven tasks of agents like mercenaries, merchants and missionaries. Forced conversions and slavery in the first period of European expansion were justified in the name of religion. Land seizure, plantation economies, and mineral rights — the hallmarks of the second period — were justified by realpolitik and economic imperatives. 19th century imperialism paved the way for globalization in the 20th century from which Western powers continue to be the primary beneficiaries, although the distribution of benefit varies in any given country. The legacy of colonial and imperial efforts also contributes to today’s instabilities.

We live comfortably with the economic benefits of the depredations of earlier eras, notwithstanding the fact that what was justifiable in the 16th or 19th centuries is now considered barbaric. Native land claims do not keep most of us awake at night, and if coffee does, it probably is not “fair trade.” Plantation economies and mines established in earlier centuries serve us well. As for political instability, today we are confident that our internationally sanctioned stabilization operations are justified, even if they are not very effective, just as the conquistadors believed in their God-given task, even while they had doubts about what happened to Mexican natives’ souls when they were worked to death.
What is justifiable today might in tomorrow’s light seem reprehensible, and if our stabilization efforts seem wrong today to our partners in war-affected countries, these transgressions will help to justify violence against us. Resource extraction and foreign presence is not inevitably exploitative, and not all empires are evil, but they risk becoming so if they serve us far better than those our guns point at. Ethics are ultimately a practical tool; we get into less trouble if we do the right thing.

This paper begins by considering the impact of foreign military presence and then puts this in the context of market-driven reconstruction solutions, which have a mixed record.

**Impacts of a Foreign Presence**

Military forces in post-conflict and counter-insurgency operations inevitably get involved in the economy of the host nation. At a minimum, they are concerned with the sustenance of the operation – renting accommodation, hiring interpreters, and purchasing supplies. For a large mission in a small country, this can represent a significant portion of the cash economy, even distorting the GDP, wages, rents, and the balance of supply and demand. UNAMSIL, for example, reached 17,000 deployed soldiers, whose spending power was overwhelmingly concentrated on the Freetown peninsula and in centres like Kenema and Bo. Local purchases of food, materials, and services accounted in Sierra Leone for about 20 percent of UNAMSIL’s budget in 2000, and the 2001 report to the Secretary General indicated that this proportion increased as the economy stabilized.5

It would be wrong to calculate impact solely on the basis of salaries and local purchase orders. An economic impact study for the UN Best Practices Project argued that UN peacekeeping missions have their largest positive impact by contributing to a stable environment, but that they also help to kick-start the local economy. The authors argue that the positive impacts generally outweigh the negative, however, there are negative effects. Although there is little flow-through inflation to the wider economy, there is upward pressure on wages for those capable of working with the international community, and this can hinder recovery. The demand for translators can strip the economy of professionals and educated students. The supply of demobilized military labour simultaneously depresses wages for low-skill labour, which cannot be employed without
entrepreneurs and capital; the record has been that it can take several work seasons to adjust the balance for any sector.

Also damaging is the potential for large numbers of deployed troops to create vice economies: the sex trade, alcohol, gambling and bootlegged CDs are the most common. Black market trade in women has been observed in the Balkans, West Africa, and Asian missions. Informal markets in alcohol, tobacco, and gasoline have also been supported or encouraged by some peacekeeping contingents, straying into illegal and sometimes violent activities in the case of the Balkan missions.\textsuperscript{7}

Price distortion is most evident in capital regions, where demand by well-paid international staff can drive rents up ten-fold in a matter of months. Local market structures will determine whether this windfall is concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy owners or dispersed more widely. Even when property ownership is widespread, gangs or political entrepreneurs may extort payments or protection money from those in receipt of hard currency. Informal taxes may also be levied against interpreters, cleaners, and others who earn wages behind the wire of an international mission.

Market enthusiasts will explain that all these distortions are temporary and serve a purpose. As rents rise, landlords will be encouraged to build and will find the capital to do so. Higher food prices will attract new suppliers to the market, taking advantage of the large guaranteed demand by stationed military forces making local purchases. But fragile post-conflict markets have some other characteristics. Security is a necessary public good, which might not have been established; in its absence, protection rackets favour capital accumulation by coercive and unscrupulous actors. If the international presence allows events to take their natural course, then the predictable economic response to distortions caused by international presence will be to put wealth in the hands of coercive actors, who will then be able to translate this wealth into political power, consolidating their positions in the post-conflict order. On a grand scale, this sort of protection racket is at the heart of building states; writ smaller, it is just organized crime.\textsuperscript{8}

What is a military commander to do?
CHAPTER 1

Markets and Reconstruction

Military forces are primarily concerned with avoiding bad practices under their home country’s regulations, but in the process they have the opportunity to support and encourage local growth or to undermine it. A larger problem is the health of markets in general, and this is where military commanders’ training and experience may leave them ill equipped to understand the ambitious and large-scale looting that may be going on around them. There is the potential for honourable soldiers to be the unwitting dupes of cunning capitalists, but the reality is likely to be more nuanced, as military force plays a small role in a larger drama. To illustrate the problem of markets and reconstruction in the age of global economies, I will begin with Marine Corps General Smedley Butler in depression-era America, compare reconstruction efforts in post-1945 Germany and post-2003 Iraq, then consider the fate of a specific business in the process of post-conflict privatization in the Balkans. Taken together, these cases illustrate the general problem with the way in which markets work in a global economy; markets favour wealth and power and do not protect public goods like security or public ownership. Duffield’s work on global governance and conflicts surrounding “shadow economies” demonstrates that the ideology of international liberalism supports persistent low-level conflict in the margins of regulated markets. Military commanders should assume that they are surrounded by nefarious schemes to profit from chaos at the expense of the weak.

Brigadier General Smedley Darlington Butler wrote in his 1935 classic, War is a Racket, “I spent 33 years in the Marines, most of my time being a high-class muscle man for big business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for Capitalism.” He had commanded marines in Mexico, China, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Haiti, and when he left the marines in 1924 to serve as Chief of Police in gangster-ridden Philadelphia he became scathing in his indictment of American profiteering and corporate malfeasance, seeing no difference between the predatory mobsters of his home town and the behaviour of American business abroad. This could be dismissed as quaint muckraking hyperbole, were it not for the frank testimony to the McCormack-Dickstein Committee of the 74th Congress, 1st Session, 15 February, 1935. The testimony describes what might have been preparations for a putsch in Washington, explored later in some detail by Jules Archer. However close the financiers and millionaires came to a fascist-inspired coup in Washington, Butler gets credit for
an astute and loyal response to complex pressures to subvert democracy. He was guided throughout by a firm commitment to the veterans, his former soldiers, and to the idea of democracy before wealth and privilege.

It is widely understood that the costs imposed on Germany at Versailles contributed to the origins of the Second World War. On top of the reparations bill, the industrial heartland of the Ruhr was occupied by France, and the patents which had put Germany at the forefront of the chemical industry where expropriated and given to American companies, including Dupont and Standard Oil. The Marshall Aid Plan represented a more enlightened reconstruction program after the Second World War. Valued at about $13 billion or about $87 billion in 1997 dollars it represented almost ten percent of the GDP of the sixteen recipient countries. Ellwood and Sogge both emphasise the degree to which recipient countries managed the distribution of aid. Reconstruction followed Keynes's prescription for managing markets through government intervention; there was no room for market failures with Soviet power waiting to take advantage of labour unrest from unemployment or depression. The lion’s share of Marshall aid went to the largest countries with the most damage – Germany, France, the UK and Italy. But the highest per capita amounts went to states facing the greatest threat of communist subversion – Greece and Austria. The expenditure of the funds was subject to close oversight by the U.S. Congress, by the governments of the receiving countries, and in places by inspectors general appointed by the US Army.

It is ironic that the reconstruction of Germany was a principal example for planning nation building and reconstruction in Iraq. American planning for the reconstruction of Iraq began at least as early as 1998 in the form of planning seminars at the US Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Although these were staff exercises rather than operational planning, they resulted in both planning documents and publications by the Center for Strategic Leadership, which focused on the Army’s Title 10 (legislated) responsibilities. It is no accident that the phrase “de-Baathification” appeared early in the conflict, because American planners drew clear parallels between Iraq and Nazi Germany, and consulted historians of the Marshall Plan as well as participants in more recent operations in Panama, Haiti, and the Balkans. Both the Department of Defence “summer project” of 2004 and prior work for the RAND corporation drew on the Second World War cases of Germany and Japan.
But while resurrecting a strong state and viable economy was the objective in Germany and Japan, deconstructing the state seemed to be the ideologically inspired objective in Iraq.

The Bush Administration’s unilateral plans for post-conflict reconstruction were presented to Congress in February 2003. Under-secretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith and Under-secretary of State Marc Grossman announced that the Department of Defense would take the lead. American forces would quickly transfer some authority to Iraqi ministries, international organisations and relief groups, with full Iraqi sovereignty restored perhaps within two years.22 The execution since 2003 has involved private corporations receiving sole-source contracts worth billions of dollars, and there has been no shortage of criticism of their performance by independent scholars,23 watchdog agencies like POGO – Project on Government Oversight24 and by US and foreign government agencies.25 Most important, laws passed under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) by Paul Bremer permitted privatization of state-owned enterprises, and gave preferential treatment to American companies for reconstruction.26 The CPA did not provide for privatization of Iraq’s national oil company, but interim Iraqi President Iyad Allawi did pass a law permitting foreign ownership of oil assets and reserves.27 Relying just on the weekly reports of the US State Department, the Iraq Investment and Reconstruction Task Force (IIRTF), and business journals, it is clear that permeability to international business has been an objective, and progress has been made despite Iraqi resistance to foreign ownership.28

For a staff officer in an operational headquarters, a battalion commander involved in operations, or even a planner in a national headquarters, these stories seem rather distant from military concerns, but they are central to the question of whether the post-conflict order will actually serve the interests of those whose “hearts and minds” are being courted in a stabilization effort. A narrower focus on a single industry helps to illustrate both the pitfalls and potential of private partnerships, of which military commanders and staff members should be aware.

When I was the Civil Affairs Officer in Prijedor in 1996 for NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR), the Mira biscuit factory was shut down. It had been a worker-owned enterprise before the war, employing more than a thousand people, and had closed in 1992. Serbs in Prijedor told me that many of the managers and engineers had been Muslim, and had
left in the first exodus, but even with full shifts, neither supply lines in nor export links out were operating with the war embargo, and so it was closed down. The Mira factory was just one of 83 major industries in Prijedor catalogued by the International Management Group (IMG, an agency established by the UNHCR).

Human Rights Watch investigations and a UN Commission of Experts provided a more complete description of the economic process surrounding ethnic cleansing:

>a major motivating factor behind the Serb takeover of the town of Prijedor was to gain control of the financial assets of the community. … prominent non-Serb community leaders, businessmen and women, and professionals were killed immediately, or detained in Omarska, where many disappeared and were most likely killed. These directors of companies, municipal officials, and others were replaced by Serbs, and many businesses were expropriated almost overnight…\textsuperscript{29}

The claim of mass expropriation is only partly accurate, and neither the Human Rights Watch report nor the UN Commission of Experts casts light on why those Serbs who did not benefit directly tolerated the expropriations.

To understand this, we need to differentiate between socially owned capital like the Mira factory, and personally owned capital like family-run coffee shops and small retail stores. Shops, homes, and retail outlets were expropriated illegally because their owners had individual title to them under Yugoslav law. The culprits were usually police, officials, and their friends, using force to take what they wanted. But large factories like Mira were not expropriated; the expelled workers and managers (if alive) still nominally owned shares in a collective enterprise. This distinction is important. Visiting Yugoslavia as a student in 1983, I was made aware of the tensions between a thriving private economy and comparatively inefficient worker-owned and state-managed public sector, which nevertheless guaranteed full employment and a good standard of living. Over the next twenty years, urban and educated Muslims in Prijedor seemed to benefit more than rural Serbs, and Serb nationalists were able to manipulate a sense of economic injustice to garner support for the persecution of Muslims.\textsuperscript{30}
I returned in 1998 with an NGO, to find the factory still closed. A secretary from the IMG’s Banja Luka office told me that the factory had been sold to an Italian company, which had decided not to resume production, preferring to export raw fruit directly to its plants in Tuscany. Former employees of the factory in Prijedor told me that they knew it had been sold, but had not been consulted or compensated for their shares. Note that while some elites had been involved in the systematic looting of both public and private assets, not all Serbs (neither those remaining in Prijedor, nor those fleeing there) had been guilty of theft or looting; many had suffered. A sense of gathering resentment built on the perception of international looting of what had been socially owned capital.

If Mira was sold prior to 1998, it is not clear who paid or who received payment. In similar cases, “managers” fraudulently attempted to collect rents from IFOR and SFOR units occupying factories, and attempted to sell those same factories to foreign investors. The safeguard was that would-be brokers could not provide proof of ownership to SFOR or the Office of the High Representative. Donais describes the case of the Sarajevo Holiday Inn, being given away to a businessman in 1996, then taken back after international protest. The anti-corruption reforms driven by the Office of the High Representative caught up with the privatization plans driven by USAID and the IMF by 1997, and privatization of socially owned capital had to be approved by international officials, to prevent giveaways to the ethnic “in-group.” This applied in Bosnia, but not in Slovenia or Croatia, where privatization had proceeded rapidly after dissolution in 1992, with the assistance of German and Austrian consultants, and the active encouragement of several Zagreb embassies.

Socially owned capital belongs to “the people,” but which people? Under Yugoslav worker self-management, apartment buildings belonged to the tenants, buses belonged to the citizens of a municipality, factories belonged to their workers, and so on. Ownership was dispersed. Other assets like mines, forests, and hydro dams belonged to the state; all citizens had a share. A voucher system was introduced in Bosnia-Herzegovina to permit compensation of workers and citizens for the sale of what had formerly been their property but its limitations were all too evident in the wake of national dissolution and massive population displacement. Most citizens were losers. But those who were well connected and able to access international capital stood to gain control of what had formerly been public property, as they did in other transition states.
international oversight limited the looting in Bosnia, it did not in Croatia and Serbia. Private investment was quick to underwrite the transfer of productive factories in Croatia, and cronyism under Milosevic and Markovic managed access to the state-run economy in Serbia.

The candy company Kras in Zagreb was formed in 1950 from two nationalized companies – Union established in 1911, and Bizjak in 1923. Under national planning guidance, Kras was linked to Prijedor’s Mira in 1967, and both companies enjoyed considerable export success until the outbreak of war. Kras was privatized in 1992 with assets of DM135 million. It achieved ISO 9001 certification in 1997, and more than DM2 million in investments and plant consolidation in 1999. The Croatian Security and Exchange Commission reported 51 percent increases in Kras share value in 2001 with rumours of take-over. Meanwhile, in 2001, Mira had been established as a joint stock company. In April 2003 the Republika Srpska government signed a contract with Kras, under which Kras obtained a controlling 46 percent share in Mira and invested about DM2.5 million in production, training, social security payments, and higher wages. Divjak comments:

Mira is a classic example of a Republika Srpska company established before the war that has reverted to Croatian control. The case is particularly interesting because Mira is located in an area where the workforce is majority Serb, but the management is Croatian.

Ironically, the ethnic differences between labour and management had been one of the sources of tension helping nationalists to mobilize Serbs in support of ethnic cleansing in 1992. Analogous differences are being cited less than a generation later as an example of economic peacebuilding, successfully re-connecting the natural links between Serb and Croat across what is now a national boundary.

It is by no means certain that these new economic links will contribute to peace and stability in the long run. They might eventually do so for one of two reasons: they might generate prosperity, or they might galvanize groups against a common enemy. Market enthusiasts like Divjak or Popov argue that privatization and foreign investment provide for recapitalization and growth, which in turn allows governments to meet basic needs; old antagonisms are less dangerous when all prosper.
privatization can concentrate wealth, and liberalization and open borders can leave groups systematically disadvantaged. Chua points to the problem of market dominant elites – minorities that benefit from market advantages thereby enfl aming the envy of majorities. Whether or not Muslims were dominant in the 1990s, Serbs were disposed to see them that way, and could come to see Croats in the same light. But Croats might also see something wrong with the larger picture. Stabilization and ownership initially brought a drop in living standards. In Croatia’s mining industry, modernization using public funds preceded privatization, which was followed by increased output for lower prices. The once-lucrative tourist industry was recapitalized through foreign ownership, and Croatian incomes rapidly dropped along the previously prosperous Adriatic coast. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims alike now find themselves on the periphery of a global economy, less cushioned from its effects than they were under Tito; some gain, some lose, and many of those who gain are foreigners.

What does this have to do with soldiers? General Michael Jackson’s advance team from Gorni Vakuf looked at Mira’s facilities as a possible alternative to the Banja Luka “metal factory” that they occupied in January 1996 with the headquarters of IFOR’s Multi-National Division South West. Every factory, warehouse, or industrial parking lot that a force occupies affects the prospects of economic recovery. Rents and compensation, depending upon who collects them and how they are paid, can contribute to regeneration or corruption, or to both. Choice of one facility over another can have implications for international investment. Whether or not local workers and families are treated fairly will affect their attitude towards the force and the states and international organizations that sponsor it. Correspondingly, it will affect support for any insurgency.

Globalization and Shadow Economies

The complexity arises not just from post-conflict reconstruction, but from reconstruction combined with a radical transition in the relationship of the economy to global markets. Cambodia, former-Yugoslavia, South Lebanon and now Iraq and Afghanistan have each seen economic transitions, in which the presence of international troops has been tied both to increased foreign ownership and penetration, and to changing informal and illegal economies inherently linked to the West. Any officer blind to global markets and shadow economies will have difficulty understanding
what is going on, let alone making ethical decisions in the post-conflict environment.

Consider globalization first. We have the certainty of the conquistadors that greater integration into the global economy is ultimately in everyone’s best interests. The US Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is firmly committed to market solutions:

The Core Mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.46

The “Essential Task Matrix” for post-conflict reconstruction addresses security, governance, humanitarian, economic, and justice tasks in 54 pages, of which a third are devoted to economics. Amongst the goals of reconstruction, seen from Washington, we find: private-public investment partnerships, strengthening relations with international financial institutions, early resumption of debt repayment, licensing of new banks, creation of conditions conducive to stock and commodity markets, increasing export diversification, ensuring legal and regulatory frameworks to support privatization, protection of intellectual property rights, and establishing a framework for the privatization of public assets.57 Benefits of privatization and liberalization are extolled by policy officer Stephen Krasner and the first incumbent of the office, Ambassador Carlos Pascual.58 Even heavyweight historians like Niall Ferguson have argued that empires sometimes perform better than nation-states in generating development.49

This liberal and internationalist privatization agenda is certainly a policy choice that mature governments might make in the hopes of achieving prosperity; it is also likely to result in greater inequalities which in turn feed informal and illegal economies and undermine fragile states. The privatization agenda in reconstruction inherently favours international capital because local capital has fled or been shattered by conflict. Development economist William Easterly argues that the “new imperialism” of Krasner, Pascual, and Ferguson is fundamentally flawed as an approach to end poverty.50 He argues that the imperial era did not facilitate
development, but gave rise to bad government, failed states, and distorted economies. Each dysfunctional intervention has justified subsequent ones, while the rich get richer and the poor, poorer. European incomes were four times those of the colonies in the 1870s, but 16 times by the 1990s.\textsuperscript{51} In non-settlement colonies and non-colonies, per capita incomes had risen respectively to three and six times that of former colonies by the 1990s.\textsuperscript{52} Globalization, like the colonial imperialism that preceded it, is a better prospect for rich strong countries than for poor weak ones, and this may make peacekeepers look more like conquistadors than they would like.

The shadow economy of illegal and informal transactions is the other face of globalization. The West’s postwar growth and Cold War triumph was founded on markets.\textsuperscript{53} The great transformation in the west was the intellectual separation of politics and economics,\textsuperscript{54} and the apogee of the state’s influence over markets was achieved in the decades after Polanyi wrote.\textsuperscript{55} States’ capacities to manage markets were declining by the 1980s, not least because the leading financial and commercial nations were ideologically committed to free market forces.\textsuperscript{56} This had its most dramatic consequences in the margins of the developed world, where developing countries faced two sorts of markets: commodity trade was integrated with Western economies on disadvantageous terms, and largely separated from the rest of the local economy; other markets were closed to them through tariff and non-tariff barriers. At the same time, international financial institutions demanded domestic social and political changes as a condition of loans. In this environment of the 1980s, Duffield describes the growth of informal shadow economies as a response to economic privation.\textsuperscript{57} In the legitimate global economy, plantations and factories are enclaves with mainly Western owners; they take advantage of climate and cheap labour; and they have little connection to the local economy. In the shadow economy, local entrepreneurs illegally exploit timber, diamonds, and other resources and sell them cheaply to unscrupulous Western companies; worse, they have to spend their profits on weapons to secure their plunder, so both formal and informal sectors tend to benefit the West disproportionately.

Market liberalism enables the evolution of new centres of authority outside the state. At the international level, these may look like unelected international financial institutions with enormous powers over the evolution of economies. IFIs impose constraints (for example, limiting
government spending on public goods like health, education, and public service salaries) but they do not supplant the state. Rather, privatization and deregulation of markets increases client networks, organized crime and cross-border shadow economies. There is complicity between state and non-state actors in evading environmental and labour standards. Cross-border trade in West Africa expanded under structural adjustment programs, and illegally harvested diamonds and timber found their way more readily into Western markets. The profits from these shadow economies are returned to the periphery in the form of weapons and ammunition to support more extraction, further undermining the control of states. A competitive aid market evolved as developed countries pursued their own objectives, and NGOs began to assume some of the functions of weak states. By this combination of forces, both the capacity and the legitimacy of weak states tend to be undermined by liberal market solutions, and the state itself begins to look more like a criminal enterprise.

**Conclusions**

Anyone looking for the ethical handle on this should start close to home. We know, for example, that drug trafficking is the largest source of illicit profit in Canada, and that more than three-quarters of its profits are laundered through legitimate banks and financial institutions. I mention this only as an illustration. Our own deposit and lending institutions are the points at which globalization and the shadow economy intersect. We in the West dominate liberal market economies and push them on peripheral areas. We are (generally) the principal beneficiaries of globalization, even while segments of our own populations may suffer from the same processes. We create the conditions for shadow economies to emerge, and we provide the financial institutions (and privacy safeguards) that make illicit wealth mobile and powerful. Good military planners will think carefully about the economic dimensions of stabilization while planning partnerships with corporations whose inner workings may be opaque to them. Accountants and auditors may be essential allies in the planning process. Beyond professional skills, they must understand local market conditions.

How should military interventions for stabilization and reconstruction work with the private sector? The answer is: with great caution, some suspicion, and attention to regulation. Great caution is necessary because for all the potential benefits of corporate investment, both globalization
and shadow economies have the potential to undermine weak states and exacerbate conflict. Suspicion of corporate agendas is warranted because the multinational corporation must act as an efficient externalizing machine – imposing on others its costs of doing business whenever possible. In the absence of strong and effective laws preventing corruption, bribing officials is simply another cost of doing business. Despite the wealth of literature on corporate social responsibility and the peacebuilding functions of business, corporate agendas do not inherently coincide with the interests of states. When they do, we should suspect the motives of both, based on the historical examples of state-sponsored corporate rapaciousness from the East India Company and the Opium Wars to Anglo-Persian Oil and beyond.

We should pay careful attention to regulation, because companies work hard to evade it. From Tilley’s description of state formation and Naylor’s examination of organized crime, we should understand that the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate business is fundamentally blurred; they coexist and intermingle. Economic regulation provides a vital means of adjusting incentive structures to keep businesses operating in the public interest, and to bring illegal and informal economies back into line with the taxable legitimate economy. We know that long-term commitments and mutual hostages within a framework of law is needed to make business-labour-government relations work in developed countries at peace; assuming that deregulation and free markets will solve problems in post-conflict chaos is naïve.

What does this mean in practical terms for national planning or for a mission headquarters? First, we should begin by assuming that multinational corporations will have an impact. If we know nothing about the structure, activities, stakeholders, and objectives of major companies investing in the region, then we have critical intelligence gaps.

Second, we should stay close to important businesses, perhaps by deploying liaison officers to their headquarters or by cultivating insiders; they have an interest in our business as well. IFIs and embassies might provide conduits for confidence building. Commercial non-disclosure agreements might engender trust. We should not rule out spying on them, though military intelligence is unlikely to match them in sophistication, and botching the job would be worse than not attempting it.
Third, most of the critical business decisions will be made outside the theatre. We need good intelligence from both open and sensitive sources. Commercial intelligence can be bought. Embassies and Trade Missions are useful trip-wires; the more reticent they are to share information, the more interested an intelligence cell should be. Of course, the availability of high-grade commercial intelligence will make the mission a target itself, and will raise other questions about military insiders feathering their nests; it has happened since the days of Clive of India. Multinational missions should have an advantage both in multiple sources of commercial intelligence, and in mutual hostage taking to ensure accountability, but this takes real leadership and a focus on the mission.

Fourth, pushing microfinance solutions early on is likely to be both the fastest route to stabilization and the least vulnerable to both criminal and corporate manipulation, but it takes a good understanding of the local economy to make it work, and it may require tariffs and regulations to encourage import substitution and local employment. This may be resisted.

Finally, there is a theme running through all four recommendations. Doing the right thing is difficult if you don’t know what is really happening, and situations like the Mira factory’s eventual disposition will evolve over a longer period than most staff officers are on the case. Not only is economic intelligence essential, but corporate memory and a consistent moral viewpoint about what the mission is trying to accomplish will help to guide us to the right decisions – decisions that work for families and communities in the affected country, whether or not they also serve the interests of international capital.

Endnotes

16 Proceedings from the 7th Canadian Conference on Ethical Leadership
25 ames A. Baker III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs. The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward, A New Approach (New York: Vintage; and Ed Harriman, 2005); “So Mr. Bremer, where did all the money go?” Guardian, 7 July. [Reporting on the July 2005 KPMG Bahrein audit of the Coalition Provisional Authority]


37 Divjak, “Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

38 Many of the blue-collar workers who might otherwise have been compensated were Serbs who left Zagreb for Banja Luka early in the war. Neither vouchers nor other means of compensation appear to have been used in this privatization. See www.kras.hr accessed 12 November 2006.


40 Divjak, “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 246.


46 www.state.gov/s/crs/
47 S/CRS, 2005, IV-1 to IV-17
50 William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin, 2006), 271.
51 Ibid., 283.
52 Ibid., 285.
53 See Polanyi (1957) on the origins and growth of markets, Reich (1992) on the rise and decline of the state-based corporation, Bobbitt (2003) on the rise of the market state, and Perkins (2004) for a tale of economic skulduggery. Reich and Bobbitt both held cabinet posts under Clinton as well as being distinguished academics. Perkins was an economist who worked for a Bechtel-like engineering consultant before his epiphany.
57 Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars.
58 Ibid., 167.
60 Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars, 54.
64 Tilley, “War Making and State Making.”
65 Naylor, Patriots and Profiteers; and Naylor, Wages of Crime.
CHAPTER 2

Obligations of the Home Front: The Necessity of Cultural Awareness Training for Interventions in the New World Order

Rachel Lea Heide

Peacekeeping is an oft-used word by politicians, media, and even history textbooks to describe Canada’s proud contribution to international peace and stability. Nevertheless, traditional peacekeeping has become a thing of the past since forces sent abroad are having to make and enforce peace rather than just keep it. Missions are also placing military personnel in the midst of very different cultures where language, religion, morals, and societal values are radically foreign to Canadians’ Western experience. Canada’s response to the attacks of September 2001, from increased border security to the War on Terror, has brought to the forefront the need for cultural sensitivity in areas where military forces intervene abroad.

Despite the increased need to be culturally sensitive as Western-based coalitions intervene in Islamic nations in the War on Terror, the recognition of this imperative is not an entirely new phenomenon for Canada’s military. Canadian armed forces have learned the hard way that the culture and values of a host nation must be respected if Canadian values for human rights and dignity are to be observed while military representatives are serving abroad. In the wake of Operation Deliverance and the tragic death of Shidane Arone at the hands of Canadian Airborne Regiment members in 1993, the resulting investigation and Commission of Inquiry identified that racism and lack of cultural empathy were at the root of these shocking occurrences. The Commission of Inquiry and its recommendations were a turning point for the Canadian Forces in its approach to training for peace support operations. After a public soul-searching, clear guidelines were created concerning racism and racist behaviour, substantial changes were made to peace support training, and cultural awareness training became an integral
element of pre-deployment training. The Canadian Forces as an institution, and members as individuals, clearly see and accept the obligation of being properly prepared for service abroad and interaction with those in need.

Canada began and formed its tradition of peacekeeping during the height of the Cold War. With this very present and very concrete threat, Canada’s armed forces had a clear purpose in the eyes of the government, the Canadian public, and the military itself: the primary focus of the armed forces was to be ready for high intensity combat in case of aggression by members of the Warsaw Pact. Peacekeeping was not seen as a separate type of operation for which the Canadian military had to prepare. Instead, senior military leaders saw peacekeeping as an alternative use for pre-existing equipment and training. It was commonly held that general purpose combat training adequately prepared Canadian military personnel for peacekeeping missions. If need be, a little improvisation would satisfactorily meet any unforeseen challenges. In the days of the traditional, classic peacekeeping mission, this combination of improvisation and combat training proved more or less adequate where peacekeepers were impartial monitors of already accepted cease-fires. Because the contingents were non-hostile, and because the parties involved consented to the presence of outside mediators, the peacekeepers were lightly armed. Missions were under the authority of the United Nations (UN), and the mission was not mandated to create conditions for peace.

Nevertheless, the very nature of peacekeeping has changed and grown increasingly complex. Since the end of the Cold War, the global map has undergone some radical changes as decolonization, nationalism, self-determination and internal conflict have exponentially grown.

Conflict between states has been replaced by ethnic and religious wars within state borders. Historical animosities have led to territorial and resource disputes. Most post-Cold War conflicts have been characterized by prolonged, low-intensity warfare where the distinction between combatant and non-combatant is blurred and where insurgents benefit from a state's weakness, poverty, and inability to quell rebellion and violence. Consequently, operations to maintain peace in the world are decreasingly about monitoring and observing cease-fire agreements and borders; increasingly, forces are being sent abroad to protect human rights and democratic values.
Wealthy nations feel morally compelled to intervene when war brings humanitarian crises, refugees, genocides, displaced persons, war crimes, and starvation for the innocent. When international forces intervene in these emergencies, they are faced with the task of not only helping those in immediate need, but also with the necessity of creating peace so that a long-term solution to human suffering can solidly be put in place. Consequently, the new peacekeeper needs a balanced mix of combat skills, diplomatic savvy and humane values.

Humanitarian missions need military personnel who can empathize with the local population whom they are trying to help; the new peacekeeper cannot simply be emotionally detached from an enemy that may have to be killed. There cannot be a sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ or ‘good’ versus ‘evil.’ Intervening in the name of democracy and for the purpose of defending human rights means that the nations and individuals involved in the peace mission must represent and carry out the very values they are trying to instil in the war-torn, impoverished, or undemocratic nations of the world. Anything less would be hypocritical and sheer imperialism.6

From the changed nature of peacekeeping operations naturally follows the necessity for a suitably changed approach to peacekeeping training. Combat training is no longer enough. Peace support and mission-specific training is essential. Since military forces will be interacting more with the local population – either in providing humanitarian assistance or trying to establish peace and stability – these men and women need to be prepared for the new world they are about to encounter. Success in these kinds of missions will mean that pre-deployment training must provide peacekeepers with an understanding of the conflict, as well as the history, culture, social values, and religion of the those they will be helping. Humanitarian assistance requires empathy on the part of the peacekeepers. Defending human rights and democracy requires integrity and living by example on the part of the interveners.7

Unfortunately, both this requisite empathy and integrity were absent on the part of many Canadian Airborne Regiment members while deployed on Operation Deliverance, the 1993 mission to Somalia. This lack of understanding and empathy, the failure to represent with integrity Canadian values, a sense of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, and prevalent racism amongst the deployed personnel resulted in numerous tortures of Somali citizens, some of which proved fatal.
Along the Horn of Africa lies the country of Somalia, a nation approximately the size of Alberta. Agriculture (raising beef, sheep, and goats) is the country’s main economic activity; less than ten percent of Somalia’s gross national product comes from industrialization. Genealogy and clan membership are Somalis’ basis for identification. Allegiance is to one’s clan, which in turn provides security and physical welfare. Because of their belief in equal rights and egalitarianism (for males), clans do not have one leader. Instead, decisions are made through consensus by the entire clan. If agreements are not ratified by the clan, then the agreements are deemed illegitimate. Clan identification also comes into play if an individual has wronged (murdered, injured, insulted) a member of another clan. Compensation (usually camels) must be paid to the injured clan by the clan that was in the wrong. This sense of collective guilt also means that punishment of specific individuals (a Western form of justice) is interpreted as attempted humiliation of an entire clan.

Somalia’s history and geography was deeply imprinted upon by the colonial rule of Britain, France and Italy. The borders set by these European powers were arbitrary and created artificial divisions amongst the nomadic clans that had previously moved about freely to find pasture and water for their herds. A sense of anti-colonialism remains today; consequently, foreigners are not automatically welcomed, and tolls are charged to outsiders wanting to pass through the various clans’ zones of control.

Independence was gained in 1960, but the ensuing years have not been peaceful. A border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia broke out in 1964. In 1969, Major-General Mahammed Siyaad Barre carried out a successful military coup. Somalia lost the 1977-78 border war with Ethiopia. A coup to depose Barre failed in 1988, but fighting continued into 1991 and the nation then descended into anarchy. As factions fought for political control, bandits and militias looted the country with impunity.

In addition to the chaos of war, drought ravaged the land, destroyed the farming industry and left millions to starve. Even relief agencies bringing in food supplies found they could do little since up to fifty percent of their aid shipments were stolen by clan gangs.

Helpless to successfully deliver the humanitarian aid in their charge, the Red Cross and various other non-governmental organizations pleaded for the UN’s help. When Somali factions agreed to a cease-fire
in February 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 751 (in April 1992) which authorized the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Under this Chapter VI operation, fifty unarmed peacekeepers would monitor the cease-fire and ensure the distribution of supplies by escorting the deliveries from Mogadishu to rural areas. In August, the UN expanded the mission’s mandate and force to carry out humanitarian operations, to establish security for the relief supplies, to monitor the cease-fire and to disarm the population. UNOSOM’s expansion occurred without the consultation and approval of Somali factions. Hence, the factions refused to accept the deployment, famine and starvation continued unabated; relief supplies remained insecure, and clan massacres and refugees’ fleeing to neighbouring countries continued.¹⁰

Before the passing of Security Council Resolution 775 (on 28 August 1992), the Canadian government had agreed to participate in airlifting relief supplies to Somalia. Once the resolution was passed, the Canadian government committed to provide more troops. On 5 September 1992, the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) was selected as the unit for Operation Cordon, Canada’s contribution to the Chapter VI mission to Somalia. Seven hundred fifty military personnel in total were committed. There would be a headquarters commando, three infantry commandos, an engineer squadron and a service commando. The CAR would be responsible for the area around Bossasso, and HMCS Preserver would provide communications, stores, evacuation, medical services and fuel. An air detachment of Hercules transport planes, based in Nairobi, Kenya, would fly relief supplies to Somalia as well.¹¹

The CAR was chosen for Operation Cordon because it had recently prepared for the UN mission for the referendum in the Western Sahara. Operation Python was to have included the tasks of “manning crossing points for refugees, monitoring and patrolling in support of UN military observers and civil police, providing security at UN sites and reception centres, and providing force reserves and basic mine clearing capabilities.” Between July and December 1991, the CAR trained for Operation Python, only to have the mission canceled before they were able to deploy. Because the CAR had been training for Operation Python, it was unable to attend a regimental exercise in Jamaica, and it also missed the opportunity to be deployed to Cyprus in spring 1992. Morale and discipline consequently fell. Canadian military leaders chose the CAR for the Somalia mission to take advantage of the previous training for a UN
mission on the African continent and to boost the morale of the dejected regiment. The advance party would leave for Somalia on 13 December 1992; troops would begin deploying on 27 December.\textsuperscript{12}

Come November 1992, the United States government agreed “to organize, command, and lead a multinational operation in Somalia if it were authorized to use force.” The Security Council agreed to this and passed Resolution 794 on 3 December 1992. The United States would lead the United Task Force (UNITAF) to Somalia, and the mission would be a Charter VII operation, meaning that UNITAF was allowed to use “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.” When Canada was asked to provide forces for the new mission replacing UNOSOM, Canada agreed. The CAR was sent seeing as it had just finished preparing for the Chapter VI Operation Cordon. With Resolution 794 on 3 December, the mission was changed to a Chapter VII mission merely days before the first CAR personnel were to begin leaving for the theatre of operations. Operation Deliverance would involved new rules of engagement and the more aggressive task of disarming Somali forces. Nevertheless, no changes were made to the CAR’s preparation (which had focused on training to provide security for humanitarian aid distribution). With the new mission came a new force structure. A mortar platoon from the Royal Canadian Regiment’s 1st Battalion and A Squadron from the Royal Canadian Dragoons were added to the original CAR battalion group that was to have been sent on Operation Cordon. Because of the cascading events of December 1992, the new eight hundred fifty man battle group never trained as a cohesive unit.\textsuperscript{13}

Despite these last minute changes and challenges, the Canadian Forces personnel were able to create a secure environment and carry out relief operations. The Canadians were remembered for their help in building tables, chairs, shelves, storage boxes, and a kitchen for an orphanage. Canadians provided volunteer medical assistance, helped rebuild a school, and trained a local police force.\textsuperscript{14} Fellow allies in theatre did not fail to notice and commend the Canadians for their much appreciated contribution. The American President’s Special Envoy to Somalia, Robert Oakley, wrote to Canada’s Minister of Defence, Kim Campbell, on 11 May 1993, calling the Canadian contribution “truly outstanding”:
The Canadian unit was able to bring about the establishment of a regional council involving some fourteen sub-clans – who had absolutely refused to meet together, much less cooperate prior to the Canadian arrival.... Canada has every reason to be extremely pleased and proud of its military forces in Somalia. Certainly, the United States military and civilian authorities and Somalia people hold them in highest esteem.

The commander of UNITAF, Lieutenant-General Johnson, also had words of high praise for the Canadians in Somalia. On 1 May 1993, he wrote to Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Anderson:

I must express my high praise for the performance of the Canadian forces under my command.... It should be no surprise that the Canadian Airborne Regiment worked most effectively with relief workers, in fact, delivered several thousand metric tons of relief supplies on behalf of the relief agencies.... The bottom line was that there was no mission the Canadians were not willing to handle.

Lieutenant-General Johnson goes on to recognize the school reconstruction with which the CAR was involved, noting that the opening of these schools “was a most significant event and a testimony to the humanitarian focus of the Canadian troops. It has earned them enormous good will, and they have properly portrayed themselves as having come to Somalia for [a] noble purpose.” 16 In the eyes of the international community, Canada’s armed forces took its peace support missions seriously.

Unfortunately, it is not the school reconstruction, the orphanage building, nor the aid distribution that Canadians on the home front remember when the 1993 mission to Somalia is raised in conversation. Sadly, Canadians remember the shameful actions of a few CAR members that have given Canada’s participation in UNITAF a tarnished reputation, that lead to a Commission of Inquiry and that eventually resulted in the disbanding of the CAR.

Infiltration of the Canadian base at Belet Huen by looters became the CAR’s most persistent problem. Not only was food, water, weapons, ammunition, parachutes, radio antennas, and other necessary equipment being stolen on a regular basis, but the intruders also posed a security risk.
since they had opportunity to sabotage the base and kill the peacekeepers. Initially, Somalis who broke into the base were bound, imprisoned overnight, and then returned to their clans or the local police the next day. When this method proved to be no deterrent, frustrated Canadian soldiers turned to humiliation and abuse to make examples of the thieves. Children found breaking into the Canadian compound were tied, hooded and made to sit in the sun with signs about their neck announcing they were thieves. Other prisoners were subject to being bound, beaten, and having wet cloths drying and shrinking over their heads so as to cause pain and discomfort. Despite these increasingly brutal and humiliating tactics, the challenge of keeping the base secure from infiltrators remained unresolved.17

Attempts by the CAR to tighten perimeter security lead to actually setting bait to attract Somali looters so that they could be captured and taught an unforgettable lesson. In February 1993, Captain Sox lead an unauthorized operation against Somali roadblocks. Dressed in Somali robes, Sox drove a civilian vehicle with armed men from his platoon hiding in the back. The intent was to confront anyone who tried to stop the vehicle. Locals did stop Sox and he held one of the Somalis at gunpoint; paratroopers then fired fifty to seventy rounds at the Somali as he fled to safety. No one was killed and the incident report stated that only three rounds had been fired in the confrontation.18

The next ambush had more fatal consequences. On 28 January 1992, Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu had issued orders to use force against any Somali who infiltrated the Canadian compound or who was seen to be running away with Canadian army property. Even after these orders, intruders were still stealing on a regular basis, taking items such as wood, water, food, jerry cans, among other items. The night of 3 March 1993 was no exception. The Engineers’ officer commanding was greeted the next morning with reports that numerous break-ins had occurred yet again, but, this time, a very important piece of equipment had gone missing: a fuel re-circulation pump for helicopters. Captain Rainville, leader of the CAR’s Reconnaissance Platoon, volunteered to help with security around the Engineers’ compound. His offer was quickly accepted, and the night of 4 March found Rainville and his men preparing to confront any would-be intruders. In order to carry out a “military deception plan,” Rainville had ration boxes and jerry cans strategically placed in the compound where they were clearly "visible from a path used daily by the
Somalis to go to the river to get water.” As hoped for, two Somali men came down the path, approached the wire perimeter, pointed in several directions around the base, and then moved toward the helicopter compound. Rainville called for the intruders to stop, and he ordered his men to “get them.” As the Somalis ran, the Canadians shot after them. Abdi Hamdare received multiple gunshot wounds. His companion, Ahmad Aruush died in the pursuit. After performing an autopsy on Mr. Aruush, Dr. Major Barry Armstrong came to the conclusion that the man had been “shot in the back by a high velocity rifle, remained alive, and was dispatched a few minutes later by two or more high velocity rounds to the head and neck.”

Even while the deadly incident was still being investigated, another fatal encounter occurred. The theft of equipment and supplies for almost three months was wearing the CAR members’ patience thin. Hence, on the morning of 16 March 1993, the officer commanding of 2 Commando conducted a routine orders group session where he told his platoon commanders “to capture and abuse the prisoners” to teach them a lesson. In his own words, Major Seward stated, “I don’t care if you abuse them, but I want those infiltrators captured.... Abuse them if you have to.”

Not all the platoon commanders felt comfortable with passing this order along to the troops. Nevertheless, some did, and two soldiers willfully carried it out. An unarmed sixteen-year-old Shidane Arone was captured at 2045 hours on 16 March. Although he claimed to have been searching for a lost child, his guards chose to treat him as an infiltrating thief on whom they would carry out the abuse order given earlier that day. Over the course of the evening, Master-Corporal Matchee and Private Brown bound the prisoner, burned him with cigarettes and beat him severely. This treatment continued until midnight despite the fact that their guard duty shifts had ended. Matchee even had his picture taken, holding a loaded pistol to the head of the tortured prisoner. Although people had dropped into the bunker where the beatings were taking place, it was not until midnight that anyone began reporting the condition of the prisoner up the chain of command. Unfortunately, it was too late for Mr. Arone. He died shortly thereafter.

After the initial shock of the abusive behaviour of the CAR in Somalia, the story disappeared from the media, faded from the minds of Canadians, and played itself out only in the courts-martial of those involved in
the shameful conduct in Somalia. That is, until November 1994, when the photos taken of Arone’s abuse were released to the media. Within days, Dr. Armstrong publicly revealed that his military “superiors had ordered the destruction of evidence relating to the 4 March [1993] killing of Aruush and the wounding of Hamdare.” The following day, 18 November, the federal government responded by calling for a Commission of Inquiry into the Somalia deployment, the disgraceful behaviour of the soldiers, and the alleged cover-up by military leaders.

The shameful conduct of the CAR was once again brought to Canadians’ attention on 15 January 1995 when the evening news aired segments of a video shot by CAR members while on the mission to Somalia. The video showed the soldiers’ drinking excessively and making violent and racist utterances against the Somalis they were supposed to be helping. Three days later, a second video was released on the news, this one showing racist and degrading hazing rituals that had taken place in the CAR in August 1992. The only black member of the group had had KKK written on his back; he had been tied to a tree, doused white with flour, called racist terms and made to crawl on his hands and knees like a dog while wearing a collar. While all the initiates had to endure the typical distasteful hazing rituals, only the black paratrooper was subject to hazing that was clearly directed negatively at his race. The Canadian public then saw another videotape of CAR hazing rituals that had been performed in 1994. In the words of one study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry, “the content of these tapes was so shocking that it created a major scandal in Canada.” On 24 January 1995, Minister of National Defence David Collenette announced his decision that the disgraced CAR would be disbanded. Its final parade and laying up of colours took place on 5 March 1995.21

The Commission of Inquiry was established and given its Terms of Reference on 20 March 1995. In looking at the pre-deployment, in-theatre, and post-deployment periods, the Commission was tasked with determining the suitability of the CAR for a mission in Somalia, the appropriateness of the training provided, the values and attitudes held by all ranks toward lawful conduct of operations and professionalism, the role that cultural differences might have played in the mission and how the military’s chain of command responded to the problems of the Somalia deployment.

The problem of racism and cultural differences weighed heavily on the three commissioners’ minds as they undertook their investigation. On
3 August 1995, they issued a statement divulging how they would interpret the Terms of Reference, find the root of the problems, and make recommendations:

In order to properly assess the impact of cultural differences [sociological, anthropological, political, economic, intellectual, and human characteristics differentiating one culture from another] on the conduct of operations, the Commission has to look at the appropriateness of the training objectives and standards of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group with respect to the Somalian culture and environment and the proper treatment of civilians and detainees, the adequacy of selection and screening of its officers and the state of discipline of its members with a view to determining the extent to which Somalian and human rights values, and the need to protect and respect them, have been properly taught, understood, and respected in the context of peacekeeping mission in a fundamentally different cultural environment.22

The Commission began holding public hearings on 24 May 1995. In January 1997, the government suddenly decided that the hearings would wrap up by the end of March 1997. The Commissioners fought the truncation of the inquiry because “the imposed time limitations precluded [them] from calling a number of important witnesses.” In a press release, the Commissioners explained why the deadline was detrimental to the findings of the final report:

The Inquiry was established in large measure to alleviate concerns that an imbalance had occurred in the official reaction to the events in Somalia. The feeling was that too much attention had been focused upon the activities of soldiers of lower rank and that not enough effort had gone into examining the role and responsibility of higher ranking officers, senior bureaucrats, and government officials. The deadline that is now being imposed on us makes it impossible for us to comprehensively address the question of the accountability of the upper ranks.

In response to a March 1997 Federal Court Trial Division decision “that the government’s actions were ultra vires and unlawful,” the Privy
Council Office issued an order that a final report on the pre-deployment phase of the Somalia mission must be submitted by 30 June 1997. It was up to the commissioners’ discretion as to what else would be included in the report on the in-theatre and post-deployment phases.

Despite the premature termination of the Commission’s public hearings, the commissioners had much to say about the CAR’s lack of leadership, discipline, and training. The investigation also unveiled the prevalent racism in the regiment and the obvious deficiencies in cultural awareness training. The Executive Summary of the five-volume report opened with criticism of rampant careerism, flawed supervision, inaction over indiscipline and training preparations that fell short of requirements.

When it came to leadership and promotions, the Commission found that “individual career management goals were too often allowed to take precedence over operational needs in the appointments process. Bureaucratic and administrative imperatives were allowed to dilute the merit principle and override operational needs.” Leadership and the chain of command were compromised by the fact that CAR officers and non-commissioned officers mistrusted each other and by the fact that a group of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) had taken on de facto leadership roles, thus affecting the authority that officers should have been exercising over the other ranks. The commissioners severely criticized the CAR’s lack of discipline. This was represented by acts such as setting an NCO’s car on fire, the illegal possession and discharge of pyrotechnics, stolen ammunition, the persistent display of Confederate flags and the negligent discharge of weapons (both personal and crew-served).

The commissioners had much to say about the dismal quality of peacekeeping training which the CAR had (or had not) received. Because the CAR was Canada’s UN standby unit, the commissioners expected that “the CAR should have at all times maintained a proficiency in both general purpose combat skills and generic peacekeeping skills (involving, for example, the nature of UN operations and the role of the peacekeeper, conflict resolution and negotiation, cross-cultural relations, restraint in application of force, and standard UN operations).” The commissioners were surprised to find that “the CAR received little or no ongoing generic peacekeeping training.” The training plan for Operation Cordon should have included non-combat skills essential for successful peacekeeping and an explanation of the nature of UN peacekeeping, the role of the peacekeeper, the law of armed conflict, arrest and detention procedures, use
of force policies, mission-specific rules of engagement, conflict resolution and negotiation, inter-cultural relations and the culture, history and politics of the environment, and stress management preparation.28

Even the CAR’s combat training for Operation Cordon was found somewhat deficient. Exercise Stalwart Providence was held from 14 to 18 October 1992. In an effort to simulate a UN mission to Somalia and test the operational readiness of the CAR, the exercise was composed of a series of scenarios that included securing and establishing the base camp, convoys’ encountering mines, convoys’ coming under fire, refugees coming to the camp for medical attention, disposing of corpses at the request of local officials, and quelling a riot at a food distribution site. The Commission found the exercise itself to be “effective training,” praising its realistic scenarios and the contact with non-combatants. Unfortunately, sub-units had not been able to complete their training by the time Exercise Stalwart Providence was held. The CAR’s commanding officer was not present for the exercise since he was on a reconnaissance mission to Somalia at the same time, (the dates for this mission had been set by the UN). Commissioners also identified the “lack of intelligence and current information on Somalia” as another serious deficiency of the exercise. When creating the Stalwart Providence, planners relied on information from CNN, whereas in-depth intelligence on the conditions in Somalia was needed from National Defence Headquarters. According to the Commission’s findings, “the exercise required a focus which more accurately reflected the threat, political, and cultural factors the CAR was liable to face in Somalia, and the opportunity for CAR members to practise the skills they would require to meet these challenges.” The review of the exercise revealed that more training was required for the safe operation of vehicles (the CAR was a light infantry battalion being given the role of a mounted unit). It also highlighted that there was a problem with the flow of information down the chain of command to the soldiers on the field. Those evaluating the exercise also found that 2 Commando was over-aggressive in its use of force: “open-fire/use of force policy is not clearly understood by all soldiers asked” was the conclusion of the after-action brief on the exercise.29

According to the Commission, the weeks remaining before deployment should have been spent on improving the passage of information, undergoing additional mounted vehicle training, learning the appropriate restraint in the use of force and the rules of engagement, and
providing training on the capture and holding of detainees. Nevertheless, the commissioners found that “these additional needs were not seriously or systematically addressed in the weeks prior to deployment.”

The fact that the mission to Somalia was changed from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII operation had serious ramifications on the CAR’s deployment. Firstly, the new units that were augmenting the CAR did not receive the training provided for Operation Cordon. Secondly, the new force structure never received training as a cohesive whole. During the training period for Operation Deliverance (7 to 16 December 1992), the newly attached sub-units had to complete “fitness training, weapons training, individual preparations training, and speciality vehicle/equipment training.” Training for the new force structure focused on a fighting function to prepare the troops for the new task of disarming factions. No training was provided on the new mission-specific rules of engagement. The time to train for the new Chapter VII mission, and the new rules of engagement, were simply not available.

In light of all the problems discovered, the Commissioners could not say that the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group was operationally ready:

If a unit is led by competent and accountable leaders who respect and adhere to the imperatives of the chain of command system; if the soldiers serving under these leaders are properly recruited and screened, cohesive, well-trained, and disciplined; if they have a clear understanding of adequately conceived and transmitted rules of engagement, then we can have confidence that this is a unit that is operationally ready for deployment. To our deep regret, we have come to negative conclusions about each of these elements and have found that the Canadian Airborne Regiment, in a fundamental sense, was not operationally ready fit its mission.

Nevertheless, the last-minute changes to the mission, the lack of unit cohesiveness, and the training deficiencies identified did not mean that the mission was naturally going to devolve into the brutal beating and murder of Somali citizens. To explain this tragic turn of events, the commissioners found racism to be prevalent in the CAR, a sense of frustration
amongst CAR members over the apparent ingratitude of the local population, and a clear lack of cultural awareness training in the pre-deployment period. Before October 1993, the Canadian Forces had no policy to screen out active racists. The Deputy Minister of National Defence stated on 11 May 1993:

CF personnel may hold any political view, as long as their views are not in conflict with carrying out their duties. Attendance at right wing extremist meetings is not illegal, and denying a citizen the right to attend such meetings would be contrary to Charter rights. What Canadian Forces members do on their own time is their own business, as long as it does not contradict the Canadian Forces Code of Service Discipline and/or Canadian law, or bring into question their reliability or loyalty.

Consequently, one’s affiliation with a racist group was not grounds for release or restriction of assignments, postings, or deployment.

Although it was Canadian Forces policy to tolerate affiliation with racist groups, the Department of National Defence grew concerned in 1990-91 about the increasingly extremist and violent ideologies of these groups and consequently set up a special investigations unit to monitor what threat racists in the Canadian Forces posed to national security. It was the task of Project SIROS to track military membership in extremist groups: “by June 1992, some 40 CF members had been identified as having possible involvement in right-wing extremist and racist organizations.” Six of these men identified belonged to the CAR. According to Project SIROS, “the problem of active racists at Petawawa was ... centred in 2 Commando of the Canadian Airborne Regiment.” Two of these known racists were deployed to Somalia; it was later discovered that another five members of the CAR who were in Somalia had links to racist groups as well. This discovery included the names of Master-Corporal Matchee and Private Brown. During the pre-deployment period, racist symbols were openly displayed around CFB Petawawa, the CAR’s home base. Nazi swastikas, Ku Klux Klan flags and Confederate flags were not uncommon, nor were racial epithets against blacks. The hazing video of August 1992 also clearly displayed racist behaviour being incorporated into CAR rituals.32

Once deployed, mission frustration and culture shock only increased the CAR’s cultural insensitivity to Somalis. Canadians arrived in Somalia
believe their main role was to help feed the starving people. Their humanitarian attitudes were strained as they faced hostility, were physically attacked, and had their supplies and equipment continually stolen. Perceptions of a people in need were sadly replaced by views that Somalis were ungrateful thieves. The need to teach the locals a lesson grew with each act of hostility against the Canadians’ presence.

Testimony at the various courts-martial following the Somalia mission revealed the prevalent attitude that the theatre environment called for aggressive military action. According to peacekeeping training expert Colonel Kenward, “the forces deployed ... had to deal with some very difficult situations where they had a local population that was not always understanding of what was trying to be accomplished, were very demanding of the people on the ground, and sometimes displayed hostility.” Furthermore, Kenward described the theatre of operations as being “the hardest physical environment that we have put Canadians into in UN operations.” The defence lawyer for Private Brown also argued that the harsh physical conditions and the lack of law and order naturally frustrated the soldiers who tried desperately to defend themselves, restore base security and create respect for the CAR’s authority and presence:

There was a general understanding amongst the troops that it was OK to rough up the prisoners a little bit for a deterrent purpose.... The troops were in a lawless country. There was no civil institutions, there was no civil authority. There was nothing that could be done to those looters who were captured. They could not be turned over to anybody who could effectively deal with them such as happens in most civilized countries. They could not call the police and have them arrested and expect that he ... would be taken to court and dealt with according to the law. At the same time, the soldiers were very vulnerable. They’re out in the field. They had no locks. They had valuable kit, and they were obviously particularly concerned about the security of their weapons.\(^{33}\)

Canadian soldiers’ growing sense of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ was not only rooted in the on-going conflict with hostile locals. Canadians also experienced shock at the differences between social cultures, differences that made the Somalis’ culture seem very alien and incomprehensible to the Canadian
peacekeepers. Soldiers admitted to assuming that homosexuality was open and prevalent when they continually saw men walking in public holding hands. (They had not been informed that this was common practice amongst heterosexual Somali men while discussing business with each other). Women seemed to do all the work while men were seen as simply lazy. Canadians expressed disgust over the abusive treatment of Somali women and the neglect of children. Canadians had also come to the conclusion that Somalis had little value for human life. After the mission to Somalia, soldiers reflected that they wished they had been warned about what to expect when they encountered the local culture. Misconceptions could have been avoided; disturbing differences could have at least been expected.34

Non-commissioned members (NCMs) freely admitted that the pre-deployment cultural awareness training was very thin. When asked what information had been provided on the Somali country, people, and customs, one soldier responded that “They brought us into a classroom, and one of the supervisors came in. They’d visited Somalia, and they came back with different studies saying that this is their culture, and this is what they eat, and what they drink, and this is how they live, this is what they believe in, and that’s about it.” Another soldier reflected that “there was an intense training that was given to us regarding all kinds of bugs that we could find there. There was no period, as such, given regarding racism. Because we were so in a hurry to do a mission.” The NCMs did not feel that the training had been tailored specifically for what would be encountered on Operation Deliverance, nor did they see much difference between regimental training and what was given as specialized mission-specific training. Non-combat training was negligible for NCMs; officers, on the other hand, did receive a number of briefings on Somali culture and politics.35

Even the Somalia Handbook, a booklet distributed to all peacekeepers deployed to Somalia, failed to be a useful resource on Somali culture. In a mere two pages, Somalia’s social culture, political situation and economic conditions were summed up. On the other hand, nine pages were devoted to tips for operating in the terrain. The booklet finished with a series of ominous warnings about dealing with the locals:

Unlike other UN missions, the different factions in Somalia have proven to be very unpredictable even day to day.
Any locals with weapons must be considered as dangerous and potentially hostile on every encounter. Always remember, yesterday’s allies can turn on non-vigilant groups if it is in their interest, and they can get away with it. This is an unfortunate aspect of trust-building in Somalia. Never let your guard down. Good luck.

Such indoctrination hardly prepared the CAR for a very different climate and culture, and it hardly set the stage for the peacekeepers to empathize with the people to whom they would be providing humanitarian assistance.

Despite having their public hearings cut short and despite an accelerated deadline being imposed upon them by the government, the three commissioners filed their report by the end of June 1997 with a total of 160 recommendations. These covered a vast array of subjects, suggesting changes in leadership, accountability, the chain of command, discipline, personnel selection and screening, training, rules of engagement, operational readiness, the military planning system, openness and disclosure, and military justice. In regards to personnel selection and screening, the commissioners wanted behavioural suitability and discipline to be criterion in selection for overseas deployments. Concerning racism, the commissioners called for “clear and comprehensive guidelines to commanders at all levels regarding prohibited racist and extremist conduct. The guidelines should define and list examples of racist behaviour and symbolism and should include a list and description of extremist groups to which Canadian Forces members may not belong or lend their support.” Recommendations stressed that the Canadian Force’s training philosophy must change and reflect the paramount importance of non-traditional, non-combat training for peace support missions. The commissioners did not feel that generic peacekeeping training should only be provided in the pre-deployment period; instead, it should become an integral part at all levels of training. This would provide more time in the pre-deployment period for mission-specific training. Recommendations also suggested that “training in the Law of Armed Conflict, Rules of Engagement, cross-cultural relations, and negotiation and conflict resolution be scenario-based and integrated into training exercises, in addition to classroom instruction or briefings, to permit the practice of skills and to provide a mechanism for confirming that instructions have been fully understood.” This pre-deployment training needed to include basic
language training and a focus on local culture, history, and politics for the theatre of operations. Additionally, the Commission called for the “development of specialist expertise within the Canadian Forces in training in the Law of Armed Conflict and the Rules of Engagement, and in inter-cultural and inter-group relations, negotiation and conflict resolution.” Institutionalizing this would ensure standardization and resources for the training of all Canadian Force members.

The Department of National Defence (DND) was very receptive of the Commission’s report. Of the 160 recommendations made, the department accepted, in whole or in part, 132 of them. In the October 1997 Report on the Recommendations of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, DND responded that all the recommendations concerning racism had already been implemented. On 25 February 1994, the Canadian Forces issued a policy on racist conduct. CFAO 19-43 defines racism as “conduct that promotes, encourages, or constitutes discrimination on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, or religion, including participation in the activities of, or membership in, a group or organization that a CF member knows, or ought to know, promotes discrimination or harassment on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, or religion.” Examples of racist conduct in CFAO 19-43 include creating, distributing, and displaying racist literature; helping these groups financially; speaking publicly on behalf of racist organizations; and using derogatory racial terms. According to the February 1994 policy, racist attitudes are totally incompatible with the military ethos and with effective military service, and any conduct that reflects such attitudes will not be tolerated. Racist conduct is therefore prohibited and will result in administrative action, disciplinary action, or both, and may include release. Any applicant for enrolment in the CF who is unable or unwilling to comply with the CF policy against racist conduct will not be enrolled.

DND was open to the suggestions that generic peacekeeping training become integral to the Canadian Forces’ new training philosophy: “Individual and collective training programs are being restructured to incorporate considerable amounts of generic training for peace support operations, along with general purpose combat training. The following subjects have been incorporated: laws of armed conflict, rules of
engagement, human rights, legal responsibilities, cultural awareness, public affairs, and ethics.” The implementation of these changes was projected to be completed by June 1999. In regards to institutionalizing peacekeeping training and developing resources and expertise, the department was pleased to report that a training package covering the subject areas of law of armed Conflict, Rules of Engagement, inter-cultural and inter-group relations, as well as negotiation and conflict resolution was also in the process of being created.

The Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC), as noted in the report on recommendations, opened in July 1996 to serve “as the centre of excellence for pre-deployment training for all peace support operations.” The PSTC provides pre-deployment training for individuals and advice and assistance for units training for peace support missions. All Canadian Forces members must receive the peace support training offered in the PSTC’s Basic Course. Formed contingents receive this training at their home locations (Edmonton, Petawawa, Gagetown, Valcartier) for the army or at Readiness Training Flights (located at Trenton, Comox, Cold Lake, Winnipeg, Bagotville, or Greenwood) for the air force. The seven-day course is conducted or supervised by PSTC staff or monitored by the PSTC when units run the course themselves. For Canadian Force members who are not part of a formed unit or contingent, they take the Basic Course at the PSTC in Kingston, Ontario. Ultimately, every Canadian Forces member deployed on peace support operations – whether officer or NCM – receives this peace support training. This training is repeated for every mission, unless the training took place within the previous year; then only mission-specific elements must be completed. The peace support training course offered through the PSTC covers the topics of peace support operations’ evolution, mine awareness, personnel survival skills, preventive medicine, negotiation and intervention techniques, foreign weapons and equipment recognition, media awareness, stress management, international force cooperation, the application of force, and the law of armed conflict. Mission specific topics include the rules of engagement, mission intelligence, mission terrain, and cultural awareness.

The cultural awareness component of the seven-day Basic Course is devoted an entire day (0800 hours to 1700 hours, excluding lunch and breaks). In the opening session of the cultural awareness training day, students are introduced to the idea of different cultural values and how
these differences can be found in concepts of leadership, time, family relations, responsibility, deadlines, gender, tempo, justice, and superior-subordinate relationships. Students are made aware of the fact that some forms of communication can be sources of conflict. Eye contact, for some cultures, can be interpreted as a challenge and a lack of respect for an individual. Smiles can have different meanings in different countries and for different genders. Hand gestures do not have universal meanings; hence, gestures commonly used for approval in Western culture can be seen as rude and insulting in Middle Eastern or African countries.

After the general session demonstrating the many facets and challenges involved with the idea of culture, students then receive mission-specific cultural awareness briefings for the rest of the day.

These interactive lectures are provided by facilitators who are indigenous to the country and culture about which they are teaching. Lectures cover historic events and personalities that shaped the country and culture, the religion, typical celebrations, family and daily lifestyles, ethics and social taboos, and even how international forces are perceived. Key phrases are also introduced and practised. Facilitators are open to any questions about their culture and freely discuss issues that are of concern to, and raised by, Canadian peacekeepers: cultural “dos” and “don’ts”; proper interaction with men and women, elders and children; successful means of communication; how not to offend and how to show respect; daily life for locals; customs and religious beliefs; the prevalence of extremist groups and the danger they may pose.

Canadian military personnel come to these sessions with open minds and an eagerness to learn about the various cultures and people they will be encountering. The facilitators augment their lectures with videos, music, and sample foods, and their frankness and enthusiasm leave the peacekeepers with a visible sense of excitement over their up-coming cultural exchange experience.

Cultural awareness training at the PSTC has been provided for the past six and a half years by the Ottawa-based language school Interlangues (which has been in existence since 1976 and now provides training in 72 languages). In addition to the cultural awareness lectures given at the PSTC, the facilitators provide cultural awareness training at bases across Canada, as well as language training at the Canadian Forces Language School. Although time does not permit field exercises for the
Basic Course (practical exercises are scheduled in the eighteen-day Military Observers Course, also run at the PSTC), training at the bases has incorporated Interlangues facilitators in field exercises, role playing scenarios, and language training simulations. This involvement of the cultural and language experts can run from half a day up to three weeks, or more if so requested by the Canadian Forces.45

The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) was established in 1995 to train and provide knowledge and skills to people and organizations involved in all aspects of peace operations. Civilians and military personnel from around the world come to attend the two-week long courses offered. Courses cover topics such as an introduction to peace operations; negotiation skills; humanitarian responses to emergencies; logistics; civilian and military core competencies; civil-military cooperation; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration; human rights; and early warning responses.46

When created by the government, the PPC was not meant to provide peacekeeping training for CF personnel deployed abroad. This is the role of the PSTC where the focus is at the tactical level. The PPC looks at peace operations from an operational and strategic focus, and attendees tend to be senior diplomats and senior officials from government departments and agencies. Senior military officers do participate (in ninety percent of the seminars, military personnel can make up approximately one third of the student body), but this is in addition to their regular Canadian Forces peace support training.

Undeniably, the international stage and the nature of peacekeeping has changed radically. The number of UN missions has been increasing since the end of the Cold War (“between 1991 and the end of 1996, 24 new peacekeeping missions were set-up – six more than the total established during the preceding 43 years”) and peacekeepers are being called upon to do more than monitor peace treaties and patrol disputed borders. Peacekeepers are increasingly sent to create peace, re-establish security, and provide humanitarian assistance to suffering populations.47 This very close interaction with civilians means that the very different cultures of the peacekeepers and the locals will be coming into contact with each other. Cultural awareness and cultural sensitivity will help to ensure that peacekeepers are prepared for the differences and conscious of their duty to treat the host culture and people with dignity and respect. This awareness and sensitivity was lacking in the CAR’s deportment during the 1993
Operation Deliverance – as identified in the Commission of Inquiry’s discovery of racists and deficient training, and as demonstrated in the beating and killing of Somalia civilians.

The “positive” outcome of the tragic events in Somalia and the very public examination of the Canadian Forces has been the institutionalization of peace support training (which includes a serious consideration of cultural awareness). Just as the international situation and the nature of peace support operations is ever evolving, so too must the evaluation and conduct of peace support and cultural awareness training. Are peacekeepers’ needs being met, or does more time and more interactive methods need to be dedicated to cultural awareness training? For the missions in which Canadians are participating, do peacekeepers need more than mere cultural awareness; do they need language expertise and cultural immersion before deployment? Do returning peacekeepers feel they were adequately prepared, or can they suggest additions to pre-deployment training curricula that will provide necessary knowledge for entering the theatre of operations? If each peacekeeper does not need to be a cultural expert, would the creation of some experts for each mission theatre be a useful allocation of time, money, and personnel resources? These questions must be asked on an on-going basis to ensure that training does not grow outdated and is meeting the needs of peacekeepers and the people they are assisting.

Although Canadians have no control over the changes that are taking place around the globe, although peacekeepers admittedly cannot be prepared for every contingency they might face while deployed, the country can control how its representatives are prepared to interact with local populations and their cultures. Ensuring that each peacekeeper has the mind-set of cultural sensitivity and ensuring that each peacekeeper is given more than adequate cultural awareness training is an obligation of the home front – an obligation to the reputation of Canada, an obligation to the integrity of the mission, an obligation to the effectiveness of each peacekeeper, and an obligation to those individuals and nations requiring international intervention and humanitarian assistance.
Endnotes

1 The opinions expressed in this paper and presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the view of Defence Research and Development of National Defence, or the Government of Canada.


4 LaRose, Non-Traditional Military Training, 96-7.

5 Sens, Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping, 93, 124.


9 Voith, The Canadian Deployment to Somalia, 6-14; Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights, 136.


11 Dishonoured Legacy Volume 1, 240, 242, 250-1; Dishonoured Legacy Volume 1, 573.

12 Dishonoured Legacy Volume 2, 569 (first quotation), 571-3.


14 Voith, The Canadian Deployment to Somalia, 39-40; Dishonoured Legacy Volume 1, 281.

15 Dishonoured Legacy Volume 1, 281.

16 Ibid., 281-2.

17 Ibid., 286, 293; David Bercuson, Significant Incident: Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1996), 233-4; Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights, 5.
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18 Bercuson, Significant Incident, 235-6.
19 Dishonoured Legacy Volume 1, 297, 298 (quotation), 300-2, 317; Bercuson, Significant Incident, 236-7; Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights, 77-8, 82 (second quotation).
20 Dishonoured Legacy Volume 1, 318-24; Bercuson, Significant Incident, 328; Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights, 93-9.
21 Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights, 121-2; Dishonoured Legacy Volume 2, 538; Brodeur, Violence and Racial Prejudice, 80 (quotation); Winslow, The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia, 96-7; Dishonoured Legacy Volume 1, 350.
22 Brodeur, Violence and Racial Prejudice, pp. xvi, xvii (quotation); Dishonoured Legacy Volume 1, 350-1.
23 Dishonoured Legacy Volume 1, 356-7.
24 Dishonoured Legacy Executive Summary, 1.
25 Ibid., 25.
26 Ibid., 23.
27 Ibid., 20-2.
28 Ibid., 27.
29 Dishonoured Legacy Volume 2, 601-7; (quotation) 605.
30 Ibid., 607.
31 Dishonoured Legacy Volume 2, 608, 609 (first quotation); Dishonoured Legacy Volume 5, 1464, 1465 (second quotation); Dishonoured Legacy Executive Summary, 28, 30.
32 Brodeur, Violence and Racial Prejudice, 245 (first quotation), 251, 294; Dishonoured Legacy Volume 1, 147, 246; Dishonoured Legacy Volume 2, 536 (second and third quotations), 537.
33 Rodal, The Somalia Experience, 71; Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights, 94 (first quotation), 112 (second quotation), 137.
37 Dishonoured Legacy Volume 5, 1476.
38 Ibid., 1477, 1479, (quotation), 1480.
39 Ibid., 1479.
41 Brodeur, Violence and Racial Prejudice, 214; Dishonoured Legacy Volume 2, 539 (quotation), 540.
42 A Commitment to Change, 36.
43 Ibid., 42.
45 Peace Support Operations – Basic Course Manual, 18-21; Interlangues website, http://www.interlangues.ca.about.html; personal correspondence with Captain Mike O’Connell (PSTC Acting Chief Standards Officer); personal correspondence with Anne Senior (Interlangues
Cultural Awareness Facilitator Team Leader); classroom observations made while attending cultural awareness sessions held 13 December 2005 and 7 February 2006.

46 Pearson Peacekeeping Centre website; personal correspondence with Captain Mike O’Connell (PSTC Acting Chief Standards Officer); Brodeur, Violence and Racial Prejudice, 127.

CHAPTER 3

Ethics and Developments in Military Technology

David Whetham

The motivation for looking at the issues explored briefly in this chapter was a concern that technology, specifically technology employed for military purposes, is developing faster than international law can keep up. It is an accepted fact that international law follows practice and will be informed, to some extent at least, by moral and ethical reasoning. This provides us with the comfort that even if the current law does not address a specific issue, at least there will be a generally agreed upon normative framework to fall back upon until legislation can be hammered out. However, in some of the cases examined in this paper, it is not even clear how some new technologies fit into existing moral and ethical debates. This chapter is an attempt to look at some of the emerging technologies in the military sphere such as Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), Stand-Off weapons, Semi-Autonomous and Fully Autonomous weapon systems, and try to situate them within an ethical context. At the same time, it is an attempt to do this in the light of the practical consideration that these developments are already here, or at least very close to being deployable in a conflict situation.

PGMs and Stand-Off weapons

The references to asymmetric warfare that people are the most familiar with refer usually to terrorism or guerrilla warfare. However, all warfare conducted by the West against non-Western forces is asymmetric, and PGMs or Stand-Off weapons provide a good illustration of why this is so. For example, in 2003 Iraq did not possess any effective counter to cruise missiles nor did Iraqi forces. This demonstrates a huge asymmetric advantage for the West. This has certain implications that are described below.

A “simple” PGM is generally a freefall weapon that has some means of terminal guidance to a position or set of coordinates provided by the Global
Positioning System or an Inertial Navigation Unit. For example, the Joint Direct Attack Munition (a “dumb” bomb with a brain). A PGM plus self-propulsion equals a precision Stand-Off weapon such as the Tomahawk Cruise Missile. While Stand-Off weapons themselves are nothing new, the degree of remoteness is clearly much greater when considering this type of weapon. The next generation of Stand-Off weaponry, very close to being operational, is the US Air Force’s Airborne Laser system. Housed in a modified 747, this Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser is intended for anti-missile defence and promises a range of several hundred miles, accuracy measured in inches and a sensor to shooter time lag of a fraction of a second. Next, we could be looking at a space based laser system or even “Rods from the Gods,” an idea comprising the use of titanium rods propelled from near Earth orbit onto exact coordinates, supposedly having the effect of a localised mini nuclear explosion without the fall-out and thought to be particularly effective against hardened bunkers.

One of the advantages of such precision Stand-Off weaponry, either already here or soon to arrive, is that fewer weapons are needed to achieve the same result. As a result, this should have the effect of reducing “collateral damage,” the euphemism for dead women and children. Because the weapons are more accurate, a smaller blast radius is required to do the same job, resulting in less civilian deaths and less damage to the infrastructure. When compared to the carpet bombing of the Second World War, the advantages from a moral perspective are very clear: one missile can replace a hundred Lancaster bombers. The other side to the equation is that fewer weapons needed means fewer platforms required to deliver them. This means less risk to the lives of the pilots involved. Such weapons preserve life from both perspectives while also being cheaper overall due to their increased efficiency.

It seems that these considerations, as a consequence, will reduce the fear of the “CNN effect.” When civilians are (supposedly) not being affected in the same way as in the past, it is easier to maintain a moral high ground. At the same time, it could also reduce the number of “body bags” to come home and increase the public support in that way. It is broadly accepted that a, if not the, principle centre of gravity in contemporary military operations is domestic and international public opinion. PGMs and Stand-Off abilities support this and as such, they lower the political cost of their use due to them being perceived as clean, humane and efficient.
Any precision system, as a disadvantage, is only as good as the information that supports it.\textsuperscript{4} Allied to this concern is that many simply do not work as intended. The failure rate in striking the intended target can possibly be as high as 20\% in some systems. A high profile example is the miss (i.e., malfunction) of the missile sent into a residential suburb in Operation Iraqi Freedom to target Chemical Ali. The paradox of precision weapons is that when they do fail to hit their targets, the political fallout can be huge due to the raised public expectations.\textsuperscript{5}

A second potential ethical implication is that, at least in this context, “can implies ought.” It means that if two weapon systems are available, both capable of destroying a target but one will cause less collateral damage than the other, one is morally obliged to use it instead of the other. But, if one does not have the option of a PGM, then the concern of obligation does not apply. Therefore, proportionality concerns are, to some extent anyway, relative rather than absolute. This has the implication that the West is held to a higher standard, both legally and morally, than its potential or real non-Western opponents.\textsuperscript{6}

Taking the proportionality question a little further, what does this mean for the \textit{jus in bello} concern? Specifically, is it proportional to employ Stand-Off PGMs against an opponent who cannot defend against them? The answer is yes! To claim otherwise is to misunderstand the principle, which is \textit{not} about being fair. It is about applying discrimination and not using more force than is necessary to achieve the required ends. To use the same ‘dumb’ weapons as an opponent and thereby inflicting more collateral damage and causing more unnecessary destruction and loss of life than necessary out of some sense of fair play appears ridiculous. However, this does raise some implications for the other side. It is accepted that radical force protection (where a force shifts the burden of risk as far as possible to the other side, by withdrawing behind defensive positions and being ultra defensive or quite literally, firing first and asking questions later) is counterproductive as it cuts soldiers off from the people and, in the process, dehumanises them. An over-reliance on Stand-Off weaponry risks taking this even further as it can reinforce a perception that a “normal” or conventional response is futile and that therefore, any means can be justified.\textsuperscript{7} In effect, such weapons may be perceived, at least by some, to generate what Michael Walzer refers to as a “Supreme Emergency”\textsuperscript{8} for the people they are employed against. This situation acknowledges that
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extreme measures *might* be justified in such circumstances (even if such measures still cannot be said to be morally right).

The lower political cost already mentioned above associated with Stand-Off PGMs clearly means that they are much easier to use. The illusion of sanitised warfare feeds the promise of bloodless victory. Rather than waiting for the traditional last resort criteria of the Just War Tradition to be satisfied, this can lead to “drive by wars.” The practical implications of the Commander in Chief being present at targeting decisions – the very long screwdriver – also seems to potentially collapse the *ad bellum*/*in bello* distinction. There are problems with this separation anyway, but this type of technological development in war seems to provide a very practical issue with maintaining this separation of the two levels.

The technological advances evident in the current generation of cruise missiles also pose a different type of ethical challenge. Although a target may be programmed before the weapon is launched, it has the ability to be “re-tasked” in flight. The advantage is that the weapon can be redirected if real-time information indicates that the original target has already been destroyed, or if the situation has changed. For example, a key bridge is now full of civilian traffic or a military target has moved from a particular area. As long as any secondary target is selected with due diligence, this would appear to be a very positive development in the reduction of collateral damage and economy of force. However, if a secondary target was selected hurriedly, without the normal checks and balances due to a perceived need to use up the asset before it is wasted, it would be easy to see how mistakes could happen. Of more concern, particularly for those who are responsible for actually “pressing the button,” it is possible that the weapon can be targeted or re-targeted in flight by someone in a completely different part of the chain of command, or even an ally, without the actual firer being aware of the new destination or the material facts behind the targeting decision. It appears obvious that moral responsibility in this case lies with the person who is actually in control of the weapon at the time.

One could draw an analogy with an anti-tank mine. If one has, in one’s possession, an anti-tank mine and is asked to give the weapon to someone else to deploy, as long as it is certain that the person will use the weapon in a legally and morally appropriate way, one is not responsible for the way that weapon is finally deployed. The responsibility lies with the
person who actually uses it. If one has doubts over the way the mine will be used, one should not make it available in the first place. The same logic would appear to apply to the launching of a missile. If one believes that it will be inappropriately redirected, then the initial firer has a responsibility not to release the weapon in the first place or the firer does bear some moral responsibility for the eventual outcome.

**Semi and Fully Autonomous Weapon Systems**

Semi-Autonomous Weapon Systems do not actually think for themselves but rather wait for their programming to be satisfied. For example, an attack drone or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) such as the HARPY system. This has the ability to loiter for several hours until it detects the operation of ground-based enemy radar, which it then locks onto and destroys with a high-energy warhead. No operator is required: once the algorithms have been satisfied, the target is destroyed. Another example is Brimstone, a Cold War system revamped for the Twenty-First Century. It has two modes: column and area logic. The column logic implies that each missile is programmed to attack a different target, and the area logic involves primary and secondary search areas. It is programmed to discriminate between tanks, armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and commercial vehicles.

Obviously, one cannot surrender to a fire and forget the weapon. If the target package is satisfied then it will be destroyed. Therefore, the decision has to be taken at the time that the weapon system is actually deployed, not when it carries out its lethal function. Is this necessarily a moral problem? Is this morally equivalent to an anti-tank mine? Here a specific weight or material composition will detonate the weapon rather the target being identified by some software. Alternatively, one can also not surrender to an artillery or mortar barrage. There are moral implications of such weapons, but the problems are not necessarily unique, at least not in this respect.

It appears that a (moral) problem could arise from the opponent’s response to this type of weapon. An obvious counter would be deception such as the deliberate use of commercial or civilian vehicles. Without a person “in the loop,” it would be very difficult to tell. Those perpetrating the deception could claim that this is a legitimate course of action as it is the only option available to them and it is likely that such an appeal
will have a fair degree of support. Another issue – of potentially greater significance – will be discussed at the end of this paper.

Fully Autonomous Weapon Systems involve some kind of Artificial Intelligence (AI). A system without a human in the loop is seen as desirable when operating in an environment too fast, too complex or too dangerous for a human operator. Genetic algorithms offer the prospect of a genuine learning ability, and Network Centric Warfare developments would enable swarms of such weapons to be employed, communicating and learning from each other. On the advantage side, if it is better to put fewer people at risk, logically, it must be better to have no one at risk. Clearly such a system has enormous advantages in extreme environments and hazardous conditions such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC), space, extreme arctic, desert or underwater etc. Advocates suggest that human error can be removed completely from the system and such weapons lower the political cost of military action even further.

However, while this makes force a more attractive option for politicians, it can mean a very real increase in costs for many other people. By offering the prospect of real impunity, autonomous weapons make easier the notion of going to war. What should be the last resort becomes, instead, the first response. While proponents argue that people in the system are the weak link, others indicate the problems of programming bugs or errors in the assumptions fed into, or potentially reached by, the machine. For example, in 1988 an Iranian Airbus was shot down by the USS Vincennes after it was wrongly identified as an F14a Tomcat, killing 290 people even though there were still people in the loop to question the conclusions of the air defence system. If a system is genuinely autonomous, whom do we blame if it goes wrong? Where does the moral responsibility lie? Again, this seems to challenge the *ad bellum*/*in bello* separation as responsibility appear to lie with those who decide on the war in the first place knowing that such weapons will be employed.

A further consideration concentrates on the implications of sending a genuinely sentient machine into battle. Is this the moral equivalent of a conscript? Even if one does not go as far as accepting true sentience, this development raises the potential of a whole war being fought on our behalf by robots. This would entail no risk to our soldiers at all. Is this a good thing?
Conclusion

This chapter has explained that the last resort criteria of the *jus ad bellum* has been circumvented, or at least challenged by Stand-Off PGMs and other weapon system developments. However, another important condition is the requirement that there be a reasonable chance of success. This, as far as the West is concerned, is often assumed and therefore largely ignored. However, such weapons question the very nature of victory itself. Specifically, why should the ‘losing side’ accept defeat? Throughout history, victory has come not from one side defeating the other, but from that side *conceding defeat*. In Ancient Greece, the defeated asked if they could recover their dead, thus signalling that they had accepted that they had lost. King John II surrendered to the English at Poitiers; Cornwallis surrendered to Washington; and the Japanese formally surrendered on the deck of the *USS Missouri*. In each case, this provided a clear termination of the conflict through recognition of defeat. A whole new generation of weapons demonstrate a willingness to kill but not to die for a cause. This appears to provide a fundamental or even existential shift in the context of the use of force. Clausewitz argues that war is a duel, a clash of wills, and a moral struggle where both actors seek to overthrow their opponent. However, if we do not engage on this moral level and demonstrate resolve, why should the other side give up? Clausewitz acknowledges that one can have a victory without fighting, but to achieve this, one must also be willing to shed blood. If this view is taken seriously, technologically advanced weapon systems may actually demonstrate a fundamental lack of resolve rather than an effective coercive capability in many situations.

Following the perceived failures in Iraq, some seek to avoid the same mistakes being repeated in the future by arguing for the use of more technology. While this view fundamentally misunderstands the character of the conflict that is being fought, the attempt to eliminate risk may also make attaining victory even harder in the long run. Perhaps we have to concede that acceptance of some risk is necessary – the present or emerging weapon systems discussed above clearly have an important role in military operations, but relying too heavily upon them, at the expense of other (often non-kinetic) means, may actually prove counter-productive. They appear to make the decision to resort to force easier while at the same time making it harder to turn that force into a successful outcome. Successful coercion demands that resolve is demonstrated and by instead demonstrating a willingness to kill but not die for a cause, that
fundamental resolve can be questioned, making the use of force less credible even as it becomes increasingly sophisticated. An alternative is that we may have to look at what we mean by “success” and settle for future victories that look very different from those that we have become accustomed to.

Endnotes

1 I accept that when looking at military capabilities and the issues that might arise, it is important to see a spectrum rather than rigidly defined separate areas. However, for the sake of clarity, this paper will explore these issues as discrete areas where possible.

2 A sniper rifle is a form of this.

3 The public opinion or will of the host nation is also essential when conducting a Counter Insurgency-type operation.

4 It was a PGM that hit the Chinese embassy during the Kosovo campaign, allegedly thanks to faulty intelligence.

5 The importance of, where appropriate, openly acknowledging errors when they happen is key to managing public expectation as the damage done by blanket denials that are later exposed as falsehoods can be immense.

6 I am not convinced that this is actually a problem – it is just the flip side of the asymmetric realities.

7 The perceived invulnerability of ‘stealth weapons’ could also reinforce this view.


9 For example, David Rodin in his *War and Self-Defense* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) has looked at some of the philosophical and moral issues in this area.


11 Arguably, Milosovic did in 1999 when it was clear that the West was unwilling to commit ground troops.
Military interventions in conflict zones are officially mandated to enforce the peace, counter insurgencies and, to quote the fathers of Confederation, help bring about “peace, order, and good government.” The challenge of economic reconstruction and development is left — officially — to civilian agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and business corporations. In the classic 20th century version of events, peace building is carried out in phases: first military, followed by civilian. The rationale: military peace building creates the physical security and basic “rule of law” required by the public and private sectors to undertake economic reconstruction afterwards.

This paper conveys an alternative view of the military peace building process. It is that military Peace Operations are themselves weighty economic actors. They manage “big budgets” in low-income countries, spending money and allocating scarce resources in economically depressed conflict zones.

The economic impacts start flowing early in the game. As soon as military units show up in a country, their peace operation is navigating in the country’s conflict economy. This happens from the moment boots hit the ground and soldiers buy vegetables from a street vendor, clear farmers off their land to build a base camp, sell first-world jeans to local peddlers or build a road that opens transportation links with the international markets.

While Peace Operations are often mandated to maintain strict political neutrality, their economic impacts are almost never neutral. As money is spent, there are inevitably economic winners and losers. In addition, consistent patterns of military spending can influence the longer term
development path of the economy, including the “social selection” of business enterprises that emerge as leaders in the process of economic reconstruction.

This paper suggests the civilian business perspective of a private sector management consultant. From this perspective, it is natural to compare the economic impacts of Peace Operations to those of multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in poor countries – sinking mine shafts, building roads and bridges, installing telecommunications networks, buying the services of local people and, in some cases, building schools and clinics to strengthen community relations. It is commonplace to assess and manage the economic impacts of MNC investments in developing countries. It should be noted, moreover, that their economic, social and environmental impacts are increasingly the subjects of vigorous political and ethical debate.

This paper argues, in a commonsensical way, that the economic impacts of Peace Operations are big enough, and varied enough, to be monitored and assessed systematically. From a business management perspective, the “big budgets” of both international Peace Operations and of multinational corporations are similar. During a Peace Operation, military units play the role of “public corporations” that have major economic impacts on the communities where they operate. (They play similar roles in counter-insurgency operations and even full-scale wars.) In any conflict zone, it is worthwhile to keep track of the economic impacts of public corporations, private corporations and even large NGOs, whatever the official phase of the Peace Operation and whatever the official mandate of the organization in question.

Business leaders are familiar with the language of “economic impact” partly because they work everyday in systems designed to measure their economic performance. In contrast, military leaders are less at ease, and may assume that economic impacts are of concern only to specialized military procurement and supply chain managers. The argument of this paper is that military operations also have major economic impacts. Some preliminary evidence – mainly examples and imaginary cases – are offered to support this argument and stimulate discussion.

Consider two simple examples of the varied economic impacts of military operations, one humorous, the other tragic.
**Afghanistan**: On the lighter hearted end of the scale, David Last from the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) recounted the story of first-world garbage disposal at a Canadian base camp in Afghanistan. The people responsible for disposing of garbage from the camp were dealing with some local suppliers, who offered to pay them a fee to get rid of used plastic bottles. After some negotiating, they discovered that the “suppliers” were not in the garbage disposal business but rather middlemen planning to sell the bottles to local beverage suppliers – and that they were willing to pay a modest price for the bottles. In economic reality then, upscale garbage became an imported product in a conflict zone.

Viewed through an economic lens, the Canadian military had actually entered the wholesale bottle importing business. Using business jargon, it was managing the upstream supply channels of local Afghan distributors and drink vendors with made-in-Canada plastic bottles.

Like multinational corporations, international Peace Operations span the economic boundaries between rich and poor countries. In this case, a small market for plastic bottles sprang up at the border with the aim of meeting local demand in an efficient way. The initiative was fuelled by business acumen and creativity. Moreover, it appeared to create positive economic impacts.

There are other cases, however, where military operations shut down local markets and block exchange across the boundary, with negative economic impacts. This brings us to a less happy case from Gaza.

**Gaza**: In the summer of 2006, an Israeli soldier (Corporal Gilad Shalit) was kidnapped in Gaza. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) suspected fishing boats putting out from Gaza of serving as floating safe houses for the hostage takers, smuggling the captive across security lines by sea. Officially, fishing off Gaza was banned but, in fact, local fishermen were allowed to fish close to shore, provided they were willing to bear the risk of crossing a shifting maritime security line (not clearly marked.) At some point, the IDF was harassing the boats so aggressively with machine gun fire that a fisherman died of gunshot wounds to the head. Some families decided to stop fishing. This put the fishermen – mainly using small family-owned boats – out of work, reduced incomes and restricted food supplies to Gaza.¹
The fishing ban, selectively enforced, is part of a larger pattern of restricting and at times blocking traffic at land and air border crossings. The reported comment of one senior Israeli government figure in the 2006 period was that the Palestinians would not be starved, but they would be kept on a diet.

Here we have a serious difference of perspective between the local community and the military. The Israelis claimed they were conducting routine security operations. In Palestinian eyes, the action amounted to an aggressive economic blockade designed to starve them and drive them out of their homeland.

So, was it anti-terrorism or a blockade? The answer is “both.” In Afghanistan, was it garbage disposal or bottle importing? Again, the answer is “both.” It all depends on which side of the economic exchange, or blockade, you are positioned.

Both examples show that the impacts of military and security operations are felt in economies and communities that are very different from that of Canada, Israel or other industrial countries. It is not just that Afghans and Palestinians have low incomes or different cultural values. They live in conflict economies with different structures, different logics, and different sets of business ethics. Leading to big differences in economic perception and practice.

Describing peacekeeping and humanitarian relief in the Balkans during the 1990s, Mary Kaldor pointed to the polarization in conflict societies between international elites, with international mobility and communications networks, and local communities, who are literally “stuck inside” the conflict. In *New and Old Wars*, Kaldor describes this as a key feature of “new wars”:

> Indeed, the wars epitomize a new kind of global/local divide between members of a global class who can speak English, have access to faxes, email and satellite television, who use dollars or deutschmarks or credit cards, and who can travel freely, and those who are excluded from global processes, who live off what they can sell or barter or what they receive in humanitarian aid, whose movement is restricted by roadblocks, visas and the cost of travel, and who are prey to sieges, forced famines, landmines, etc.
Kaldor’s comments have deep economic significance. They point to the fact that armies – like MNCs, civilian development agencies and NGOs – are part of the “global class.” Their interventions in conflict zones involve spanning the economic boundary between international and local communities. There are clear parallels with the patterns that develop when NGOs intervene in poor countries and MNCs build so-called economic enclaves around their operations.

**Spanning the boundary: Economic Terms of Engagement**

What happens when military units, as public corporations, span the international-local boundary? How can the economic impacts be tracked and managed? Two concepts can help military leaders find practical answers to these questions: market exchanges and economic terms of engagement.

**Market Exchanges:** The first concept is simply that of market exchange. Most markets operate within national and industry boundaries. However, there are also all kinds of international markets that spring up naturally at the points where people from different economic worlds meet. These markets can be vibrant, even chaotic, given the powerful incentives people have to exchange goods, information and services across a frontier (think of international port cities, medieval fairs, global Web portals like eBay, etc.).

Peace Operations function like economic magnets, creating powerful incentives for market exchange. One major incentive for local people is access to first-world goods, from used plastic bottles to new jeans and CDs. In these cases, military units play the role of importers – often that of wholesale importers that supply downstream local retailers with a pipeline of scarce goods. They may play the role intentionally or, as in the Afghan case, unintentionally. They may sell, ration, give away or throw away these scarce goods, which assuredly have economic value on the other side of the boundary. Another set of incentives flows from the “big budgets” of Peace Operations. They manage concentrated masses of spending power; their streams of expenditure flow over long periods of time and in very large amounts relative to the modest incomes of local communities. In these cases, the military units can play the role of export markets for locally produced goods and services. It depends on their procurement policies. For example, they may buy some goods in
local markets (e.g., tomatoes, hot meals) and other products in international markets (e.g., ammunition, medical supplies). Obviously, these procurement decisions can have a huge impact on the development of local markets and businesses. Local communities have a ‘sixth sense’ about where the dollars are flowing and what it means for their incomes.

Military leaders are not business managers. However, they need to be realistic about the economic role of their Peace Operations. In economic fact, these operations create rich environments (agoras) for market exchange, with local entrepreneurs and brokers engaged both in importing and exporting via military channels. This happens not only in military bases but also in other “non-economic” environments like refugee camps, prisoner-of-war camps, and public spaces from Hanoi to Accra where governments (unsuccessfully) attempt to suppress informal markets.8

Of course, the military can also discourage market exchange at the rich-poor boundary, as indicated by the Gaza fishing case. They can prevent or restrict exchange, whether through an explicit blockade or through the unintended consequences of security operations and military sieges.9 (Many such measures are only partially effective, given the powerful incentives for brokers to organize trade across any rich-poor divide). Realizing that Peace Operations provide an institutional setting for market exchanges between the international and local communities leads to the next question: What are the terms of trade? How well do these markets work? A second concept will help to answer these questions.

Economic Terms of Engagement: Both the Afghan and Gaza examples indicate that Peace Operations are engaged economically, not just militarily, in their host societies. They span international economic boundaries and face the choice of encouraging, or discouraging, economic exchange across those boundaries. That choice is at once strategic, operational and ethical.

What are the economic terms of engagement? This invented term blends military language – “rules of engagement” – with an economic concept – the “terms of trade.” Military rules of engagement define how force can be used to achieve the operational mission. Similarly, the economic terms of engagement (not yet clearly defined as rules) guide how spending power, military force and other management tools are used to bring about economic change supporting peace and the rule of law. These terms of
engagement include the narrower economic “terms of trade,” meaning the relative prices of imports and exports as well as various institutional and contractual rules about how exchanges are structured, credit is given, disputes are settled, etc.

This paper makes no claim to present a rigorous definition of the economic terms of engagement. Nevertheless, it does try to go beyond the slogans like “big budgets,” “designer jeans” and “plastic bottles” by offering a reasonable hypothesis to be debated and tested. From a management perspective, the hypothesis is that both public Peace Operations and private MNCs define their economic terms of engagement in a developing country by taking decisions in five primary areas:

1) Location of major operations (military bases, plants, mines);
2) Construction and repair of infrastructure (roads, pipelines, power grids, communications networks);
3) Choice of suppliers (international, boundary-spanning or local);
4) Small purchases of everyday goods and services (with major cumulative impacts);
5) Security arrangements (physical, legal and political).

This hypothesis is a starting point for discussion, not a conclusion based on hard evidence. As indicated earlier, a key starting assumption is that a military Peace Operation behaves like a “public corporation” in a conflict economy. A related assumption is that civilian MNCs, with decades of experience managing their own terms of engagement in developing countries, may be able to offer some useful insights.

There is no hidden suggestion here that military corporations should be privatized. International Peace Operations have very different missions and goals than multinational corporations when intervening in a poor country. The only claim is that public and private corporations have similar, and related, economic impacts.

**Two cases: Shaping the Economic Terms of Engagement**

It would be premature for the military to write a rule book (or “doctrine”) that defines the economic terms of engagement in Peace Operations and
counter-insurgencies. We are not yet at the stage of applying established rules to structured, well-known situations. Rather, we are swimming in the uncharted waters of conflict economies, with all kinds of life forms floating around us. Therefore, we must explore, experiment, test and keep on learning as we go.

To stimulate the learning process, two fictional cases are presented. The first one concerns a military operation with major economic impacts in Afghanistan and the second one looks at a military logistics decision regarding the routing of a new road. They both address the strategic and ethical choices involved in determining the economic rules of engagement. These cases are composites built from a variety of sources, mainly the news media and conflict-economy literature. They are simplified in order to stimulate debate. Experienced military officers may find them to be more like “economic cartoons” than real-life case studies.

**Afghan Poppy Fields: counter-insurgency operations with economic impacts**

A military unit is ordered to destroy the poppy crop growing next to a village of 200 people in an isolated valley. The rationale is not poppy eradication but counter-insurgency. The goal is to stop a local Taliban network from preying on the villagers and force the insurgents to move to a nearby valley where they will be easier to corner and neutralize. The villagers are to be moved securely to Khandahar and lodged free of charge for the next 6 months while authorities find a new location for their farms, or alternative employment in the city.

Negotiations are initiated by the commander and a translator. After some palavering, it becomes clear that the two clans in the village have grown many cash crops over the years – and they consider poppy to be relatively high priced, risky and subject to high tribute payments. They would rather grow wheat and propose to the troops that they will switch crops next season if the unit can guarantee year-round security. When it becomes clear this is not possible, one clan head makes a counter-proposal: pay cash compensation to the villager’s clans for the lost poppy crop. They will vacate the area, go to another village on their own and – as a bonus – they will provide intelligence on local Taliban leaders.

All the villagers flatly refuse to go to Khandahar. The elders are afraid that the boys will “go bad” in Khandahar (e.g., join the Taliban, cross the
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border to Pakistan, join poppy trafficking networks). They fear an even worse fate for the girls (either kidnapping by human traffickers or exposure to Western secular schooling by NGOs). In passing, the translator mentions to the commander that the amount of compensation being proposed is about the same as the black market value of the crop last year with a 10% premium added on top.

To do the deal, the commanding officer must divert funds from a transportation account and lacks time to have the orders formally changed; this situation will require verbal authorization. The alternative is to just follow orders, call the villagers’ bluff and possibly use force to vacate the village.

The ethical question: Is the compensation a corrupt payment that encourages the drug trade? Or is it legitimate and reasonable compensation for military expropriation of “private property” belonging to the villagers?

**Congolese Diamond Field: Military infrastructure & the local economy**

A unit of MONUC is ordered to build a road linking a small village to a regional market town so that military vehicles can patrol more frequently in the area, where gangs are preying on local girls and farmers. The local population learns of the plan from the Congolese surveyors. As the plan is being implemented, it emerges – without forewarning – that there are several optional routes with big local economic impacts. Two local lobby groups approach the MONUC commanding officer. (1) Local notables want the road to run next to an abandoned mine that is slated to be re-opened by an MNC. (2) Small farmers and artisanal miners ask for a diversion of the route.

Typically, the notables were consulted in advance and had an opportunity to influence the terms of reference drawn up in Kinshasa, where the mining company and central government have just signed the terms of the a new mining concession (as if by chance). On the ground, however, the commander finds out that not all stakeholders, unfortunately, have been consulted.

A group of 200 local farmers appear at local headquarters and ask for the road to be diverted near their fields, which have been planted on land from an abandoned mine that they informally “invaded” during
the civil war. They say the road will enable them to grow vegetables that can be sold in the regional market. They offer to plant extra patches of tomatoes and cucumbers, reserving the crops for sale to MONUC military units at reduced prices. Local guides explain to the commander that the economic alternative is essentially barren fields and limited subsistence agriculture. Without rapid transport to market, the vegetables will either rot, or be stolen by gangs. The incentives to increase production depend on the road and regular MONUC patrols to secure the farmers’ property.

The notables, a group of about 40 larger land owners (including the former local prefect under the Mobutu regime) tell another story. They used to be landlords and local mine managers. Their farms were exhausted and abandoned by many of the peasant farmers now in the first group, before the civil war. The land was sold to Gecamines, the state mining corporation, but payment was never received as the war broke out and the mine’s senior management embezzled the funds and fled the DRC\textsuperscript{13} for Zambia and points east. The local notables want the mine to be bought, re-opened, and expanded by the foreign mining MNC, or again by Gecamines, which still owes them a payment. They press hard for the road to be built, as planned and “agreed,” next to the abandoned diamond mine. They hope it will re-open providing them with a cash injection and local people with permanent jobs with good salaries. The surveyors observe that the small farmers also dig shallow artisanal mines on their farms, selling diamonds at low prices to the local gangs.

The MONUC terms of reference favour the notables and the MNC, both with an interest in securing the mining concession. Accommodating the first group would require keeping the road crew an extra two months and breaking the road-building budget. A recommendation is awaited at headquarters.

There is a security trade-off that is hard to pin down. The direct route, near the old mine, is preferred by military planners looking at the map in regional HQ. However, the indirect route promises less measurable benefits: the loyalty of an emerging network of MONUC allies, tired of being harassed by the gangs.

So, what should the commander do? What are the ethical trade-offs? Which option is “least corrupt” in this poor country? Economically, what
ethically better for the country — the international mine reopening in a few years, or a more vibrant local economy this year? Is there an ethical and economic rationale for a change of plan? What about security?

**Terms of Engagement: Asking the right questions**

Our focus is ethics in leadership, and the two cases present difficult ethical issues. The choices are complex and naturally, the first classic question is, “What is the right thing to do?” However, it is premature to ask this question. To take tough decisions, the commanders first need a clear understanding of the issues and well-defined decision options. These are not “one-off” decisions but rather visible choices that will shape the economic terms of engagement of the Peace Operations in the two regions, including how they shape patterns of market exchange and how they are perceived by the local communities.

The military commanders are operating in a foreign culture with different values, posing the problem of cultural relativism. They are also spanning an economic boundary, which may be more important than the cultural barrier. We need to ask these questions: “What are the economic interests and concerns of the villagers, farmers, street vendors and others who ask for compensation and road diversions? Would we bargain for the same things if we were in their position? Do we really understand the choice we are making? In particular, what are the economic impacts of each option?”

It would appear that we should “make haste slowly” at the start, and take some care to define issues and options. To use the classic management consulting slogan, we need to make sure we are “asking the right questions” before we try to find the answers.

For purposes of discussion, the military commanders should consider three basic questions about the economic terms of engagement of their operations:

- **Perspective**: What perspective governs the Peace Operation?
- **Strategic Position**: What are the strategic decision options?
- **Ethical Standards**: What are the ethical decision options?
Only after answering these questions should the commanders circle back to confront the ultimate question: “What is the right thing to do?” Of course, it is understood that time pressures may be extreme and that answers to the three preliminary questions may be jotted on note pads (or just considered for a few minutes of heated conversation). However, this does not weaken the key point: military leaders need to develop a mental discipline and method for understanding economic issues — and this discipline needs to be cultivated in advance of crises in the field.

**Perspective: What perspective governs the peace operation?**

When a military unit arrives in a war-torn country, it is not a member of the local community. It is spanning the cultural and economic boundaries mentioned earlier. The words and actions of the military personnel define economic terms of engagement. To a significant degree, it is a question of perspective and mindset.

The natural tendency is to adopt an international perspective. This is the perspective of the leadership of the Peace Operations: the home government, United Nations (UN) agencies, international organizations and the commander of the military unit. Peace Operations and counter-insurgency operations are mandated by governments outside the conflict zone. They look “from the outside in” at a war that must be stopped to protect international security.

But there is another perspective called the “community perspective.” It positions you on the other side of the boundary. It comes naturally to the farmers, miners, fishing boat owners in the cases cited earlier, and to many insurgents. These stakeholders look at the Peace Operation as the latest arrival on the scene, questioning quite reasonably whether international players will be able to end a conflict that has lasted for years. They experience the conflict “from the inside out,” with no international escape routes, as Mary Kaldor indicated.

The key question is: “Which perspective do we adopt? International or community? Do we stay faithful to the views of the headquarters of the military mission … or do we step into the shoes of the villagers and farmers?”
There is no getting away from the fact that these perspectives may be quite different, and not just for reasons of cultural relativism. Consider a basic question that goes to the heart of the mission of any Peace Operation: “What do we mean by peace and security?”

In “Marcher sur la corde raide: le maintien de la paix et le maintien de l’ordre impérial,” David Last explains that the answer to this question varies significantly depending on the perspective that you adopt. Contrasting perspectives on the issue are rooted in distinct traditions of what he calls imperial and community policing. Not surprisingly, they inspire distinct economic perspectives, and different approaches to defining “economic terms of engagement.”

**International perspective on security:** Security means military control creating the classic monopoly of force on the territory of a state that is weak and being reconstructed. It means Canadian POGG\(^5\), the rule of law and “clean” economies free of criminal elements. Legality is important. In the two cases, poppy farming fuels an illegal global industry while artisanal diamond mining violates international standards of mine safety and product certification. Farmers are to be discouraged from dealing with brokers and gangs involved in international criminal networks; certainly, their farming activity is not viewed as improving international security.

It follows that the Peace Operation is viewed as playing primarily a military role, attempting to secure a region threatened by insurgents and gangs operating on the far frontiers of the international legal order. In the case of the Congo, the international perspective favours economic development managed by a “legal” multinational company that would invest in the mine after security was established.

**Community perspective on security:** At the community level, people are also looking – desperately – for physical peace and security. However, their working definition of “security” naturally expands to include health, food, and basic economic security; these essential goods are essential to staying alive in a conflict zone and are never taken for granted by poor people “living off what they can sell or barter or what they receive in humanitarian aid.”

This is not so much a matter of ideology as of common sense, especially at the community level. For poor people in a conflict zone, earning income
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is part of basic physical security: it means making enough money, or in-kind income, to eat for the next few days, weeks (or months). The farm villagers’ concern about getting vegetables to market, or selling a poppy crop about to be harvested, is not an “add on” to physical security. It is part of any viable plan to stay alive and in relatively good health. Economic legality is relatively less important, though it may enter into the community-level risk equation.

From a community perspective, military units are not only viewed as providing physical security. The villagers view them as economic players. International military and civilian peace builders – together – are seen as bringing economic change, promising benefits that may, or may not, materialize.

Consider the economic opportunities – and risks – that are opened up for the Congolese farmers and artisanal miners by the arrival of MONUC scouts and road builders. Initially, they are engaged in subsistence farming and selling small lots of diamonds to local gangs. The new road promises to create a new opportunity to increase their acreage and produce vegetables for a larger cash market; they might continue selling diamonds on the side but this activity would become relatively less important with the growth of commercial farming revenues. If the road is built near the mine, however, they would have another type of opportunity altogether – the possibility that the mine will re-open and bring economic development to the region.

In effect, the choice of routes for road building in the case is both physical and economic: the MONUC commander is choosing between two alternative paths towards economic development (using language borrowed from development economics.) One development path encourages gradual growth of small farms and micro-enterprises, while the other path would focus on the mine and links to the global economy. Both paths emphasize the development of markets but they are different in each case – the regional market for agricultural produce versus the global diamond market.

Of course, both development paths can be pursued over time and may be complementary. However, the point raised by the case is that the MONUC unit will play a role in setting priorities and in channelling private sector investment towards one path, or the other, in the near term.
Communities & informal economies: This is not familiar terrain to many military commanders. The arrangements proposed by the villagers in the two cases (compensation payments, route diversions) vaguely smack of corruption and favouritism. Corruption that could tarnish the international reputation of the military unit. The economic benefits may appear vague and undefined.

However, the issue can be understood differently, from the community perspective, using the concept of the “informal economy” from development economics. This concept explains the fact a large portion of economic activity in many developing countries is concentrated in businesses and farms that operate “outside the law” – unregistered, unincorporated, not paying tax, using informal property leases and contracts. These firms operate mainly in a cash economy, or using informal credit, but outside the legal banking system.

For those interested in fighting poverty, there is a critical distinction between the extra-legal economy and the illegal or criminal economy. The former can be an attractive target for investment and even “scaling up” to create growth. In the 1980s, for example, Hernando De Soto studied the flourishing informal economy created over four decades by Andean migrants to the shantytowns around Lima. That economy generated income for the vast majority of people in the region. More than 90,000 informal street vendors and 275 informal markets dominated the city’s retail trade, while informal bus and taxi drivers controlled more than 90% of Lima’s urban transportation fleet. Informal neighbourhoods, created by so-called land “invasions,” accounted for more than 40% of all urban housing.

In his classic *The Other Path*, De Soto explained how the migrants were excluded from the legal economy and adapted by learning to operate outside the legal system.

If they were to live, trade, manufacture, transport, or even consume, the cities’ new inhabitants had to do so illegally. Such illegality was *not antisocial in intent*, like trafficking in drugs, theft or abduction, but *was designed to achieve such legal objectives as building a house, providing a service, or developing a business.*

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The informal economy of Lima was far from anarchic but, on the contrary, was guided by a host of informal norms and standards governing property titles, leases, contracts, business credit, dispute resolution, community associations (which De Soto describes as quasi-governments) and more.

In Canada, the informal economy operates in a handful of sectors (e.g., home cleaning, child care, and construction), accounting for an estimated 10-20% of gross domestic product (GDP). In the Congo, an estimated 90% (or more) of economic activity is informal. It is predominant in many sectors: farms, artisanal mines, small-scale manufacturing, urban and rural transportation, housing construction and more. Informal businesses and farms are the economic centre of gravity of the Congo.

The legal sector of the Congolese economy, dominated by mining and natural resources, accounts for the majority of officially reported export earnings, state revenues and GDP. However, development experts point out that the mines have historically operated in “enclave economies” that usually provide few benefits to local communities. The legal economy may represent little more than 5-10% of real income-earning activity, and provide income to an even smaller portion of the population (measured by heads counts).  

In the Afghan and Congolese cases, the military commanders need to “see” the informal economies operating in the poppy and diamond fields. They need perspectives on economic impact that include both the legal and informal economies. Above all, they need to avoid stereotyping the “informals” as criminals and black market operators. The villagers growing poppies and “invading” mine land may be supported by longstanding community rules and traditions.

Development debates: Just as there is a tension between the international and community perspectives concerning security, so there is a debate between international and grassroots approaches to economic development. Traditionally, international development banks and agencies supported the development of dams, highways, mining mega-projects and major economic restructuring projects. National business elites and MNCs often had vested interests in promoting these projects. They did not, however, prove uniformly effective in promoting sustained economic growth and poverty reduction.
In the last 20 years, there has been increasing focus on the power of the informal economy to support income growth at the community level, lifting people out of poverty. Community-based development programs have proliferated in the public and private sectors — the most common models bearing the monikers micro-finance, micro-enterprise and “bottom of pyramid.” The focus is on various blends of financial investment, management coaching and institutional change, especially legalization of informal practices.

Inspiration was provided by De Soto. Another icon in this field is Grameen Bank, credited with inventing the global microfinance movement and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. One must also mention Mohammed Yunus, a Bangladeshi economist, founded Grameen with the aim of challenging national and international banking standards, which employ traditional credit ratings based on income and formal legal ownership of physical assets (giving emphasis to male ownership in a Muslim society).

Yunus developed an alternative by lending tiny amounts ($27 to 42 villagers) to very poor women grouped into village co-operatives and working with them to develop credit ratings based only on repayment track records. This created a new community-based standard that encouraged micro-loans to women (who were responsible for children, family and village reputation). Note that it was originally a community perspective on lending to the very poor that provided the foundation for Grameen Bank. Peacebuilders might note, as well, that Grameen won the Nobel Peace Prize, not an economics prize, and that the bank was created during famines following a civil war in Bangladesh in the 1970s. The Nobel Committee referred to the grassroots approach to poverty reduction as one key to peace building in poor, war-torn countries.

In recent years, the microfinance model has been adapted by commercial banks in India and many other countries. An Indian bank, ICICI, reaches into rural areas by using village councils to grant micro-loans while other groups create banks focusing on segments like lower caste women. Citicorp is adapting banking machines to bank the poor in urban areas as part of a major micro-finance investment. A debate rages about the profitability, and the role of the profit motive, in microfinance, reflecting the diversity of “business models.”
Competing perspectives: Which perspective should the military commanders choose in these two cases – the Afghan poppy fields and the Congo diamond fields?

For purposes of discussion, we suggest that both perspectives need to be taken into account, especially in terms of stakeholder consultations and negotiations. Adopting a single perspective will increase risks to the Operation rather dramatically by eroding support either at the community level or at operational HQ. The practical reality is that a Peace Operation needs to balance international and community perspectives. This requires leadership, with a moral compass, rather than the mechanical application of simple moral and legal formulas.

Strategic position: What are the strategic choices?

The question of international and community perspectives on the Peace Operation opens the door leading to a debate on strategy – specifically the strategic choices regarding the operation’s terms of economic engagement in the Afghan poppy field and the Congolese diamond field.

It is more than a matter of mindset. In military language, it is a matter of policy and doctrine. Using business management jargon, it is a question of strategic positioning. The central strategy question: “How will the military units engage with the local economy?”

At one extreme, there is a pure international strategy: stick to the international mission rule book and treat the villagers’ proposals as one-off attempts to earn cash in exchange for fleeting co-operation and scraps of intelligence. At the other extreme, there is a community outreach strategy: open engagement with the informal sector and informal business enterprises. This means, for example, treating the proposals as “business cases” for investments – direct or indirect – in the development of the local farm economy. It also means recognizing (and possibly legitimizing) the informal rulebooks of poppy farmers working their traditional village land, tomato farmers planting on “invaded” mine land and artisanal miners selling diamonds to black market operators.

The key questions about the informal economies are: “Which set of rules do we accept? Do we propose new rules? What strategic position should our public military corporation build in these economies?” Let’s quickly review the strategic decision options in each case.
Afghanistan: The Afghan clan heads propose a compensation payment in return for their peaceful co-operation with the destruction of their poppy crop and “free” intelligence about the Taliban in this region. While the payment may violate international norms, it is clear that it would be acceptable, even expected, according to the rules of the informal economy – including traditions that one village elder traces to the British Raj. The farmers have chosen opium as a cash crop under duress from the Taliban and it may be the only crop in a war economy that can be sold at a reasonable price. They worked hard to grow it, do not plan to consume it and desperately need the money from this harvest. They have also had no choice but to adapt to what amounts to a Taliban protection racket (“security arrangement”).

The alternative option is destruction of the crop. This could be interpreted as an act of war by the villagers, and probably as violating traditional law and custom. Moving them by force to Khandahar could make them enemies of the Peace Operation. They might be obliged to accept subsistence payments, essentially an international version of social welfare insurance, that could prove humiliating to this group of hard-headed “montagnards.”

In economic terms, the choice is not easy because there are big question marks hanging over both proposed strategies. In the case of community outreach, a series of questions occur: “How will the villagers earn a living outside the poppy economy? Where can the villagers invest their compensation payment? Are there good informal or legal investment opportunities?” In the case of the international strategy, we must ask: “What are the employment opportunities in Khandahar? Can these people work in the legal economy? Or will they become new recruits to the refugee economy and perhaps the criminal economy?”

Congo: The strategic decision options are similar in the Congolese diamond field. If the military unit accepts the proposal for a route diversion, it will recognize informal land titles claimed by the poor farmers and artisanal miners who “invaded” mine land. It will boost this group’s relative importance in the regional economy and probably support expansion of the regional vegetable market. In summary, this investment in physical infrastructure would provide economic and institutional support to both the peasant economy and small businesses. Some of those businesses would continue selling informal diamonds to the black market...
market networks but incentives could be offered to wean them from this income source. This is what we mean by open engagement with the informal economy.

The alternative route would virtually block this development path and favour a re-opening of the mine by the multinational corporation. The regional development plan would focus on global resource markets. This path is in line with the priorities of the national government, regional elites and many international agencies and development banks.

The decision options are specific to each case. But they also apply to patterns of decisions – patterns that shape the operations’ strategic positions and terms of economic engagement. There are winners and losers under each scenario. The local elites win with the international strategy, while informal farmers win under community outreach. This is what we mean by the “social selection” of businesses leading reconstruction.

In summary, we have asked two of the “right questions” and considered competing international and community perspectives on the Peace Operation. We have widened our frame of reference (and our field of vision) to include the informal economies of Afghanistan and the eastern Congo. This has enabled us, in turn, to defined clear strategic options – international or community outreach – governing the economic terms of engagement of the Peace Operations in the two communities.

**Ethical Standards: What are the Ethical Choices?**

We can now turn to the third “right question” regarding the ethical standards that will shape the Operations’ economic terms of economic engagement.

*Ethical debate, complexity and competing standards:* We could sense from the outset that the two cases can provoke vigorous ethical debate among reasonable people, including military leaders. We can also sense that there are many mixed decision options situated between the two extremes of “international” and “community outreach” strategies.

The field of business ethics may provide some useful insights into the dilemmas in these two cases. *In The Ethics of Management,* LaRue Tome Hosmer argues that ethical dilemmas in business management rarely have simple yes-no answers. Rather, they challenge managers to decipher
complex trade-offs between the imperative to improve economic performance and that to improve social performance in a variety of areas. Typically, ethical decisions have these features:

1) Extended consequences: there are first-level impacts on the enterprise (usually in the near term) and multiple-level impacts throughout society (usually in the longer term);

2) Multiple alternatives: there are many decision options between two “pure” alternatives (e.g. illegal pollution vs no pollution);

3) Mixed outcomes: most decision options produce a blend of social, economic and even small-p political outcomes;

4) Uncertain consequences: outcomes for many decision options are hard to predict in advance, creating ethical ambiguity;

5) Personal implications: the outcomes affect individuals not just institutions.

The military commanders in the Afghan poppy fields and the Congolese diamond fields appear to face this type of complexity.

Not only are there many decision options, however. There are also competing ethical standards that can be used to guide decisions. In Good Management, Frederick Bird and Jeffrey Gandz identify seven types of moral reasoning ranging from traditional to purposive and charismatic, each with specific strengths and weaknesses. Hosmer, for example, suggests analysing economic, legal and ethical issues involved in management decisions. Just within the domain of philosophy, he identifies five major ethical systems – ranging from eternal law to modern distributive justice and personal liberty. He then makes this suggestion:

There is no single system of belief to guide managers in reaching difficult ethical decisions … What should we do? Instead using just one ethical system, which we must admit is imperfect, we have to use all five systems and think through the consequences of our actions on multiple dimensions.

Needless to say, military leaders would resist this approach on practical grounds. It is a recipe for decision-maker’s overload: multiple standards,
complex situations, imperfect information, extreme time pressure, etc. At the same time, it would be simplistic and risky to select a single “best standard” or rule based on instinct alone.

A reasonable compromise is to focus on two broad schools of thought, considered fundamental by many authors, that can provide ethical rationales for the international and community outreach decision options. These are the principles-based (or rules-based) and utilitarian schools of thought. It should be noted that these are not simple decision rules; rather, they are “schools of thought” that include many specific codes, rule books and ethical standards.

**Principles-Based school of thought:** Principles-based ethical thinking focuses on rational, idealistic commitment to simple universal moral principles that apply to all individuals and that merit their voluntary acceptance.

Such thinking can inspire many different versions of a moral code. The Judaeo-Christian version is, of course, the 10 Commandments. The rational Enlightenment version is Kant’s categorical imperative, a rigorous statement of the golden rule incorporating a general moral obligation to show respect for all persons, regardless of their beliefs, likes, dislikes or group affiliations. Principles-based reasoning also inspires certain legal codes: the core rules of international human rights charters, national criminal codes and anti-corruption measures (OECD codes for MNCs, treaties, national legislation, etc.). A military application would be the core principles embodied in the law of armed conflict (Geneva Conventions) and international humanitarian law.

Principle-based ethical reasoning places strong emphasis on various forms of altruism, selflessness and a sense of honour and public duty. This reflects the moral obligation of all community members voluntarily to support and even to publicly promote the principles of right action, without constantly resorting to private cost-benefit calculations.

Principles-based reasoning, like all ethical schools of thought, applies more naturally to certain groups and sets of issues than to others. Its natural home is a small community, family and organization – all groupings where the 10 commandments cover most of the moral problems people encounter. It also applies to professional codes and the development of fair rules for small-scale business transactions among individuals and
small groups. For Peace Operations, the obvious candidates for principles-based reasoning are the need to preserve integrity, honour, discipline and consistent observance of humanitarian law at the base of military organizations – with a focus on the standards of moral integrity that must not be compromised.

In the two imaginary cases, principles-based reasoning should not be applied to justify mindless obedience to orders (much less possible war crimes against civilians). However, such reasoning would strongly encourage reasoned application of a set of rules designed to prevent favouritism and corruption when dealing with community stakeholders.

Principles-based standards would create high hurdles for commanders who want to justify informal compensation payments and route diversions. Such actions smack of favouritism and special treatment – and would prove hard to generalize to all groups in a similar position making similar demands of the Peace Operation. How many such groups are there? Why are these groups different and deserving of special treatment?

In each case, therefore, military commanders wanting to pay compensation to the Afghan farmers or divert the route for Congolese peasants will need to argue that: (1) they are morally justified to give priority to moral principles embedded in the rules of the informal economies of the two communities; (2) the harm to those communities is so serious that it justifies as exception to the international Peace Operation rule book. Such justifications may be hard to make, but not impossible using principles-based standards.

With respect to strategic decision options, principles-based reasoning can be applied naturally to justify the international strategy. International management and anti-corruption principles are easier to apply, with many fewer exceptions, when the supply chain is also international managed and military units limit exchanges with the messy informal economy that starts just outside the security perimeter of base camp.

Principles-based reasoning reliably delivers certain morally desirable outcomes, notably a Peace Operation with a reputation for legality, integrity, disciplined management, solid systems and transparency to the international audit process (UN, host governments, international agencies, NGOs like Transparency International).
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The weakness of the principles-based approach is that it seeks a high level of clarity that is not always possible when confronting moral complexity, high risk and tough trade-offs in government policy and business strategy.

This is why we need also – at minimum – to consider the utilitarian school of thought, as an alternative to the impersonal (at times inhuman) austerity of the Categorical Imperative and the 10 Commandments.

Utilitarian school of thought: This school of thought takes a very different tack, focusing on the worthy moral objective of promoting “the greatest happiness for the greatest number.” Utilitarians are often falsely accused of promoting the short-term pursuit of pleasure, even of perverse pleasure, as an ethical standard. This is a red herring since the classic utilitarian argument applies to entire societies over long periods of time, with the aim being to maximize human happiness and welfare for society as a whole.

The classic application of utilitarian thinking has been to promote social change and the reform of tradition-bound institutions – notable examples being the prison, court, criminal justice and public health systems of 19th century Britain. There is a rigorous intellectual discipline of doing precise rational calculations of collective welfare (the inspiration for welfare economics). The decision-maker is bound to treat himself or herself as just one “unit” – like all others – registering pleasure and pain. There are egotistical and hedonistic versions of utilitarianism, usually with a strong emphasis on the happiness created by individual freedom, but this is not the standard relevant to the discussion of peace building cases.

In classic utilitarian reasoning, clear moral principles and rules serve an important purpose in promoting many forms of human welfare, mainly because people need a minimum level of predictability and social consensus. However, these principles are far from absolute; they serve as guidelines and “rules of thumb” that leave the door open to exceptions and broad interpretation.

Utilitarian thinking applies most naturally to entire societies and large organizations attempting to maximize the collective welfare generated by collective policies. It does not apply easily to the moral justification for the 10 commandments or codes of fundamental human rights.
In the two imaginary cases, the utilitarian commander would focus primarily on socio-economic impact of the Peace Operation. With respect to strategic decision options, utilitarian reasoning naturally favours community outreach strategies. Buying lots of goods from poor people and investing in their micro-businesses seems like the most direct route to maximizing human welfare – generating “the greatest good for the greatest number” in the two conflict zones.

Utilitarian reasoning will reliably deliver certain morally desirable outcomes for the Peace Operation. These include sensitivity to local perspectives and welfare, a better reputation in the community and – if the strategy is well implemented – a greater sum of welfare for the majority of people in the near term. In this regard, utilitarians are sensitive to Lord Keynes classic warning about what inevitably happens to us “in the long run.”

The risks and drawbacks to the Peace Operation of applying a “pure” utilitarian standard can be seen simply by referring back to the outcomes most reliably offered by a principles-based policy. Adopting community outreach as a clear strategy, with clear ground rules, might overcome certain objections to paying poppy compensation on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.

Which brings us back to the tough question where we began this long journey. After all is said and done, after the costs and benefits have been entered in the computer, and all the stakeholders have been fully consulted, “What is the right thing to do?”

**Answers and Solutions: What is the right thing to do?**

Consideration of all three questions – regarding competing perspectives, strategies and ethical standards – yields a deep understanding of two clear alternative options: international vs. community terms of economic engagement.

**International terms of engagement:** An international perspective on the Peace Operation imposes strict limits on engagement with the informal economies of these communities. The decision is implemented with a “behind the wire” military strategy and a clean international supply chain, both justified using principles-based ethical reasoning.
Community terms of engagement: A community perspective on the Peace Operation leads to decisions that favour open engagement with the informal economies of the two communities. The decision is executed using an “outside the wire” military strategy and a supply chain that boosts community outreach, both justified using utilitarian ethical reasoning.

It is tempting to advocate a clear decision and get the job done! But pushing the “simple button” would be a risky choice indeed. To choose an extreme option, the military commander would have to flip a coin … or just rely on his own experience and instincts.

At this point, we should listen to Hosmer’s voice.34 Military commanders would be well advised to consider more than two extreme decision options and look for insights that come from both ethical schools of thought. The best case for this approach is to try a thought experiment with either extreme position. Consider the simple ethical rationale for actively pursuing a community-outreach strategy to economic peace building. Just throw the anti-corruption standards and legal rulebooks out the window, and use a utilitarian rationale: “We need to break the rules to maximize social and economic welfare for poor people.”

Taking this “simple” position could easily lead to undesirable outcomes in both cases. In Afghanistan, the military commander would compensate peasants for destroying the poppy crop. But he would be tempted to pay up far too easily and perhaps pay too high a price for the crop. Word would travel fast, probably over Taliban cell phones, and an incentive would be created to plant more poppies. The peasants in question might even invest their compensation payment in yet another poppy crop – calculating they will make more money either from foreign sales to drug networks or foreign compensation payments from the Peace Operation (with a new commander rotating into the region).

In the Congo, diverting the road without reaching a clear informal agreement with “real teeth in it” would also very likely lead to a multiplication of demands for special favours through the region. In such an environment, the multinational mining companies might decide to exit the region for good, and give priority to other regions of eastern Congo. This would leave the peasants, and their children, growing vegetables in the informal
A narrow “pure utilitarian” rationale might not just be theoretically questionable in military and business ethics classes. It could lead to tunnel vision on the ground, creating the practical risk that the community outreach strategy would fall apart in a patchwork of local deals and creeping corruption. In Afghanistan, this sequence of events could occur:

1) The military commander accepts quick compensation calculations by the farmers and quickly develops a reputation for being an easy payer;
2) This leads to several rounds of game playing (poppy harvests) by the farmers and terrorists;
3) The Peace Operation develops a reputation for lack of clear ground rules.
4) This Peace Operation seems to lack firm principles and belief in its mission.

Experienced military commanders can probably make a short list of the risks incurred by a Peace Operation without clear ground rules:

- Weak Credibility
- Eroding Legitimacy
- Creeping Corruption
- Weak Strategy
- Uncertain Outcomes.

The net result is lower economic welfare, over time, for the very poor people that the utilitarians are trying to help with the community outreach strategy.

In philosophical debate, utilitarians face the same challenges as in real life. They claim to live in a simple world where wise decision makers run
welfare calculations (mainly economic welfare calculations) and grind out decisions (with help from advanced supercomputers). However, they deal poorly with situations where a good decision in the first case may create bad precedents for subsequent decisions in other cases thereby undermining and distorting the “rules of the game.”

We need the perspective offered by principles-based reasoning – in particular an appreciation of the urgent need for clear ground rules, even if exceptions are made in carefully defined circumstances. The community outreach strategy, being new and less well known, needs to be supported by clear policies and audit standards or it risks becoming an incubator of corruption. The informal economy investments can be fast diverted from legitimate informal businesses to black market industries, possibly compromising the reputation of the Peace Operation.

The principles-based school of thought faces its own problems. It seems simple to enforce “clean” international strategies and standards. But the risks are quite tangible and serious. This strategy can create an economic enclave around the Peace Operation that feeds a sense of exclusion and unfairness in the surrounding communities. It can create artificially high demand for first-world goods from base camp, leading to a flourishing contraband market run by black market operators. Eventually, the Operation can become unpopular with the informal farmers and business people, and lose vital community support. This further fuels the insurgency as the most viable economic and security option for ordinary families in a poor country.

All this factual complexity makes it hard for military commanders to take decisions based on a single, simple ethical standard. Especially in the “fog of war,” the “smog of peace operations” and the “haze of counter-insurgency.”

**Conclusion: Military Leadership & the Moral Compass**

We have taken a long journey and come up with no clear answer. But the purpose has been to offer guidance for taking well-grounded strategic and ethical decisions regarding the economic terms of engagement of Peace Operations in conflict zones. The “well-grounded” expression does not mean the “right decision” that applies a “correct” single formula. Rather, it means three things:
First, an informed decision that grows from an assessment of the Peace Operation’s economic impact on the communities of the conflict zone;

Second, a strategic decision that consciously shapes the economic terms of engagement of the Peace Operation in the community.

Third, a decision that applies critical ethical reasoning, meaning a decision that applies insights from distinct ethical schools of thought.

The best way to take such a decision is to “ask the right questions,” even if the answers must be found quickly, imperfectly and under great time pressure. Asking the right questions means you always try to work with the best possible picture of the facts, expected impacts, issues and decision options.

The moral compass guiding this decision process is provided by the military leader – whether that leader is heading the poppy eradication operation, debating plans for the road or developing strategy for the entire Peace Operation. The key to sound strategic and ethical decisions is mature leadership and tough judgment calls in a shifting environment. It is not the mechanical application of formulas to a known set of facts. It is not blind obedience to orders or the mission strategy, but intelligent execution of orders, when “execution” is understood by all stakeholders to include questioning orders that can have bad consequences, especially unintended consequences.

Military leaders can use the “right questions” presented here, and the concept of terms of engagement, for guidance and insight. However, these can only support their moral compass. Ultimately, commanders must lead by proposing their own integrated solutions and judgments and making tough trade-offs.
Endnotes

2 Alan Johnston, BBC News, Gaza (January 17, 2007), Gisha (January 2007)
10 All details are imaginary. Inspiration comes from news reports, including Andrew North, “Losing the war on Afghan Drugs,” BBC News, Lashkar Gah, Helmand (December 4, 2005) and Rachel Morajee, “Doubt shrouds fight against Afghan poppies,” *Financial Times of London*, (FT: Khandahar, April 27, 2007), 1.
12 United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
13 Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation
15 Peace, order and good government.
21 BBC News, “Q&A: So what is microfinancing?” (October 13, 2006).


26 Connie Bruck, “Millions for Millions.”


28 Ibid., 13-14.


30 LaRue Tone Hosmer, *The Ethics of Management*, 24-25, 118-120.

31 Ibid., 119-120.


33 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

34 LaRue Tone Hosmer, *The Ethics of Management*, 13-14, 118-120.

CHAPTER 5
Competing Values: Loyalty to the Chain of Command and Personal Integrity

Greg Maddison

It is often presumed that one cannot be loyal to the chain of command and possess personal integrity at the same time. However, through personal integrity a leader is loyal to the chain of command. This paper explores what being a leader within the chain of command means and what values an effective leader must possess which, incidentally, includes a large measure of personal integrity. Notably, however, it must be understood that additional competing values can occur when the military functions outside the military chain of command. In these circumstances, the values demonstrated outside the military may not be the same as those within the military.

Chain of Command

What is the chain of command? Suffice it to say, there are many definitions. In its most concise construct, the chain of command is the continuous and clear line of authority between the most senior individual directing action and the most junior sailor, soldier, airman and woman following that direction. Everyone within that chain knows to whom he or she reports and therefore to whom he or she is accountable for their actions.

It is self-evident that there are leaders throughout this chain. The most senior individual who can give direct orders to members of the Canadian Forces (CF) is not the Minister of National Defence. It is only the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), and those he delegates, who can give direct orders to members of the CF. The Minister, as directed by the Prime Minister and Cabinet, can provide policy direction to the CDS, but he cannot issue direct orders to members of the CF. This is an important distinction, particularly, should situations arise where one’s professional values come into conflict with what our political leaders may wish to have happen.
Values

What we demand of our leaders or, more to the point, what attributes or values does the profession of arms expect of its leaders? Everyone, from your subordinates to yourself, is shaped by their own values system that was learned through their families and enhanced through their experiential base. Within any profession and, particularly the profession of arms, values are the backbone that support the profession. The most critical for the CF are duty, loyalty, service before self, personal courage and integrity.

Duty

Duty is the ability of a leader to take full responsibility for his or her own actions as well as those of their subordinates. In doing so, leaders strive for that unattainable goal of perfection by committing to excellence and by doing everything in their power to succeed whatever the endeavour, not with personal ambition in mind but with the goal of doing what is optimal for the profession and, therefore, what is right for their country.

Loyalty

Loyalty, simply stated, goes at least two ways: there is loyalty to your superiors as well as to your subordinates. Arguably, there is also an element of loyalty to your profession and what that profession stands for.

Loyalty is not a given. Loyalty is a forged link amongst those who share common obligations and goals. A leader who is not loyal to those he or she leads will not have subordinates loyal to them. This does not at all suggest a mob-rule mentality, where a leader acquiesces to the desires of a group, should ever exist. Nevertheless, if a leader does not look out for the legitimate needs of his or her subordinates, then that leader will ultimately fail as a leader and will not be able to succeed in the missions he or she is assigned to him or her.

Loyalty is a fundamental pillar forged by common goals and beliefs that truly determines the strength of a profession. Blind loyalty, however, completely undermines that pillar. Loyalty to the chain of command demands personal integrity. One can still be loyal and criticize constructively for a better end result. No leader wants a “yes” person. Leaders want individuals who analyze situations and issues critically, weigh the advantages and
disadvantages of a particular course of action and argue for changes they consider necessary – that is being loyal to the chain of command and that is what reinforces a positive and healthy chain of command.

Where loyalty can truly test the chain of command is when one's superiors, either military or political, having listened to your advice, still decide to forge on with their initial intent. Now what has to be done is to determine whether you can live with a decision with which you disagree. If not, then what options are open to you?

The point that senior leaders in a democracy must provide military advice as independently from any political considerations as possible must be reinforced. If, within a chain of command, senior leaders cannot persuade their superiors to follow their advice and they honestly believe they have done everything possible to present their views, then a number of options are open to them.

First, they could try to gain access to Cabinet and the Prime Minister. This is a very difficult thing to achieve but very senior officers do occasionally have such opportunities and do attend cabinet meetings as advisors to the Minister of National Defence. It takes courageous officers to go outside the chain of command and put forward a contrary point of view to Cabinet that is not supported by their immediate superiors. The point is, that writing directly to the Prime Minister or trying to persuade Cabinet is a vehicle that can be used. This path, however, has not recently been chosen by anyone except for the CDS whose direct responsibility is to provide unfettered military advice to the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Another vehicle that could be used is for senior leaders to put forward their arguments in “all party” parliamentary committees such as the Senate Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs. It is possible that their point of view may convince a committee, and in so doing, have an influence on government decision-making.

A third and final option open to a senior leader is to resign on principle. Ultimately, leaders have to remain true to their own moral code and they ought to be able to look at themselves in the mirror and be content at what they see. Resigning publicly may be the only recourse open to them. The issue over which a senior leader resigns has to be of such significant importance that this would occur in very rare circumstances indeed. It does happen, however. Nonetheless, an approach where an individual
makes it known publicly that unless a particular policy or direction is reversed he or she will resign is undesirable. Threatening to resign and then subsequently not doing so can be most debilitating to a profession – you either resign or you say nothing. Threatening to resign causes subsequent issues regarding loyalty, regarding the type of example that you set, and will likely lead to a crisis of confidence. Ultimately, it is not about you. Rather, it is about what you believe is in the best interest of your nation.

Service Before Self

This is one of those values that is sometimes glibly stated as a given for any effective leader. It does mean that a leader's personal interests are secondary to the needs of the profession. It does not mean that leaders allow themselves to be so totally subsumed by the interests of the profession that they neglect their own well-being and that of their families. Effective leaders are able to balance the needs of the organization with their own personal needs. What service before self really means is that good leaders do not allow any personal ambitions to harm the organization or those around them.

For example, when I was appointed commander of Canada's navy, I moved to Ottawa without my family for the first year because of schooling considerations for my children. Because I was by myself, I had no immediate domestic responsibilities and so I immersed myself in dealing with the thorny issues facing the navy at the time. This manifested itself in my spending long hours in the office from very early in the morning until late at night. It took me about ten days to suddenly realize that there were all kinds of folks working diligently throughout the entire time I was in the office – yet they had their own families and their own obligations they were neglecting so that they could serve me. So around 1730-1800 I would leave my office, ostensibly finished for the day. What I actually did was walk outside for twenty minutes and return to find my staff had left for the day – everybody was a lot happier and also much more productive than before.

Personal Courage

Personal courage has two key components. There are the acts where you place yourself in harm's way physically, be it at sea, in the air or on the ground. It is where fear is overcome to execute assigned missions while being exposed to considerable risk. There is also the other component of
personal courage whereby responsibility is taken for decisions and subse-
quent actions. It results in leaders standing up for what they believe in
regardless of the consequences, as opposed to remaining quietly on the
sidelines. Personal courage is the ability to act when others may not see
the rationale for doing what is thought right.

**Integrity**

Integrity is the ability to conduct oneself in a manner that does not vio-
late a set of personal beliefs based on one’s own moral code. It means
being honest and truthful so that what is said is what is meant and what
is done is what is said. It is that cliché of leaders being able to do the right
thing not because they are forced to do the right thing but because they
know implicitly that it is the right thing to do.

**Setting the Example**

All of these values, whether standing alone or lumped together, cause
leaders to be very visible in whether or not they live by these values. Oth-
ers can tell whether these values are actually being applied or if they are
only being followed somewhat superficially.

Clearly, the best leadership is leadership by example. Whether directly
or indirectly, it is the example being set by leaders that forms, trains and
influences the next generation of leaders. Senior leaders must recognize
that far more people see them in action than they see. They are constantly
being watched and, like it or not, they are on display at all times. There-
fore, leaders set the example for others to emulate. They cannot hide. If
an admiral or general acts unethically, then some may very well conclude
that that is how they, the subordinates, must act to advance their own
careers, while others, who may have a stronger moral code, will have no
confidence in that leader. Both results have a big negative impact on the
maintenance of a healthy, vibrant profession composed of members who
demonstrate strong ethical behaviour. Parenthetically, any good leader
has a box of different tools to assist him or her in motivating those they
lead – sarcasm and cynicism are not in that toolbox.

**Ethical Behaviour**

The above suggests a need to focus on a senior leader’s ethical behaviour.
Key values to be underscored include duty, loyalty, service before self,
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personal courage and integrity. Moreover, the leader is someone who constantly sets a visible example for others to copy. There are also other key elements of a leader’s behaviour that contribute to setting that ethical environment.

What is ethical behaviour? A simple approach to this definition, and one of the best, is that of Professor Desmond Morton. He says that “ethical behaviour is whether or not you [can] explain your actions to your mother”! This definition distills ethical behaviour to its core, meaning the feeling of acting in an ethical manner.

Making the correct choice and acting on it when facing an ethical dilemma can certainly be difficult. If there is any single focal point that makes leadership at senior levels critical, it is the ethical visibility or example set by senior leaders. We ought not to confuse what is ethical behaviour with the responsibility of taking and managing risk. Ethical decisions, by their very nature, involve tough choices and open up leaders (or anybody for that matter) to criticism. Most trust and confidence problems can be traced to the ethical climate that exists in an organization or profession.

For example, I was involved in the rescue of a submarine crew a number of years ago where this submarine was operating covertly within another nation’s territorial waters for intelligence gathering purposes. There were no hostilities involved in this operation but the possibility of hostilities did exist. There was a malfunction onboard the submarine which dangerously affected the air quality and caused a number of the crew to become quite ill. The captain of the submarine could have surfaced immediately, cleansed the air and provided a safe environment for his crew but he would have risked being detected by the nation in whose territorial waters he was operating. Instead, he decided to remain submerged until he transited about ten miles to get outside the twelve-mile territorial sea limit before surfacing and providing cleaner air to his crew. The result was that a number of sailors were very seriously hurt and sustained permanent disabilities. This is the kind of dilemma leaders will face at the operational level. Did the submarine captain act in an ethical manner whilst managing risk? I’ll leave that for you to determine.

Now place yourself also in the boots of those officers and soldiers who are guarding checkpoints in either Afghanistan or Iraq when what appear to be children or pregnant women approach and who do not seem to
understand the instructions to stop. Do these people just want to travel to the next village or do they have explosives strapped to their bodies and are trying to get closer so that they can detonate the explosives with as much damage done as possible? There is no simple answer to this question but those folks who are ordered to man these checkpoints have to make these types of ethical decisions in an instant. Training and exercising scenarios go a long way in preparing officers and soldiers for similar events but, ultimately, making a decision in situations like these is horrifically difficult and can profoundly change the character of the decision-maker permanently, let alone the operational or strategic environment.

At the very senior level, decisions of another sort, yet just as difficult, can also be taken. For example, making a recommendation for the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) and our Special Forces to go into combat against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002 and then controlling that operation from a safe and secure operations centre in Ottawa was one of the most gut-wrenching times in my life. It is different if you are going into conflict yourself, but when you are safe and sound in your own home environment and you are asking young Canadian men and women to risk their lives based on a plan that you have devised, then you get to the very core of whether or not you are making the right ethical decisions. Clearly in these circumstances, risks were carefully analyzed during the preparatory stages of the operation. I also made sure that the commanders on the ground could contact me any time during the night or day for direction or advice. Additionally, I recognized that the plan may need to change based on the assessment of the in theatre commander. Throughout all this, the team of leaders in and out of Afghanistan were constantly trying to make decisions from a strong ethical base.

There are other examples, such as arguing to release the annual assessments that the commanders of the navy, army and air force conduct—we were brutally honest as to the state of our forces and, because of that clarity, there were others who wanted those assessments to be classified and not released to the public. Is it an ethical issue to release these documents or not? Perhaps, they have been released to the public for a number of years now.

There are, however, times when an issue becomes so black and white that the only alternative to not following the ethical course is to be prepared to resign. If it is fundamentally believed that a superior is deliberately
misleading an organization or the public for some ulterior reason and it is your word against your superior’s, then you have to stand up and make your point loud and clear. This is actually being loyal to the chain of command and maintaining your personal integrity. A visible leader represents the entire profession. To stray from those principles would, at the very least, tarnish that profession and, likely, would do irreparable harm to it because it is that profession that must function with principles permitting its members to deal with the “Solomon like” decision making at checkpoints or in submarines or in national strategic appointments.

Conclusion

Loyalty to the Chain of Command is not in conflict with personal integrity. The key values that effective leaders must possess – duty, loyalty, service before self, personal courage and integrity – and leading by example are paramount for leadership success. Nonetheless, as the examples have illustrated, it is sometimes difficult to act ethically. Indeed, ethical behaviour may force you to the precipice of resignation.

Certainly, there is no better code of behaviour than that of the Royal Military College of Canada: truth, duty and valour. Following these three words is how I tried to govern my decision-making as a leader in the CF. Indeed, when understanding the so-called competing values of loyalty to the chain of command and personal integrity there is no better foundation of discernment than truth, duty and valour.
Ethical leadership begins at the top. Ethics and ethical leadership training remain an undisputable necessity for every person assigned to a position that requires leadership and command responsibilities. To be truly successful, a leader must be committed to enforce ethical behaviour. Understanding and clarifying standards of ethical behaviour thus become critical to leadership success.

This chapter addresses military and ethical challenges related to combat leadership and their political implications (i.e., long-term impact, gains and risks). It serves as a critical assessment of recent decisions and actions within the Executive Branch and government departments, especially the United States (U.S.) Department of Defense and the State Department, that resulted in conflicting information being provided to military leaders on operations. This chapter emphasizes, in particular, the U.S. involvement in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ethical leadership qualities in the military service

Nowhere is leadership more well-defined and ethical leadership abilities summoned more often than in military service. This is becoming increasingly true as International Defense and Security Agreements become progressively more dependent upon military support and intervention by U.S. military forces in response to declarations of war, invasion, occupation, coup d’état, peacekeeping or any other number of politically motivated and aggressive actions. The deployment to war (e.g., hostile fire zones, lines of fire, or into harm’s way) distinguishes military leadership from any other type of leadership. It is the reason why ethical behaviour plays such a poignant and significant role in decision-making. Such ethical behaviour is an inherent duty for leaders with the authority to
place soldiers in harm’s way. In fact, such leaders should possess the highest standards of leadership.

Ethics plays a significant and relevant role in any discussion related to command and leadership in military service. Peacetime leadership responsibilities should not be viewed as separate and apart from wartime leadership responsibilities. While the differences are manifest and discernible, they should be discussed in terms of understanding how, when and why peacetime roles and responsibilities expand in transitioning towards wartime leadership roles and responsibilities. For example, wartime leadership responsibilities focus specifically on the intricacies of ethical leadership in a complex security environment and, as mentioned above, the unique and inherent leadership responsibilities when placing soldiers’ lives at risk and sending them into harm’s way.

**Ethics and serving under the “right” conditions**

Ethical behaviour and exercising strong leadership abilities must be asexual in today’s military environment. Commanders, contrary to personal beliefs and prejudices, must apply ethical principles when they choose and assign the appropriate soldiers to particular tasks. Although laws (supposedly) prevent women from serving in combat zones, they have been assigned to a variety of tasks in Afghanistan and Iraq. It seems that the “lines” are no longer clear and identifiable. Therefore, policies must be consistently genderless and leaders – men and women – must adhere to one set of ethical standards. Any prejudice based on gender, race, religion or political affiliation only serves to weaken the overall ethical climate when in combat zone.

It is important to mention, as an example, that a climate of hostility and discrimination towards women permeated the entire Iraq Theatre. Although military women filed numerous complaints detailing acts of sexual harassment, sexual assault and rape, some commanders failed to respond appropriately, using the priorities of the ongoing war and combat operations as excuses for not addressing these complaints immediately. As a result, these women felt as if they were being disruptive and not part of the team. Many complaints were simply ignored, creating a source of discrimination and fear amongst the women. The command climate established by the most senior U.S. commander in Iraq allowed these complaints to go unresolved. It is a sad failure of leadership that used ignorance as an excuse for unethical behaviour.
This example illustrates how unethical behaviours from leaders at all levels can be detrimental in applying ethical standards and asking soldiers to follow them. It appears that the war in Iraq has created an unethical climate and that soldiers are questioning the fundamental reason for that mission. As a consequence, this continuing war is producing more absent without leave (AWOL) soldiers than expected. Although soldiers going AWOL may be somewhat of a military tradition, it seems that this time it is a direct result of the unethical behaviour of sending a nation's military force to war without every chance of success, and no plan or means to end the occupation.

Traditionally, military leaders take instruction and cues from, and follow the lead of, the Commander in Chief, regardless of political affiliations. A traditional strength of the military force is to serve the Commander in Chief, without hesitation, whether or not you cast a vote for the incumbent. It is up to the Commander in Chief, through his commanders, to issue clear directions and enforce the same across the board. We boast about the U.S. military being the greatest in the world, comprised of the smartest soldiers ever, applaud their patriotism, dedication and service, then turn a blind eye to elected and appointed officials and other politicians who expect soldiers to accept orders and instructions without reservation or question. The citizenry assumes that leaders know what they are doing, but this is a costly and mistaken assumption.

A discussion of ethical behaviour is incomplete without considering the unique alignment of key individuals in the Bush Administration, and the individual and collective poor examples demonstrated in terms of ethical behaviour. The President avoided combat service in Vietnam; the Vice-President has no military experience; the Secretary of Defense claims Air Force service but did not serve in combat. This unusual triad is directing the war, and planning new ones. This example of limited military experience and absence of combat experience of a nation’s top leaders may help to understand the total lack of planning and controversial decisions affecting the military forces at a time of war. The ethical behaviour of each one of these individuals must be individually and collectively above reproach, particularly if they want to serve as role models. This issue crosses party lines and covers a diversity of issues, such as human rights, international law, sole source contracts, and compromising intelligence operatives. We see little evidence of any one of them exercising this responsibility. In fact,
the President is often criticized for overstepping his presidential authority and belligerently breaking the law.¹

It is stating the obvious to mention the clear line of influence from the White House to military leaders. Military leaders expect ethical behaviour from the Commander in Chief, and hence, his appointed Secretaries. It is challenging for commanders on the ground to apply ethics when the behaviour from the top leaders is questionable. Commanders have witnessed procrastinations, half-truths, diversions and total avoidance in an effort to provide answers and explanations. This behaviour is an affront to ethical behaviour in government.

Unfortunately, soldiers are aware of this unethical climate and resentment continues to build. When soldiers choose to follow the examples set by key individuals, they usually find themselves being punished for such behaviour. One standard has little application in current military operations. It is the telltale sign warning the demise of ethical behaviour. It is a challenge for leaders to demonstrate a commitment to ethical behaviour through personal and professional conduct, to do the “right” thing so subordinates will emulate ethical behaviour when they are watching. It is far more important to enforce a standard of conduct and have the confidence in subordinates to continue to do the “right thing” even when nobody is watching.

It is of interest to mention that following the atrocious report and allegations of murder by a group of Marines who served in Haditha, Iraq, the senior military officer in Iraq, General Casey, called for a stand down of all forces to receive training in values and ethics. By acknowledging this shortfall and calling for refresher training by the most senior, General Casey admitted, without realizing it, that leadership failed in Iraq. It may be a step in the right direction but it is hardly a solution.

**Leadership: Peacetime and Wartime**

Peacetime Leadership presents unique requirements to speculate on best case/worst case scenarios for fighting and simulating times of war. The reality of war cannot be easily simulated and nothing can replace the realism of war. The “fog of war” and additional unknown factors are not realistically considered in peacetime scenarios. The best we can hope for are strong voices of combat experience insisting on realistic aspects of
Although military leaders are encouraged and expected to “train in peace as you will fight in war,” leadership takes on a slightly different role in peacetime operations as compared to leadership responsibilities in war-time. Military leaders are encumbered with prioritizing many distracters and “time bandits” stealing valuable training time from training schedules, leaving commanders with little time to know their soldiers and to practice leadership with those they will lead. As a consequence, many units deploy to war with inadequate training, personnel, and equipment to successfully meet and engage the enemy and win. They deploy with a false sense of security and a strong belief in leaders to do the “right” thing.

Wartime leaders are tested, literally, in the heat of the battle. The situation is fluid and decisions must be made rapidly. Unfortunately, failures often result in death. Ensuring that leaders are well prepared for the expected, the unexpected, the inevitable and the unknowns on the battlefield must be the priority for appointed individuals and senior military leaders. The ongoing war in Iraq proves otherwise. There are far too many unanswered questions on the Rules of Law. Senior commanders on the ground are not certain and are forced to make critical decisions as they see fit. Some are too focused on the political implications of their decisions in lieu of the leadership responsibilities they owe to their soldiers. These distractions cause subordinate leaders to hesitate in making the split second – often life changing – decisions in the combat zone. Subordinate leaders are entitled to clear and concise orders.

Wartime ethical leadership is often distorted because it is “implied.” It seems, at times, as if the rules will apply and, at other times, may apply, and yet other times, may not apply at all. This is unfair to leaders at all levels. Ambiguity has no place in the ethical behaviour of leaders at war. The “fog of war” presents enough ambiguity in itself. Good military planning prevents ambiguity to a certain extent, and modifications to plans and operations are a necessity of waging war and winning. For example, the absence of any logical and realistic planning prior to going to Baghdad is the most commonly cited reason for confusion, repetitive battles and the effectiveness of the insurgency. There is much to be said about giving the insurgents a training and testing ground in Iraq, principally due...
to the lack of any real plan for sustaining operations and nation building following the declaration of “Mission Accomplished” in May 2003.

Failing to provide clear, concise guidance and information to commanders in the field is unethical, reprehensible and irresponsible, and will lead to confusion on the ground and in the line of fire. This is the pinnacle of leadership failure and it is unethical for the Secretaries of State and Defense to deny it, let alone allow the issues to continue without debate and resolution. For example, simply stating repeatedly, “We do not torture,” does not eliminate the issue, particularly if the abundance of information and evidence points to the opposite direction. Most importantly, it places commanders in the untenable situation of having to “punt” and “best guess” situations and potential outcomes while making very critical, life-altering decisions in the heat of battle. Ethical training by itself does not, unfortunately, resolve conflict at the highest levels of the U.S. government. It is without doubt that ethical leadership and ethical decision-making begin at the very top because soldiers need to see them as examples of ethical behaviour in order to duplicate and exemplify it.

The need for good leaders

Leaders are not being mentored by senior officers nor by seasoned and experienced non-commissioned officers (NCOs). There is limited time outside of training scenarios and leadership courses at advanced schools and courses. The training provided is included in classroom lectures, not on the ground in realistic scenarios. More important, requirements are non-existent for a leader to garner experience on a battlefield before being selected and assigned to a leadership position in a unit having a contingency plan to deploy to war. It is patently unethical for senior executives and leaders to endorse processes to select and assign leaders at any level for command assignments without having experience in combat. It is a prescription for failure and, therefore, preventable.

There are fewer leaders, particularly junior leaders, who subscribe to the twenty-year career plan, resulting in more leadership vacancies and fewer officers willing to make the sacrifices necessary to succeed in command. They feel that the time and effort required to succeed in command are not worth it. They place a higher value and priority on family life and personal time. Recent statistics reveal a shortage of 7000 junior officers to fill the required positions within the military, largely due to the frequent
deployments, diminishing support for the war in Iraq, and conflicting information originating from the Pentagon. This shortage considers, but does not include, projected vacancies based on transitions within the military structure.

Junior leaders are selected for advanced courses and promoted at an accelerated rate in comparison to past years. They are often subsequently selected for command at the next level without developing proper experience and confidence at the junior level. Moreover, junior leaders have little time to learn the basic intricacies of their assignments once they are in command. This happens also to the NCO corps. However, peer pressure on NCOs usually forces them to learn the duties and responsibilities of the position once they are “on the job.”

Junior leaders need role models and senior leaders have the responsibility to be good role models by demonstrating proper ethical behaviour. Ethical behaviour cannot be reduced to electronic and correspondence courses if real results are the desired outcome. Ethics must be taught “face to face.” For example, the concept of good and bad must be discussed. Furthermore, ethics is best learned from actual experiences. For instance, leaders could serve in “trial” leadership positions under the guidance of a mentor before being assigned to a leadership or command position. There is most assuredly a need to personalize an ethical style of leadership in fostering an ethical unit climate, perhaps best undertaken at the beginning of the new assignment and after successful completion of a mentoring phase.

Junior leaders, officers and non-commissioned members (NCMs) are no longer convinced by a style of leadership that conveys a conflicting message such as, “do as I say, not as I do.” Junior leaders, and in fact soldiers of all ranks, are watching senior leaders more closely. They are not as prompt to excuse them for misconduct, but they will vigorously support them if they feel there are unfair accusations and criticisms being launched at them. As senior leaders, it is imperative to be aware of the impact of comments and demeanor. Soldiers and junior leaders in particular, need role models and mentors who exude ethical behaviour and show courage under fire. It is therefore recommended that senior leaders demonstrate strong decision-making skills and show a profound desire to be fair and just. Unfortunately, inexperienced junior leaders in today’s
military are afraid to take risks, to disagree, to challenge orders, out of fear of being chastised and left behind.

The fallout of discord at the highest levels of the U.S. government explains the confusion demonstrated by senior military officers in exercising leadership duties and making ethical decisions. This conflicting information does not help soldiers on the ground understand the situations they are facing. When members of the Executive Branch of the U.S. government and senior military leaders debate the issues and fail to offer a clear explanation of the law or rules of engagement, soldiers cannot resolve the issues for them, nor should they be blamed for not knowing. To illustrate this point, the issue related to the treatment of prisoners or detainees under the control of the U.S. military serves as a perfect example. This is an ongoing and unresolved dispute, one discussed occasionally in the public forum. There is a prevailing confusion regarding pertinent and relevant issues of the GWOT, especially the issue of prisoner abuse. This type of issue and widespread public debate is unfortunately a typical consequence of the GWOT, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The heart of the problem is that it is unethical to debate such an important issue as you are engaging in war. Failing of having the details of the plan before going to war, the ethical action now is to “stop the train,” discuss the issues, admit mistakes, render final determinations and decisions, then issue direct, imperturbable guidance. In other words, “act” like responsible senior leaders.

Tell the truth!

Leaders have the responsibility to establish an ethical command climate where soldiers are not afraid to voice their opinions and more importantly tell the truth. Soldiers demand a great deal from their leaders and they will give back with unlimited enthusiasm when they believe in the sincerity of their leaders. Leaders must realize that their subordinates are smarter, sharper, more intelligent, and more aware than ever before in our history. For example, soldiers will detect impersonation quickly. They will ask, search, examine, and confirm if they see that their leaders pretend to fulfill their role as leaders. It is important to mention that the leader’s role is to meet or exceed subordinates’ expectations through behaviour and decision-making skills. Soldiers expect that their leaders lead, respond, and behave in a certain manner. Soldiers demand nothing more. We should expect nothing less.
A self-protection mode is too often engaged when the risks are too high and the fear of telling the truth is all too justifiable. When elected officials, appointed senior officials, or senior leaders fail to set or maintain standards for personal conduct, subordinates at every level are understandably confused and afraid. When military personnel are serving in a hostile and volatile environment, and are first weighing the political ramifications and political correctness of their decisions, it is a far more dangerous place to serve. The moral and ethical values of strong military leadership have taken a back seat to making politically correct choices.

The practice of leaders placing personal agendas ahead of the welfare of their soldiers is unacceptable, yet it is occurring every day. For soldiers to know and realize this self-serving “forgery of leadership” is difficult to accept. More important, they watch and learn from their leaders and see the ambiguity of leadership. Soldiers know what is going on and they usually know it before anyone else. They have questions and deserve answers. Flagrant leadership failures (e.g., allegations of rapes, corruption, and murder) deserve immediate intervention. Unfortunately, senior leaders are choosing not to intervene because they fear reprisals or that their involvement may reflect poorly on themselves and, most importantly, could jeopardize the chances of selection for promotion in rank and the next command assignment.

This self-serving “approach” could serve as a good illustration on how a nation justifies unethical decisions and conducts from senior leaders. For example, the participation of the international community in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) demands adherence to human rights and international law. America, often the most vocal critic of the infractions and violations by other countries, must adhere to the same standards as the rest of the world. Yet, the U.S. continues to justify the treatment of prisoners, send to prison detainees without evidence or reason, while denying the authorization to torture and abuse. Resistance and demands for dialogue has been met with veiled resistance and there are obvious denials of torture and abuse in any facility under U.S. control.

The international community holds a valuable tool in refusing to participate in operations without cooperation and forthcoming dialogue about secret prisons and the U.S. role in reports of torture and abuse of detainees at prison facilities around the world. These operations hold significant challenges to ethical behaviour in the complex security environment.
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What are the limits, or are there limits, in operational control? When is it torture? What responsibility does the U.S. have in preventing other countries from using torture and abuse in prison facilities? Is the U.S. using other countries to torture prisoners and detainees? Is the U.S. enabling other countries via financial subsidies, to torture and abuse prisoners suspected of terrorism? One of the foremost challenges to ethical behaviour is preventing U.S. forces from becoming the “torturers” and “insurgents” as a result of an ongoing occupation without clear boundaries in obtaining information and responding to an increasingly effective insurgency. It is a shame or/and unethical that we have no answers or legitimate discussions on these issues.

Reserve Components

Reserve components were never a priority in the war in Iraq. A double standard was evident throughout Iraq. Regular Army units were given priority over Reserve and National Guard units. Soldiers were well aware of that discrimination. The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, attempted to excuse this deliberate discrimination by stating quite succinctly, “You go to war with the Army you have, not necessarily the one you want.” Soldiers from all components felt they were hijacked with false and incomplete information and many were questioning the purpose of the war in Iraq.

The U.S. Army Reserves enjoyed a validation of relevance as a result of the first Gulf War. Units were generally well prepared and trained to deploy to a theater of war. They served in any variety of positions and assignments, and succeeded. Many reservists deployed and filled positions “normally” assigned to Regular Army personnel who, for a variety of reasons (e.g., attending career courses, scheduled for schools, ending term of service, etc), did not deploy. There was, coincidentally or otherwise, a reasonable amount of reservists who were more than willing to volunteer for service in the first Gulf War. This provided an additional benefit for testing training levels, mission capabilities and relevance of the Reserve forces.

General Norman Schwartzkopf, Commander of Central Command, (CENTCOM) was familiar with Reserve forces’ capabilities as it was fairly common practice for Major Commands (MACOMS) to have a mixture of Regular Forces, Reserve, and Civilian Personnel on the Staff.
General Schwartzkopf ordered the Army Reserves to deploy with Third Army Headquarters, as an integral component of the Headquarters. Other Reserve Forces followed close behind. The Combat Divisions were strictly Regular Army, although several Reserve Field Artillery units were called into service.

Leaders involved in peacetime training for reservists are superbly negligent in ensuring that they are well trained and prepared for war. The time between training opportunities and actually testing and evaluating leadership abilities is very limited. This shortcoming makes them hesitant (i.e., lack of confidence) to take command assignments. This lack of training was reported and acknowledged by senior leaders at the Pentagon and within the reserve components. Unfortunately, it was never addressed properly and continued to deteriorate. Furthermore, specific efforts were made to keep the extent of the problem from the scrutiny of the Pentagon. For example, readiness reports, detailing and evaluating the capacity of reserve units to deploy, were inaccurate in order to obtain funding. It is clearly unethical to disguise accurate deployment and readiness capabilities in an effort to obtain money and to compromise soldiers’ welfare.

This lack of ethical behaviour was well known within the Reserve components in the aftermath of the first Gulf War. Commanders were trying desperately to stop the progress of fabricated readiness reports in an effort to maintain relevance but gave up. Senior leaders were aware of the demise of ethical behaviour yet continued the charade to cover up the truth. The full-time Army and Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel were far less than qualified for the positions they accepted and should have been disqualified from serving in the military. Unfortunately, thousands of Reserve soldiers were sent to the Iraq to war, ill-equipped and ill-prepared to survive and succeed.

**Conclusion**

Throughout history, war fighting and military service to one’s nation have been traditionally viewed as honourable professions. Individuals who served were honoured, praised, respected, and granted sincere appreciation for their sacrifices. This respect and admiration have been tarnished by a lack of integrity and ethical standards, specifically related to the conduct of elected and appointed individuals conducting the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. An indisputable commitment to ethics and ethical standards of conduct are imperative to effective leadership. The results of a wartime environment devoid of ethical standards are chaos, corruption, and demoralizing behaviour. We have, unfortunately, read numerous reports detailing all of these behaviours with few real solutions or changes. The standard responses are delivered with promises of full investigations, yet nothing happens and nothing changes.

Senior leaders have walked away from responsibility and senior officials have moved on to the next issue. The expected standard of performance for the military is badly tarnished and difficult, if not impossible, to rescue. Reputations are lost and can never be recovered fully. As a result, we become desensitized to the ugliness and horrors of what has become reality and lowered the standards of acceptable behaviour. Ethical standards for conduct seem to have become elusive. It is essential to establish ethical standards from the very beginning of any organization and at the very top, and then demonstrate and enforce those standards in personal conduct, and refuse to accept anything less at all levels.

If ethics is not present in peacetime, ethics will never be there in wartime. A war will challenge ethics on all fronts and commanders are challenged with holding the high ground and enforcing standards. Any compromise of ethical behaviour is an open door for utter chaos to enter into the picture and to disintegrate into a complete disaster. Commanders are placed in the impossible position of trying to enforce ethical standards higher than the ones being set at the top, placing soldiers at great risk if inclined to adhere to lower standards. It is a distinct challenge to leaders to set the example for ethical behaviour and to demand the same of subordinates when more senior members in the chain of command are behaving in a contradictory manner. A commander’s personal conduct will serve as the greatest example for the way soldiers behave. Soldiers will watch their leaders and act accordingly. Established ethical behaviour leads to ethical behaviour regardless of the circumstance. It is far easier for a soldier to behave appropriately when his or her leader is watching. However, it is a testimony to effective leadership when a soldier behaves appropriately when no one is watching.

A leader who sacrifices ethical behaviour in an effort to please superiors will never obtain the desired results. This logic applies to leaders at every level, up to and including the President of the U.S., who is expected
to set the standard for excellence in ethical behaviour and to serve as the example for all members of the armed forces. Therefore, it is unrealistic to require that soldiers demonstrate exemplary ethical behaviour when senior leaders’ behaviour is everything but exemplary.

Endnotes

1 The President, Vice-President, and Secretary of Defense are all very familiar with the financial advantages bestowed on commercial businesses and corporations as a result of war. The Press continues to report, for example, on no bid contracts and the billions of dollars in profits Halliburton Inc. is deriving from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The reason Senator John McCain is often asked for an opinion concerning military affairs and actions is because he is one of a very limited number of elected officials with military experience.

2 As a good example, Senior U.S. military Commanders refused to stand up and disagree with the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Secretary Rumsfeld was ready and willing to remove any dissenter from his position for disagreeing with him, and did so quite often, reminding all of the senior leaders to proceed cautiously, or not at all, in exercising a difference of opinion.

3 “As new reports detail further abuse by the U.S. military of its prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan, a behind-the-scenes battle is being fought between the U.S. departments of state and defense about whether a key section of the Geneva Conventions should be included in new rules governing Army interrogation techniques. The Pentagon is pushing to omit from new detainee policies a central principle of the Geneva Conventions that explicitly bans ‘humiliating and degrading treatment.’ Critics say such a step would mark a further shift away from strict adherence to international human rights standards. The State Department is opposing the decision to exclude Geneva Conventions protections and has been pushing for the Pentagon and White House to reconsider.” William Fisher, “Pentagon resists ban on ‘Degrading Treatment’:,” Inter Press Service, New York (Monday 26 June 2006).

4 General Norman Schwartzkopf was also a key player in planning and requiring troops and equipment for successfully push Saddam’s military out of Kuwait, restore the integrity of Kuwait, and secure a peace treaty between Iraq and Kuwait. This is what ethical leadership looks like at all levels.

5 We have mentioned that this lack of training is often due to numerous conflicts with civilian jobs, family considerations, risk assessments, etc.
Ethical Climate and Leadership: Can Leaders Really Make a Difference?

Damian O’Keefe

In the military, a strong and incorruptible culture is not only important but essential. Unethical behaviour in the workplace can have a deleterious effect on the efficiency of the organization. In a military context, it can have a disastrous impact on the operational effectiveness of the unit. Indeed, military personnel are expected to adhere to a strict code of core values that help guide them in the performance of their duty. However, as evidenced in well-published events involving western militaries (e.g., the mistreatment of Abu Ghraib prisoners by U.S. soldiers in 2003, and the torture and death of a civilian detainee by a few Canadian soldiers in Somalia in March 1993) discriminatory and unethical behaviour still occurs. Why did these supposedly professional and well-trained soldiers come to act so unethically?

There are perhaps organizational factors that contribute to unethical behaviour in the workplace. Indeed, several researchers suggest that the ethical climate of the organization has a large impact on the ethical behaviour of workers. Alternatively, maybe the dispositional makeup of leaders plays a large part in the ethical behaviour of subordinates. This paper argues that perceptions of the ethical climate, as it relates to supervisor behaviour, has a large influence on ethical behaviour in the workplace. However, there are dispositional factors that have been shown to predict unethical behaviour and, if present in leaders, could subsequently influence the ethical behaviour of subordinates. To this end, effective military organizations are those who not only foster a strong ethical climate, but also place strong emphasis on selecting leaders on the basis of ethical leadership. In fact, ethical organizations, particularly military organizations, cannot have one without the other.
Ethical Culture in the Canadian Forces

The organizational culture of the Canadian Forces (CF) is strongly influenced by Canadian values as expressed in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter emphasizes democracy, the concept of peace, order and good government, and the rule of law. These Canadian ideals have strongly influenced the CF code of ethics that requires members to respect the dignity of others, to serve Canada before self, and to obey and support lawful authority.4

As outlined in the new Canadian Forces doctrinal manual Duty with Honour – The Profession of Arms in Canada, the CF values are expressed within the context of the Canadian military ethos and include: Duty, Loyalty, Integrity, and Courage. The concept of Duty obliges personnel to adhere to lawful authority, while displaying dedication, initiative and discipline. Loyalty is very similar to duty, and requires CF members to support superiors and readily obey lawful commands and to also display loyalty to comrades across the chain of command. Integrity involves having unconditional commitment to a principles approach, which includes being responsible for one’s own actions. Indeed, integrity requires acting with honesty and candour and pursuing the truth, regardless of personal consequence. Courage is both physical and moral, and involves having the strength to make the right choice among difficult alternatives, and to disregard the cost of one’s actions in terms of physical difficulty, advancement or popularity.5 However, despite fostering these core values some CF members still behave unethically. As stated above, perhaps there are organizational factors that influence ethical behaviour. One such organizational factor is ethical climate.

Ethical Climate

Ethical climate is conceptualized as “… general and pervasive characteristics of organizations, affecting a broad range of decisions…” that act as the basis on which people decide if a decision is right or wrong.6 It is similar in definition to culture, which is defined as shared ideologies of an organization that are acquired through collective experience and repeated social interactions over time. However, unlike culture, which is associated with beliefs and values, climate is usually defined as perceived attitudes towards specific aspects of organizational behaviour such as safety, service, or ethical issues. People’s sense of ethical climate is based on their
perceptions of organizational practices and norms involving acceptable behaviour and ethical issues. Researchers have found that organizations with clear ethical norms and strong ethical climates report less serious ethical problems and are more likely to address ethical issues when they arise.7

In the 1980s, scholars B. Victor and J.B. Cullen conducted a large scale project to develop a measure to assess the ethical climate of organizations. 8Based on the work of Schneider, they hypothesized that ethical work climate has an organizational basis and groups within organizations develop a unique approach and set of rules with regard to decision-making. When group members know these rules well enough, it comprises a work climate, or the psychological life of the organization.9 Perceptions of work climate can differ from affective evaluations of work climate. In other words, workers’ opinions of the climate may differ from how they themselves describe their own personal work climate. What is of interest in most research investigating the relation between ethical climate and ethical behaviour, is people’s perceptions of ethical climate, in that members are asked to act as observers of the work environment.10

In an effort to clearly define ethical climate, Victor and Cullen postulated a two-dimensional, nine-cell typology of ethical climate (see Table 1).11 The first dimension of the ethical climate model is ethical criterion (level of moral development) that consists of three mutually exclusive levels: Egoism, Benevolence, and Principle. That is, in making ethical decisions, people consider the results of the decision as it is relates to either their own self interest (i.e., egoism), the interest of the group (i.e., benevolence), or personal morality (i.e., principle). Using Kohlberg’s model of moral development, Victor and Cullen hypothesized that the Egoism ethical criterion espouses that ethical reasoning is based on consideration of what is in the best interest of the individual. The Benevolence ethical criterion is based on utilitarianism that suggests that people consider the positive and/or negative consequences of their decision on others. The Principle criterion is based on the premise that people make ethical decisions using an unchanging principle of right and wrong.
TABLE 1

Theoretical ethical climate types hypothesized by Victor and Cullen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethical criteria</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Cosmopolitan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egoism</td>
<td>Self-interest</td>
<td>Company profit</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Instrumental</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Friendship</td>
<td>Team Interest</td>
<td>Social responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Caring</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle</td>
<td>Personal morality</td>
<td>Rules and procedures</td>
<td>Laws, professional codes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Independence</em></td>
<td><em>Rules</em></td>
<td><em>Law and Code</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The highlighted and italicized labels are factors gleaned from analyses of a measure designed to assess the nine possible ethical climate themes.

As stated, the ethical criteria dimension of Victor and Cullen’s model of ethical climate is based on Kohlberg’s model of moral development. Kohlberg described the development of moral reasoning in terms of three broad levels of cognitive moral development, each comprised of two stages. In the first level of moral reasoning (Preconventional), moral decision-making is based on punishment and obedience orientation (Stage One), and one's hedonistic desires to satisfy one's own needs (Stage Two). In the second level of Kohlberg’s model of moral reasoning (Conventional), moral decision-making is based on the need to live up to the expectations of others (e.g., family, peer group, or the nation), and comprised of stages that involve the “good-boy/nice-girl orientation” (Stage Three), and the “law and order orientation” (Stage Four). The third level of Kohlberg’s moral development is the Postconventional level, which involves morality based on abstract principles. Stage Five in this level is the ‘Social Contract’ and is based on the principle of utilitarianism. Stage Six is the orientation of universal ethical principles. At the Postconventional level, moral correctness is not defined by laws and rules, but rather by one’s own conscience in accordance to self-determined ethical principles. Kohlberg places most adults in our society in Stages Three or Four and, as such, they are susceptible to the influence of cultural and/or job context variables – that is, ethical climate.
The second dimension of Victor and Cullen’s ethical climate model is locus of analysis (the moral atmosphere), and is comprised of three levels: Individual, Local and Cosmopolitan (i.e., societal), which refers to the referent group used to identify the source of moral reasoning in applying ethical criteria in decision-making. The Individual locus of analysis is external to the organization and engages one’s own personal ethics (e.g., personal values) in ethical decision. The Local locus of analysis is organizationally based, and could utilize the norms of the specific workgroup, which can play a large part in role definition of the individual and hence decision making strategies. In a military context, this could be at the platoon/divisional, squadron, or battalion level. The Cosmopolitan locus of analysis is at the societal level, which involves ethical decision-making that is influenced by the practices of a professional association or legal authority. In a military context, this could be the military ethos of the profession of arms, or more occupationally specific such as the Hippocratic oath for Doctors, or the Canadian Psychological Association code of ethics for Psychologists.

Using this model of ethical work climate Victor and Cullen developed an ethical assessment measure based on the 3 X 3 matrix of possible ethical climate themes outlined in Table 1. Although hypothesized as a nine-dimensional construct, statistical analyses yielded a five-component solution of climate types, which include: Caring (i.e., looking out for the welfare of coworkers), Law and Code (i.e., compliance with the law and professional standards), Rules (i.e., compliance with organizational rules), Instrumental (i.e., self-interest), and Independence (i.e., personal ethics), each representing a distinct theoretical type of climate. Table 1 presents the theoretical ethical climate types hypothesized by Victor and Cullen with the five climate types identified in analyses highlighted in bold and italics. Subsequent analyses revealed similar, but not identical factor structures to Victor and Cullen’s analysis.

Several studies report a significant relation between ethical climate and maladaptive practice at work, such as organizational misbehaviour (OMB) intentions, which is defined as intentional acts that violate formal core organizational rules. For example, one study using a sample from a metal-products company reported that the ethical climate factors Rules, Caring, and Instrumental significantly predicted OMB, with Rules having the largest impact on behaviour. In other words, people who perceived that the ethical climate as it relates to rules (i.e., emphasis
placed on following rules and regulations) was weak were more inclined to misbehave.

Another study revealed that perceived climate did not have a direct effect on behavioral intentions, but influenced the relation between ethical judgment (i.e., ratings of the ethicality of the behaviour) and behavioural intentions. Specifically, when the perception of the ethical climate was weak, the relation between ethical judgment and behavioral intentions was significant such that as ethical judgment increased, unethical behavioural intentions decreased. In contrast, when the perception of ethical climate was strong, the relation between ethical judgment and unethical behavioural intentions was non-significant. Practically speaking, people who perceived that the ethical climate was weak, and rated the ethicality of their behaviour as being low, tended to be the more unethical, compared with people who perceived that the climate was weak and rated the ethicality of their behaviour as being high, and people who perceived a strong ethical climate, regardless of their level of ethical judgment. These results suggest that a strong ethical climate plays a large part of curbing the unethical behaviour of people who are predisposed to behave unethically.

**Ethical Climate in the CF**

Given the gravity of the likely consequences of unethical behaviour within a military organization (e.g., jeopardizing the safety of other military personnel or civilians), the Department of National Defence (DND) has established a program dedicated to developing, fostering, and maintaining a strong ethical culture in the Defence organization. Conceptualized in 1994, and formally instituted in 1997, the Defence Ethics Program (DEP) is mandated to: provide an ethical framework for the CF and Department of DND personnel; promote awareness of what constitutes an ethical situation; and provide strategies to aid Defence personnel in decision-making concerning the ethics of any issue.

As part of the programme, Kelloway and colleagues were commissioned to develop a measure of ethical climate specific to DND. To this end, the authors developed the Canadian Forces Organizational Climate (CF ORG Climate) questionnaire. The CF ORG Climate questionnaire is used as a predictor of ethical climate and it includes 10 scales, four of which were adapted from the work of Victor and Cullen (i.e., rules, caring, independence, and self-interest). The Rules Scale assesses the
degree to which respondents perceived that people in their immediate work unit prioritizes following rules and regulations. The Caring Scale assesses the extent to which people believe that people in their immediate work unit value its members. The Independence Scale assesses the degree to which people believe that people in their immediate work unit value independent thought and action (i.e., following one’s own personal sense of right and wrong). The Self-interest Scale assesses the degree to which people perceive that those in their immediate work unit values self-interested behaviour (e.g., looking out for one’s self, placing a priority on self-interest) above the interests of the work unit.

The remaining scales were designed to assess: the extent to which the immediate supervisor was seen as expecting ethical behaviour from others (i.e., supervisor expectations), the extent to which the immediate supervisor (i.e., supervisor behaviour) and coworkers (i.e., coworker behaviour) were seen as exhibiting ethical values (e.g., Duty, Loyalty, Integrity, and Courage), the extent to which DND (as an organization) was seen as being fair (i.e., organizational fairness) and following appropriate rules (i.e., organizational rules), and the degree of personal control that was believed to exist in the organization (i.e., personal control). Results of a CF-wide ethics survey conducted in 1999 indicated that, on average, respondents perceived that the ethical climate of CF was positive, suggesting that the DEP is effective in establishing a climate that promotes CF values. Indeed, ethical climate as it relates to supervisor behaviour is a measure of ethical leadership, which, as will be discussed next, has a large impact on the ethical behaviour of subordinates.

**Ethical Leadership**

As stated by several researchers, a critical determinant in the ethical climate of an organization is ethical leadership. Ethical leadership is defined as “the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making.” Although it seems intuitive that supervisors should serve as a key source of ethical guidance for employees, it is only in the past few years that empirical research has been focused entirely on the ethical dimension of leadership. Prior to this, ethical leadership behaviour was explained within leadership models such as transformational leadership, for example.
The construct of transformational leadership was developed by Burns in the 1970s and later expanded by Bass in the 1980s, and refers to the process of influencing changes in attitudes and building commitment to the mission and objective of the organization. Transformational leaders have the ability to motivate followers to undertake roles that followers would not normally pursue on their own. They address followers’ motives by encouraging them to consider the moral and ethical consequences of their actions and goals, above and beyond satisfying their self interests. Transformational leaders serve as role models for perseverance and self-sacrifice, and by doing so, have a strong and positive influence over the followers’ personal values.

Transformational leadership is positively related to cognitive moral development (and thus high ethical standards), and has been linked to several performance criteria such as follower perceptions of leader effectiveness, supervisory ratings, and military performance appraisals. Although transformational leadership taps into ethical leadership, the ethical dimension of leadership is only a small part of, and indeed not totally explained by, transformational leadership. In contrast, the main focus in the recently conceptualized constructs of ethical leadership is specifically linked to the role that leaders have in the ethical behaviour of subordinates and focuses primarily on how best to influence the ethical behaviour of followers.

Brown and colleagues, using the social learning perspective (i.e., modeling) to postulate the construct of ethical leadership, proposed that leaders influence the ethical conduct of followers via modeling. Ethical leadership encompasses both the personal ethical conduct of the leader, and expectations of ethical conduct of followers by the leader. The authors explored ethical leadership from the perspective of organization members, (similar to the way that ethical climate is measured), and argued that leaders are models for ethical conduct and, as such, become the targets by emulation for followers, influence ethics-related outcomes and engage in and reinforce ethical behaviour. Such behaviour involves honesty, integrity, and the fair treatment of others.

Ethical leadership has been shown to predict trust in the leader, interactional justice (i.e., being treated with dignity and respect), perceived effectiveness of leaders, and followers’ job satisfaction and dedication. Moreover, these relationships were over and above that accounted for by transformational leadership, suggesting that the construct of ethical
leadership is indeed different from that of transformational leadership. Although there are no measures of ethical leadership specific to the CF, the supervisor behaviour scale (i.e., the extent respondents perceive that their immediate supervisor displays and encourages ethical conduct as outlined in the CF values Duty, Loyalty, Integrity and Courage), of the CF ORG Climate questionnaire assesses all aspects of ethical leadership as defined by Brown and colleagues. Indeed, the two constructs are very similar, if not identical, suggesting that the supervisor behaviour scale of the CF ORG Climate questionnaire can be used to assess ethical leadership at all rank levels in the CF.

In a recent anonymous self-report survey study of past unethical behaviour of CF Army personnel \((N = 364)\), perceptions of ethical climate as it relates to supervisor behaviour (i.e., ethical leadership) predicted confidence in leadership, and affective commitment (i.e., a sense of belonging to, and having an emotional tie to the organization). More importantly, supervisor climate predicted past instances of discriminatory and self-serving behaviour. Specifically, perceptions of supervisor climate predicted discrimination on the basis of gender, race, sexual orientation and language, and acting in one’s self-interest (e.g., submitting fraudulent travel claims, cheating on a course, taking credit for the work of other people), such that respondents who reported lower levels of supervisor climate (e.g., my supervisor lacks integrity and honesty) were more inclined to behave unethically. These results, support perceptions of the ethicality of CF leaders have substantial power to create, model, and maintain ethical norms among subordinates with regard to discriminatory and self-serving behaviour.

As stated earlier, results of a CF-wide ethics survey conducted in 1999 indicated that respondents perceived that the ethical climate of CF was positive; however, the DEP has focused on fostering a strong ethical climate within DND, without giving any attention to the impact that the dispositional make-up of the leader may have on the ethical decision-making of subordinates. For example, social dominance orientation is one such dispositional factor that we know predicts unethical behaviour.

**Social Dominance Orientation**

Social dominance orientation (SDO) is the degree to which people desire hierarchy among social groups and promote domination over outgroups. It is based on Social Dominance Theory (SDT), which was conceived by
Felicia Pratto and Jim Sidanius in the early 1990s. They postulated that societies tend to minimize group conflict by creating consensus or ideologies that promote the superiority of one group over another. SDT explains group relations as an individual's propensity to classify groups along a superiority-inferiority dimension, which is a motivating factor in racial, class, and gender inequalities.

SDO is operationalized with the SDO Scale, which assesses the tendency to which one prefers relations between groups to be equal or hierarchical in nature. People scoring higher on the SDO Scale are highly competitive, tend to place great emphasis on high economic and social status, personal prestige and power, and more strongly endorse the statement that 'winning is the ONLY thing'. They are willing to manipulate others for personal gain, and tend to have a preference for group dominance based on gender, race, ethnicity, class, religion, and sexual preference. Higher scoring SDOs prefer an unjust and unfair social system, which they believe benefits them, and this opposition to equality appears to be based on a general drive for personal dominance. Moreover, higher scoring SDOs tend to have little moral restraint, and are willing to step over people for their own personal gain.

A study conducted with CF personnel reported a positive relation between SDO and self-report instances of unethical behaviour by military police personnel. Using a self-report measure, a sample of military police personnel ($N = 228$) was asked to indicate the extent to which they had engaged in questionable behaviour such as reducing the amount of a traffic violation ticket in exchange for a favour, or embellishing details of a report to strengthen a case. In the same study, when voting on how to distribute budgets cuts to a variety of programmes, there was a positive relation between SDO and cutting both a diversity training program, and an ethics training program. In other words, people who were more socially dominant were more likely to be discriminatory compared to people who were less socially dominant. In a study with CF Army personnel ($N = 364$), SDO predicted past discriminatory and self-serving behaviour, also suggesting that people who are more socially dominant tend to be more unethical than those who are less socially dominant.

There is some research that suggests that people who score high in social dominance tend to be unethical leaders, which subsequently impacts the ethical behaviour of subordinates. For example, when investigating
the link between SDO and unethical behaviour in a managerial role-playing task, Son Hing and her colleagues found that when acting as the leader, higher scoring SDOs, compared to those with lower scoring SDOs, made more unethical decisions if they stood to gain an increase in personal power and profit. Moreover, when paired with subordinates who had a dispositional tendency to submit to the will of a perceived authority figure (i.e., scoring high in right-wing authoritarianism, which measures the degree to which one is submissive to authority, aggressive towards outgroups, and socially conventional) higher scoring SDOs made more unethical decisions. This line of reasoning suggests that people who are more socially dominant tend to be more unethical.

Given that perceptions of ethical climate as it relates to supervisor behaviour predicts unethical behaviour of subordinates, it should follow that CF leaders who are high in social dominance have a dispositional tendency to be unethical, which subsequently could influence the ethical behaviour of subordinates. To this end, the most effective ethical leaders are those who are low in social dominance.

As stated, the fundamental premise behind the Defence Ethics Program is to promote a strong ethical climate. However, by merely fostering an ethical climate that promotes these values, without considering the dispositional makeup of leaders that may affect the ethical behaviour of subordinates, the Defence Ethics Program is ripe for failure. Rather, the CF needs to not only continue to foster a strong ethical climate, but also to conduct extensive research to identify dispositional factors that, if present in leaders, will affect the ethical behaviour of subordinates. As discussed, one such factor is social dominance orientation.

This paper commenced by citing examples of serious unethical behaviour committed by western military personnel and questioned why these supposedly professional and well-trained soldiers came to act so unethically. It has been argued that both situational and dispositional factors play a role in unethical behaviour of military personnel. Specifically, perceptions of ethical climate as it is related to supervisor behaviour (i.e., ethical leadership) play a large part in curbing the unethical behaviour of subordinates and, thus, the CF should continue to foster a strong ethical climate. However, the CF needs to screen officer applicants (and all CF applicants for that matter) using measures (such as social dominance orientation) that have shown to predict unethical behaviour. Hopefully, the inclusion of such a measure as part of the CF selection system, and the
continued nurturance of a strong ethical climate, will help eliminate the
types of grave and immoral behaviour that we witnessed in Somalia in
1993, and at Abu Ghraib prison in 2003, as well as to reduce day-to-day
instances of discriminatory and self-serving behaviour.

Endnotes

1 Some of the results reported in this chapter are based on my dissertation research “Assessing
the moderating effects of ethical climate on the relations between social dominance orientation
and right-wing authoritarianism and ethical decision making.” This research was conducted for
the CF Army, and sponsored by CFLI. I am indebted to my advisor, Dr. Leanne Son Hing from
the University of Guelph, for her guidance throughout this research

2 Colonel Mike Capstick, “Defining culture: The Canadian Army in the 21st Century,”

3 See: T. Barnett & C. Vaicys, “The moderating effect of individuals’ perceptions of ethical
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(2000), 27, 351-362; B Schneider, “The Psychological life of organizations,” in N.M. Ash-
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5 Ibid.

6 See Victor & Cullen, “The organizational bases of ethical work climate.”

climate and ethical problems within human resource management,” Journal of Business Ethics

8 See Victor and Cullen, “The organizational bases of ethical work climate.”

9 See Schneider, “The Psychological life of organizations.”

10 Schneider, “The Psychological life of organizations”; and Victor and Cullen, “The organi-
zational bases of ethical work climate.”

11 See Victor & Cullen, “The organizational bases of ethical work climate.”

12 Ibid.

13 See Barnett & Vaicys, “The moderating effect of individuals’ perceptions of ethical work
climate on ethical judgments and behavioral intentions.”

14 See Victor & Cullen, “The organizational bases of ethical work climate.”

15 L. K. Trevino, “Ethical decision making in organizations: A person-situation interactionist

16 See Victor & Cullen, “The organizational bases of ethical work climate.”

17 See Victor & Cullen, “The organizational bases of ethical work climate”; and D. C. Wyld, &
C. A. Jones, “The importance of context: The ethical work climate construct and models of ethi-

18 See Victor & Cullen, “The organizational bases of ethical work climate.”
20 See Barnett & Vaicys, The moderating effect of individuals’ perceptions of ethical work climate on ethical judgments and behavioral intentions. See also Vardi, “The effects of organizational and ethical climates on misconduct at work.”
21 See Vardi, “The effects of organizational and ethical climates on misconduct at work.”
22 See Barnett & Vaicys, “The moderating effect of individuals’ perceptions of ethical work climate on ethical judgments and behavioral intentions.”
24 Ibid.
28 See Brown, Trevino, & Harrison, “A social learning perspective for construct development and testing.”
31 Ibid.
34 See Brown, et al., “A social learning perspective for construct development and testing.”
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 See D. O’Keefe, *Assessing the moderating effects of ethical climate on the relations between social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism and ethical decision making* (University of Guelph, Ph.D. Dissertation).


41 See Pratto et al., “Social Dominance Orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes.”


43 Noonan, *Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation as predictors of tolerance and ethical behavior in Military Police job incumbents and applicants* (University of Guelph, PhD Dissertation, 2006).

44 See O’Keefe, *Assessing the moderating effects ethical climate on the relations between social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism and ethical decision making.*

CHAPTER 8

Impetus to Action: Moral and Ethical Decision-Making in Canadian Forces Operations

Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Megan M. Thompson and Joseph V. Baranski

The changing world order over the past fifteen years and the conflicts that have emerged as a result have presented militaries with increasing operational demands from a number of sources that can result in moral and ethical dilemmas, those complex problems that invoke conflicting values or demands and that have no easy solution. For instance, in confronting asymmetrical threats, often a defining feature of recent missions, it can be extremely difficult to distinguish combatants from civilians, indeed belligerents often use civilian milieus for disguise and cover. Here the dilemma is often one of force protection versus not injuring civilians.

Canada’s participation in coalition combat operations with diverse militaries that may adhere to different rules of engagement (ROEs) also presents complexities if these ROEs implicate different sets of values. Moreover, the participation of Canadian Forces (CF) personnel in peace support operations (PSO) is likely to continue to present a set of problems for moral and ethical decision-making which are unique from those experienced in missions prior to the 1990’s. For example, the granting of more robust ROEs for United Nations (UN) peacekeepers in recent missions has given soldiers the ability to use force to protect innocent civilians from harm. However, despite ROEs, when exactly peacekeepers should use this force can still be highly uncertain, especially in light of the potential ramifications that might emerge like political fallout, the erosion of the UN peacekeeper’s protected status and the threat to force protection. Daniel Blocq refers to this as “the fog of UN peacekeeping”, and points out soldiers will require clear guidance to answer a number of difficult ethical questions, most pressingly how to balance moral engagement with self-control. He holds that traditional guidelines, stemming
from both national governing policy and international law for peacekeeping operations, do not assist peacekeepers in this regard. He explains that these guidelines are unclear because they do not provide adequate national or legal requirements for the actual execution of force. Regrettably, this can lead to increased moral confusion for PSO personnel.

Finally, the CF most recent operating concepts of Joint Interagency Multinational Public (JIMP) and 3D (defence, diplomacy and development) almost certainly will present challenges for moral and ethical decision-making. Under the JIMP framework, the CF will work with other agencies and organizations that may have very different mandates, decision-making processes and goals. This may lead to conflicts in terms of overarching goals and the best methods to achieve such goals and may also have implications for challenging moral and ethical decisions. As well, within the 3D concept of operations, CF personnel will be required to balance roles. Not only will they be carrying out traditional combat activities, they will also be representing Canada in diplomatic and development capacities, and providing support to Canadian diplomatic and development agencies. As such, behavioural expectations for the CF will be multifaceted and identifying when to adopt the appropriate role and its particular skill set may be a challenge.

These operational realities mean that CF personnel are likely to continue to confront a range of moral and ethical dilemmas during the missions that they are charged to undertake. This environment also means that CF personnel will require increasing skill in judgement, decision-making, communication and action to effectively address these moral and ethical dilemmas. In light of this complex military operating environment, and the potential for encountering moral and ethical dilemmas, it is important to gain a better understanding of the CF’s perspective on moral and ethical decision-making. In order to enhance operational effectiveness then it will be critical to gain more empirically-based knowledge about the factors influencing this kind of decision-making to promote training that will best assist military personnel in these challenging circumstances.

Our work in this area began with an extensive literature review. That review revealed that traditional judgment and decision-making theory and research promote a strict rational process of weighing the pros and cons of alternatives and adhere to a strict set of predetermined axioms.
Thus, this class of models reflects an exclusively cognitive approach – apprehension, judgement, intent, and action. Further, there exist few traditional cognitive models that deal with moral and ethical decision making specifically.

The naturalistic approach to decision making\(^5\) was developed as an alternative to these traditional decision-making models. In contrast to the rational deliberative approach, this school of thought emphasizes knowledge, familiarity and expertise and quick pattern matching between new situations and past experiences or heuristics as guides for decisions and actions. Research based on this model often illustrates the difference between the decision-making processes of novice versus experts. More specifically, novice decision-makers appear more likely to follow a more deliberative approach, weighing various courses of action one by one, whereas experts make quicker decisions based upon intuition and pattern matching from their previous experiences.\(^6\)

More recent social cognitive models of decision-making also have begun to incorporate other variables. For instance, Haidt’s social intuitionist model of moral judgement downplays the priority of “private reasoning” in moral judgements and emphasizes the role of social and cultural processes, in particular suggesting that decision-makers often have an intuitive notion of what is right and then seek reasonable justification for their intuition by sharing it with others.\(^7\) Other work suggests that characteristics of the moral issue itself (i.e. moral intensity) will have a significant influence on moral and ethical decision-making.\(^8\) Although highly relevant, these factors have not been extensively studied nor has their combination been consistently applied to the moral and ethical decision-making process. More research in this domain will be required to understand how these factors arise and influence the moral and ethical decision-making process.

Finally, the moral psychology literature seeks to understand how people are motivated to act morally and has explored concepts such as moral development, altruism and pro-social behaviours, and empathy. These approaches have often emphasized the power of identity as an impetus to moral behaviour, largely because conventional ways of understanding moral behaviour (e.g. moral understanding or knowing what is right and wrong) have proven inadequate.\(^9\) This research and theory suggest that those who view morality as central to their sense of self reflect a deeper
commitment to a moral identity and may be more motivated to behave consistently with this.\textsuperscript{10} However, a limitation of the work within moral psychology is that it does not provide specific decision-making models. Moreover, these approaches largely focus on traits and character, to the exclusion of other important factors implicated in decision-making in moral and ethical domains.

Overall then our review of the literature revealed that no one approach seemed to capture the complexity of decision-making in the moral and ethical realm. Further, in general, studies specific to moral and ethical decision-making are still at a relatively early stage of development, and there is even less work that specifically addresses a military context. Nonetheless, as the introduction makes clear, situations that evoke moral and ethical dimensions will remain a key feature of future military operations. To begin to address such concerns in the CF context, we conducted and analyzed 15 intensive interviews with CF personnel who had confronted moral and ethical dilemmas in operations. Participants reflected on what they considered moral and morally relevant in their experiences, providing a phenomenological account of morality. The specific goal here was to reveal the factors and the underlying psychological processes that these individuals perceived as fundamental influences on their decision-making. We also compare the factors they recounted to the general approaches to decision making outlined in the psychological literature.

**Method**

**Participants.** 15 CF members were initially identified as potential interviewees and were contacted by phone by a military liaison officer working at DRDC Toronto. At this time, the military liaison told potential candidates what would be expected of them should they choose to participate (i.e. general overview of the study, the format of the interview, the time commitment, etc.). Participants then chose whether or not they wanted to participate. Participants were all senior officers who had extensive operational experience in challenging missions.\textsuperscript{11} They were all men. Seven participants were retired and eight were active duty personnel. There were thirteen army personnel and two naval personnel.

**Interview Protocol.** An interview protocol was developed to guide the discussion and, when necessary, assist participants in recounting their moral and ethical decision making experiences in operational situations.
In general, the interview questions were based on critical aspects of the moral and ethical decision-making process generated from the literature review\textsuperscript{12} as well as the CF perspective of moral and ethical decision-making outlined in the Defence Ethics Program (DEP).\textsuperscript{13} The main topics explored included a description of the event, factors impacting the decision, how the decision was made, the decision outcome, and participant reflections on the extent to which their past training had helped them in facing their moral and ethical dilemma. To ensure that researchers received a comprehensive picture of the situation in which it occurred, the questionnaire included probes that helped participants recall particular details, such as where and when it happened, who was present, what was happening before the situation arose, and how the participant was feeling at the time. The protocol was general enough to permit researchers flexibility in asking the questions in order to accommodate participants’ train of thought as well as acknowledge participants’ decision to voluntarily disclose information. As such, the protocol encouraged a free, conversational atmosphere in the interview. The interview protocol and all methods used in the study underwent review and received approval from the Defence Research and Development Canada Human Research Ethics Committee, and followed Tri-council Guidelines for the ethical conduct of research involving humans.

**Data Collection.** After potential candidates had the opportunity to voluntarily consent to participation, an interview time and place was arranged. The interview session began with the introduction of the research team to the participants by the liaison officer, participants were reminded of the study purposes, relevance and potential benefit to the CF, the nature of their participation (i.e. format of the interview, time commitment, etc.), and any possible risks. Indeed, considering the difficult nature of many moral and ethical dilemmas, great consideration was given to issues of confidentiality and to ensuring the ethical treatment of participants.

As part of the informed consent procedure, participants were assured that they should feel free to stop participating at any time as discussing some moral and ethical decisions might cause discomfort. Before starting the interview, the primary interviewer asked permission to record the conversation to ensure a full and accurate account of the interview and all participants agreed to this. All participants voluntarily agreed to participate in this research and signed an informed consent. A trained
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The interviewer, who asked pre-selected and impromptu probes, but did not interfere with or influence the participants’ flow of disclosure or opinions expressed guided each interview. Only when necessary and appropriate, researchers asked follow-up questions to further clarify important themes relating to moral and ethical decision-making.

Following the interviews, a member of the research team transcribed audio-recorded interviews verbatim. To protect the confidentiality of participants, researchers removed identifying information from the transcription and replaced it with generic information. For example, specific references to cities or countries that might identify the participant have been replaced by the generic terms (CITY) or (COUNTRY). The average length of the fifteen interviews was one hour and nine minutes. Further, each participant was sent only the scenarios and passages from their interview that were considered for use in the final report. They were asked to mark any sentences or sections they wanted to exclude from the report prior to its publication. All participants agreed to the full use of their dilemmas and passages.

Data Analysis. Content analysis involved a member of the research team identifying the broad themes that emerged across the interviews. This process began with classifying each interview as an uncertainty, competing obligations, or harm dilemma, according to definitions in the CF DEP. The research team also developed operational definitions for each of the personal, situational and contextual factors previously identified in the moral and ethical decision making literature review. Finally other unanticipated factors that might have emerged from the interviews were also coded. This analysis was completed for all interviews, with most interviewees identifying several different factors that influenced moral and ethical decision-making.

Results

Classifying Moral Dilemmas. The fifteen participants described thirty-three moral and ethical dilemmas. Both the type and the uniqueness of the situations recalled varied widely. Some participants recalled several smaller dilemmas, while other participants provided only one event throughout the duration of the interview. These moral and ethical dilemmas ranged from administrative dilemmas (e.g. dealing with plagiarism, deciding how to discipline one’s staff, etc.), to having to deliberately...
violate mission orders, to having to decide what lives to save (and, by extension, what lives could not be saved). In general then the interviews showed a wide range of dilemmas and decisions.\(^{15}\)

Of the three kinds of dilemmas described by the DEP, twenty-five experiences recounted by participants fell within the category of competing obligations. One recurring theme in this kind of dilemma was participants caught between obedience to mission orders or ROEs and their personal values and conscience. For example, one soldier described a situation in which he was not supposed to offer humanitarian assistance (i.e. “fuel and food”) to civilians because proper Canadian bureaucratic procedures prevented this if there was any probability of “skimming.” However, given that there was no one else to provide aid, despite the fact that there was some degree of skimming, he felt morally responsible to help the civilians in need. In this case, he felt simultaneously obligated to obey both the competing Canadian regulations and his own sense of moral responsibility. In the end, he chose to follow the latter.

The next most frequent type of dilemma was the harm dilemma. Participants recounted seven of these. Harm dilemmas occur in situations in which no matter which course of action is selected, harm or injury will come to others as a direct or indirect consequence of one’s actions.\(^{16}\) As part of past UN peacekeeping contingents, several participants described harm dilemmas, where they were forced to make a moral choice between two undesirable alternatives, both of which had an extremely high probability to cause harm. These were described as “lose-lose situations.” For example, describing his experiences in trying to save people from ethnic cleansing, one participant recounted the moral dilemma he faced and how normative principles provided little assistance in his decision.

I am respecting the dignity of the people by trying to save their lives I think, I am obviously serving my country before I am serving myself, you know I think I am operating in accordance with the value and I am operating pretty ethically. But the result of the very ethical decision is that within 24 hours, 36 hours, a family died of cholera because I took them to a place that was a hell hole – but I had no other place to take them. So do I leave them where militia can chop them apart…which way is better to die?
Being chopped up by a machete or being raped, in sense of a woman, being raped to death, or taking a risk with cholera. So these are not easy but...you know....you choose the lesser of two evils.

This can only be described as an impossible decision to make. Though he knew there was a high probability that the family would die of cholera, his decision reflects his probable assessment for their survival.

Substantiating aspects of Jones’ model of moral intensity, the degree of certainty of people being harmed and the physical proximity of the soldier to the situation seemed to make these decisions particularly traumatic; caught in the middle of a conflict with limited ability to enforce change. Moreover, the interviews showed that harm dilemmas often require decisions that are difficult to forget and that negative counterfactual thinking (e.g. “If only...”) can torment the decision maker long after the fact.

There was only one recorded dilemma that was categorized as uncertainty, that is, whether the action was right or wrong was ambiguous. For example, in peacekeeping missions, soldiers always have the right to use lethal force for self-protection. However, the conditions under which to engage are sometimes equivocal. In this specific example, the CF commander explained:

It took a long time to instill in my soldiers, that if somebody threatened them, if they were fired upon, they were to return fire and they were to kill whoever it is that they were firing upon. They weren’t there to ask them to stop or to do anything else. They were to do what they were trained to do. It took a while for them to do that. There was always sort of an impression with them that they weren’t to act aggressively or something like that because as a force [CF] we didn’t do that, we acted very passively.

In this instance, the participant argued that the organizational culture of the CF made it difficult for Canadian soldiers to determine when they should actually engage belligerents.

Factors that Influence Moral and Ethical Decision Making. One of the major factors that emerged across the interviews was the importance of
person-based factors like social roles (e.g. “soldier” or “UN Commander”) and identity in guiding the decisions made. Attached to these roles were basic assumptions about behaviours that would be expected in particular situations, which participants explained had been instilled through culture and socialization. Thus, consistent with the thinking of moral psychology, our results indicate that once an individual had internalized his role as central to his identity, this seemed to provide the impetus to act according to these moral imperatives at whatever cost to himself. One interviewee, caught in a situation in which he was unable to use lethal force to protect non-combatants in an operation, reported that “morally, I cannot live with that as a senior commander.” His identity as a senior commander, representing a country that endorses the UN Declaration of Human Rights, underscored the necessity of maintaining both implicit and explicit expectations for his current role and as a member of the military profession. As such, he chose to continue to be guided by his role and identity to act consistently with the moral position that he believed the role demanded, and in a way that was consistent with his identity. It was certainly not uncommon for participants to report a need to behave in a way which would enable them to look themselves in the mirror after the fact. As one participant stated, “I ran into a moral dilemma, but it’s only easy because I stayed consistent”.

Participants’ strong value systems and deep sense of personal responsibility stemming from their commitment to their roles as senior officers sometimes ran counter to the demands of contextual factors, such as mission mandates and ROEs, placing them in moral dilemmas. Several participants strongly endorsed the view that “truly” ethical individuals should be compelled to follow their own conscience (however derived) in such circumstances. In these cases, the need to maintain one’s social role and identity again becomes fundamental. As one participant explained:

I think it’s a thing … every officer…faces in their career… the whole issue of how far am I prepared to go…I think we all face that….there was a situation where I was quite prepared to resign, and asked to be…if things were not come out the way it did…in the end, I still have [to] get up every morning and look at my face in the mirror, not anybody else’s…
Therefore, moral and ethical decision-making appears to be integrally related to our sense of self and the roles we adopt. The outcomes of moral and ethical actions will shape how we come to see ourselves, especially if we view morality as a core defining feature of our identity (i.e. who we are or who we want to be). Remaining consistent with this self-perception may be a strong motivator for moral and ethical action.

Others noted the role of specific emotions, such as feelings of compassion or disgust (termed moral emotions) in their decision-making. For example, upon discovering the immoral conduct of some CF members at a social institution during an overseas operation, one participant illustrated how emotions are reflected in moral judgements. He recalled (with emotional difficulty):

> It was, it was, it was disgusting. I found it almost unfathomable that Canadians were doing, what people, the unprofessional soldiers, were doing over there to people. It was just totally, repulsively wrong and just struck that cord with me instantly. And any other decent human being would have as well.

Indeed, in many cases, these strong emotions seemed integral to moral judgment, that is, the assessment these individuals made concerning the rightness or wrongness of their position or action.

We also saw evidence of the role of past experience in these accounts. As one officer put it, “…a lot of that is just your gut feel from your own experience, your own background, your read of the situation on the ground at the time.” This supports the naturalistic decision making approach endorsed by Klein and associates.

Moreover, consistent with social cognitive theories, some participants noted having appealed to significant others in order to “benchmark” their own intuitions about the correct ethical decision. As one participant who was pressured by Ottawa to relinquish his concept of operations explained:

> …who are you, a single individual, a force commander out there to be in disagreement with the all the establishment in Ottawa – who was I? So, you ask yourself that question, ‘who’s right?’…That’s why you feel the need to benchmark
your analysis. And you have to do it with as many people as possible because the danger once again is that you’re out of step yourself. For unknown reasons to yourself your judgment may not be the right one in those circumstances…I had done all that benchmarking, so from an ethical point of view I had gained confidence that I was right.

This suggests that, in instances of self-doubt regarding moral positions, participants worked to confirm their moral judgements through a collaborative review, checking and justifying their position with others, which provided them with greater conviction for their judgement. In the example above, having worked through this collaborative process with those close to the mission, the ethics of his position and then his decision was confirmed.

Participants also reflected on the positive impact of regimental culture on moral and ethical decision-making. As one soldier shared, taking on the “colours” and “the battle honours of the regiment…that sense of responsibility with the traditions” was, in his view, a force for developing character and motivating moral action. Shared regimental culture seems to have instilled in regiment members “a fierce kind of pride…the kind of thing that makes you do things.” Another soldier also attributed his moral action to the regimental culture and believed that a strong regimental culture would reduce the number of “stress casualties.” He explained:

You have to have unit cohesion and you have to look to the legacy provided to you from your heritage. Our heritage has been the regimental system, but there are movements afoot to disband that. Because you look to…these guys that fought for each other and provided for the greater good. You just keep drilling that in… Look at our training system and we have dismantled the shit out of that. The training system that we went through, it either builds strength of character or it weeded out people that didn’t have the strength of character… You do it for the regiment… you fight and die for the regiment…

This suggests that regimental culture, with its history and role models, may well be a strong contributing factor in the socialization processes that generate strong and positive beliefs, values, expectations and norms for moral and ethical decision making in a military context.
It is of note, however, that at the level of organizational culture, an apparent disjunction between the espoused values of the CF as an organization and the actual “values-in-use” was evident throughout these interviews, and this seemed to have substantive impact on moral and ethical decision making. For instance, some participants felt that National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) culture and army culture were at cross-purposes with respect to promoting consistently moral and ethical decisions. One described the former as imbued with “cowardice,” preventing soldiers from being warriors. He believed that soldiers should be “pit bulls on a short lead,” rather than “a bunch of lap dogs.” Another commander echoed this sentiment, describing a situation in which the Canadian government wanted its peacekeepers to evacuate their post if an offensive began, violating his interpretation of soldiering and fighting spirit. He stated: “They were my best trained. They were not able to withstand what they were paid to do? What was soldiering? Yes, shit happens, you know. That’s why you are trained.”

Indeed, the lack of continuity between organizational culture of NDHQ and the role that participants believed the CF had entrusted them was the source of several moral and ethical dilemmas recounted in this study. Several participants expressed their dismay with the CF’s failure to actually practice its own espoused values in relation to its general responsibility to care for its own people both at a day-to-day level and in supporting the difficult moral and ethical decisions they had been compelled to make in the course of operations. This disjunction challenged participants’ personal values and resulted in more than one participants’ decision to “quit” the CF with lasting regret.

Process of Moral and Ethical Decision Making. We also found that the process of making a moral and ethical decision stood in contrast to most traditional decision-making models, which emphasize a sequential deliberative, rational weighing of options prior to making a decision. Rather, participants often emphasized the very quick nature of their intuitive, emotional reactions or their gut instincts to the situations they encountered.

…Sometimes the only thing you’ve got is a gut feeling instinct…it was my gut feel about when at what point…at what point would the situation be such that it was more dangerous than it was previous…and there was a higher
probability that a Canadian might or might not be killed or wounded. I mean you can’t…do a statistical analysis …

Similarly, in the previously cited example in which a commander recoiled in disgust at the immoral actions toward vulnerable civilians of a previous group of CF personnel, he noted that his emotional reaction of disgust was instantaneous. In the mind of this soldier, the wrongness of the conduct was immediately signaled by his feelings of disgust and disapproval. This participant’s first emotions to the event invoked morality and seemed to turn quickly into judgement that served as the guiding impetus behind his decision to expose the breakdown in discipline. In another example, working through the moral and ethical decision he made in operations, one participant said, “I’m an engineer by training, but I didn’t go through this systematic process. If I may say, I’m a man of passion…” This suggests the importance and immediacy of emotions during moral and ethical decision making in operations.

However, more conscious deliberation also played a part in at least some of these decisions. In some cases, moral and ethical decisions were initiated by a hunch or feeling, followed by long and excruciating deliberations. Some participants also described discussing the situations and aspects of their decisions with valued and trusted peers while continuing to deliberate on their decision prior to taking action, and the value of these discussions to their judgments and actions.

It is also important to note that the interviews revealed the lasting effects that these tough moral and ethical decisions can have on people. Regardless of the decisions that participants made, there was a strong tendency for the impact of these decisions to linger long after the decision, largely associated with counterfactual thinking, emphasizing the lasting effect of moral and ethical decisions and suggesting that the process in these instances can be very long and arduous. The sheer amount of time required for recovery from the perceived impact of some of these decisions was documented in a number of interviews. As one participant disclosed, “It took me years to rationalize and to understand that we were doing the best we possibly could.” Indeed, the post-decision justification process may continue indefinitely and should be considered a critical part of the moral and ethical decision-making process. In other cases, although participants noted the difficulty in making moral and ethical decisions, they also suggested that the deliberations leading up to their actual decision
were in fact more difficult than actually implementing their decision. In other words, once the decision was made, and they knew what they needed to do, they did not second-guess themselves.

**Discussion**

Taken together, these interviews begin to illustrate the complexity of decision making in real-world moral and ethical dilemmas and suggest that morality and, more specifically, moral and ethical decision making can be quite different from the processes described in existing normative (i.e., prescriptive) models that focus on rational, linear cognitive processes and have particular axioms and procedures to follow. Instead, these accounts provided by these experienced CF members were rich in their references to personal identity and social roles.

Though a couple of participants mentioned acting for the “greater good,” in general, these accounts revealed that participants were not guided by any strong reflection on or connection to a specific moral theory, that is, descriptions did not show how ethical principles (i.e., treat everyone always as an end in themselves, and never as a means or act in such a way that maximizes happiness for the greatest number of people) helped them resolve the moral and ethical dilemmas they confronted in operations and guide their moral behaviour. Rather, participants appeared to be guided by a deep and genuine commitment to their social role (i.e., soldier, officer, force commander) and identity (i.e., as a Canadian, as a human being). Acting consistently with their identity appears fundamental in understanding how participants made moral and ethical decisions in operations, which ultimately allowed these individuals to retain their integrity despite facing competing external pressures. The motivation of these individuals to moral action in the face of sometimes extreme external pressures seems consistent then with current thinking in moral psychology, which holds that those who view morality as central to their sense of self reflect a deeper commitment to a moral identity and hence may be more motivated to behave consistently with this.22

A key factor emerging from these interviews was the impact of emotion and intuition on moral and ethical decision making processes. A number of the interviewees specifically referred to feelings of compassion, empathy, disgust and pride, showing evidence of the power of moral emotions23 as a basis for judgments and actions. As well, participants spoke of their reliance on their gut instinct or intuition to help them determine the
correct action to take when facing moral dilemmas. In a couple of cases, this emerged from their past experience, suggesting that they relied to some extent on heuristic-based decision making processes, as argued in the naturalistic decision-making literature. Of course, this does not mean that participants resolved moral and ethical dilemmas without ration-ally considering their actions too. Instead, it suggests that the recognition and resolution of a moral issue can derive from their intuitions and from their emotional response to an issue as well as from abstract principles and moral reasoning. As participants revealed in their descriptions, the role of rationality, emotion and intuition were all evident and were reported to work together to determine their moral and ethical decisions. Thus, any approach to understanding moral and ethical decision-making that treats these factors as separate entities might run counter to how people actually resolve moral issues and dilemmas in an operational context.

Further, the process that some participants reported matched well with Haidt’s description of moral judgements as participants often worked through their moral hunches by appealing to others, leading them to either reinforce or diminish this original moral position. This process did not guarantee agreement. Rather, individuals had an initial intuition that was further elaborated through the exploration of shared reasoning with others.

Another factor emerging in the study, and one that we had not anticipated based on the literature, was the subtle role of regimental culture in advancing ethical behaviour. Some of our interviewees contended that regimental culture, and the associated value structures, had a very positive impact on the moral and ethical decisions that individuals made in the course of operations. In terms of the elements we have identified as important to this type of decision-making, regimental culture appears to be a factor that fosters and develops one’s identity. It is important, therefore that future work in this area seeks to understand how the positive aspects of regimental culture could be used to help promote moral character and consistent moral and ethical conduct in the regiment itself and across the CF.

**Conclusion**

These interviews make clear that these individuals have faced a wide range of moral and ethical challenges in operations, including those involving life and death situations and choices. We are indebted to our participants
who provided us with such rich and complex depictions of the moral and ethical decisions they faced and the factors implicated in their decision-making process. The descriptions of the moral and ethical dilemmas they encountered and the associated decisions that they made were imbued with great moral courage and conviction.

The experiences they recounted in this study present a compelling case for a moral and ethical decision making model that is more complex than those previously considered in traditional models of decision-making. Indeed, participant reports make clear that a “pure” linear, rational model of decision making cannot approximate actual moral and ethical decisions encountered in military operations, and that understanding this process will require consideration of a broader set of factors. As the accounts imparted by these CF personnel indicate, these models should include many additional factors (e.g. identity, values and attitudes, regimental culture, moral intensity, etc.) and psychological processes (e.g. intuition, emotion, rationality) that these CF members described as being in play when they confronted moral and ethical dilemmas. As well, rather than standing alone as discrete entities, moral and ethical decisions need to be framed and interpreted through the multiple lenses of individuals as well as society and its normative institutions.

It is clear that CF personnel will continue to face difficult moral and ethical decisions in operations in the future. Such accounts will certainly promote enhanced awareness of the challenges that personnel will sometimes confront at the time of the decision and following the decision. This knowledge should be integrated into CF training mechanisms for maximum impact. Certainly, it is promising to see the positive contributions of the DEP and the Army Ethics Program (AEP), suggesting the CF’s commitment to prepare their personnel for facing tough moral and ethical decisions in operations. For example, on their website, the AEP includes a number of operational moral dilemmas that CF personnel can think about and resolve. A range of training opportunities and platforms of various fidelities, based upon the experiences provided by personnel who have faced such dilemmas should be developed to advance training in these areas.

These efforts should be informed by a programme of empirical research that focuses on these particular kinds of operational decisions. We have already begun to conduct field studies to determine the effects of variables
identified in the literature review and this interview study upon perceptions, decision-making and behaviour. These findings will be supported by laboratory studies that offer the opportunity for more systematic control of these variables than is possible in field studies. Moreover, it is important to determine how variations in the situations and stressors encountered such as time pressure might affect the situational assessments, decision making choices, and various attributions (e.g., degree of threat, harm, and responsibility) that military personnel make. It is our belief that an integrated programme of this nature will best assist the CF prepare for the mental and psychological rigors associated with the moral and ethical dilemmas they will encounter as they represent Canada in future operations.

Endnotes


11 Operational experience was the main requirement for participation in the study.


15 For a full description and analysis of the moral and ethical dilemmas arising from the interviews, see: M Thomson, B. Adams & J. Sartori, Ibid.


20 It should be pointed out that the majority of the moral and ethical dilemmas that participants confronted in operations occurred during the 1990s and as such might not accurately reflect the current CF organizational culture. While participant accounts may be historic, a factor like organizational culture will still be an important variable to consider when researching moral and ethical decision making in a military context.

21 A few participants described moral deliberations that lasted weeks.


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