

A close-up photograph of the American and Canadian flags. The American flag's stars and stripes are on the left, and the Canadian maple leaf is on the right. The flags are slightly wrinkled and overlap.

THE SAME YET DIFFERENT

**Continuity and Change in the
Canada-United States Post-9/11
Security Relationship**

by Bernard James Brister

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This work is dedicated to my parents,
Marion and Jim, who instilled in me a quest for excellence
and a refusal to accept personal limits.

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I am deeply indebted to a number of professionals who gave selflessly of their time and intellect to nudge, push, and sometimes carry me until I finally crossed the finish line for this book. Among those many individuals are Dr. Ronald G. Haycock, former Dean of Arts who inspired me, Dr. Paul Taillon, Adjunct Professor who motivated me, Dr. Joel J. Sokolsky, Principal of the Royal Military College who guided me, and Dr. David Haglund, Professor at Queen's University who challenged my every thought and conclusion.

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FOREWORD



The Canadian Defence Academy Press, in its continued attempt to increase the amount of relevant, contemporary discussion on the new security environment, is pleased to introduce *The Same Yet Different: Continuity and Change in the Canada-United States Post-9/11 Security Relationship* by Bernard James Brister. The focus of this work is to provide discussion on the evolution of this relationship through an exhaustive analysis of events and factors. This analysis indicates that although the relationship has remained fundamentally the same, it is also in some ways significantly different from its historical nature and form.

The Canada/United States relationship has remained the same in that it has been managed, at least on the Canadian side, through the use of three common policy threads throughout its history. These threads are: a policy of accommodation that involves the use of the twin strategies of “defence against help” and “quiet diplomacy;” a continuing reliance upon a rules-based institutional relationship for the management of day-to-day issues as well the resolution of differences and conflicts; and an ongoing need for Canadian governments to walk a political tightrope involving the maintenance of a precarious balance between the satisfaction of Canadian interests in the relationship and the maintenance of domestic support for it. These policies have had a determining influence on the nature and quality of the relationship as much by their avoidance as by their employment. That is to say that the relationship changes and is influenced both when the policies are effectively employed as well as when they are misapplied or not employed at all.

Other continuities that underlie and shape the employment of the common policy threads and the relationship itself include the issue of Canadian sovereignty as a concern that permeates every aspect of the relationship, and the ongoing maintenance of the “Kingston Dispensation” as a central tenet of the relationship as a whole.

Even within these similarities and historical consistencies however, the relationship has evolved in some new and significantly different ways. The most central of these changes include: the expansion of the security relationship beyond that of the military to include an infrastructure encompassing all aspects of security in the private and public sectors, American demands for unequivocal support for policies at home and abroad, and a shift in the nature of the Canadian participation in the physical security component of the relationship from discretionary to mandatory.

This volume makes a commendable contribution to an essential discussion regarding the historic evolution and contemporary complexity of the Canada-

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United States security relationship. Brister's study of the consistencies and changes, as well as their effects on the relationship, is complicated by the fact that both occur in close proximity to one another and in many cases have an influence on the same events and developments in the relationship. His analysis, through its emphasis on the evolution of Canadian/American affairs, from a period of unique historical significance (9/11 and its aftermath) to the 2010 Olympic Games in Vancouver, considers the implications for the future, and all eventualities it may bring.

In closing, I wish to reiterate the importance of this book in providing discussion on the subject of the new security relationship with our close ally and neighbour. At the Canadian Defence Academy Press, we hope that it in turn inspires additional discourse and thought on this subject. Your comments are always welcomed.

P.J. Forgues
Major-General
Commander
Canadian Defence Academy

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION



A New Type of War

At 8:46:40 Eastern Standard Time on 11 September 2001, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. All on board and an unknown number of people in the tower were killed instantly.¹ At 9:03:11, United Airlines Flight 75 struck the South Tower of the World Trade Center. All on board and an unknown number of people in the tower were killed instantly.² At 9:37:46, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon. All on board and an unknown number of military and civilian personnel on the ground were killed instantly.³ Shortly after 10:00, the passengers of United Flight 93 were successful in their efforts to prevent the hijackers of their aircraft from using it as a flying bomb. All on board were killed instantly when the aircraft crashed into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

Lieutenant-General E.A. Findley, a Canadian Air Force officer and the Operations Officer of North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), had spent the night of 10 September and the early morning hours of Tuesday the 11th in the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Centre (CMOC) engaged in a Cold War era training exercise entitled “Exercise Northern Denial.” The scenario for the exercise was a classic Cold War “stovepipe” scenario⁴: air force to air force and navy to navy operations involving a conventional external threat to continental North America. News broadcasts on the attacks began reaching the CMOC, located near Colorado Springs, Colorado, shortly before 9:00. Almost immediately thereafter operational reports from the Northeast Air Defence Sector (NEADS) began arriving. As he began what was to become a very long day overseeing the bi-national response to the first attack on North America in NORAD’s history, Lieutenant-General Findley recalls a feeling of fundamental change in the order of things.⁵

At approximately 9:45 that morning, the Federal Aviation Administration began the closure of American airspace and ordered the immediate landing of more than 4500 aircraft. Further, they advised that any aircraft presently en route to an American destination or any destination that routed it through American airspace would be denied access and must find a landing alternative. Shortly thereafter, families and communities at key locations throughout the Maritime provinces began opening their homes and coordinating the reception of thousands of stranded travellers for what they understood would be an indefinite period of time. The immediate, direct and voluntary participation by so many Canadians in response to an attack on the United States was unprecedented in American history.

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Later in the day, NORAD staff assigned to the Canadian NORAD Region (CANR) were faced with a commercial airliner from Korea that had ceased communicating with air traffic authorities and had failed to acknowledge the closure of American airspace or the instructions for it to land at Whitehorse in the Yukon Territory. For the first time in Canadian history, military officers and government officials had to consider the possibility of shooting down a commercial airliner filled with civilians in order to prevent a potentially greater loss of life on the ground.

Later in the day one of the Operations Officers in the NEADS command center was heard to remark, “This is a new type of war.”⁶

A Relationship in Hibernation

Notwithstanding the close cooperation that occurred throughout the military and civil security infrastructure at the tactical and operational levels⁷ on 9/11 and in the days that followed, the Canada-United States security relationship had appeared to be in a state of flux for some time prior to the events of that day.

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s had eliminated the common threat to North American security that had bound Canada and the United States together with a common purpose for almost fifty years. For almost a decade before the Cold War, the two nations had found common purpose in protecting their respective homelands from the dangers posed by the twin threats of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in the Second World War. Thus for over half a century during the Second World War and the Cold War that followed, they had each upheld the bargain initially set out by Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in what had come to be known as the “Kingston Dispensation.”⁸

The two leaders had formally established their historic understanding in August of 1938 when, during a speech at Queen’s University in Kingston Ontario, President Roosevelt declared that the United States would not stand idly by if the domination of Canadian soil were to be threatened by any other empire. For his part, Prime Minister King stated (several days later) that Canada would make itself as immune to attack as could be reasonably expected and that enemy forces would not be allowed to obtain access to the American homeland by way of Canada.⁹

Since that declaration, both countries had maintained their respective parts of the bargain through the Second World War and the long years of the Cold War that had followed.¹⁰ At the end of the Cold War however, the two allies found themselves without a common threat upon which to focus; while the security relationship and the historic dispensation that defined it did not disappear, it can reasonably be considered to have atrophied through lack of use and focus.

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Moreover, in the immediate post-Cold War era of the 1990s, there was a curious phenomenon that emerged amongst traditional American allies, Canada included. American power had safeguarded the Western world from threats to its security and prosperity from the early days of the Second World War until the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. During that period, it had been unspoken policy for many of the nations relying upon America for security (France being one exception among others) to align their own national policies with those of the United States on major issues of security and economics. They were inclined to do so because the Western world, to a considerable extent, had existed under the umbrella of global American power. The continued need of smaller, less powerful nations among the Western allies for inclusion under the American security umbrella encouraged, if not outright support for American global policies, at least a reluctance to openly criticize or break with the American position on fundamental economic and security issues.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent lack of any significant strategic threat to Western peace, stability, or prosperity (and the consequent absence of any need for American power to offset such a threat) had two major effects amongst America's western allies, particularly those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). One of these effects was an expansion of NATO in size, mandate, and operational tempo. This development was the exact opposite of what many expected to happen. In the absence of the unifying influence of the Soviet threat to Western Europe, many had expected that the NATO partnership would weaken, atrophy, fall into disuse and ultimately disintegrate.

The second effect of the end of the Cold War was a loosening of the ties between America's policy agenda and those of many of its Cold War NATO allies. This resulted in a growing pattern of divergence between American global policy leadership in the Western world and the strategic policy preferences of a number of their traditional allies.

Policy differences and disagreements began to appear between Europe and the United States on a number of issues from Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo to the integration of Eastern Europe into the Western alliance. It appeared that many of the original NATO partners no longer felt either compelled or obligated to maintain support for policies that paralleled the American policy agenda. American allies did not foresee the need for security assistance from the United States in the near future; however, should such a need arise, they were confident that American self-interest would motivate involvement on behalf of its European allies. In either case, Western nations enjoyed a level of freedom in strategic policy-making that they had not exercised since prior to the Second World War.

This is not to say that the system of American alliances shrank during this period. Rather, it expanded significantly as many former Eastern Bloc nations, recently freed from Soviet domination, rushed for shelter under the American security umbrella. These countries sought affiliation with NATO through

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participation in NATO subsets including the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Mediterranean Dialogue states as the first step to full membership either for security reasons or as an initial step to closer relations with the European Community (EC) in a bid for increased economic security and prosperity. The point here is that the Western alliance became both larger and looser as the initial *raison d'être* for its existence dissolved before it.

In Canada, both of these developments were experienced in full measure. Canadian troops and members of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) played major security, diplomatic and developmental roles in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Deployments of the Canadian Forces abroad increased throughout the decade of the 90s and into the new millennium, with a gradual transition taking place from traditional peacekeeping to stability operations to peacemaking and, most recently, to war-fighting in a counter-insurgency context. In this respect, the Canada-United States relationship had not changed – the front line for Canada was still overseas as it had always been, and the acid-test of the relationship in American eyes was still the Canadian willingness to deploy overseas in support of policies that were in agreement with those of America.

While employing the military in support of its foreign policies to an almost unprecedented level since the Korean conflict more than half a century prior, the Canadian government elected not to emphasize to the public that a number of these missions came about either at the request of our American allies, or were directly in support of a Canadian policy that paralleled an American policy. The deployment of Canadian resources in support of American policies or parallel Canadian ones, as evidenced by the Canadian commitment in Afghanistan, is as common today as it was both during and immediately after the Cold War.¹¹

At the same time that Canadian policy-makers were contributing resources to NATO and other operations that supported or complemented some American policies abroad however, they were also pursuing initiatives that specifically undermined and opposed other American policies. Examples include the brokerage of a new treaty on the use of landmines and support for an International Criminal Court, both of which were at odds with American policy.

Domestically, NORAD struggled to maintain its relevance as a security mechanism, casting about for para-military operational tasks, such as counter-narcotics operations, while at the same time maintaining an air defence capability focused outwards on the remnants of the traditional bomber threat. The struggle to remain relevant proved especially difficult because NORAD operations had always been somewhat of a security backwater for both Canada and the United States.¹² As mentioned earlier, Canada has a long tradition of expeditionary operations intended to establish a degree of forward security for its interests at home and abroad. For its part, America has always had sufficient resources

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to defend the continent unilaterally, preferring that Canada deploy its forces overseas in support of its policies rather than keeping them at home to secure the continent.¹³

These factors, combined with the fact that Canada's major contribution to NORAD had addressed a manned bomber threat which had been decreasing from the late 1950s and was at a historical low with the demise of the Soviet Union, raised questions about the continuing relevance or value of the organization in contributing to the quality of the security relationship between the two countries. The absence of a viable threat to the continent and the profile of some of the other off-shore security concerns inevitably pushed those of continental security issues in general and NORAD issues in particular much further down on both the Canadian and American list of priorities.

Two other historically important aspects of the security relationship, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) and the Military Coordination Committee (MCC) were in similar straits. Both groups continued to meet semi-annually, as they had since the Second World War, but the agendas were lacklustre, and follow-up actions on topics of discussion were neither focused nor aggressive. More and more of the attention of the participants was occupied by the opportunity to get away from the office for a few days rather than on the resolution of key issues affecting the collective security of both nations.¹⁴

The continental military relationship between Canada and the United States did not collapse in this period but it certainly fell into disuse. The mechanisms of the relationship and the myriad of personal contacts and professional relationships that had supported what is seen by many as the most complex security relationship in the world were not exercised and, like a muscle that is never used, these elements atrophied and became weak.

In the absence of any rationale to support the presence of the security relationship at the forefront of the collective national consciousness, the social, cultural, and economic issues of the time crowded out existing security concerns as well as those that were developing on the periphery. The absence of a credible ballistic missile threat to the continent had pushed the historically sensitive issue of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) firmly into the background of the relationship. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was working well for Canada. Business was booming and trade with the United States was on a steady upward trend. The economic relationship was increasing in size and complexity almost on a daily basis and there was much talk of the "disappearing border" between the two countries. To a very real extent then, national pre-occupation with other issues overshadowed evolving security issues and prevented them from being addressed or in some cases even recognised.

As the millennium came to an end however, there were significant signs of an approaching threat to western if not global peace and stability. But the

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unconventional and asymmetric nature of Islamist extremism was not recognized for the threat it posed, cloaked as it was in the guise of tactical level insurgent, guerrilla, revolutionary, or terrorist operations. Domestic, national and bilateral security initiatives relating to this threat were not highly placed on national agendas and thus went unfunded in favour of other government spending priorities. Legislation intended to strengthen the powers of the security infrastructure was deemed too restrictive to individual freedoms for the times and if tabled at all, was defeated in Parliament/Congress.

The mechanisms of the Canada-United States security relationship appeared to be operating at a decreased tempo as governments and populations on both sides of the border focused their attention and financial resources on other issues. Although it would have been unlikely in the extreme for the security relationship to have collapsed completely or dissolved, it was entirely likely that, in the absence of any tangible threat or any national or bilateral will to keep it functioning on a robust and aggressive level, it could have gone into a state of hibernation.

Running Both Hot and Cold

At first, the events of 9/11 appeared to reverse the trend towards hibernation in the security relationship. At the tactical level, the response to the attacks on both sides of the border was immediate and sustained throughout the civil and the military security infrastructure. Individuals at many levels compensated for gaps in experience or established procedure and accomplished things in minutes, hours, or days that would have taken weeks, months, or would have been completely unsupported just days prior if they had been pursued on the basis of existing policy or national will at the time.

The reality at the operational and strategic level however was quite different. While the American political and governmental machine went into high gear, at first calming and then motivating the public towards an aggressive response to the attack on the homeland, Canada focused on maintaining the viability of the economic lifeline with the United States. While America focused on the physical security of its homeland, Canada focused on its economic security. Former Deputy Prime Minister John Manley served as the locus for the Canadian Government's response to 9/11 and of the Canadian efforts to influence the evolving American policies resulting from the attack. He coordinated the response of the civil and military security infrastructure with a string of initiatives, proposals, and access policies intended to pre-empt American reactions that might have provided a perception of short term physical security for America but would also have produced longer term negative economic consequences for both Canada and the United States. Manley's intent was thus to assuage American concerns about physical security while addressing the primary Canadian concern regarding its economic security – the maintenance of trade.

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It was his robust response to American security concerns, among which was the Smart Borders proposal that remains the foundation of Canada-United States border security measures, that reassured the Americans that their northern ally was taking the threat to the American homeland seriously. It also reassured the Americans that measures to enhance continental and therefore American security were a priority for the Canadian government and its people. These actions convinced the Americans that they could reduce the pressure on what was becoming a very restrictive border membrane while still maintaining an acceptable level of security against this newly identified threat. As this membrane relaxed somewhat, the Canadian economy and significant portions of the American economy re-established the life-giving flow of economic activity that allowed both sides of the border to begin their recovery and to therefore avoid a disastrous economic backlash resulting from the attacks.

Under Manley's continued guidance security cooperation at the tactical level remained at the high level of effectiveness it had established on 9/11. He also continued to guide the implementation of the operational level (to do with continental security overall) policies and actions that kept the border open and the lifeblood of the Canadian economy – trade with America – flowing. But what of the strategic or national level political and public responses?

When Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty¹⁵ was invoked shortly after the 9/11 attacks, all of the NATO allies were compelled to come to the assistance of the United States, a circumstance that had never been realistically anticipated at any point in the history of the alliance. Canada immediately began to commit military forces in support of the Article 5 response that eventually included air, land and naval assets that rivalled the deployments of the Korean War half a century previously. The domestic Canadian public mood of the time – that their American ally had been attacked by a foe hiding in Afghanistan – and the full support of all of the NATO allies, made the deployment of Canadian troops into a war-fighting scenario within an American-led coalition a domestically supportable move for the government. Subsequent events however quickly turned what could have been a reprise of Cold War bilateral solidarity into a slowly deteriorating morass of American unilateralism and resurgent Canadian anti-Americanism.

Shortly after 9/11, the American military had been reassigned its Revolutionary War task of continental security. In this capacity they had approached Canadian military planners with a concept for the integrated all-domain military defence of the continent using a model similar to that of NORAD.¹⁶ Canadian public opinion however, after briefly peaking in favour of closer military cooperation with the United States on defence issues immediately after 9/11, had cooled considerably in the ensuing months.¹⁷

Dire warnings of the loss of sovereignty over Canadian territory and control over our own military and even social policies by Michael Byers and former

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Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy began to sway public opinion away from the initial positive perspective towards military and security cooperation that existed in the days and weeks immediately following the events of 9/11.¹⁸ The government, led by former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, chose to remain silent on the issue and in the absence of a public voice to counter the anti-American rhetoric opposing a closer military security relationship, domestic opinion gradually turned against any thought of enhancing the security of the continent through such an arrangement.¹⁹ With public opinion clearly against the idea, the government declared that Canada would not be considering a closer bi-national military relationship with the United States at that time.

As a compromise to the American proposal, and possibly in order to maintain the renewed sense of close cooperation engendered in other areas by the events and reactions to 9/11, a Bi-National Planning Group (BPG) was formed with military representatives from both nations to study the ways in which Canada-United States military cooperation might be enhanced in the future. In the meantime however, America maintained its steamroller-like pace and intensity of military security infrastructure development while Canada watched and considered its options from the military security sidelines.

Events subsequent to this development served only to intensify the downward spiral of the relationship in some areas. As the dimensions of the American-inspired “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) grew ever larger, bellicose statements of American resolve and determination were made that were intended to first stabilize and then increase domestic American support for the spectrum of that nation’s responses to the 9/11 attacks. At the same time however these responses began to destabilize allied support for the GWOT. While the governments of many American allies did support the war in Iraq, it is also true that the degree, type, and nature of that support was influenced and reduced by the widespread negative reaction of the domestic publics to the American policies and actions at the time. Sympathy and a willingness to give America the collective benefit of the doubt on some issues associated with the conduct of post-9/11 military operations began to give way to a certain scepticism regarding American strategy and intentions. When this was met by rather blunt, unhelpful, and inaccurate American responses and a stated willingness to proceed unilaterally if need be, the sympathy and common sense of purpose among the NATO allies that had characterized the immediate post-9/11 American-led coalition in the GWOT began to melt away.

In Canada this trend evidenced itself most clearly in the period preceding the invasion of Iraq by an American-led coalition of forces in March 2003. The Canadian public was generally unconvinced of the American rationale for the invasion although support for a traditional ally appeared to keep public opinion for and against Canadian participation in the war in almost equal measure. The position of the Canadian government was that Canada would not support or participate in operations against Iraq unless the United Nations also supported

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the venture. Running counter to this public stream of events against the war was a low profile, government-sanctioned process of planning and discussion with the American military that was intended to determine the parameters of the most effective Canadian contribution to the coalition, should one be authorized.

As American rhetoric towards those NATO allies uncommitted to the coalition became more heated and negative, Canadian public opinion gradually solidified against Canadian participation in the invasion.²⁰ The final Canadian government decision not to participate in the operations against Iraq was announced in Parliament just days before the invasion began to the applause of many of the members of the House of Commons.²¹

While the decision itself caught American policy-makers and military commanders somewhat by surprise, a number of observers contend that the real damage to the relationship that occurred was a result of the way in which the decision was conveyed to the world and to the Americans. The Canadian decision was announced, following a period of somewhat unprofessional behaviour among some parliamentarians and extended vacillation by the government, in public, with a moralizing tone, and without a prior leader-to-leader consultation on the issue.²² The events unfolded in a way that maximized domestic support for the Canadian government, at least in the short term, and appeared to match the hurtful American approach to the relationship with an equally hurtful Canadian one. The rather cool relationship between the two leaders, Prime Minister Chrétien and President George W. Bush, became quite cold on both sides of the border as a result of this issue and how it was handled.

The distinct chill that entered the public relationship at the strategic political level however appeared to be in direct contrast to the quality of the overall military and security one being coordinated at the operational and tactical levels – by the same governments who apparently could not get along in public. The strategic level discord may well have impeded some developments in the operational and tactical levels of the relationship but within the politically allowed limits of the relationship, security officials on both sides of the border, in and out of the military, were working together at an unprecedented pace and intensity.

The period of incipient hibernation immediately before 9/11 had given way to equal and opposite reactions at the strategic versus operational and tactical levels of the relationship. Notwithstanding the fact that the close cooperation at the operational and tactical levels could not have occurred without some degree of explicit authorization at the strategic political level, the personal and political positions of the two leaders, key to the growth and vitality of any relationship, could not have been further apart.²³ Thus it appeared that the Canada-United States security relationship, as evidenced by the events described here, was running simultaneously both hot and cold.

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Into the Sunshine?

The retirement of Jean Chrétien and the assumption by Paul Martin of the leadership of the country appeared to herald a warming trend in the chill that had overtaken the strategic political aspects of the Canada-United States relationship. Public statements by the newly minted Prime Minister identified the importance of the Canada-United States relationship.²⁴ These sentiments were echoed in the nation's first ever national security policy published in April 2004 that also contained a renewal of and recommitment to the "Kingston Dispensation" of 1938.²⁵

Early hopes for a warming in the relationship however were dashed when the brash, impatient operating style of the American President evidenced itself in public statements regarding Canada's anticipated role in continental BMD.²⁶ In making his statements, the President was either unaware of or had chosen to ignore the historic domestic Canadian opposition to BMD dating back to the 1960s and similarly had chosen to ignore, or was unaware of, the traditional use of quiet diplomacy between the two nations on issues of great sensitivity to one national public or the other.

Notwithstanding the historic public opposition to direct Canadian participation in BMD, Canadian officials had been making overtures to the American government for several years indicating that if approached they would probably join the program, thus enhancing and strengthening both the BMD program and the defence relationship between the two countries. A major step towards a BMD partnership was taken in August 2004 under Prime Minister Martin when Canada and the United States signed an amendment to the NORAD operating procedures allowing the flow of BMD information through the NORAD Integrated Threat Warning and Attack Assessment (ITWAA) system.²⁷

Nonetheless early in 2005, the issue became a very public one with the anti-American lobby in Canada resurrecting a litany of dated arguments against the BMD program, recalling the alleged horrors of former President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and the earlier Cold War strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Statements pressuring Canada to join BMD made by President Bush served to inflame feelings against his administration and this quickly translated into opposition to the concept of Canadian participation in continental BMD, regardless of the strategic political and security value that such participation might have entailed for Canada.²⁸

As with the issue of closer military cooperation in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, public opinion was turned against Canadian participation in BMD with a barrage of criticism and arguments that went unanswered by the government. Gauging public opinion in a minority government situation, the government eventually made a public announcement that Canada would not participate in the BMD program.²⁹

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Again, as had been done with the decision not to participate in the invasion of Iraq, the Prime Minister elected not to advise the President of the decision of the Canadian government before it was announced publicly. When the announcement did come, it was again made in Parliament in a moralizing tone, to the cheers of a number of Parliamentarians.³⁰ It appeared to many on both sides of the border that America had once again been led “down the garden path” and then publicly humiliated for short-term political gain by a government unwilling to publicly defend what it had privately supported.³¹ It was not the decision itself that rankled in the minds of many because as with the aborted concept of a closer NORAD style military cooperation floated after 9/11, American policy and progress along an established course of action was uninfluenced by the Canadian decision. The major irritant regarding this issue was again the manner in which the decision was conveyed. A number of observers and participants felt that it simply was not the way one ally should treat another. Thus the strategic personal and political relationship between the two leaders continued to cool, while the military and security one continued apace.

The relationship news was always bad however. Before leaving office, the Liberal government had started to increase defence spending and made a major commitment to a combat role in Afghanistan. As Stein and Lang note, this was in part an effort to restore the relationship battered by the Iraq and BMD decisions.³² The April 2005 international policy statement, “A Role of Pride and Influence in the World,” supported significant aspects of the Bush doctrine including the pursuit of terrorists overseas and dealing with fragile and failed states as a means of countering terrorism.³³

When the Liberals did leave office after their election defeat, the arrival of the Conservatives in 2006 was heralded by many as the beginning of a renaissance in the Canada-United States relationship. By many others however, most notably the anti-American lobby in Canada, it was seen as an approaching abdication of our sovereignty and the loss of everything held dear by Canadians.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper put his full support and significant government funding behind a number of the former Liberal government security commitments and policies to bring them to fruition ahead of schedule. He also advanced the previous government’s plans to fund capital purchases of military equipment that are contributing to the capability of the Canadian Forces for the fulfillment of its responsibilities under the international policy statement. In spite of these developments under both the Liberal and Conservative governments however, the Harper government has faced frequent and periodic criticism that many of their actions are simply pandering to the Americans, notwithstanding the fact that many of the policies under criticism are extensions of those of the previous government. At the same time, those policy responses that appear to diverge from those of American policies, such as those dealing with the sanctity of NAFTA and Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, were carefully ignored by their critics.

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There were however two things that changed in the strategic nature of the relationship after the Conservatives took power in 2006. The first was that there was an absence of undisciplined criticism and moralizing by parliamentarians for what had appeared in the past to be temporary domestic political advantage. The second was that the anti-American lobby apparently lost its ability to influence government actions and achieve results for their agenda simply by associating a Canadian policy and initiative with that of an American one. When challenged on issues that contain implications for Canadian sovereignty, the government was quick to explain and defend its actions.

Yet another development that will influence the nature of the Canada-United States relationship is the election of Barack Obama to the presidency of the United States. With President Obama's commitment to a renewal of America's principled leadership in the world and the removal of the souring influence of George W. Bush on domestic Canadian perceptions of the relationship, it may well be that the Canada-United States strategic security relationship is coming out from under a cloud and into the sunshine.

The Central Issue

Is the Canada-United States security relationship indeed improving? Has it come from a low point and is now gaining new strength? Exactly what has transpired in the relationship as a result of the relationship events since the tragic day of September 11, 2001? Are the two nations breaking new ground, are they repeating past errors, or are they mired in the reality of domestic politics, moving neither forward nor backward?

To answer these questions one must first examine the evolution of the Canada-United States security relationship. The timeframe under analysis in this book includes the events from 9/11 forward to an examination of the relationship as it has been shaped by a number of strategic and continental issues including the security implications for the relationship of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games. In order to obtain a useful perspective of the security relationship, it will be considered within the context of the entire Canada-United States history of security interaction from the early days of the American Revolutionary War. The Games have been selected as a milestone in the evolution of the relationship as they will be the first comprehensive opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the policies, strategies, plans and preparations that have formed the basis of its post-9/11 reality.

The examination and analysis of the Canada-United States security relationship will aptly illustrate its paradoxical nature, that the contemporary (post-9/11) relationship is the same, yet different from the historical one. To paraphrase Robert Kagan in his book, *Of Paradise and Power*, on the day of and in the years subsequent to the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, the Canada-United States security relationship did not change – it became more

of itself.³⁴ Much of what has happened in the relationship and how it has been managed since 9/11 reflects continuities with the past.

From a number of policy threads running through the history of the relationship, three are considered of primary importance in acquiring a nuanced understanding of the relationship and how it is managed by Canada. The first common thread is the policy of accommodation that involves the use of the twin strategies of “defence against help” and “quiet diplomacy.” The second thread is a continuing reliance upon a rules-based institutional relationship for the management of day to day issues as well the resolution of differences and conflicts.

The last common thread is the ongoing need for Canadian governments to walk a political tightrope. In this last thread, it will be shown that governments must often balance a values-based domestic perspective against a pragmatic or interests-based international one that maximizes the benefits to be derived from the relationship without being accused of being “too close” to America and thereby threatening perceptions of national sovereignty. These common threads form an integral part of the Canada-United States security relationship throughout its history and continue to represent both essential tools and fundamental characteristics of the relationship in the post 9/11 era that not only help to understand the relationship, but to anticipate its future course and development.

Yet even as these common threads provide continuity and even predictability to the relationship, this same relationship has also changed and arguably intensified in a manner that has never been seen before. The events of 9/11 and the nature of the threat that those attacks represent have significantly changed the relationship in three ways:

1. It is no longer dominated by the military aspects of national security. Instead, the non-military aspects have come to the fore and occupy the place of primary concern in the minds of politicians and leaders on both sides of the border;
2. America’s perceived state of vulnerability has created an atmosphere of insecurity within America such that the United States is less inclined to accept the sometimes schizophrenic nature of the historic Canada-United States relationship. Americans now require consistent and unequivocal support for their security agenda at home and of their policies abroad; and
3. The nature of the threats to continental security and by inference to the security of the United States has altered the nature of Canadian participation in continental security measures such that what used to be discretionary participation has become critical and arguably mandatory.

So while there are a number of common threads that run through the history of the relationship, it is also true that there is somewhat less latitude or

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discretion for Canada in terms of the nature, type, and extent of participation than had been the case in the past. The increasing complexity of the security relationship is highlighted by the fact that demonstrations of the degree to which it is “the same, yet different” will occur almost simultaneously using the same events and timeframes.

There have been a number of events and evolutions in policy in the years following 9/11 that have punctuated the changes in the specifics of the security relationship. Although there has been an abundance of political rhetoric and posturing on the state of the relationship since 9/11, there was never a definitive measure or indicator of the actual state of the Canada-United States security relationship. The renewal of the NORAD Agreement in May 2006 had been touted as the next major indicator of the state and quality of the Canada-United States security relationship, yet when it occurred it provided no such indication. Renewed in perpetuity with a provision for periodic review, the renewal process provided no tangible clues as to the relative strength or weakness of the relationship. Rather, the entire process appeared to involve more symbolism than substance.

As such it was the 2010 Winter Olympic Games that finally provided the end-state measure of the changes and effectiveness that by 2010 had been in effect for almost a decade since they were initiated by the events of 9/11. It is this event therefore that will serve as the end point of the examination and analysis of the reality of the relationship and as a start point for consideration of its future.

The primary focus of this examination and analysis is on the Canadian perspectives and issues as they pertain to the evolution of the relationship from a period of unique historical significance (9/11 and its aftermath) to a test of that relationship in the 2010 Olympic Games that serves as a bellwether for its future strength and longevity. Thus while American positions, issues, and concerns are presented, they are put forward within the context of Canadian issues and concerns. The purpose will be to document and explain the evolution of events that have challenged the basis of the Canada-United States security relationship and will form the infrastructure of its future – not to defend or criticize the relationship itself.

The issue of the influence of the Obama administration will come up frequently throughout this work. The events and perspectives gained from the opening gambits of his administration may appear to provide a picture of the relationship that runs counter to some of the arguments put forward. There is however, a danger in dismissing researched arguments that document the evolution of a relationship spanning more than a century based upon a couple of years of anecdotal information. Thus, while due attention will be given to relatively recent developments in relationship issues, these will be weighed against established, longer-term trends and the reality that American Presidents actually have little flexibility when it comes to policies influencing the security of the American homeland and its citizens.

The first step in the examination of the Canada-United States security relationship will be the establishment of a common interpretation of several terms and issues that are central to the acquisition of a nuanced understanding of Canadian perspectives on it.

Endnotes

1. American Airlines transcript of Michael Woodward Interview, 25 Jan 2004 in National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company), 7.
2. Flight path study, NTSB Report-United Airlines 175, 19 Feb 2002 in National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 8.
3. Flight path study, NTSB Report-American Airlines Flight 77, 19 Feb 2002 in National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 10.
4. The term “stovepipe” is frequently used, as in this case, to denote simple relationships and interactions neatly categorized according to some basic and unchanging principle with little thought or effort devoted to addressing variations, other contributing factors, or evolutions from the basic theme that might increase the complexity or degree of the security threat.
5. Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) E.A. Findley, former Deputy Commander of NORAD. Calgary, 3 May 2006.
6. NEADS audio file, Identification technician position, recorder 1, channel 4, 10:02:22. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 46.
7. For the purposes of this work, consideration of the security infrastructure will occur at three levels. The tactical level is where individuals and teams interact directly with the security environment, with the public and with the security threats as they present themselves. The operational level is where government and military departments, commands, and organizations interact to turn government policy into operational plans and actions on both sides of the border. The strategic level is that at which government policy is formulated, monitored and maintained. Within the context of the events of 9/11, those actions and reactions that addressed specific issues or events such as aircraft intercepts would be considered as tactical activities. Actions at the operational level are intended to influence theatres of operations and the movement of large groupings of material and resources. In the context of the events of 9/11, the overall response at the continental level would be considered as the operational level reaction to the events of the day. Actions at the strategic level encompass global issues and events. The strategic level is the first one at which government policy is first translated into tangible plans and procedures to achieve the stated policy goals and objectives. In the context of the events of 9/11, the combined response domestically, continentally, and eventually internationally represents the strategic reaction to the attacks of 9/11.
8. Michel Fortmann and David G. Haglund. “Canada and the Issue of Homeland Security: Does the Kingston Dispensation Still Hold?” *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2002): 18.
9. Desmond Morton. *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to the Gulf War*. 3rd ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992), 176-177; Michel Fortmann and David Haglund, “Canada and the Issue of Homeland Security: Does the Kingston Dispensation Still Hold?” *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2002): 18.
10. From the American view in terms of aerospace defence Canada had not always been a good ally because it had allowed its military to be reduced. Fortunately, a major air threat had not developed and once missiles became the threat, Canadian territory and aerospace defence assets were not as critical to American security interests.

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11. Canadian deployments to the Suez in 1956 and to Cyprus in 1963 were intended to stabilize the western alliance against the Soviet Union as much or more than for humanitarian purposes. Other deployments in the Cold War and post-Cold War period of the 1990s served in a number of cases to represent western interests in a region or situation where an American presence would be intolerable and in other cases to add legitimacy to an overseas mission that could be justified in Canada on humanitarian grounds but which served American and/or western interests internationally. Sean Maloney. "Helpful Fixer or Hired Gun: Why Canada Goes Overseas." IRPP Conference, *Challenges to Governance: Military Interventions Abroad and Consensus at Home*. (Montreal, Nov. 2000).

12. Although critical to the security of the North American continent throughout the Cold War, the NORAD aspect of the Canada-United States relationship was relatively trouble-free in comparison to other issues and events taking place in other parts of the world at the time. As such, both Canada and the United States devoted a greater part of their national policy attention to other issues and NORAD received relatively little attention.

13. This was the case even during the Second World War prior to the American entry into the war. One of the major objectives of both leaders had been to free Canadian military resources for the defence of Great Britain following the evacuation of Dunkirk in June 1940. Stéphane Roussel. *The North American Democratic Peace*, 150-151.

14. Senior Officer "N" assigned to ADM POL at NDHQ, Ottawa, 3 May 2007.

15. Article 5 states that an attack on one member of the organization is to be considered as an attack on all members. This was a curious and unforeseen invocation of this measure as it had originally been intended to bring America and Canada to the assistance of their European allies in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union and its satellites and not of the smaller members to the assistance of the superpower anchor of the alliance. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *The North Atlantic Treaty*. Washington D.C.: April 4, 1949. <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>.

16. Michael Byers. "Canadian Armed Forces Under United States Command." *International Journal*. (Winter 2002-2003): 91.

17. Majority (73%) Agree that Canada Should Join the United States and Also Declare War on International Terrorism. Ipsos Poll, 21 September 2001. <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/results.cfm?geo=1>.

18. Majority (85%) support making changes to create a joint North American security perimeter. Ipsos Poll, 30 September, 2001. <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/results.cfm?geo=1>.

19. It is important to differentiate between legitimate criticism of an American act or policy and the concept of anti-Americanism. Generally speaking the critique of a particular act or policy based upon tangible and/or measurable facts may be considered fair comment. However the general demonization of an entire population or nation based upon an interpretation of events that is clearly subjective can and should be considered anti-American and of little value or utility in assessing whether or not a particular policy or proposal is in the national interest. The issue of anti-Americanism will be the subject of a more detailed discussion and analysis in chapter 2.

20. 67% Cdns did not approve of unilateral American action in Iraq. Ipsos Poll February 7, 2003. <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/results.cfm?geo=1>.

21. Chretien says Canada will not join war on Iraq. Tuesday March 18, 2003. CTV News Online. http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1047929183714_41?hub=TopStories

22. Canadian official called Bush 'a moron'. CBC News Online November 26, 2002. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2002/11/21/moron021121.html>. Parrish apologizes again for American 'bastards' remark. CBC News Online February 28, 2003. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2002/11/21/moron021121.html>

23. The role and influence of personalities in the Canada-United States security relationship is an interesting one. Generally it could be said that personalities shape issues but do not determine their outcome. They may provide context for an issue or outcome but will not determine the nature of a decision

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or relationship event on their own. Examples of this are Diefenbaker and Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Mulroney and Reagan with SDI, and Chrétien and Bush with Iraq. In all three cases there were external factors that both created the relationship issue and decisively influenced its outcome. But also in all three cases, the nature of the personal relationship between the two leaders influenced how the decisions were conveyed and the quality of the relationship at the time.

24. Smoothing the bumps in the road. CBC Online. January 7, 2004. http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/canada_us/pms-presidents.html.

25. "...our second national security interest is to ensure that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies." Canada. *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*. Privy Council Office. (Ottawa: April 2004), 5.

26. Bush pressured Martin over missile plan: report. CBC Online. January 24, 2005. http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/canada_us/pms-presidents.html

27. NORAD change isn't step toward joining missile defence: Graham. CBC News Online August 6, 2004. http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/canada_us/pms-presidents.html.

28. Bush visit spurs questions over Canadian involvement in missile defence. CBC Online November 29, 2004. http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/us_missiledefence/newsarchive.html Bush pressured Martin over missile plan: report. CBC Online. January 24, 2005. http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/canada_us/pms-presidents.html.

29. Canadians protest against missile defence system. CBC News Online October 2, 2004 http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/us_missiledefence/newsarchive.html. Missile defence for coalition of idiots: Liberal MP. CBC News Online. August 25, 2004. http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/us_missiledefence/newsarchive.html.

30. Canada won't join missile defence plan. CBC News Online. February 24, 2005. <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2005/02/24/missile-reax050224.html>.

31. Missile. CBC News Online February 24, 2005. <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2005/02/24/missile-reax050224.html>

32. Janice Stein and Eugene Lang. *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*. (Toronto: Penguin Group, 2007), 68-72.

33. Canada. *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence. Canada's International Policy Statement*. Ottawa: 2005.

34. Robert Kagan. *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*. (New York: Knopf, 2003), 85.

CHAPTER 2: SOME RELATIONSHIP FUNDAMENTALS



A Security Community

The starting point for the examination of the Canada-United States security relationship will be the concept of a “security community” put forth by Stéphane Roussel. Roussel contends that the cooperative and peaceful nature of the Canada-United States relationship is due to the fact that both countries are liberal democracies and have acknowledged each other as such.¹ On this basis, the relationship has evolved from one of armed conflict, to peaceful co-existence with violent undertones, to improvised cooperation addressing issues of the moment, and finally to structured cooperation based upon liberal democratic norms and institutions. The history of the relationship should thus be seen as evolutionary rather than cyclical.²

The relationship is not unique in that it is quite similar to the west European security community that is also based upon the concept of a liberal order. Unlike the European version however, it is not defined by formal statements as much as by practices. This feature in the North American case allows for a maximum of latitude in each partner’s individual security policy. It is a convergence of values that explains the commonalities in security policy that exist between the two countries rather than adherence to a regulatory regime.³

The influence of liberal democratic norms in the Canada-United States security relationship is geographically limited to the continental security arena. Despite the desires and even the claims of Canadian diplomats, there is no evidence to suggest that there exists a “special relationship” that provides Canada with influence over American security policy in general. Thus the limits of Roussel’s position are those issues pertaining exclusively to the bilateral relationship. Broader issues of security that are influenced by factors external to the continent may be influenced by liberal democratic principles but not nearly to the extent that continental bilateral issues are. On issues that involve extra-continental issues, Roussel states that multilateral fora such as the United Nations (UN) and NATO are the forum of choice.⁴

Some evidence of this fact is contained in the relationship difficulties experienced by Canada in the Second World War⁵, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Yom Kippur War – all events that threatened the fundamental security of the United States and all events where American behaviour within the relationship was shaped by external, extra-continental events and concerns. Thus it might also be concluded that the liberal democratic principles that, according to Roussel, so

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dominate the relationship in some bilateral instances, do not exert a determining influence in situations that involve the fundamental security of the United States.

There is some support for this position from Roussel himself in his description of the difficulties encountered in the relationship following the attacks of 9/11. America appears to have abandoned the liberal democratic principles that had guided the relationship to date and began to press for a realist approach that implied the use of American power when and as necessary with the only role for others being one of support and compliance or designation as an enemy.⁶ This new phase in the relationship of security integration awoke Canadian fears of American domination of their society and of a loss of sovereignty that could mean the “end” of Canada. Canadian doubts and insecurities regarding the extent to which the American system of government adheres to liberal democratic principles, first raised by the Conservatives and Imperialists in the early years of the relationship, have returned in the contemporary era with issues such as the Patriot Act, Guantanamo Bay prisons, the policy of rendition, and a perceived domination of Washington policy-making by the oil industry.⁷ In a similar vein, the evolution of Northern Command (Northcom) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) do not promise to follow the pattern of the relationship that has developed over the last century and as such appear to be pushing it backward rather than forward. Notwithstanding promises to reverse American policy on a number of these issues, the Obama administration has yet to distinctively differentiate itself from the previous one on any major security issue.

The existence of a Canada-United States security community therefore should not imply that there is ongoing harmony, unity of purpose, or the absence of any conflict or of disagreements. Rather, as Roussel documents in his work, *The North American Democratic Peace* it is clear that there have always been some difficulties in the relationship and as a consequence, it is likely that this trend will continue into the future.

This underlines the fact that even a community needs tending in order to minimize disagreements in the first place and then to resolve those that actually occur. And while the liberal democratic institutional structure that has evolved within the relationship is an ideal vehicle for the resolution of internal relationship issues, it may not be as singularly valuable in the resolution of those issues arising from differing perceptions of an external threat to the fundamental security interests of one or both partners.

The Canada-United States security community is prone to disagreements in this regard because, while the two countries have similar values and interests, share a common geography and systems of governance, and in many cases are subjected to similar threats, they do not necessarily have a shared vision of the most appropriate response to those threats or a common understanding of their prioritization on the respective national agendas. This results from the fact that

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notwithstanding the similarities, the relationship is a lopsided one in terms of size, economic power and military strength and is differentiated by specific differences in the goals and objectives that result in turn from differences in the values, interests, and perspectives that exist between two similar peoples.

One could argue that it is because Americans see Canadians as sharing their norms and values that some in the United States have, from time to time, been unable to understand why Canada has not done more to protect those values. Indeed, given the difficulties in the contemporary era of the relationship noted by Roussel, it could also be argued that the United States no longer sees the relationship as a community, or if it does it is one where America does things for Canada while prompting it to contribute what it feels is a more equitable share of the inputs. When Canadian territory and policy (foreign and domestic) have been seen as being important to American security, Washington has let it be known that it wants (and expects) to see and in the majority of cases Canada has responded positively and cooperatively. They have sometimes responded with “just enough” and other times, as in the post-9/11 case that will be discussed later, with more than enough in both quantity and timing. The United States has and will continue to do what it sees is in its best security and economic interests. Fortunately, Canada shares many of those interests and together the confluence of values and interests makes a security community possible. But it does depend, as the “Kingston Dispensation” makes clear, on Canada responding to specific American interests, and not just sharing its values.

The “Kingston Dispensation” would not work if the two countries did not share fundamental values. But when Roosevelt made his speech at Queen’s University in Kingston in 1938, he was concerned that Canadian security weaknesses (notwithstanding the shared values) would place America at risk. The values the two countries share are important to how the relationship functions at all levels; strategic, operational, and tactical. The level and quality of cooperation between the bureaucracies of the two countries – that which really makes it run smoothly – would not exist without shared values on the purpose of government and how it should operate.

Thus while it is difficult to deny the existence of the Canada-United States security community, it is important to analyze exactly how the relationship that defines that community operates in situations involving differing perceptions of a direct threat to the fundamental security of one or both partners. As Roussel indicates, the relationship has been going through a difficult period in the post-9/11. It may be that with the successful security conclusion of the Games, Canadian contributions and sacrifices in pursuit of its interests in Afghanistan, revitalization of Canadian defence capabilities with purchases of aircraft, ships and equipment, and the emphasis of Canadian foreign policies that parallel those of America and highlight common interests rather than differences, the relationship is leaving a period of friction and entering one of enhanced cooperation.

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Sovereignty

Linked to the concept of a Canada-United States security community, indeed, to every aspect of the security relationship, is the concept of sovereignty. In general terms, sovereignty is the ability of states to make their own decisions, to have absolute control over their affairs, unencumbered by pressure or influence from other states or intra-state organizations, bodies, or agreements. In this sense no state is absolutely sovereign as no state has absolute control over its affairs, uninfluenced by events around them. Every state is influenced by international events and all states have entered into a number of treaties and agreements with others and this has the effect of restricting their domestic decision-making options. This is especially so in an increasingly globalized environment that is characterized not only by treaties and agreements but increasingly by memberships in global and/or regional organizations and alliances, each of which requires a degree of compliance with commonly agreed upon rules and procedures in return for the benefits of membership.⁸

Sovereignty is also taken to mean that the state has, and is recognized to have, ultimate authority over a recognized geographic space—land, sea and air, wherein no other state or entity may have such authority. In the Canadian case, apart from the North West passage, there is no question of the United States not recognizing Canadian sovereign authority. But that is not the crux of the sovereignty issue for Canadians when they consider their relations with the United States. The crux is instead both the reality and the perception on the part of Canadians that because of latent and applied pressure from Washington, Ottawa is not able to make decisions and adopt policies that are in Canada's best interest or more fully consistent with its values.

The issue of sovereignty is an ever-present one and in a number of cases, an overriding concern of most Canadians when considering the Canada-United States security relationship. The size difference between the two partners in the relationship is an unspoken obstacle to its harmonious conduct. Whenever America is seen to be pressing Canada to adopt a particular position on an issue, or even to make a decision on an issue at all, it is invariably interpreted as a threat to Canadian sovereignty. The reality is that in these cases the real issue is that of Canada bending to American power. That is what rankles Canadians in many cases, and with some factions of the domestic Canadian public, regardless of the issue under consideration. Concerns regarding Canadian sovereignty, and Canadian perceptions of its presence or absence in their relationship with the United States, permeate literally every issue, concern, and interaction between the two countries.

Anti-American or Legitimate Criticism?

The term “anti-American” has been loosely used in the past to describe anything from an unpopular criticism of something American to a focused and

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vitriolic attack on specific policies or actions attributed to the United States. In the Canadian context, the term has been used to both praise and condemn domestic positions taken on the Canada-United States relationship. The objective of this discussion will be to provide some differentiation between legitimate criticism of American policies and strategies, and illegitimate or vitriolic attacks on the American system. These attacks would include those upon the American culture and people of the kind that would, were they leveled against some other countries, be considered racist. This type of attack, when it is undertaken by the Canadian people it will be argued, serves no valid purpose in terms of the pursuit of Canadian goals and objectives and may even be detrimental to the pursuit of Canadian interests within the relationship.

Anti-American sentiments have existed since the Declaration of Independence in 1776 with early manifestations of the phenomenon representing a combination of ignorance, envy and fear.⁹ Although the most vicious, sustained and direct expressions of contemporary anti-Americanism can be found in the modern Arab and Islamic world, it can also be found around the world in places such as North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela. And although it appears to have abated somewhat for the time being with the arrival of the “Obama Moment”, it is still otherwise a common phenomenon in its birthplace – the European continent.¹⁰

Another factor contributing to the existence of anti-American sentiments, or possibly a combination of the original three mentioned above (ignorance, envy, and fear), is that powerful societies tend to incur the dislike of those that are less powerful. There is the phenomenon where the “top dog” nation of the time is routinely and naturally criticized by weaker states simply because it is stronger. The criticism is a device used by the weaker states and their inhabitants to make themselves feel better about their relative weakness. This is not a new phenomenon and has occurred on a regular basis throughout history with respect to the relationship between the dominant state/race/culture of the time and the less powerful states around them. One such example of “super power envy” was the negative view that many Europeans had of the British at the height of their days of Empire. Such views in both the past and the present are usually expressed in ambiguous cultural terms rather than the more precise political, economic, or military ones.¹¹ This factor may account for at least some of the anti-American sentiments expressed by Canadians.

The typical stereotypes of Americans as egoistic, materialistic, vulgar, tasteless, sanctimonious, childish, hypocritical braggarts were formed for the most part before 1860 and have endured to this day in many areas of the world.¹² Two additional stereotypes have come into common usage in the post-Second World War era: America as imperialist and capitalist.¹³ Although present in one form or another all over the world, a particularly virulent brand of anti-Americanism is found within America itself. Some of the harshest criticism of America and what it stands for has come from within.¹⁴ Indeed the extremes of this American

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penchant for self-criticism hold that the only legitimate criticism of America can come from within as it is only there that a true perspective and understanding of everything that America stands for can be obtained.¹⁵

As an example, author Marcus Cunliffe, British historian and academic, maintained that it was only with the rise of domestic opposition to the war in Vietnam that credible and significant opposition to American positions and policies began to be heard on that issue. Opposition movements abroad, including those in Canada, appeared to mimic those developing in America itself against a number of policies. To the extent that these were informed and focused opposition on specific issues they might be considered legitimate criticism. However to the extent that they were used as a hobby-horse for America-bashing by those with differing agendas they must be seen as blatant anti-Americanism.¹⁶

The latest evolution in the tradition of criticism of things American and of anti-Americanism evolved in the post-9/11 era as a result of America's policies in Iraq. It was being fuelled at least in part by a resentment of America's unrivalled power in the world and the extent to which globalization, at least until the world went into a recession in 2008, appeared to be unduly strengthening American economic and cultural influence on the world. This development may be seen as the contemporary version of super-power envy. There is also significant concern, fear, and suspicion as to how Americans intend to use their unprecedented power and influence in the world in the future.¹⁷ The bellicose attitude taken by former President George W. Bush in the months and years following 9/11 appeared to go beyond reasonable limits with the result that it alienated large segments of a previously sympathetic international public. The arrival of the Obama administration and definitive plans for the withdrawal from Iraq has resulted in a reduction of America-bashing, at least over the short term. Similarly, the onset of the global economic recession in 2008, with America at its centre, appears to have lessened criticism of American global influence, although they have been blamed for it by some.

But what is it that separates an anti-American sentiment from legitimate criticism? Is all criticism anti-American? August Fry of the Free University of Amsterdam contends that among other things, anti-American sentiment is a product of some form of ill will that could be based upon the previously mentioned foundations of fear, ignorance or envy. Such sentiments are usually easily disproved, but when spoken by a person in authority and/or in a public forum, can be damaging both in their spread of misinformation but also in the misdirection of support for various causes or issues.¹⁸

An example in the Canada-United States context is the criticism by Lloyd Axworthy and Michael Byers of the American proposal for Canada to join their continental BMD scheme and an earlier one made in the fall of 2002 to discuss a closer security relationship for North America along the lines of the bi-national NORAD Agreement. The crux of the Axworthy/Byers argument

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was that a closer relationship would result in Canadians being under American command and subject to American regulations that would take precedence over Canadian social policies on such issues as language rights and the presence of gays in the military.¹⁹ Although the arguments that Axworthy and Byers put forward could have been countered by those in authority had they chosen to do so, Axworthy's reputation as a former Liberal politician and Byers' position as an academic afforded them the latitude to advance their specious argument such that it was immediately taken up by a number of factions in the Canadian public. Their public reputations combined with the absence of any counter to their arguments resulted in a rapid build-up of public opposition to the proposal and its eventual rejection by the government. By the standard established by August Fry it would appear that the criticism leveled by Axworthy and Byers constituted an expression of anti-Americanism.

Another author on the subject of anti-Americanism, Josef Joffe, applies two tests to differentiate legitimate criticism from anti-Americanism: language and selectivity. The first test, that of language, attempts to determine whether or not the objective of the criticism is to address a particular policy/issue or to condemn the country or the people as a whole. The purpose of the second test is to determine if the intent of the criticism is to selectively condemn the United States by holding it to a standard of behaviour applied to America but not others.²⁰ Axworthy and Byers with their consistent criticism of American policy on this and other issues, have taken the position that the American government has an ongoing strategy focused upon robbing Canada of its sovereignty and that the American proposal in the fall of 2002 was just the latest example of their attempts to do so.

In terms of a standard of behaviour that is singularly applied to America, they have yet to condemn any other state or combination thereof for having similar designs and as such it appears that either America is the only evildoer in the scenario, or the United States is the only country that they see as a threat to Canada in this way. In either case, their bias in this regard could be an example of anti-American sentiment according to Joffe's standard. Their contemporary silence with respect to the Obama administration may be the result of several factors. These include the current higher regard in which President Obama is held in Canada than was George Bush during his term in office. Although in this case, the higher regard is based more upon expectations than performance to this point in his administration and the fact that to date, there have been no Canada-United States issues of any significance addressed by his administration.

It would seem then that this instance of criticism of an American proposal and/or action also qualifies as anti-American according to Joffe's basic criteria. Axworthy and Byers interpreted the proposal as a concerted effort to undermine Canadian sovereignty and independence rather than a legitimate effort to coordinate security efforts based on what Americans believed was a shared threat and past experience. Neither Axworthy nor Byers knew or addressed the fact

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that neither the provisions of the NORAD agreement, or of the North Atlantic treaty, where Canadian forces have been under periodic American command for several decades, would allow the imposition of American values on Canadian social policy. Given their qualifications and experience in public life and academe, one would expect a clearer understanding and/or a better research effort before using their public profile and influence to sway public opinion – if they were indeed interested in providing a clear, unbiased, and accurate depiction of the implications of the American offer. The fact that this information was available to them and they chose not to make use of it and then subsequently used their positions to influence domestic opinion could provide a very good fit for the definition of anti-Americanism according to some of the factors that follow.

In addition to his two basic criteria, Joffe also contends that instances of anti-Americanism can be broken down and analyzed based upon five elements. The first is hostile stereotypization that consists of a set of general statements attributing certain negative qualities to the American people. The second is some form of denigration that ascribes moral inferiority. The third element is demonization where the focus shifts from the target group to what they intend to do – the key theme being some sort of conspiracy. The fourth element is obsession – the idea and belief that America is the ultimate source of the world’s problems regardless of which one is being considered. The fifth and last element is exclusion where the solution or salvation from the problem is put forward as the elimination or destruction of America as opposed to a change in policy.²¹

If these five criteria were applied to the Axworthy/Byers example one could conclude that their position on the issue in question was somewhat anti-American but not rabidly so. Both men are known for the broad spectrum of their criticism when it comes to the Canada-United States relationship. Indeed neither has taken an openly supportive position on any aspect of the relationship in the past. Both appear to ascribe American actions to an ongoing plot to rob a proud and principled country of its sovereignty and all of the things that make it a better place to live than America. Where the analysis of their position breaks down however is in consideration of the last two criteria. Neither contends that America is the source of “all” of the world’s problems and thus should be destroyed. As such the positions of both men fall short of anti-American behaviour according to Joffe’s criteria.

Another author, James W. Caesar, provides additional insight into the anti-American phenomenon with the belief that anti-Americanism has historically been propagated by intellectuals and the “thinkers” of society and is only thereafter taken up by the politicians and the rest of society. He also contends that the presence of an anti-American position on an issue precludes a rational discussion and resolution of differences between America and the society/culture involved. Further, he believes that rather than seeking to eliminate anti-Americanism, politicians frequently use it as a tool to manipulate the public and the media in order to attract support for their own agendas and platforms.²²

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In considering Caesar's perspective on the phenomenon there are some similarities between his views and what has been the Canadian reality, at least in the recent past. In the Canadian case, criticism of American policies or strategies often starts with the intellectuals and thinkers of society as it did in the Axworthy/Byers example. It would appear that the longevity or "traction" of the issue with the Canadian public then depends upon the extent to which the criticism is countered by the government of Canada.

If the criticism is effectively countered then it usually quickly fades from public view. If, however, as will later be shown in an analysis of the American offers for Canada to join Northcom in 2002 and BMD in 2005, the government appears weak or undecided on the issue, it gains increasing amounts of attention and support in the media and public arena. This is followed shortly thereafter by a spate of political opportunism as the politicians seek to obtain whatever benefit is available from working the criticism against the government. Finally, if the government is lacking in strength or solidarity in terms of public support, the growing criticism of the issue often forces it into a policy decision that supports the criticism as being just and valid, whether or not it actually is. Thus the decision ultimately taken on an issue might have little to do with the pursuit of Canadian interests and everything to do with perception and political manoeuvring.

Returning to the Axworthy/Byers example, it would appear that this is exactly the process that took place with respect to whether or not Canada should consider establishing a more comprehensive bi-national relationship with the Americans. Given the general but not exact fit of a number of the factors and criteria set out by Fry, Joffe, and now Caesar's criteria, it would be an exaggeration to say that the Axworthy/Byers example is an instance of rabid anti-Americanism and it is certainly not comparable to that which exists among Islamist extremists. Notwithstanding their failure to advocate extreme reactions to American policies and actions however, the Axworthy/Byers example should be considered an example of what Moises Naim, editor-in-chief of *Foreign Policy* magazine refers to as anti-Americanism "lite."

Naim differentiates between the murderous anti-Americanism of fanatical terrorists and the less dangerous but still damaging anti-Americanism of those who restrict their efforts to broad denunciations of American policy and actions. He contends that the latter should not be discounted on the basis of its less than lethal effects and argues that such verbal attacks, although not physically destructive, still inflict significant damage upon American credibility at home and abroad. When this occurs, the results of this damage are a much higher political cost for the home government to provide its support for American policies and actions.²³ This may be the case in Canada and result in a lower degree of support for American policies and actions even when they may be serving Canadian interests.

Is the Axworthy/Byers example a common phenomenon in Canada? Are Canadians prone to frequent anti-American "lite" attacks upon our closest ally

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and business partner? Norman Hillmer, a leading Canadian historian, believes that Canadians are both hypocritical and narrow-minded, but generally not anti-American. He contends that the phrase has been used – or misused – far too often in the recent and distant past. He makes a distinction between outbursts of fear and resentment and the anti-Americanism that a number of others feel is a Canadian obsession.²⁴

He also contends that the efforts of Canadian nationalists to drive a wedge between the two nations have rarely been successful and when they have experienced success it has not been a lasting one. Notwithstanding their efforts it seems that the truth of Seymour Lipset's statement, that Canadians and Americans are more similar to each other than to any other people or nation, holds true and cannot be denied or overcome by those who wish things were different.²⁵ Some evidence to support Lipset's belief was found in the recent past (2004) during a period characterized as being a low point in the Canada-United States relationship when it was determined that even at this supposed low point in the relationship, less than one third (1/3) of Canadians felt that there were major differences between the two peoples.²⁶

It appears that given the few differences that seem to exist between Canadians and Americans, there is a need by some to emphasize those differences that do exist – thus providing an example of what Freud has termed the “narcissism of minor differences.” The result is a constant search for differentiation that picks up on American self-criticism and also feeds on the Canadian penchant for self-aggrandizement at the expense of their closest ally.

Thus while Americans are portrayed by some as a violent, disorderly, and venal people who emphasize size, efficiency, power, and material prosperity, Canadians are presented in an interesting similarity to some of Joffe's principles as the tolerant, peaceful, multicultural, bilingual, moral superpower with an emphasis on our humanity, peacefulness, compassion and civility. In many ways the Canadian nationalists of today are parroting the very first defensive criticisms made by the European aristocracy when they first felt threatened by the political and cultural anomaly that was the United States. While many Canadian politicians are quite willing to play the anti-American card for domestic political gain, however short-term it might be, many Canadian leaders have been pro-American in the essentials and at the right times and places to safeguard the best interests of Canadians.²⁷

In contrast to Hillmer's position, Jack Granatstein, another leading Canadian historian, contends that anti-Americanism is the Canadian state religion.²⁸ He goes on to say that while on one level, a modicum of anti-Americanism is necessary for Canadian survival, and that anti-Americanism has long-been a staple of Canadian political culture, in recent times the shrillness of some of the comments has been quite startling. He attributes this to two factors: 1) the policies of the Bush administration during their time in office and 2)

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the tendency of Canadian politicians to exploit the ever-present anti-American tendencies in Canadian society.²⁹

Granatstein contends that this exploitation has frequently not been in Canadian interests but rather the partisan political interests of a given party or region, with the most recent example being the decision taken by former Prime Minister Paul Martin on BMD. Anti-American sentiments are usually a minor factor in the Canadian public discourse until they are taken up in the political arena and used to manipulate public opinion for a number of reasons usually unrelated to the national interest.³⁰

If the positions of Hillmer and Granatstein are to be considered in conjunction with those of Caesar, Fry, and Joffe, the phenomenon of the Canadian brand of criticism, when it occurs, can indeed be considered as anti-American “lite” as concluded in relation to the Axworthy/Byers example. It would appear that there is a latent, but ever-present stratum of Canadian social opinion that is predisposed to considering American policies that influence Canada as a threat to their perception of the special and superior society that has been established in Canada.

Support for anti-American criticism in Canada is generally based upon narrow considerations of the facts available and even the subtle re-definition of fundamental concepts such as the national interest. Axworthy’s publicly stated concern for Canadian sovereignty and American encroachment plays upon the historic mainstream of thoughts and concerns regarding the relationship – and he should know better.³¹ He expressed concerns regarding the take-over of the Canadian Forces by the American military when an expansion of the bi-national relationship was considered post-9/11, but made no mention of the fact that the closest military-to-military relationship in the world had already existed for over four decades without such an outcome. He also neglected to mention that Canadians had been working under American and British command overseas in war and peace for decades without any loss of Canadian sovereignty. It would appear that he “cherry picks” the issues and facts for his arguments and expects America to react to these while leaving all the other aspects of the relationship with which he is satisfied alone.

In the Byers case there is a subtle redefinition of the national interest from one of security and prosperity to what appears to be an exclusive focus on sovereignty and independence. His position fails to address the security realities of the relationship posed by North American geography or the potential negative effects on the Canadian standard of living of an independent security policy, if one were possible. Both Byers and Axworthy also choose to ignore the increasing effects of globalization and the integration of the continental economy that militates against independent control and disengagement of the Canadian economy from the American one. They wish to have the prosperity of an integrated economy without having to consider the need for coordination of government economic policy with the partner state.

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Given the flaws and weaknesses of the positions taken by Byers and Axworthy, it appears that the reality of Canadian opinion on most things American is best understood by considering the thoughts of both Hillmer and Granatstein. Canadians are perennially complaining about some aspect of their relationship with their closest neighbour in the same way that there are frequent and ongoing American complaints about some aspect of Canadian behaviour. It is only when the intelligentsia and the political elements of society become engaged however, each with their own agenda and purpose, that these criticisms reach the level of anti-American rhetoric and begin to negatively influence the relationship. Otherwise the comments and complaints are either ignored by a public pre-occupied with other issues or discredited by the presentation of factual evidence to the contrary.

The key aspect of whether or not an anti-American sentiment is allowed to take hold in the public consciousness and subsequently to influence public policy appears to be the extent to which the government is unwilling to risk the possible loss of public support by countering it with the facts of the issue. Conversely, it is directly related to the extent to which the government wishes to use it as a tool of domestic political manipulation to achieve its own ends in a given set of circumstances.

Regardless, it would appear that the Canadian brand of anti-Americanism, or anti-American “lite,” is relatively harmless outside of Canada. Within Canada, anti-Americanism “lite” Canadian-style intrudes on the public discourse and can have an impact on specific policy decisions, but the overall historical trend in the security and economic relationship is that its impact is minimal on the broad calculation of the Canadian national interest. This may be because Washington is generally satisfied with Ottawa’s position on key security issues, has demanded relatively little, and accepted the level and character of Canadian contributions. On the economic side, Canadians generally know how to take advantage of a good thing. To the extent that its brand of anti-American “lite” prevents Canada from maximizing the benefits to be derived from the relationship, the damage is self-inflicted by politicians and interest groups with specific and narrow agendas that are not necessarily aligned with Canadian interests.

Working Together: Bilateral or Bi-National?

The last relationship issue to be explored will be the difference between a bilateral and a bi-national relationship and the extent to which each is or has been representative of the Canada-United States security relationship in the past and present. These two terms are frequently used interchangeably in discussions of the relationship. When this occurs, the nuances and subtle differences in some aspects of the relationship are lost with a resulting loss of clarity in the nature of the relationship and position of the partners within it. As such, establishing a clear meaning and understanding of these terms is an essential pre-requisite to acquiring an accurate understanding of the security relationship.

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There are a number of issues surrounding the use of the terms bilateral and bi-national within the context of the Canada-United States security relationship. First among them is the question of exactly what is the difference between the two terms, or is there one at all? Another issue is why is this differentiation important in general and to this work in particular? Yet a third issue is which of these relationship models best serves the respective partners? Lastly is the question of which of these terms best characterizes the nature of the security relationship past and present? It will be argued that differentiating between the two terms is critical to acquiring an understanding of the dynamics of the relationship, past and present, as well as an estimation of what might be in the best interests of each of the partners.

The first issue, the difference between the two terms, is key to the overall discussion because many contributors to the examination of the relationship use them interchangeably and thus, in error. The term bi-national refers to an aspect of the relationship or the relationship as a whole that is governed by provisions agreed to by the heads of the respective governments involved. This is significant because it means that the rules, regulations, understandings, and/or protocols that are agreed upon cannot be amended, changed, or ignored by anyone without the express authorization of both heads of government. Thus a bi-national agreement theoretically binds and restricts the actions of both parties to an agreed upon set of allowed behaviours and courses of action within the context of a specific issue or structure.

A bilateral agreement or relationship however, is one that exists at any level of the relationship between the two partners and can be changed or altered by the officials at or above the level at which the agreement was initially concluded. Bilateral agreements or understandings are much less formal and are considered more flexible because the heads of government are not involved and the protocols involved with changing or amending the agreement are much easier to undertake than is the case with a bi-national agreement.

The Canada-United States security relationship is comprised of both types of agreements/working relationships. Canadian folklore on the relationship favours a bi-national “tradition” based upon the use of NORAD as the centrepiece and principal icon of the relationship. This is in spite of the reality that there has always been a certain amount of friction associated with the NORAD Agreement. Opponents and supporters alike however have traditionally reacted to the myth of NORAD as opposed to the reality. Notwithstanding this friction, the Agreement is frequently used by both governments and their militaries as an example of the closeness of the two friends in their defence of the respective homelands. The bi-national “tradition” of the relationship is emphasized at every opportunity.

The reality, however, is that in the history of the relationship that originated in the months prior to the Second World War and encompasses military,

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industrial, diplomatic and purely political aspects at every level of government, industry, and the economy, there are only two aspects that are bi-national. One is the functioning of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) and the other is NORAD, an Agreement that came into existence at approximately the twenty year mark in the relationship. In contrast to this, there are several thousand bilateral accords dealing with every aspect of the relationship.³² Given these facts, if one were to be precise about the nature of the relationship in terms of history, breadth, and content, there is a strong case to be made that the security relationship is essentially a bilateral one. Thus any conclusions that recent developments in the relationship represent a departure from its bi-national tradition or roots overstate both the past and present bi-national aspects of that relationship. A more accurate description of the recent evolutions in the relationship would be that the relationship is returning to its bilateral roots.

The distinction between the two types of relationships is important not because of their physical differences. While the physical or technical differences between the two might first appear to confer different benefits and advantages on each of the partners, the reality is quite different. Rather, the major difference and value in the differentiation between a bilateral and bi-national distinction is the extent to which the two types of relationship serve as indicators of the quality of the relationship at any given time in terms of trust and cooperation. When the partners engage in bi-national arrangements and activities the appearance of the relationship is a much closer, more trusting one than when bilateralism is the order of the day. As such, the value of the different types of relationship is found in their ability to act as barometers of the relationship to the extent that appearances reflect reality and to serve as a signaling device by both partners rather than to confer specific benefits and advantages upon one partner or the other.

An examination of the technical differences between the two types of relationship will serve to illustrate this reality. In a bilateral agreement or situation, both parties are free to change the terms of the relationship/agreement from the level at which it was first initiated either upon mutual agreement or on a unilateral basis if they so choose. Neither party is bound or compelled to follow a particular course of action or policy if they deem that it is not in their best interests to do so. In the Canadian case, bilateral agreements and aspects of the relationship are especially popular in the political realm as they do not attract the domestic public scrutiny, concern, and criticism often associated with bi-national agreements. Bi-national agreements or issues tend to act as magnets for anti-American naysayers in Canadian society because they are considered by many to bind Canada to American policies and involve unreasonable sacrifices of sovereignty for the sake of questionable increases in security or economic welfare. Examples of these concerns include the domestic Canadian controversy associated with the signing of the initial NORAD Agreement in 1958 and the American proposal to expand it to an all-domain, all-hazards approach in the aftermath of 9/11.

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In the case of bi-national agreements and from a general theoretical perspective, it is widely held that the weaker power is better served by a structured, rules-based relationship that cannot be easily changed by the stronger partner. This structured arrangement is supposed to prevent the stronger partner from using its superior power to alter the relationship to its own advantage in response to the circumstances of the moment. An example of this can be found in the ongoing “merging” of the staffs of NORAD and Northcom. Historically NORAD has always been twinned with a wholly American command with the American commander of NORAD also tasked with command of the wholly American entity.³³ In the past the respective staffs of each command have worked closely yet remained formally and physically separate from one another.

In the present situation the command that has been twinned with NORAD is Northcom. This organization is a “Combatant Command” established as a response to the events of 9/11 and is one of the “unified commands” of the American military infrastructure. It is charged with all aspects of military support to the safety and security of the continental United States using an “all-hazards” approach to their mission. The staffs of NORAD and of Northcom have been engaged in a formal process of merging since Northcom was established in 2002. As of the exchange of diplomatic papers signaling the latest renewal of the NORAD agreement on May 12, 2006, the only staff directorates of NORAD that remained independent of Northcom were those of operations (J3) and planning (J5). Of these two the planning directorate has since been merged, leaving the NORAD J3 operations directorate as the sole remaining independent entity.³⁴

Although the phrase used by NORAD staff to describe the joining of these directorates is “merged” versus “integrated” or “combined”, the result is the conduct of tasks and staff functions by an overwhelmingly American staff commanded and controlled by American leadership within the context of the American Combatant Command structure. In fact, several personnel rotation cycles after the merger process began, the use of the words “integration” and “combination” may well be an understatement. It may be more accurate to describe the process as one of “elimination” and “replacement.” The staff functions and relationships in place in the past that ostensibly serve both commands may now be better described as Northcom staff executing the Combatant Command tasks in conjunction with NORAD activities. That this mindset has already developed, the role of NORAD as a subset of Northcom is in evidence at senior levels of command within several of the staff directorates.

An example is one provided by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) E.A. Findley, a former deputy commander of NORAD, in the years immediately following the events of 9/11. A number of issues had arisen over the course of his tenure at NORAD that involved a specific focus on Northcom priorities and responsibilities, the solutions for which violated some aspect of the NORAD agreement. When challenged on these violations, the American staff leaders had

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justified their proposals on the basis that Northcom policies and priorities as a Combatant Command overrode those of NORAD.³⁵ This might well have been the case if NORAD were simply a subset of Northcom or subject to a bilateral rather than a bi-national agreement between the two nations. As it was however, with a bi-national agreement in place, American policy decisions intended to address a quintessentially Northcom issue were not allowed to impinge upon the bi-national NORAD domain and it was only when the distinction between the two types of agreements was pointed out to the Northcom-focused staff leadership that the issues were subsequently resolved in accordance with NORAD procedures and protocols.

This example demonstrates that in at least one area of the relationship, a structured relatively inflexible set of rules governing the behaviours of the partners in the relationship has the effect of restricting the scope and courses of action of the more powerful partner such that they are less able to use their greater strength and power in the relationship to its full advantage. Similarly, a structured relationship appears on the basis of this example to increase the power of the weaker partner as it has the effect of “hobbling” or degrading the power of the stronger partner and thus of “leveling the playing field” for the participants in the relationship. Thus, one interpretation of the net effect of a bi-national agreement is to enhance the power of the weaker partner and restrict the power of the stronger one within a relationship.

Generally speaking then, it would seem that weaker states should always support the establishment of bi-national agreements and stronger ones would avoid them. What would the circumstances be such that a stronger state would knowingly surrender some of its power to a weaker one, as apparently occurred in the case of the NORAD Agreement between Canada and the United States? There are at least two sets of circumstances under which this unusual action could occur.

The first would be in a situation where the issue at hand was a relatively limited one in the overall relationship as well as one in which the weaker party not only contributed a key ingredient to the relationship issue, but where the stronger party had absolute trust and confidence in the weaker party’s willingness and ability to perform effectively under the agreement. Thus in this first instance, a bi-national agreement makes sense for a stronger power if the issue at hand represents at least a local power parity between the two parties (contributions of equal value) and the stronger party is sure of the capabilities and fidelity of the weaker partner.

The second circumstance under which entry into a bi-national agreement would appear to make sense for the stronger party in a relationship is if that stronger party has no intention of allowing the limitations of the agreement to bind it in determining the most appropriate and advantageous course of action in a given set of circumstances. The result in this case would be the *façade* of a

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close and binding relationship without the strategic inconvenience associated with limitations on the stronger state's courses of action.

Applying the rationale for a strong partner entering into a bi-national agreement to the NORAD case, it would appear that the United States believed that Canada had an irreplaceable contribution to make to the air defence of North America in 1958 when the Agreement was ratified by both partners. Following the first piece of logic above it would also appear that America had absolute faith and confidence in Canada's willingness and ability to hold up their end of the agreement based upon their performance within the relationship to date. What then were the specifics of this agreement that resulted in an American commitment to a structured approach to the air defence of their homeland?

First, the Canadian contribution was one which could not be duplicated by American technology or resources – it was real estate, or battle space. American security under the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) concept was predicated upon receiving an early warning of an attack in sufficient time to allow for the launch of the American nuclear deterrent. In the 1950s this required an amount of time and space that only real estate in conjunction with the technology of the day, could provide. Canada thus provided the necessary buffer between the United States and the Soviet Union to facilitate the provision of the necessary warning of an attack.

The other ingredient, trust and confidence in a Canadian willingness and ability to fulfill its end of the agreement, was also in evidence. Canada had proven itself to be a strong and reliable ally in the Second World War with its contributions out of all proportion to its population. Following the war, Canada had been a key supporter of American policies in the UN, a founding member of the NATO and a major contributor to the UN forces in the Korean War and the defence of western Europe from the Soviets at a time when the nations of that region could not have defended themselves.

Internationally, Canada had provided the diplomatic and military effort that had stabilized the Suez crisis and defused not only the possibility of a nuclear confrontation but also of a major rift in the Western alliance. All of these actions contributed directly to the support of American policies in the post-Second World War, and early Cold War world.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that America was willing to enter into what might be considered the closest of security arrangements with a partner who was contributing an essential ingredient to the security of their homeland and who had proven to be eminently reliable in the past. But was there also an ingredient of the second piece of logic for a stronger power to enter into a bi-national agreement – the absence of any intention to allow that agreement to ultimately influence its decision-making process on issues of national security? The history of the relationship indicates that there was – that the United States,

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while committing to the binding nature of a bi-national agreement with a “consultation pledge,” had no intention of allowing that agreement to restrict its own actions in defence of the American homeland.³⁶

In order to validate this contention one must first examine the wording of the NORAD Agreement to determine the intent of the respective parties. The interpretation preferred by many in Ottawa is that the Agreement requires consultation with Canada prior to America taking any action affecting the aerospace defence of North America.³⁷ The American interpretation based upon their subsequent actions is quite simple – no it doesn't. Whether there is a sound legal and diplomatic basis for the Canadian position is a moot point because the Americans have demonstrated that they will not consult with Canada on major points of policy as they relate to fundamental issues of American security such as the defence of North America and of their homeland. The two examples of this are the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 when American air forces were put on alert for the defence of North America without consultation with Canada. In both cases no efforts were made on the part of the Americans to consult with their Canadian partners before the fact. In both cases the American authorities, civil and military, advised their Canadian counterparts in a timely fashion of what action was being taken and why. At no time, however, was there a process of consultation undertaken as to whether or not that action should be taken.

The NORAD Agreement therefore appears to be an example of the simultaneous employment of both pieces of strong-partner logic: an invaluable contribution by a trusted ally combined with absolutely no intention of consulting with them in a crisis. It would also appear that there is little difference between the two types of relationship in terms of the influence of the weaker power in the decision-making process of the stronger one. It is clear from reading specific parts of the NORAD Agreement and the subsequent exchange of diplomatic notes as well as from the comments of key participants in the process such as Chief of the General Staff, General Charles Foulkes, that there was a Canadian expectation of influence upon American strategic decision-making that simply never existed.³⁸ Thus it would appear that, while the physical or technical differences between the two types of relationship might theoretically confer different benefits and advantages on each of the partners, the reality in the Canada-United States case is that they do not and as such there is no specific advantage to Canada or to Canadians for pressing for one type of arrangement or another either with the Americans or the Canadian public.

Rather, the major difference between the two is the relatively greater utility of the bi-national aspects of the relationship in demonstrating the close and cooperative nature of the partnership to each other and the respective domestic publics. Proof of this is the continuing use of the NORAD Agreement by both partners as an indicator of the high quality and durability of the relationship. The choices of the two governments of which type of agreement they wish to

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undertake with respect to an evolving issue or concern and the degree to which these choices are supported by the Canadian public also serves as an indicator of the contemporary strength of the relationship in terms of mutual trust and confidence between the two partners. It is unclear as to whether or not the American public opinion is ever engaged or a factor in the security relationship. Indeed, based upon the 9/11 Report, the Congress is scarcely aware of it.³⁹ The use of the bi-national or bilateral choice as a relationship barometer in this fashion may well be its greatest value when considering the nuances of the Canada-United States security relationship.

Having drawn these conclusions with respect to the two types of relationship in general, are there any advantages to selecting one over the other for Canada? At first glance there would not appear to be any. The choice of bi-national over bilateral does not appear to change the amount of influence that Canada can exert over strategic American security decisions. Similarly, access to strategic American fora and to any economic benefits that might arise from the relationship do not appear to be dependent upon the bi-national/bilateral choice as evidenced by the close but bilateral relationship of the United Kingdom and of Australia with the United States. Access then, strategic and economic, appears to be a function of the quality of the relationship as opposed to its bi-national or bilateral nature.

The single advantage to Canada of the use of one type of relationship over another may well be rooted in domestic political stability. Historically as was noted earlier, although the bi-national aspects of the relationship have always been the most popular examples of a strong relationship, they have also attracted the greatest domestic criticism and concern regarding Canadian sovereignty. Each renewal of the NORAD Agreement as well as the 2002 American proposal to expand the relationship was met with varying degrees of domestic opposition in Canada. This opposition was based upon the fear that continuing or expanding the relationship would involve a sacrifice of Canadian sovereignty. Thus each renewal of the Agreement became somewhat of a rallying point for anti-American activism and subjected the security interests of both nations to the ebb and flow of public opinion as manipulated by a number of factions and interest groups whose interests were not necessarily aligned with those of the nation. In this regard, it can be argued that one of the central reasons for renewing the NORAD Agreement in 2006 in perpetuity with provision for a “review” in the future rather than “renewal” was to avoid the negative effects of the ebb and flow of Canadian public opinion upon issues of national security.

It would appear then that there really is no relationship advantage to be gained by favouring a bi-national approach and indeed there may be a disadvantage to exposing issues central to the security of Canadians to the storm of emotion-charged debate. A preference for bilateral arrangements on the other hand confers the same benefits upon the participants without raising the ire and

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concern of Canadians regarding their sovereignty. Canadians are not fearful of engaging with the Americans on security issues so long as they believe that they will not be bound to American decisions and policies by doing so. Thus the choice of a bilateral over a bi-national approach would appear to be in the best Canadian interests with respect to its security relationship with the United States.

Interestingly, both the pro-defence right and the anti-American, anti-defence left tend to exaggerate the importance of bi-nationalism. The right exaggerates the amount of influence that bi-nationalism can give Canada, and thus wrongly sees it as a way to assert Canadian sovereignty and independence. The left exaggerates the level of influence which the United States can or seeks to exercise over Canada and the benefits for sovereignty and independence of avoiding bi-nationalism.

Conclusion

The discussion of the meaning, nature, of key terms and expressions used in discussing the relationship has provided a degree of clarity and precision in their use that will facilitate the effective analysis of the evolution of the security relationship that follows. The discussion of the concept of “security community” provided the context and limitations of influence of the relationship in both Canadian and American international affairs. Next was the analysis of what is meant by “anti-Americanism” where it was established that the Canadian brand of anti-Americanism, or anti-American “lite,” is relatively harmless outside of Canada and can be controlled or at least countered domestically if the government chooses to do so. The relationship can still be damaged by this phenomenon, however, and it is an unfortunate reality that this damage is self-inflicted and limits the extent to which Canada is able to benefit from the relationship as a whole.

With respect to the issue of the bi-national and bilateral approaches to the conduct of the relationship, it is clear that the relationship has historically been bilateral in nature and that there exists little difference between the two in terms of advantages or disadvantages in the conduct of the relationship from the Canadian perspective. The one factor that tipped the analysis in favour of the use of bilateral mechanisms was the reduced influence of Canadian domestic anti-American and/or sovereigntist sensitivities on the relationship when this approach was used. Aside from this one factor the primary utility to be derived from the choice of bilateralism over bi-nationalism is in the use of these decisions as a barometer of the relationship with a public and political preference for bi-national agreements being seen as an indicator of a closer relationship. The bi-national “tradition” seems to be a concoction of those who periodically seek to emphasize the close cooperation between the two countries. The continuing presence of anti-American (lite) attitudes in the Canadian domestic public and the recent evolution of the relationship along bilateral lines appear to be the first of several instances of the Canada-United States security relationship returning

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to its roots and representing more of the same rather than something different in the relationship.

Endnotes

1. Stephane Roussel. *The North American Democratic Peace: Absence of War and Security Institution-Building in Canada-US Relations, 1867-1958*. (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), xi
2. Ibid., 237-238.
3. Ibid., 231.
4. Ibid., 235.
5. Ibid., 236.
6. Ibid., 239.
7. Ibid., 240.
8. Stephen Clarkson. *Canada's Secret Constitution: NAFTA, WTO and the End of Sovereignty?* (Ottawa: Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2002), 1.
9. Ignorance in that Europeans were convinced that their society was the ultimate form of civilization, envy in that some European reformers were unable to affect the changes that appeared to come so easily to America, and fear in the European aristocracy that their favoured positions would come under attack as a result of the American example being set in North America. J.W. Schulte Nordholt, "Anti-Americanism in European Culture: Its Early Manifestations," in *Anti-Americanism in Europe*, ed. Rob Kroes and Maarten van Rossem (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1986), 13.
10. Josef Joffe. "Dissecting Anti-isms," *The American Interest* Vol. 1 (4) (2006) <http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=83&MIId=4>.
11. Marcus Cunliffe. "The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism," in *Anti-Americanism in Europe*, ed. Rob Kroes and Maarten van Rossem (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1986), 31.
12. There is also the possibility that a lot of the anti-American sentiment can be seen as a reaction to American *braggadocio* and the rise of a sense of American exceptionalism particularly as the 19th century progressed. Which one came first, the European anti-American sentiment, or the dismissive American attitude of the Old World vice and folly, is in all likelihood impossible to determine. What is fairly safe to say however is that one certainly fed off of and was encouraged by the other. Ibid., 29.
13. In the First and Second World Wars it was American power that saved the western world from domination by Germany and Japan. In the postwar period it was the envy of American economic and pop culture affluence and the fear of their economic and military dominance sweeping aside national European institutions, traditions and the established elites. This was particularly so in Great Britain where massive post-war American investment in growth and consumer industries combined with the political and military rise to prominence of America was matched by the equal and opposite demise of the British Empire and a struggle to pay off its war debts. Ibid., 20-25.
14. Authors such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, Walt Whitman, Jack London, Noam Chomsky and Tennessee Williams are but a few of the influential Americans who have spoken out harshly against their country of origin. Ibid., 27.
15. Ibid., 28.
16. Allan M. Winkler. "A Personal and Historical Perspective," in *Anti-Americanism in Europe*, 151.
17. Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes. *America Against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006), xiii.

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18. August J. Fry. "Undergoing Anti-Americanism: A Personal Statement," in *Anti-Americanism in Europe* ed. Rob Kroes and Maarten van Rossem (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1986), 143-144.
19. Michael Byers and Lloyd Axworthy. Liu Institute News Articles 2002-2006. <http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/>
20. Examples of the first test are criticisms that explain American actions as resulting from inbred imperialism, capitalism, or religious bigotry. An example of the second test is a condemnation of the American use of force to achieve its objectives in the Middle East while ignoring Islamist terror, Russian actions in Chechnya, China's oppression of Tibet, or state terror against white farmers in Zimbabwe. Another example is the selective demonization of American leaders. This is not to say that the American action or leadership figure is necessarily valid or justified but the selectivity of the condemnation, the reflexive pointing to the same culprit, is an indicator of anti-Americanism. Joffe. "Dissecting Anti-isms."
21. Joffe. "Dissecting Anti-isms."
22. J.W. Caesar "A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism," *The Public Interest* (Summer 2003): 16.
23. Moises Naim. "The Perils of Lite Anti-Americanism," *Foreign Policy* (May-June 2003): <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/resources/directory>.
24. Norman Hillmer. "Are Canadians anti-American?" *Policy Options* (Aug 2006), 63.
25. Seymour Martin Lipset in his book, "Continental Divide." Hillmer, "Are Canadians anti-American," 64.
26. This is a historically stable position taken by Canadians on this issue. In 1943 25% of Canadians were willing to join the United States. In 1964 that number had increased to 30%. Ibid., 64-66.
27. Hillmer, "Are Canadians anti-American," 64.
28. Ibid., 63.
29. J.L. Granatstein, *Whose War is it? How Canada can Survive in the Post-9/11 World*, (Toronto: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), 86.
30. Jack Granatstein. "Changing Dynamics in Canada – U.S. Relations." *Comments at CIC Conference* Victoria, 12 May 2008.
31. Lloyd Axworthy. *Missile defence: sorta, kinda, maybe*. Liu Institute 2004. <http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/?p2=/modules/liu/publications/view.jsp&cid=1812>.
32. Stéphane Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace: Absence of War and Security, Institution-building in Canada-US Relations, 1867-1958*. (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 58.
33. Examples of this include Air Defense Command (ADC), Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM), and Space Command (USSPACECOM). Joseph Jockel. *Canada in NORAD: 1957-2007 A History*. (Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, 2007), 103; Joseph Jockel. *Four U.S. Military Commands: NORTHCOM, NORAD, SPACECOM and STRATCOM – The Canadian Opportunity*. IRPP Working Papers Series 2003-03. (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2003), 3.
34. Unclassified NORAD briefing Colorado Springs, 23 May 2006.
35. Senior American officers in the various staff directorates would generate staff solutions favouring the Northcom position or agenda and seek to obtain approval through the bi-national chain of NORAD Command by stealth (this is standard policy), bravado (this is the right decision for NORAD and Northcom), or outright aggression (this is a Northcom organization, this decision is supported by American commanders, and/or I work for Northcom, not NORAD and the provisions of the NORAD agreement either do not apply or are superseded by my Northcom mandate and authorities). It is only when it is pointed out that the provisions of a bi-national agreement (nation-to-nation) supersede those of a multi-lateral one (military-to-military) and that they do not have the option of

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ignoring the NORAD provisions, that they grudgingly accept the NORAD-dominated status quo. Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) E.A. Findley (former Deputy Commander NORAD), in discussion with the author, 4 May 2006.

36. The existence of this “consultation pledge” in both the NORAD Agreement itself and in a diplomatic note exchanged later in 1958 is well documented in Joseph Jockel’s book on the history of NORAD. Joseph Jockel. *Canada in NORAD: 1957–2007 A History*. (Kingston: Queen’s Centre for International Relations, 2007), 36.

37. While the wording of the NORAD Agreement may be interpreted as offering a certain degree of flexibility in terms of exactly when and under what circumstances consultation should take place, the diplomatic note exchanged later in 1958 appears to clearly set out the requirement for consultation especially during a crisis. Note, Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State to Heeney, 10 November 1958, copy in Department of National Defence, Directorate of History and Heritage, Raymond fonds, 217/992 quoted in Jockel. *Canada in NORAD*, 36.

38. “...as we are full partners in the defence of North America, we have to be consulted every time the US contemplates using force anywhere in the world.” Charles Foulkes, “Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age,” *Behind the Headlines* 21, No. 1 (May 1961): 12.

39. United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Executive Summary*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company).

CHAPTER 3: THE COMMON THREADS



Introduction

With a common understanding of key terms and phrases in use within the relationship established, the next step is to establish the historical basis and context for consideration of the contemporary security relationship. In accomplishing this objective it will be demonstrated that the relationship has remained the same in a number of key areas over the course of its history and through to the contemporary post-9/11 era. This will be evident from the identification of three “common threads” or policies in the relationship.

The first thread is a policy of accommodation that involves the use of the twin strategies of “defence against help”¹ and of “quiet diplomacy.”² The second thread is a continuing reliance upon a rules-based institutional relationship for the management of day-to-day issues as well the resolution of differences and conflicts. Institutional in this case does not refer to a single overarching structure or organization that manages the relationship. Rather it refers both to the structured and formal aspects of the relationship to include NORAD, the PJBD, NAFTA, *et al* as well as the web of intergovernmental interactions between government agencies on both sides of the border that occur on a daily basis and give the relationship substance and guidance outside of formal diplomatic interactions.

The last common thread is the ongoing need for Canadian governments to walk a political tightrope between the maximization of benefits associated with a closer relationship with the United States and the seemingly national pre-occupation with sovereignty.

Establishing the Common Threads

The first two of the common threads in the relationship, a policy of accommodation and a Canadian reliance upon a rules-based institutional framework for the relationship have their origins in the earliest days of interaction between the two nations. A security relationship of one kind or another has existed between Canada and the United States since the American declaration of independence in 1776. The major threat to Canadian security from 1776 to 1914 was the United States and fear of invasion by America was the major factor in the early development of a security policy for Canada.³ The threat to Canadian security posed by the United States is also considered by many to be the single most important reason for forming the alliance of colonies that resulted in the Dominion of Canada.⁴

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From 1776 to the early years of the 20th century the British conducted the security relationship with the United States on Canada's behalf. Perhaps not surprisingly, the tone and content of the relationship in those years was shaped by the best interests of the British Empire rather than simply those of Canada.⁵ In spite of this or perhaps resulting from it, the focus of the Canada-United States security concerns up until the days before the Second World War was on conflict resolution or its management rather than upon cooperation in the areas of defence and security. This reality was underlined on the American side by the development and maintenance by the United States of a number of war plans involving the invasion of Canada in the interwar years and on the Canadian side by the development of Defence Scheme No. 1.⁶ On the Canadian side much of the value of the plan was in the fact that it was considered to be the best vehicle for use by the military in convincing the government of the need for maintaining Canada's readiness for war and support of the Empire.⁷

The final abandonment of these war plans and the adoption of the Rainbow Plans in 1938-39 underscored a fundamental change in the Canada-United States security relationship at the end of the 1930s when the focus shifted from conflict resolution to security cooperation with a dominant military component.⁸ This fundamental change however was not an immediate and unheralded event in response to short-term explicit events and security developments. Rather it was the result of a series of smaller evolutions in the relationship over a period of several decades that shaped the Canada-United States security environment and culture such that when the events preceding the outbreak of the Second World War began to unfold, the evolution of the relationship from conflict resolution to security cooperation was the next logical step in the process.

Perhaps the key dynamic in the early years of the relationship from 1776 to the Treaty of Washington in 1871 was the military power of the British Empire that served as a counter-weight to American territorial ambitions. While the War of 1812 was fought for reasons that did not originate in Canada, it was the British regulars and the Royal Navy that thwarted American attempts to bring the Canadian colonies into the Union. The British counter-weight was implicitly employed a number of times after that to avoid in Canada the fate that befell Mexico on a number of occasions because that country lacked a powerful security sponsor.⁹ Increasingly however, as a geo-strategic Anglo-American relationship began to evolve that was shaped by global issues of empire on the parts of both America and Great Britain, the value of having Britain as a security counterweight began to decline and Canadian interests became secondary to those evolving between America and the British Empire.¹⁰

British military and political support with which to counter American threats to the territory and sovereignty of Canadians steadily declined until it essentially disappeared in 1871 when the Treaty of Washington implicitly established Canada's responsibility for its own security.¹¹ Although the British concept of Imperial Defence would theoretically provide support in time of need,

it soon became evident that this was intended only to assuage Canadian fears of domination by America as the interests of the Empire and a budding cooperative relationship between Great Britain and the United States continued to take precedence over purely Canadian interests.¹²

An example of how Canadian interests were subordinated in the development of the Anglo-American relationship is the Alaskan boundary dispute of 1903. This issue is particularly significant as it was the first dispute arising directly from a Canadian-American controversy, and not as a result of some aspect of explicitly British foreign policy. The two main components of Canadian defence policy in the early part of the 20th century had been the Royal Navy and the Monroe Doctrine and unfortunately in this case neither could be brought to bear in pursuit of Canadian interests on this issue.¹³

Instead, the Canadians under Wilfrid Laurier were caught in a significant miscalculation of power politics and found themselves in a situation where they had no power themselves and their reliance upon British power to influence the issue on their behalf was misplaced. The British, opting to place the health of the evolving geo-strategic Anglo-American relationship above the interests of Canada, chose to support the American position after recognizing some minor and inconsequential concessions made on the part of the Americans.¹⁴ Outmanoeuvred and powerless, Laurier had no choice but to accept defeat gracefully and the international commission's decision in favour of the American position.¹⁵

In retrospect, the Canadian position on this issue and how they chose to approach its resolution must be considered a strategic political misstep resulting from a miscalculation of the relative strengths in the relationship of the parties concerned. It also represented somewhat of a departure from the evolving Canadian strategy for addressing Canada-United States issues that had been developing since the ratification of the Treaty of Washington in 1871.

After the Treaty of Washington, the British counter-weight in the evolving Canada-United States relationship was gradually replaced by another key dynamic. This was the development of a Canadian policy of accommodation with respect to its relationship with America. The policy explicitly recognized that the Canadian land mass remained indefensible from a determined American attempt at invasion and in simple terms the policy embodied a resolution by Canadians, in the early days of nationhood, to conduct their domestic and later international affairs such that they never posed a risk to the security of the American homeland or ran afoul of the Monroe Doctrine. It also involved a determination on the part of Canadian leaders to never give the Americans an excuse to intervene in Canadian domestic affairs based upon the Roosevelt Corollary to that doctrine.¹⁶

Thus it came about that the initial purpose of the Canadian militia was not to secure the nation's borders from attack but to aid the civil authority in ensuring that there were no instances of civil unrest that might serve as a pretext

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for American intervention and military involvement in Canadian affairs.¹⁷ The whole concept was an early version of the principle of “defence against help.”¹⁸ This concept would be employed by Canadian leaders in the latter part of the 19th century in the context of developing the Canadian west, in the years leading up to the Second World War, in the Cold War and indeed is in use today with respect to the security of the continent against the terrorist threat.

Another facet or aspect of the policy of accommodation involved the use of “quiet diplomacy” to resolve disagreements between the two states. To resolve the numerous instances of disagreement over the exact delineation of the border between the two countries, the two democracies developed a dispute resolution process that utilized either negotiation and compromise or arbitration by a joint commission of experts from both sides.¹⁹ In the years between 1905 and 1914 the establishment of permanent institutions and mechanisms between Canada and the United States would begin to address contentious issues before they reached the nation-to-nation or the political arena. One such body was the “International Joint Commission”, or IJC that was formed in 1909 to perform a broad range of regulatory, investigatory, supervisory, and recommendatory functions.

The formation of these bodies and the associated dispute resolution mechanisms worked well for Canada as it served to re-balance the increasingly asymmetric economic and military power of America in Canada’s favour. The result of the implementation of the Canadian policy of accommodation and the nurturing of a rules-based institutional framework for the relationship was that there developed habits of cooperation and conduits of communication that became more akin to intra-departmental relationships within a single government than formal relations between two sovereign states.²⁰

Institutions such as the International Joint Commission (IJC) and the processes they involved acted as a counter-balance to the periodic attempts to exercise raw power and to minimize the chance of another negative outcome for Canada in the relationship similar to that of the Alaskan dispute.²¹ The success of this strategy was such that barring the instance of the Alaskan Boundary Dispute that involved an arbitration panel unlike the more genuine articles established after 1905, the Canada-United States relationship steadily improved after the ratification of the Washington Treaty in 1871 and the period between 1905 and 1909 saw literally all of the outstanding contentious issues between the two countries resolved to the satisfaction of both countries.²²

The development of the policies of accommodation and reliance upon a rules-based institutional relationship were both critical to the successful pursuit of Canadian interests in the Canada-United States security relationship. A major factor in the success of the policy of accommodation was that it directly addressed the core American concern for the security of their homeland. The fundamental value to Canadian interests associated with the establishment of a rules-based institutional framework for the relationship was that it

“de-politicized” the issues by taking them out of the realm of the political and public eye and into the realm of the subject matter experts. This process worked very much to Canada’s advantage as when the subject matter experts were engaged, the decisions were rendered in more of an egalitarian fashion on the basis of the facts and not as a result of the political pressures or personalities of the moment.²³ One may conclude then that the Alaska Boundary Dispute and its outcome represents a misstep in Canadian diplomatic history from which the Canadians learned a valuable lesson in the conduct of the relationship.

The establishment of the third common policy thread in the relationship, the ongoing need for Canadian governments to walk a political tightrope between maximizing the benefits of the relationship for the Canadian people without being accused of being “too close” to the United States, also has its origins in the earliest days of the relationship. The existence and evolution of this thread is directly tied to the perceptions of the domestic Canadian public regarding the extent to which Canadian policies and actions can be seen or interpreted as being independent of those of the United States. The one-word definition of this concept is “sovereignty.” The domestic perception of national sovereignty is the single most important issue that must be addressed by every Canadian government in its relationship with the United States. Against this ever-present values-based concern of the domestic public must be balanced their best interests as perceived by their government. This frequently involves a political trade-off between values and interests, principles and pragmatism.

As indicated earlier, there has been an ongoing Canadian sense of concern about being overwhelmed by the United States from the outset of the American Revolution in 1776. The threats of domination and absorption by the United States first militarily, then territorially, and most recently economically and culturally have been omnipresent throughout Canadian history. One of the by-products of this constant concern and in some cases preoccupation with the influence of the United States on Canadian affairs is an undercurrent of anti-American feeling that runs through Canadian society.

The contemporary manifestation of the need to balance domestic opinion (and the public perception of Canadian interests) against the national interest can first be detected through an examination of the relationship between American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King. Observing the unfolding of Japanese strategies for the domination of Asia and the re-establishment of balancing strategies by the European powers, Roosevelt had turned his mind towards the identification of a set of common security interests for North America around which he could establish a bilateral relationship with Canada that would facilitate the security of the United States.²⁴ Although Roosevelt took advantage of several opportunities in the 1935-37 period to plant the seeds of such a relationship in King’s mind, the Canadian Prime Minister was a reluctant suitor.²⁵

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This reluctance was in spite of the fact that King was keenly interested in strengthening Canada's relationship with America in the areas of trade and economics as a means of extricating Canadians from the depths of the Great Depression. He also had an interest in using the United States as a balancing device in the Canada-United Kingdom relationship. He was not however particularly keen on entering into any type of relationship with America that would surrender or compromise the newly acquired sovereignty epitomized by the 1931 Statute of Westminster.²⁶ He was thus reluctant to address issues of common defence especially if those issues involved the presence of American troops on Canadian soil as the American proposals frequently did in that period.²⁷ Adding to this reluctance was an aversion to spending money on the military unless there was absolutely no other option.²⁸

King's overall objective in his interactions with Roosevelt was not to facilitate a shift from the Anglo to the American orbit, but to establish for Canada a position bridging the two. This would allow the pursuit of Canadian interests in one orbit or the other or a combination of the two spheres of influence depending upon which circumstances were the most advantageous. King also saw advantage for Canada in the role of neutral third party in Anglo-American discussions on global security issues.²⁹

The reluctance on King's part to embrace American concepts of continental security was interpreted by a number of American generals, politicians, and government officials as an apparent absence of concern on the part of their Canadian neighbours regarding the threats emanating from Europe and the Far East. The American belief that the Canadians simply did not understand or comprehend the nature of the threats facing North America was based in large part upon the fact that the Canadians were not fully supporting American proposals to counter these threats. The reality of the Canadian position and concerns regarding these evolving threats was that they fully appreciated both their size and gravity as evidenced by the fact that they chose to actively address them by entering the war against the axis powers more than two years before their American friends. Both nations therefore had a good appreciation of the threat. The difference lay in the ways in which the respective governments chose to address these security concerns. While the Americans wanted the Canadians to adhere to the American strategy of a closer continental security relationship with America taking the lead, the Canadians chose to rely primarily upon Great Britain and the Empire for their security.

The parallels with contemporary American fears regarding the apparent lack of Canadian concern for what are clearly discernible threats to North American security and the similar fears expressed by the Americans in the 1930s are startling. In both cases the Canadians had relatively clear perceptions of the threat to continental security but because their response to that threat was not the same as that of the United States, the Americans assumed that for some reason the Canadians did not fully appreciate the gravity of the threat – why else

would they not agree with the American proposals to address it? This serves to highlight the fact that the immediate post-9/11 period was not the first time that America has misinterpreted Canadian perceptions of a threat and their response to it as a lack of awareness or concern based upon the fact that the Canadian position differs from their own.

Notwithstanding King's cool response to American security proposals however, Roosevelt continued to maintain his pressure on the Prime Minister 1937 to do more on continental defence. One example of American proposals in the period was the construction of a highway from the "lower forty-eight" to Alaska to provide an "inner line of communication for the security of the west coast" (read: Alaska). King however had made all of the concessions that he was prepared to make at that point in time and noted to Roosevelt that while some Canadians felt that Canadian security was guaranteed by the Monroe Doctrine, no Canadian government could ever explicitly or even implicitly embrace that view.³⁰ In other words, while many Canadians understood and believed that the United States was the lynchpin of Canadian security, they were not particularly interested in having that fact made so obvious to themselves and others that their sovereigntist sensibilities were made to suffer.

In spite of Roosevelt's declaration that his only objective in fostering a closer security relationship was the enhancement of American security, Canadian officials remained concerned that one of the outcomes of a closer relationship would be a loss of Canadian sovereignty.³¹ In an example of an attempt at "quiet diplomacy" and of his growing understanding of the domestic tightrope being walked by King and many of his successors with respect to the Canada-United States relationship, Roosevelt even offered to conduct future talks on security "off-the-record," but to no avail.³²

Indeed it was only when King began to experience pressure from the Canadian public that he began to relent and consider the possibility of a visibly closer security relationship.³³ An example of the public pressure that King was being subjected to was a series of articles that appeared in the Ottawa and Toronto newspapers in early January 1938 that discussed the weaknesses of the Canadian defences on the Pacific coast and hinted that a Canada-United States security plan was in the offing. In a foreshadowing of events in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the articles further hinted that America might choose to fortify its border if Canada chose not to act (to carry out the security measures deemed necessary by the Americans for American security).³⁴ The inevitable result and unvoiced fear was that this would choke off the burgeoning trade relationship with the United States that had resulted from the recently concluded reciprocity agreement that was helping both countries recover economically from the Great Depression.³⁵ There are a number of interesting parallels with this set of circumstance and those of the contemporary post-9/11 relationship that will continue to be addressed throughout this work.

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The domestic pressure (and permission?) to move closer to the United States eventually appears to have reached a point where King felt that it would be politically unwise to ignore it. The event that actually signalled the move towards a closer security relationship took place in August 1938 when Roosevelt delivered a speech at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario during which he declared what has been coined by Michel Fortmann and David Haglund as the "Kingston Dispensation."³⁶ In this speech Roosevelt declared that, "...the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire."³⁷ For his part, King stated (several days subsequent to Roosevelt's announcement) that Canada would make itself as immune to attack as could be reasonably expected and that enemy forces would not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air to the United States across Canada.³⁸ This sentiment and objective has survived the intervening years and has most recently been enshrined in the first official Canadian National Security Policy issued in April 2004 and restated on the occasion of President Obama's visit to Canada in February 2009.³⁹

Notwithstanding the generous tone of his comments in the Kingston Dispensation, Roosevelt was clearly acting to protect that most vital of American interests: the security of their homeland.⁴⁰ In the years subsequent to the "Dispensation" America has not so much helped Canada to defend its own territory, but has helped Canada to defend the United States.⁴¹ King was in turn, not issuing a "blank cheque" to the Americans and automatically stating support for the security of a close friend and ally, but was making it quite clear that his nation was determined to maintain both its sovereignty and to carry out its responsibilities as a friend and ally of the United States – an explicit and high profile variation on the policy theme of "defence against help." Insofar as the preoccupation with sovereignty held by King and much of the domestic public, under the circumstances the Prime Minister and the Canadian public considered the "trade-off" between the increased contribution to key Canadian security interests and the threat of an infringement upon Canadian sovereignty by an eager America to be a fair one at the time.

The Threads Through History

In June 1940 with the fall of Dunkirk and the defeat of the allies on the continent of Europe, it became apparent to the Canadian government that Great Britain was no longer in a position to offer the mantle of security, even in principle, that it had heretofore provided for so long. Further, every man, bullet, ship, tank, and aircraft sent overseas to defend Great Britain in its hour of need must be considered lost in the event of an invasion of the British Isles and that would leave North America and Canada vulnerable. Canada, for the first time in its history, was thus under very real threat and without a security sponsor.⁴²

While King clearly understood the Canadian responsibility to assist in the defence of Great Britain with every asset at their disposal, he also realized that as

Canada increased its contributions to its strategy of forward defence in support of Great Britain, it needed the United States to take on an increasing role in the security of the continent and of the Canadian homeland. Thus the period of the Second World War proved to be a difficult time for Canada in balancing sovereignty concerns with those of security in what was clearly to be an unequal relationship made more difficult by questions of survival.⁴³ Canadian concerns over sovereignty were however, at least for the time being, overridden by those of survival.

As such King was quite agreeable to Roosevelt's proposal for a closer security relationship between the two countries made during a short meeting between the two leaders at Ogdensburg, New York in August of 1940. The meeting resulted in what has become known as the "Ogdensburg Agreement." The Agreement was a short, simple document signed by both leaders that amounted to a personal pledge of cooperation between them in the security of the continent, the production of war material, and the support of Great Britain in the defeat of Nazi Germany.⁴⁴ This agreement was followed by another between the two leaders later in the month on August 18, 1940 for the establishment of a joint (bi-national) defence board with the task of discussion and development of the defence of the northern half of the western hemisphere. Thereafter known as the Canada-U.S. PJBD, it formed the foundation of a cooperative approach to the defence of North America that exists to this day.⁴⁵ It was also a landmark in the relationship in another way in that it represented the first bi-national aspect of the evolving security relationship.

The net result of these early discussions and agreements was a basic understanding that Canada would focus its resources on the defence of Great Britain and that the United States in turn would take primary responsibility for safeguarding the North American continent. Under this arrangement Canada would continue to carry out its strategy of forward defence that involved meeting and defeating threats to national security before they reached the Canadian homeland, a strategy that has developed into a tradition and has carried through to the present with the Canadian government's policy on Afghanistan.⁴⁶

Canada entered into the Ogdensburg Agreement and the PJBD with an enthusiasm borne of necessity.⁴⁷ While realizing the necessity of obtaining American assistance in their national defence, Canadians in government at the time also realized that the most favourable terms and position for Canada in this relationship could only be obtained early on in the formative stages of the relationship. It was clearly understood that the longer Canada waited to cement a viable security relationship with America, the less favourable would be the terms of that relationship for Canada. Too long a delay would require ever-closer Canadian adherence to the American agenda with the resultant loss of sovereignty and the ability to meet specifically Canadian goals and objectives within the relationship. This was one of the conclusions found in the pamphlet, "A Program for Immediate Canadian Action," drawn up in July 1940 by a group

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of Canadians representing the “who’s who” of liberal intellectuals knowledgeable in Canada-U.S. relations.

Notwithstanding the severity of the security crisis facing Canada at the time, it became apparent that government officials still had to address issues of sovereignty and control within the boundaries of the budding relationship. Even though the American war machine was still developing in the early days of these defence agreements while the Canadian one was in full operation and growing daily, it quickly became apparent that the initial American position on relationships within the agreement was that they would control the situation, almost as a natural right. It required skillful negotiation supported at times by bald-faced intransigence on the part of Canadians to disabuse them of this notion. Once accomplished, however, the Americans displayed a generosity of spirit and respect for Canada and its sovereignty.⁴⁸ Thus while Canadians and their government had been reluctant to adopt a closer security relationship with the United States because of concerns over sovereignty in the years prior to the Kingston Dispensation, when such a move became a measure of national security, the new Canadian policy was embraced aggressively and proactively to maximize the benefits to be realized from such a development. In the face of such issues of national survival, the Canadian public was willing to reconsider but never abandon their sovereignty concerns and put their support wholly behind their government’s initiatives. The Canadian government in turn, maintained national sovereignty as a priority within its spectrum of national interests at the time.

To the extent that a proactive policy similar to that adopted in the summer and fall of 1940 was followed in the post-9/11 timeframe, it could be argued that the initial efforts of former Deputy Prime Minister John Manley were in the finest traditions of the Canada-United States relationship as were the air, land and sea deployments for the invasion of Afghanistan and its subsequent stabilization. Yet also present in the Canadian post-9/11 reactions to events were simultaneous instances of a distinct lack of understanding and empathy for American concerns and perspectives that included; the way in which the decisions not to support the expansion of the NORAD relationship from one of air defence to that of an all-hazards military defence of the continent in 2002, the refusal to join the Coalition for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and a similar refusal join the BMD program in 2005 were transmitted to the domestic public and to the Americans.

Returning for the moment to the early years of the Second World War, the benefits flowing from the Canadian decision to adopt a closer security relationship in 1940 were not restricted to the sphere of military security during the war years. Rather, for the first time in the history of both countries, their cooperation extended beyond that of the basic military sphere and into the realm of defence cooperation in general by virtue of the economic and industrial aspects of the defence production sharing arrangements that were initiated and

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developed throughout the following decades. And just as the 1940-41 period saw the evolution of the relationship from one of military cooperation to that of defence cooperation, the autumn of 2001 would see yet another evolution of that relationship from one of defence cooperation to that of security cooperation writ large to include all aspects of civil, military, and economic cooperation related to the security of both countries.

The initial evolution of the relationship however, beyond the military sphere to that of defence encompassing both economic and industrial aspects, was signalled by the Hyde Park Declaration of April 20, 1941. This declaration provided the foundation of Canada-United States defence production sharing agreements that exist to this day.⁴⁹ This initial agreement has been reinforced and expanded upon since then with a number of other agreements that included the formation of the “Joint Industrial Mobilization Committee” in April 1949 – a reaction to concerns about strategic readiness in relation to the growing threat to the continent posed by the Soviet Union.⁵⁰ Additional agreements such as the “The Defence Production Sharing Agreement” (DPSA) in 1960 and the “Defence Development Sharing Agreement” (DDSA) in 1963 facilitated the cross-border sharing of classified technical information and leading edge technology and gave Canadian firms equal access to research and development (R&D) contracts for the American military relative to American firms and preferred access to these contracts relative to other American allies.⁵¹ The combination of economic benefits and security from a commonly identified threat (first Nazi Germany and then the Soviet Union) served to offset domestic concerns over national sovereignty and made the domestic negotiation of the political tightrope that much easier to accomplish for the Canadian governments of that period by lessening the burden of defence on the Canadian people.

Also serving to make the negotiation of the tightrope somewhat easier was the dynamic Canadian profile on the world stage that established an increasing sense of confidence and national pride within the Canadian public which in turn served to dampen domestic concerns of being overwhelmed by their American friend and ally. This increasingly dynamic profile resulted not only from its role in the allied victory in the Second World War, but also from a postwar policy of “responsible internationalism” championed by Louis St. Laurent and Lester B. Pearson.⁵² This new strategy was evidenced by the establishment of strong positions for Canada in two international fora, the UN and the NATO.⁵³ The evolution of NATO and Canada’s role in that process served to further reinforce the domestic sense of common purpose and solidarity in approach to the common threat to the security of both Canada and the United States that was posed by the Soviet Union.⁵⁴

Three other events served to further bolster the Canadian domestic sense of self-worth and as a consequence, allay fears or concerns regarding the loss of sovereignty in the Canada-United States relationship. The first two events occurred almost simultaneously. In response to the growing confrontation with the

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Soviet Union in Europe (assisted by the demonstration of its nuclear capabilities in August 1949) and the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in June 1950, the Canadian government committed substantial forces to both regions.⁵⁵

The third event was the “Suez Crisis”, a situation that propelled Canada to its peak of international influence and its historic high in terms of a global profile. This was an event that Canada has continually showcased since it took place in 1956. It was the first time the UN sent a peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) and Canada contributed the first commander and most of the troops to the mission. The real value of Canadian contributions to this crisis however has nothing to do with revisionist perceptions of the development of an instant Canadian tradition as peacekeepers or the seemingly purely altruistic motivations for global peace that resulted in a Nobel Peace Prize for Lester Pearson. Rather, the fundamental value that accrued to Canada resulting from the role played by Canadian diplomats and soldiers in ending the crisis was more along the lines of a realist belief that the Canadian contribution helped to prevent a major schism in western security relations and to stabilize and eventually halt a global escalation of east-west tensions that could have resulted in a nuclear exchange.⁵⁶

In all three cases the Canadian contributions had a number of positive outcomes. First the Canadian strategy of forward defence was once again reinforced with conventional responses to what were seen as threats to the Canadian interest of global peace and stability. Second, the Canadian responses/participation/policies in all three instances firmly supported American policies, interests, and global leadership. This factor, public and substantive Canadian support for American policies in the “away game” cannot be overemphasized in terms of its importance in the American psyche where domestic support for homeland security is taken as a given and the acid test of friendship and reliability as an ally is considered to be the extent to which you are prepared to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with them abroad. Third and last, all three cases served to further enhance and bolster the Canadian self-image as a proud, independent and sovereign state making substantive contributions to global peace and security and thus served to ease feelings of inferiority and dependence upon America as a security guarantor.

Yet even in the best of relationship times there appeared to be a limit beyond which Canadians were not prepared to go in terms of the tug-of-war between concerns over sovereignty and national security. This limit was apparently reached with the signing of the NORAD Agreement in 1958, an event that served to highlight the political implications of a governmental failure to maintain its balance on the tightrope of Canada-United States relations.

Initially both countries had worked independently in the postwar era to secure their homelands from the threat of nuclear attack posed by the Soviet Union. The contacts and relationships established between the respective national militaries during the Second World War facilitated the increasingly

detailed cooperation that occurred in order to prevent “gaps” in the respective national defensive shields.⁵⁷ From this process of cooperation a concept of collective and strategic defence gradually emerged that on the Canadian side was developed by the military leadership more or less in isolation from the other departments of the Canadian government.⁵⁸ The draft document authorizing the establishment of the NORAD was presented for approval to the new Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker in 1958.⁵⁹ The Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, General Charles Foulkes, pressed the new Prime Minister for approval of the document noting that there “were no boundaries upstairs” and that NORAD was simply the evolution and formalization of existing programs and initiatives begun at the end of the Second World War that had been fully supported by the government at each stage of their development and implementation.⁶⁰

On this basis and apparently unaware that the document he was signing was not the product of a coordinated effort on the part of his government, Diefenbaker signed it without hesitation.⁶¹ When the Agreement was made public however, he came under almost immediate and intense criticism from a number of sources including the media, various citizens groups and even his own ministers for not ensuring that Canadian interests were adequately safeguarded before committing the nation to the agreement.⁶² Speculation was rampant as to whether the agreement was intended to protect Canadians or the American nuclear deterrent. And considering the somewhat “cozy” relationship that existed between Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the United States Air Force (USAF) there was additional speculation as to in exactly whose interests the RCAF was acting when it recommended an agreement to the Prime Minister that in some minds indentured Canada to American service.⁶³

Diefenbaker spent months attempting to convince his critics in and out of government that America would consult with Canada on issues of American vital interests before taking action and that NORAD was somehow linked to NATO and was therefore a good deal. The reality of course was that neither statement was true.⁶⁴ One of the ironies of this situation was that as much as Diefenbaker was criticized for approving the agreement in 1958, he would come under additional criticism for failing to fulfill what was seen by many as the Canadian obligations under the agreement during the Cuban Missile Crisis some five years later.⁶⁵

Notwithstanding the fact that Diefenbaker had failed to effectively negotiate the sovereignty/security tightrope, there were a number of advantages to Canadian security that resulted from the signing of the NORAD Agreement. They included access to American strategic intelligence assets, security fora, and a voice (albeit a very limited one) in security decision-making affecting the safety of Canadians. These are benefits that accrued to Canadians as a result of a focused proactive strategy of engagement in an area of intense American interest – security of their homeland.

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Although many Canadians at the time believed that the Agreement represented an abdication of Canadian sovereignty, there is compelling logic to indicate otherwise.⁶⁶ Given the obvious concern held by the Americans for the security of their northern flank, it is unlikely that they would have been content with a lesser result such as a reiteration of the Kingston Dispensation unsupported by any tangible acts or commitments of resources. As such the reality of the Agreement, rather than representing an abdication of sovereignty, could be interpreted as a measure that supported Canadian national sovereignty from the time of its signing through to the present day to the extent that it represented another example of the established Canadian strategy of “defence against help.”

If in response to American concerns regarding their northern security, the Canadian reaction had been to deny that the threat existed or to address it in a way that was not seen as effective by the United States, it is entirely possible that a unilateral American solution to the issue would have gained support and momentum in American strategic circles.⁶⁷ Given the nature of the threat and the state of technology at the time, some assets for early warning of an attack had to be stationed on Canadian soil.⁶⁸ Without enthusiastic and proactive Canadian participation in the solution, a unilateral American solution might well have had some significant negative implications for Canadian sovereignty. Thus the NORAD Agreement has been interpreted by many as a very positive development in the Canada-United States security relationship in terms of the influence exerted by Canada within that somewhat asymmetric relationship, and in the strength of Canadian sovereignty over its own territory and affairs. And indeed public opinion has come around to strongly supporting this interpretation.

The NORAD example provides a demonstration of the value and significance of the common threads or policies in acquiring a nuanced understanding of the relationship. Further, it provides an example of the value of these policies in both their observance and absence in any given instance. Although a comprehensive discussion of every instance of observance or absence is beyond the scope of this work, a number of other examples will be provided to further reinforce and illustrate the impact of these common threads or policies on the evolution of the Canada-United States security relationship.

The tenure of John Diefenbaker in the Prime Minister’s office was marked either by failures to balance or by explicit decisions to not balance the security relationship effectively between relationship factors and domestic concerns regarding sovereignty. It was also characterized by an abandonment of the policy of accommodation to include the absence of “quiet diplomacy” and of the employment of the principle of “defence against help.” These failures and abandonments are well illustrated by the events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis and the controversy that arose surrounding the incorporation of nuclear weapons into the Canadian weapons inventory.

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In 1959, Diefenbaker and his Minister of National Defence, George R. Pearkes were subjected to some intense American lobbying to introduce nuclear weapons into the Canadian arsenal. In almost an exact repeat of the circumstances that led to the public uproar following his somewhat precipitous signing of the NORAD Agreement, Diefenbaker's lack of trust in his advisors led him to agree to the proposal without consulting with either his cabinet or advisors in External Affairs.⁶⁹

Faced with an almost immediate public and political backlash resulting from his decision, Diefenbaker became evasive with the Americans on exactly when he would accept the weapons and make them operational.⁷⁰ Frustrated with Diefenbaker's inconsistent and unreliable behaviour and rhetoric, the Americans themselves abandoned the use of "quiet diplomacy" on the issue and publicly castigated both him and his government on their indecisiveness and the resulting security implications for North America.⁷¹

As this drama continued into 1962 yet another crisis was about to unfold that has been described by Jack Granatstein as the single greatest breach of civil-military relations in Canadian history.⁷² The discovery by the United States of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) on the island of Cuba in October of that year had resulted in the imposition of a naval "quarantine" of the island by the American President John F. Kennedy. In the resulting increase in global tension with the USSR, the President placed the NORAD-designated United States Air Force assets on a higher state of alert and diverted American naval forces in the Atlantic southward for the blockade of Cuba – all without consulting or even warning their Canadian allies and partners in security before the fact.⁷³

Diefenbaker personally believed that the Americans were overreacting to the magnitude of the threat and, given the absolute disregard both leaders had for each other, was not inclined to give the Americans the benefit of the doubt. He called for debates in the UN and in Parliament and refused to authorize the movement of Canadian air and naval forces to an alert status matching that of the Americans. The result of this refusal could well have been the creation of "gaps" in the continental security screen through which an attack could devastate both countries.⁷⁴ Had this been allowed to occur it would have represented a clear abandonment of the concept of "defence against help" and would have provided a tailor-made rationale, indeed an invitation for the Americans to resurrect the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine and deploy air and naval forces to manoeuvre within Canadian territory to protect American and Canadian citizens, territory, and the strategic nuclear forces of the United States.⁷⁵

The Canadian Minister of Defence of the time, Douglas Harkness apparently understood this difficult reality and made the decision to disobey Diefenbaker's direction to take no action and ordered the Royal Canadian Air Force to a state of readiness comparable to that of the United States Air Force. He also authorized an increased state of alert for the army and the navy. Admiral

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Kenneth Dyer, the commander of the Royal Canadian Navy on the East Coast, ordered Canadian ships to sea under the guise of a training exercise to cover the gap left by the American naval ships that had been diverted southward by the blockade.⁷⁶ The net result of these pragmatic actions taken behind Diefenbaker's political back was to re-establish the concept of "defence against help" and so avoid a loss of Canadian sovereignty that might have resulted had the Americans chosen to take unilateral action to secure Canadian airspace on their own. The disjointed and inconsistent opposition of the Canadian government to the American position combined with the smooth functioning of the military-to-military aspects of the relationship made the government look inept and without control of their military.⁷⁷

The Cuban Missile Crisis in combination with the furor over the acceptance of nuclear weapons into the Canadian inventory served to materially weaken the Canada-United States defence relationship in a couple of ways that are again eerily similar to the contemporary situation and circumstances. First it established a clear sense of doubt in the minds of some American military and civilian leaders as to the reliability of Canada as an ally and possibly in the competence of Canadian leaders and diplomats in effectively addressing joint security interests in a crisis. For Canadian leaders and bureaucrats, the crisis clearly established the fact that regardless of the presence or absence of any clause in the NORAD or any other agreement, America is unlikely to consult an ally on issues affecting its own fundamental security interests before taking action in what is clearly considered to be a crisis situation. Such is the position of a junior partner in an alliance.⁷⁸ Considering the discussion in the previous chapter regarding the criteria under which a strong nation would enter into a bi-national agreement with a weaker one, it would appear in this case that America had no intention of allowing the Agreement to limit the unilateral scope of its strategic action in the event of a crisis, regardless of whether or not Canadian diplomats believed that the terms of the Agreement bound them to consult with Canada before taking such actions.

Lester B. Pearson's leadership as Prime Minister beginning in April 1963 provided a mixed record that generally did not repair much of the damage done to the relationship in the Diefenbaker era. One of Pearson's first acts as Prime Minister was an unconditional acceptance of the nuclear weapons into the Canadian inventory. This represented a pragmatic reversal of the Liberal policy opposing the Canadian acquisition of nuclear weapons with which he had bludgeoned the previous Conservative government under John Diefenbaker.⁷⁹ In a display of political leadership that would be emulated fifteen (15) years later by Pierre Elliot Trudeau on the issue of cruise missile testing in Canada, Pearson explained the policy of his government with the statement, reiterated in the 1964 White Paper, "...that one cannot be a member of an alliance without taking some share of responsibility for its strategic policies."⁸⁰ The delays and policy reversals that had taken place under Diefenbaker prior to final acceptance of the weapons by Pearson however had eliminated much of the influence within

the relationship that Pearson had hoped to re-establish for Canada with the acceptance decision. The junior partner with little to contribute now had even less influence than before.⁸¹ Unlike the decision resulting in the Ogdensburg Agreement and the subsequent defence production sharing arrangements that proved so lucrative for Canada economically, Canada's deployment of nuclear weapons in support of their own security and American policy, came too late, and after too much "waffling" to have any positive influence on the relationship as a whole, or Canadian interests within it.

In a smaller scale reprise of his Suez performance, Pearson followed resolution of the nuclear weapons issue with a decisive deployment of UN-mandated forces for intervention in the Cyprus crisis of 1964, thereby preventing a serious rift and possible open warfare between Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies.⁸² As with the Suez Crisis, Canadian intervention served American security interests rather well and in this case defused increasing tension between two critical NATO allies on the southern flank of the organization.

Notwithstanding these improvements however, the downward trend of the relationship continued. One issue that contributed to this trend was the American War in Vietnam. In an attempt to maintain a classic middle power position that would have theoretically allowed Canada to eventually assume a negotiating role in the resolution of the conflict, Pearson combined a position of low-key support with attempts to diplomatically push the Americans towards withdrawal. The results however were distinctly unsatisfactory as he was condemned by the Canadian public for being pro-American, and by the Americans for being critical of the very situation that was providing a large volume of business (and profit) to the Canadian defence industry. The Vietnam issue remained a sore point in the relations between the two countries until the end of the conflict.⁸³

When Pierre Elliot Trudeau succeeded Lester Pearson as leader of the Liberal party and as Prime Minister in 1968, he initially abandoned the postwar internationalist strategy and embraced one of his own making focused upon domestic unity and sovereignty.⁸⁴ His attention to both foreign and defence policy and the relationship with the United States has been characterized by J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell as both "sporadic" and "inconsistent."⁸⁵ He possessed only a limited understanding of military and national security issues and the dynamics that informed them, yet eschewed the advice of the Defence and External Affairs bureaucrats in the belief that their narrow perspectives could not match his own intellect.⁸⁶

Generally he viewed the military in general and defence spending in particular as discretionary items of national policy.⁸⁷ He did not see the military as performing any major function or providing any tangible benefit to Canadian interests and considered it to be just so much baggage for the government to carry around and as such, it had to be kept as light as possible. A series of budget cuts and the unification of the separate arms of the military prior to Trudeau's

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arrival in the Prime Minister's office reflected the fact that this mindset was not unique to Trudeau.⁸⁸

What Trudeau failed to understand however was that while the Canadian contributions would never determine the outcome of any struggle that they were applied to, it did not mean that they had no value in the international arena where he sought influence in the pursuit of his own internationalist agenda. Thus after initially making significant changes in defence policy direction, most notably taking a step back from NATO, the process of his subsequent education in these matters resulted in the performance by Trudeau in the words of Granatstein and Bothwell, of a graceful policy "pirouette."⁸⁹ Notwithstanding this reversal however, it was in the Trudeau era that there began to be comments made among Canada's allies regarding the amount and quality of Canadian contributions to the principle of collective defence.⁹⁰

The Trudeau era was marked by erratic shifts from aggressive nationalism that pushed America away to unrealistic internationalism that puzzled Ottawa's friends and allies. The result was that, combined with reductions in the resources allocated to the policies, Canada's influence and credibility sank lower still, both abroad and within the Canada-United States relationship.⁹¹ The overall effect of his policies and public statements on the relationship itself was to reduce the political and material support provided by Canada for the American "away game." As discussed earlier, this facet of the relationship was a critical one in determining the level of trust and confidence in Canada held by its most important security partner.

A security bright spot in the relationship in the Trudeau era however was his pragmatic support for at least one aspect the Canada-United States defence relationship. Trudeau recognized the value of NORAD as a means of protecting the Canadian homeland.⁹² The *realpolitik* nature of his approval of cruise missile tests in Canada in the face of significant opposition in both Parliament and the public reflected both his increased understanding of national security issues and a leadership style that in the words of Granatstein and Bothwell, would surely have earned him an invitation to President G.W. Bush's ranch.⁹³ Such demonstrations of leadership and support for their policies no doubt provided some comfort for the Americans.

The Trudeau era was characterized initially by a failure to recognize or to acknowledge the need to perform the relationship balancing act and it was not until later in his tenure as Prime Minister that the national leadership learning curve took effect and resulted in a low-key reversal (pirouette?) of several of his policies unaccompanied by the bombast and high-minded rhetoric of their introduction. Ultimately, however, Trudeau demonstrated a high degree of political capability in maintaining his government's balancing act between giving the Americans what they needed to maximize Canadian benefits from the relationship and assuaging domestic Canadian fears regarding their sovereignty. Notwithstanding

his return to the policy of accommodation to include adherence to the principles of defence against help and of quiet diplomacy, Trudeau remained a domestically vocal champion of Canadian sovereignty.

During Brian Mulroney's tenure as Prime Minister he was able to restore some of the quality, confidence and mutual trust to the Canada-United States relationship that had been lost over the preceding decades. In his adroit handling of several issues he demonstrated what might be considered the finest contemporary examples of effective balancing of the relationship to achieve the greatest benefits from it while maintaining a domestically acceptable distance from American policies and actions. His use of identity-conferring opportunities such as the establishment of an independent Canadian policy on South African Apartheid established a domestic perception of independence without undermining American policies addressing their fundamental interests. Further, his return to the use of quiet diplomacy on contentious issues in the relationship harkened back to the era of Canadian diplomacy sometimes known as the "Golden Era."

Mulroney's grasp of the essentials of the relationship and of the importance of the common threads under discussion here are illustrated in his treatment of three issues that had significant potential to damage the relationship had they been mishandled. The issues were those of free trade, BMD and the potential Canadian acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines. The domestically hard fought battle to establish the Free Trade Agreement with the United States reflected both an acknowledgment of where future Canadian prosperity lay as well as the value of a structured relationship to Canadian interests in the relationship. His leadership and determination to make free trade a reality resulted in an unprecedented growth in the economic relationship and domestic prosperity.

When the issue of Canadian participation in President Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" program was raised, Canadian opposition to BMD was well established.⁹⁴ Canadian ratification of the UN Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the insertion of specific wording in the 1968 NORAD renewal agreement excluding BMD from the mandate, and support for the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 all clearly defined the Canadian position. The American offer to participate touched off the greatest public and political debate both domestically and between the two countries since the ABM controversy of the late 1960s.⁹⁵ The announcement by Mulroney in 1985 that Canada would not participate in the program was an astute political decision that certainly reflected public values but not Canadian political and strategic interests in the program.⁹⁶

The excellent personal and working relationship that Mulroney had with Reagan allowed this decision to pass without the negative rhetoric and public profile that accompanied the Canadian decision not to support BMD in 2005. He also attempted to cushion the blow for Canadian business by granting them dispensation to bid for and participate in contracts related to the SDI.⁹⁷

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The fact that he was able to artfully address all three factions involved in the issue; domestic, bi-lateral, and business, without alienating any of them was a masterpiece of political manoeuvring.

The last issue, the acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines, was generated by the publication of the Defence White paper of 1987.⁹⁸ This document at first appeared to be the one that would reverse decades of shrinking defence expenditures. It was considered the most aggressive White Paper in the nation's history and served to silence, if only briefly, the American complaints on the paucity of Canadian defence expenditures. The document was flawed from the beginning however and the combination of the astronomical price tag for the improvements to military capability and the visible disintegration of the Soviet Union swiftly eliminated any public support for the proposal and by 1989 the document was a "mere footnote in the history books."⁹⁹

Some aspects of the American reaction to the document however, were curious given their previously well-documented concerns over shrinking Canadian defence expenditures. The major American concern, especially within the United States Navy, with respect to the 1987 White Paper was the proposal for the purchase by Canada of a dozen nuclear-powered submarines. Concerned that such an acquisition would require the disclosure of sensitive technical and strategic information regarding American capabilities and activities in Arctic waters claimed by Canada, there was great relief in the Pentagon when the project was cancelled.¹⁰⁰ Mulrone's role in allowing the plan to die and correct this misstep in the relationship is unknown but the end state was the successful avoidance of an issue that could have violated one of the founding principles of the Canada-United States security relationship – that Canada should never develop or acquire a military capability that would complicate American security activities.

It would appear that American concerns regarding Canadian defence expenditures, then and arguably now, come with specific caveats on not only how much Canada should spend, but on what. While the United States was all for cooperation and Canadian defence spending in general, they wanted both on their terms and in such a manner that American vital interests were not compromised. In this regard they are very similar to Canada's first security sponsor, Great Britain. Throughout the Canadian security association with the motherland, the British constantly sought ever greater Canadian contributions to the security of the Empire but always along very specific lines and capabilities that fit with an overall British strategy and under British control. It would seem that life as the junior partner in a security relationship changes little from one sponsor to another.

Conclusion

The history of the Canada-United States relationship clearly establishes three consistent or common policy threads in the Canadian approach to

managing that relationship over time. As noted throughout the chapter, the value and role of these policies in managing the relationship has been demonstrated as much by their absence as by their observance.

The policy of accommodation encompassing the twin strategies of “defence against help,” and “quiet diplomacy” has been a regular feature of the relationship from the Treaty of Washington in 1871 onward. Examples of the employment of Nils Ørvik’s principle of “defence against help” include the establishment of the Northwest Mounted Police and their use along with the Canadian militia in the latter part of the 19th century to maintain peace and order in the Canadian west, the signing of the NORAD Agreement in 1958, and the action by the Minister of National Defence Douglas Harkness to put the Canadian Forces immediately on alert during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Examples of how the use of “quiet diplomacy” has positively influenced the relationship include the resolution of a series of boundary disputes from 1871 through to the early years of the 20th century, King’s handling of the critical evolution of the relationship in the years immediately preceding the Second World War and Mulroney’s handling of the BMD issue in the 1980s.

The Canadian reliance upon the establishment and use of institutions to regulate the relationship and as a counter to the power asymmetry of that relationship is also well-documented. From the establishment of the IJC in 1909 to the Hyde Park Agreement and defence production agreements of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, the NORAD Agreement of 1958 and its subsequent renewals, and the Free Trade and North American Free Trade Agreements of the 1980s and 1990s, Canadians have sought the use of institutions and institutional agreements to maximize the benefits to be derived from the relationship. Whether or not this faith has been consistently well-placed is certainly open to discussion, but the ongoing reliance upon them is not.

Lastly, the ability or willingness of Canadian governments to maintain the “balancing act” between domestic concerns over sovereignty and the best interests of Canadians has been a regular feature in the evolution of the relationship. To the extent that many Canadians believe that the two are mutually exclusive or at least are subject to a degree of conflict in the management of the relationship, Canadian leaders and their governments have sometimes been reluctant or unable to balance the relationship and have instead acted clearly at one end of the spectrum or the other. Their performance in this regard has had mixed results.

From King’s generally successful balancing performance, the relationship progressed through St. Laurent’s relationship successes (propped up as he was by Pearson) and Diefenbaker’s general failure at the task. While Pearson as Prime Minister struggled to improve the relationship with mixed results, Trudeau seemingly ignored its importance until the national leadership learning curve forced him to acknowledge it with Granatstein and Bothwell’s “pirouette.” The Mulroney era and the end of the Cold War saw an upturn in the relationship as

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he employed a combination of statesmanship and diplomacy to chart a Canadian political course that seemingly satisfied both Canadian sovereignty concerns and the need to maximize the benefits of the relationship to Canadians.

The existence of the three common policy threads illustrates the reality that the Canada-United States security relationship has remained the same in a number of fundamental ways over the course of its history. At the same time, the examination of the three common threads through the history of the relationship has also revealed the presence of one of three fundamental changes to the nature of the relationship that have occurred since 9/11 – that the contemporary relationship is no longer dominated by the military aspects of national security and has in fact expanded to include a broader spectrum of defence activities. In this regard, this review of the history of the relationship has outlined its transition from one focused on conflict management in its early days, to one of purely military cooperation in the period immediately prior to the Second World War, to one of defence cooperation in the early years of the war. In the era of defence cooperation, the relationship expanded from consideration of purely military issues to those of national defence encompassing the strategic planning for the establishment and maintenance of continental industrial capacity, production sharing, the exchange of technology and R&D information, and a closer, bi-national military cooperation in the defence of the continental homelands. The contemporary and future evolution of the relationship to one of security writ large using the common policy threads will now be addressed.

Endnotes

1. This strategy is one employed by smaller states against larger friendly powers. It is intended to maintain a distance or independence from the larger power in the face of their friendly offers of overwhelming assistance that could tend towards an encroachment upon the sovereignty of the smaller state. Nils Ørvik, “Defence Against Help – A Strategy for Small States?” *Survival* 15/5 (September/October 1973): 228.
2. The concept or tactic of “quiet diplomacy” was first formally identified by Livingstone Merchant and A.D.P. Heeney in 1965. When employing this tactic the public forum is reserved for issues and decisions that enhance the image of Canadian autonomy and sovereignty in the relationship. The channels of “quiet diplomacy” are reserved for those issues and the positions on them that are not necessarily popular with the domestic public but are nonetheless seen to be in their best interests by the government. The use of “quiet diplomacy” keeps contentious issues out of the public eye and away from any fora where they can be unduly influenced by the ebb and flow of public opinion and emotion. Livingstone Merchant and A.D.P. Heeney, “Principles for Partnership.” In *In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World*, ed. Denis Stairs, et al, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (2003), 16.
3. This is not to say that it was the only threat or that the threat level was consistently high over the entire period. Indeed the growing Anglo-American entente of the late 19th and early 20th centuries resulted in a steady decline of the threat over time. D.W. Middlemiss and J.J. Sokolsky. *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), 10-12.
4. Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada*. 3rd ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992), 83.
5. Roussel. *The North American Democratic Peace*, 111.

6. As part of War Plans RED, ORANGE-RED and CRIMSON, Canada would have been invaded in the event of a war between the United States and Great Britain. The plans did not reflect political reality after the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 disappeared in the 1920s. Edward S. Miller. *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan 1897-1945*. (Annapolis Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 134-135; Steven T. Ross, ed., *Plans for War Against the British Empire and Japan: The Red, Orange, and Red-Orange Plans, 1923-1938*. Vol. 2. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1992), xxv.
7. A pre-emptive strike to disrupt American preparations for an invasion of Canada, it was one component of a series of plans: Defence Scheme No. 2 addressed a possible war with Japan, in case the Pacific realignment drew Britain into war with its former ally, and No. 3 and No. 4 simply planned the dispatch of Canadian troops to aid British forces in European and colonial wars. Canadian Defence Scheme No. 1 was never a formal part of Canadian policy or strategy, not least because it was largely an internal army discussion, “not fully disclosed to the Government.” Pursuit of approval for the plan was finally abandoned in 1929. Stephen Harris. “Or There Would Be Chaos: The Legacy of Sam Hughes and Military Planning in Canada, 1919-1939,” *Military Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Oct., 1982): 121-122; James Eayrs. *In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 72.
8. Even as the RED, ORANGE-RED and CRIMSON plans were withdrawn, the Rainbow Plans outlining a series of options for the defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan in a number of scenarios involving an alliance with Canada were adopted by President Roosevelt in late 1940 with secret staff talks with British and Canadian planners undertaken in January 1941 that resulted in the ABC-1 and ABC-22 plans. Ross, ed., *Plans for War*, xiv, xv; Miller. *War Plan Orange*, 264.
9. America got part of the territory it wanted in the Oregon boundary dispute with Canada/Great Britain, but everything it wanted with respect to its claims to Texas in dealing with Mexico. When asked the reason for the different outcomes one American Senator remarked, “...because Great Britain is strong and Mexico is weak.” Roussel. *The North American Democratic Peace*, 112.
10. The British had begun to worry about the balance of power in Europe as it pertained to Germany. While the Americans shared this view to an extent, they were also concerned about their own evolving empire in the Pacific. Neither power could address these concerns if they were pre-occupied with their past differences. Consequently, America and Great Britain were able to find common cause on a number of issues that allowed them to focus more on their present and future aspirations rather than past disagreements.
11. Formal responsibility was not ceded to Canada until the Statutes of Westminster in 1931. The Washington Treaty saw the withdrawal of most of the remaining inland British garrisons from the Dominion. The only garrisons left in place were those at Halifax and Esquimalt to protect the strategically important Imperial naval bases that supported the Royal Navy and the trade routes. These bases were of value only in supporting the Empire and did not play any role in the security of Canada. Ronald G. Haycock, *The Evolution of Canadian National Security Policy*, 5-7; Richard A. Preston, *Canada and “Imperial Defence”* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967), 336-343.
12. Fortunately by this time, or perhaps acting as a catalyst for the Treaty of Washington, the Anglo-American relationship had stabilized along the lines of peaceful co-existence and even cooperation. It should be noted however that after 1871 America and its Presidents still sought annexation of Canada, but had for the most part abandoned the idea of doing so through the use of force. After the Treaty the American liberal annexationist thinking was that Canada would still eventually join the United States, but only when it chose to do so. Roussel. *The North American Democratic Peace*, 124.
13. Joseph Schull, *Laurier: The First Canadian* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965), 438.
14. David Haglund builds an effective case that supports the contention that the ultimate outcome of the issue was shaped primarily by the global interests of America and Britain with Roosevelt’s primary objective being that the British be given a face-saving opportunity to decide the issue in favour of his own well-telegraphed preferences and intentions. He provides a sound

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argument that supports the idea that America exercised a classic realist strategy intermingled with seasonings of manifest destiny by speaking softly to the British and showing the big stick to the Canadians. Some Canadians who contend that Canada was betrayed by the British also contend or imply that Canada would have done better on its own. This is unlikely given Roosevelt's position and philosophy. Canada did as well as it could have but simply did not do well at all. The British did their best to address Canadian concerns without sacrificing what could be considered the larger geo-strategic interests of the British Empire. The desire by Roosevelt to save British face and further the evolving Anglo-American relationship saved Canada from the fate of Colombia in the Panama Canal dispute or of Mexico in the dispute over Texas. David Haglund and Tudor Onea. "Victory without Triumph: Theodore Roosevelt, Honour, and the Alaska Panhandle Dispute," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 19 (2008): 35; David Haglund, "The TR Problem in Canada-U.S. Relations," *Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal*. Vol. XXIX, No. 2 (Spring 2008): 26.

15. The bellicose American President had stated publicly that notwithstanding any decision by the international commission established to mediate the issue, if the decision went against the United States he was prepared to deploy troops to the region to protect what he stated rightfully belonged to America. Roussel. *The North American Democratic Peace*, 112, 115 and 135; Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict*, 100-103.

16. The Monroe Doctrine shaped American thinking on its neighbours from its inception in 1823 to the present. The principles of the policy warned off the European powers regarding any intent they might have or acquire in the future for interfering in events of the western hemisphere. Its explicit focus at the time was the central and southern portions of the hemisphere. The Roosevelt Corollary was announced in December 1904 by President Theodore Roosevelt and extended the use of the Monroe Doctrine from preventing any interference by any state to one of a policy of intervention by the United States in the domestic affairs of any nation in the western hemisphere if the conduct of those affairs could be in any way interpreted to be a direct threat to the security of the United States or even an indirect one if the conduct of such affairs invited the attention of a European power. Walter Lafeber. *The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to the Present*. 2nd ed. (New York: Norton and Company, 1994), 83, 247; Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*. 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 36, 39; Haycock, *The Evolution of Canadian National Security Policy*, (Kingston: DND, 1994), 5-7.

17. Instances of this strategy being employed to good effect included the suppression of the Riel uprising in 1885 and the dispatch of an expeditionary force to the Yukon in 1898 to stabilize lawlessness in the region. Stacey. *Canada and the Age of Conflict: Volume 1: 1867-1921*, 113.

18. Ørvik. "Defence Against Help," 227.

19. This process resulted in the settlement of no fewer than 10 quarrels between 1794 and 1903, all of which were eventually settled by treaty. Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace*, 134.

20. Ibid, 132-133.

21. Ibid., 141.

22. This period also witnessed a period of economic transition for Canada during which it began to sell more goods to Great Britain than it purchased from them and it also experienced a greater increase in trade with the United States than in growth with Britain. These aspects of the economic relationship would only become more pronounced in subsequent years. M.C. Urquhart and K.A.H. Buckley, ed. *Historical Statistics of Canada* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965), 181-182; Roussel. *The North American Democratic Peace*, 135.

23. Ibid., 136.

24. Galen Roger Perras. *Future plays will depend upon how the next one works: Franklin Roosevelt and the Canadian Legation Discussions of January 1938*. (Paper, University of Ottawa 2006), 3.

25. King studied at Harvard and at the University of Chicago and had subsequently worked for the Rockefeller family. He was quite sympathetic towards many American perspectives on the world, but at the same time was protective of Canadian sovereignty. *Ibid.*, 4.
26. Canada was focused initially on the economic aspects of the Canada-United States relationship secure in the belief that the growing threat from Europe would be adequately addressed through its security relationship with Great Britain and the British Empire. This belief gradually changed as a result of events unfolding in the initial months of the Second World War until 1940 when the fall of France produced near panic on both sides of the border. J.L. Granatstein. *Canada's War: The Politics of the MacKenzie King Government 1939-1945*. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), 125; C.P. Stacey. *MacKenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle*. The 1976 Joanne Goodman Lectures. (Toronto: MacMillan and Company, 1976), 51.
27. Notwithstanding King's friendship with Roosevelt and his eagerness to enhance the Canadian relationship with that country, he never lost his concerns regarding the ultimate power of the United States and the ongoing danger to Canadian sovereignty of fostering a closer relationship with it. Stacey. *MacKenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle*, 62.
28. King was later to surrender to pressure from his own government to shore up the defences on both coasts to forestall the possibility of American unilateral action. He reluctantly approved an expenditure of \$400 million dollars over a period of 5 years. Once the pressure from his government and from Roosevelt had eased somewhat, he reduced the expenditures to \$200 million over 10 years and addressed only the most urgent of the American concerns on the Pacific coast. Joint Staff Committee (JSC), "An Appreciation of the Defense Problems Confronting Canada with Recommendations for the Development of the Armed Forces, 5 September 1936, Kardex file 74/256, Directorate of History and Heritage as documented in Perras. *Future plays*, 6; Eayrs. *In Defence of Canada*, 148.
29. Perras. *Future plays*, 9.
30. *Ibid.*, 8.
31. Canada. "Letter Minister in United States to Prime Minister. Washington, October 16, 1940." In *Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 7 1939-1941 Part II*. David R. Murray, ed. (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1974), 152.
32. Roosevelt's offer of the off the record nature of the talks may also be interpreted another way. It is known that he was also conducting naval talks with the British at the same time and it may have suited his purposes to have kept both discussions off the record in order to separate the contents of the two discussions which may have been running at cross purposes – i.e. discussing with the Canadians what happens in North America if the British are defeated and with the British how to keep the British from being defeated. Barbara Rearden Farnham. *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 71.
33. Initially King had remained firm in his decision to do nothing further. This was a reflection of his reluctance to face any difficulty until it was absolutely unavoidable. King was later heard to muse that the successes he had achieved in life were due more to avoiding action on an issue than taking it. Neatby. *William Lyon MacKenzie-King 1932-1939*, 322; Perras. *Future plays*, 17.
34. "Canadian Defense Weakness a Menace to U.S. Security," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 6 January 1938; "Joint Coastal Defense Plan Envisaged," *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 6 January 1938; as documented in Perras. *Future plays*, 18.
35. The depression had devastated the economies of both nations. In 1935 both nations turned toward reciprocity as a solution for the stimulation of their economies after rejecting it in the past (America 1866 and Canada 1911). At the time Roosevelt was very popular in Canada, largely because of the success he had enjoyed to date in improving the American economy based upon his "New Deal" programs. Whereas in the past Canadians had been somewhat reluctant to foster a closer economic relationship with America out of fears of being economically overwhelmed with a consequent loss of their

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sovereignty, the Great Depression had created so much hardship that they were willing to take the chance. Although the Conservatives under Bennett had initiated reciprocal trade talks with the Americans in 1934 they were unable to complete negotiations before their electoral defeat in 1935. King quickly completed those negotiations and signed the King-Hull Agreement in November 1935. Both the Canadian public and the government saw free trade with the United States as a solution to their economic woes. Stacey. *MacKenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle*, 47-49.

36. Fortmann and Haglund. "Canada and the Issue of Homeland Security," 17.

37. President Roosevelt's comments, stripped of their comradely tone, may be considered a reiteration of the Monroe Doctrine with the Roosevelt Corollary. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine justifies American intervention in the affairs of another nation if their actions violated the rights of the United States or invite foreign aggression to the detriment of the other nations on the continent. A number of Canadian newspapers appeared to support the spread of the Roosevelt Corollary northward. Somewhat disturbingly, a number of Americans felt that the announcement was redundant as they believed that the Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries had always encompassed Canada. The Kingston Dispensation looms large in the minds of Canadian historians and political scientists as a fundamental commitment by Roosevelt to Canada and the King government to safeguard the nation and also as a veiled threat of interference in Canadian national sovereignty in the event that Canada was unable to defend itself. While it may have been all of these, Roosevelt couched his comments on that day within the context of a long time neighbour and claimed to Lord Tweedsmuir, the Governor General of Canada at the time, that America's willingness to support Canada in these circumstances was so obvious that he could not understand why an earlier American President had not already made this point. Farnham. *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis*, 95 and *Diary, 18 and 25 August 1938, King papers, LAC* as documented in Perras. *Future plays*, 26; Congressional Record, December 6, 1904: 6; James M. McCormick. *American Foreign Policy and Process*. 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson-Wadsworth, 2004): 14 and 18; Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 176-177; Fortmann and Haglund. "Canada and the Issue of Homeland Security," 18; Justus D. Doenecke and Mark A. Stoler. *Debating Franklin Roosevelt's Foreign Policies: 1933-1945*. (Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2005), 25; Roosevelt, "Reciprocity in Defense," 18 August 1938, Skelton Papers, vol. 5, file 5-6, LAC as documented in Perras. *Future plays*, 26.

38. Morton. *A Military History of Canada*, 176-177; Fortmann and Haglund: 18.

39. The Kingston Dispensation is considered by some although not here, to have marked the definitive transition in terms of security dependence of Canada from the United Kingdom to the United States. Richard A. Preston. "The Cost of Palimony: Canada's Military Dependence on the United States." *War & Society* (September 1983): 90; Canada. *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*. Privy Council Office. (Ottawa: April 2004), 5; United States. The White House. Transcript of Comments made by President Obama and Prime Minister Harper of Canada, on the occasion of the President's trip to Ottawa. Ottawa, Canada 2:46 P.M. (Local). http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Press-Availability-by-President-Obama-and-Prime-Minister-Harper-of-Canada-2/19/09/.

40. Roger Frank Swanson. "An International Perspective: The Foreign Policy of Adjustment," in *Understanding Canada: A Multidisciplinary Introduction to Canadian Studies*. William Metcalfe, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1982), 551.

41. Joel J. Sokolsky, "Walking the Line: Canada-U.S. Security Relations and the Global War on Terrorism," *Breakthroughs*, Vol. XV, No. 1 (Spring 2006): 34.

42. J.L. Granatstein. "MacKenzie King and Canada at Ogdensburg, August 1940," in *Fifty Years of Canada-U.S. Defense Cooperation: The Road From Ogdensburg*, Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel, eds. (Queenston Ont.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 24-25.

43. Roussel. *The North American Democratic Peace*, 150-151.

44. After the fall of France when Great Britain and the Commonwealth stood alone against the Nazis and notwithstanding the plans to support Great Britain in its "hour of need," Canada and the United

States also engaged in secret (from the British) naval staff talks to discuss a combined strategy in the event that Great Britain was defeated and knocked out of the war. One of the American objectives in these talks was to obtain military basing rights in Canada. Thus even in times of crisis, the Canadians had to “balance” the need for security against the implications for national sovereignty. David Reynolds. *From Munich to Pearl Harbour: Roosevelt's America and the Origins of the Second World War*. (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 81.

45. Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel. *Fifty Years of Canada-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 2.

46. In terms of its strategy of forward defence, Canadian military power is not generally seen as having contributed key strategic influence in world history, but it arguably has done so on at least two occasions. The first was in the summer of 1940 after the fall of Dunkirk the Canadian army in Great Britain was the primary land force in place to repel a potential German invasion. Their presence required a robust German invasion force that in turn required air supremacy that was denied them by the Commonwealth air forces in place at the time. The second was when Canadian naval power secured the sea lanes that supplied Great Britain and ultimately enabled the invasion of the European continent. In neither of these cases were the Canadian forces engaged in a major or epic battle such as Jutland or Midway, but their presence and capability were decisive in the ultimate strategic success of the allies over the Axis powers. Professor Jeremy Black. Exeter University. *North American Defence in World History*. Comments from the Conference entitled, “Continental Defence - Policies, Threats and Architecture” sponsored by the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. Calgary: May 4, 2006.

47. Although the Board was not the central instrument of continental security in the following years, it did set the stage for a number of bilateral strategic ties that included the Hyde Park Agreement of 1941, the North American Air Defence Command and a well-established but lower profile tradition of close naval cooperation. The economic defence cooperation embodied by the Hyde Park Agreement continued on long after the end of the war in a series of defence Development and Defence Production Sharing Agreements that provided significant economic and industrial benefits to Canada. Sokolsky and Jockel. *Fifty Years of Canada-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 2.

48. W.A.B. Douglas, “Democratic Spirit and Purpose: Problems in Canadian American Relations, 1939-1945,” in *Fifty Years of Canada-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 32-33 and 50.

49. Dan Middlemiss. “The Road From Hyde Park: Canada-U.S. Defense Economic Cooperation,” in *Fifty Years of Canada-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 177.

50. Ibid, 180.

51. Middlemiss, 189-191 and Lindsey, 68.

52. Pearson was a veteran of the First World War and had spent the Second World War in senior positions in External Affairs in Ottawa, London (High Commissioner) and Washington where he had just left the post of Ambassador in the closing years of the war. Hillmer, 197-199 and 208-213; Adam Chapnick. “Canadian Foreign Policy: The Middle Power Muddle,” in *SITREP* (July/August 06): 3; Adam Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 80-86; Nossal, 55-60; Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s*, (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994), 180-183.

53. Maloney. *Helpful Fixer or Hired Gun*, 14.

54. An alliance with European nations would provide additional opportunities for the development of markets for international trade already started with loan guarantees and industrial credits given to Great Britain for the purchase of Canadian goods. It would also add to the physical security of the nation to offset the external threat posed by the Soviet Union and feared by most of the western world, including Canada. Lastly, it would provide an opportunity for Canada to obtain the international influence denied it in the United Nations. C.D. Bradley, *Breaking the Mirrors and Removing the Smoke: A Primer for Canadian Army Combat Development*, (Kingston: Royal Military College of Canada, 1988),

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12-15; Escott Reid, "Canada and the Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948-1949" in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings*, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1993), 218-220.

55. Canada agreed to deploy a brigade to Korea with the United Nations and another brigade and an air wing to Europe with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The contribution to the Korean conflict was a contentious one within the government which had been opposed by many members with a trans-Atlantic focus and little understanding of how Asia could figure in the meeting of Canadian goals and objectives. It was only when Pearson refocused their perspective on the "big picture" of influence in the UN and with their major allies (addressing what is important to them gives us greater influence in what is important for us) that the government (Louis St. Laurent) agreed to the deployments. David J. Bercuson. *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 40; Bradley, *Breaking the Mirrors*, 16; Hillmer, 216-217; Walker, 155-162.

56. There was also an American concern that the colonial flavour of the Anglo-French attack would complicate American initiatives for bringing the newly independent nations of North Africa and the Middle East in the sphere of western influence. Egener, 78; Milner: 223-225 and 335-337; John W. Holmes, ed. Adam Chapnick. "The Unquiet Diplomat – Lester B. Pearson," in *International Journal* 62 (Spring 2007): 301.

57. Douglas Murray. "NORAD and U.S. Nuclear Options," in *Fifty Years of Canada-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 213.

58. As the concept of a collective strategic defence was developed, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipated no difficulty working with the Royal Canadian Air Force. Rather, their main concern was with the bureaucrats of the Canadian Department of External Affairs who they feared would delay issues with concerns over sovereignty and an attempt to link North American defence to the fledgling North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the event this is exactly what transpired. Following the signing of the document officials in the Department of External Affairs immediately began angling to use the document as a lever of Canadian influence that would give Canada a consultative role with America in an international crisis, a goal that was never to be realized. For his part, General Charles Foulkes, the Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staffs Committee of the time and a strong supporter of the initiative saw it only as an excellent vehicle for the gathering, collation, and analysis of information pertaining to the air threat to the continent, for the operational response to those threats, and a useful channel for the exchange technical and planning information between the two countries. Joseph Jockel. *Canada in NORAD: 1957-2007 A History*. (Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, 2007), 4; George Lindsey. "Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the Cold War," in *Fifty Years of Canada-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 66-67.

59. The document represented a significant concession of American sovereignty that has not been repeated. Canada was in a unique position among the nations of the world in that it contributed directly to the security of the American homeland and to the security and stability of the world by protecting the American nuclear deterrent. Further it is the only ally that has commanded American forces in the United States. Notwithstanding the claims of Canadian nationalists that Canada was partner to a behemoth or a powder monkey to the United States, the reality was that in some ways it was the sovereignty of the United States that was compromised – in that case it is just as well that few Americans outside of NORAD are aware of the specifics of the agreement. Sokolsky. "Realism Canadian Style," 27; Lindsey, 68.

60. While Foulkes was correct in his description of the nature of the document, it is open to speculation as to whether there was a complete understanding in Diefenbaker's mind or even at the executive level of the government of the full implications of the several smaller agreements and documents that had passed between the two countries as their separate air defence systems merged into one. Jockel. *No Boundaries*, 5; Jockel. *Canada in NORAD*, 3.

61. Unlike Pearson or St Laurent, Diefenbaker lacked experience in, and a clear understanding of the workings of international diplomacy. Nor did he fully grasp the type and nature of support *that he*

should have been receiving from the civil service to compensate for this experience deficit. Additionally, or possibly because of this lack of understanding, Diefenbaker subsequently neither trusted nor relied on the advice or expertise provided by the Departments of External Affairs or Defence. He regarded them all as disciples of Pearson and loyal only to him. Robert H. Clark, *Canadian Weapons Acquisition: The Case of the Bomarc Missile*, (Kingston: Royal Military College of Canada, 1983), 110; John F. Hilmer, “The Politicians and the Pearsonalities: The Diefenbaker Government and the Conduct of Canadian External Relations,” in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings*, ed. J.L. Granatstein (Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1993), 223-225.

62. Diefenbaker’s Minister for External Affairs, Howard Green, was lacking in any experience in international affairs with which he could have offset Diefenbaker’s weakness in the same area, but as an ardent monarchist and unflinching advocate of nuclear disarmament, publicly condemned the Agreement and worked to undermine the relationship throughout his time in office. Hilmer, 239- 241; Jockel. *Canada in NORAD*, 3.

63. The reality of the intent of the agreement was that it was intended to do both – to protect the American deterrent and in so doing eventually add to the security of Canadian citizens through the application of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction. External Affairs Minister Howard Green believed that compliance with the agreement would make Canadians “vassals forever” of the Americans. Author James Minifie wondered in his book, *Peacemaker or Powder Monkey* if Canada was a partner in continental defence or simply in the service of American strategic interests. Although the two militaries worked closely and easily together in securing the continent as a result of their formal and informal relationships forged in war and peace, there is no evidence that America had designs on Canadian sovereignty. With numerous security issues spanning the globe, America wanted a limited trouble-free partnership that allowed them to focus on other more contentious issues and in this they were of one mind with Canadian politicians. While America never ignored Canada, neither did they spend endless amounts of time plotting its takeover. Preston: 94; Jockel. *No Boundaries*, 4, 118; Jockel. *Canada in NORAD*, 19.

64. The promise of close consultation between governments on all issues relating to the defence of North America, a cornerstone of Canadian political support for the agreement, was never honoured by the United States. For America, NORAD was a means to gaining access to territory, and airspace as well as a coordinating mechanism for combined forces. At no time did they intend that it would confer special influence upon a minor ally – Canada. Jockel. *No Boundaries*, 127-128.

65. Richard A. Preston. *Canada and “Imperial Defence”*. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967), 94.

66. Preston: 94; Jockel. *No Boundaries*, 4, 118; Jockel. *Canada in NORAD*, 19.

67. As with the pre-war threat from Japan, America felt that, notwithstanding Canadian contributions elsewhere, that the threat from the north was exacerbated by Canadian military weakness with respect to continental security. A number of different concepts for resolving the issue were bandied about in the American press and government fora. They ranged from suggestions that the United States assume some form of guidance or oversight function to “assist” the Canadians in securing the north to American satisfaction to a proposal that America deploy its own forces to the high Arctic on a permanent basis. Jockel. *No Boundaries*, 1.

68. Jockel. *Canada in NORAD*, 5.

69. Clark, 110-114.

70. At the time of the announcement to acquire the weapons, Canada was officially supporting nuclear disarmament in the United Nations. The Minister of External Affairs, Howard Green, was in fact opposed to nuclear weapons, and subsequently took advantage of every opportunity to delay their receipt and operational deployment. At times these delays were very public and became very embarrassing for Diefenbaker. Clark, 115-121; Lindsey, 71.

71. Hilmer, 258-260; Clark, 110-131.

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72. J.L. Granatstein. "A Friendly Agreement in Advance." *The Border Papers*. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary No. 166, (June 2002), 6.

73. In a 1964 report commissioned by both national leaders to examine the nature of the bilateral relationship it was concluded that the relationship would work best with constant consultation conducted in good faith and with disagreements managed through diplomatic versus public channels of communication. The Heeney-Merchant Report as it was called has subsequently been credited with the initiation of "quiet diplomacy" as a means of resolving disagreements or just publicly sensitive issues in Canada-U.S. relations. Commander Peter T. Haydon. *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*. (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1983), 65 and 218; Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, "Canada, The United States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," in *Interpreting Canada's Past Volume II: After Confederation*, ed. J.M. Bumstaed, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), 412-414; Hilmer, 261-262; Preston 93.

74. This unwillingness to accept the advice of his military leaders may have stemmed from his experiences with the NORAD agreement when the military was less than completely forthright in its presentation of the agreement for his approval. Thus isolated from the American leadership and his own military advisors, Diefenbaker's decisions appeared slow and disjointed. Haydon, 217.

75. Ghent, 415-421; Hilmer 263-264.

76. Walker, 164.

77. Douglas L. Bland, ed. "1964 Defence White Paper." *Canada's National Defence Vol I Defence Policy*. (Kingston: Queen's University Press, 1997), 58.

78. Lindsey, 69.

79. Joel Sokolsky. *Defending Canada: U.S.-Canadian Defense Policies*. (New York: Priority Press Publications 1989), 4.

80. This statement begs the question as to whether or not Prime Minister Martin would agree with him on this issue. Bland. "1964 Defence White Paper," 82.

81. Preston, 94.

82. Sokolsky, 153.

83. John Holmes, "Canada and the Vietnam War," in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings*, ed. J.L. Granatstein, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1993), 246-248.

84. This ignored the reality that Canadian defence policies are largely determined by external pressures and influences with truly strategic decisions being made only rarely. Two examples of such events were the decisions made by Canada to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 and the North American Air Defence Command in 1958. Edna Keeble. "Rethinking the 1971 White Paper and Trudeau's Impact on Canadian Defense Policy." *American Review of Canadian Studies* (Winter 1997): 2; Sokolsky. *Defending Canada*, 5.

85. Foreign policy papers published in 1970 predicted the disappearance of Canada's role as a middle power as a result of Trudeau's influence. He felt that Canada's role in world events had always been exaggerated and cost more than they gave back. Consequently the nation would do well to focus on its own problems and concerns. Nossal, 59-60; J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell. *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 377.

86. Trudeau's personal opinion on the military was reflected in a comment he made to the campaign tour organizer for the 1968 election who had been a Wing Commander in the Royal Canadian Air Force, "Why would a guy as smart as you waste his time in the military?" Trudeau had no respect for the intelligence of the Generals, he considered them to be drones who carried out the orders of people such as himself. Granatstein and Bothwell, 6-8 and 240-248; Walker, 160-165; Terry Wu and Ross Fetterly, "Canadian Defence Policy: An Analysis," *Canadian Public Policy* 16(2) (June 1990): 161; John Sawatsky, *The Insiders: Government, Business, and the Lobbyists*, (Toronto, 1987), 31; Nossal, 180.

87. The Canada-U.S. relationship is unique in the concept of collective defence in that Canada would be protected and secure even if it were neutral. The nature of the threat and the geographic positioning of the two nations requires the extension of the American protective umbrella over Canada if the American homeland is to remain secure. The expenditures that Canada makes on defence do not increase Canadian security and budget reductions do not decrease it. Canadian contributions to continental defence are made on the basis of a sense of shared responsibility and concerns regarding territorial sovereignty. Sokolsky. *Defending Canada*, 9.
88. Bruce Thordarson, "Cutting Back on NATO, 1969," in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*, ed. Don Munton and John Kirton, (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1992), 176; Walker, 154; Granatstein and Bothwell, 8-10.
89. Granatstein and Bothwell, 378.
90. There were sharp reactions from the Americans, British, Dutch, Belgians, and Germans when the news of the changes in policy were announced in May 1969. Most countries felt that this move reduced Canada's contribution to collective security below an appropriate level even though the nation's relative and qualitative contribution had been decreasing for years. Denis Stairs, "Reviewing Foreign Policy," in *Canadian Foreign Policy, 195-198*.
91. Allan Gotlieb. "Romanticism and Realism in Canada's Foreign Policy." *Policy Options* 26 (February 2005): 20.
92. In this sense he can be seen to possess, in spite of his sophistication, the classical Quebecois suspicion of European entanglements and overriding concern with Quebec, Canada, and North America. Trudeau's inclination was to follow a more bilateral approach to agreements instead of the multilateral approach taken in the past. I.D.M. Egener, "Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy: 1950-1970 A Summary," in *Occasional Papers on Changing Patterns and Influences in Canadian Defence Policy 1904-1970*, (Kingston: RMC, 1971), 72; Sokolsky, 153; Granatstein, 11-12.
93. Trudeau's willingness to make decisions on the basis of his concept of right and wrong versus the latest polling results demonstrated a leadership style rarely seen in Canada (arguably what President Bush was looking for from Prime Minister Paul Martin in the recent controversy over BMD) Granatstein and Bothwell, 380-381.
94. The SDI program focused on five elements; surveillance, acquisition, tracking and kill assessment, systems concepts and battle management. It also examined various kill technologies including laser, kinetic energy, and particle beam weapons. Murray: 228.
95. Canadian support for these measures was used as a pillar of the Canadian multilateral efforts to promote arms control. Government officials could not publicly agree to comprehensive participation in SDI without incurring domestic censure and undermining the Canadian position on arms control. Jockel. *Canada-U.S. Relations in the Bush Era*, 8; David Cox. "Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense," in *Fifty Years of Canada-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 255-257; Murray, 229.
96. Cox, 240.
97. Prime Minister Mulroney brought a reality-based foreign policy rooted in the concept of America as a friend and ally that did not require counterweights. He also pursued an agenda of enthusiastic international engagement on global issues that enhanced Canada's standing in the world and put a temporary halt to its slide into foreign policy mediocrity. Gotlieb, 23.
98. Douglas Bland, ed. "1987 Defence White Paper." Canada's National Defence Vol I Defence Policy. Kingston: Queen's University Press, 1997.
99. Bland, "1987 Defence White Paper." 184.
100. Jockel. *Canada-U.S. Relations in the Bush Era*, 9.

CHAPTER 4: CONTEMPORARY THREADS AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES



The Policy of Accommodation – Hits and Misses

The end of the Cold War eliminated the basis for the common Canada-United States perception of the threat to continental security that had developed in the early days of the Second World War and had continued into the Cold War era when the Soviet nuclear threat from manned bombers made its appearance. When the Cold War ended and for essentially a decade afterward until the events of 9/11, there existed no common perception of any threat to continental security. There was no agreement on the primary threat to continental security or upon a means of addressing any threats that arose. The relationship as well as the mechanisms that had supported it thus fell into disuse and atrophied.¹

In the previous decades, the common policy threads had been noteworthy because their use or absence both elicited tangible and marked influences on the conduct of the relationship. But in the decade between the end of the Cold War and the events of 9/11, the common threads became transparent in that their presence or absence seemed at the time to have little effect on the course of the relationship. Events that were initially seen in the 1990s as minor irritants or examples of Canadian differentiation for its own sake were later interpreted in the post-9/11 era as watershed moments in the relationship.

The post-Cold War period was characterized by a search for a mission by what was then considered by many as the centrepiece organization of the security relationship, NORAD, and a series of policy divergences on issues such as landmines and the International Criminal Court to name but two.² In the absence of an identifiable threat to the interests of either state, the Canada-United States defence relationship had fallen off of the respective national “radars” or agendas in terms of crucial issues of the day that must be addressed as priorities.

Before exploring the evolution of the relationship in the post-9/11 era however, it is important to have an understanding of the context within which the evolution took place. There are two central issues that inform the contemporary Canadian position with respect to continental security. The first is sovereignty and the second is threat perception. Howard Cody, an American professor of political science, identifies a couple of factions within Canada in terms of their perspectives on their nation’s sovereignty as it is influenced by the Canada-United States relationship. One of the factions is the continentalists who argue that Canada can have an influence on American policy but not from “outside the tent.” They endorse a position for Canada as a staunch ally of America, providing

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support to common goals and influencing American policy from within a strong relationship as a trusted friend. The private sector represents one of the main elements in this faction and they are consistently pressing government and lobbying public opinion to support additional networking initiatives with America.³ While this may be a realistic role for Canada, it is a perennially difficult one to sell to a sovereignty-sensitive Canadian public.⁴

The other faction is the nationalists, or security-sovereignists who see Canada as a fully autonomous peace-seeking middle power working to achieve its goals globally through multilateral institutions. The nationalist position is that Canada stands little chance of influencing a unilaterally-minded America and that attempts to influence America are servile and therefore demeaning. Nationalists see such attempts as a compromise of Canada's sovereignty and its hard-won reputation for multilateralism and middle-power diplomacy. They believe that American pressure to force Canadians into conforming to their own security requirements threatens the foundation Canadian principles of multilateralism and multiculturalism. Forget about independent foreign policy they contend, can Canada even conduct an independent domestic policy?⁵

These two groups are in a continuing state of conflict in and out of the public eye. Their attempts to sway public opinion and in doing so influence government actions in favour of their own objectives highlight the presence of two of the common policy threads in the contemporary era of the relationship: the need for governments to continually negotiate the political tightrope of managing the "closeness" of the Canada-United States relationship and the value and importance of the use of "quiet diplomacy." Both policies are intended to ensure that Canadian value from the relationship is maximized while its profile is minimized.

The mainstream Canadian public likes to see their government visibly differentiate Canada from the United States. Most governments understand this but also have a firm grasp of the economic and security realities of the Canadian situation.⁶ Thus they are committed to walking the domestic political tightrope mentioned previously. Domestically they exploit relatively safe identity-conferring opportunities such as Kyoto and the International Criminal Court initiative as well as stressing domestic bilingualism and multiculturalism. At the same time, within the context of the bilateral Canada-United States relationship, Canadian governments seek to maximize political and economic leverage with the United States to safeguard national security and economic prosperity.⁷ The two processes often require such different approaches and rhetoric that if closely compared may appear to be in ideological conflict with one another.

Successful Canadian governments (ones that remain in power) have frequently employed the previously mentioned tactic of "quiet diplomacy" to facilitate the execution of these two apparently conflicting strategies. The best illustration of the value of the use of "quiet diplomacy" comes from an

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examination of the consequences of it not being followed. The employment of this tactic had been forgone in favour of one of public criticism and moralizing on a number of post-9/11 issues that included the decision by Canada not to join the coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003, and another decision not to accept the American invitation to support BMD in 2005. Merchant and Heene, the authors of the concept of “quiet diplomacy,” believed that when public criticism is substituted for “quiet diplomacy” in the relationship the outcome is invariably a guarantee of Canadian irrelevance in Washington as Americans close their minds to the Canadian position and leave it blustering on the sidelines, changing nothing.⁸ This in fact was exactly what transpired in these two examples.

Within the context of the sensitivity of the Canadian public towards issues of sovereignty, the shock of 9/11 served to bring the relationship back to the centre of the security consciousness of both countries in the space of just a few minutes. In those few short minutes, after the planes hit the World Trade Center, America developed a threat perception with respect to its most vital of national interests, the security of its homeland, which was significantly more severe than that held by Canadians and their government. The initial Canadian perception was that this new threat was focused not on the continent, but on America, with Canada as an unfortunate bystander subject to injury only to the extent that it was affiliated or confused with the United States.⁹

The reality however is that Canada is indeed a potential target for terrorists although with a lower profile than that of the United States. In many cases, particularly with Islamist extremist groups, Canada is seen as being synonymous with the United States, possessing the same liberal democratic freedoms, comparatively vast wealth and social/cultural mores.¹⁰ In an era of WMD where a single attack can weaken an entire nation, Canadians and their government really do not have a choice as to which side they are on: this decision has been made for them by the extremists and they have put Canada on the side of America.¹¹

Notwithstanding this reality, the continuing Canadian perception that the threat is focused on America has undoubtedly contributed to the presence in the contemporary relationship of a trademark Canadian characteristic in the relationship. This trademark is a reluctance to become involved in countering threats that explicitly result from actions by their security guarantor and are not seen by Canadians to be directly related to the maintenance of their security. In much the same way that Canadians were reluctant to make ongoing contributions to Imperial defence under the assumption that many of the security issues that they addressed were the direct result of British policies unrelated to Canada, Canadians are now similarly reluctant to actively support and contribute to countering a threat that many see as a direct result of American policies abroad that are similarly unrelated to Canadian security.¹² Added to this historic mix had been the almost visceral dislike by the Canadian public of anything related to President Bush or his policies. Now that President Obama has taken office, this situation may change. While President Obama is enjoying a high approval

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rating among Canadians in his first term in office, this should be attributed to their expectations rather than his specific actions since he has yet to take any actions that have significant implications either for the Canada-United States relationship or for Canadian interests abroad.

Returning to the issue of differing perceptions of the threat, John J. Noble argues that regardless of these differences, the low Canadian domestic opinion of President Bush, or the newly established high regard for President Obama (however long that lasts), Canadians still have to deal with whoever is in power in Washington.¹³ He contends that Canada cannot afford to periodically “opt out” of the relationship or set it aside until an American President who appears to be more sympathetic to Canadian needs arrives for a couple of reasons. One is that vital economic and security interests cannot remain unattended for any period. Another is that any future President will place just as high a priority on American security as the present one. The only difference might be implementation of their policies with a smile instead of an attitude, to paraphrase Joel Sokolsky, a well-known author and scholar on the Canada-United States relationship.¹⁴

With a nod to sovereigntist concerns, Noble advocates the exercise of sovereignty through consistent, active, constructive, and meaningful engagement with the United States on issues involving American security. He believes that Canadians should do so whether or not they actually believe or support the American position on an issue because in what can legitimately be considered as the Pearsonian tradition, it is in their best interests to remain engaged with America on issues of continental security. This engagement should start at the top with the national leadership of each country and should not be based upon friendship but upon common interests and objectives. Noble concludes with the comment that such engagement should avoid “tweaking the eagle’s beak” as it is small-minded and counterproductive to the achievement of Canadian national interests.¹⁵

This current state of affairs in the Canada-United States security relationship has parallels with the past. As a consequence of the events of 9/11 and in combination with these issues of sovereigntist sensitivities, differing threat perception, a historical reluctance to shoulder what was perceived as someone else’s burden, and an intense dislike for the policies of the Bush administration, Canada was transported back to the days before the Second World War when America considered itself to be in grave danger of invasion from Imperial Japan. Canada, while cognizant of a threat to its security, did not perceive either the threat or the solution to that threat in the same way that America did. Another similarity is that while Canada, then and now, acknowledged the difference in threat perception, it also recognized that a major component of its own national security was long-term economic stability and prosperity – a condition that would be satisfied with a strong and secure trade relationship with the United States.¹⁶ Thus, there was a need, then and now, for Canada to react in some way that was seen by America as an acknowledgement of their concerns. This need was generated by the fact that should they fail to demonstrate the required

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degree of empathy or support, the Canadians may well have suffered economically as even at that time Canadian economic welfare was decidedly influenced by the American economy – as it is now.¹⁷

Thus, as in the early days of the security relationship, Canada is faced with the need to address American security concerns (that are different from its own) in some fashion that is meaningful to America. These concerns must be addressed not because they are shared to the same degree by the Canadian government and its public, but because of the negative implications for the health of the Canadian economy and of national sovereignty should they be ignored.¹⁸

The contemporary circumstances for Canada in this regard are not only analogous to the early days of the relationship when the threat was from Imperial Japan, but are also quite similar to the early days of the Pearson government in the 1960s when Lester B. Pearson, after having supported non-proliferation and disarmament in the past, fought an election in which he criticized Diefenbaker for his failure to follow through with his commitment to accept nuclear weapons into the Canadian inventory. Upon winning the election Pearson quickly accepted the weapons, thus mollifying an increasingly upset American administration and defusing a potentially long-term “dissatisfier” in the relationship.

What Pearson did was accept the weapons knowing they would not change Canadian security one iota but at the same time understanding that their acceptance by Canada was important to the Americans and that satisfying them on this issue would cost Canada nothing while facilitating the attainment of Canadian goals and objectives in other areas that really were of critical interest to Canadians, such as the economy. Pragmatism and strategy: such is the “real” Pearsonian tradition.

The logic espoused by both Noble and Pearson taken in the contemporary context is that if Canada addresses fundamental American security concerns, even though these concerns are not completely or precisely shared by Canadians, the result will be an American administration that is more inclined to positively address fundamental Canadian concerns in the Canada-United States economic relationship.¹⁹ Thus contemporary Canadian security policy may be seen in light of the historic Canadian one of accommodation as supported by the examples in the pre-Second World War days of the relationship and of the nuclear weapons crisis of the 1960s.

Another critical aspect of the contemporary Canadian reaction to American security concerns relates to the application of the historic principle of “defence against help” in the relationship. The security of their homeland is a fundamental American interest. If it is the heartfelt belief of American leaders that a particular course of action with respect to Canadian territory or security is essential to the survival of their homeland, then it is reasonable to believe that they will stop at nothing to ensure those actions are carried out – including the possibility of doing it themselves in the face of Canadian objections as well as those of the

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international community. For issues that involve significant security concerns that fall short of homeland survival, American leaders can be expected to take somewhat less drastic action, but action that could nonetheless adversely influence Canadian sovereignty. Thus it is in Canadian interests to provide an appropriate level of empathy, participation, and cooperation with respect to security measures such that American leaders do not feel compelled to employ methods and actions that would impinge upon Canadian sovereignty.²⁰

This very issue also represents the first indications of one of the three fundamental changes in the relationship – the demand by America for more than just real estate to secure its homeland as it did in the early days of the Cold War, or for rhetorical Canadian support for its policies abroad. In the past, Canadian participation in continental security programs has largely been discretionary.²¹ The single exception in the past was for a short period in countering the Soviet manned bomber threat in the early years of NORAD. This was when limitations in technology required the establishment of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line in the Canadian Arctic in order to provide sufficient warning for the American nuclear deterrent to be launched in the event of an attack on the continent. At that time and for a very short period Canada was, in the words of John Foster Dulles, “a very important piece of real estate.”²²

With advances in surveillance technology and the transition of the main threat focus from the manned bomber to the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), this window of vulnerability based upon Canadian participation was short-lived and has not occurred again in the relationship – until now. This contemporary period of American vulnerability to the threat posed by international terrorism promises to be an extended one, and as will be seen later, the Americans are painfully aware of its presence. It is no longer sufficient that Canada support the heavy-lifting of America, it must now participate.

The Balancing Act – Successes, Failures, and the Abandonment of Quiet Diplomacy

Closely linked to the post-9/11 Canadian failures in the use of “quiet diplomacy,” was an apparent inability or reluctance of Canadian governments to maintain the historic balancing act between the values-based issue of domestic sovereignty and the reality-based one of national interest. There were several examples of these failures in the months following the events of 9/11 that are worthy of note.

First was the public furor over the mention of establishing a closer military security relationship with the United States in 2002.²³ Another example occurred in 2003 with the very public refusal by the Canadian government to support the American “away game” in Iraq: an announcement that was largely supported by the Canadian public and their parliamentarians. The behaviour of the government and of some parliamentarians on this issue, to include public moralizing and applause of the decision not to support a traditional ally, was

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considered by many to be a clear example of the practice of “tweaking the eagle’s beak” that Noble warns as being counter-productive to Canadian interests. The result was, as Merchant and Heeney had predicted for situations of this nature, that in terms of continental security Canada was left on the sidelines, without influence or credible input on the issue.

Indications of the loss of balance and the abandonment of “quiet diplomacy” continued until 2005 with the refusal of the government to participate in the BMD program as part of the “home game.” This decision was again accompanied, as with the decision not to join the Coalition formed to invade Iraq, by government moralizing and rhetoric that played to the domestic audience and resulted in yet another counter-productive “tweak” that left Canada without influence or credible inputs with which to pursue its interests on the issue.

Much has been said about the 2005 Canadian decision to withhold support for the decades old BMD program to shield continental North America from the threat of nuclear-tipped ICBMs. One perspective on the government’s refusal to participate is that it actually believed that participation in the BMD program was in Canadian interests, but was unable to carry through with a decision to support the program because of a failure to effectively balance domestic public opinion with Canadian interests. The failure to effectively balance in this case was related to several domestic political factors and at least one American political misstep in the process.

This theory is supported not by explicit statements by government insiders of the day but rather by consideration of the actions of successive Liberal governments to first broach the issue with the Americans under Jean Chrétien and then to develop the parameters under which an American offer to support and participate in the program would be made under Paul Martin. It is also based upon observation of the continued attempts by the Canadian government over several years to keep this issue out of the public realm and to develop it in the finest traditions of “quiet diplomacy,” a technique historically and primarily reserved for aspects of the Canada–United States relationship that are advantageous to Canadian interests but that can be expected to attract little domestic support and even to generate public opposition.

Notwithstanding the government interest and support expressed during the Chrétien and Martin years for Canadian participation in BMD, Martin ultimately elected to reject the American offer of participation for domestic political reasons. These were that the Canadian public was against the decision as a result of some strong and public lobbying against it by some groups that were habitually opposed to BMD. The Liberals under Paul Martin were in a minority government situation at the time with a new leader that had yet to consolidate power within his own party after a very fractious leadership convention. Absent the iron fist of Jean Chrétien, a number of the members of the Liberal caucus made public statements that indicated the less than complete solidarity of the government on the BMD issue. This in turn

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encouraged the intellectual elites to become engaged on the issue and to push their perspectives to skew public opinion in support of their own agendas. In a number of cases, the arguments and rationales used to oppose Canadian participation in BMD were simple repetitions of those used in the earlier BMD debates of the 1960s and 1980s, several of which were no longer relevant and/or simply untrue.

On the American side, a determined President Bush insisted on maintaining the issue in the public light rather than allowing the Canadian government to deal with the issue in their own way – one of pushing it down below the “radar” of Canadian domestic opinion at the earliest opportunity and thereafter bringing it to resolution through the use of “quiet diplomacy.”²⁴ The result of the President’s efforts was to both maintain the issue in the glare of nationalist and sovereigntist examination and to associate Canadian participation or support for BMD with support for American security policies in general (including Iraq) and for the policies and rhetoric of George Bush in particular. The consequence of the combination of these factors was that rather than being seen as an issue of national security, the BMD issue became a litmus test for Canadian support of the Bush Doctrine.

Trapped by a combination of domestic political circumstances and a security partner that either did not understand or chose to ignore the historical dynamics of the relationship as they pertained to the use of “quiet diplomacy”, the Canadian government rejected the American offer of support or participation in the BMD program. This decision was made regardless of the fact that no explicit action was required on the part of Canadians except possibly participation in some of the lucrative research and development or production contracts. Any other decision in the circumstances however could have easily resulted in the fall of the government. As the primary objective of any political party is to acquire and retain power, support and participation in BMD regardless of any benefits that might accrue to the Canadian people as a result of such actions was clearly an unacceptable alternative for the Liberal government. Seen in this light, the decision to reject BMD, even after surreptitiously lobbying for it for several years dating back to the pre-9/11 era (the 1994 White Paper spoke favourably of the program) takes on a somewhat more rational and plausible perspective.²⁵

In contrast to this rationale however, is some recent research conducted by James Fergusson, author of *A Million Bullets*. In an interview with Paul Martin, Fergusson found that notwithstanding the ultimate decision to not participate or formally support BMD as a matter of government policy, Martin states that he believed that he had provided the Americans with the essentials for which they were looking with the August 2004 amendment to the NORAD Agreement that allowed for the sharing of threat data with Northcom. Martin went on to state that he did not believe that the relationship would suffer as a result of his government’s announcement not to join BMD.²⁶ He apparently did not account for the second of the three fundamental changes in the relationship that had taken place since 9/11: the lack of willingness on the part of Americans to tolerate the sometimes schizophrenic nature of Canadian behaviour in the

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relationship, whether or not this behaviour was supported by some tangible and significant domestic political realities.

In this case the Americans refused to acknowledge the quiet government support of their policy in combination with the domestic political necessity that the Liberal government reject the offer of participation. This decision (rejection of the American offer) was made necessary by an inability on the part of the government to effectively balance Canadian sovereignty concerns (that had become enmeshed in a growing anti-Bush sentiment) with the national interest on the issue. Adding to the damage experienced by the relationship on this issue was the abandonment of the use of “quiet diplomacy” that resulted in the Canadian public, and some would say insulting, rejection of an American initiative that had been supported by both governments until immediately before the decision not to participate was announced by the Canadian government.

Although difficult and frustrating, the decision, following a process that had unfolded over a number of years, was understandable to anyone familiar with the dynamics of political power, as both Martin and Bush undoubtedly were. If the decision not to join had been made and disseminated using established lines and tones of diplomatic communication (quiet diplomacy?) prior to being announced, it is possible that the issue would have passed without serious offence to the Americans or damage to the relationship in much the same way that the Mulroney rejection of the program unfolded in 1988. Under those circumstances it might have been possible to resuscitate the issue at a later date with a reduced risk of political alienation of the Canadian public. As it was however, the methodology adopted by the Canadian government, that of an announcement in the House of Commons using language that the Americans found both hurtful and offensive, served as a rallying point for security-sovereignist and anti-American (lite) rhetoric. It seemed that yet another grain of salt had been put into the open wound of the Canada-United States security relationship of the time.²⁷

The BMD issue as just described, in addition to highlighting the continuing relevance and utility of balancing and the use of “quiet diplomacy,” also serves as an ideal one with which to examine the evolution of one of the three fundamental changes in the Canada-United States security relationship: the recently established American requirement for demonstrations of consistent and absolute support for American policies at home and abroad. The case for this assertion is made with an examination of two contemporary examples of the American lack of trust or confidence in the willingness of Canadians to effectively address fundamental American security concerns.

Two American authors on Canada-United States issues provide a succinct overview of the position held by many Americans with respect to Canadian reliability as an ally in the post-9/11 era. Christopher Sands believes that trust is the key issue for America in the Canada-United States relationship and that Canada’s track record over the last decade has not been at all encouraging. An

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American perception of the Ottawa Process that resulted in the 1997 Landmine Treaty is that Canada treated America badly.²⁸ He believes that the decision not to support America in the Iraq war as a member of the “Coalition of the willing” was another example of an event that undermined American trust and confidence in Canada as an ally. After months of public vacillation and private indications of eventual participation, Jean Chrétien had made a very public statement refusing to participate on a matter of “principle.” The decision itself was difficult enough to accept but the manner in which it was conveyed exacerbated the feelings of ill will and betrayal at an important time for America.²⁹ The abandonment of “quiet diplomacy” and the unprofessional and insulting comments of Canadian elected officials simply added insult to injury.³⁰

Sands also believes that the decision not to participate in BMD was seen by America as yet another failure by Canada to support its ally and partner. Asking only for agreement in principle, he contends that America instead received what was considered by many as another moral rebuke. As with the decision not to go to war with Iraq, there were numerous positive signals put out by the Canadian government in the months leading up to the final decision in February 2005 not to participate. American officials could not decide whether Canada was being disingenuous, hypocritical, or possibly worst of all, simply incompetent in its diplomatic machinations when the final decision not to participate was announced.³¹ The comment by Pierre Elliot Trudeau on Canadian opposition to cruise missile testing in Canada in 1983 may have come to their minds: ... that Canadians are willing to benefit from the protection of the American nuclear umbrella, but are reluctant to hold the handle.³²

Sands completes his perspective on the relationship with the comment that the challenge to Canada of maintaining a secure border will grow in the future and it is in the best interests of America that the United States assist Canada in dealing with “their” problem.³³ This one statement provides both a validation of the Canadian strategy of “defense against help,” and an example of the sense of distrust or lack of confidence in the Canadian ability to successfully undertake security actions deemed necessary by America. Such is the American position stated “with a smile.”

David T. Jones takes essentially the same position as Sands but chooses to convey it in a somewhat more negative fashion. Jones has in the past dismissed Canadian contributions to continental security as half-hearted and ineffective and states that America is determined to make itself more secure and that if Canada is not prepared to make comparable efforts, America will take the necessary measures to protect itself from the terrorists in Canada.³⁴ Such is the American position “with an attitude.”

Jones’ comments lend credibility to the contention that there is a differing perception of the threat to continental security held by Canadians and Americans. He declares that most Canadians are aware that the events of September 11,

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2001 changed the world for the United States but he contends that relatively few Canadians believe that it has likewise changed the world for Canada. While the American government and many of the citizens constantly anticipate the next attack, Canadians have no comparable concerns and Jones feels that this leaves many Americans with the impression that Canadian security efforts are intended more to humour America than to protect it. Certainly there is no shortage of American-sourced information on the shortcomings and weaknesses of Canadian security measures with which to support this contention whenever America chooses to criticize its ally.³⁵

The message from both Sands and Jones is clear: America sometimes questions whether or not Canada is truly and sincerely committed to American security and for this and other reasons may not be providing the degree of security required to safeguard the security of the American homeland. One reason for this lack of faith in the Canadian ability to secure American interests might be the American realization that even with all of the resources, funding, technology, skill, and intelligence that America possesses it was still unable to prevent terrorists from entering the country directly from overseas, establishing themselves within the social system, and conducting training and preparations before finally perpetrating their attack on September 11, 2001. If America, with all its vast resources and dedication to the task cannot stop them they reason, how can Canadians do it with their laid-back attitudes, and propensity to downplay the threat?³⁶

Canada therefore has a credibility gap with America that has been highlighted by events that have occurred both before and since 9/11, as well as by the Canadian reaction to those events that indicate to Americans either a cold disregard for American security or a failure to recognize the threat posed by terrorism.³⁷ While the gap may have been addressed at least in part by Canadian expenditures on security at home (*Smart Borders, et al*), military deployments abroad, and capital purchases of military hardware, it is unlikely that American concerns have completely disappeared such that they would not re-surface in the aftermath of another attack on the homeland.

The diminished trust of America in Canada has resulted primarily from two factors, each of which can be traced to an American and a Canadian shortcoming respectively. The first is the tendency of Americans to take disagreements with their position on any issue as an act of betrayal. It is almost as if they seek not agreement, but absolute adherence to the American perspective and position on an issue, otherwise the other party is deemed to be either unaware or incapable of grasping its importance. This is clearly an unrealistic expectation and reflects a skewed American perspective of the relationship. No matter how close the relationship and the extent to which national interests might run parallel, complete agreement on all issues all of the time is unrealistic and demonstrates a lack of both perspective and maturity with respect to the dynamics of any bilateral relationship.³⁸

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The other factor is the manner in which Canada communicated those decisions to the United States and the world. While disagreements are inevitable even between friends, the way in which Canada chose to communicate its decisions was not the act of a responsible friend and ally.³⁹ The inevitable result is a diminished sense of trust in Canada as well as a loss of influence and marginalization of Canadian interests.⁴⁰

Whereas before 9/11 America was willing to tolerate Canadian departures from and disagreements with American policies on some fairly high-profile issues such as landmines and the ICC, be it for clear reasons of philosophical disagreement or for the sake of differentiation for the purposes of acquiring domestic or international influence, they are not willing to do so in the post-9/11 era. The post-9/11 American government's hypersensitive security psyche now apparently expects consistent and unequivocal support for its policies at home and abroad if the relationship is not to suffer. This represents a fundamental change in the nature of the relationship in that there is an apparent refusal by America to continue to accept the sometimes schizophrenic nature of Canadian policy-making. What is now demanded by America is more of the "Pearsonian Tradition," that of Canadian support for issues of fundamental importance to the Americans that will in turn enable the attainment of the fundamental Canadian goals in the relationship.

According to Sands, the examples in the post-9/11 era are merely the latest in a series of decades-long American disappointments in their Canadian allies dating back to the late 1950s.⁴¹ Contrary to the perspectives of Sands, Jones and others that the relationship had been on a downward spiral for several years in the post-Cold War era over issues such as the Landmines Treaty and the ICC, and that the relationship had come close to breakdown in the post-9/11 period when Canadian support for American security concerns such as BMD and Iraq occurred, the reality is somewhat different. Forgotten in all of this criticism is the plethora of examples when Canadian policy has supported American interests at home and abroad up to and including the contemporary era of the relationship. Notwithstanding all of the disappointments and shortcomings presented by both Sands and Jones, there were also a series of substantive examples of support for American policies at home and abroad that bolstered and strengthened the relationship over the same period in which it was supposedly deteriorating.

In contrast to the claims that Canada was no longer contributing to the pre-9/11 "away game" relationship, deployments to the 1991 Gulf War, Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, and East Timor provided ongoing and explicit support for American policies abroad and left the Canadian military in crisis riven by funding shortages, increasingly obsolete equipment and growing personnel retention problems. Each one of these contributions, in addition to serving Canadian interests, also served American ones in support of a variety of their policies and international initiatives. Whether or not these contributions to the support of American policies will ever be openly acknowledged, and it would appear that they will not,

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Canadian support of American policies abroad was at an all time high at exactly the point that Sands and Jones contend that it was near collapse and in need of unilateral American intervention if both states were to remain secure.⁴²

Support for the American pre-9/11 “home game” was no less impressive. As part of the ongoing strategy of “defence against help,” a number of measures and initiatives were undertaken with American partner agencies that included but were not limited to the formation of the Bilateral Consultative Group on Counter-Terrorism in 1988, the Canada-United States Border Accord of February 1995⁴³, the Canadian Anti-Smuggling Working Group and the Northeast Border Working Group, both formed in February 1997, a new Border Vision Initiative in April 1997 (to facilitate greater information sharing and coordination on illegal migration), and the Canada-United States Partnership (CUSP) Agreement.⁴⁴

In the post-9/11 era, clear support for the American “away game” was signalled early on with an immediate deployment of Canadian combat troops to Afghanistan in support of the American-led invasion to destroy the Al-Qaeda sanctuary in that country. Later, in the aftermath of the Canadian decision not to join the American-led coalition to invade Iraq, additional support for the American security priorities abroad was provided with a redeployment of forces to the Afghanistan theatre of operations within a UN-sanctioned NATO-led mission structure. Throughout this period, there was tangible if not high-profile evidence of Canadian support for American policies abroad with a standing naval and air transport/maritime patrol contribution to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in the Gulf region. These commitments continue to this day and have evolved into one of the cornerstone national commitments to the NATO mission and to American security interests abroad.

Canadian post-9/11 contributions that enhanced the relationship on the continent for the “home game” have also occurred on a regular basis since the attacks. First there was the immediate reaction to the attacks themselves that involved the accommodation of thousands of passengers and dozens of aircraft deemed too dangerous to enter American airspace. The risk instead was accepted by Canada and both aircraft and passengers were accommodated at Canadian airports until the United States re-opened its airspace.

This act of support was quickly followed by another with the establishment of the “Smart Borders Agreement” and a host of other sub-state procedures and processes as well as massive increases in security budgets focused on both the border separating the two states and the perimeter of the continent. The Smart Borders Agreement has served as the cornerstone of post-9/11 civil security development and is in fact a contemporary example of the benefits that can accrue to Canada as a result of adopting a proactive negotiating strategy on Canada-United States security issues.

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Former Deputy Prime Minister John Manley quickly packaged and presented a series of existing border security initiatives⁴⁵ in a way that addressed the immediate American security concerns without severing the all-important economic umbilical cord.⁴⁶ His proactive stance on this issue likely prevented the Americans from taking immediate and possibly drastic actions to resolve what they perceived as a threat to their security – the apparent attack on their homeland from terrorists based in Canada. In this case, an intemperate American reaction could have involved a complete closure of the border rather than just a slowdown if Manley had not intervened as he did.⁴⁷

Historically, Manley's actions and their positive outcomes for Canadian security interests (economic health and stability) compare quite favourably in terms of their proactive nature to the adroit diplomatic manoeuvring that resulted in the Hyde Park Agreement of 1941. This agreement established a privileged position for Canada in the Canada-United States defence production-sharing relationship that continued to serve the country well for over half a century.⁴⁸ In the contemporary case, Manley's early and pre-emptive actions forestalled a closure of the border and at the same time initiated a re-engagement with the Americans that has allowed the economic relationship to recover from the attacks.

Manley's actions not only averted economic disaster for Canada and economic distress for the United States (closure of the border would have magnified the effectiveness of the attacks, not reduced or mitigated them), but also established the impetus that resulted in one of the fundamental changes in the relationship itself, that of an expansion of the relationship from one of defence to that of security "writ large." The overwhelming majority of security spending and strategic policy focus in the post-9/11 era has been on the civil aspects of the security infrastructure rather than the purely military ones. These expenditures provide ample evidence of both an expansion of the nature of the relationship from one of defence to that of security and of an emphasis on the broader aspect of security in general vice military security in particular that in fact has been taking place since the latter part of the 20th century.⁴⁹

Other signs of Canadian support for American security concerns continue to develop. A number of civil security initiatives focusing on the maintenance of security while facilitating a growth in the trade relationship to the greatest extent possible continue to be developed and enhanced through the "Security and Prosperity Partnership" or SPP. The SPP was established by the leaders of Canada, the United States, and Mexico at the summit meeting at Waco Texas on March 23, 2005.⁵⁰ Yet another indicator of Canadian support for American policies pertaining to the "home game" was the reorganization of the Canadian security infrastructure in response to the major restructuring of the American one immediately after 9/11.⁵¹

Militarily, and notwithstanding the deployments to Afghanistan mentioned earlier, the formation of the BPG in 2002 to investigate those ways in which the

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military security relationship might be enhanced was the first indicator in the realm of the “home game” of an improving relationship or at least a reduction in the process of deterioration.⁵² Another was the renewal of the NORAD agreement in 2006 “in perpetuity – but not forever” a phrase coined by Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky.⁵³ Lastly there was the formation of Canada Command in 2006 that serves as a parallel organization to Northern Command. These military developments in the post-9/11 relationship will be examined later in greater detail.

Taken as a whole, this series of agreements and structural changes to the organization and mechanisms of the relationship represent not only a robust support for American security interests to counter the positions of Sands, Jones, and others, but also a continuing Canadian faith and reliance upon a clearly defined and structured organization in the pursuit of Canadian interests within the Canada-United States security relationship.

There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from this litany of support. One of them is that while there has been much discussion and criticism from American sources regarding Canadian actions in response to the attacks of 9/11, the reality is that the Canadian response was fast, substantial and solidly in support of American concerns and priorities to include their central concern, the security of their homeland. In this sense Canada did as it has always done – gotten down below the radar and dealt with the issues without fanfare or hesitation. In a series of measures ranging from clearing the skies of thousands of civilian aircraft and caring for thousands of displaced American citizens to near immediate implementation of border security measures to address the mistaken perception that the attackers somehow had a “Canadian connection,” Canadians and their government responded immediately to the security concerns of the American government.

In this regard the Canadian response was sufficient and was consistent with the past practices and working relationship methodologies. Therefore the Canadian response to 9/11 can be considered as “more of the same” in much the same way that Kagan described post-9/11 American foreign policy as becoming more itself. Canada upheld its responsibilities that were freely undertaken in the “Kingston Dispensation” of 1938 and validated its commitment to American security in this century as it had on several occasions in the previous one. In the aftermath of 9/11, America needed (demanded?) immediate cooperation and support for both the “home” and “away” game and received it. In fact it received it better, faster, and more effectively from us than from its own government and agencies. Our simplified system reacted faster and more effectively than the American system of cheques and balances.⁵⁴

Since those early days of the post-9/11 era, the Canadian government has focused the majority of its political and fiscal resources on strengthening Canadian efforts and security effectiveness in the civil security infrastructure.

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Canadian actions in this regard have reflected the threat to the United States and the implications of that threat to Canada – they have not reflected the threat to Canada. The perennial difficulty in attempting to specifically address American demands for action is the absence of any single agenda, plan, proposal, or demand. There is no consistent national level opinion on what they would like to see from Canada, merely an out of tune chorus of wishes and demands for action. Thus the focus of Canadian governments is on providing what Americans “need” as opposed to what a spectrum of American interest groups and commentators might be calling for at any given time. In pursuing this objective Canadians have responded to the reality of American needs and priorities as opposed to their rhetoric. And in responding to American needs they have, as a result, responded to Canadian ones as well.

The magnitude of these efforts, while significant, has not and likely will not be openly acknowledged by Washington.⁵⁵ Rather it is quite possible that, in American eyes, Canadians will never be able to contribute enough to American security to satisfy them and that when the next attack comes all previous efforts and measures will be ignored by them as being insufficient. Fault will again be found with the Canadian response to the American perception of the threat.

Conclusion

This overview of the contemporary era of the Canada-United States security relationship has established both the continuity of the common policy threads within the history of the relationship and the fact that the relationship has also undergone a number of fundamental changes since 9/11. With respect to the common threads, the policy of accommodation is still clearly in play with a number of examples of “defence against help” and the influence on the relationship of either the presence or absence of the use of “quiet diplomacy.”

Former Prime Minister Chrétien initially performed rather well with respect to his use of “quiet diplomacy” and in his efforts to balance the relationship between the best interests of Canadians and their perceptions of sovereignty. He spoke to the domestic public in strong sovereignty-conferring terms and established Canadian positions on issues that did not threaten fundamental American interests while providing tangible support to these interests with a steady stream of deployments of the beleaguered Canadian military.

He did, however, abandon the use of “quiet diplomacy” in the post-9/11 era on key issues that did influence their fundamental security concerns with the result that the relationship deteriorated. Similarly, he chose to abandon his efforts to balance the relationship in the latter part of his tenure in office and made no effort to counter the growing anti-American sentiments that were emanating from his own government and staff. He also publicly distanced himself from American policies in terms that the Americans found both troubling and insulting. The clearest example of this process was the decision not to join the coalition in the war against Iraq.

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Chrétien's successor as Prime Minister, Paul Martin, was initially seen as a leader who would initiate a recovery in the relationship, but ultimately proved to be a disappointment in this regard. Hobbled by an uncertain political power base and an increasingly anti-American (or at least an anti-Bush) domestic public, Martin was unable to balance the relationship and it continued in its decline over his tenure in office. Like his predecessor, Martin elected to abandon both the use of "quiet diplomacy" and any attempt to balance the relationship in favour of currying short term domestic political support for his government. The most salient example of this was his decision not to support the American BMD program and the manner in which he chose to convey this decision to the Americans and the Canadian public.

Stephen Harper's tenure in office has so far seen a general improvement in the relationship as he has been able to maintain domestic political support for his national policies that have regularly been parallel to American ones and have invariably served American interest in one way or another. Interestingly, he has also been able to brush off ongoing criticisms of this increased closeness in the relationship even during the closing months of the Bush administration. The future of the relationship with the initial love affair of the Canadian public with President Obama promises to maintain the trend of improvement and make the task of balancing the relationship by future Canadian leaders a relatively easy one, at least in the short term. While documentation supporting Harper's use of "quiet diplomacy" is not yet available, one could assume from the harmonious and polished nature of Canadian and American positions on a broad range of issues that such diplomacy is taking place out of the public eye as it was intended.

The contemporary use of the policy of accommodation forms the cornerstone of Canadian security policy *vis-à-vis* the United States in the post-9/11 era as it has in the past. It is centred on the use of "defence against help" to the extent that if Canada does not address American security interests in a way that is seen as meaningful to the Americans, they may well take whatever measures they see fit on a unilateral basis, an outcome that may have negative implications for Canadian sovereignty. It is also founded upon the Pearsonian concept that by addressing quintessentially American interests in the relationship, the stage will be set for the satisfaction of Canadian interests as well.

The continuity in the contemporary era of the last of the three common policy threads, that of a reliance upon an institutional framework for the successful pursuit of Canadian interests in the relationship has also been well established in this examination. Examples again include the establishment of the Smart Borders protocols to guide the development of cross-border security measures and safeguard the economic flows, the establishment of the Security and Prosperity Partnership to provide a framework for the development of trilateral continental security issues, and creation of Canada Command (Canadacom) as the evolving cornerstone of the military relationship in response to the American shift in preference from NORAD to Northcom as the central construct for continental military security.

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As reflected in the foregoing discussion however, the common threads were also accompanied by three fundamental changes to the post-9/11 security relationship that were occurring even as the connections of the relationship with the past were being established. These changes and their influence upon the future course of the relationship are the focus of the next phase of the examination of the Canada-United States security relationship.

Endnotes

1. Notwithstanding the continued existence and functioning at a very low level of activity of organizations such as NORAD, the original focus of these mechanisms had disappeared and another that would serve to exercise, test, and motivate them to a high degree of readiness had yet to appear. The post-Cold War decade was characterized by a search for a mission and a focus for the Canada-United States defence infrastructure that had relied for so long on the Cold War as its *raison d'être*.
2. The Canadians did not support American initiatives for additions to the landmines treaty that would have allowed America to join. Instead they led the opposition against any amendment to the treaty that would have allowed the United States to sign it and explained that their position was based upon moral principles – implying a lack of morality on the part of America. Frank Harvey, Director, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University. *Continental Security Dimensions of the Canada-U.S. Relationship*. Remarks to the 21st Annual Conference of Defence Association Institute, March 3, 2005.
3. The most recent strategy proposal is contained in a tri-national paper co-authored by former Deputy Prime Minister John P. Manley entitled, “Creating A North American Community.” Council on Foreign Relations. *Creating a North American Community*. United States, 2005.
4. Howard Cody. “U.S. – Canada Trade, Defense and Border Issues Since September 11: The View From Canada,” in *Perspectives on U.S.–Canada Relations Since 9/11: Four Essays*. The Canadian-American Center. (Orono Maine: University of Maine Press, 2003), 13.
5. *Ibid.*, 14.
6. The United States shoulders a large share of the security burden that in turn frees Canadian wealth for its social programs. Similarly, the health of those social programs is dependent upon continued and uninterrupted access to American markets. John J. Noble. “Getting the Eagle’s Attention Without Tweaking Its Beak.” *Policy Options* (February 2003): 44.
7. Martin Lubin. “Strains between Governments at the Top, Hands Across the Border at the Base: The Role of Subnational Governments During the Bush-Chrétien Era and Beyond,” in *Perspectives on U.S.–Canada Relations Since 9/11*, 31; Cody. “U.S. – Canada Trade, Defense and Border Issues...”, 15.
8. Merchant and Heeny. “Principles for Partnership,” 16.
9. Terrorism down (40 to 33%) as a major concern, 80% believe gov’t should continue with pre-9/11 agenda, Gov’t has done enough for border and airline security. Ipsos Polls dated 22 November, 7 December, and 22 December respectively. <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/results.cfm?geo=1>.
10. Jonathan Kay. “The ‘Pretend’ Universe of the Multilateralist and the Non-Fiction of Unilateralism,” in *Independence in an Age of Empire: Assessing Unilateralism and Multilateralism*. Graham F. Walker, ed. (Halifax: The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2004), 202.
11. Andrew Richter. “The Invisible Country: Canada After September 11,” in *Independence in an Age of Empire*, 265.
12. 84% of Canadians say the US bears some responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. Ipsos Poll 6 September 2002. <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/results.cfm?geo=1>.
13. Noble. “Getting the Eagle’s Attention...”, 39 and 41.

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14. Evidence of this is an April 2009 comment by President Obama reflecting upon the continuity of his Afghanistan and Iraq policies with those of the Bush administration, "...just because I was opposed at the outset does not mean that I don't now have responsibilities to make sure that we do things in a responsible fashion." *Wall Street Journal*, April 8, 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article_email; Joel Sokolsky. "Between a Rock and Soft Place: The Geopolitics of Canada-U.S. Security Relations," *Geopolitical Integrity*, Hugh Segal, ed. (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2005), 302-303.
15. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the relationship has been periodically subjected to Canadian politicians and even leaders engaging in criticism and political grandstanding at American expense for domestic political consumption in behaviour the late Pierre Trudeau once described as "knee-jerk anti-Americanism verging on hypocrisy." Noble. "Getting the Eagle's Attention...", 44.
16. The strain in the relationship post-9/11 was due in part to a difference in national priorities. Security in the United States and the economy in Canada. Americans largely believe that another terrorist strike is inevitable, while Canadians do not. Paul Cellucci. *Unquiet Diplomacy*. (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2005), 108 and 222.
17. The validity of this position over the history of the relationship is reflected in the words of Mitchell Sharp, former Secretary of State for External Affairs, in a statement made more than 30 years ago to the effect that, "The Canada-U.S. relationship, as it has evolved since the end of the Second World War, is...by far our most important external relationship. It impinges on virtually every aspect of Canadian national interest, and thus of Canadian domestic concerns..." Mitchell Sharp. "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future." *International Perspectives*, Autumn 1972 Special Issue, 1.
18. A statement from a 1953 Department of External Affairs study on continental air defence applies to our overall security considerations today. "It may be very difficult indeed for the Canadian Government to reject any major defence proposals (*read security in the contemporary context*) which the United States government presents with conviction as essential for the security of North America." Joel J. Sokolsky. *Alliances and the Canadian Political Culture*. Occasional Paper No. 26. (Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, 1988), 25.
19. Ian P. Rutherford. *The Myth of Mike: Re-evaluating the Pearsonian Interpretation of Canadian Foreign Policy*. Term Paper. Kingston: Royal Military College of Canada, 2005.
20. Christopher Sands has provided what is arguably the most succinct and accurate description of the reality of the Canada-U.S. security relationship as it pertains to continental security: "The United States has to protect Canada in order to protect itself. And Canada has to protect the United States in order to protect itself - from potential U.S. intervention in Canadian affairs." He made his statements approximately one month after Ahmed Ressam was apprehended on December 31, 1999, attempting to smuggle explosives in the United States for the purpose of attacking the Los Angeles airport and 20 months before the attacks on New York and Washington. United States. *The U.S. Policy Response to Canada on the Subject of Border Security*. Testimony of Christopher Sands, Fellow and Director, Canada Project, Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Prepared statement given in testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims United States House of Representatives (January 26, 2000), 1.
21. Even when such participation is subsequently governed by agreement, as in the case of NORAD, the parameters of that participation are a result of explicit Canadian decisions on the extent to which they choose to participate. It is unlikely that the United States would object to zero participation if Canada gave them *carte blanche* with respect to the use of Canadian territory and airspace.
22. Sokolsky. "Realism Canadian Style", 27.
23. The US offered Canada a seat at the table of the new defence command that was being designed, Northern Command, but when the Canadian government did not respond within the desired time frame (which was no longer than a few months), the US simply moved ahead unilaterally. Bernard Stancati. "The Future of Canada's Role in Hemispheric Defence," in *Parameters* (Autumn 2006): 103-116.

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24. President Bush played into the sovereigntist/nationalist's hands when during a summit in late-November 2004 it was reported that despite Canadian efforts to keep the missile defence issue off the agenda, he directly raised it in his discussions with the Prime Minister and also during a press conference afterward, thus solidifying the connection between support for BMD and support for Bush policies in general. It is difficult to imagine a more damaging event for those on both sides of the border who wished to see Canada join the BMD program. Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang. *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*. (Toronto: Penguin Group, 2007), 164.
25. Douglas Bland, "1994 Defence White Paper," *Canada's National Defence Vol I Defence Policy*. (Kingston: Queen's University Press, 1997), 326; Joel Sokolsky and David Detomasi. "Canadian Defence Policy and the Future of Canada-United States Security Relations." *American Review of Canadian Studies* (Winter 1994), 6.
26. James Fergusson. Discussions at the CIC Halifax Conference, *American Nuclear Strategy and the Implications for Global Security*. 24 May, 2008.
27. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Pettigrew stated that Canada would not be participating in BMD based on adherence to Canadian values and principles yet failed to specify exactly what those values and principles were. Jon Allen. Minister Political Section, Canadian Embassy USA, *Continental Security Dimensions of the Canada-U.S. Relationship*. Remarks to the 21st Annual Conference of Defence Association Institute, March 3, 2005.
28. Christopher Sands. Continental Security Dimensions of the Canada-U.S. Relationship. Remarks to the 21st Annual Conference of Defence Association Institute, March 4, 2005.
29. Ibid.
30. There were a number of examples of this behaviour: (1) Liberal Member of Parliament Carolyn Parrish said she "hated" American "bastards"; (2) Francoise Ducros, Jean Chrétien's Communications Director, was overheard by reporters calling US President Bush a "moron" at a NATO forum; and (3) Herb Dhaliwal, the Minister of Natural Resources, said that President Bush was letting the world down by not being a "statesman" and (4) in June 2002, Prime Minister Chrétien declared that the US Congress suffers from a "democratic deficit", while on the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, he suggested that US "arrogance" was partly responsible for Al-Qaeda's attack. "Angry US Response to 'Bastards' Comment," *cbc.ca*, February 28, 2003 as quoted from Andrew Richter, *Permanent Allies? The Canada-US Defence Relationship in the 21st Century*, Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, Ill., April 2008.
31. Sands. *Continental Security Dimensions*.
32. John Noble. Director of Research, Centre for Trade and Policy Law, Carleton University. *Continental Security Dimensions of the Canada-U.S. Relationship*. Remarks to the 21st Annual Conference of Defence Association Institute, March 4, 2005.
33. United States. *The U.S. Policy Response...*, 5.
34. David T. Jones. "Yo, Canada! A Wake-Up Call For Y'all Up There." *Policy Options* (February 2003): 47.
35. When America wishes to criticize Canadian security efforts they mention the 36,000 individuals subject to deportation that cannot be located, the weak security at Canadian airports, the 25,000 lost passports annually, or the more than 50 terrorist organizations that have a presence in Canada. Canada. "Accountability for Security and Intelligence Activities: A New Challenge for Parliament." *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, April 2005*. Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2005; Canada. *The Report of the Second Special Committee of the Senate on Terrorism and the Public Safety* Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1998; Stewart Bell. *Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World*. (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 2004), xv.
36. David G. Haglund. "North American Cooperation in an Era of Homeland Security," *Orbis* (Fall 2003): 678.

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37. Two events often referred to in American discussions of the inadequacy of Canadian security are the apprehension by Americans at their border of Abu Mezer, a Palestinian with known connections to Hamas, and Ahmed Ressay, an Algerian that had been ordered deported from Canada but had gone underground. When American customs officials arrested Ressay he was transporting explosives from Canada for a millennium attack on the Los Angeles International airport. These events are used even though former Attorney General John Ashcroft praised Canada for its contributions in the arrest of Ressay and Mezer was not linked to any known threat or plot at the time of his detention at the border. Christopher Sands. *Provide for the Common Defense: Updating the Canada-United States Security Relationship*. Remarks to the Political Studies Graduate Seminar University of Manitoba February 2, 2001; David T. Jones. "When Security Trumps Economics – The New Template of Canada-U.S. Relations." *Policy Options* (June July 2004): 74.
38. Professor Jeremy Black. Exeter University. *North American Defence in World History*. Comments from the Conference entitled, "Continental Defence – Policies, Threats and Architecture" sponsored by the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. Calgary: May 4, 2006.
39. Sands. *Continental Security Dimensions of the Canada-U.S. Relationship*.
40. Polling data indicates that American perceptions of Canada as a reliable friend and ally are below pre-9/11 levels after spiking during Afghanistan and bottoming out over Iraq. Only 37% of Americans thought Canada was doing enough to ensure that terrorists do not enter the U.S. from Canada in April 2003, well before the BMD decision that may have pushed it lower. Ipsos Public Affairs Poll, *Latest Poll data on Canada as "Friend and Ally."* November 2004.
41. Sands. *Continental Security Dimensions of the Canada-U.S. Relationship*.
42. Bland, "1994 Defence White Paper.": 302; Sokolsky. "Realism Canadian Style," 17.
43. This agreement included a series of measures to improve cooperation between customs and immigration officials in both countries.
44. *Canada-U.S. Relations*. Foreign Affairs Canada. <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/menu-en.asp>; David A. Charters. "Terrorism and Response: The Impact of the War on Terrorism on the Canadian American Security Relationship," in *Conference Proceedings: Canadian Defence and the Strategic Canada-U.S. Partnership*. (Ottawa: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2002), 14.
45. Many of the measures had been in progress for several years prior as the result of the work of a number of bilateral committees and commissions. Their implementation had been delayed as a result of funding shortfalls and a lack of political will to enforce the security measures on a public that was unaware of or unwilling to accept the threat picture that had generated the proposals in the first place. Examples of the pre-9/11 groups at work and the measures they were trying to put into effect include; the Bilateral Consultative Group on Counter-Terrorism in 1988, the Canada-U.S. Border Accord of February 1995 (This agreement included a series of measures to improve cooperation between customs and immigration officials in both countries.) the Canadian Anti-Smuggling Working Group and the Northeast Border Working Group, both formed in February 1997, a new Border Vision Initiative in April 1997 (to facilitate greater information sharing and coordination on illegal migration), and the Canada-United States Partnership Agreement. Canada. *Canada-U.S. Relations*. Foreign Affairs Canada. <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/menu-en.asp>.
46. The action plan embodied four pillars or themes for development in the areas of the secure flow of people, the secure flow of goods, the security of infrastructure, and information sharing and coordination in the enforcement of these objectives. Complete details of each of the original 32 points in the plan as well as progress on their implementation can be found at the FAC Canada-U.S. web site. Canada. *Canada-U.S. Relations*; David A. Charters. "Terrorism and Response," 14.
47. Contrary to many perceptions, the border did not close on 9/11. The U.S. Customs service went to a level 1 alert that required all traffic to be stopped and checked. The result was the long lines and wait times that were experienced. At no time did the border close. Edward Alden. "Tight border regime an enduring legacy of 9/11," *Ottawa Citizen* January 3, 2009.

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48. Many Canadians believe that American policies and actions with respect to Canada are part of a carefully crafted and well thought out plan – or plot – to rob Canadians of their sovereignty. Another perception is that Americans spend a lot of time thinking about Canada and the relationship between the two countries. In both cases they are wrong. American leaders and policy strategists spend little time considering the quintessentially Canadian nuances of their policy decisions. And what is more, once having adopted and announced a strategy they are unwilling to change – it is a history not of subtle intrigue and insidious envelopment but of a lack of attention and focus combined with an unwillingness to change after the fact – if Canadians want to influence the Americans they cannot sit back and wait for them to notice, or for the Americans to come to them, rather the Canadians must insert themselves aggressively into the situation and work to influence the ultimate outcome to at least a neutral result if not a positive outcome for their own interests.

49. “Concepts of security are changing. Military security is but one element of a broader concept of national security that must reflect political, economic, social, environmental and even cultural factors.” Canada. Parliamentary Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence Policy. *Security In A Changing World*. (Ottawa: Canadian Communications Group – Publishing, 1994), 5

50. Canada. *Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America Established*. March 23, 2005. Waco, Texas. Foreign Affairs Canada. March, 2005. <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=444>.

51. Arguably yet another example of the overwhelming sense of immediacy in American decision-making and in this case combined with a political sleight of hand that implied to the American public that it was the system that was at fault, not the processes or people, and that the system was now fixed so they were once again safe from harm.

52. The move was considered by some as a rather weak attempt to repair some of the damage to the relationship seen to be caused by the almost visceral Canadian rejection of the informal American proposition to expand the bi-national military relationship to a broader “all-hazards” approach to continental security. Notwithstanding the massive amounts of time and effort devoted to the project by the Canadian and American staff members of the group, none of the recommendations have been explicitly incorporated into the evolution of the post-9/11 continental security infrastructure, thus fuelling the theory that the utility of the effort was a cosmetic one intended to provide a faced of enhanced cooperation in a time when America demanded greater security reassurances and the Canadian public was unwilling to provide them. In this vein, the NORAD renewal in perpetuity – with a provision for a four year review and the inclusion of a maritime warning function in the mandate may also be seen as a similar effort to provide a public façade of an enhanced relationship that addresses both American needs for security reassurance and Canadian needs for distance in the military relationship.

53. Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky. “Renewing NORAD, Now If Not Forever,” *Policy Options* (July-August 2006): 54.

54. In his diary, the first American Secretary of Defense James Forrestal comments on the relative efficiency of the Canadian government in making and implementing policy in negotiations with allies vs. the relative inefficiency of the American system with its counter-vailing, conflicting and overlapping powers. He also contrasted the experience and value of the Canadian pool of civil service bureaucrats that supported the elected ministers saying that their experience and perspective lent stability and quality to the decisions being made – providing a central nexus of common procedure and coordination – the American system of appointees lacks both continuity, experience, and coordination Walter Millis, ed., and E.S. Duffield, collaborator. *The Forrestal Diaries*. Toronto: MacMillan Co., 1951), 474-475.

55. Joel Sokolsky. “A Hard Bilateral Moment of Truth: Canada and the United States in the Age of Terror,” in *Independence in an Age of Empire: Assessing Unilateralism and Multilateralism*, ed. Graham F. Walker. 79. (Halifax: The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2004).

CHAPTER 5: THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP



Introduction

The contemporary Canada-United States security relationship has two components. The smaller component is that which includes its military aspects, ones that in the past had dominated the relationship and determined its overall path and direction. The larger part of the relationship and the one that now provides the overarching structure and context within which the military aspects function and develop is that of the security infrastructure writ large. This component of the relationship includes every aspect of the military, government, and civil effort to secure Canadian and American citizens, infrastructure, and interests. It also includes economic security to the extent that measures to protect the physical security of both countries would affect their economic welfare. The construct will likely include environmental security in the future as both governments develop their strategies more fully. Both components considered together will hereafter be referred to as “the security relationship.”

The scope and importance of the three fundamental changes in the security relationship introduced in the previous chapter are such that they have the potential to alter both the nature and the direction of the relationship into its longer term future, if not permanently. The first of the changes is that the relationship is no longer dominated by the military or defence aspects of national security. The second is that America’s perceived state of vulnerability resulting from the attacks of 9/11 has created an atmosphere of insecurity within America such that the United States is no longer willing to accept the sometimes schizophrenic nature of Canadian policy behaviour that has historically occurred within the Canada-United States relationship. The third and last change is that the character of the threats to continental security, and by inference to the security of the United States, has altered the nature of Canadian participation in security measures such that from the American perspective, what used to be discretionary participation has now become critical and even mandatory.

The first of the fundamental changes, the broadening of the relationship to one of security writ large as opposed to defence, completes the transitional process in the relationship initiated in the opening months of the Second World War when the relationship evolved from a purely military endeavour to a broader one of a defence.

In the past, American political leaders have been willing to tolerate the sometimes moralizing tone of Canadian political rhetoric. These were often necessitated by the influence of domestic nationalist and sovereigntist elements

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or the needs of Canadian political leaders to appear independent of American influence. As noted earlier, this sometimes involved differentiation for its own sake and the occasional “tweaking of the eagle’s beak.”¹ These activities often took place in the public eye while behind the scenes the process of “quiet diplomacy” was used to address the essential elements and aspects of the Canada-United States relationship. The second of the fundamental changes in the relationship is that America is no longer willing to tolerate this sometimes schizophrenic behaviour.

A hypersensitivity developed in the aftermath of 9/11 over the course of a detailed examination by American leaders of the extent to which many of their so-called “friends and allies” were willing to support American objectives and fundamental interests. The new standard by which America’s friends and allies were measured was the degree to which they were willing to consistently support American policies at home and abroad as well as the extent to which they were willing to go beyond simple rhetoric in their support – specifically in the so-called “Global War on Terror.”²

Of particular concern to some Americans in this regard was the Canadian performance record of the post-Cold War decade on a number of issues such as landmines and the International Criminal Court. As noted previously, at the time of their occurrence, these events had been tolerated and not considered of any great import with respect to the relationship. Not so in the post-9/11 era. Of even greater interest in the American “friendship analysis” was the post-9/11 Canadian record on issues such as BMD and the invasion of Iraq. Rightly or wrongly, each attempt to differentiate Canadian policy from that of the United States was seen by some Americans in the post-9/11 era as an example of an unreliable and fickle ally that could not be trusted to provide support for the most fundamental of American interests, the security of the homeland.³

The last of the three fundamental changes in the relationship is the shift in Canadian participation from discretionary to mandatory. In the past, America had generally provided the overwhelming weight of resources to secure the continent and common Canadian-American interests abroad. With one exception, the degree of participation had been largely left to the inclination of the Canadian government and was determined based upon a combination of domestic political and economic circumstances. America for the most part sought policy support and a token contribution that provided what was seen by some as the illusion of bilateral support for common interests and a cover for the pursuit of fundamental American security objectives.

The one exception to this long-standing arrangement occurred as noted previously in the early days of the Cold War when a combination of the Soviet manned bomber threat, the limitations of surveillance technology, and the requirement for early warning to protect the American nuclear deterrent demanded the presence of a series of radar stations across northern Canada.

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This key and exceptional requirement for Canadian participation was short-lived however and in fact disappeared shortly after the signing of the NORAD Agreement in 1958 when advances in surveillance technology and the advent of the ICBM removed the absolute necessity of the ground-based radar coverage of the northern approaches to North America.

There is a similar situation in the contemporary era of the relationship where, as in the Cold War, the fundamental security interest of the United States, the safety of the American homeland, is again threatened. What is required to address this threat is once again something that cannot be provided by any amount of American resources or resolve. Whereas in the early days of the Cold War the essential Canadian contribution was real estate, in the contemporary case it is a focused and effective broad-based security effort and commitment by the government of Canada. The situation this time differs in two fundamental ways from that of the Cold War situation more than half a century ago. First, the need for Canadian participation will be anything but short-lived and will not be eliminated by any advance in technology. Second, the confidence of the United States in Canada's willingness and ability to address this fundamental American interest might be considered by some to be lacking, notwithstanding some of the more recent relationship events such as the Canadian combat role in Afghanistan and the capital acquisitions of military equipment that have enhanced the Canadian military capabilities.

In the first instance of American dependency upon Canadian participation, the relationship was in a period where both members were enthusiastic participants and had a common vision and perception of the threat. Further, they had just passed through a decade of unwavering mutual support and cooperation spanning the greatest global conflict in history. In this most recent iteration of dependency however, the track record of the Canada-United States security relationship, Afghanistan and the initial period of the Obama administration aside, has involved a number of disagreements and differences. As a result, American confidence in their Canadian ally approached a low point in the post-9/11 period from which it may just now be recovering. Notwithstanding recent developments in the relationship however, America remains in a state of security sensitivity such that not only does it require support, but this support must be both consistent and ongoing with respect to its policies at home and abroad. It is only when they receive this support that America will acquire the confidence needed to allow it to rely upon the Canadian contribution to the security of the continent and of the American homeland. Failure by Canadians to establish the requisite level and consistency of American confidence in Canada as an ally has implications for Canadian interests that go well beyond issues of sovereignty and speaks to fundamental issues of national security and even of economic survival.

The next phase of the examination of the Canada-United States security relationship will examine the current realities of each of the three fundamental changes within the Canada-United States security relationship described above.

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The changes will be discussed and evaluated within the context of an examination of the contemporary threat to continental security posed by international terrorism, a pre-9/11-post-9/11 overview of the Canadian security infrastructure, and examinations of some key issues as they pertain to the “home game” and the “away game.” Finally, the implications for the relationship of broadening the relationship to include Mexico will be examined.

The objective of this phase of the examination is to establish the extent to which the fundamental changes have taken root within the relationship and are influencing its tone, nature, and direction. It is important to note that the discussion will be limited to those strategic level issues and concerns that pertain to the security relationship in general. Those issues that pertain primarily to the defence relationship, a subset of the larger security one, will be addressed later.

The Threat

Any discussion of a security infrastructure must be carried out within the context of the threat upon which it is based. How then does the threat posed by international terrorism affect Canada, the “peaceful kingdom?”

In terms of a direct attack on the Canadian homeland, the well-developed and sophisticated infrastructure that Canada possesses as a modern industrialized nation provides a plethora of lucrative targets. The modern communications system allows instant worldwide coverage of the attack and dissemination of the terrorists’ message. The transportation network facilitates both easy access and quick escape from the target area. The open nature of the Western liberal democratic society allows for the unmonitored movement of individuals bent on mayhem. These same characteristics that make Canada an attractive target also make it an ideal waypoint in the terrorists’ journey to or from missions in other countries such as the United States.⁴

Thus it should not be surprising that most of the world’s international terrorist groups have established operations in Canada. With the exception of the United States, there are more international terrorist groups active in Canada than any other nation in the world. These groups have their origins in practically every significant regional, ethnic, or nationalist conflict that exists today.⁵

Canada is largely considered a safe and easy place for terrorist organizations to conduct a variety of support operations that include; recruiting, fundraising, acquisition of materials and equipment, and provision of a safe haven for personnel between operations or after they have completed the operational portion of their careers. This was so before 9/11 and is also true today notwithstanding the implementation of the post 9/11 anti-terrorism legislation.⁶

Canada is also ideally situated geographically and politically to provide access to operational areas such as the United States, Great Britain, Europe, or the Indian sub-continent and even to manage events taking place in those

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regions.⁷ Individuals and groups operating from Canada have been linked to the 1985 Air India bombing, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Al Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the massacre of tourists in Luxor, Egypt in 1997, a number of assassinations in India, suicide bombings in Israel, bombing campaigns of the Provisional IRA and the millennium bomb plot by Ahmed Ressam to blow up the Los Angeles International Airport.⁸

In the more recent past, there have been clear linkages established between activist groups and so-called charities in Canada and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (before their defeat) in Sri Lanka and Al Shabab in Somalia. These linkages included fundraising using methods of intimidation and extortion in the ethnic diasporas of Canada, open lobbying of Canadian elected officials, glorification and celebration of homeland terrorist leaders at Canadian cultural events, the conduct of propaganda campaigns at home and abroad from Canadian soil, and the coordination of large scale purchases of military hardware and technology in Canada and the United States.

Most international terrorist organizations try not to jeopardize their safe haven in Canada by targeting Canadian citizens or property. To date, most attacks by international terrorist groups have focused on foreign targets within Canada with the intention of influencing the terrorist group's homeland government.⁹ The most notable example of this was the Air India tragedy in June 1985 when 331 people, most of them Canadians, were murdered using explosive devices placed on the aircraft while it was in Canada.¹⁰

Prior to 9/11, however, the threat to Canadian security posed by terrorism was assessed as low despite these early examples of terrorist activity.¹¹ The threat was limited to extremists from a variety of movements. These involved international groups as well as a variety of domestic ones that included native activists, white supremacists, right wing groups, factions on both sides of the sovereignty debate, and single-issue groups concerned with the ecology, the ethical and moral aspects of abortion, and cruelty to animals.¹² Most of the domestic groups are known to have received funding, training, and organizational support from similar groups based in the United States.¹³

Many Canadians then and now fail to grasp or believe the nature of the terrorist threat facing the country and the continent.¹⁴ While many acknowledge the presence of terrorist groups in Canada, only a smaller number agree that they pose any threat to Canadian security or the safety of Canadians.¹⁵ Notwithstanding their predominantly “non-operational” status to date, what could motivate these groups to initiate operations on or from Canadian soil?

There are three primary motivations. One is revenge for Canadian transgression(s), real or imagined, against the fundamental principles or beliefs of a given group. One such threat comes from “home-grown” extremists alienated by Canadian society and radicalized over the internet or as a result of contacts

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with key figures in their community. Contemporary examples of this in Canadian society include the recently convicted Moamin Khawaja and the Toronto 17. The London subway attacks of July 2005 aptly demonstrate the lethality of the threat from this quarter. It would appear that just such an attack was narrowly averted in Canada in June 2006 with the initial arrest of the 17 Toronto area males allegedly involved in a plot to attack a variety of targets in Toronto and Ottawa.¹⁶

Another example of revenge might be the execution of the threats already made against Canada and Canadians by senior members of Al-Qaeda.¹⁷ Characterizing Canada's contributions to NATO in Afghanistan as the efforts of "second rate crusaders," lieutenants of Osama Bin Laden have called upon their faithful to attack Canada and punish Canadians for their own attacks against Islam. General calls for action such as these may be interpreted as instructions to sleeper cells or recently radicalized domestic groupings eager to prove their worth to the cause and to undertake *Jihad* in the land of their birth or their new homeland.¹⁸ As with the threat from "home-grown terrorists" there is a recent example of the reality of this threat as well with the August 2006 arrest of eight men in the United Kingdom who have pleaded guilty to several charges related to an attempt to detonate liquid explosives on a number of overseas flights originating in Heathrow and destined for airports in Canada and the United States.¹⁹

Canada could also be targeted for terrorist attack as a result of preventive actions by other governments. Terrorists tend to be risk averse. As nations such as Israel, the United States, and Great Britain take increasingly effective measures for the protection of their citizens and property, fewer attacks are carried out within the physical boundaries of those nations.²⁰ Instead, these nations are targeted by striking at their citizens and physical assets located abroad in other countries where the security measures are not as comprehensive or thorough. In this regard, Canada may become a target of opportunity where American citizens and possibly infrastructure (a few kilometres away across the border) could be threatened if the Canadian security infrastructure is seen to be weak relative to that of the American homeland.

Another variation on this theme is the targeting of Canadian citizens or infrastructure simply for being allied with a particular nation such as the United States. When asked the reason for his attack on the Manhattan World Trade Center in 1993, convicted terrorist Ramzi Ahmed Yousef stated that it was in fact an attack on Israel. Pressed further as to why he had not selected an Israeli target he replied, "... Israeli targets were too difficult to attack, if you cannot attack your enemy, you should attack the friend of your enemy."²¹ As the American anti- and counter-terrorism program gains strength and effectiveness, Canada is increasingly considered by some to be a soft target relative to some other Western industrialized nations.²² Studies indicate that the threat to American national security posed by terrorism will persist and even increase in the years to come.²³ Given this prediction, the potential for Canada to become a target of terrorism will also persist or even increase with time.

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Any one of the reasons just discussed could form the basis or rationale for a terrorist attack against Canadian citizens or their property. Considered together however, they present a compelling rationale for an attack upon Canadian citizens, infrastructure or interests at home or abroad.²⁴ Another aspect of the terrorist threat to Canadian security comes not from the terrorist themselves, but from the other nations allied with Canada in the fight to defeat them. It could be that if Canada is seen as a weak link in the defensive system intended to thwart terrorist attacks, allied nations such as the United States may consider it necessary to interfere in sovereign Canadian security issues in order to effectively address their own fundamental security interests. Thus an effective Canadian response to the threat posed by international terrorism should be considered an essential element of national policy from both a basic security and a “defense against help” sovereignty perspective.²⁵

But is an attack on the Canadian homeland really the greatest threat to our security? Even acknowledging the tragic consequences of the use of a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) against Canadian citizens and property, does the loss of people and infrastructure in one location in Canada, even on a large scale, represent the greatest danger to the nation as a whole?

As horrific as such an attack might be, some contend that the “Nightmare Scenario” for Canadian security and the Canada-United States relationship is not a terrorist attack on Canadian soil, nor is it another attack on American soil similar to or greater in scale than that carried out on 9/11. Rather the worst possible scenario for Canadians and their relationship with the United States is an attack on America that originates in or is launched from Canada. Running a close second would be an attack on a Canada-United States target from or through Canada – an attack along the “seam” of the relationship if you will. An example of such an attack could have been an assault on Vancouver during the 2010 Olympic Games, the effects of which could spill over to negatively affect American security interests in terms of the death of their athletes and/or citizens, or the contamination of their territory just a few kilometres away.²⁶ In either event, the likely consequences of such an attack, in addition to the physical and financial losses, would be some degree of damage to the relationship from which it would be unlikely to quickly recover.

Such an attack could be considered by America as the ultimate betrayal, a clear violation of and even the death knell for the Kingston Dispensation. This interpretation, in conjunction with the tremendous pressure the American government would be under to act decisively, could trigger one of several American reactions. One reaction, if American citizens or territory were clearly seen as the target, could be an application of the Monroe Doctrine with a variation of the Roosevelt Corollary that would involve actions by America to exert a controlling influence over domestic Canadian security measures in order to secure its own vital interests.²⁷ This could possibly destroy the security relationship in its entirety and catapult it backward almost 200 years when America felt compelled

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to invade Canada in the War of 1812 in order to address its own fundamental security interests and acquire some additional territory at the same time. Although a physical invasion would probably not result in this case, American actions would likely involve some infringements upon Canadian sovereignty that would be unacceptable to the Canadian people.

Other possible American reactions could be a closure of the border for a period of time with ruinous effects on the Canadian economy in an effort to compel Canada to take sterner measures, or a combination of border closure followed by the assumption by America of some Canadian domestic security tasks as discussed above. Former American Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, reflects a common American view with his statement that security trumps economics when it comes to American vital interests.²⁸ It is not inconceivable that should the Americans perceive Canada as a security threat, possibly even before an attack took place, they would close the border completely or take other actions injurious to the relationship.²⁹

With the border having been close to closure once already in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, American industrial leaders and those from other regions such as Asia or Europe that have established branch plants in Canada to serve the American market, know full well the impact on their businesses were it to be closed even for a short period of time.³⁰ If America loses confidence in Canada's ability to adequately secure its own borders and even just *threatened* border closures – the economic impact on Canada in both the long and short term could be ruinous.

Thus even in the absence of a physical attack, a public loss of American confidence in Canadian security could trigger a migration of industry and capital southward. It would also mean the loss of an unknown number of foreign investment opportunities as investors anticipate a defensive thickening or closure of the Canada-United States border and pre-emptively invest in the United States rather than in Canada. This nightmare scenario and the implications of American reactions resulting from it lend additional weight and credibility to a continuation of the historic policy of accommodation with an emphasis on that aspect of it involving “defence against help.”³¹

Given this multitude of threats and their consequences, what is the contemporary context within which they should be considered? The lens through which the world is perceived has been forever changed by the events of 9/11. Since that series of attacks, the Western world in general if not Canada in particular has become more worried about vulnerabilities than about threats. This is due in part to the fact that in many cases the specific threats cannot be identified. It is no longer just a simple concept such as a weapon be it a bomber or a cruise missile. It is not another state. Instead, the threat has become a constellation of dangers each with a chameleon-like ability to evolve and adapt to changing circumstances. As one security measure remedies a particular weakness

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or vulnerability to attack, the threat seeks out other weaknesses and morphs into another form and capability to strike at the time and place of its own choosing.³²

The issue is one of security, not simply one of defence.³³ The concept of continental security involves a capability to respond to a natural disaster as effectively as to a terrorist attack. The public expects an immediate and an effective reaction to either one. Hurricane Katrina re-taught security professionals a number of important lessons in this regard.

Given the multi-faceted and complex nature of this threat (an attack on Canada, through Canada on the United States, or along the security “seam” and against both countries simultaneously) what are its implications for the contemporary security infrastructure and the Canada-United States relationship? The next section will provide a brief overview of the pre-9/11 security infrastructure upon which will be based an examination of both the “home” and “away” aspects of the security relationship within the context of the contemporary threat.

Pre-9/11 Security Infrastructure

The global increase in the use of terrorism as a tool for the disenfranchised in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s combined with a series of terrorist incidents in Canada, served to highlight the initial lack of preparedness of Canadian security agencies in dealing with this threat.³⁴ A series of reports from the Cheriton Task Force and the Senate Special Committee on Security and Intelligence chaired by Senator W.M. Kelly first documented the lack of an adequate response and then monitored the development of the Canadian counter- and anti-terrorism infrastructure as it evolved in the 1980s and 1990s.³⁵

The last of the Kelly reports, published in 1999, noted that significant progress had been made in the establishment of a viable counter- and anti-terrorist capability. It concluded that Canadian security practitioners had a good grasp of the threat and its implications for Canadians. Security practitioners at the tactical and operational levels were also well aware of the need for a coordinated approach to addressing this problem and were working within existing budgets and policy priorities to accomplish what they could to further the process of securitization.

The primary difficulty that was experienced at all levels in the pre-9/11 era was the lack of funding and prioritization of effort as a number of other issues appeared to be higher on the government agenda than were counter- and anti-terrorism measures at the time.³⁶ The only way that the issue of countering or preventing a terrorist act would get a higher priority appeared to be if the nation were to experience a catastrophic attack and/or receive credible indications of such an event far enough in advance to facilitate a government-sponsored build-up of resources and capabilities to counter it. However, notwithstanding problematic issues of budget allocation and policy prioritization, significant

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progress had been made before 9/11 and this progress facilitated the more rapid development or securitization of the overall relationship when the government funding priorities and agenda did change following the attacks.

Prior to 9/11, the National Counter Terrorism Plan (NCTP) served as the centrepiece of the Canadian anti and counter-terrorism efforts. Initial development of this plan had evolved from the “Report of the Senate Commission on Terrorism and the Public Safety,” the work of the Cheriton Task Force and the second report by the Special Committee of the Senate.³⁷ Reviewed and amended on an irregular basis prior to 9/11, the NCTP is now under constant assessment, evaluation and revision. The NCTP functions as a central mechanism for the coordination of the anti- and counter-terrorism effort between federal agencies and also forms the basis for cooperation with other government agencies at the provincial and municipal levels.³⁸ It represents the sum total of the plans, philosophies, working relationships, resources, personnel, and funding dedicated to addressing the issue of terrorism at all levels of government that existed prior to 9/11.

The initial absence of a program to train, analyze, and test the anti- and counter-terrorist measures for effectiveness was a major concern of both the Cheriton Task Force and the Senate Committees chaired by Senator Kelly.³⁹ A program that involved large scale periodic exercises and evaluations was put into place in the early 1990s to address these concerns and was considered by police and government agencies at all levels to be very effective.⁴⁰ Unfortunately, this program fell victim to the Program Review process necessitated by government budget cutbacks in the early 1990s. Reincarnated in a reduced form in 1996, the program was an event-driven process that focused on major international events for which Canada had the primary anti- and counter-terrorist responsibilities.⁴¹ While this process provided some security coverage against the threat, it did little to prepare the nation in the event that the terrorists chose to attack outside of a major event – that is to say when the Canadians weren’t expecting one.

The relative infrequency of the training at all levels prior to 9/11 was thus a major concern of those responsible for the prevention and countering of terrorism in Canada.⁴² A robust training program involving challenging scenarios and widespread interaction between the various agencies vertically and horizontally on both sides of the border was considered by many as an essential pre-requisite to preventing an attack and to the provision of an effective consequence management response if one occurred. The prior establishment of sound working relationships and knowledge of the capabilities, limitations and standard operating procedures of all of the players in a scenario was considered to be a key aspect in both the prevention and countering of a terrorist attack. The establishment of a sense of trust and of a symbiotic working relationship would provide an agility and flexibility of response critical to addressing multiple priorities and interests in a crisis, and/or when the priorities of two sovereign states collide. The absence of regular interaction in a crisis training environment inhibited the formation of the relationships and

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situational awareness necessary to prevent or minimize the effects of a terrorist attack along the physical or metaphorical “seam” of the relationship.⁴³

A related concern of those responsible for Canada’s security preparedness prior to 9/11 was the infrequency with which the national leadership, up to and including the Prime Minister and other key decision makers participated in the training process. The purpose of their participation would have been to sensitize the national leadership to the specifics of the threat and to expose the men and women involved in the countering and prevention of terrorist acts to the requirements of their personal decision-making cycles.⁴⁴ Prior to 9/11, participation by senior members was infrequent and by the national leadership non-existent. This reflected in large part the relatively low Canadian prioritization of the terrorist threat relative to the other pressing issues of the day.⁴⁵

The other aspect of the pre-9/11 security infrastructure to be examined is the anti-terrorism program, or Canada’s ability to predict and thereafter prevent a terrorist attack. The core of any anti-terrorism capability is the intelligence function. The mandate of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) was and is to provide advance warning to government departments and agencies about activities that may reasonably be suspected of constituting threats to the country’s security.⁴⁶ It was the assessment of both the Cheriton Task Force and the Senate Committees in the late 1980s that a major shortcoming of the program then in existence was poor intelligence support in the anti-terrorist function and in the counter-terrorist management of incidents.⁴⁷

Progress was made however and as of the late 1990s it had become a widely held opinion that the ability of CSIS to gather, analyze, and effectively disseminate terrorism-related intelligence had greatly improved and that CSIS had shifted decisively from the reactive/investigative police mentality of its early years to a forward-looking, analytical, approach emphasizing the “anti” or preventive aspect of its work.⁴⁸ This development was as result of both a concerted effort upon the part of the CSIS personnel as well as the demise of the Soviet Cold War threat which to a certain extent left significant intelligence assets looking for a focus for the future.⁴⁹

The net effect of the national effort to improve their capability to prevent or counter terrorist attacks was that by the late 1990s security professionals in the realms of both policy and operations were well aware of the threats posed by international terrorism. In addition, the security infrastructure had been the subject of major efforts and developments that had both improved current capabilities and laid the foundations in terms of planning and identification of policies and priorities that would facilitate a rapid and largely effective response to the attacks of 9/11.

Still lacking however was the government support in terms of budgeting and policy prioritization that would have allowed an even greater degree of readiness and security for the nation. Notwithstanding the progress that had been made in

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the years leading up to 9/11, however, the low priority of many of the measures inhibited the development of a robust counter- and anti-terrorism plan such that many of the recommendations made by the Cheriton Task Force and the Senate Committees for the remedy of identified weaknesses in the security infrastructure went unanswered and unfunded until after 9/11.

Post-9/11: The Home Game

In the months immediately following 9/11 however came a rash of additional funding, legislation, and bilateral agreements that served to address many of the previously identified shortcomings in the security infrastructure. The fiscal, policy, and social issues that had prevented progress in a number of security-related areas were for the most part swept aside in an effort to increase the security provided to Canadians and to reassure the Americans that their closest ally and trading partner was taking the terrorist threat very seriously. Seen in this light, 9/11 did not serve as a turning point in the evolution of the Canada-United States security relationship but as an accelerant for a process that was already underway. The turning point had in fact already occurred in the mid-1990s as a result of the Senate reports and the efforts of Canadian security professionals at all levels of government.⁵⁰

As noted earlier, the end of the Cold War left much of the security infrastructure without a clearly defined mission or *raison d'être*. This resulted in a kind of “de-securitization” process that efforts to address the looming threat from terrorism had struggled against. The events of 9/11 reversed the process and re-started the securitization of the border and of the relationship. Without the impetus provided by the 9/11 attacks, the relationship would not have moved forward in either the direction or the pace that it has. And as will be noted later, the 2010 Olympics has had a similar effect on the progress of the development of relationship issues now that the effects of 9/11 are beginning to fade into the past.

The acceleration in the development and expansion of the relationship began in the days following 9/11 with the 31-point Smart Borders Agreement that addressed the Senate Committee’s core recommendation to proactively pursue the coordination of Canadian and American security policy.⁵¹ The Anti-Terrorism Act enacted legislation that addressed the legitimacy of so-called charitable organizations with established connections to terrorist groups, the growing threat of the use of cyber-space as a means of attacking national stability, and the formal legitimization of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) as a national asset in the security infrastructure. Integrated Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) were established to address difficulties in information sharing and operational coordination between government agencies that had been identified prior to 9/11. Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) were established to address similar previously identified bilateral difficulties between Canadian and American law enforcement and intelligence agencies.⁵²

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The creation of the “Safe Third Country” agreement addressed American concerns regarding the number of undocumented asylum-seekers that were allowed into Canada and then released on their own recognizance. The conclusion of the agreement was seen by some in Canada as an infringement upon Canadian sovereignty and therefore was a measure that required some degree of delicacy in terms of the balancing act required of the Canadian political leadership between the domestic public perceptions and Canadian interests in the relationship. The reality however was that the agreement served Canadian interests as much or more than it served American ones. This is because the solution as set out in this agreement will keep many of those individuals out of Canada and in America where they initially landed seeking sanctuary. Although signed in 2002, it only went into effect in 2005 as a result of delays in American ratification of the document.

Another measure implemented after the attacks of 9/11 involved the national level coordination of counter- and anti-terrorism measures. Other nations with extensive experience in dealing with terrorism such as the United Kingdom and Israel had established a single overarching government body or department that was held responsible for coordinating the national security effort and was headed by a cabinet level position responsible for reporting to government on the state of the nation’s security.⁵³ The Senate Committee had recognized the need for this type of structure in the Canadian system and had recommended its formation more than a decade before 9/11 but nothing had been done.⁵⁴ In the immediate aftermath of the attacks this situation was rectified first with the replacement of the Solicitor General’s Department with that of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) and shortly thereafter with Public Safety Canada (PSC). The new department was headed by a cabinet level minister responsible to the government for the state of Canadian security.⁵⁵

The new organization was different from the old in terms of the security organizations that it controlled, but the Canadian re-organization did not compare in any way to the sweeping and fundamental re-structuring that was part of the American reaction to 9/11 and involved the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Nonetheless the “adjustment” of the Canadian system appeared to have addressed the major organizational concerns at the time and was in keeping with the Canadian preference for fixing or improving upon an existing system in contrast to the American one for replacing it.⁵⁶

The net result of contemporary Canadian security efforts is that some believe that Canadian inter-agency cooperation and participation in the security relationship has never been higher or broader in scope than in the post-9/11 security environment.⁵⁷ This perspective has been challenged by Eric Lerhe who contends that, notwithstanding significant changes and large increases in budget allocation to the Canadian security infrastructure, the Canadian system falls significantly short of the capabilities expected of it. Further, he contends that it is the result of a lack of political focus and will rather than any shortfall in

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technology, organization, or budgeting.⁵⁸ Although open to endless discussion and debate, if the Canadian system has improved (but possibly not to the level of some expectations) it may well be due to a feature of Canadian governance that has been commented upon (and admired?) by Americans over the course of several decades.

America's first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal noted the relative efficiency of the Canadian government in making and implementing policy in negotiations with allies versus the relative complexity of the American system with its competing authorities and overlapping powers. He also contrasted the experience and value of the Canadian pool of civil service bureaucrats that supported the elected ministers saying that their experience and perspective lent stability and quality to the decisions being made – providing a central nexus of common procedure and coordination – whereas the American system of appointees he observed was relatively lacking in continuity, experience, and coordination.⁵⁹ Based upon this observation and the rapid expansion or *securitization* of government activity and policies in the post-9/11 period, it would appear that the government of Canada can and did move very quickly to adjust the system to the new security realities, although not with complete success.⁶⁰

As mentioned earlier a number of recommended measures had not been implemented prior to 9/11 as a result of budget or policy priorities. While budget limitations are fairly self-explanatory, some clarification of the term “policy priorities” should be made. A number of the recommendations made prior to 9/11 would have, if implemented, been in conflict with several social policies and norms established by successive governments and subsequently accepted by the public as the *status quo*. This *status quo* could not have been disturbed by the government without attracting significant public opposition and an accompanying loss of political support at the polls. Consequently, those measures were deemed to be too politically “expensive” and were set aside.

Examples of issues that fell into this category were measures that would have reduced the scope and flexibility of the immigration programs to accept as many applications as possible, measures that would have limited the activities of charitable organizations intended to address issues in the ethnic homelands of many Canadians, and measures that would have increased the powers of government agencies with respect to oversight of the activities of Canadian citizens. Attempts at implementation of any of these measures could and did attract criticism from civil rights activists and watchdog groups. Other changes, chiefly ones dealing with the organization of the government security infrastructure, would have encountered bureaucratic “push-back” from the civil service mandarins conscious of their power and authority in the system and anxious not to lose any of it.

The events of 9/11 had the effect of figuratively “lowering the bar” for several of these measures by virtue of an increased fear/security concern among

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the general public that translated into a greater willingness to accept some of these measures and in the case of the bureaucracies, a political will that overcame opposition to the measures proposed.⁶¹ Although some other Canadians saw the implementation of these measures as a compromise of national sovereignty in much the same way as the Canadian adoption of the Safe Third Country Agreement, they were in the minority and the measures were nonetheless put into effect using the Smart Borders Agreement, the ATA, and the organizational restructuring that took place.⁶²

Notwithstanding the broad spectrum of changes in the Canadian security infrastructure that have taken place, there are a number of criticisms that are regularly if not frequently levelled against the Canadian efforts by their American detractors. One area that has come under regular criticism is the national policy on immigration and specifically the issues of asylum and the processing of refugee claimants.⁶³ In spite of recommendations to restrict the freedoms of undocumented refugee claimants prior to the establishment of their true identities, and recommendations to limit the appeals process for those deemed to be a security threat to the country, little had been done in Canada before 9/11 to “tighten up” the process by which questionable individuals were accepted into this country and evaluated for eventual citizenship.⁶⁴ Even though there have been improvements to the system effected through such changes as the implementation of the Safe Third Country Agreement, there remains a perception in the media and the minds of many on both sides of the border that the Canadian system is seriously flawed and requires a major overhaul if it is to address some significant security concerns.⁶⁵ These concerns represent a significant and influential if not informed perspective among American legislators and the media and are continuing points of friction in the relationship today.⁶⁶

It is just this issue that American pundits fixate upon when they state that Canada is a gateway to America and a safe haven for terrorists bent on attacking the American way of life. They highlight this issue of concern or contention between Canadian and American policies and use it as a basis for claims that Canada will always live in a September 10th world (blissfully unaware of the threat) while America will always be in a September 12th world (keeping the continent and the world safe from the threat of international terrorism).⁶⁷

The most common general American criticism is that the Canadians just do not understand the true nature and severity of the threat.⁶⁸ As evidence of the veracity of their claim they point to a number of so-called security short-comings that include a failure to move fast enough or far enough in the overhaul of their system – a case in point being their contention that the Canadians have failed to make their border agency and coast guard full blown law enforcement and security organizations with powers of arrest etc. – a measure that is clearly necessary in their minds because that is how they have approached these issues.⁶⁹

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They also point to the rigid adherence by Canadian bureaucrats to the inter-agency communication protocols and structure between American and Canadian agencies that were established in bilateral agreements, arguing that a clear Canadian understanding of the threat would allow them to be more flexible and to react more quickly to changes in circumstances – in this case the Canadians would understand the American need for complete and unfettered access to the Canadian agency of their choice at the time and place of their choosing.⁷⁰ A more recent example in support of their contention that Canada does not understand or appreciate the threat is their identification of an apparent lack of Canadian will in maintaining the security infrastructure that had been put into place after 9/11. They cite parts of the ATA that have been struck down or allowed to expire (definition of terrorism and the expiration without renewal of the sunset clauses) and some procedures for detaining suspected terrorists under immigration laws (security certificates) that have been struck down because they were in violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.⁷¹ Lastly, in a perfect example of considering whether the “glass half full or half empty,” some American critics point to the arrest of 17 suspects in Toronto in 2006 as an example of the ineffectiveness of Canadian security efforts – apparently using the logic that if the measures were effective, there would be no arrests because there would be no terrorists in the country to arrest.⁷²

The intensity and extent of American criticism of the Canadian post-9/11 security performance begs the question: to what extent have American efforts been more effective? Given the criticisms that have been levelled against the Canadians, the American system and results must be clearly superior. But is this the case?

As mentioned above, the American approach to post-9/11 security was to carry out a major structural reorganization of their security infrastructure and house most of the new entity in the entirely new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The new organization was touted as having eliminated the shortcomings of the old ones, some of which included a reluctance or outright failure to communicate and cooperate effectively between agencies on security issues to prevent “gaps” in national security such as the ones that resulted in the 9/11 attacks.

Notwithstanding claims of success, the impression of a smooth transition to DHS is a false one, as is the idea that all of the ills that facilitated the attacks of 9/11 have now been rectified. DHS was created amongst large-scale “in-fighting” in Congress over budgets and oversight authority. These fights continue to this day. Notwithstanding the change in the structure and the re-organization of the agencies that make up DHS, the Congress has refused to change any of the budget control and operational oversight mechanisms. As a result DHS must report to no fewer than 88 different committees and subcommittees of Congress that are often at cross-purposes. Effective oversight, control downward or reporting upward is considered impossible by a number of informed participants.⁷³

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Within DHS itself there were missteps where organizations like the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) were stripped of funding deemed to be surplus to the DHS focus. In the FEMA case this resulted in its natural disaster response training and coordination funding being expropriated using the logic that if you can respond effectively to a terrorist attack, you can do natural disasters. While this misperception was corrected by Hurricane Katrina, this example illustrates that budgets were tightly controlled centrally with an overwhelming focus on the terrorist hazard.⁷⁴

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, this singular DHS focus on terrorism has since broadened to an “all hazards” approach and post-Katrina the iron grip of central DHS control has relaxed somewhat with separate budget authority and “fencing” occurring for a number of agencies within DHS such as FEMA, the Customs and Border Protection branch (CBP), and the Secret Service.⁷⁵

Another shortcoming is that while some Americans complain about Canadian stove-piping that inhibits the effective response to an evolving situation (American agencies are not allowed to talk to whichever Canadian agency they wish to whenever they wish to), others within their system acknowledge the fact that the flow and exchange of information within the American system is less than optimal. Notwithstanding the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the major restructuring of the American security system, the individual parts within it are still subject to the petty jealousies and bureaucratic infighting that characterized their relationship prior to 9/11 with the result that the sharing of information is still subject to organizational politics and “turf” issues.⁷⁶

A number of informed observers within the American security establishment contend that the American approach is not particularly effective at all. Indeed some support the contention that the homeland security efforts in the United States have become overly politicized to the point that they have spawned a “Homeland Security Industrial Complex” in much the same way that President Eisenhower warned the American people of a military industrial one in the early days of the Cold War.⁷⁷

This situation gives rise to the question of whether or not the plethora of American strategy documents provides guidance for action or rationales for government spending. Are governments and legislators exploiting and fanning levels of public fear to get bigger budgets and greater funding for their constituents? It is somewhat curious that while the entire American security complex has undergone a complete makeover in the post-9/11 era, the structure of the funding and oversight committees in both houses of Congress has not changed.

Stephen Flynn has written extensively on the waste that has occurred in government spending on security since 9/11 with no observable increase in security capability.⁷⁸ It can be argued that the American homeland security

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“pork barrel” is second only to that of defence in its size and attractiveness to American legislators and maybe not even second anymore. This has led, in the words of Frank Harvey, author of *The Homeland Security Dilemma*, to an “addiction” to security that will never be satisfied and result in unending budget increases as bureaucrats refuse to declare expenditures unnecessary out of a fear of failure – of another attack occurring on “their watch.” This addictive approach to security, one that lends itself well to abuse in the wealthiest nation on the planet, contrasts sharply with the more measured British one of maximum resilience that focuses on building a reasonable capacity first to prevent and then if necessary to recover from a terrorist attack.⁷⁹

Yet another issue of concern regarding the American security infrastructure is the harmonization of Canada-United States legislation following an agreement. While America frequently criticizes Canada for its lax security legislation or the slow pace of their implementation, they neglect to consider their own performance record in this regard. As mentioned earlier a major “hot button” issue with American critics is the Canadian immigration policy as it pertains to refugees and those seeking asylum. What is not widely publicized in America is the fact that 70% of the undocumented refugees seeking asylum in Canada come across the land border with the United States.⁸⁰ Thus America appeared to be the source of the very problem that they were regularly castigating Canadian lawmakers for failing to address.

Canada had addressed the issue and signed the “Safe Third Country” Agreement with the United States in December 2002.⁸¹ The early resolution to this difficulty however was ignored by American critics of the Canadian track record and much like the story of the 9/11 hijackers entering the United States from Canada, the story of lax Canadian immigration measures continues to be used to support a variety of American agendas in the media and the public.

The Safe Third Country Agreement prevents “asylum shopping” where asylum seekers denied their case in one jurisdiction (America) could apply for asylum in the other (Canada). But when Canada effectively “closed the door” on 70% of the problem that so concerned their American neighbour, it took three years, until 2005, for the Americans to adjust their legislation and bring the agreement into effect.⁸² The ratio of Canadian to American legislative response times in this case is 1:3. The delay in the American ratification of an agreement that theoretically addresses the very Canadian immigration issues that concerns them the most may be attributed to the fact that the agreement makes it extremely difficult for undocumented aliens who have been living in the United States to leave that country and apply for refugee status in Canada. The net result of this difficulty would be that America no longer has a “no-cost” means of reducing the number of illegal immigrants in the United States. It would appear that at least in this case, America chose to continue to criticize Canadian immigration policy even as it was delaying improvements to the policy that were specifically designed to address concerns regarding its permissive nature.

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The last aspect of the American homeland security performance record to be examined is their central strategy and approach to the issue. The American strategy is to push the security perimeter outward as much as possible and to make this barrier as dense as possible with a variety of measures and policies to detect and eliminate the threat before it reaches the continental United States. This process is known as “thickening” the border.⁸³

There are at least three American perspectives on the issue of thickening the border with Canada. One perspective is that there should be a single border policy for both Canada and Mexico and that whatever measures deemed necessary on the Mexican border must be implemented on the Canadian one. Comments by Secretary of Homeland Defense Janet Napolitano, a former governor of Arizona with no previous experience with Canadian border issues, indicate that there is significant support for this policy among the Democrats in Congress.⁸⁴ The specifics of this issue will be addressed over the course of an in-depth examination of trilateral issues later in the chapter. A second American perspective focuses only on the issue of security and perceived Canadian shortfalls in providing that security along the northern flank of the United States. The dominant position within this faction is that the border must be thickened as much as possible.

The last perspective focuses on the economics of the security issue and, taking note of the economic interdependencies that suffer every time a security measure is added or increased, urges caution in order to avoid American economic pain as well as Canadian.⁸⁵ This perspective is rarely if ever acknowledged in any public American discourse on the subject of homeland security – the economic factors affecting homeland security are simply not mentioned. The American mantra first coined by former American Ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci: Security trumps trade – plays well to a fearful public and sends a clear message that the safety of American citizens will not be compromised in the interests of economic welfare.⁸⁶ Consequently, when there are delays in implementing American security legislation such as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) that is intended to impose strict quality control on documentation required to transit the Canada-United States border, these delays are in many cases attributed by the American public to concessions made to their Canadian friends rather than to the efforts of their fellow citizens of the border states attempting to avoid economic hardship by exercising their influence through their Congressman and/or Senators.⁸⁷

If all of these instances of American security performance (or non-performance) are considered together and compared to the Canadian security performance record, it could be argued that Canada is in fact taking homeland security in general and American concerns on that topic in particular more seriously than are the Americans themselves. This may be especially so given the fact that careful scrutiny and comparison of the evolution of the Canadian and American national security and military defence infrastructures and policies reveals significant commonality in a number of the themes and priorities with greater progress and better results accruing to the Canadian efforts.⁸⁸

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Until the arrival of the Obama administration, any open acknowledgement that Canadian security policies and measures were intended to mirror those of America would have been tantamount to political suicide in Canada. It is only within the context of the high level of domestic Canadian support for the new American administration in its first term in office (before any substantive security issues are raised or addressed) that Prime Minister Harper is able to point out to the American press how closely the Canadian government's measures parallel those of the United States.

Regardless of the domestic political climate of the moment, the points at which the respective national policies and infrastructure are in parallel combined with the fact that many of the Canadian measures were implemented after the parallel American measure was put into place should serve as a not so subtle indicator of the extent to which Canada has been and continues to provide consistent and unequivocal support for American policies at home – in this case to the point that it has modeled its post-9/11 changes to the national security infrastructure such that there appears to be a more than a coincidentally good fit with the American one.

Whatever the controversy or debate, and whether it is informed or uninformed, it is apparent that at this point in its evolution the security relationship has expanded significantly beyond that of defence alone. There is also ample evidence, with respect to the “home game,” of the presence of the other two fundamental changes to the relationship. The demand for continuing support for their domestic policies through the adoption of those policies at home by the Canadian government and the demand for very specific and non-negotiable participation in the continental security infrastructure at a level and intensity deemed appropriate by the United States.

At the same time that these fundamental changes are being established in the relationship, however, there is also evidence, as provided in the foregoing discussion, that Canadian contributions to the post-9/11 relationship to address these changes have been significant and in a number of cases more effective than changes to the American policy and security infrastructure. The American need for support for their security policies is being met with far reaching and aggressive policies and actions on the part of the Canadian government. Canadian participation in continental security, particularly in those areas of greatest importance to America where it requires Canadian participation (domestic Canadian measures and institutions), appears to address their needs in both extent and intensity. So not only have all three of the fundamental changes been established in the post-9/11 relationship but that they have also each been substantively addressed by Canadian policies and contributions.

Yet it would appear that, based upon American reactions to the Canadian post-9/11 performance to date, Americans are still unsure of or lack confidence in the Canadian ability or willingness to provide positive and significant support for

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their security agenda. They do not appear to believe that Ottawa recognizes their security concerns and has acted upon them effectively. Although open and public criticism of Canadian policies has decreased significantly since the Canadian military has undertaken a combat role in Afghanistan, and the government has funded major increases in security capabilities and announced policy positions closely paralleling those of America on a number of issues, there are still periodic criticisms of Canadian security measures, particularly with respect to our immigration policies.⁸⁹ This reality gives rise to two questions. First, what are the foundations of these criticisms and why are they still occurring? And second, what will it take to satisfy the Americans that Canada is indeed providing robust and significant support for their policies and that we are taking their concerns seriously with contributions essential to the security of the continent?

Christopher Sands offers some insight into the American perspective on the issue. In the aftermath of 9/11 America re-assessed the performance of all of its allies over the last several decades in terms of their contributions to the security interests of the United States. The key concerns were how much they really brought to the table in terms of contributions and did they perceive the threat to the same degree and in the same manner as that of America – did they feel it was a common or shared threat?⁹⁰

Sands contends that Canada was assessed as a free-rider in this process.⁹¹ Canadian contributions had apparently not, at least initially, met American expectations in terms of increased spending, threat assessment or support for the war on terror and this is notwithstanding the fact that America has never explicitly stated what would constitute a sufficient contribution – there has simply been a longstanding declaration of failure on the part of the Canadians by the Americans.

In 2006, Sands identified three major events that had soured the relationship and significantly reduced support for Canada in the United States – the Canadian role in promulgating the Landmine Treaty, the Canadian decision not to join in the coalition invasion of Iraq, and the Canadian decision not to participate in continental BMD. The result was that those Americans considering the relationship were split into two groups: those for and against a continued bilateral (as opposed to a unilateral) approach to security with Canada. Unfortunately, he states, the position of those supporting a bilateral approach had been weakened by the paucity of Canadian contributions to the security effort. If the relationship was to re-acquire its previous lustre and closeness, a significantly greater Canadian security effort would be required.⁹² Notwithstanding the contributions made by Canada since Sands made these remarks, there are still those in the American camp that contend that Canada is the weak security link in the chain and as such has failed to provide the requisite understanding of the security threats, the support for American policies, and the physical contributions that are required and expected in the circumstances.⁹³

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Ben Rowswell neatly summarizes many American positions on the relationship when he observes that there existed a crisis of confidence and trust between the two countries and that this is the most salient aspect of the present threat to continental security.⁹⁴ Although he clearly implies that the crisis had been generated by the past high-level and very public Canadian disagreements with American policies, he fails to understand that there was also a crisis of confidence among Canadians in their American ally such that they saw the Bush administration as a significant threat to their social, political, moral, ideological, and security beliefs. In short, many Canadians saw George W. Bush as more of a threat to Canada than terrorism.

The departure of the Bush administration and the arrival of President Obama promises to provide a positive influence on the relationship. Canadians are initially quite enamoured of President Obama and this includes, at least at the outset, the nationalists and sovereigntists who were most vocal in their condemnation of American policy during the Bush administration. Part of this affection is undoubtedly linked to their expectations rather than his performance to date and as such it remains to be seen if their high opinion of his administration will be maintained once the reality of American security and economic policies strike home. This reality is that regardless of who is in the White House, American concerns will always trump Canadian sensitivities and the only difference between the Obama and Bush positions on a given issue may well be the tone of the delivery.

The solution Rowswell proposed was dismissive of existing Canadian measures to secure the continent and suggested the need for a clear statement of Canadian support and commitment to continental security (read American security) that is supported by substantive and concrete measures. As such, Rowswell's position supports the reality of the second of the three fundamental changes in the post-9/11 relationship – the requirement for consistent and ongoing support for American policies at home and abroad. As with American author David T. Jones, he also darkly alludes to the possibility of America addressing the threats to continental security in its own way should the security relationship not develop to American expectations.⁹⁵ This comment in turn supports the reality of the third fundamental change in the relationship – the mandatory – not discretionary requirement for increased Canadian participation in continental security.

David G. Haglund is in agreement with Rowswell's basic perspective on the issue and with the existence of the second fundamental change in the relationship in that he contends that what America needs most is assurance that the "Kingston Dispensation" still holds – that Canada recognizes the threat to the American homeland and will take every reasonable measure to prevent an attack on the United States through Canada.⁹⁶ Frank Harvey rounds out the development of this concept with a recommendation that addresses both of these fundamental changes with an aggressive approach to regaining American confidence and trust

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by becoming so closely networked with the American security infrastructure that Canadians are involved and present in all security fora to influence both the security situation and the American reactions to it.⁹⁷

It would be difficult to envisage American objections to such a program of security networking.⁹⁸ There are also a number of Canadian factions such as the Canadian Chamber of Commerce that would support the creation of a “North American Community” for both economic and security purposes as evidenced by the release of their position paper of the same name.⁹⁹ Undoubtedly however, other factions in the Canadian public would still be wary of such a move, even with the arrival of the Obama administration, for what might be considered the negative effects on Canadian values and national sovereignty. It is for this last reason that any move towards greater security networking with the United States must be approached gingerly and with the right timing to tap both the pragmatic and the emotional veins of Canadian public opinion.¹⁰⁰

Perhaps not surprisingly, the best policy may well be one of accommodation employing a combination of strategies involving the use of “quiet diplomacy” and “defence against help.” “Quiet diplomacy” should be used on those issues for which there is some disagreement that should be resolved away from the emotional and politically intense arena of public opinion. “Defence against help” should be used to address those issues that are central to American security concerns. At the same time, a higher public profile as part of a “renewal” of the relationship with the Obama administration could be adopted for those issues and concerns on which Canada and America have already reached agreement and for identity-conferring issues that are not central to American security concerns. The successful implementation of this strategy, could also involve the application of some Pearsonian pragmatism. This would involve giving the Americans what the Canadians know they want, not because they (the Canadian) necessarily agree with the need for it, but because in giving the Americans what they want, Canada will in turn satisfy its own fundamental interests – economic security and sovereignty.

If Canadians were to adopt a Pearsonian approach to this issue, exactly what would they have to do to give the Americans what they want? This question is a difficult if not an impossible one to answer because as alluded to earlier exactly what America wants from Canada in terms of type, nature or quantity of security and support has never been explicitly stated or agreed upon by or between Americans themselves. Beyond vague statements of “more” or “not enough” there have been few clues from American academics, bureaucrats, or leaders as to what they might want to see. It is almost as if Canadians are expected to increase their contributions until all American criticism from every source is silenced. If this is the case, it is unlikely that any degree or amount of physical or quantitative contribution would be deemed enough or sufficient.¹⁰¹

Dwight Mason, an American scholar and former co-chair of the PJBD, is one of the few who have pondered in writing exactly what America would

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like to see in such a relationship. He believes that there are two basic needs for America that must be addressed on a priority basis. First, America would favour the establishment of a single theatre of operations modeled on NORAD but including all aspects of the security infrastructure. The military portion of the framework would and indeed has become the smaller portion in this scenario although it could serve as a template for coordination, command, and control of the constituent elements. The key advantage of this course of action is that NORAD has a proven record of success in terms of addressing security crises involving threats that allow only minutes for reaction before they can wreak massive amounts of death and destruction on the continent. As such the NORAD command and control infrastructure appears to be an ideal template for a more comprehensive continental security framework to address a more comprehensive threat.¹⁰²

The central question in this case however, is whether that infrastructure and capability should be governed by an agreement that is bi-national or bilateral in nature. While a bi-national agreement may serve Canadian interests, there likely would be no more domestic support for this concept now or in the future than there was in the aftermath of 9/11. American support for a bi-national arrangement might also be lacking given their current issues of confidence and trust in their ally and the potentially binding nature of a bi-national arrangement.

Another concern, at least for American leaders, is the extent to which a bi-national continent-wide comprehensive security infrastructure would restrict America's strategic movement in addressing its vital interests. Although as mentioned earlier, American involvement in such a relationship with Canada in the past has yet to prevent them from taking whatever action they feel best addresses American interests. Examples of this include the unilateral increase in the alert status of the American military forces assigned to NORAD during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Yom Kippur War. In neither case were Canadian authorities consulted before the fact. It would seem then that entering into a bi-national agreement is only an impediment to American action if America plans on allowing it to become one, and in the past it has not.

It may be however that there is no longer any appetite for bi-nationalism on either side of the border, even if it is only to exist in form rather than substance. It may well be true that the American right opposes bi-nationalism to the same extent as the Canadian left. The indication that this might be so is the fact that the basic building blocks of a bilateral continental security organization have been evolving within the context of the contemporary relationship since 9/11. With the continued evolution of ever-closer security ties and the re-organization of the military aspects of the relationship along the lines of Canadacom-Northcom it could be that Mason's first basic requirement for the restoration of American confidence and trust in their ally is evolving, but in a bilateral fashion. The end result may not be a tidy well-defined structure like NORAD, but it might accomplish the same objectives as it develops over the longer term.

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Another issue concerning the first American priority need would be whether or not the security construct would focus on a continental security perimeter or a strongly reinforced national border. Not surprisingly, both Canadian and American opinion on the utility of a continental security perimeter versus a strongly reinforced border is divided. David G. Haglund has argued that such a perimeter would imply the erasure of the existing border for security purposes with some obvious worries in Canada with respect to sovereignty and in the United States about their ultimate security. He has predicted grave implications for Canada in the event of a second successful attack on the American homeland if the border were to be erased and Canada were to become identified as the last line of American defence.¹⁰³

An opposing point of view is put forward by Michael Hennessy and Scot Robertson who criticize the piecemeal approach that has evolved from focusing security on the border after initial mention of a continental perimeter evoked what might be characterized as yet another “knee-jerk” sovereignty outcry from Canadian nationalists. Hennessy and Robertson believe that a more effective approach would have been for the Canadian government to “grasp the nettle” of perimeter security and to have actively sold the concept to the Canadian public as the more effective means of securing both Canada and the continent.¹⁰⁴

A third option is the “suspenders and a belt” approach discussed by Joel Sokolsky and Phillip Lagassé.¹⁰⁵ They believe that neither America nor Canada will ever favour reliance solely upon a perimeter defence. Further, they contend that what will actually occur is a combination of the proposals by Haglund, Hennessy, and Robertson. An outer continental perimeter will be established (suspenders) but the national border (the belt) will be retained to provide a “finer” security filter as well as the barrier at which national differences in domestic policies can interface. As some of the necessary security measures will result in greater delays than others, it would be in Canada’s interest for these to be placed on the continental perimeter thus encouraging the faster flow of goods and services for plants and facilities within the perimeter. The national border membrane would also provide the important last line of defence for America supported by Haglund that would serve to deflect the inevitable tendency for American leadership to blame Canada yet again for weaknesses in the security of the American homeland (as they have previously done in the Pre-Second World War, the early Cold War, and the post-9/11 eras).¹⁰⁶

A second priority “need” that Mason identified in his article would be Canadian participation in some form of American-led expeditionary operations in the War on Terror. This would provide support of their security agenda abroad, thus contributing to the fulfillment of the second post-9/11 fundamental change in the relationship, the need for consistent and unequivocal support for the American security agenda. Hennessy and Robertson correctly identify the required size of such contributions as “minor.”¹⁰⁷ This is due to the fact that the most valued of Canadian contributions is the moral support for America’s

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position and the international legitimacy it would contribute to an American-led Coalition.

The ongoing Canadian contribution to the American-led, UN-mandated, NATO mission in Afghanistan is more than just a “minor” contribution however. The nature of the commitment, to one of the most violent and unstable regions of that country, is filling a large capability hole in the NATO commitment that is characterized by much enthusiasm among NATO members to have their flag planted on Afghan soil as a member of the Coalition, but little enthusiasm to take casualties or do any of the “heavy lifting” associated with the mission.

The willingness of Canadians to commit the lives of their citizens to the mission is not lost on the Americans or the other members of the NATO mission and has quieted criticisms of Canadian military contributions and capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic. Unfortunately, a strong contribution to the “away game” does not translate into a greater recognition or understanding of the Canadian contributions to the “home game.” America still requires a strong showing in each and their ongoing assessment of the Canadian “home game” is that it still requires some work.

Nonetheless it would appear that if Mason’s identification of the basic American needs from the security relationship is true, that Canada has addressed, both of the major American concerns that might be construed as supporting the ongoing sense of distrust and lack of confidence in Canada as a reliable ally. If this is indeed the case, the satisfaction of the demands involved with two of the three fundamental changes to the post-9/11 relationship may not be far away. The unequivocal Canadian support and participation in the “home game” is evolving and notwithstanding an American reluctance to publicly acknowledge this fact, will continue to develop over time with the ultimate achievement of a steady state between what Canada is prepared to contribute and what America expects/demands, likely a function of interplay between future Canadian actions and future American expectations.

The mechanisms being used to address and satisfy these fundamental changes in the relationship are, not surprisingly, rooted in the common policy threads. As noted previously, the presence of these threads has been integral to the Canadian response to the post-9/11 American demands on the relationship and when taken in conjunction with the ways in which the fundamental changes have been addressed, do indeed illustrate how the relationship is the same, yet different.

Post-9/11: The Away Game

The discussion of the post-9/11 security relationship to this point has focused primarily on the “home game” or continental security. The security of the Homeland however involves much more than just direct measures to secure the continent.¹⁰⁸ Rather, the historic core of both the Canadian and American

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security strategy has been one of forward defence, or “layered defence” using contemporary terminology. An essential part of this strategy has been the projection of power overseas in pursuit of Canadian interests. In the post-9/11 era this has meant the conduct of expeditionary operations to secure Canada, the continent, and the security relationship with the United States.

There has been some discussion and controversy over the actual value that playing the “away game” has for Canada in terms of achieving its interests within the Canada-United States security relationship. As stated earlier, the contributions made by Canada to the bilateral efforts to secure the continent have been considerable, yet they have not been widely acknowledged as such by Washington.

This may be because the litmus test of loyalty to America and of empathy with the security interests of the United States is support for American overseas operations. Canadian contributions to the “home game” are seen by the United States as addressing the security of the Canadian homeland and as such, are something that is expected of a nation rather than being particularly noteworthy and deserving of special status. It appears that the actions that garner the greatest American attention and respect are those demonstrations of support for American policies involved with the “away game” where the direct benefits to Canada are not nearly as evident.

Joel Sokolsky contends that this emphasis on the part of the Americans, at least with respect to Canada, is misplaced. The key contribution to American interests he argues, is not support for overseas operations, the size of which would never be sufficient to materially affect the outcome of the venture, but a focus on the “home game.” He goes on to say that the “home game” is the one most critical to the relationship because that is the one that addresses the most fundamental of all American security interests, the direct physical security of the homeland.

Yet another piece of the rationale for a focus on the “home game” is financial in nature. Notwithstanding the recent increases in defence spending, historically Canadians have been reluctant to spend their tax dollars on defence. One can speculate that after the economy has begun to recover from the 2008 recession and government deficit spending is a thing of the past, the public will demand a degree of federal budget “belt tightening” to attack the national debt. One could also speculate that some of this “belt tightening” will focus on expenditures on the Canadian military. Given the limited defence resources available to Canada at the best of times and the likelihood of these resources decreasing in the future, Sokolsky believes that the priority for security and defence resources must lie with the “home game” because that is where Canadian vital economic and security interests lie.¹⁰⁹

With respect to the “away game,” he contends that those resources that are left over and remain available for the implementation of Canadian policies abroad must be carefully rationed to provide the greatest possible benefit to

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Canadian interests.¹¹⁰ Gone would be the days of the Chrétien era when every mission is accepted as a matter of national pride or political convenience. Support for American initiatives overseas should be provided whenever possible, and in the Pearsonian tradition, it should even be provided in situations that are not completely supported by Canadian “values” if the *quid pro quo* will further Canadian “interests.”¹¹¹

Thus for Canada, the key contribution would be focusing its resources on defence of the Canadian and therefore of the American homeland. This would ensure that Canada does not become a security liability of the United States in the protection of its vital security interests.¹¹² In providing America with a secure northern flank that inspires its confidence, Canada will also ensure its own security, economic prosperity, and ongoing potential for growth. A number of other authors already cited to include Rowswell, Hennessy and Robertson and Mason agree with Sokolsky that the most important Canadian contribution to American interests would be a greater participation in continental security issues.¹¹³

The polar opposite to Sokolsky’s argument is that the “away game” is the most important one for Canadians to address. The central argument for primacy of the “away game” is twofold. First, as mentioned earlier, the American perceptions of any Canadian contributions to continental defence will have no influence because contributing to your own security is not seen as an outstanding or unique contribution to American security interests, it is expected. What would be unexpected is if a country refused to contribute to the defence of its own homeland. Further, Canadian participation in the “home game” is taken as a given by Americans for another reason – they understand that Canadians will do whatever is necessary to keep the border open and the economic lifeblood of Canadian society flowing.

The second aspect of the argument in favour of the “away game” is that America has more than enough resources to secure the continent on its own and arguably would prefer to do so with a free hand, unimpeded by partnership obligations to Canadians who are continually pressing for advantages as a result of their minor contributions. As such America would prefer to see Canadian resources deployed overseas in support of American policies abroad, where they have traditionally provided the stamp of credibility and legitimacy regardless of their size and operational impact. The litmus test for the strength of the Canadian commitment to its friend and ally would therefore be what Canada does when it has a choice, and this would be the extent that Canada consistently and reliably supports America in the “away game.”

There are a couple of weaknesses to the argument supporting the primacy of the “away game.” One of them is that while there are diplomatic and foreign aid aspects to it, it primarily addresses only a small part of the relationship, that of defence (military) rather than the larger security aspects of the Canada-United States relationship. As a consequence of this focus on a relatively small part of the relationship, the influence it can expect to garner will also be relatively small.

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A second weakness to the argument is that it ignores the previously established reality that there are some tasks associated with the “home game” that simply cannot be addressed by American resources or personnel and as such are considered of primary importance when considering Canadian contributions to the relationship. This makes Canadian contributions to the direct security of the continent (the “home game”) mandatory from the American perspective: in this case the dependency will be security based and long-term rather than defence-based and short term as it was in the early days of the Cold War. Thus if the situation is one of a trade-off between Canadians contributing a discretionary degree of credibility or legitimacy abroad or an essential degree of direct security to the homeland, the choice would logically be the homeland option.

This last point however suggests that there might be a third argument that occupies the middle ground between the two preceding perspectives. The third argument is that Canada must address both the “home game” and the “away game” with the weighting upon each varying according to the domestic, bilateral, and international political circumstances prevailing at the time. The logic of this argument directly addresses all three of the fundamental changes to the relationship that have occurred since 9/11.

The reality of the expansion of the Canada-United States defence relationship to one of security writ large means that all components of the security infrastructure can and should be considered for use across the spectrum of the relationship. In this case the fact that Canadian participation in continental security is no longer discretionary but has become mandatory will necessarily focus much of the non-defence security effort on those tasks within Canada that are necessary to secure the continent and the homeland. This will address the concern of many Americans regarding the security of their homeland and will facilitate the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty from a “defence against help” perspective among other things. Non-defence security assets may also be employed abroad as available but the priority should be for domestic employment to provide support for the American security agenda at home and to fulfill the requirement for Canadian contributions for direct security of the continent.

While the non-defence assets are focused on the direct security of the continent, the Canadian defence capability contribution to the relationship can be focused on forward security as it has traditionally been for most of Canadian history. A continued focus on forward defence has a distinct advantage for Canada in that it directly addresses the historic American need for support of its policies abroad and as such, is highly valued by American leaders as a stamp of legitimacy for their actions abroad.¹¹⁴

As was the case with non-defence assets focused on the continent, a focus of the defence assets abroad does not preclude their use at home in situations and circumstances where they would bring value to the domestic operational scene. The overall balance and employment of security assets (defence and non-

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defence) at home and abroad must be managed to attain the greatest influence on Canadian interests. The correct balance will acknowledge the expansion of the relationship from one of defence to that of security, it will provide America with the support it needs for its policies at home and abroad, and it will address those aspects of domestic security that have become mandatory for Canada to address if it is to maintain its sovereignty in a post-9/11 threat matrix. One final question remains however and that is who will determine the correct mix of resources and their employment at home and abroad?

The United States will always press for more forces overseas at the same time that it presses for a greater continental security effort. This will be a result of both the variety of American agendas that are being simultaneously pursued by different factions, and a negotiating strategy whose objective is to maximize the contributions of others in support of American interests. It will therefore be the job of successive Canadian governments to prioritize the allocation of their resources in the best interests of Canada – which incidentally will also be in the best interests of the continent and of the United States. In doing this Canadians will be assisting America in the achievement of the primary goal of United States security policy – the protection of the American people.¹¹⁵

The Mexican Connection

The discussion of the evolving Canada-United States security relationship has to this point considered only the two founding members and their positions on a variety of issues. There is growing consideration however, of a possible third party in the future of the relationship. In the days of the Cold War when the threat was an aerospace one originating in the north, east and west, Mexico was not considered a key player in continental defence. The question now is: has this changed with the evolution of the threat to the continent to include both international terrorism and the narcotics trade? Has Mexico become an essential element of continental security, or at least is it considered to be one by Canada or the United States? Is the Security and Prosperity Partnership signed by Canada, Mexico, and the United States but the first move in a process that will eventually incorporate Mexico as a full partner in the historic Canada-United States security relationship?¹¹⁶

The inclusion of Mexico in the continental security relationship is an American-driven initiative that appears to have few advantages for Canada. The trilateral approach is a concept that theoretically simplifies the resolution of border security issues for the United States – theoretically because in order for it to effectively do so the security issues on both borders must be similar in causality, size, type, and nature and this is not the case.¹¹⁷ The reality is that the border issues presented by Canada and Mexico bring different security and trade concerns to the American table. The countries are different, some of the problems may be similar, but the solutions are likely different as well, with the danger for Canada being the conflation in the American mind of somewhat similar problems with dissimilar solutions.¹¹⁸

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There are several advantages that accrue to the United States as a result of dealing with issues trilaterally instead of bilaterally. One of the most important factors is that when Canada is included with Mexico by the United States in consideration of any issue, there is the likelihood of America attempting to resolve essentially different Canadian and Mexican issues with a single blanket solution.¹¹⁹ The attraction and advantage for American legislators and government officials in this regard is threefold.

First, in the absence of real knowledge of both border situations and circumstances, it is intellectually neater to have one policy for all land borders. Second, if a solution is applied to the Canadian as well as the Mexican border, American legislators cannot be accused by their domestic constituencies of having separate racially-based policies for their border regions. Branding Canada as a threat facilitates this process. By applying a single measure that might be targeted at a southern problem to both borders they acquire domestic political cover for policies that are essentially aimed at their southern boundary.¹²⁰ Lastly, the inclusion of Canada in the discussion/negotiating process carried on between Mexico and the United States circumvents some historical American difficulties in dealing with Mexico directly – Canada can and does serve as interlocutor on issues that America has been unable to effectively address bilaterally with Mexico.¹²¹

In addition to the benefits to America, there are advantages to Mexico of entering a trilateral security relationship with Canada and the United States. First there is a rather nebulous benefit to be gained by being able to join with Canada in opposing an American initiative or policy proposal using the logic that the influence of Canada combined with that of Mexico may bring about a flexibility in American policy-makers not present in a strictly bilateral circumstance. The real value or utility of this rationale however has yet to be tested.

Another benefit to Mexico of a trilateral relationship might be that the American policy that is formulated so that it applies to both Canadian and Mexican circumstances on an issue may be a more moderate one than if it were negotiated based upon Mexican circumstances alone. Thus the inclusion of the Canadian case would benefit Mexico by virtue of having a moderating effect on what might otherwise be a harsher bilateral policy.

Notwithstanding these apparent advantages to Mexico, the Mexican authorities have demonstrated a consistent lack of interest in the establishment of closer security ties with the United States. This could be a result of concerns over their sovereignty. Having been physically invaded twice and roughly handled politically and militarily on several other occasions, the Mexican public and their leadership appears to be very sensitive regarding the development of a closer security relationship.

Having identified a number of advantages to a trilateral relationship for the United States and Mexico, one is hard-pressed to do the same for the

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Canadians. One possible advantage that could be put forward by Canadian nationalists would be a variation of one just mentioned for Mexico. That with Canada and Mexico opposing an American initiative or policy there would be the mistaken belief that American authority and influence upon the relationship as a whole would be weakened and Canadian interests would be better served in the process. The reality is that the last vestiges of special consideration and a special security relationship between Canada and the United States would likely disappear as Canada and Mexico were lumped into the same security strategy envelope, with the specific security interests of neither state being directly addressed.

With Mexico in the relationship Canada could be used by the United States as additional support for its views as is already the case with its membership in the Organization of American States (OAS). America could prevail upon Canadians to go and talk to the Mexicans to bring them around to the shared Canada-United States perspective on issues that Canada and the United States agree upon. It can use the Mexicans in the same way against the Canadians on issues upon which the Mexicans and the Americans agree. The United States would be able to use both Canada and Mexico against each other but refuse to yield when the two junior partners are united against an American position.

One could also argue that effective use of the three common policy threads in managing the relationship would be more difficult if not impossible under a trilateral system. The effect would essentially be one of a significant reduction in the Canadian “room to manoeuvre” within the relationship. The use of the policy of accommodation to include both balancing and quiet diplomacy becomes immeasurably more difficult with three partners versus two. The added complexity of a third party and issues in the institutions of the relationship would reduce the speed and effectiveness with which common Canada-United States issues and interests could be addressed at every level of the relationship. The differences between Canada and Mexico in the levels of trust between agencies, governance capabilities, and the specifics of the issues to be dealt with as they pertain to the United States, would all complicate the relationship and reduce the precision with which Canada could employ its established policy threads in pursuit of the national interests.¹²²

Considering the net advantages and disadvantages for each potential partner, the only clear winner in a tripartite continental security structure may well be its only supporter, the United States. The Americans, as the dominant partner, would likely set the agenda and play one partner off against the other to achieve their ends with the result a reluctant Canada and hesitant Mexico being dragged down the path of American security policy and interests.

Thus Canadian security nationalists and the smaller anti-American faction within that group may actually be furthering the American agenda and hindering their own (greater say in continental security issues, enhanced sovereignty and security policy independence) by supporting the inclusion of Mexico in a

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continental security structure. The reality may well be that the interests of both Mexico and Canada would be best served by the pursuit of independent bilateral security relations with the United States.

With an American tendency to sculpt a policy based upon worst case scenarios the Canadian objective is often to avoid having the American “lowest common denominator” solution applied to the Canadian case.¹²³ A restrictive policy that addresses a quintessentially Mexican circumstance could have no relevance on the Canada-United States border and could indeed have an inhibiting effect on our trade and/or security relationship. The application of a single policy in a trilateral forum may well have advantages for both the United States and Mexico but it is unlikely to have any real benefits for Canada. Canadian interests would thus be best served by pursuing issues with the United States and Mexico bilaterally. If the issues are the same, then the two countries can compare notes, but Canada should avoid trilateral engagement whenever and wherever possible.¹²⁴

Notwithstanding some advantages to Mexico, there is generally no political appetite among the two potential junior partners for a trilateral security partnership with the United States. Somewhat surprisingly, the assessment of the major benefactor of such a relationship, the United States, is that the formal and structured inclusion of Mexico is not yet advisable given the different stages and directions of development that exist at the moment between the Mexican political and security infrastructure and that of the United States.¹²⁵ Nonetheless, the inclusion of Mexico in the continental security matrix does appear to be a long-term objective for the Americans and as such a long-term concern for Canada.

In the interim however, and regardless of how much Canadians wish to be considered separately from Mexico on many security issues, the reality is that an American problem on their southern border will inevitably influence the thickness and permeability of their northern border if Canada does not actively engage both the Americans and the Mexicans on the issue.¹²⁶ Thus as much as Ottawa would like to avoid becoming embroiled in United States-Mexico issues, Canadians have a vested interest in the resolution of Mexican security and economic issues as they pertain to their American neighbour.¹²⁷ And as with other issues of American policy with the potential to damage Canadian interest, a conscious decision to address these issues proactively rather than reactively will best serve those interests in the future as they have in the past.¹²⁸

Conclusion

The overall conclusion regarding the three fundamental changes to the post-9/11 Canada-United States security relationship is twofold. First, their existence and reality have been clearly established by the events and the Canadian and American reactions to them within the context of the relationship. This supports the contention that while the Canada-United States security relationship has

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remained the same over time, there have also been several fundamental changes to both the relationship and its dynamics. Second, these changes are of such central importance in the contemporary relationship that they are acquiring a degree of permanence and may well be key to determining its tone, nature and direction into the long term future.

The need/desire/requirement to securitize government and private sector policy-making in response to the threat posed by international terrorism was recognized prior to the events of 9/11 but required the events of that day to give them sufficient political priority such that they could be implemented. One of the results of the subsequent Canadian domestic organizational changes and innovations has been that the Canada-United States relationship has never had a broader range or depth than in the post-9/11 security environment. Another of the results is that the value and use of the common policy threads has become more important than ever before. The degree and extent of these structural and relationship changes make it unlikely that the relationship will abandon the broad security focus it has now and return to a narrower one of defence or simple military coordination.

Notwithstanding these changes however, the security relationship appears to be relatively stable at the moment based upon Canadian actions and policies at home and abroad as well as the arrival of the Obama administration with a significantly different operating strategy than that which characterized the approach of George Bush to global affairs. The assumption of a combat role in Afghanistan, increased defence expenditures in some key capability areas, the assumption of a higher profile role in the conduct of NATO affairs and the clarification of a number of positions on international issues such as the conflicts in the Middle East that support American policies have all tended to offset the negative effects of issues and events in the preceding decade of the relationship. Of particular note is the shift in Canadian politics away from policy differentiation for its own sake or for the purpose of obtaining short-term domestic political support.

The departure of the Bush administration and the current positive aura in which President Obama is seen by most Canadians bodes well for the future upward trend of the relationship. The change in the American administration may well signal both a change in how past Canadian support of American security concerns is perceived and may even shape future expectations of such support. This is not to say however that demands for increasing support of their policies at home and abroad and for increased participation in continental security will abate. It is just possible that they will become less strident and be conveyed with somewhat less arrogance, at least until the next attack on the American homeland. The potential addition of Mexico into the relationship does not bode well for Canadian interests and promises to make the resolution of relationship issues an even more complex process than it is now.

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The expansion of the Canada-United States relationship from one of defence to that of security writ large has both broadened and complicated the choices available to Canadian leaders in terms of acquiring the best results for Canadian interests within the relationship. One alternative intended to address the American requirement for consistent support of their policies abroad while simultaneously participating in those aspects of domestic security that have arguably become mandatory from both a security and a sovereignty perspective is to split the resource utilization into defence and non-defence groupings. The defence assets can be employed primarily abroad and the non-defence assets primarily at home in a combination determined by Canadian leadership according to the domestic, bilateral, and international political circumstances at the time.

Endnotes

1. John J. Noble. "Getting the Eagle's Attention," 44.
2. Christopher Sands. Continental Security Dimensions of the Canada-U.S. Relationship. Remarks to the 21st Annual Conference of Defence Association Institute, March 4, 2005.
3. Christopher Sands has stated that by 2000, Canada's military capabilities had been reduced to a symbolic role even in such non-traditional military operations as disaster relief. Whereas in the past Canadian opposition and/or disagreement on issues or policies had been offset by significant and effective contributions of defence, diplomacy, and developmental resources, he believed that this was no longer the case. David T. Jones has stated that Canada was irrelevant because it had effectively marginalized itself by its refusal to shoulder what he believed to be an equitable burden of continental defence costs. Christopher Sands. "How Canada Policy is Made in the United States," in *Canada Among Nations 2000: Vanishing Borders*, ed. Fen Osler Hampson, and Maureen Molot, (Don Mills Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2000), 68; David T. Jones. "When Security Trumps Economics – The New Template of Canada-U.S. Relations," *Policy Options* (June July 2004): 74; Andrew Cohen. *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World*. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd, 2003), 47.
4. Canadian Security Intelligence Service. *Submission to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence*. Ward Elcock, Director. (Ottawa: June 24, 1998), 3; Canada. *The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety*. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987), 15; Canada. "International Terrorism: The Threat to Canada" *CSIS Perspectives Report No. 2000/04* (May 2000), 3.
5. Some of the major terrorist organizations active in Canada are Hezbollah, a number of Sunni Islamic extremist groups including Hamas with ties to Egypt, Libya, and Algeria, Lebanon, and Iran, the provisional IRA, the Tamil Tigers, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and all of the major Sikh terrorist groups. These groups originate from conflicts in the Punjab, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Egyptian, Algerian, and Sudanese unrest, Lebanon, Turkey, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan. Canadian Security Intelligence Service. *Submission to the Special Committee*, 4; Canada. "International Terrorism..." 7.
6. A number of the counter and anti-terrorism measures embodied in the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) have either expired without renewal, are untested, or are just now in the process of being tested in the courts. The trials of the Toronto 17 are proceeding at a snail's pace, and while that of Moamin Khawaja has recently ended, the appeals process is yet to come and promises to be a lengthy one ending only with a Supreme Court ruling. The sunset clauses of the ATA have expired without renewal, and the custody provisions of the security certificate process are steadily being eroded by the courts. While the Canadian government is struggling to re-establish those provisions, to date they have been unsuccessful.

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7. Other objectives include but are not restricted to obtaining weapons and equipment, offensive and defensive intelligence surveillance, cooperating with or countering other terrorist or criminal organizations, influencing Canadian public and government opinion, and illegally obtaining Canadian travel and identification documents. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *1997 Public Report*. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1998), 2; Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Counter-Terrorism," *Backgrounder Series*, No. 8 (Ottawa: CSIS Communications Branch 1997), 4; Canada. "International Terrorism...", 4.
8. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Submission to the Special Committee*, 6; Canada. "International Terrorism...", 5.
9. Examples are: the September 1982 attempted assassination by Armenian terrorists of the Turkish Commercial Consul, Hani Gungor in Ottawa, the August 1982 assassination by Armenian terrorists of the Turkish Military attaché, Colonel Altikat, and the March 1985 murder of a private security guard by members of the *Armenian Revolutionary Army*. A visiting Punjab cabinet minister was wounded in an assassination attempt in Gold River, BC, October 1991. Members of *Jamaat ul Fuqra* were arrested in connection with a plot to bomb a Hindu Temple, a movie theatre, and an East Indian restaurant in Toronto, and in April 1992 the Iranian Ambassador was slightly injured when members of the anti-regime organization *Mujahedin-e-Khblaq* stormed and briefly occupied the embassy. Canada. *The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety*, 2 and 6; Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Counter-Terrorism," *Backgrounder Series*, No. 8, 4.
10. Canadian authorities have traditionally underestimated the level of the threat and certainly did so in this case. The Air India mass murder could be considered as a mini-9/11 Canadian style. Canadians did not believe it would happen in Canada. Investigators assumed that the preparations they were seeing were for an attack in India. Official "W" of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in Ottawa 18 June, 2007.
11. This arises from incidents perpetrated by terrorist groups in Canada against Canadian targets in order to focus on domestic issues that can be resolved by the Canadian government. Canada, *The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety*, 2 and 6.
12. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Submission to the Special Committee*, 5.
13. This threat takes the form of the same "lone wolf" or small cell "single issue" terrorist organizations that conduct operations designed to highlight and publicize a cause such as the pro-life movement, the ecology, or animal rights activists. A 20-year-old member of the animal rights group known as the "Animal Liberation Front" faces a minimum sentence of 35 years in jail after destroying a business supplying feed and equipment to mink farms in Utah. The group is known to have more than 3,000 members. Mike Carter. "Animal Rights Activist Convicted." *Associated Press*, 18 September, 1998.
14. Robert Huebert, of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary contends that Canadian political and corporate elites do not see terrorism as a threat to Canada outside of its impact on the trade relationship with the United States. Canadians are in a state of denial over the level of terrorist activity within our borders; whether from Islamist extremists, Tamil Tigers, or Sikh terrorists (the Air India incident was the largest terrorist act prior to 9/11). He has also emphasized that the government has taken significant steps since 9/11 to put emergency response infrastructure in place, but as time passes since the last terrorist action in Canada, resolve may slip. Robert Huebert. Edmonton United Services Institute 2005 Symposium, "Canada's Role in the War on Terror." 12 February, 2005.
15. The position that terrorists in Canada are primarily non-operational is dated and dangerously wrong in the post-9/11 environment. Official "W" of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in Ottawa 18 June, 2007.
16. "Toronto Bomb Plot." CBC News Online. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/> on 5 June, 2006.
17. On three separate occasions Al-Qaeda statements have listed Canada as a priority for retribution. These statements were released on November 2002, March 2004, and July 2005. To date, Canada

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remains the only country on these lists not to have been directly attacked by Al-Qaeda. In the spring of 2004, an online manual for Islamic militants called the Military Camp of al-Battar believed to be run by Saudi Al-Qaeda operatives – listed Canada as the fifth-most important nation on a list of “Christian terrorist” countries. Canada. *Intelligence Assessment 6/23* (Unclassified), Intelligence Threat Assessment Centre. April 2006.

18. A case in point is the Japanese Embassy in Peru. Rumors of complicity in the attack on the embassy by the Peruvian authorities and of plans to kill the *Tupac Amero* terrorists if they had been granted safe passage on a Canadian aircraft have resulted in vows of revenge by the *MRTA*. A second example is the Canadian role in the Iran hostage crises where Canadian embassy staff was seen as aiding American citizens in their escape from Iran after militant students stormed the United States Embassy. A concrete act of revenge did in fact occur in 1982 when members of the Armenian terrorist group *ASALA* attempted to bomb the Air Canada cargo terminal in Los Angeles in reaction to the arrest of alleged Armenian terrorists in Toronto. They subsequently bombed the Air Canada offices in Paris and Lyon, France in November 1985 to publicize their demands for the release of their colleagues serving sentences in Canadian jails. Senior Official “B” of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, Ontario, 6 October 1998; David Pugliese. “Elite Canadian Commando Force Planned Attack on Peru Terrorists.” *The Ottawa Citizen*, 4 November 1998, A1; Canada, *The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety*, 16.

19. Stewart Bell. “Canadian Flights Targeted in British Terror Plot.” *National Post online*, Wednesday April 02, 2008. <http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=417558>.

20. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Submission to the Special Committee*, 3.

21. Benjamin Weiser. “2 Convicted in Plot to Blow Up N.Y. World Trade Center.” *The New York Times*. 13 November 1997.

22. Senator W.M. Kelly, Chairman of the Special Security and Intelligence Committee, Ottawa, Ontario, 4 November 1998.

23. Roger Medd and Frank Goldstein. “International Terrorism on the Eve of a New Millennium,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Volume 20, Number 3 (1997): 289.

24. Official “A” of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 1 October, 1998.

25. This is in fact reflected both on the National Security Policy statement of 2004 and in Prime Minister Harper’s comments during the February 2009 visit by President Obama. Canada. *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy*. Privy Council Office. (Ottawa: April 2004), 4; The White House. *Transcript of comments made by President Obama and Prime Minister Harper of Canada, on the occasion of the President’s trip to Ottawa*. Ottawa, Canada 2:46 P.M. (Local). http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/.

26. Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) E.A. Findley. Former Deputy Commander of NORAD. Calgary: May 4, 2006.

27. David A. Charters. “Terrorism and Response: The Impact of the War on Terrorism on the Canadian American Security Relationship,” in *Conference Proceedings: Canadian Defence and the Strategic Canada-US Partnership*. (Ottawa: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2002), 6.

28. The former Ambassador has subsequently acknowledged the importance of trade on both sides of the border but contends that in the event of an attack originating in Canada, American leaders would be hard-pressed not to take some kind of decisive action at the border. Paul Cellucci. Victoria, 12 May 2008.

29. An editorial in the New York Times called it “shocking” how little progress has been made in securing U.S. borders. “Suspected terrorists have long been entering the country from Canada,” said the March 21 editorial. Canadian Press. “McKenna challenges N.Y. Times editorial on border.”

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March 30, 2005. [www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews; Robert Bothwell. "Canadian-American Relations: Old Fire, New Ice?"](http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews; Robert%20Bothwell.%20%22Canadian-American%20Relations%3A%20Old%20Fire%2C%20New%20Ice?) in *Canada Among Nations 2004*, 151.

30. Steven Globerman and Paul Storer. *The Impacts of 9/11 on Canada-U.S. Trade*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008): 3.

31. Specifically, Canadian policies should be such that America does not feel threatened by Canada or by Canadian security weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Failure to do so will almost inevitably result in American actions to address these weaknesses in the interests of both Canadian and American security interests.

32. Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) E.A. Findley. From comments made at CDFAI Conference in Calgary, 4 May 2006.

33. Frank P. Harvey. *The Homeland Security Dilemma: The Imaginations of Failure and the Escalating Costs of Perfecting Security*. Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (June, 2006), 3.

34. Canada, *The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety*, 4-5; Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Counter-Terrorism," *Backgrounder Series*, No. 8, 3.

35. There were three Senate reports issued in 1987, 1989, and 1999 that documented the baseline national capability, deficiencies in that capability and then improvements to that capability as time went on. The Cheriton Task Force, formally known as the Counter-Terrorism Task Force was formed in 1988 as a result of the first Senate report and charged with the responsibility of establishing an effective Canadian counter-terror capability and correcting the deficiencies reported in the first Senate report of 1987.

36. Official "A" of the Solicitor General Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, 22 September 1998.

37. Canada, *The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety*, 57-68; Canada, *The Report of the Second Special Committee of the Senate on Terrorism and the Public Safety*, 4, 12, 20; Canada. *Interim National Counter-Terrorism Plan*. (Ottawa: Solicitor General Canada, 1998).

38. All of the provinces have specific plans, resources, and personnel dedicated towards dealing with emergency situations be they natural, criminal, or terrorist oriented. Some provinces, Ontario for example, have specific counter-terrorism plans that are designed to maximize the utility of personnel and resources already committed to law enforcement, fire fighting, medical emergencies, and natural disasters. Ontario. "Annex D: Provincial Counter Terrorism Plan (Draft)," *Provincial Emergency Plan*, (Toronto: August 1998), D1.

39. Canada. *The Report of the Second Special Committee of the Senate on Terrorism and the Public Safety*, 7-9.

40. Official of the Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Ontario, 9 October, 1998; Official of the Canadian Security Intelligence Agency, Ottawa, Ontario, 1 October, 1998; Official of the Ottawa Carleton Police Service, Ottawa, Ontario, 1 October, 1998.

41. Official "A."

42. Official "B" of the Solicitor General Canada. Ottawa, 22 September, 1998.

43. Geoffrey M. Levitt, "Democracies Against Terror: The Western Response to State-Supported Terrorism." *The Washington Papers/134*. (Westport Conn: Praeger, 1988), 98; Joseph Paul de Boucherville Taillon, *International Cooperation in the Use of Elite Military Forces to Counter Terrorism: The British and American Experience, With Special reference to Their respective Experiences in the Evolution of Low Intensity Operation*. Doctoral Thesis (London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1992), 337, 339, and 358.

44. Official of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service, Kingston, Ontario, 26 September 1998; Official of the Department of National Defence.

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45. This was in direct contrast to other nations with more experience with terrorism such as Israel and the United Kingdom. Immediately prior to the incident at Prince's Gate in London in May 1980 when the Iranian Embassy was taken over by terrorists that eventually resulted in a successful assault by the SAS, the British government had conducted a crisis management exercise that included Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. As with the failure of Canadians and their government to embrace the reality of physical threat (as opposed to the economic one) after 9/11, it may well be that the absence of any physical losses for Canada similar to that of Israel and Great Britain shaped the priorities of the government such that participation in crisis management exercises was not seen as a useful expenditure of their time. R.J. Andrew, "The Siege on Princess Gate: Attack on the Iranian Embassy," *Terrorism and Beyond: An International Conference on Terrorism and Low-Level Conflict*. Conference Director, Brian M. Jenkins, (Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 1982), 244-245.
46. Canada, *Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act*, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1989), Articles 12 and 13.
47. Canada. *The Report of the Second Special Committee of the Senate on Terrorism and the Public Safety*, 11.
48. Official of the Security Intelligence Review Committee on 6 October; Senator W.M. Kelly; Official of the Ontario Provincial Police; Official of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Service; Official "B" of the Solicitor General Canada on 22 September; Senior Official of the Department of National Defence on 24 September, 1998.
49. Senator W.M. Kelly; Senior Official of the Department of National Defence; Canadian Security Intelligence Service. *Submission to the Special Committee*, 5.
50. Official "W" of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Ottawa, 18 June, 2007.
51. The agreement involved commitments to develop specialized pre-clearance procedures for cargo (FAST) and people (NEXUS) as well as biometric identifiers for personal identification and significant infrastructure improvements to provide increased capacity without the compromise of security and resilience in the event of a successful terrorist attack. United States. *Canada-U.S. Relations*. Congressional Research Service. (Washington D.C. 15 May, 2007), 14 and 25.
52. Canada. *The Report of the Special Senate Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence*, 75-78.
53. Aharon Yariv, "A Strategy to Counter Palestinian Terrorism." *On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism*, ed. Ariel Merari, (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1985), 6; R.J. Andrew, "The Siege on Princess Gate," 244-245.
54. Although the rationale for failure to act upon this measure has never been documented, it may have been a simple case of bureaucratic infighting to the extent that no one was willing to give up any of their power and everyone wanted to be the new centre-point of the security effort with the accompanying bureaucratic and fiscal power. Canada. *The Report of the Second Special Committee of the Senate on Terrorism and the Public Safety*, 12-15; Canada. *The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety*, 58-69.
55. Public Safety Canada, <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/abt/index-eng.aspx>.
56. In addition to the cultural preference, the sweeping changes of the American reactions to the attacks were also very political in nature and designed to demonstrate to the American people that the government and the President were making massive changes (improvements?) to the infrastructure that would prevent this type of attack from occurring in the future.
57. Although true, this statement is almost an oxymoron given the fact that the border is arguably more difficult to cross now than at any time in the history of the relationship.
58. Eric Lerhe. *Connecting the Dots and the Canadian Counter-Terrorism Effort – Steady Progress or Technical, Bureaucratic, Legal, and Political Failure?* Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. (March 2009), 12.

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59. Walter Millis, ed. and E.S. Duffield, collaborator. *The Forrestal Diaries*. (Toronto: MacMillan Co., 1951), 474-475.
60. A characteristic of the Canadian government over the past 15 years has been a progressive consolidation of power at the top. This has been facilitated in part by the much stronger party discipline that exists in the Canadian system over the American. The end result is that a Canadian majority government is more effective than a minority even though the minority government may be more democratic. In any event, Canada's lack of democracy has worked well for American freedom and security.
61. Indeed shortly after 9/11 a significant number of Canadians (73%) were in favour of continental integration, such is the priority of survival over that of national pride. Support for integration eroded rapidly however and as the threat level went down in the minds of many Canadians and the events that caused the fear recede in their memories, sovereigntist concerns are likely to take increasing precedence over those of security. Ipsos-Reid Poll, September 21, 2001.
62. Canada. *The Report of the Second Special Committee of the Senate on Terrorism and the Public Safety*, 12-15; Canada. *The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety*, 58-69; Canada. *The Report of the Special Senate Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence*, 75-78.
63. Elizabeth Smick. Canada's Immigration Policy. Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, July 6, 2006. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11047/>.
64. Canada. *The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety*, 62-65; Canada. *The Report of the Special Senate Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence*, 77.
65. Stephen Gallagher. *Canada's Broken Refugee Policy System*. (The Fraser Institute, 2008): 54. http://www.fraserinstitute.org/Commerce.Web/product_files/ImmigrationPolicyTerroristThreatCh4.pdf.
66. Senior Official "X" of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Homeland Security Integration, Washington D.C., 30 May 2007.
67. This perspective is held by a number of security professionals on both sides of the border. Senior Intelligence Official "I" formerly assigned to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in Ottawa: 20 July 2007; Senior Official "CC" of Intelligence and Operational Analysis, Department of Homeland Defense. Washington D.C. 1 June, 2007.
68. Senior Official "EE", International Affairs Policy, Department of Homeland Security. Washington D.C. 29 May, 2007.
69. Ibid.
70. Senior Official "BB", Office of Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security. Washington D.C., 2 June 2007.
71. United States. *Canada-U.S. Relations*, 29.
72. Ibid., 16.
73. Senior Official "EE".
74. Official "Z", Federal Emergency Management Agency of the Department of Homeland Security, Washington D.C. 29 May 2007; Official "AA", Federal Emergency Management Agency of the Department of Homeland Security, Washington D.C. 29 May 2007.
75. Senior Official "CC".
76. Senior Official "CC"; Senior Official "EE".
77. Senior Official "EE".
78. Stephen Flynn. *America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us From Terrorism*. (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 67; Stephen Flynn. *The Edge of Disaster*. (New York: Random House, 2007), 11.

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79. Harvey. *The Homeland Security Dilemma*, 22.
80. United States. *Canada-U.S. Relations*, 28.
81. "Safe third country' pact puts refugees at risk, say critics." CBC.ca December 17, 2002. http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2002/12/07/border_deal021207.html.
82. Ibid., 29.
83. Senior Official "GG", Embassy of Canada. Washington D.C., 29 June 2007.
84. Sheldon Alberts. "New administration, same old security qualms," *National Post*, March 27, 2009 0935 AM. Accessed at: <http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2009/03/27/sheldon-alberts-new-administration-same-old-security-qualms.aspx>. Accessed on: 30 March 2009.
85. United States. *Canada-U.S. Relations*, 13.
86. What is not so often recalled is that immediately after making this historic statement, he also said, "...but trade is important too." Paul Cellucci.
87. United States. *Canada-U.S. Relations*, 15.
88. Interview with Senior Officer "E" ADM POL in Ottawa: 18 June 2007.
89. Although none have yet to come from the Obama administration in the midst of its first year in office, this should not be taken as absolute approval of Canadian actions, but possibly as an indicator of a change in strategy of addressing continental security concerns with a smile instead of an attitude, to paraphrase Joel Sokolsky.
90. Christopher Sands. *Comments at the Conference: Continental Defence - Policies, Threats and Architecture*. Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. Calgary: May 4, 2006.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Bill Gillespie. *The no longer quite so undefended Canada-U.S. border*. CBC News.ca May 16, 2009. <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/05/15/f-vp-gillespie.html>.
94. Ben Rowsell. "Ogdensburg Revisited: Adapting Canada-U.S. Security Cooperation in the New International Era," in *Policy Papers on the Americas* Vol. XV Study 5. (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2004), 1.
95. Ibid., 2.
96. David G. Haglund. "North American Cooperation in an Era of Homeland Security." *Orbis* (Fall 2003): 691.
97. Frank P. Harvey. "Terrorism, Proliferation and the Myth of American Independence: Multilateral vs. Unilateral Approaches to security after 9/11 and the Implications for Canada, in *Conference Proceedings: Canadian Defence and the Strategic Canada-U.S. Partnership* (Ottawa: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2002), 33; Senior Official "CC"; Senior Official "EE".
98. This approach has widespread support within the American security community. Senior Official "CC"; Senior Official "EE".
99. Council on Foreign Relations. *Creating a North American Community*. (United States, 2005), 5; Canadian Television News. "Canada-U.S. Border May be Scrapped." July 28, 2001. www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews1; Canadian Television News. "Cellucci Wants Zone of Confidence." December 23, 2001. www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews1; United States. *Canada-U.S. Relations*, 33.
100. John Higginbotham and Jeff Heynen. "Managing Through Networks: the State of Canada-U.S. Relations," in *Canada Among Nations 2004*, 151.

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101. This would be due in part to an American desire for Canada to devote as much of its resources as possible to continental security and in part to the fact that there is no consolidated American perspective or “shopping list” on exactly what the ideal or appropriate Canadian contribution would be. Regardless of how little or how much was done there would always be some security constituency that pressed for additional support or some Congressman or Senator decrying the laxness of security on the northern border for partisan political reasons. The problem of determining exactly what the Americans want is exacerbated by the pre-existing density and intimacy of the security relationship that makes it exceedingly difficult to quantify what is now in place and then compare it to a commonly accepted American requirement. In short it is difficult or impossible to obtain an American consensus on what Canada should be contributing to making America secure.

102. Dwight N. Mason. “Canadian Defense Priorities: What Might the United States Like to See?” in *Policy Papers on the Americas* Vol. XV Study 1 (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 4.

103. Haglund. “North American Cooperation in an Era of Homeland Security,” 690.

104. Michael A. Hennessy and Scot Robertson. “Defence and Security Challenges for Canada in Light of the Bush Mid-term Sweep.” *Policy Options* (February 2003): 27.

105. Joel Sokolsky and Philippe Lagassé. “Suspenders and a Belt: Perimeter and Border Security in the Canada-U.S. Relationship” *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association*. (Washington, DC. Sep 01, 2005): 5.

106. Paul Cellucci, United States Ambassador to Canada. *Continental Security Dimensions of the Canada-U.S. Relationship*. Remarks to the 21st Annual Conference of Defence Association Institute, March 3, 2005.

107. Hennessy and Robertson. “Defence and Security Challenges for Canada,” 27.

108. Professor Jeremy Black. *North American Defence in World History. Continental Defence - Policies, Threats and Architecture*. Comments at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. Calgary: May 4, 2006.

109. He is joined in this belief by former American Ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci. Paul Cellucci, Victoria, May 12, 2008.

110. To illustrate his point vis-à-vis the spending emphasis on continental security versus expeditionary operations Sokolsky quotes the Commander of Northcom as saying that, “... just as in sports, it is always nice to win the “away game”, but it is absolutely critical that you win the “home game.” Joel Sokolsky. “Realism Canadian Style: National Security and the Chrétien Legacy.” *Policy Matters* 5 (June 2004): 36-38.

111. This pragmatic approach to the Canada-U.S. relationship was arguably pioneered by former Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson. One example of this approach was Pearson’s support for the acceptance and employment of nuclear weapons by Canada in spite of Canadian policies on non-proliferation. Pearson did so secure in the knowledge that the Canadian participation would not materially affect the balance of power and with confidence that the political currency banked with the Americans as a result would be useful in the future for issues closer and dearer to Canadian interests than a symbolic gesture of defiance towards America. This concept was originally explored and discussed in a term paper by Ian P. Rutherford - *The Myth of Mike*, 17.

112. Joel J. Sokolsky, “A Hard Bilateral Moment of Truth: Canada and the United States in the Age of Terror,” in *Independence in an Age of Empire*, 79.

113. Dwight N. Mason. “Canadian Defense Priorities,” 11.

114. Recent research indicates that 92% of Americans knew that Canadians were in a combat role with their forces in Afghanistan. The NATO mission and Canada’s participation has huge weight with the

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Americans. Charles Doran. Comments at CIC Conference “Changing Dynamics in Canada – U.S. Relations.” Victoria. 12 May, 2008.

115. Sokolsky. “Realism Canadian Style...”, 38.

116. Senior Official “H”, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa: 28 June 2007.

117. An example of this is that in 2005 of the 1.2 million improperly documented persons intercepted attempting to enter the United States, fewer than 10,000 came from Canada and of those, and the majority consisted of irregularities in documentation as opposed to attempts to flee across the border undetected. Application of the same filters and security screening processes on both borders would clearly result in a waste of precious security resources and a further unnecessary thickening of the border that will further retard the cross-border economic flows. Canadian Ally at: <http://www.canadianally.com/ca/canadasimm>.

118. Michael Hart. Comments at the CIC Conference entitled, “The Future of the Canada-United States Relationship.” Victoria, 12 May 2008.

119. Senior Official “II”, Canada Command. Ottawa, 20 July, 2007.

120. Senior Official “JJ” National Security Policy Directorate. Ottawa, 21 July 2007.

121. Senior Official “H”.

122. Attempting to address the Mexican issues of violence, drug cartels and human smuggling using procedures in place on the Canadian border would be ineffective and imposing measures taken on the Mexican border to address security and trade issues (prohibition of cross-border trucking) would prove disastrous for both countries. Centre for International Governance Innovation. “Respecting NAFTA: Cross-border Trucking.” *Portal for North America*. 19 March 2009. <http://portalfornorthamerica.org/spotlight/2009/03/respecting-nafta-cross-border-trucking>; “US hurts itself by prohibiting Mexican trucks.” *Arizona Daily Star*. March 20, 2009.

123. Senior Official “H”.

124. Michael Hart. Comments at the CIC Conference entitled, “The Future of the Canada-United States Relationship.” Victoria, 12 May 2008.

125. When it does begin to unfold however it will likely do so slowly and gradually with possibly an initial presence in the J5 Plans staff of Northcom. Senior Canadian Officer “D” Assigned to NORTHCOM. Colorado Springs: 24 May 2006; Discussion with USNORTHCOM J5 Contractor, Colorado Springs 24 May 2006.

126. Senior Official “H”.

127. Notwithstanding differences in the security situation and perceptions thereof between America’s northern border with Canada and its southern border with Mexico, events along one border will inevitably have a sympathetic effect on the other. Senior American Officer “E”.

128. Senior Official “H”.

CHAPTER 6: THE DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP



Introduction

The Canada-United States security relationship has been described by the American Department of State as the closest, most complex and extensive between any two countries on the planet.¹ Within the context of this relationship, the military component is considered to be the most effective, stable and enduring.²

The traditionally strong defence relationship has become even stronger in recent years, with close ties developing between Canadian and American military leaders as a result of their service together at home and abroad in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.³ Yet in spite of an already healthy and robust military relationship, there are still periodic calls for the strengthening of this aspect of the Canada-US relationship, the most recent of which are contained in key strategic documents such as the Canadian 2005 International Policy Statement and the American 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.⁴

The ongoing closeness and effectiveness of this aspect of the overall security relationship is, in part, due to the fact that that it is most often conducted and administered by professionals and experts out of the public eye, where the security specifics associated with a particular issue or concern can be addressed independent of the ebb and flow of public emotion or of political gamesmanship. On those occasions when issues of military security have been brought into the public eye and/or raised to the level of national political discourse, it quickly becomes apparent that there are definite limits to the degree of “closeness” that can be tolerated by the Canadian domestic public (the American public is largely unaware of the relationship).

A contemporary example of one such situation was the rejection of an American initiative to expand the NORAD construct from one of aerospace defence to an “all-hazards” military approach to continental defence. The Commander of NORAD at the time, General Ralph Eberhart, suggested that Canada and the United States consider allowing NORAD to expand into the maritime and land areas during an October 2002 interview with the *National Post*.⁵ This informal overture was repeated at a meeting of the PJBD, but was ultimately rejected by the Canadian officials based on concerns over national sovereignty.⁶ The formal rejection however, only came after a public campaign against the initiative was waged by anti-American “lite” factions in Canada in the face of an acquiescent Canadian government. While some contend that this rejection damaged the relationship, subsequent events – which will be covered later – tended to mitigate any potential long-term effects.

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Almost a year later, Canadian officials agreed to form a Bi-National Planning Group comprised of American and Canadian officers tasked to study the expansion of the military relationship. Although this was clearly an attempt, at least on the Canadian part, to move the relationship forward within the limits of domestic public opinion, this analysis will show that the American strategy for continental defence was well-advanced along bilateral lines by the time the results of the study group were known, and would not ultimately be influenced by their findings.⁷

The detailed examination of these and other post-9/11 defence-related events will place them within the context and the framework of the contemporary Canada-United States security relationship as a whole. In doing so, it will demonstrate the presence and influence of the three fundamental changes to the relationship and of the three common policy threads. Also included in the discussion will be an analysis of the implications and effects associated with the shift in focus from bi-national to bilateral relations.

The examination and discussion will look at two levels: the strategic, and the operational. Analysis at the strategic level will involve a short discussion of defence production sharing and the higher levels of military interaction within the PJBD, the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) and between National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) and the Pentagon. At the operational level, the discussion will look at evolutions in the Canada-United States military relationship within NORAD and between NORAD and the relationship newcomers, Northcom and Canada Command (Canadacom). As discussions in previous chapters have already addressed international and expeditionary operations, this analysis will focus predominantly on continental security.

The Strategic Level

Historically, the defence production sharing arrangements with the United States have always been quite lucrative for Canada from the early days of the Second World War with the Hyde Park Agreement in 1941 and continuing through the years of the Cold War to the present.⁸ In the early decades of the relationship, Canada was able to obtain preferred access to American defence contracts not accorded to any other ally.⁹ The number and size of these contracts, however, shrunk over the decades as Canadian defence expenditures declined.¹⁰ Similarly, the once-exclusive Canadian access to the lucrative American defence markets has disappeared and other allies, particularly those allies who have provided more recent and robust political and military support for American policies, have entered the market and are providing stiff competition for Canadian firms.¹¹

There may be a renaissance in progress in the post-9/11 era of the relationship, however, driven by the upsurge in Canadian defence spending. The direct benefits to Canadian industry of this upsurge include more than CDN\$5.3 billion in industrial offsets associated with the purchases of 4 C-17 Globemasters,

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17 C-130J Hercules, and 16 CH-47F Chinook helicopters; these contracts will bolster the Canadian aviation industrial base for several years to come.¹²

Canadian contracts associated with the purchase, announced in July 2010, of 65 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft currently under development by General Dynamics in the United States represent another significant example to this effect.¹³ The intent of the JSF project is to provide a replacement fighter aircraft for the CF-18 Hornet scheduled for retirement in the 2017 timeframe and to maximize the Canadian industrial benefits in the process. To date, Canada has contributed US\$170 million to this project, and has garnered more than CDN\$350 million for 85 Canadian companies. Over the 44-year anticipated project life, Canadian investment is anticipated to be in the neighborhood of CDN\$16 billion, with an expected minimum industrial benefit of CDN\$12 billion. The ultimate industrial benefit to Canadian industry may well be even higher as the global sales of the JSF are now expected to exceed 5000 aircraft (earlier estimates were in the range of 3000) and the Canadian companies involved will each have a share in both the production and maintenance of the aircraft over the 44 year life of the project.¹⁴

Although these developments bode well for future access to American high technology R&D and production contracts for Canadian industry, there are two other issues that have tended to dampen any earlier resurgence in the defence production and technology-sharing aspect of the relationship. The first is the Canadian refusal (and the way in which the refusal was presented) to “participate” in the continental BMD program. The offer of participation in this program from the Americans indicated that no explicit action or resource contribution was required; the only overt activity that Canada could have participated in might have been the bidding process for some rather lucrative production and/or R&D contracts.

The other development that may have dampened an earlier resurgence in the defence production and technology-sharing aspect of the relationship was the refusal by the Canadian government to allow the US\$1.3 billion sale of the space division of MacDonald, Detwiller, and Associates (MDA) of Vancouver to an American defence contractor, Alliant Techsystems Inc., in April 2008. The sale of the space division would have involved transfer of control of the Radarsat-2 satellite that had just been launched by Canada in December of 2007.¹⁵

The government blocked the deal citing the impending loss of CDN\$430 million of government funded R&D as well as the loss of control of key technology. This technology is of material value in maintaining surveillance and therefore sovereignty over the Arctic and much of the Canadian land mass.¹⁶ Having said this, there is at least one authority on the issue who believes that blocking the MDA-ATK deal significantly damaged the Canada-United States defence production and technology-sharing relationship. James Fergusson contends that, by blocking the sale, Canada harmed the defence production sharing aspect of the relationship in an attempt to placate the sovereigntists. In

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this sense, Fergusson believes that Canada has destroyed any remaining vestige of a special relationship in terms of defence production-sharing, essentially normalizing it. This is similar to what happened to the military aspect of the relationship after the government refused to discuss a more comprehensive NORAD-like relationship in the months after 9/11.¹⁷

Notwithstanding the mixed results in terms of the post-9/11 defence production and technology sharing aspect of the defence relationship, the state of the other aspects of the strategic level defence relationship appear to be favourable to Canadian interests. The PJBD was formed on 18 August 1940, based upon the declaration by both King and Roosevelt that continental security was indivisible in nature and could not be pursued by a single nation.¹⁸ The Board was, and continues to be, the oldest bi-national organization in the Canada-United States defence relationship; the only other bi-national organization within this relationship is NORAD, which functions at the operational rather than at the strategic level.

The original intent of the PJBD was to function as a low-profile strategic level organization to facilitate the practice of “quiet diplomacy” and a proactive negotiating strategy by Canada.¹⁹ The body has been quite useful in this way for most of its history, allowing for the frank, open, and informal discussion of strategic issues where differences of opinion and perspective could be resolved away from the public eye and outside of the political arena. It has allowed both nations to establish consensus positions on difficult issues before said issues entered the public domain. The Canadian and American co-chairs of the PJBD each have direct access to their respective national leaders when necessary but otherwise manage the evolution of defence issues with a strategy of cooperation and liaison between a number of agencies and departments on both sides of the border.²⁰

Joint concerns regarding the global strategic military situation following the end of the Second World War, including the worsening of relations with the U.S.S.R. and the advent of the nuclear age, led to the establishment of the Military Cooperation Committee in 1946. The intent of the MCC was similar to that of the PJBD in that it involved the conduct of strategic military planning and the exchange of information, though it functioned in the purely military sphere. The Canadian and American co-chairs (military officers) had direct access to the Chief of Defence Staff (the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee prior to 1964) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff respectively, if they so chose. The MCC was thus the principal strategic military staff linkage between the senior leadership of both militaries.²¹

The MCC is not responsible to the PJBD, though it is responsive to it and the issues discussed therein. The MCC is a two-way conduit of information and coordination between the joint senior political and military coordination bodies, and the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) at NDHQ and the Joint Staff at the Pentagon provide support to the MCC. These two bodies comprise an integral part of the

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relationship, as they contain and manage a multitude of joint service contacts that facilitate the discussion and resolution of issues raised at or through the meetings of the MCC.²²

Half a century after their founding, however, both the PJBD and the MCC fell into disuse at the end of the Cold War, becoming little more than social fora for the officers and public officials involved. This changed radically after 9/11 with the identification of a new and imminent threat to the security of both countries. Both the PJBD and the MCC have since received new terms of reference that serve to expand the mandate of their work beyond continental security issues to issues of global cooperation and coordination, addressing such topics as the security implications of China's rise to prominence in the world and the ongoing implications of developments in Afghanistan.²³

The apertures of both the PJBD and MCC have now expanded from a defence-minded focus to an "all hazards," "all source" approach to security issues. Although they remain consultative and focused on discussion, the main function of both organizations – is still to eliminate the "seams" in the relationship.²⁴ In a sense, the evolution of these two bodies reflects both consistency and change in the relationship. In terms of consistency, the PJBD and the MCC have maintained their focus on the reconciliation of differences and fostering a sense of cooperation. With respect to change, the expansion of these organizations in terms of both participation and the scope of the issues addressed represents, in the military context, the reality of the first of the fundamental changes in the post-9/11 relationship: the expansion of the defence relationship into a broader one of security in general.

Representation (but not full membership) at the meetings of the PJBD has expanded such that it now includes the Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy (Leader), the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, the Privy Council Office, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Public Safety, NORAD, and Canadacom, as well as their parallels in the United States (Dept. of State, Dept. of Homeland Security, Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Northcom).²⁵ All of the representatives at the meetings bring issues for discussion, and take away the results for use in the development of policy and action plans within their respective departments. In between meetings, as with the MCC, there are innumerable points of contact made and relationships established as issues are discussed between the two countries. On issues at an apparent impasse, there is a fast-track access to the national political or military leadership through which to obtain guidance or direction such that problem issues are not allowed to paralyze either the relationship or the process.²⁶

With all of this change and the *de facto* expansion of these strategic level coordinating bodies, one would think that there would be a move towards expanding them into a full-blown security coordination mechanisms. Both governments, however, seem content with the way that things are unfolding in these fora, showing no inclination or desire to formally develop them further at

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this point in time.²⁷ This disinclination towards a closer relationship at the strategic level may be a reaction to the public outcry over the proposal in 2002 to develop a closer relationship at the operational level through an expansion of the NORAD relationship. Officials on both sides of the border may be somewhat wary when it comes to initiatives that will bring the relationship closer with the resulting possibility of attracting public attention and/or criticism. Given this possibility, and the fact that the relationship is performing well in its present state, there does not appear to be any formal interest to change it on either side of the border.

Given these developments, the defence relationship at the strategic level appears to support the existence of both consistency and change in the post-9/11 era. But what of the operational level military relationship?

The Operational Level

Major changes in the perspectives of both Canada and the United States, with respect to the military relationship as it pertained to continental defence, began to occur almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks. The examination of these changes at the operational level of the defence relationship will focus on the evolutions of NORAD, Northcom and Canadacom.

The contemporary continental military relationship was shaped in part by two significant events: the Canadian refusal to pursue the American offer in October of 2002 to consider an expansion of the NORAD; and the subsequent refusal to “join” America in the development of a continental BMD capability. As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the United States proposed an examination of the expansion of the NORAD relationship into the realms of maritime and land security through the then Commander-In-Chief of NORAD, General Ralph Eberhart and the PJBD.²⁸

The Canadian government declined the offer after encountering domestic opposition from the anti-American “lite” and the security sovereigntist factions of Canadian society, both of whom stirred up fears among the general public of an American take-over of the Canadian military should any closer cooperation occur.²⁹ Opting not to provide the public with a balanced assessment of the offer and its implications, and possibly fearing a loss of political support from the domestic public resulting from the charge by the security sovereigntists and anti-American “lite” factions of being “too close” to the Americans, the government elected to decline the offer as it attempted to perform a balancing act on the tightrope of the Canada-United States security relationship. James Fergusson’s conclusion on this issue was that Canada had lost out on an opportunity to expand the bi-national aspect of the military relationship and “open the door” for further expansion of the relationship in general – to the ultimate benefit of all Canadians.³⁰

If what Fergusson contends is true, this failure to join the American initiative to expand the relationship contributed to the entrenchment of a sense of unease, a sense of distrust and a lack of confidence with respect to the degree to which

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Canada was committed to continental, and thus American, security. This in turn contributed to an era of American demands for consistent and unequivocal support for their policies, the second of the three fundamental changes in the post-9/11 security relationship.

Initial consideration of the 2002 refusal to expand NORAD may indicate to some, a lack of foresight and judgment on the part of the Canadian government. The reality, however, is that the Americans tendered their proposal with a requirement for a response within a very short period of time. When the Americans did not receive an immediate positive reply, they went ahead with their intention to form a continental military security forum, Northcom, in October 2002. Thus the reality of the situation might have been that Canada was being invited to join an American construct on American terms. As a consequence, it may well be that the security sovereigntists were right, but for the wrong reasons. This may also demonstrate that the American understanding of either a bi-national or bilateral approach to an issue consists of the bilateral or bi-national partner adhering to the American agenda.³¹ This was certainly true with the Bush administration in the immediate post-9/11 era and, generally speaking, American bilateralist, bi-nationalist, or even multilateralist approaches to international issues are all based upon an implicit assumption of American leadership.

The formation of the BPG in December 2002 was an attempt to compensate for this apparent setback in the relationship resulting from the Canadian rejection of the American offer to expand the NORAD Agreement. The stated mission of the BPG was the exploration of the Canada-United States military relationship to determine where, when, or if there were opportunities for improvement.³² The group had a distinctly bi-national flavour, owing not only to its name but also to the fact that it was led by the Canadian Deputy Commander of NORAD, and mandated to report their findings and recommendations through NORAD.³³ The entire BPG concept may well have been an attempt to re-engage the Americans on the issue of the future of continental military security without further enraging the sovereignty concerns of the Canadian domestic public.³⁴

If this was the case, one might reasonably suggest that it failed in its objective almost from the very start. A major indicator of this failure was a perception within Northcom of the BPG mission as one of exploring the “theatre security options” available to both countries.³⁵ The use of this terminology, more closely associated with that of the bilateral orientation of the Unified Command Plan (UCP), indicates that American policy was even then moving away from the bi-national NORAD concept for continental defence, and had already adopted a bilateral perspective for the future.

Another indicator of less-than-enthusiastic American support for the BPG mission was the gradual dwindling of American staffers for the project to less than 1/3 of the total by the time the final report was issued. In addition, the Commander of NORAD at the time, Admiral Timothy J. Keating, did not in

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anyway associate himself with the report and was never publicly supportive of it. Most telling of all, however, is the extent to which the recommendations of the final report issued by the BPG in March 2006 have been acted upon. Not a single recommendation has been publicly accepted for action by either Canada or the United States, and there is no single significant aspect of the military relationship today that can be attributed to the recommendations made in the report.³⁶

The reason for this lies not only in the genesis of the BPG but also in the timing of its final report – almost five years after 9/11 and in the wake of extensive bilateral development of the relationship, with Northcom and Canadacom serving as its bookends north and south of the border. The BPG report had a heavy flavouring of bi-nationalism and, as such, was likely considered to be out of step with the contemporary relationship realities in both countries. It has been noted that the Canadian International Policy Statement (IPS) in 2005 and the American Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 2006 both strongly support an enhanced military security relationship. It should also be noted, however, that these documents did not specify the precise nature of this enhanced relationship – specifically whether or not it should be bi-national or bilateral.³⁷ In the circumstances that existed at the time, and those that have continued through to the present, the preference on both sides of the border appears to be in favour of a bilateral approach. As such, the BPG report was received and quietly shelved by both countries without any tangible action ever being taken.

As was mentioned earlier, the two major events that pushed the military relationship along bilateral lines in the post-9/11 era, and thus dated the BPG report before it was even issued, were the formation of Northcom in October 2002 and Canadacom in February 2006. And, as mentioned in the previous chapter, there is some speculation that Canadian post-9/11 security policy, including the formation of Canadacom, has been heavily influenced by American policy in the same period – as one might expect within a security community. While it is unlikely that a clear acknowledgment of this fact will ever be forthcoming from Canadian government sources, there are a number of factors that indicate just such an influence.

The first indicator is that the major Canadian policy statements and/or security measures taken by Canada post-9/11 have been in trailing lockstep with American statements. The re-organization of the domestic Canadian security infrastructure in 2003, the issuance of the National Security Policy (NSP) in 2004, and the IPS with its defence section in 2005, as well as the initiation of the Canadian Forces transformation in 2006, all occurred after similar steps were taken in the United States.

Looking past the rhetoric in the Canadian and American security policy statements, their similarities are evident; the Canadian NSP is essentially the Bush Doctrine wrapped in a maple leaf. The structural changes in the Canadian security infrastructure, the formation of Public Safety Canada and Canadacom,

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have trailed the formation of the Department of Homeland Security and Northcom in the United States. This trend should not necessarily be viewed with surprise or with any sort of negative connotation, as Canada and the United States are both Western liberal democracies targeted by the same threat. They have similar cultures and values and view a number of global issues through a similar lens, based upon a shared geography and history. Indeed it would be unusual if two such allies were to come up with radically different policies and approaches to the same issues. That being said, the extent to which the changes tend to complement one another in both timing and function is noteworthy even within the close relationship shared between Canada and the United States.

One possible motivation for Canada to generate such similarities in its policies and structures, in addition to the fact that they effectively address shared issues and concerns, is that they were designed to send a signal to the Americans that Canadians recognize American security concerns and are taking them seriously. As such, these measures and changes can and should be taken by the Americans as proof of the strong Canadian support of the American security agenda. For the Americans, this addresses and mitigates the sense of distrust and lack of confidence in their Canadian ally, and the consequent need for consistent and ongoing support of American policies – the second of the fundamental changes in the post-9/11 security relationship. Indeed, as indicated previously in discussing the security relationship writ large, a close look at the Canadian policy as well as structural changes to the security infrastructure in the post-9/11 era indicate ample Canadian support for the American security agenda. Changes to Canadian policy and infrastructure speak for themselves in this regard – but are the Americans listening?

Within the military relationship, the message being sent to the Americans could not be any clearer than that which was sent through the formation of Canadacom in February 2006.³⁸ Modeled after Northcom in its mandate and responsibilities, Canadian military planners were quite clear that the formation of Canadacom met a recognized need for enhanced military coordination with the United States within the context of continental security.³⁹ Indeed, a case could be made that the entire process of transformation of the Canadian Forces was one large message to America that Canada understands Americans security concerns at home and abroad and is prepared to act in support of them in some very significant ways. The fact that the architect of transformation and therefore of the message, former Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier, served extensively with American formations at very senior levels and is familiar with the American strategic psyche, should not be ignored when considering the veracity of this theory. Indeed the current CDS, General Walter Natynczyk, has a similar profile and understanding of American strategic thinking and processes and is also of some significance.

Although Canadacom is still a relatively new body, it has already engaged in the fulfillment of some of the objectives identified as the apparent *raison d'être*

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for its formation. One such objective is the development of a close (but not too close) bilateral relationship with Northcom, including daily contact at all staffing levels and positions on a variety of issues as well as the exchange of staff and liaison officers.⁴⁰ Canadacom has become the primary conduit for the flow of information between any Canadian department or agency and Northcom.⁴¹ The impetus for the growth of Canadacom vis-à-vis its relationship with Northcom was the approaching 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics.⁴² Without the impetus of the Olympics as a catalyst for the evolution of the relationship, it is uncertain whether or not it would have developed at the rate it did given the reactive, “wait and see” approach to the security relationship that is taken on occasion.

How does Canadacom fit into the overall organization of the military security relationship? Canadacom reports to the Chief of the Defence Staff, but has representatives at the PJBD and MCC for information-sharing and situational awareness purposes, as does Northcom. Curiously, there is no direct linkage between Canadacom and NORAD in that there is no command and control relationship between them, and one is not the senior formation of the other.⁴³

Another interesting aspect is the position of NORAD in the evolving military security structure with respect to Northcom. While NORAD has no formal or tangible command relationship with the American command either, they do share a common American commander and many, if not all, of the American NORAD staff have parallel duties as Northcom staff officers. This rather “intimate” relationship, combined with the complete lack of any command relationship with Canadacom, gives the impression that the Canadian bilateral military structure, as created by General Hillier via his strategy of transformation, is intentionally and specifically maintaining its distance from NORAD lest it become entangled in a bi-national web and get pulled into Northcom.⁴⁴

What, then, is NORAD’s place in the contemporary military security relationship, given the new dynamic that is developing between Canadacom and Northcom? In order to gain a full understanding of the events and processes that have resulted in the contemporary positioning of NORAD within the Canada-United States military security relationship, it is necessary to first explore the second of two seminal events that were alluded to at the beginning of this chapter: Canada’s refusal to “join” America in the development of continental BMD.

The BMD program represents a long-running component of American security policy. After refusing participation twice in the past, Canadian officials had, for several years (since the 1994 White Paper), been indicating that a formal request from the United States for Canada to participate in the program would be met with a positive reply. Indeed, in August 2004, the Canadian government authorized the transmission of critical information through NORAD channels to facilitate the early identification and response to an attack. Both the eventual refusal to participate, and the way in which the refusal was transmitted came as a surprise to the Americans, and fed the doubt in the minds of a number of

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American leaders about Canada's reliability as an ally. By reinforcing this doubt, Canada's refusal to join BMD also contributed to the further establishment of two of the fundamental changes in the post-9/11 relationship: the requirement for consistent and ongoing support of American policies and a need, even a demand, for greater participation in the security effort protecting both countries.

Ironically, as Joel Sokolsky points out, America did not want resources or territory, simply a policy from Ottawa that indicated support for the program that would provide confirmation that Canada recognized the threat and took it seriously.⁴⁵ Had this been granted, the American need for ongoing and consistent support for their policies, as well as for a greater degree of Canadian participation in the relationship, may have been reduced as opposed to enhanced. While signing on to BMD is unlikely to have garnered any significant degree of influence in the program for Canadians, by refusing participation, the Canadians indicated that they, like the Americans, were not interested in any further development of the bi-national aspects of the Canada-United States security relationship.⁴⁶

Although the reinforcement of the aforementioned fundamental changes in the relationship was the most likely outcome of the Canadian decision not to join BMD, there are at least two other theories related to these events that must be mentioned. The first theory suggests that this event had no effect at all upon the relationship. As noted earlier, research conducted by James Fergusson indicates that Paul Martin believed that the Americans had already obtained what they wanted when he approved the sharing of information through NORAD in August 2004 and that, as a consequence, the decision not to join BMD had no effect on the relationship.⁴⁷

Another proponent of the "no effect" theory is advanced by Jon Allen, Minister of the Political Section at the Canadian Embassy in the United States at the time of the decision. He has stated that the decision not to participate in BMD would not do any long-term harm to the bilateral relationship.⁴⁸ While this "no effect" outcome is certainly desirable, it is also improbable, given the connection of this issue to a vital American interest (the security of the homeland) and the context within which the refusal was made.

Another potential outcome could have been the dissolution of NORAD. This possibility was put forward by a number of authorities on Canada-United States relations, including Joel Sokolsky, Dwight Mason, and Joseph Jockel.⁴⁹ If the decision had resulted in a complete loss of faith (as opposed to a partial loss) in Canada's willingness to recognize American security concerns and to react to them in a meaningful way, the United States may have withdrawn from NORAD. If this had occurred, the American air defence function would be exercised through the air component of Northcom, 1st Air Force headquartered at Tyndall AFB in Florida.⁵⁰ The overall air defence of the continent would then have been conducted as it had been in the early days of the Cold War – bilaterally in coordination with Canadian air defence resources (in this case through 1st Canadian Air Division) north of the border.⁵¹

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In any event, NORAD did not crumble and there was no major visible effect on the relationship that resulted from the decision not to join BMD. However, rather than having no effect at all, the outcome of this decision was the reinforcement of two of the three fundamental changes in the relationship: a continuing need for the demonstration of consistent and ongoing support for American policies, and for tangible participation in the defence of the continent beyond the historic contributions through NORAD.

With Canada's refusal to expand the nature of the NORAD relationship in 2002 or to join BMD in 2005, the question arises; what is NORAD's place in the contemporary military security relationship? The latest renewal of the NORAD Agreement took place on 12 May 2006 and was a landmark event in that, rather than representing a standard renewal valid for 5 years, it was agreed to by both states that this particular renewal would be valid in perpetuity, with a provision for *review* every four years.

Although touted as an important component of North American security and an enduring symbol of the long term quality and strength of the Canada-United States security relationship, noticeably absent from the announcement was any specific details or commitment to the place of NORAD in the overall continental security framework of the future.⁵² Indeed, the NORAD leadership itself admitted that the way in which NORAD would accomplish its new mission and/or work with its partner commands (Canadacom, Northcom, and Stratcom) had yet to be determined, negotiated or agreed upon; this remains the case today.⁵³

There appears to be no help forthcoming from official sources in the determination of NORAD's place in the contemporary military security infrastructure and as such, the examination will turn instead to the open source information available for study and analysis. In doing so, the contemporary role of NORAD from both the American and the Canadian perspective will be considered. As many of the factors influencing the Canadian perspective have their roots in American policies and actions, the American perspective on the issue will be considered first, following an initial review of the unique nature of the 2006 renewal.

With the renewal of the agreement in perpetuity, but with a provision for a four-year review scheduled for 2010, it would seem that, in this case and as Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky have observed, "in perpetuity" clearly does not mean forever.⁵⁴ This arrangement appears to serve several purposes and both parties equally well. First, it gives the appearance to the general public of a robust and solid friendship that is so secure the partners no longer need the comfort of an escape clause that allows them to withdraw from the partnership.

The second purpose, and the reality of the new wrinkle in the agreement, is that it allows both parties to call for a review and/or withdrawal at any time, not just at five-year intervals as was the case before. This may reflect a declining faith

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in the other partner on both sides of the relationship in the post-9/11 era, and/or a mutually recognized need to find new arrangements. Lastly, the abolition of the timed renewal periods allows a review/renewal to occur outside of the public eye and without the pressure of the intense but sometimes fickle and emotion-driven public opinion. As such, the elimination of the programmed review and renewal option appears to serve a number of positive purposes.

The American perspective on NORAD's position and role in the contemporary military continental security relationship is illustrated through the examination of a number of indicators. These indicators include how and where NORAD is placed within the American security infrastructure, the criteria for the selection of Commanders for NORAD, and the rhetoric and behaviour of the senior leadership within the context of NORAD-related issues.

Since it was established on October 1, 2002 as a Combatant Command under the UCP, the Northcom mission has been to defend the American homeland and in doing so protect the American people, *their national power and freedom of action*.⁵⁵ If the last two objectives are taken literally, one of the purposes of Northcom is to reduce and thereafter minimize the extent to which NORAD, as a bi-national command, influences or limits American options in the defence of their homeland. By extension, therefore, one of the "implied" tasks of the Northcom mission is the reduction of NORAD's influence as a tool of continental and American national security.

This being the case, it is clear that from the American operational perspective that Northcom is the lynchpin of the American military's contributions to homeland security, and NORAD is, at best, a subset of that equation – possibly as a part of the Air Force component of that command. This conclusion is supported by a number of statements that are used to amplify the Northcom role and mission, including the statement delineating the Northcom Area of Responsibility (AOR) that defines the NORAD AOR as a subset of the larger Northcom territorial responsibility.

Another example is the assignment to the Commander Northcom (and to all other Commanders of Combatant Commands) of responsibility for Theatre Security Cooperation (TSC) with the nations within his AOR. For Northcom, these nations are Mexico and Canada.⁵⁶ The TSC relationships between Combatant Commanders and the nations within their geographic areas of responsibility occur on a bilateral level, rather than the "bi-national" or nation-to-nation level. Thus, with the establishment of Northcom and its apparent dominance in American operational thought, Canada is faced with a shift in the nature of the strategic relationship with the United States from bi-national, as epitomized by the NORAD Agreement, to bilateral with a Canadacom-Northcom focus.

Yet a third indicator of American intention to establish Northcom as the dominant mechanism in the Canada-United States defence relationship is the

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mention of the command of NORAD as a sub-task in the list of responsibilities for the Commander Northcom, in addition to his/her primary one of Commander of a Combatant Command.⁵⁷ Taken together, these subtle indicators present a perspective on the American frame of mind that clearly places NORAD as a subordinate organization to Northcom in the homeland security infrastructure, and therefore in the continental security infrastructure as well.

Not nearly as subtle as these other indicators was the appointment on 5 November 2004 of U.S. Navy Admiral Timothy J. Keating. As a naval aviator, Admiral Keating was well-acquainted with the aerospace environment as a battle space. Worthy of note however, was the absence of any experience with continental aerospace security in general and with NORAD operations in particular effectively. This effectively removed any possible bias or strategic understanding that would have favoured or supported a preference towards the use of NORAD as a model for continental defence and security. As one senior Canadian officer explained, with Admiral Keating, one had a Northcom Commander wondering what to do with NORAD. If tradition in the appointment of NORAD Commanders had been followed, and a United States Air Force (USAF) NORAD veteran had been assigned the command, one would have had a NORAD Commander wondering what to do with Northcom.⁵⁸

One of indicators of Admiral Keating's position on the NORAD issue appeared shortly after his appointment to Northcom, when he openly questioned the value of a NORAD bi-national structure in light of the need to address Mexican participation in continental security.⁵⁹ Coupled with a number of other examples contained in Congressional testimony, this clearly indicates the low value assigned by a number of key strategic thinkers in the American security infrastructure to the utility of NORAD. In his appointment of Admiral Keating to command Northcom and NORAD, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld clearly wanted the focus on the maximization of American flexibility to address the most vital of American interests: the security of their homeland. This flows from the fact that military security of the homeland in general, and aerospace security in particular, is only part of the larger Northcom mission (the overall mission includes the coordination of military assistance to civil authorities). The military effort in this context is a subset of continental security, and the aerospace security role is a subset of that subset.

The use of the UCP template for Combatant Commands like Northcom to define the structure and responsibilities of command further supports the contention that Northcom was intended as the defence centrepiece of the U.S. military homeland security effort. As mentioned previously, the UCP “cookie-cutter” template for Combatant Commands places interaction with the nations within a particular command's AOR as a subordinate task to the main mission of that command, and falls under the heading of “Theatre Security Cooperation.” There is no mention of partnership or the sharing of responsibilities in the execution of the Northcom mission; rather, it is a case of the Northcom

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Commander shaping relationships with the nations included in the geographical area of the command in such a way as to enable the achievement of the Command's mission. The application of the "cookie cutter" template to the North American case denies its unique nature, given that Northcom has responsibility for the military defence of the American homeland, and not simply American interests abroad.

There is thus the suggestion that the American strategic intent is to re-shape the Canada-United States continental military security relationship from a bi-national one, as epitomized by NORAD, into a bilateral relationship that maximizes the freedom and scope of action for the achievement of American security objectives, unfettered by the restrictive commitments or obligations that accompany a bi-national agreement. This suggests a trend of moving away from a partnered (albeit a lopsided one) approach to continental security and towards a nominally bilateral, though in reality unilateral, approach whereby Canada would assume a subordinate, "follower" position. This would place Canada on par with any given nation in the world that exerts only a minor influence on American security concerns. There is no recognition that Canada is a key and direct participant in the security of the American homeland itself.

From the emerging American perspective, therefore, the template for the Canada-United States defence and security relationship under the UCP could be the same as that used to manage the one with New Zealand, Thailand, or Morocco, with no recognition of the unique geographical and strategic positioning of the Canadian landmass with respect to the physical security of the American homeland. There does not appear to be any recognition of, or concern within the Northcom construct, of the unique difference involved in the Canada-United States case, or that this difference may call for a unique approach to security beyond the UCP "cookie-cutter" approach.

Perhaps the most credible evidence of America's intent to reduce the significance of NORAD in the Canada-United States military security relationship in favour of Northcom as the centrepiece of American continental military security lies in the reality of the ongoing integration of the two organizations and their staffs. Responsibility for the various functions of NORAD and Northcom is defined through the use of the Continental Staff System. Since the establishment of Northcom on October 1, 2002, a number of the staff systems and functions of the two commands have been merged. Among these systems and functions are: personnel administration (J1), intelligence (J2), logistics support (J4), command and control, communication and computer systems (J6), planning (J5) and the responsibility for exercises, training, operational evaluations and assessments.⁶⁰ At the present time, the only staff directorate of NORAD that has remained independent of Northcom is that of operations (J3).⁶¹

As the majority of the NORAD/Northcom staff billets are staffed with American Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel

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with no NORAD background or experience, the NORAD focus will gradually be lost and a continental Northcom focus will be acquired.⁶² Indeed this is already occurring, and it has been noted that quintessentially Northcom issues are playing a role in defining the priorities for the NORAD/Northcom staffs. One such example was the 2006 planning priorities for the combined staffs, which focused on support to the civil authority in the event of a natural disaster; this was clearly a result of the backlash from the Hurricane Katrina debacle in 2005, with nothing whatsoever to do with the NORAD mandate or mission.⁶³

While the changes and trends described above were initiated under the command of Admiral Keating, the case could be made that they resulted from his own personal leadership style and command initiative, or that of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. If so, the emphasis would likely have changed with the newest appointees to the positions of Secretary of Defense and Commander Northcom.

Such changes did not occur, and were unlikely to have occurred given the backgrounds and experiences of both individuals – the replacement for Admiral Keating as Commander Northcom was Air Force General Victor E. Renuart Jr., a man cut from the same UCP cloth as Admiral Keating.⁶⁴ Nor was it likely that the Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, would have changed the emphasis on the development of the bilateral rather than the bi-national aspects of the defence relationship.⁶⁵ Given the similar approaches to issues of continental security and the continuation of both Gates and Renuart Jr. and Renuart Jr.'s successor, Admiral James A. Winnefeld, in their positions of responsibility under President Obama, it would appear that the evolution of Northcom and the shift from a bi-national to a bilateral focus in the relationship reflects longer term American policy preferences rather than those of a particular individual or administration.

The American strategy with respect to the military security relationship in general appears to involve two parallel strategies of change, one of deconstruction and the other of counter-construction. While the existing NORAD organization is being undermined and effectively broken down, Northcom is pursuing a parallel program of counter-construction that involves establishing competing agreements and a military security infrastructure that effectively pushes both the NORAD structure and agreement into the background of the Canada-United States military security dialogue.

Indeed, the American position can be neatly summarized in the remarks of a Senior American Officer on the staff of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and who also plays a role in the PJBD and the MCC. He explains that the United States is not trying to dispose of NORAD, but that it is very clear that NORAD does not provide everything that an effective military security relationship between the two countries requires given the new realities of the continental and global security situation; as such, new mechanisms must be established.⁶⁶

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He goes on to say that it was because of this that Northcom and then Canadacom were created – to address these new security realities in ways that NORAD is not capable of and was not designed to do. The new commands are designed not to replace NORAD but to play a role bigger than NORAD was ever intended for.⁶⁷ He closes by observing that there does not appear to be a “consistent” acknowledgement within Canadian government circles (civil or military) that the NORAD bi-national relationship has been eclipsed by the Canadacom-Northcom bilateral one. Canadacom is not yet seen as the lead military agency at the operational level by all Canadian agencies/departments, or by the Canadian NORAD staff. This may be due to the absence of a clear definition of their relationship with Canadian strategic military circles and, to a certain extent, to inter-service rivalries and “turf issues.” This lack of clarity, he believes, can only result in confusion and a lack of real progress in a time where both nations are at risk and approaching a milestone in their domestic security history.⁶⁸

But what of the Canadian perspective on NORAD and its place in the contemporary relationship? Do the Canadians share in the belief that the days of NORAD as the centrepiece of the relationship are gone? Or are they attempting to maintain the bi-national aspects of the relationship as its central features?

From the military perspective, it would appear that the senior Canadian commanders are very much in agreement with the Americans on the issue. NORAD was an afterthought in General Hillier’s strategy to transform the Canadian Forces and structure them for a post-9/11 world. Although the former CDS recognized the advantages of a bi-national relationship, he was also realistic enough to accurately assess the current political climate on both sides of the border and to proactively push for the bilateral emphasis that he knew would have the greatest success. In this regard, Hillier’s previous service within American formations allowed him to orchestrate the strengthening of the military-to-military relationship in the presence of a sometimes deteriorating political one in the immediate post-9/11 era.⁶⁹

The CDS’s initial selection of commanders and representatives in the newly evolving military relationship infrastructures supports this position, and reflects some of the same logic that went into the selection of the key American leaders. His selection for the first commander of the newly established Canadacom was Vice-Admiral J.Y. Forcier, a naval officer with a wealth of command experience but no previous exposure to NORAD. For his first and senior liaison officer to Northcom, the CDS appointed Brigadier-General Mark MacQuillan, an army officer also untouched by any experiences with NORAD.⁷⁰ Subsequent commanders of Canadacom have not had previous NORAD experience in their CVs either.

Hillier’s successor, General Walter Natynczyk, has thus far continued the development of a bilateral focus, with Canadacom as the new centrepiece of the Canada-United States military relationship at the operational level. Vice-Admiral Forcier summarized the contemporary position of Canadian strategic military thinking with his comment that NORAD is a command that is quickly

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being marginalized and set aside, with an eventual end state as a support organization for the Canadacom/Northcom dynamic.⁷¹ Given the evidence available, it is apparent that the contemporary focus of the relationship in both Ottawa and Washington is on the Canadacom/Northcom dynamic rather than the NORAD one.

Will the relationship, and the ability of Canadians to pursue their interests within it, suffer as a result of the Canadian decisions to not pursue opportunities to broaden the bi-national relationship or “join” the Americans in BMD? James Fergusson contends that Canada’s ability to pursue Canadian interests has suffered and will indeed continue to suffer, and that the relationship has become normalized to the point that Canada is on par with most other nations in their military relationships with the United States.⁷²

Another perspective is that Canadian interests in the relationship, consistent with what has happened in the past, have actually suffered very little as a result of some of the Canadian decisions in the post-9/11 era and the consequent shift in American thinking from a bi-national to a bilateral perspective. The reason for this is the plethora of other points of contact that can be used to advantage by Canadian negotiators, commanders, and operators at both the operational and strategic levels of the relationship, not to mention the tactical or person-to-person level of individual Canadian and American servicemen working together on a daily basis.⁷³ With this multitude of ongoing contacts at every level of the relationship, its designation as bi-national or bilateral is of no real consequence.

The continuing bi-national contacts at the strategic level, with the PJBD providing access to both national leaders and key government departments, are a powerful tool with which to press the Canadian agenda. Also at the strategic level, the MCC provides daily multi-point contact with the respective heads of the two militaries as well as their senior planners, commanders and policy “wonks.” At the operational level, there is the ongoing, if weakening, bi-national NORAD relationship that nevertheless continues to serve as the symbolic centrepiece of the military security relationship and as the proven quick reaction capability to counter the aerospace threat to the continent.

The multiple points of contact at various levels within the military relationship combined with the American system of overlapping and counter-vailing powers enable Canadian military planners and commanders to go “forum-shopping” for the best negotiating entry point for the issue of the moment. The only prerequisites for the success of this strategy will be those of proactive Canadian engagement and of staying ahead of American planners. If Canada is to obtain decisions and outcomes that best serve its interests, it must engage the Americans at multiple points in the spectrum before they have made a decision on an issue. In this sense, a shift to a bilateral way of doing business may actually benefit Canada, as it might encourage a proactive approach to military security planning rather than a reactive one that could dominate Canadian strategic thinking in the future as it has in the past. With a reactive mindset and a bi-national relationship,

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Canadians may assume that the United States is required to wait for Canadian agreement on an issue before they can take action. The reality of course is that they do not, and have not, as evidenced by the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

While Elinor Sloan argues that a bi-national standing force is required to react to the multitude of short-notice threats on both sides of the border that can and will have serious consequences for both countries, it can also be argued that what is specifically required is the early detection and warning of a threat along the lines of what is now being provided by NORAD.⁷⁴ The concept of a comprehensive bi-national security agreement, as proposed by America after 9/11 and recommended in the final report issued by the BPG, is inherently attractive to some Canadians when considering a security relationship with America.⁷⁵ Yet, as Joel Sokolsky cautions, Canada cannot afford to become too closely integrated with the American security infrastructure, or it risks losing domestic political support arising from the ever-present sovereignty sensitivities.⁷⁶ Theoretically a bi-national threat detection and warning capability supported by extensive bilateral interaction throughout the various levels of the relationship can accomplish the security mission while simultaneously addressing Canadian sovereignty sensitivities. This is exactly the nature of the system that is developing now.

At the strategic political level, it can be argued that Canadian thinking is much the same as that which exists at the operational military level – in favour of an emphasis on development of the bilateral Canadacom/Northcom relationship rather than on any attempts to resuscitate or expand the bi-national NORAD organism. The minority Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper was in no position to re-open the issue of an expansion of the bi-national relationship with such a tentative hold on national political power that could be upset by a poorly timed controversy over sovereignty. The political capital that would have to be expended in order to maintain the government's balance on the political tightrope of Canada-United States security relations is likely already allocated to other more pressing issues, such as the economy, that have the ability to solidify and maintain that government's hold on power.

There does not seem to be any pressing need to re-engage the Americans on the nature of the security relationship. It appears, from the ongoing level of cooperation, that Canada is getting everything it needs from the relationship and has not suffered any grievous loss of security as a result of the decline of NORAD's stature in the relationship. The measures that the government has taken in terms of its commitment to a combat role in Afghanistan until 2011, and the establishment of Canadacom as a sister organization and primary linkage with Northcom appear to be serving Canada and Canadian interests quite well. Given the obvious pre-disposition of the Americans towards the development of the relationship along bilateral lines and an equally obvious pre-disposition of the Canadian public to oppose additional bi-national development of the relationship, it would be absolute folly for any government to press for an enhanced bi-national aspect to the relationship.

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Whether or not such a pursuit might be advantageous to Canada at some point in the future would clearly depend upon the evolution of new threats to continental security. In the current political and threat environment, and from the American perspective, given that the evolving military security mechanisms appear to effectively address military security concerns on both sides of the border, it is unlikely that the Obama administration will attempt to change the course of the post-9/11 evolution in the military security infrastructure and approximately two years into its first term, this assumption appears to be holding true. This is especially so given the magnitude of the other economic and security issues that the new American President has to contend with.

Thus it would appear that the military security relationship is set on a clearly bilateral course for the future, while maintaining the fragments of its bi-national past. In that sense, it is yet another example of how the relationship has remained the same (historically bilateral) but different (from the Cold War tradition of bi-nationalism with a NORAD focus). The military security relationship contains other evidence that also supports this perception of the relationship (the same, yet different). With respect to other aspects of the military relationship that have remained the same, the Canadian approach still clearly attempts to accommodate American concerns regarding security and perspectives, as evidenced by the shift from bi-national to bilateral and the establishment of structures that complement the American approach. The continuing reliance upon the structured, institutional approach to the relationship is in and of itself a strong link to the past. The implicit acknowledgement of the need to balance the relationship with prevailing public opinion at the time and the knowledge of the contemporary preference for a bilateral approach also highlights the continuing relevance of this dynamic in the military aspects of the relationship.

Yet the fundamental changes in the relationship are also making themselves felt. The political decisions within the realm of military security regarding BMD in 2005 and the expansion of the NORAD relationship in 2002 contributed to a loss of faith and/or confidence in Canadian reliability as an ally, and have resulted in a need for consistent and ongoing demonstration of reliability through the provision of support for American policies. Almost at the same time, however, events such as the formation of Canadacom and the enhancement of the roles of the PJBD and MCC that have quite effectively addressed American demands for increased participation in the relationship, as well as provided solid evidence of its expansion beyond purely military considerations.

The new Canadacom-Northcom dynamic has served to expand the military security relationship without the political baggage that would have accompanied either an expansion of NORAD or the accommodation of Canadian interests within a Northcom construct, as was briefly explored after 9/11. Much of the damage done to the relationship by disagreements on the expansion of NORAD and participation in BMD appear to have been overcome by subsequent events and as such, the relationship appears to be in relatively good shape at the moment.

Conclusion

The post-9/11 defence relationship, like its broader security counterpart, has been characterized by the near simultaneous occurrence of examples in both the way that the relationship has remained the same and in the ways that it has fundamentally changed. Similarly, the events and instances that demonstrate the presence of those fundamental changes can be found in close proximity with other events that tend to mitigate and reduce their effects.

Two of the three fundamental changes in the relationship were reinforced and enhanced by the rejection of the American initiative to expand the NORAD structure to an “all hazards” military institution in 2002 and the similar rejection of the American offer to participate in a continental BMD program in 2005. Both rejections contributed materially to the establishment of an American need for consistent and ongoing support of their security policies, and an increasing expectation and pressure on their part for greater Canadian participation in the military security of the continent. These events also serve as examples of the difficulty experienced by Canadian governments in successfully balancing the relationship with domestic public opinion when issues such as these escape the confines of “quiet diplomacy” and become part of the public and political discourse.

The strategic level evolutions of the PJBD and the MCC in the post-9/11 security relationship provide an example of exactly how the relationship has remained the same and yet is different in some fundamental ways. The continued reliance upon institutions to manage the relationship, combined with the use of these institutions to maintain an ongoing conduit for the conduct of quiet diplomacy, reflect two of the three common policy threads that have been traced through the history of the relationship. The third thread, that of the conduct of a balancing act, is also present to the extent that the low public profile of these institutions facilitates the resolution of security issues by professional diplomats and military leaders out of the public eye and away from the ebb and flow of public emotion and political gamesmanship.

Evidence of the fundamental changes to the relationship is also present at the strategic level. The expansion of the relationship is clearly evident with the growth, albeit informal at the moment, of the PJBD to include the addition of a number of observers from a growing number of government departments and agencies on both sides of the border. And while events such as the rejection of the American offer of expansion of the NORAD structure to an “all hazards” military approach to continental security and a similar rejection to participate in a continental BMD project appeared to foster the development of a lack of confidence or trust in Canada as an ally, the post-9/11 evolutions in the PJBD and MCC have served to offset and reduce the influence of these fundamental changes on the relationship. The growth of both fora to consider common global security issues has contributed to Canada’s ability to address the American need for consistent and ongoing support of their policies and demonstrate an empathy

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for their security concerns, supported by enhanced contributions to common security issues and concerns.

At the operational level, there are a number of examples of both the common policy threads and the fundamental changes. Continued reliance upon the institutional nature of the relationship is well supported through the creation of Canadacom, Northcom, and the renewal of NORAD. Evidence of accommodation exists in the manner in which the post-9/11 changes to the military infrastructure have complemented parallel changes in the American one – the creation of Canadacom to complement that of Northcom being a prime example in this case. Other examples are the renewal “in perpetuity” (but not forever) of the NORAD Agreement and to a lesser extent, the activities of the BPG. As with the PJBD and MCC at the strategic level, the functioning of these institutions at the operational level enhances the ability of the Canadian government to balance the relationship, and facilitates the accommodation of American issues and concerns by removing them from the public and political fora and placing them in the hands of the professional diplomats and military staffs.

The fundamental changes are also well represented in the military aspects of the relationship at the operational level. The expansion of the relationship along bilateral lines and away from the Cold War bi-national past was clearly signaled with the establishment of the Canadacom-Northcom dynamic. The same dynamic, combined with the previously mentioned NORAD renewal, has also served to dampen the negative effects of the rejections in 2002 and 2005 to expand the relationship. In reducing the negative effects of these decisions upon the relationship, they have also materially addressed two of the fundamental changes to the relationship: the need for consistent and ongoing support for American policies and of enhanced support and participation in security initiatives.

The future structure of the relationship will likely continue to rely upon its institutional roots with NORAD assuming a subordinate relationship to the growing influence of the Canadacom-Northcom dynamic. With this evolution, the nature of the relationship will understandably continue to shift from bi-national to bilateral, at least in the shorter term. Notwithstanding this shift, the value and relevance of the relationship to the attainment of Canadian goals and objectives within the sphere of the military relationship is unlikely to change. As with the broader security relationship, it would appear that the first of the fundamental changes, the expansion of the relationship itself, is unlikely to be reversed in the future. The other two fundamental changes, a need for consistent and ongoing support for American policies and a demand for increased participation in security initiatives and programs, are likely not permanent, at least to the degree that they influence the relationship at any given time. Rather, their influence will fluctuate with the level of trust and confidence that America might have in Canada as a partner in the security relationship and the community.

Endnotes

1. The U.S. defence arrangements with Canada are more extensive than with any other country. United States. *Canada-U.S. Relations*. Congressional Research Service. (Washington D.C. 15 May 2007), 8.
2. Senior Officer “E” ADM POL in Ottawa: 18 June 2007; Senior American Officer “E” assigned to CJCS Staff, The Pentagon. Washington D.C.: 1 June 2007; Official “Y” of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Homeland Defense, Washington D.C., 28 May 2007.
3. Several recent Chiefs of the Defence Staff, including Generals Natynczyk, and Hillier have served in American military formations. Their performance on these assignments and exposure to senior American military commanders has provided a degree of credibility and a networking capability that is unparalleled in the relationship. Senior American Officer “E.”
4. United States. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Office of the Secretary of Defense. (Washington: February 6, 2006), 87; Canada. *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence*. Canada’s International Policy Statement. (Ottawa: 2005), 12.
5. Sheldon Alberts. “U.S. General seeks closer military ties: Sovereignty worries: Anti-terror chief urges co-operation for navy, land forces.” *National Post*, 19 Oct. 2002. <http://proquest.umi.com>.
6. Dwight N. Mason. “The Canadian-American North American defence alliance in 2005,” *International Journal*. (Spring 2005): 3-4.
7. United States. *Canada-U.S. Relations*, 9.
8. Dan Middlemiss. “The Road From Hyde Park” 177.
9. The initial agreement at Hyde Park had been reinforced and expanded upon with a number of other agreements that included the formation of the “Joint Industrial Mobilization Committee” in April 1949 – a reaction to concerns about strategic readiness in relation to the growing threat to the continent posed by the Soviet Union. Additional agreements such as the “The Defence Production Sharing Agreement” in 1960 and the “Defence Development Sharing Agreement” in 1963 facilitated the cross-border sharing of classified technical information and leading edge technology and gave Canadian firms the same access to R&D contracts for the American military enjoyed by American firms and preferred access to these contracts relative to the rest of the world. Middlemiss. “The Road From Hyde Park,” 189-191; George Lindsey. “Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the Cold War,” in *Fifty Years of Canada-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 68.
10. Part of the understanding with the Americans was that they would grant Canadian businesses preferential access to defence contracts if the Canadian government maintained its expenditures on defence. The intent was to provide some implicit offsets to the cost of maintaining those expenditures for the government. When Canada imposed a system of explicit offsets in the 1970s, the Americans accused the government of “double-dipping” and attempting to gain even greater economic advantage from an already generous system. This factor, in combination with an overall decline in defence expenditures over the Cold War period, resulted in a deterioration of the benefits derived from the defence production sharing arrangements with the United States. Middlemiss. “The Road From Hyde Park,” 191-194.
11. Middlemiss, “The Road From Hyde Park,” 186-189; Lindsey, 71.
12. Minister’s Speech, *The Canada First Defence Strategy, Excellence at Home and Leadership Abroad*, Halifax May 12, 2008.
13. Ibid.
14. *Canadian Forces*. Canadian Participation in the Joint Strike Fighter Program, *BG-06.038 - December 11, 2006 and BG-10.018 - July 16, 2010*.

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15. Canada. *Polar Epsilon to assert Canada's Arctic sovereignty*. Canadian Forces NR-08.002 (January 10, 2008).
16. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. "Federal government blocks sale of MDA space division." Thursday, April 10, 2008 | 11:58 AM ET. <http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2008/04/10/Comments174>.
17. James Fergusson. Discussions at the CIC Halifax Conference, "American Nuclear Strategy and the Implications for Global Security." 24 May, 2008.
18. Declaration by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States of America regarding the establishing of a Permanent Joint Board on Defence made on 18 August 1940. Lexum, Faculty of Law, University of Montreal. http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ca_us/cgibin/.
19. Dwight Mason. Senior Associate, Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Comments at the CIC Conference entitled, "The Future of the Canada-United States Relationship." Victoria, 12 May 2008.
20. Sean M. Maloney. *Our Defended Borders: A Short History of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the Military Cooperation Committee, 1940 to Present*, in The 200th Meeting of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence. (Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1997): 15.
21. Canada. *Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee Terms of Reference*. 13 January 2006.
22. Senior Official "II" Canada Command. Ottawa, 20 July, 2007.
23. Official "Y", Washington D.C., 28 May 2007.
24. Senior Official "FF", Senior Military Advisor to the Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Washington D.C. 28 May, 2007.
25. Senior Official "II."
26. Senior Official "H" assigned to Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa: 28 June 2007.
27. Senior Official "JJ", National Security Policy Directorate, Ottawa, 21 July 2007.
28. *National Post*, 19 Oct. 2002, 2-5; Mason. "The Canadian-American North American Defence Alliance," 3-4.
29. Michael Byers. "Canadian Armed Forces Under United States Command," *International Journal*. (Winter 2002-2003): 89-114.
30. James Fergusson. Discussions at the CIC Halifax Conference.
31. Senior Officer "E."
32. Canada-United States. *Bi-National Planning Group: The Final Report on Canada and the United States (CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation*. (Peterson AFB Colorado: March 13, 2006), i.
33. If the purpose of the BPG was to provide a credible review of the future of the relationship it would have more logically and rationally been reporting to the MCC. Structured as it was and reporting to NORAD, the credibility of the work of the BPG was much reduced in the eyes of the CF Northcom commanders. Vice Admiral (Ret'd) J.Y. Forcier, Former and First Commander Canada Command. Comments at the CIC Conference entitled, "The Future of the Canada-United States Relationship." Victoria, 12 May 2008.
34. In Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) J.Y. Forcier's view, the primary benefit derived from the work of the BPG was to facilitate information-sharing and the enhancement of the relationship at a difficult time. Ibid.
35. United States. *Homeland Security: Evolving Missions and Roles for United States Northern Command*. Congressional Research Service. (Washington D.C. December, 2006), 5.

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36. Canada-United States. *Bi-National Planning Group*.
37. United States. The *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 87; Canada. *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence*, 12.
38. Some say that Canada has developed and absorbed an American command system. James Fergusson. Discussions at the CIC Halifax Conference.
39. Canada Command. <http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/site/bgr-con-eng.asp>.
40. Senior Official “M” of the Canadian Forces, Ottawa, 3 May 2007.
41. As noted earlier the rigid Canadian adherence to this procedural stove-piping is seen as a shortfall in the Canadian system – it is considered a weakness that demonstrates a lack of flexibility by American officials who wish to contact any Canadian agency at will and establish a relationship with them such that they essentially become a subset of the American one. Conversely Canadian officials see the measure as an essential pre-requisite to maintaining control over their own system. They act as a filter for American attempts to push their influence into our infrastructure – a sovereignty check for Canada. Americans frequently chafe under this system and are critical of it. Senior Official “II.”
42. Senior Official “M.”
43. Senior Official “II.”
44. The specifics of military command and control relationships are such that even though there are Canadian officers in NORAD and in Canadacom, the fact that both have a relationship with Northcom does not establish a direct relationship between NORAD and Canadacom. The two entities have been kept separate for command and control purposes and while they are aware of the other’s activity and are expected to coordinate the execution of their respective missions, one does not answer to the other and they have no formal relationship.
45. Joel J. Sokolsky. “A Hard Bilateral Moment of Truth: Canada and the United States in the Age of Terror,” in *Independence in an Age of Empire*, 76.
46. James Fergusson. Discussions at the CIC Halifax Conference.
47. Ibid.
48. Jon Allen, Minister Political Section Canadian Embassy in USA, Ottawa 3 March 2005.
49. Dwight N. Mason. “Canadian Defense Priorities: What Might the United States Like to See?” *Policy Papers on the Americas* Vol. XV Study 1 (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004): 7; Joseph T. Jockel. “Four U.S. Military Commands: NORTHCOM, NORAD, SPACECOM and STRATCOM – The Canadian Opportunity.” *IRPP Working Papers Series 2003-03* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2003): 7.
50. Northcom Website. <http://www.northcom.mil/Home.htm>.
51. Joel J. Sokolsky. “A Hard Bilateral Moment of Truth,” 77.
52. “NORAD remains flexible and capable of responding to evolving threats in a new security environment,” said Adm. Timothy J. Keating, former Commander of NORAD and U.S. Northern Command. “NORAD’s mission will provide our nations with a more complete picture of the approaches to North America and its internal waterways, such as the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway.” “The decision to strengthen NORAD and renew the agreement without an expiration date demonstrates the long-term commitment the United States and Canada have made to the defence of North America,” said Lieutenant-General Rick Findley, former NORAD deputy commander. “It is an endorsement of the success we have achieved working side-by-side for the past 48 years, and shows the confidence that our nations have in the men and women of NORAD.” NORAD Website Accessed on: 16 June 2006. Accessed at: <http://www.norad.mil/Home.htm>.
53. Ibid.

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54. Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky. "Renewing NORAD, Now If Not Forever," *Policy Options* (July-August 2006): 54.
55. Northcom Website. <http://www.northcom.mil/Home.htm>.
56. Ibid.
57. "Northcom's AOR includes air, land and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands...The commander of Northcom is responsible for theatre security cooperation within his AOR, notably with Canada and Mexico..... The commander of Northcom also commands the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a bi-national command responsible for aerospace warning and aerospace control for Canada, Alaska and the continental United States." "The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is a bi-national United States and Canadian organization charged with the missions of aerospace warning and aerospace control for North America." Northcom website. <http://www.northcom.mil/Home.htm>.; NORAD website. <http://www.norad.mil/Home.htm>.
58. Unclassified NORAD Briefing Colorado Springs, May 23, 2006.
59. United States. "Testimony of U.S. Senator John W. Warner." Department of Defense. (Washington: October, 2006), 3-4
60. Unclassified NORAD briefing Colorado Springs 23 May 2006.
61. Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) J.Y. Forcier, the first Commander of Canadacom interprets this situation as the Northcom absorption of NORAD by stealth. Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) J.Y. Forcier, Victoria, 12 May 2008.
62. Senior American officers in the various staff directorates would generate staff solutions favouring the Northcom position or agenda and seek to obtain approval through the bi-national chain of NORAD Command by stealth (this is standard policy), bravado (this is the right decision for NORAD and Northcom), or outright aggression (this is a Northcom organization, this decision is supported by American commanders, and/or I work for Northcom, not NORAD and the provisions of the NORAD agreement either do not apply or are superseded by my Northcom mandate and authorities). It is only when it is pointed out that the provisions of a bi-national agreement (nation to nation) supersede those of a multi-lateral one (military to military) and that they do not have the option of ignoring the NORAD provisions that they back off and grudgingly accept the NORAD-dominated *status quo*. Senior Canadian Officer "A" assigned to NORAD. 4 May 2006.
63. This presents some curious dynamics between the two organizations given their close relationship and sharing of staffs with the loyalties of the U.S. servicemen being unquestionably to their country and their unified command. Senior Canadian Officer "D" Assigned to Northcom. Colorado Springs: 24 May 2006.
64. General Renuart has no NORAD experience and in fact is steeped in both the UCP cookie cutter and the bilateral approach to defence relations after having been the Joint Force Air Component Commander for U.S. Pacific Command and a senior military advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in previous assignments. Northcom website. <http://www.northcom.mil/Home.htm>.
65. Gates is a long-time Bush appointee, having previously served his father (41) as Director of the CIA. If there is to be a change at all it is likely to be in the manner in which the American bilateral agenda is pursued. Gates was expected to and has indeed adopted a more pragmatic and realistic view and approach that focuses on stability and making relationships work rather than the reshaping the world in America's image. U.S. Department of Defense website. <http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/biographydetail>.
66. Senior American Officer "E."

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67. Senior Canadian Officer “D”; Senior American Officer “E.”
68. Senior American Officer “E.”
69. Senior Officer “E.”
70. Senior Canadian Officer “D.”
71. Vice-Admiral (Ret’d) J.Y. Forcier, 12 May, 2008.
72. James Fergusson, 24 May, 2008.
73. Even though Northcom is sticking to the UCP cookie cutter vis-à-vis the TSC concept, Canada is not adhering to that policy and is maintaining capital to capital relationship and a NDHQ to Pentagon relationship. This is outside the normal scheme for the UCP where the regional command usually has the lead for all military to military contacts – we are not playing ball and the American system of countervailing powers is working well for us in this instance. Senior Official “H.”
74. Elinor C. Sloan. “The Road from September 11: Canada-U.S. Defence Relations in the Terrorist Era,” in *Canada Among Nations 2004*, 159.
75. Canada/United States. *The Final Report on Canada-United States Enhanced Military Cooperation*, i.
76. Joel J. Sokolsky. “A Hard Bilateral Moment of Truth,” 78.

CHAPTER 7: THE STRATEGIC FUTURE



Introduction

Having discussed the past and present of the security relationship, the focus will now shift to its future. The vehicle to be used for the examination of the future of the relationship will be an analysis of the execution of the security aspects of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games.

The reason that the Games have been selected for this purpose is that, in the absence of another catastrophic North American security event similar to that which occurred on 9/11, the 2010 Olympics represent the first broad-based opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the policies, strategies, plans and preparations implemented in the post-9/11 era for the securitization of the Canada-United States relationship. This event provides an end-state measure and qualitative assessment of the changes that have occurred in the relationship in the decade following the events of 9/11. While the Games will provide the context for the examination, the primary focus of this analysis will remain the extent to which the three common policy threads and the three fundamental changes in the security relationship are shaping the Canada-United States security relationship for the future.

The 2010 Olympic Games

The examination of the future of the Canada-United States security relationship through the lens of the Games starts with an overview of the Canadian security infrastructure that was established for the event (see Appendix). Strategic oversight and control of the security functions for the Games was coordinated by Ward G. Elcock. Mr. Elcock was designated the “Coordinator for the 2010 Olympic Games and G8 Security” and reported directly to the National Security Advisor (NSA), Marie-Lucie Morin in the Privy Council Office (PCO).¹ In addition to this task, he was responsible for keeping Heritage Canada, the lead government agency for the Games, and the Department of Public Safety, the lead agency for domestic security issues, informed as to how the planning and execution of the security program for the Games was unfolding.²

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) reported directly to the Coordinator as the lead security agency for the Games. The primary vehicle used by the RCMP for the planning and execution of the Games security effort was the Integrated Security Unit (ISU). The RCMP ISU was responsible for establishing the overall security plan for the Olympics, and coordinating the input of the international, federal, provincial and municipal government departments that contributed resources, personnel, and capabilities to the security at the Games.

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National Defence, via the Canadian Forces (CF), was one such department and the CF had been tasked to provide key assets, personnel, and capabilities in support of the RCMP ISU.³

The security infrastructure that was established for the Games reflects the lengths to which the Canadian government is willing to go to reassure the United States that Canada is taking contemporary security issues and, in particular, American security concerns seriously. In order to ensure that the United States fully appreciated the lengths to which Canada was willing to go to ensure that the Games were safe from attack and/or disruption, Americans were granted unprecedented access to Canadian security planning and coordination fora. Not surprisingly, no other country was allowed the degree of access to the Games security planning and coordination process that was granted to American officials.⁴

Consideration of the American shadow infrastructure established to address American security concerns with respect to the Games (also depicted in the Appendix) provides interesting insights on a number of issues. The first of these relates to the fact that the American Department of State (DoS) was designated as the lead American agency for coordination of their security inputs to the Games. While this represented the standard post-9/11 American template in terms of their approach to security at major events occurring abroad⁵, it also represented yet another move away from acknowledgement of the unique Canada-United States security relationship.

As discussed earlier, many, if not most bilateral issues are dealt with on a department-to-department/agency-to-agency basis with little or no oversight by the Canadian DFAIT or the DoS.⁶ In the case of the Games, DFAIT had no direct role and, though tasked with the overall safety of Canadian citizens and infrastructure, the Department of Public Safety had only a peripheral role in terms of policy support.⁷

For the Americans, if security for the Games were to be addressed in the same manner as the majority of other Canada-United States relationship issues, one would have expected American oversight and coordination through an entity associated with the DHS, rather than the DoS – but this was not the case. The designation of the DoS as the coordinating department for this enterprise, as opposed to an element of Homeland Security, reflected yet another use of the “cookie cutter” approach to the Canada-United States relationship, an approach that does not recognize (intentionally or otherwise) the unique nature of this relationship or the manner in which it is managed in the overwhelming majority of instances.⁸ This failure to recognize the uniqueness of the Canada-United States security relationship serves as yet another indicator of the loss of trust and confidence by America in its Canadian ally.

Another interesting aspect of the security infrastructure for the Games is the extent to which it reflected a number of the dynamics of the relationship that are not necessarily evident from a review of the diagram in the Appendix. These

dynamics represent the way the relationship actually works as opposed to how it is officially described or depicted.

The diagram outlines a formal relationship where policy issues are agreed upon at the NSA-DoS level. The operational coordination of issues within these policy guidelines is facilitated on an agency-to-agency basis, usually aligned according to function.⁹ For example, in the case of military support to the Games, all such issues were to be formally collected at the national level by Canadacom and Northcom, and subsequently addressed using the Canadacom/Northcom bilateral relationship. This ensures that the issues on both sides of the border are coordinated nationally before being addressed bilaterally.¹⁰

The overall success and effectiveness of this process can be threatened if agencies are allowed to make contacts outside of established channels according to the individual agendas of their personnel. The resulting situation would be a hodgepodge of uncoordinated “side deals.”¹¹ While these arrangements may appear appropriate and effective in their own right, when they are aggregated with the myriad other such decisions, the resulting collection of isolated arrangements would make oversight and control at the national level impossible. The result of such a process would be the loss of national control (sovereignty) over the security process, as well as a loss of security itself.¹²

One example of just such an outcome is a situation that developed in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when American intelligence and security agencies were making demands for the immediate provision of detailed information from an array of Canadian agencies using vague and general questions. Northcom directly contacted a number of Canadian intelligence organizations, such as the CSIS and the RCMP, on several issues rather than addressing these issues through DHS/FBI or DHS/CIA as they should have done. By taking this approach, Northcom effectively eliminated the other American agencies from the information “loop.” They enhanced their own intelligence picture, leaving the rest of the American intelligence infrastructure to fend for itself and/or consume valuable time on both sides of the border with repetitive questions and duplication of effort in responding to them. On the Canadian side, there was the release of intelligence without any consideration of quality control or coordination within the Canadian security infrastructure.

The same process may well have played a role in the mismanagement of the Maher Arar issue, whereby raw intelligence was requested and subsequently received directly from the RCMP as opposed to being processed centrally through CSIS. Had the request and transmission of this information been routed through CSIS, the data available would have been collated, and then provided to the Americans only after a vetting process had been completed.¹³ If this dysfunctional practice had continued to develop unchecked, the ability on both sides of the border to provide overall coordination and control of their security efforts would have been damaged, perhaps irreparably. Since that time, however, Canada has, for the most part, re-established the structural discipline and asserted control by

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referring all attempts at “free lance” intelligence gathering back to the established lines of communication.¹⁴ The correction of this flaw in the system has had the added advantage of ensuring a more comprehensive and efficient distribution of information based upon the post-9/11 intelligence dictum of the “need to share” rather than the Cold War one of a “need to know.”

The potential damage to the Canadian security effort by a loss of control and oversight due to relaxed discipline during the aforementioned process could indeed be significant. In effect, it would represent an abdication of Canada’s security responsibilities to an anarchic environment.¹⁵ Furthermore, it would facilitate the advancement of a number of American departmental agendas through the individual procurement of intelligence, or in other words, a loss of Canada’s sovereignty over its own affairs.

One may question why a Canadian surrender to anarchy would expose the system to abuse by “a number” of American agendas, as opposed to the advancement of the sole agenda of the storied American plot to take over Canada or to somehow control and direct its affairs. The reality is that there is no single American “plot”, but rather a collection of agendas and policies that vary depending upon the mandate, interests, and objectives of the American agency, group, or faction involved in any given issue.

As noted earlier, and notwithstanding the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report¹⁶ and the major restructuring of the American security infrastructure to enhance inter-organizational communications and sharing of information, American “stove-piping” and inter-agency rivalries still exist, and may, in fact, represent a common occurrence. This “stove-piping” is epitomised by a refusal on the part of American agencies to talk to each other to the extent of providing their Canadian counterparts with directions as to what information can be shared with which American agency or department.¹⁷ In several cases, this has led to a situation where American agencies are more willing to share information and develop relationships with Canadian agencies than with their own peers within the American infrastructure, whom they often perceive as competitors rather than partners.¹⁸

The reason for this ongoing dysfunctional situation is due in part to the very nature of the American system of government, as discussed previously. The structure of the American system of government is premised upon the intentional establishment of overlapping and, as described by some, conflicting powers and responsibilities. The mechanisms that were originally intended to curb or prevent the abuse of power have had the unintended consequence of restricting cooperation and information-sharing, in effect working against the governmental integrity and efficiency these policies were conceived to safeguard. The reasons behind this unintended but unresolved issue range from inter-agency competition for budget dollars to the quest for power and authority within the government of the world’s most powerful nation.

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As was noted earlier, the Canadian response at the strategic level to this American pattern of behaviour was to establish clear channels of communication and to maintain the discipline of the relationship in order to mitigate the negative ramifications associated with this aspect of the American system. In achieving this objective, the Government also maintained Canada's sovereignty over its own security infrastructure. In terms of planning for the Olympic Games at the operational and tactical level, the objective was the same, with Canadian officials determined to ensure that contact and cooperation on security issues remain clearly within the policy guidelines established at the strategic level by the NSA and the DoS. As such, the Canadian approach to managing the security relationship in the lead-up to the Games clearly established the continued implementation of one of the common policy threads, that of a reliance upon the institutional structure and nature of the relationship to maintain order, effectiveness, and sovereignty within it.

This criticism of the American system is not intended to imply that the Canadian aspects of planning and coordination for the Games were entirely free of dysfunctional competition and rivalries amongst government officials and bureaucrats. Indeed, the establishment of a security infrastructure for the Games independent of the existing infrastructure may well have been a reaction to the emergence of "stove-piping" characteristics within the Canadian system. The Canadian government determined that the objectives of the process were not being met early on in the planning process and accordingly undertook two basic actions to remedy the situation.¹⁹

The first of these was, of course, the establishment of a security infrastructure outside of the existing bureaucracies and agencies, as illustrated in the Appendix. This structure effectively circumvented the established bureaucracy and its most dysfunctional aspects, and focused on the operational necessity of providing security to an event that influences the fundamental security concerns of both Canada and the United States. The second remedial action was the assignment of capable individuals from outside of the coordinating agencies to critical positions in the new infrastructure such that the influence of individual departmental interests and agendas on the evolution of the security preparations for the games was minimized.

The assignment of Ward Elcock as the NSA Coordinator for the Games was one such example of this phenomenon at the strategic level. It also occurred at the operational level with the process of education and cooperation that developed between the Assistant Commissioner of the RCMP and the Commander of Canada Command. In a cooperative partnership, they worked together to ensure that they fully understood the needs, tasks, and missions of their respective organizations as they pertained to the planning and execution of the security strategy for the Games. At the tactical level, key organizers within the ISU had to actively break down the mentality of institutional stove-piping among the personnel contributed to the operation of the ISU by various government

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agencies. It would appear that the phenomenon of bureaucratic stove-piping was actively addressed at every level in the Canadian infrastructure. The results, based upon research and observation over the course of the Games themselves, appear to be quite positive. Inter-agency working relationships established through the interactions of agency staffs at the ISU gradually improved, and the flow of information and active participation in the resolution of security issues associated with the Games increased and became more positive.²⁰ However, the nature of these changes in terms of their permanence within the Canadian structure can only be determined with time. It may well be that the increased level of trust and cooperation will be a temporary phenomenon that disappears after the impetus of the Games has been removed.

Setting aside the intra-governmental communication and cooperation issues of each country, what can be said of the issue of cooperation and harmonization of the planning efforts in the context of bilateral security relations between Canada and United States? The answer to this question illustrates two prominent Canadian and American behavioural characteristics in their conduct of the relationship.

The American position and approach to Olympic security issues was one of extreme enthusiasm, borne of an overwhelming sense of immediacy in terms of executing all initiatives deemed necessary by American officials, including those involving other sovereign states. American officials have frequently commented on how slow the Canadian system and officials are to react. They also make observations on how the Canadian system of forcing information flows along pre-designated channels (stove-piping) tends to slow things down and inhibit the timely accomplishment of security planning and tasks.²¹ The circumstances in the case of the Games were no different. American proposals and initiatives sometimes exceeded Canadian concepts of security for the Games. Similarly the pace at which the Americans wished to proceed in the planning, development and implementation of the security concepts for the Games was frequently on a shorter timeline than the one the Canadians were using.

In the planning stages of the security operation, the Canadian position appeared to be marked by an oscillation between reactive and proactive policy-making that changed depending on where in the Canadian chain of responsibility the decision point resided. With respect to the American sense of immediacy, Canadian officials commented on the frequent exertion of pressure to act on issues deemed of critical and immediate importance to the security of the Games by their American counterparts.²² Conversely, American comments included observations that the Canadians generally undertake their process of planning and policy development at a pace that put them in the position of reacting to events rather than shaping them.²³ Some Americans warned that this reluctance to act decisively would not only inhibit the security effort for the Games but might also negatively influence the bilateral development of the broader security relationship itself.²⁴ It is reasonable to assume that, should these American concerns go

unaddressed in the future regardless of their legitimacy or lack thereof, they will contribute to a weakening in the relationship in terms of a loss of confidence and trust in the Canadian willingness and/or ability to address American security concerns. The result of course would be a reinforcement of the negative aspects of the fundamental changes to the post-9/11 relationship.

Additional research into this American perception of a Canadian reactive mindset indicates the presence of an interesting anomaly within the Canadian security infrastructure. If the infrastructure is divided between a strategic policy level at the top and an operational and tactical level below, there exists what might be termed a degree of schizophrenia within the structure as whole when it comes to addressing security issues. Some officials within the Games security infrastructure contend that, at the strategic policy level, there was a desire to cling to the idea that the Games must be a wholly Canadian affair to the extent that the planning, resourcing, manning, and execution of the security plan for the Games must take place using exclusively Canadian personnel, assets, and processes.²⁵

This position was in marked contrast to indications that the planning staff at the operational level believed that there were excellent logistical, technical, security, policy, relationship and national interest reasons for not only accepting American assistance with the Games, but for inviting them to participate and to work side-by-side with Canadian officials and operators. The difference between the two mindsets at the strategic and the operational/tactical level, appears to be one of opinion between those who are responsible for the “optics” of the Canada-United States relationship as they pertain to the Games, particularly with respect to domestic Canadian opinion, and those who are responsible for delivering a successful operational outcome in terms of security for the Games.

If the research accurately reflects these two different mindsets, one each at the strategic and operational levels, it indicates the presence of yet another of the common policy threads, a continuing concern and need to balance the relationship between domestic public perceptions of Americans “taking over” the security for the Games and the very real advantages that can accrue from incorporating (and controlling) American resources and expertise into the security efforts for the Games.

There are a number of practical issues and at least one major relationship consideration that inform the discussion of the relative merits of a proactive and inclusive versus a reactive and exclusive strategy of engagement with the Americans on this issue. Among the practical issues is the fact that, with the magnitude of the security requirements for the Games in the present threat environment and the other national security commitments at home (domestic infrastructure and citizens) and abroad, the Canadian security resource pool simply was not deep enough to adequately address all of the demands that might have been placed upon it in the run-up to and execution of the Games. A corollary to this is the fact that the Americans had a deep and broad security resource pool and a wealth of recent experience with the provision of security to major international sporting

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events (Atlanta 1996, Salt Lake City 2002, and most recently Greece 2004).²⁶ While Canadian security planners also had expertise and experience with this scale of event and ultimately the Canadian approach to the security for this type of event may be somewhat different, the value of the American input in terms of expertise and resources should not be discounted.

The key issue is a relationship one to the extent that the Games were a major security risk that were to unfold only a few kilometres from the American border, and would involve significant numbers of American citizens as both participants and spectators. As such, the Games represented a potential threat to two fundamental American security interests – the safety of their citizens, and of their homeland. If there was a perception and/or belief at the Canadian policy level that the Americans would allow themselves to be excluded from the security aspects of the Games, especially in the event of a security mishap involving their citizens or territory, it was a naïve one.

At the practical or operations level, one course of action to address both the shortfalls in the Canadian capabilities and the Canada-United States relationship issues was to proactively welcome the Americans onto “the team” before the event and shape their participation in a measured and controlled manner. The employment of this strategy would minimize the likelihood of security problems resulting from any shortfall in resources or capabilities and, in the event that a security mishap did occur, forestall an uncoordinated (uncoordinated with Canadian resources) and uncontrolled (uncontrolled by Canadian officials) American reaction that could compromise Canadian sovereignty and damage the Canada-United States security relationship, perhaps traumatically and permanently.²⁷ At the policy level, if resistance to active American participation in the security process for the Games was widespread and ongoing, it would likely further exacerbate the American sense of distrust and lack of confidence in the Canadian willingness or ability to react effectively to American security concerns.

The best course of action to maintain the overall effectiveness of the security effort, Canadian sovereignty over events taking place on Canadian territory, and an effective balance of the relationship in the eyes of the domestic public would have been one of proactive engagement similar to the processes which were undertaken in the early days of the Second World War, the Cold War, and in the days immediately following the events of 9/11. Following a strategy of proactive engagement, Canadian officials would bring their American counterparts into the security infrastructure in order to provide the American leadership with the reassurance that issues and threats are being effectively addressed. This approach would also scratch the American “itch” to participate in the security effort by accepting resources and manpower to address areas in which legitimate shortfalls have been identified by the Canadian planners.²⁸

This course of action, if it were adopted, would simultaneously reduce the influence of two of the fundamental changes in the relationship (perceptions of a lack of support for American policies and a demand for greater Canadian

participation) by increasing Americans trust and confidence in the Canadian willingness and ability to address their security concerns. Adherence to the proactive approach would also facilitate a Canadian-controlled execution of the security effort that in turn would discourage an uncontrolled American reaction to any mishaps that might occur. The net effect of this course of action would be to execute a modern day version of the “defence against help” strategy. This approach would also assist the Canadian government, if it were accompanied by an effective public relations campaign, in its continued negotiation of the domestic political tightrope of maximizing the benefits derived from the relationship without being accused by the domestic public of being “too close” to the Americans.

American assistance as it pertains to a physical presence in the area of the Games could be kept low-profile and for the most part out of sight in much the same way as the overall Canadian military support to the Games was being managed. Those aspects of American support that did make their way into the public eye could be stage-managed to reflect their supporting role in a Canadian-led operation. This would all have been accomplished with the full cooperation of the Americans, given that the United States has extensive experience assisting allies with domestic public relations issues or sovereignty-related “optics” problems.

Notwithstanding the varying degree to which strategic and operational elements of Canada’s security infrastructure were prepared to accept American influence and/or participation, the components of the Canadian infrastructure appeared determined to maintain control over their own territory and events. The Americans were equally determined to ensure the security of both American territory proximate to the Games and of American citizens attending the Games. Both groups were pressing hard for their own agendas: the Americans for a greater degree of participation (and influence and control) in the security aspects of the Games and the Canadians to minimize and control the role that was ultimately to be played by the Americans.²⁹

So what actually did happen? Which of the Canadian strategies won out? Was it the exclusionary or the inclusionary one? Did the government successfully negotiate the political tightrope of American involvement in Canadian security affairs? Were the Canadian nationalists and sovereigntists able to exert a determining influence on the make-up of the security strategy for the Games?

Ottawa appeared to gradually soften their stance with respect to an exclusively Canadian response to the Games.³⁰ Over the period of 18-24 months before the start of the Games, Americans, as mentioned earlier, were granted unprecedented access to the Canadian planning and development fora. In response to their generous offers of resources, personnel, and experience, the Canadian government accepted an ongoing presence in the ISU and the central operations centres and command cells of American observers and liaison officers. The Canadian government also accepted the inclusion of a number of American units created specifically to help manage the consequences of a mass casualty attack possibly using a WMD. These units would have been called upon to act

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if similar Canadian military and civil assets in place to address such threats had been overwhelmed by such an attack. While these units were staged on American soil and never actually entered Canada except on carefully controlled and staged exercises, all of the diplomatic paperwork was in place to have them activated and on site within a matter of hours following a carefully established deployment protocol controlled by Canadian authorities.

In terms of addressing domestic concerns over Canadian sovereignty, the government did in fact take a proactive approach and couched American assistance in securing the Games in the context of a helpful neighbour providing some assistance where and if it was required under the control and supervision of Canadian agencies and departments. The Americans were thus placated, the sovereigntists disarmed, and the Games secured. The political tightrope was successfully negotiated and Canadian values and interests were maintained.

The issue now of course is what influence will the successful conduct of the security plan for the Games have on the future of the Canada-United States security relationship? The explicit answer to this question is not likely to be known until the unity and cohesion of the relationship is tested in the next crisis. Generally speaking however, processes and institutions that are the hallmarks of the contemporary relationship appeared to have worked well and been effective in the coordination and execution of the largest bilateral operation in the history of the relationship.

An Assessment

It is apparent from this discussion that all three of the common policy threads have a continuing role to play in the future of the relationship. It is equally apparent that the three fundamental changes in the post-9/11 relationship will also have a role to play. As in the past, the influence that the threads will have on the fundamental changes to the post-9/11 security relationship will be determined to a large extent by the precise manner in which those threads are or are not managed.

The first of the fundamental changes is the expansion of the security relationship beyond purely military or defence-related elements to include the entire spectrum of national security. The security infrastructures (Canadian and American) established for the Games clearly indicate an expanded breadth and focus in the post-9/11 security relationship that is unlikely to contract in the future. The ongoing pace and ultimate extent of this expansion of the relationship is dependent upon the degree to which the policy threads are employed, or ignored. The processes and relationships that will develop from this event have the potential to further reinforce the continued expansion of the relationship towards broader consideration of security issues, organizations and infrastructure.

The second fundamental change involves an American expectation of ongoing and consistent support for their policies resulting from their perception

of a lack of Canadian support in the past combined with a heightened sense of vulnerability. While the Canadian measures and actions described in the preceding chapters, and the strategy supported by the Canadian security professionals directly responsible for the operational execution of the Games (one of acceptance of American inputs within a Canadian framework of oversight and control) has undoubtedly served to reduce the American sense of vulnerability, there are no explicit indications in the aftermath of the Games that the sense of vulnerability or the need for Canadian support is abating in any significant way.

The distinct absence of public criticism on Canadian security capabilities and actions is clearly a consequence of a number of factors in addition to the cooperative and successful execution of the security plan for the Games. One such factor is the Canadian contributions to continental security and the support for American policies abroad that has been forthcoming in the latter part of this decade. It is also due in part to a change in the operating style of the Obama administration from the one that preceded it. And lastly, the absence of criticism is also likely due in large part to the absence of any security crisis that would actually test the limits of the relationship as it has evolved since 9/11. The real test then, of how the relationship has evolved over the last decade will be the reactions on both sides of the border in the next continental security crisis.³¹

The third fundamental change in the relationship, that is, the increasing demand for Canadian participation, is the most difficult of the three changes to analyze within the context of the Games. The timing of the Games forced the evolution of the relationship at a faster pace than would otherwise occur on its own – at least in terms of Canadian preferences.³² This is evident nowhere more so than in the friction that was experienced on the issue of the extent or degree of American participation in the planning and execution of the security strategy for the Games.

If the initial position of the Canadian strategic-level policy-makers who were strongly opposed to the acceptance of American participation in the security aspects of the Games is likely to be taken up again in the future in the context of every bilateral security event, there clearly exists a continued lack of appreciation of the post-9/11 American resolve with respect to vital American security interests. If this is the case, it would seem that some Canadian officials at the strategic level believe that there still exists an environment within which Canadians can “opt in” or “opt out” of American security initiatives, and go their own way on an issue if they feel inclined to do so. The longer this misperception on the part of Canadian policy-makers persists, if it does exist, the more entrenched the American resolve to overcome it will become, and the more brittle the security relationship will be. Although the relationship is unlikely to shatter with respect to the day-to-day bilateral interactions, in times of crisis, continued opposition to close Canada-United States participation on security issues could mean that America would proceed unilaterally to address its security concerns in the future, even if it involves trampling upon Canadian sensitivities with respect to sovereignty.

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If significant opposition to close cooperation and bilateral participation in security issues persists into the future, it may even be considered an abandonment of the historic Canadian policy of accommodation, whereby successive governments have resolved to minimize the threat of invasion by America by ensuring that it never felt sufficiently threatened by Canada to make such actions worthwhile. In the present relationship environment, a refusal by Canadian policy-makers to allow American participation in a security event that influences the safety of their homeland, followed by a catastrophic event that impacts American citizens and/or territory could well be the catalyst for that uninvited incursion upon Canadian territory that has been thus avoided for almost two centuries. Along the same lines, refusal to accept American security inputs for future events could also be interpreted as an abandonment of the Kingston Dispensation to the extent that Canadian officials are not taking all reasonable steps to ensure that America is not threatened through Canada.

Conclusion

A focus on the threat posed by international terrorism within the context of the Games was appropriate in terms of examining the future of the relationship for a number of reasons. First, the Games represented the highest profile domestic security issue in the post-9/11 era, and thus served as a template for the security coordination of major national events in the post-2010 era. Second, and in terms of their importance and significance to Canadian interests is the fact that the Games also represented the best opportunity in the short term to enhance the quality and value-added (to Canadian interests) of the Canada-United States security relationship.

Indicators of the relative success or failure of the Games in terms of improving and strengthening the relationship will likely be seen in future interactions between the two states, likely during a crisis, when the degree to which the three fundamental changes in the relationship that have occurred since 9/11 are either reinforced or weakened. For instance, a continued expansion and deepening of the relationship beyond the historic military and defence components could be considered an indicator of success in evaluating the Canadian approach to the Games.

In terms of the other two fundamental changes in the relationship, the use of the common policy threads have undoubtedly enhanced American confidence in Canadian consistency and support for fundamental American security interests and concerns, an essential building block for a stronger relationship. The strong cooperative security effort at the Games also probably reinforced, to American strategists and policy-makers, the extent to which Canadian participation in continental security is playing a robust role in the security of the American homeland. This last outcome, in concert with the other measures of support and participation that have developed, especially in the latter part of the decade, have mitigated and even silenced the continuing American demands for enhanced Canadian participation in security issues – for now.

Beyond the Games, there are a number of actions that can reasonably be taken by the Canadian government to enhance the security relationship, and increase its utility in the attainment of Canadian goals and objectives. The success of these actions depends upon the degree of influence and credibility that the Canadian government has with American leaders. Recent Canadian policies with respect to Afghanistan and other issues at home and abroad have slowed and possibly even reversed the decline in the quality of the relationship. Future policies that serve to reinforce this trend towards the re-establishment of a deep American confidence in Canadian support for their security concerns and tangible actions that serve American interests (while they are also serving our own) are likely to do more to enhance the quality and value (to Canada) of the relationship than any other course of action.³³

If they are to be effective in enhancing Canadian interests, an essential ingredient for all of these actions, be it in the short, mid, or long term, is a proactive policy of engagement with both the Americans on the security issues associated with the Games and the domestic Canadian public on the evolving nature of the Canada-United States security relationship. The Canadian government must actively engage the public with an education campaign with respect to the benefits of the relationship as well as the realities of the contemporary security situation. They must publicly correct the claims of anti-American lobbyists when and where such groups choose to attempt to shape Canadian domestic opinion for their own purposes, emphasizing to the Canadian public the difference between working “with” Americans and working “as” Americans.³⁴ The government must also avoid the temptation to “tweak the eagle’s beak” for temporary domestic political gain.³⁵

The key objective of this whole strategy is to reinforce the history of the Canadian record of performance in the relationship in terms of consistency, reliability, and level of participation on those issues in which there are common Canadian and American interests. The use of the three common policy threads or approaches to maximize the positive effects of the relationship for both countries and to minimize the negative effects of the fundamental changes in the relationship is an essential component in the achievement of this objective and in the maintenance of the Kingston Dispensation.

Endnotes

1. Canada. Privy Council Office. <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/Org/2009-03-eng.pdf>.
2. Senior Official “Q” assigned to Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit, Vancouver B.C., 15 May 2008 and 29 April 2009.
3. Senior Official “L” of the Department of National Defence, Ottawa: 5 May 2008.
4. Senior Official “R” assigned to Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit, Vancouver B.C., 15 May 2008 and 30 April 2009.
5. Senior Official “Q”
6. Senior Official “H” assigned to Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa: 28 June 2007.

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7. Senior Official “Q.”
8. This was also seen with the establishment of Northcom under the Unified Command Plan (UCP) for the coordination of the military aspects of continental defence.
9. I.e. Military to military, intelligence to intelligence, etc. Senior Official “Q” assigned to Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Unit, Vancouver B.C., 15 May 2008.
10. Senior Official “H.”
11. These are frequently seen by American officials, at least in their discussions with Canadians, as positive developments. The most frequent American criticism of Canadian bilateral security efforts is that they rely too much on protocol and structure and in so doing reduce the flexibility and responsiveness of the entire structure. Senior Official “BB” of the Office of Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security, Washington D.C., 2 June 2007.
12. In the aftermath of 9/11 American agencies were requesting and receiving information from whatever Canadian agency they engaged with. American intelligence agencies treated their Canadian counterparts as extensions of their own system, but without the rules of access that govern the relationships within the American system. In essence, the Canadian intelligence system was used and abused by a variety of American agencies for their own objectives. The extent to which this represented a formal decision by the Canadian government to cooperate in this fashion has not been established, but the situation at the very least represents a significant abdication of sovereignty over Canadian assets and capabilities. Senior Intelligence Official “I” formerly assigned to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in Ottawa: 20 July 2007.
13. Senior Intelligence Official “I.”
14. Senior Official “H.”
15. Senior Intelligence Official “I.”
16. United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report*.
17. Senior Official “Q”; Senior Official “H.”
18. Senior Intelligence Official “I.”
19. The appointment of specific personnel and the establishment of a tailor-made security structure for the Games illustrates that the Canadian government is aware of the bureaucratic tendencies of the government infrastructure and the fact that concerns over power, authority, recognition, and budgets may induce dysfunctional behaviour from time to time that can negatively effect the attainment of government objectives.
20. Senior Official “R.”
21. Senior Intelligence Official “I.”
22. Senior Officials “Q” and “R.”
23. Senior Official “S”, Department of Homeland Security, Washington D.C., 29 May 2007.
24. Senior American Officer “E” assigned to CJCS Staff, The Pentagon. Washington D.C.: 1 June 2007.
25. Senior Official “R.”
26. American military, intelligence, and security agencies provided extensive support to the Greek authorities throughout the preparations and execution of the 2004 Summer Olympics. The support ranged from the provision of advice to oversight of infrastructure protection, security procedures, and the provision of intelligence.
27. Senior Official “R”.

28. Senior Official “Q.”
29. Senior Official “L.”
30. Senior Officials “R” and “Q”.
31. Senior Official “R.”
32. Officials “J” and “K” of the Department of National Defence, Ottawa: 5 May 2008.
33. Michael Hart. *Comments at the CIC Conference entitled, “The Future of the Canada-United States Relationship.”* Victoria, 12 May 2008.
34. Michael Hart. *Comments at the 10th Annual Conference of the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada,* Montreal, February 16, 2005.
35. John Noble. Director of Research, Centre for Trade and Policy Law, Carleton University. *Continental Security Dimensions of the Canada-U.S. Relationship.* Remarks to the 21st Annual Conference of Defence Associations. Ottawa, March 4, 2005.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION



There will be a tendency by some to over-emphasize the American influence on Canadian policies, to declare that Canadians react to situations and circumstances only once they have determined what the American response will be. This unjustifiably relegates Canada to the role of an American protectorate, and does not reflect the true nature of the relationship. In order to achieve and maintain fundamental national interests of security and prosperity, Canada must address the security interests of the United States but this does not mean that the country is a passive participant in the relationship. Rather Canada's role is to influence its American neighbour to address issues of common concern such that Canadian interests are best served by the coordinated response of both partners.

A situation where Canadian interests are not served, at least in part, by an American policy is difficult to envision. In this sense, and to the extent that the two countries share common values, interests, goals and objectives, Canada and the United States represent a security community of two like-minded states. This reality however, does not preclude strains within the community and the relationship in situations where one of the partners perceives that their own interests, possibly their very survival, require actions that are detrimental to the interests of the other. While a set of common values and a similar social and cultural history minimize the likelihood of this occurring, they do not eliminate it.

This examination of the Canada-United States security relationship has focused on those aspects of it that serve to inform and influence the conduct of two partners of different size, inclination, and capabilities who nevertheless share a similar set of values and interests. From a potentially wide array of issues and events were selected three key aspects of this relationship that have provided continuity, consistency and strength to it and as such represent the glue that holds it together. These aspects represent common policy threads that were developed in the early days of the Canada-United States security relationship, and have had a continuing influence through their role in or absence from this relationship to the present day and, based upon research to date, will continue to exert a determining influence on the conduct of the relationship into the future.

The most central of the threads is the use of the policy of accommodation, which includes the concepts of “defence against help” and “quiet diplomacy” as the main pillars of its implementation strategy. Canadian interests have been best served by adherence to this policy, and departures from this policy have resulted in negative ramifications to the Canada-United States security relationship. Understanding the expression of this policy in Canada-United States security relations serves to increase our understanding of the larger relationship in the past, present, and certainly the future.

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Also highlighted was the value of the Pearsonian strategy of addressing American interests that, though they may not have any direct advantage for Canada, cost the country nothing and set the stage for the satisfaction of Canadian interests on other issues.

While the policy of accommodation focuses on the external management of the relationship between Canada and the United States as partners, the second common policy thread addresses the domestic management of this relationship from the Canadian perspective. Canadian governments through history have been required to walk a political tightrope between maximizing the benefits that can be realized from the relationship for Canadians, and incurring the wrath of a portion of the domestic public as a result of moving “too close” to America and thus theoretically surrendering Canadian sovereignty.

The issue of national sovereignty is a central concern in the Canadian part of the security relationship and in itself serves as another example of how the relationship has remained the same over time. Governments ignore domestic sensitivities with respect to sovereignty at their peril. The Canadian public is wary of the potential held by America to overwhelm and dominate Canada politically, socially, economically, and with respect to security. A number of different factions in Canada, ranging from sensitive nationalists to security-sovereignists to anti-American (lite) activists who oppose American policy on principle, frequently seek to tap into this vein of insecurity for their own purposes and agendas. Canadian governments must balance their recognition of the fact that two countries with similar values, geography, politics, culture, and economies will often have similar interests which can be addressed by similar policies with the perception that, by engaging America on any given issue, Canadians are surrendering their sovereignty. A balance must be struck between addressing Canadian interests and the domestic perception of bending to power. One tool that has proven especially valuable in shaping the relationship and managing the public's perception of this relationship is the use of proactive diplomacy both at home and abroad. Abroad, it can be used to influence American policy-makers in the formulation of their own positions on various issues. At home, a program of domestic public diplomacy can be used to educate and influence Canadians on Canada-United States issues by presenting them in a context based on fact rather than emotion.

The last of the three common policy threads involves an ongoing Canadian reliance upon the rules-based institutional nature of the relationship. In this context, “institutional” means not only a reliance upon structures, treaties and agreements to manage American power in the relationship, but also upon the myriad of daily contacts at every level and in every area of government on both sides of the border. The institutional nature of the Canada-United States relationship as defined here is what makes the relationship unique in the world. It also provides Canada with a strong central mechanism with which to hold its own in a partnership with a global superpower. Taken together, the three

common policy threads represent the continuity of the security relationship with its past in the post-9/11 era and beyond.

The examination of the Canada-United States security relationship also involved the identification of three fundamental changes to it that have emerged in the post-9/11 era. These changes are currently influencing the conduct of that relationship, and have the potential to do so far into the future. This begs the question of exactly how these changes should be considered. Should they be considered as transient influences to be accommodated in the short term until the circumstances that generated them fade away? Or should they be addressed as ongoing determinants of the state of the relationship and as such, key factors to be managed and shaped to our advantage?

Regardless of the state of permanence of these changes, the reality is that they are present now and must be addressed in some way if Canadians are to control and influence the relationship rather than be controlled and influenced by it. The first change is the expansion of the relationship from one of defence to the much broader field of security in general. The permeation of security issues and concerns throughout every aspect of government, business, and society is not the result of a single threat, such as terrorism, but of globalization in general, a process that brings the threats against which Canadians had been shielded by distance, geographic barriers, or technology into the homes, businesses, and places of government throughout the two countries. Even though the global economic downturn that began in 2008 may have slowed the forces of globalization, it is unlikely that those forces will come to a halt or reverse themselves in the future. Similarly, it is unrealistic to assume that the securitization of the two societies will reverse direction once any one particular threat, such as that posed by international terrorism, has been effectively addressed. As such, the continuing need to improve and expand the Canada-United States security effort must be taken as a given.

The second change in the post-9/11 relationship, an American need (demand?) for constant reassurance of Canada's commitment to their most vital of interests, the security of their homeland, has taken the form of an expectation of consistent and unwavering support for their policies at home and abroad. Departures from this policy of support will likely, though not inevitably, contribute to the exacerbation of the American sense of distrust and/or lack of confidence in the Canadian willingness or ability to address American security interests. Again, this is not inevitable, because the need for support of the American security agenda does not have to be absolute if departures from it are handled proactively, with sensitivity to the American pre-occupation with security and without "tweaking" the eagle's beak. The reasons for this are twofold.

The first is that any expectation that friends will agree on every issue all of the time reflects both a lack of maturity and of understanding when addressing the dynamics of any relationship.¹

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Second, if policy disagreements are handled using the historic mechanisms that are in place for just those purposes, the inevitable and legitimate Canadian departures from stated American policy on any given issue need not be seen as a betrayal or as an indifference to American concerns. The mechanisms available to ameliorate any difficulties arising from differences of opinion on an issue include the use of “quiet diplomacy”, among others.

The last fundamental change in the relationship concerns that of Canadian participation. While the only previous instance of American dependence upon direct Canadian participation in the continental security relationship was a relatively short term requirement for real estate upon which to place radar installations in the early days of the Cold War, the current requirement (generated initially by the threat posed by international terrorism) promises to last a good deal longer. The shift from discretionary to mandatory participation can be seen as a double-edged sword with respect to the future relationship. On one hand, there will be the additional leverage that will accrue to Canadians in the ongoing management of the relationship that results from the provision of a crucial ingredient to American security. On the other hand, is the fact that Canada can no longer afford (or be allowed?) to opt out of those aspects of security that are central to the protection of the American homeland. As such, the traditionally broad scope for action by Canadian political leaders in their management of the relationship and of Canadian public opinion/support has become somewhat narrower than in the past.

Notwithstanding American criticisms of the level of Canadian support for American security concerns, Canada is providing a focused, effective, and broad-based security effort in defence of the continent and of American security interests. This fact is not being acknowledged, possibly not even recognized, in some American circles for a number of reasons that include the variety of American agendas and a negotiating strategy intended to get as much out of Canada as possible by sometimes hinting at, but never actually threatening dire consequences. A successful Canadian strategy to counter this relies upon Ottawa's calculations of Canadian self-interest and an informed knowledge of American ones to elicit a positive response from the United States most of the time.

As argued here, it is unlikely that the first of the fundamental changes, the expansion of the relationship from one of defence to that of security writ large, will ever cease to influence relationship issues and as such is destined to become a permanent change in the relationship. The other two changes, those of a requirement for consistent and unequivocal policy support and of mandatory participation in continental security may well moderate or disappear in the future based upon an as-yet-unknown combination of Canadian actions and American expectations.

The future of the relationship will likely be bilateral in nature and this tendency serves as another example of how the relationship has remained the same. While there have been and still are some bi-national aspects to the

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relationship, its history has been predominantly a bilateral one and this promises to be the trend for the future. Notwithstanding arguments claiming numerous benefits for Canada to be derived from a bi-national approach to the relationship, the reality is that the relationship and Canadian interests within it can and will prosper as much under a bilateral agenda as under a bi-national one.

Another partnership issue is the possible addition of Mexico, which would give a trilateral nature to the historically bilateral relationship. The initiative is essentially an American-driven one with few advantages to be derived for Mexico and none at all for Canada. The addition of another partner and a different slate of issues, concerns, and priorities will complicate the relationship for Canada, and reduce the effectiveness of this relationship to address specifically Canadian-American interests that are not held or shared with Mexico. Significant differences in governance and security capabilities between Mexico and Canada and the United States are presently retarding the evolution of the relationship towards a trilateral future, but the move toward trilateralism appears to be a long-term objective of the United States and, as such, is an issue that should be aggressively and proactively addressed by Canada.

The first major test of the security relationship and the changes made to it since 9/11, were the 2010 Winter Olympic Games. The Games shaped strategic level mindsets, perceptions, processes, procedures, inter-personal relationships, and institutions for the foreseeable future, and will likely form the template for addressing relationship issues for at least the next generation and possibly longer. It was indeed fortunate therefore that the Canadians appear to have “gotten it right” in terms of addressing American security needs and concerns while simultaneously addressing domestic realities regarding sovereignty.

Success, with respect to the Games, was not determined by the absence of a major security event or mishap over the course of the Games, although this must certainly be considered as a positive outcome. Rather it was determined more by the direction of movement of the relationship as a result of the preparation for and execution of the security plan for the Games. Initial research in the immediate aftermath of the Games indicates a positive trend in the relationship although this is undoubtedly the result of a number of other positive developments in the relationship in addition to the Games themselves. The planning and execution of the security plan was ultimately accomplished in an environment of cooperation and common purpose, and undoubtedly contributed significantly to the upward trend in the relationship. It will also probably result in closer agreement on the nature of future threat(s) and possibly even the best means of addressing them thus continuing the upward trend in the relationship even further into the future.

Should the relationship continue to improve along these lines, it will constitute yet another phase in the Canada-United States security relationship, one in which the same threads that have shaped this relationship and allowed it flourish amid different circumstances will again provide mutually agreeable solutions and processes.

CHAPTER 8

Endnotes

1. Two countries that never disagree are two countries that don't have much to do with each other. Paul Cellucci, Former American Ambassador to Canada. Victoria, 12 May 2008; Professor Jeremy Black. Exeter University. *North American Defence in World History*. Comments from the Conference entitled, "Continental Defence - Policies, Threats and Architecture" sponsored by the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. Calgary: May 4, 2006.

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
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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY



Major Bernard James Brister's family home is in Calgary, Alberta. He joined the Canadian Forces in 1973 and has served as a helicopter pilot in a number of Squadrons in North America and Europe. Over the course of his career he has had operational tours of duty in Germany, Haiti, The Former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. During a hiatus in his military career, he also undertook employment as a bush pilot in the Canadian north. Prior to his most recent arrival at the Royal Military College in 2004, Major Brister was assigned to the former Directorate of Counter Terrorism and Special Operations at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. He is presently serving at the Royal Military College as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Economics and also as the Chair of the Military and Strategic Studies Program.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS



9/11	September 11, 2001
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ADC	Air Defense Command (United States)
ADCOM	Aerospace Defense Command (United States)
ALCM	Air launched cruise missile
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ATA	Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act – Bill C-36
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
BPG	Bi-national Planning Group
C-TPAT	Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
Canadacom	Canada Command
CANR	Canadian NORAD Region
CBP	Customs and Border Protection (Bureau of) (U.S.)
CBSA	Canada Border Services Agency
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CMOC	Cheyenne Mountain Operations Centre
CONUS	Continental United States
COP	Common Operating Picture
CSC	Correctional Service of Canada
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
CUSP	Canada-United States Partnership
DEA	Department of External Affairs
DEW	Distant Early Warning
DDSA	Defence Development Sharing Agreement
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DHH	Directorate of History and Heritage
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DND	Department of National Defence
DoD	Department of Defense (United States)
DoS	Department of State (United States)
DPSA	Defence Production Sharing Agreement
EC	Environment Canada
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAST	Free and Secure Trade plan

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HC	Health Canada
IBET	Integrated Border Enforcement Team
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Bureau of) (U.S.)
IJC	International Joint Commission
INSET	Integrated National Security Enforcement Team
IPS	International Policy Statement
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
ISU	Integrated Security Unit
ITAC	Integrated Threat Assessment Centre
ITWAA	Integrated Threat Warning and Attack Assessment
JSC	Joint Staff Committee
JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MCC	Military Coordination Committee
MDA	MacDonald, Detwiller, and Associates
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCTP	National Counter-Terrorism Plan
NEADS	North Eastern Air Defense Sector
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
Northcom	Northern Command (United States)
NSA	National Security Advisor
NSP	National Security Policy
OAS	Organization of American States
OGD	Other Government Departments
OPP	Ontario Provincial Police
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PCO	Privy Council Office
PJBD	Permanent Joint Board on Defence
PSC	Public Safety Canada
PSEPC	Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
R&D	Research and Development
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative
SJS	Strategic Joint Staff
SLCM	Submarine-launched cruise missile

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

SPP	Security and Prosperity Partnership
SQ	Sûreté du Québec
TC	Transport Canada
TSC	Theatre Security Cooperation
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UN	United Nations
UNEF 1	United Nations Emergency Force
USAF	United States Air Force
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHTI	Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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The focus of this work is the evolution of the Canada-United States security relationship in the post-9/11 era. The conclusions that result from the analysis of this period are that the relationship has remained fundamentally the same in some ways yet has changed radically in others. Both the consistencies and the changes are influenced by the issue of Canadian sovereignty as a concern that permeates every aspect of the relationship, and the ongoing maintenance of the “Kingston Dispensation” as a central tenet of the relationship as a whole.

The evolution of the relationship is traced through its history as a basis for the subsequent detailed examination of post-9/11 events and the influences that they had upon the relationship. The history and contemporary evolutions in the relationship are then used to assess and analyze possible futures for the relationship using the bilateral execution of the security plan for the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics as a case study.

